C.
Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published
NERWIN v PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its
subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a)
acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location
of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a
contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing,
prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract
or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful
activity necessary for such contract or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory
prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or
project acts contrary to law.
Antecedents
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:
an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise
known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty
thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand
(20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural
Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4)
components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or
crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation for Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders,
such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their
application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At
the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass
the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their
financial bids.
Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and
eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent
[Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80
contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial
bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest
bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then
conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins]
manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier
in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs
requirements.
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3
- IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and
Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M.
Estrella III recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of
award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80
on account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of
Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the
second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles
and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and
extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is
equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids
of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the
amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and
20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the
woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on the
pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed
Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for
IBP No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the
materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast
approaching. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules of
IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin].
Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction,
alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy
appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified
documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led
to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA
officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel
who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private
respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to
seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate
Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to
prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with
other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private
respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive
application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case
No. 01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting
to be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ
30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles
needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for
the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries
Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R.
Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of
the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying
that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the
wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921,
stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the
rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against
non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority
to sign and file the complaint.[3]
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to
respondents reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No.
03106921.[4]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby
issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S.
Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the
defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the
defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards
Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the
subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of
P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the
defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner
is not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this
case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond
by the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants
and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30,
2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their
answer to the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for
reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit
answer.[6]
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that
the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin
had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from
the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the
Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring
respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents counsel
from representing them.[7]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents
complaint for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on February 9, 2005.[9]
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the
basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by
the Supreme Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the
entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the
issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final
remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering
that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled
and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003
and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case
No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety
of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the
earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an
application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a
preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining
petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a
palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7,
2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the
assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No
court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting
under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely
supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to
courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development
projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This
law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by
the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the
Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative
Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or
writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases
involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling
in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of
infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs.
Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term
infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and
rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports,
communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage,
water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power
facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and
other related construction projects that form part of the
government capital investment.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from
the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant
disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of
PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to
government infrastructure projects. Respondent Judge did not even
endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls
under the single exception where the said proscription may not
apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order
is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in
default because, in the first place, he should not have given due
course to private respondents complaint for injunction. Indubitably,
the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other
grounds proffered by petitioners.[10]
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin
against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by
respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued
the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain,
prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way
and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a
bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is
null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and
effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous,
nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to
exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have
been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975
considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and
justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-
2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the
issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory
injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge
Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the
branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in
fact already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the
assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The
Court could only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6,
2008 in view of his intervening retirement from the service. That
sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat
v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross
misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the
petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban
imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government
infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project
certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this
Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and
injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with
the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v.
Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein
this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or
execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in
Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for
issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding
of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference
thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818,
as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance
therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute
is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious
TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor
assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws.
Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are
expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and
the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect
the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity
and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law
obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to
administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance
of the law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and
well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply
properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a
fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum
amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative
sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment
and discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and
unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly
appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive
remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision
to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence
has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and
to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts.
Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No.
03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring
a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act
or acts.[13] It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a
litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the
pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established
that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.[14]
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is
indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated
Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this
requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when
the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the
violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ
are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the
act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or
a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a
right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded
on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not
demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of
Appeals,[17] it is enough that

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts
affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act
sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right
claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be
conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling intended
merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only
the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the
case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private
respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial
courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.[19]
Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is,
the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done,
the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest
abuse.[21]
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief
ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or
writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that
tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function
of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a
case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive
remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25]
further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the
rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such
relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render
a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to
guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30]
It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction
should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and
irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly
and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower
courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Kida v Senate, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty.
Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan
Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in
G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by
petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g)
the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the
temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where
we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on
the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May
2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the
expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in
support of their motion:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT
THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT
(R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.][1]
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing
that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED
WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO
EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B)
THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS
AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN
APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND
REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT
BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT
MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM
GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL
ASSEMBLY.
III. THE PRESIDENTS APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH
SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE
AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING
ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE
HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION
AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM
ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED
FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC
ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF VOTES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE
VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE
ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY
OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC
ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND
CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF
AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN
ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELECS HOLDING OF SPECIAL
ELECTIONS.[2] (italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A
STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT
OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-
OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND
APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE
FOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
xxx
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED
THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF.
HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN
ENACTED PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054
xxxx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET
FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A
SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY
IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
xxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.[3]
(italics and underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A. ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH
APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR
APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN
INTERIM MEASURE.
B.THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
C. THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE
ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST
POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS
SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7,
ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.
D. WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM
ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR
THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL
SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013
SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.[4]
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not
apply to the ARMM elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican
democracy which, by constitutional mandate, guides the
governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054)
and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in
a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to
hold their offices even after their terms are over and non-elective
individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment
as OICs, the holdover option is the better choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over
autonomous regions, which does not include the power to appoint
OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections
separately from the national and local elections as this will make it
easier for the authorities to implement election laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of
ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA
No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special
elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs
violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President
exceed the Presidents supervisory powers over autonomous
regions?
The Courts Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates
the synchronization of national and local elections. While the
Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the
national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by
the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives,
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and
the remaining twelve for three years.
xxxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions,
we refer to the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a
section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads:
THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL
SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that
Commissioner Davide be recognized
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would
only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on
Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as
follows: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30,
1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on
Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided
by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local
officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next
election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close
to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization
of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a
local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in
1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years
each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will
result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be
an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who
will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election
will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in
1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12
Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of the
Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an
election once every three years, therefore defeating the very
purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years
for the President and another six years for the Senators with the
possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for
three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my
proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election
which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the
Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local
elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee
say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of
elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to synchronize
the elections every three years, which the body approved the first
national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in
office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now
proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that
the term of the President will be for six years and continue
beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local
and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall
have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until
1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local
officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall
have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in
order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years
which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the
election of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not
synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the
election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt
here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory
Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992
for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.[5]
(emphases and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their
objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for
all elective officials from the President down to the municipal
officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet
this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional
mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections,[6] where we unequivocally stated that the Constitution
has mandated synchronized national and local elections."[7] Despite
the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have
failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the
ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically
mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot
be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by
the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider
that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by
the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to
provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure
through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in
the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not
only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite
future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain
fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution
must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a
great length of time, to be progressive and not static.[8]
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled Local
Government, clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to
classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local
governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and
the local governments, and does not make a distinction between
the local government and the regional government, is particularly
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate
forms of government, but as political units which, while having
more powers and attributes than other local government units, still
remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous
regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections
held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the
Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM
elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional
elections and not local elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba
legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.[9] Applying this principle to determine the scope of
local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as
understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a
community or minor political subdivision. Obviously, the ARMM
elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous
region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than
other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to
treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local
elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When
the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.[10]
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in
postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule
for only the first ARMM elections;[11] it does not provide the date
for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the
date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or
revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM
elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination
of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion
finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled
the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did
not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the
specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be
fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,
RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all
enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since
these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No.
6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently,
there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on
March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on
the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date
of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among
the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the
date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not
ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA
No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054.[12] (emphases supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is
no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the
provisions of RA No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be
held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the
court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion.[13] Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or
to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention had been called to the omission.[14] Providing for lapses
within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature,
and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no authority to
intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in
RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the
amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable
law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however,
we have already established that the supermajority vote
requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[15] is
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot
pass irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to
amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act,
attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has
the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary
powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:[16]
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or
limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained.
Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by
itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at
the same session at which the original act was passed; and even
while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to
approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is
quorum.[17] In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to
comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution
provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly
violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte.
To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and
cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.[18]
We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T.
Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: Section 1, Article
XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of
Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA
9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One
Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of
succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than
what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No
law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because
Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the
Constitution.[19]
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners contention that the
plebiscite requirement[20] applies to all amendments of RA No.
9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement set forth in the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose[.] We interpreted this to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-
essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
provide for in the Organic Act[21] require ratification through a
plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No.
9054 to comply with the plebiscite requirement is to recognize that
sovereignty resides primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners underlying premise that
sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we disagree that this
legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite
requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to
go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to
undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this
would lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the
ARMMs progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that
timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as
weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that
unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No.
10153, in giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the
place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental
change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires
compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No.
9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the
basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary,
this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM
regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM
regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily
assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices.
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section
7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to
remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners
essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be
allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013
elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution
which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their
duties in a holdover capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X
which provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a
period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day
of September next following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent
elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect
until their successors are elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective
local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established
that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus,
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution.
It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover
provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution,
and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover
provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the
present case and these past cases[22] is that while these past cases
all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the
ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the
three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[23]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover
option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule
expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it
deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to
question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the
legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to
fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise
from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of
synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to
set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the
Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.[24] Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC
the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is
confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the
law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the
following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be
heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both
Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections
have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had
to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other
analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in
furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any
of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP
881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the
next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a
different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is
still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May
2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor
the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to
an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
limits the term of local officials to three years.
Presidents authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power
to appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend
to positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as
executive in nature.[25] Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one
quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
[emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution
and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence
construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various
appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single
sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various
appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the
enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in
providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of
presidential appointments and the second group of presidential
appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after
captain and x x x delete and all and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.[26]
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint.[27] The second sentence acts as the catch-all provision
for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact
that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature.[28] The
wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further
demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to
appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by
law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled,
but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the
Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office
by appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents
appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized.[29] Given that the President
derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional
government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential
appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus
rests on clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,[30] which merely grants
the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the Presidents
appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the
Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President,
within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.[31] This is distinguished from the power of
control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter.[32]

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged
power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the
Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these
officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners
supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed
the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials
will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected
officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even
hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments
he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are
more apparent than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No.
10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In
the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections
with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to
postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it
with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in
the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one
(21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible
solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by
synchronization (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office
after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be
elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May
13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over
the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions
in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their
terms. We have already established the unconstitutionality of the
first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted
to respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given
the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for
a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional
or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?[33]
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the
adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply
with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us.
Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as
an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures
traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints
officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local
government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of
the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither
novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA
No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any
cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the
Sangguniang Pampook).[34]
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and
Motion dated December 21, 2011, question the propriety of the
appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor
and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue
that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7,
and given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the
parties, the President, in recognition of the principle of judicial
courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision
until we have ruled with finality on this case.
We find the petitioners reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations.[35] In other
words, the principle of judicial courtesy applies where there is a
strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.[36] Consequently,
this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a
co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to
disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole
system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim
vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our
ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the
voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the
members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations
of the case,[37] a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members
is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be
respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position
to speculate that, based on the voting, the probability exists that
their motion for reconsideration may be granted.[38]
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent
Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions
for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging
our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we
initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and
effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to
implement our October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the
motions for reconsideration borders on disrespect if not outright
insolence[39] to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v.
COMELEC,[40] where the Court held that while it had already issued
a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and
executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution
issued by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[41] where
the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of
the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO
previously issued.[42]
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be
included as a subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail
our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains
effective until after we have issued a final and executory decision,
especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of
our October 18, 2011 decision, which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and
UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
September 13, 2011. No costs.[43] (emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino
and the present case. While it may be true that Tolentino and the
present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing
the challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an examination of
the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the
Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the
present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13,
2011. There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the
President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM
Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No.
10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the
petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our
Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority
to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and
legal circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA
No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress
had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM,
in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM
elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot
call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective local
officials for less than three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term
limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no
legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials
from continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency
require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan
elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to
stand on. I maintain my vote joining the dissent of Justice Velasco

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners motions for TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
reconsideration. Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the

motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

WE CONCUR: MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA I maintain my dissent

Chief Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion I join the Dissent of J. Carpio

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 VIRTUCIO V ALEGARBES, G.R. NO. 187451, AUGUST 29, 2012
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse
(On Leave) and set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing and setting aside
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO the February 19, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
Associate Justice 1, Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an action for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction."
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice The Facts
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application
No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was
Associate Justice approved on January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as
a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to
Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio), who filed Homestead Application No.
CERTIFICATION 18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421 (E-
18-2924).4
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.5
opinion of the Court. On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision
denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to
RENATO C. CORONA exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The
Chief Justice applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140,
respectively, were likewise given due course.6
Judicial Decisions Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, who dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He then
sought relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however,
affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in a decision, dated October 25, 1974. Alegarbes
moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently
denied.7
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution8 was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered
Alegarbes and all those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot,
but he refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint9 for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction" before the RTC.
In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau
of Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of
Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of
the Public Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision
conferred no rights and imposed no duties and left the parties in the
same position as they were before its issuance. He further alleged
that the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through
fraud and deceit, thus, void ab initio.
Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative
defenses, that the approval of his homestead application on January
23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and
could not be reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot
Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and
uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years
and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.
In his Amended and Supplemental Answer,11 Alegarbes also
averred that his now deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and
the latter's family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro
and his family, as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been
permanently occupying the said lot and, introducing permanent
improvements thereon since 1960.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring
Virtucio. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the
plaintiff and against the defendant by:
1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to
vacate Lot No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan,
Basilan and surrender the possession and ownership thereof to
plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (₱ 15,000.00) as attorney's fees and another Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses for litigation; and
3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(₱500.00).
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring
Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing and
setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Alegarbes
became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain
possession of it.
Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit were deleted.
In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve
Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.
The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead
application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had
earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he
claimed by virtue of adverse possession.
The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in
disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the
decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched upon
the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of
over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA held that the
Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the OP did not determine whether Alegarbes'
possession of the subject property had ipso jure segregated Lot 140
from the mass of public land and, thus, was beyond their
jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
ISSUES
Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the
assailed decision of the CA, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment of the
trial court, which awarded the lot in question to the respondent by
virtue of acquisitive prescription and ordered herein petitioner to
surrender the ownership and possession of the same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the decision in
CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership,
Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual circumstances
as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES.14
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's
fees to the petitioner.15
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired
ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
Ruling of the Court
The petition must fail.
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable
in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in the
petition.16
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by
Alegarbes through acquisitive prescription and the character and
length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of
controversy is a factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not
precluded from reviewing facts when the case falls within the
recognized exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.18 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are
apparently contrary to those of the RTC, hence, the need to review
the facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion.
On Acquisitive Prescription
Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was
interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed
the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving
due course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano
Custodio. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding
that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial
demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription.19
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712,
provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through
the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down
by law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription
may either be ordinary or extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive
prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.22
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One
is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time
as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind
is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the
lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139.
Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action.23
These two kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of
prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on
the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code.
Thus, Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the
period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of
interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive
prescription are natural and civil interruption.24
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to
the possessor.25 When no action is filed, then there is no occasion
to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes
against his homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year
period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll
the said period.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the
Court ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute
an effective interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of
Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the
Rañon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the
property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title
in one's name cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired
through acquisitive prescription.28
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency
and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the
running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an
instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed
before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus,
interrupt possession. Records show that it was only in 1997 when
Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct
in ruling that Alegarbesbecame ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling
him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous
and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable
public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the CA erred in disregarding
the decisions of the administrative agencies which amended
Alegarbes' homestead application excluding Lot 140 and gave due
course to his own application for the said lot, which decisions were
affirmed by the RTC.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and, in fact, are
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the
record.29 It appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC
was not substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its
decision:
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply
with the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could
be issued in his favor – what divests the government of title to the
land is the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with
the Register of Deeds.30
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of
any patent in favor of either parties. This simply means that the land
subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State.
Hence, neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There
was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare
that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the
administrative agencies, which ultimately attained finality, as legal
bases in ruling that Virtucio had the right of possession and
ownership. In fact, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) even issued the Order of Execution31 on May 11,
1989 ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot 140 and place Virtucio in
peaceful possession of it. The CA, however, was correct in finding
that:
But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot
140 which he claims by virtue of adverse possession. On this issue,
the cited decisions are impertinent. Even if the decision to approve
appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
appellant could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive
prescription.32

In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,33 the Court ruled
that the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of
exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the
required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant
applied for.34 It likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon35 and
Pineda v. CA,36 where the Court ruled that the possession of a
parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed
period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property.37
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as
1949. He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR
issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his
possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed
the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in
possession of the subject property for forty-eight (48) years.
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the
evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the
Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether
Alegarbes’ open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty
(30) years of alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from
the mass of public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these
agencies.38
When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the
abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary
jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that
the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it
declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to
retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb
these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial
evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.39
On the CA Decision involving a similar case
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision
in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual
circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.
It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot
139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that
case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable
judgment may have had just because it involved similar factual
circumstances. The Court also found from the records that the
period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively
interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in
this case.
Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish
judicial precedent.40 "The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument. "41
The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to
adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which
is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are
considered precedents.42
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
of Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of attorney's Associate Justice
fees in his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay Acting Chairperson, Third Division
attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding
him to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive CERTIFICATION
prescription.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
SO ORDERED. case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
WE CONCUR: Chief Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice REPUBLIC V. RENMAN ENTERPRISES, GR 199319, FEB. 19, 2014
Acting Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD Republic v. Renman Enterprises, GR 199319, Feb. 19, 2014

Associate Justice
DECISION
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice REYES, J.:

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule
Associate Justice 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2
dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
ATTESTATION CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached Registration Case No. N-11465.
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division. The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed
an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over
two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig
Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m,
respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the
respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The
scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The
Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April
1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-16337 and in the
March 21, 2002 issue of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City
hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent’s application for registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s
application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12
alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued
thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the
respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee
of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the
application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena
(Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and
Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer
hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the
subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon
Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr.
Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the
LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said
parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent
purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador
(Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The
subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica
Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in
the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943.
Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador
and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented
the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August
28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the
respondent;13 (2) survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3)
technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic
Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002,
issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s
application for registration should be denied since the subject
parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of
Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of
12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said
lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based
on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an
aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National
Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the
elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25,
2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject
properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are
above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the
respondent’s application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
confirming the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises
Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square
meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy.
Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical
Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and
ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in
the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the
subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the
subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the
subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was
merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an
aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to
prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966
for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the
topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does
not always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject
properties may have already changed since 1966 when the
supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by
LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the
method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the
subject properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below
12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation
to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he
used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the
elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion
of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was
allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the
subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference point,
said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was
below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as
said witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who
determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he
used as the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the
elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge
as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the
said [benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its
elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF
Cruz.22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are
indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be
considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under
Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those
areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC
averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the
shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are
already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water.
The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry
and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its
maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was
able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23
affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA found that
the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that
the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the
petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant
registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness
Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification
of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest
portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its
highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out]
that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6
meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said
elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5
meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No.
4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies
merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by
Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject
parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of
Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966.
However, nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of
the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for
LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are
below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be considered
inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that
his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by
DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to
present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA
further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the
testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in
affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the
respondent’s application for registration since the subject
properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the
subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of
the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-
standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC
which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed
conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are
substantial reasons for doing so.25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the
elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary
level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna
Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court
nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its
entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of
the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the
subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act,
as amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that
the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two
certifications30 issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC
Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,31 the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued
by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable
and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate
the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held
that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area
per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further,
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for
has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public
domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the
land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the
land by any certification from the appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.34 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in
support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to
prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the
respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts
erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the
failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be
applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form
part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil
Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points
out that its application for registration of title to the subject
properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s
promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it
failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the
subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by
the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims,
would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration
was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of
laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law
from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial
doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists
merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in
subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the
subject properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was
granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v.
Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property
therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial
court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases,
notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and
granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N.
Properties and denied the applications for registration on the
ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the
respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena
testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime
who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that
sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and
Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the
respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the
character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements
which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by
planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any
specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the
conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and
occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in
the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested
from the crops supposedly planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties
have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation,
which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years."40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired
the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943,
it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes
of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership."41 That the
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed
ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year.
Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in
the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's
testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for
registration should be denied.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the
Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Duty to render judgment

PEOPLE V. RITTER 194 SCRA 690

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and
who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal
canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent
to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into
the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the
case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the
following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y
Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr.
Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva
Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo
Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia
Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee
Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst.
City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta,
(22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to
"24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque
Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val
Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as
follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about
midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl
namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at
MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2)
children were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once
inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie
Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came
out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While
Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out
some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on
top of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on
top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as
like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played
with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is
grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which
was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects
were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution
purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a
tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to
lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him
to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they
were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When
Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove
her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The accused then
placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started
fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him
to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his
penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to
penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw,
Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and
fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described
as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario
P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American left,
they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American
inserted something in her vagina. But they could not do anything
anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did
they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day,
Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie
Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw
Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when
Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet
removed. Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was
summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and
when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory
remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he
already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio
Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while
garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base
saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot
21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and
she was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped
Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the
Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via
jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who
gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her
residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara
signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the
emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not
know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the
hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk
Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was
Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The
Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as
against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the
reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed
that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario
Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said
girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is
his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of
"Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother
Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law
and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's
house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of
all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at
his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the
name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court
he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks
money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well.
It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a
characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of
the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General
Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a street child,
having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three
(3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations,
in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in
one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot
who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after
finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After
a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only
because she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they
decided to help her by providing her the medicine she needed
during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe
Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot
from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time.
For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor
because their program assisted only indigent patients from infants
up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was
loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as
gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of
peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity.
Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the
physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign
object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge
tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body.
One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-
GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a
forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was
deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues.
Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of
peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was
scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for
an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent
of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The
surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified
that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to
save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by
Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was
in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete
opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach.
He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and
so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in
the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have
septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia
were traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign
object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario.
The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties
that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina
of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with
tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical
nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the
authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo
Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the
patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed
with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter
he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo
Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of
May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of
Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the
foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario
Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a
transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera
asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under
proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who
helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister
Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr.
Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to
Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They
were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla,
and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and
lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with
her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her
residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a
case against the person who caused the death of her
granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to
the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo
Legaspi with his messenger came to her house and told her that the
accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had
only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she
knows that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that,
she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer
for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case
settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer
bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty.
Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at
the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she
went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an
assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there,
she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked
at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he
left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to
settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she
received the money with the understanding that there was a
balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and
she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario.
With the document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went
to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed
before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not
paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo
City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of
the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of
Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the
Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of
Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted
the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an
American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its
investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado
Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva
Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they
rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they
learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an
American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted
in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about
Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario
Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who
brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the
U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was
brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of
the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was
photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police
and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some
American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite
drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie
Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical
description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented
Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be
European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent
Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres
Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile,
proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office,
and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987.
On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-
sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative.
Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were
standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male
caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly
infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez
then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity
with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to
follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and
when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said
foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the
MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no
beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard.
Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The
said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he
came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as
a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested
Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It
could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were
accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District.
The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect
for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the
pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder
bag which contained his personal belongings, and from there they
brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said police
headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the
foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and
confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of
dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that
the suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national.
During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left
the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time
Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the
accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was
detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide
was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the
preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel.
The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she
who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos
died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had
left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's
whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of
this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his
(Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the
death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long
after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could
be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was
described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced
by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario
Baluyot was at the time of the commission of the offense, already
more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26,
1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario
Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on
December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St.
James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having
custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975,
but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters
or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the
accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a
weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual
pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the
incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the
Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp.
109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds,
that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as
defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine
Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs.
(Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned
errors allegedly committed by the court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON
OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12)
YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a
judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most
painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the
arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that
the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v.
Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape
with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape because of a
foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her
vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of
the victim—whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve
(12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on October
10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there
was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under
12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of
reason or unconscious state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she
was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was
committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the
testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified
that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations
were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the act or
declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any
notable fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a
matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of
hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as
proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she
remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in
Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only
one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just
given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember,
Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988)
and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old
when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by
the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was
12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged
guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk,
Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario
Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12
years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the
truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case
declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was
older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in
1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986.
(Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the
grandmother and father supported by other independent evidence
such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of
Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate
presented by the defense without any probative or evidentiary
value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age
cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of
Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites
are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be
related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy
occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the
prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the
rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding
Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the
Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their
declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the
controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on Rosario's
age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of
Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal
knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay evidence on
matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of
doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's
testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3
Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the
mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The
mother stated that she knew the age because the child was born
about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not
hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the
child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is
frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the
witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People
v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the
brother's death or funeral was never established, which indicates
that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The
father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in
court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge of his
daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one
(1) year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the
victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their
competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on
Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought
the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a
year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon
by the trial court was merely based on the clinical records. It is even
less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario
Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged
incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much
less offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which
the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against
the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is
more convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued
by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales,
Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated
that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal
Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for
baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry
Book, there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized
on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents
are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic,
Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo
City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73
[1980]), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its
pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled
that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified—
but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct.
31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA
1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is
conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship
of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order
that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by
proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be
considered as entries made in the course of business under Section
43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in
the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the
church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil.
105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the
defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974
may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio
Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a
baptismal certificate different from the one presented in court.
However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a
date different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the
baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December
25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have
been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been
baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of
baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in
1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one
(1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to
agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal
Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth
had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled
by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary
Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by
Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the
date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could
serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's
age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that
Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged
incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this
respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of
age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there
was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On
the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to
the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have
consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning
while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50,
January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with
the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the
impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a
prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have
forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the
circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute,
no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the
victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into
the victim's vagina by the appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator
left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial
evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying
interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object
inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object
(Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on
September 4, 1987, he answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka
bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung
mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay
itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang
vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at
pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas
ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may
habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may
tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo
ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng
Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti
ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang
mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong
kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay
katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano
sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng
makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler
which the appellant does not deny having possessed at that time.
He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6,
1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was
grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na
parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the
witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements
made especially when he answered on additional cross-examination
that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same
object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown
to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988).
Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because
he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the
next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her
vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res
gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse
of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13
years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that
matter into the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For
Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show
that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was
given instinctively because the event was so startling Res gestae
does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something
inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute
the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object
inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on
Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was already
able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words
used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked
her and when she told you that she was already able to remove that
object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her,
"Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was
removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of her
stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter
of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words against me as she
was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day
after both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel.
(T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in
pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this
point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the
pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain
and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged
incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant.
Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert
witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State
University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the
Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University.
He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and
also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on
the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed
Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940
until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and
became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present
a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and
Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH
Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center,
MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has
attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of
the textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical
Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background,
his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent
portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked
as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a sexual
vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you
kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old
girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed
into a human being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a
foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the
foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that
foreign body. One of the reactions that maybe manifested by the
person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the
foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury
to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain
manifest symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body
is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be
localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic
reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown
to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different
parts for the body to react. If there is mechanism to cause the
foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from
within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition
of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and
any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances
are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the
primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues,
thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside
from those inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection
in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer
from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever,
swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp.
13-15, October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor
before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how many
days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old
girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the
ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to
get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced
and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal
reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow
after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any
foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period
of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a
sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and
she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took
more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it
will take that long before any adverse infection could set in inside
the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter
time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs
and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2)
weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object
that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as
to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a
foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not
more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time
frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal
cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on
probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which
favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of
foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the object
gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a
battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr.
Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics,
Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and
vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual physical
dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the
catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic
examination on the open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of
specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not
considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more
likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that
the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the
generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a very
thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the
body is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19,
1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the
circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions
qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and
binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he
examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient
from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the
patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario
Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of
your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the
delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-
chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic).
She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On
examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly nourished,
fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time
and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly
distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over,
with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5,
September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what
was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal
examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle finger
inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard
object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was
able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw
purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal
and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal
canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he
asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use of
forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario
Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was
conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were
examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge
inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO
AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and
who inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3)
months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward,
what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on
operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo
surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering
Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that
she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and
would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara
stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she
was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and
ambulant at that time because there were several instances
testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior
to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the
Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as
a member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital
every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was
still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates
helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-
19, May 25, 1988)

(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para
social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center
under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she
encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She
actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on
the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there,
she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot
for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7,
1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the
hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36,
September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he
brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still
conscious and could still answer questions asked of her although
she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical
attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition.
The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is
blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the
abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection
from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and
the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4
of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule
as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we
explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is
not synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it
fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is
no defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state
authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against
him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases
loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore,
to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to
refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the
number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by
the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof that the
accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's
vagina which caused her death seven (7) months after its insertion.
What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. While circumstantial
evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative,
though, that the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4
Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction
can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
[1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420,
433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the
appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario
Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that
most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to
survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should
preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most heartless
and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with
tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back
the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario
Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and
prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to justice
so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However,
we cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice
system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of
society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind
moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the
offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing
reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates
reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old when the
carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is
to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is
not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or
deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such
proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the
sexual act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator
inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not
see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he
was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met
Rosario who informed him that she was able to remove the object.
And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second
encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach.
She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only
hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony,
for a foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort,
and serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl's
vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie
Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in December of 1986.
(TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows
that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As
per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report,
Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left
on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987
(Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in
October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the
sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months with
the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her
hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng
Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's
activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's
testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3)
months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate
profession, there is always the possibility that she could have
allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual
behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina
between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in
reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the
prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection
with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129
SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the
appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that
the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot
base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions
and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken
against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the
accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to
hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the
mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must
survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be
allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615
[1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule
that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of
the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning
such proof "to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though
strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and
moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason
and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes,
3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our
being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore,
entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the
appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in
October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are
convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical
sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in
order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez
that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among
the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he
was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two
masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the
appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was
sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book
entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the
compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either
sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like
fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual
intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual between a man
and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia,
assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social
well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution)
(Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our
country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant
committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra).
The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with
money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also
free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate
what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or
omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances
of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes
of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her
grandmother's house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she
has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish,
anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the
appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that
we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the
prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him,
not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated,
there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was
left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have
caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity
on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As
earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility
for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the
appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation
committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned.
Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of
P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will
adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles,
pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit
from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and
other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent
influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among
the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine
articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal
at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign
publications catering to them will continue to advertise the
availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts
and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of ALONZO V PADUA, 150 SCRA 379
Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's
concern about the problem of street children and the evils
committed against them. Something must be done about it.
CRUZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do
P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even
Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of
against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and
prejudice to re-entry into the country. purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

SO ORDERED. Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur. under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his

undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of
P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area.4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs,
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir,
filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption
claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that
the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days
from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no
written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be
plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on
the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including
the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister
Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the
petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and
neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the
sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied
by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for
Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had
been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially
significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-
concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without
objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that
the notice required by the said article was written notice and that
actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case
of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no
particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the
Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for
written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running.
" should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking
through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice
should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to
a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining
owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given
by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes
dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit,
that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption
had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly
may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the
law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we
may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but
to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although
it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently,
a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in
1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more
than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that
tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice
to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case?
Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing.
would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption
had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof
of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the
letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963
and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of
the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the
interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move
to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already
expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor
or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership.
Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to
object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent
court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr.,
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact,
and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales

although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for BARCELLANO V BARZA, GR 165287, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. DECISION

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of
the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67702 dated 26 February 2004, granting the petition of Dolores
Baas, herein respondent, to reverse and set aside the Decision[3] of
the lower court.

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is rendered GRANTING to
petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for
the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this decision.
The facts as gathered by the court follow:
Respondent Baas is an heir of Bartolome Baas who owns in fee
simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina (Medina),
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of
1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for
sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome
Baas, including herein respondent Dolores Baas, Crispino Bermillo
(Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela)[4] Crispino
Bermillo, as the representative of his family, agreed to the offer of
Medina, the sale to take place after the harvest season.[5]
On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner
Armando Barcellano for P60,000.00. The following day, the heirs of
Baas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to
inquire about it.[6] Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to
Barcellano. The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the
property but Medina replied that there was already a deed of sale
executed between the parties.[7] Also, the Baas heirs failed to
tender the P60,000.00 redemption amount to Medina.[8]
Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5
April 1997.[9] Medina sent only his tenant to attend the proceeding.
On 9 April 1997, the Baas heirs and Barcellano, with neither Medina
nor his tenant in attendance, went to the Office of the Barangay
Council to settle the dispute. According to one of the Baas heirs,
Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the property
but for a higher price of P90,000.00.[10] Because the parties could
not agree on the price and for failure to settle the dispute, the
Lupon issued a Certification to File Action.[11]
On 24 October 1997, Dolores Baas filed an action for Legal
Redemption before the Regional Trial Court. However, on 5
February 1998, the petition was withdrawn on the ground that:
xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the
country, petitioner opted that the amount they are supposed to pay
for the redemption be readily available for their immediate and
emergency needs.
On 11 March 1998, Dolores Baas, as represented by Bermillo, filed
another action[12] for Legal Redemption. It was opposed by
Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art.
1623 of the New Civil Code but Baas failed to exercise her right
within the period provided by law.
Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the
complaint of the Baas heirs for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for
failure to file an action in court together with the consignation of
the redemption price within the reglementary period of 30
days.[13] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of
the lower court and granted the heirs the right to redeem the
subject property. The appellate court ruled that the filing of a
complaint before the Katarungang Pambarangay should be
considered as a notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were
exercising their right of redemption over the subject property; and
as having set in motion the judicial process of legal redemption.[14]
Further, the appellate court ruled that a formal offer to redeem,
coupled with a tender of payment of the redemption price, and
consignation are proper only if the redemptioner wishes to avail
himself of his right of redemption in the future. The tender of
payment and consignation become inconsequential when the
redemptioner files a case to redeem the property within the 30-day
period.[15
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari
In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate
court for being contrary to the admitted facts on record and
applicable jurisprudence.
The Courts Ruling
Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art.
1623 to be given to adjoining owner was no longer necessary
because there was already actual notice. Further, he asserts that the
appellate court erred in ruling that the tender of payment of the
redemption price and consignation are not required in this case,
effectively affirming that the respondents had validly exercised their
right of redemption. Lastly, he questions as erroneous the
application of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as
Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay
Level, thereby ruling that the filing by the heirs of the complaint
before the Barangay was an exercise of right of redemption.
We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623
of the New Civil Code, which provides that:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties
shows that there was a written notice sent to the respondents.
Without a written notice, the period of thirty days within which the
right of legal pre-emption may be exercised, does not start.
The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in
the early case of Conejero v. Court of Appeals,[16] penned by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that
such notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which
Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of
the sale, acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner, does
not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by
the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its
validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive.
The statute not having provided for any alternative, the method of
notification prescribed remains exclusive.
This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:[17]
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long
established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling
co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its
terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. the Court of Appeals,[18] this Court
again emphasized the mandatory character of a written notice in
legal redemption:
From these premises, we ruled that [P]etitioner-heirs have not lost
their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of
the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to
run. These premises and conclusion leave no doubt about the
thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their
right of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its
exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been
notified in writing of the fact of sale. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the
New Civil Code is to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is
actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his property.
To advance their argument, they cited Destrito v. Court of Appeals
as cited in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] where this
Court pronounced that written notice is no longer necessary in case
of actual notice of the sale of property.
The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced
that the disregard of the mandatory written rule was an exception
due to the peculiar circumstance of the case. Thus:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof
of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the
letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963
and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of
the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the
interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move
to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already
expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor
or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership.
Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to
object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.[20]
xxxx
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
The Court clarified that:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact,
and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Without the peculiar circumstances in the present case, Alonzo
cannot find application. The impossibility in Alonzo of the parties
not knowing about the sale of a portion of the property they were
actually occupying is not presented in this case. The strict letter of
the law must apply. That a departure from the strict letter should
only be for extraordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence
of Art. 1623 that The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement,
would explain in his commentaries on the New Civil Code that
despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is
STILL entitled to the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of
the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of
the written notice by including therein any other kind of notice such
as an oral one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to
include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient
to give the effect of this notice, there would have been no necessity
or reason to specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for
under the old law, a verbal notice or mere information was already
deemed sufficient.[22]
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.[23]
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should
be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear
in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of
Baas.
Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.[24] MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the
petitioner. The respondent Baas has a perfect right of redemption ATTESTATION
and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no
redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
payment or no consignation. in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702, granting to
petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for ANTONIO T. CARPIO
the amount of Php60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality Associate Justice
of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost. Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Associate Justice Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
WE CONCUR: Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Jus

ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Presumption and Applicability of Custom
MARTINEZ V. VAN BUSKIRK, 18 PHIL. 79
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in
this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong
de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of
Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant
used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant,
and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in
the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-
hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's
delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of
passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her
head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence
to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon
at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had
sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran,
and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the
team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of
the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered;
that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it
out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip
and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached
to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in
which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of
negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with
interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th
day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except
that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code
pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage
to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of
their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damages should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished
a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under
the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence
of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the
judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly
be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a
question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of
negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same.
That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the
law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally
speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December,
1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2
March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13
April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18
March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses
several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in
the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in
which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never
run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no
accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in
unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of
the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered
merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by
the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom
was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs.
Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs.
Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs.
Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.)
lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170),
Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the
house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the
street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another
to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of
the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of
his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised
by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances.
It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in
itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse
unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse;
whether he was under the observation and control of some person
all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be
determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it
was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is
not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him
unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public
highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the
wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in
finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was
upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the
alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that
way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as
requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver
goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel
at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left
the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the
house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for
three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start,
is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his
part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the
respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence.
Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal
or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no
liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs.
Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs.
Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.
Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs.
Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance
of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have
been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result
from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted
in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes
successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate
against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a
prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the
circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It
is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's
case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the
injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and
Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court
said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the
case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in
smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be
prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's
agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the
case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a
wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her
officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage
was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be
so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves,
not only the fact of the runway and the accident resulting
therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway
occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the
defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the
horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed
as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the
universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind
of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in
which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at
the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not
been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the
sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people?
We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur. This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August
1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
Separate Opinions 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3

TORRES, J., dissenting:
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue
district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that
the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused
the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while
business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not

liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly
corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from
real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8
Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required

respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.10
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
Legal periods April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
INTERNAL REVENUE V PRIMETOWN, GR 162155, AUGUST 28, 2007
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was
DECISION filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the
CORONA, J.: National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No

suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty
claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum
alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained,
whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under
protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face
of the return upon which payment was made, such payment
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced
on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed
by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last
included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent
filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence,
it filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact
that a particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to
April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of
730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither
interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus,
this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22
Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before
April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for
review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided
in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from
the filing of the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-
year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when
the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365
days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that
a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day",
to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
(emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without
regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of
time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next
month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To
illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from
January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29,
2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that
the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when
the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled
with the previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be
abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all
laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must
have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The
test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the
subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or
reasonably reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap
year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, 6th calendar month
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
derogat priori.
7th calendar month
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April
14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows: 8th calendar month

November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th calendar month

Year 1
December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
1st calendar month
10th calendar month
April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
nd
2 calendar month
11th calendar month
May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
3rd calendar month
June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998 12th calendar month

4th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

Year 2
July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
13th calendar month
5th calendar month
April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month 22nd calendar month

May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999 January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

15th 23rd calendar month

calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999 24th calendar month

16th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th calendar month

August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month

September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th calendar month

October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th calendar month
November 15, 1999 to
21st calendar month
December 15, 1999 to
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the
December 14, 1999 day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed
within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED
January 14, 2000 to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously
proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V.
Parcero.
MONTAJES V PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 183449, MARCH 12, 2012
No costs.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
PERALTA, J.:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions
dated September 21, 20071 and May 19, 2008 2 of the Court of
WE CONCUR: Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410 which dismissed the
petition for review filed by petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for
REYNATO S. PUNO being filed out of time, and denied reconsideration thereof,
Chief Justice respectively.
Chairperson
In an Information3 dated June 5, 2003, petitioner was charged with
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ the crime of Direct Assault before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, the accusatory portion of which
Associate Justice reads:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice That on or about the 8th day of December, 2002, at 1:00 early
morning, more or less, in Purok 10, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista,
CERTIFICATION Agusan del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack one JOSE B.
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in RELLON, an elected Punong Barangay, while in the performance of
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the his duties, and accused fully know that Jose B. Rellon is a Barangay
opinion of the Court’s Division. Official, to the damage and prejudice of said Jose B. Rellon.

REYNATO S. PUNO CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 148 of the revised Penal Code.4
Chief Justice
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense is summarized by
the MTC as follows:
To substantiate the alleged commission of the crime of direct
assault by the accused, complaining witness Jose B. Rellon declared
inter alia, that he has been the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte since the year 2002. On
December 8, 2002, at about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning, he
was at the benefit dance sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan at
Purok 4, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. He met
accused Alfredo Montajes who uttered to him the words "YOU'RE A
USELESS CAPTAIN." Other words of similar import were likewise
uttered by the accused against him which he could no longer recall.
After uttering the said words, the accused then drew his bolo locally
known as "lagaraw" and approached him. He then moved
backward, but the accused came near to him and struck him once
with the "lagaraw." Luckily, complainant was not hit as he managed
to move backward. Complainant's daughter named Vilma Dector
and his wife, approached him and brought him home. Many people,
including two (2) CVO (Rodelio Laureto and Victorio Trinquite),
witnessed the incident.
During the mediation in the barangay hall, an investigation was
conducted. The accused, according to the complainant, asked for
forgiveness from him which he declined, as he was of the
impression that the law must be applied and the accused should
instead ask for forgiveness in court.
As proof that the accused asked for forgiveness, complainant
presented a document (Exh. "B") to that effect.
Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as
evidenced by an extract thereof.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that he went to the
benefit dance to stop it since it was already 1:00 o'clock in the early
morning and the benefit dance was still going on when it was
supposed to end at 12:00 o'clock midnight as the permit he gave
was only up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. As a result of the stoppage of
the benefit dance, many persons got angry, and he heard that the
house of the accused was stoned which made the accused angry. In
fact, he saw the accused murmuring as his house was stoned by
unknown persons. When the accused came near to him, the former
did not ask for assistance from him.
Prosecution witness Rodelio Laureto corroborated the declaration
of the complainant that it was the accused who hacked the
complainant with the use of a "lagaraw," but failed to hit him.
Accused Alfredo Montajes testified that in the evening of December
7, 2002, he was at home listening to the disco as there was a benefit
dance near their house. The benefit dance started at 7 o'clock in the
evening and ended at 1 o'clock in the early morning of December 8,
2002 when it was stopped by Barangay Captain Jose Rellon. It was
then that trouble started because many of those who have paid but
were not anymore allowed to dance complained to the Barangay
Captain and requested that they be given one more music so that
they could avail for what they have paid for on that benefit dance,
as they were not refunded with their payments. When this protest
went on, the CVO's reacted by clubbing them using their jackets.
Then a stoning incident followed. One of those hit by stones was his
house. This made him wild prompting him to get his "lagaraw" to
look for the people responsible for stoning his house. While looking
for these persons along the road, he saw Barangay Captain Jose
Rellon who was then two (2) meters away from him, and he
responded by telling him that he was looking for those persons
responsible for the stoning of his house. The complainant wanted to
get the "lagaraw" from him but he refused.
The accused explained, when confronted with a document (Exh.
"B") wherein it was stated that he asked for apology from the
Barangay Captain during the barangay level conciliation, that it was
for the sole purpose of not elevating this case and that they would
settle amicably.
The accused also vehemently denied the accusation that he
attacked the barangay captain.
Defense witness Luis A. Cajeles, Jr., a Barangay Kagawad of
Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, testified that at
about 1:00 o'clock in the early dawn of December 8, 2002, he heard
of stoning and shouting, in fact the window grill of his house was hit
and he heard the people in panic. As a barangay kagawad assigned
to the Peace and Order Committee, he went out immediately from
his house and went to the road across the basketball court where
the stoning was. He then saw accused Alfredo Montajes holding a
bolo. The accused was shouting that he was looking for the persons
who stoned his house. He also witnessed that the barangay captain
asked the accused why he was bringing a bolo and the accused
replied that he was looking for the persons who stoned his house.
He did not know what else happened because he tried to drive the
teenagers to their homes, because it was already very late in the
evening.
On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for
forgiveness during the confrontation at the Barangay because of the
disturbance he made to the barangay captain and to the community
because some people were in panic as he was bringing a bolo, and
not for attacking the Barangay Captain.
Anatolio Lozada Bangahon, another defense witness, testified that
he saw the accused coming out from his house carrying a bolo, and
when he asked him why he was bringing a bolo, the accused replied
that he was going to look for the persons who stoned his house. The
accused was roaming around to look for the persons who stoned his
house, but he was not looking after the Barangay Captain.6
On December 29, 2005, the MTC issued its Judgment7 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault. The dispositive
portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALFREDO MONTAJES y JACA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Assault as
defined and penalized under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer an indefinite prison term of FOUR
(4) MONTHS AND ONE DAY of arresto mayor in its maximum period,
as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of
prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum, there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the offense charged. The accused is likewise ordered
to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,000.00) Philippine
Currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Butuan City,
rendered its Decision9 dated January 23, 2007 affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied
in an Order10 dated May 4, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for
extension of time to file petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May
21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition.
Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution
dismissing the petition outright for being filed out of time. In so
ruling, the CA said:
As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007,
Thus, the 15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition
for review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday) considering that the
last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007. It appears that petitioner
reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007 (Monday) and not from
May 19, 2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-
day extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is
well settled that when the day of the period falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or a legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension of
time, the extension should be counted from the last day which is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated May 19, 2008.
Petitioner is now before us on the issue of whether the CA erred in
denying due course to his petition for review for being filed out of
time.
Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time to
file a petition for review with the CA pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22
of the Rules of Court; that based on such provision, if the last day to
file a petition falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the
next working day. Here, the last day of the reglementary period
within which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a
Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the
next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was
not wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007
to file the petition and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday.
Nonetheless, petitioner asks for liberality in the interest of justice
taking into consideration the merit of his petition claiming that his
conviction was not supported by the evidence on record. Moreover,
he claims that his petition for review was filed with the CA on June
5, 2007, which was long before the CA dismissed the same on
September 21, 2007 for being filed out of time. He prays that the CA
resolutions be reversed and set aside and the CA be directed to give
due course to his petition and to resolve the case on the merits.
We grant the petition.
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner
provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by
any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the
date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M.
No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time
When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday
and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which
reads:
xxxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court] applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the
due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case,
the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on
time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended
ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the
last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so
that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of
extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from
the original expiration of the period.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench
and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the
last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and
the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and
hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file
the required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,12 we said:
Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party
desire to file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to
file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal
holiday, he may do so on the next working day. This is what
petitioner did in the case at bar.
However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on
certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in
case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the
extended period shall be counted from the original due date, not
from the next working day on which the motion for extension was
filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to
expound on the matter. In that case, we held that the extension
granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period.
In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for
extension was within the period provided by law, the filing of the
petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional
period of 30 days within which to file the petition. Reckoned from
the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead,
he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.13
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day
of the period for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original
period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19,
2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working
day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday,
was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for
extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to
June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his
petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the
motion for extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated
September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being
filed out of time.
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was
filed out of time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC
that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the
original period and commences immediately after the expiration of
such period.14 Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of the
period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea
2007 was already two days late. However, we find the of technicalities.20
circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application
of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.1âwphi1 WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, reinstate the Petition for Review filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. CR
which was long before the CA issued its Resolution dated No. 00410.
September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being
filed out of time. There was no showing that respondent suffered SO ORDERED.
any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of such
delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
in the petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC Associate Justice
judgment convicting petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petition
involved no less than petitioner’s liberty.15 We do not find anything WE CONCUR:
on record that shows petitioner's deliberate intent to delay the final
disposition of the case as he had filed the petition for review within PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
the extended period sought, although erroneously computed. These Associate Justice
circumstances should have been taken into consideration for the CA Chairperson
not to dismiss the petition outright.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
for review does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof.16 Associate Justice
And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in Associate Justice
the petition, we may relax the stringent application of technical
rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.17 ATTESTATION

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
really impair the proper administration of justice.18 After all, the in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the substantive opinion of the Court’s Division.
rights of the parties are protected.19 Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Binding effect
ATCI OVERSEAS CORP VS. ECHIN, G.R. NO. 178551, OCT. 11, 2010
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical
technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s
Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated
from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly
passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration,
she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her
own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against
petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by
petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign
principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that
petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant
respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular
employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of
her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a
foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly
dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the
one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws.
Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an
officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the
NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as
agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and
solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law,
a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for
the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract
of employment.
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of
1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment
agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to
overseas workers.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error
for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor
Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord
respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws
and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine
labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not
sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable,
petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction
was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming
that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with
immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must
first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and
solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042
precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers
United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so
that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement,
the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts
of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
very purpose for which the law governing the employment of
workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy
of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.9
Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit
of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of
the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable
renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on
probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as
in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and
practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws
which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders
Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties
(lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws
should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only
domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi
laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence,
they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA
between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI,
which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws
and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the
termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the
probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination,12 both of which
documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the
Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic
Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
"Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of
the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the
subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic
to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this
Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to
be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to
the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested
party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer,
the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042
on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction Associate Justice
to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee Associate Justice
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, ATTESTATION
exemplary and other forms of damages.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
The liability of the principal/employer and the in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this opinion of the Court’s Division.
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be Associate Justice
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall Chairperson
be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a CERTIFICATION
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Division.

SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

TUNA PROCESSING INC. V PHIL. KINGFORD, 185582, FEB. 29, 2012
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,1 petitioner
Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution2 dated 21
November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be
declared void and the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings. In the assailed Resolution, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award3 against respondent
Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines,4 on the ground that
petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue.5
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as
the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine
Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911
(collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"),6 and five (5)
Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East
Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz
Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as
the "sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent provisions of which read:
1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent
No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent
No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors for
purposes of enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting
licenses under those patents, and collecting royalties.
The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents
in order to practice the processes claimed in those patents in the
United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, enforce those patents
and collect royalties in conjunction with Licensor.
xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree
to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation
established in the State of California, in order to implement the
objectives of this Agreement.

5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the
United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit funds that it
will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated to spend in
connection with the implementation of this Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the purpose
of being elected as member of the board of directors. The remaining
shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors according to their
respective equity shares. 9
xxx
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement10 dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend
Memorandum of Agreement11 dated 14 July 2003.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the
licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner
TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.12 Petitioner
submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International
Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United
States and won the case against respondent.13 Pertinent portions
of the award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this
Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total
sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the
sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY
FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20% of
MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT
TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORD
shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS
($271,490.20)[;]14 and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the
YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay
CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx
xxx15
To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The petition was
raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss.16
After the court denied the motion for lack of merit,17 respondent
sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the
reconsideration of the order denying the motion.18 Judge Alameda
inhibited himself notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions in the motion."19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz
of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition
on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the
Philippines.20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was
correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s
lack of legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency
of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded
against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo
dismissed the petition. Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a
foreign corporation established in the State of California" and "was
given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka
Patent" and "was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said
patent and collect corresponding royalties" in the Philippines. TPI
likewise admits that it does not have a license to do business in the
Philippines.
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has
been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so
issued by the concerned government agency of the Republic of the
Philippines, when it collected royalties from "five (5) Philippine tuna
processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish
Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc.
and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real
situation, TPI cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any
action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of
the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff
TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to
sue in the Philippines.21
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the
recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in
1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of
these specifically requires that the party seeking for the
enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its
argument on the following:
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a
ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this reason that
TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court, as it
[i]s imperative to clarify whether the Philippines’ international
obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical
considerations not found in the relevant laws.24
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation
Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model
Law on the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature
and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a
general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas,
Jr.,25 this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code
and applied the New Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:
Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is
misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled
that:
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all
types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates
specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the
dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and
special law, the latter shall prevail – generalia specialibus non
derogant." (Emphasis supplied)26
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,27 this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing
for the formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on
agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.28
Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System
in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law
especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
own arrangements to resolve their disputes."29 It specifically
provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award.30
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a
municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the
need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the
New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already
form part of the law.
In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by specifically
providing:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York
Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards covered by the said Convention.
xxx
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign
arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the
procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on
those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the
regional trial court.
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. International commercial arbitration shall be governed
by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the
"Model Law") adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx."
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the
affirmative.
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides
that the opposing party in an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds
that were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention,
to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition
and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of
the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity
to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the
award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution,31 which was promulgated by the Supreme
Court, likewise support this position.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a
foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition are
enumerated in Rule 13.5.32 Capacity to sue is not included.
Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in
instances where "the place of arbitration is in the Philippines,"33 it
is specifically required that a petition "to determine any question
concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such
arbitration agreement"34 available to the parties before the
commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief
from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question
upholding or declining its jurisdiction"35 after arbitration has
already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the
persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to
sue or be sued."36
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement
of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of
the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in
the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party
enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as
in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by
the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration,
conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the
contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the
instant case, also worthy to consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals,37 to wit:
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining
adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested
mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it
must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the
arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the
very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.38
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award
should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws
and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court
a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York
Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,39 petitioner may
still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine
court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical
exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.40
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement
of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
II
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise
unmeritorious.
First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that
petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited
that its act of entering into a MOA should not be considered "doing
business" in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity
to sue. We reiterate that the foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in
the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 November
2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in
certiorari under Rule 45.41
Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances,
warrants the outright dismissal of the case,42 we opt to relax the
rules following the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,43 to wit:
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts]
generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations.
Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.44 A
strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason
behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present case,
where the issues are not factual but purely legal.1âwphi1 In these
types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely
abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique
circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues
outright.45
Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue
herein raised should be seriously considered.46 Surely, there is a
need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide the bench and
the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution, and uphold the policy of the State embodied in the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of
disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State
shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and
impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the
foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a quo
where its recognition and enforcement is being sought.
Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court
of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review on
certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court.47 We,
however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s "Motion
for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45" is
a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by respondent
Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated from Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was received by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 January
2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 61.48
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason
alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a
Philippine court.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings
No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

AMOS V BELLIS, 20 SCRA 358
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines,
in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses
of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00
to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid
all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to
this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of
the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by
the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16
— of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in
this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the
opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his
brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred
in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the
briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the
motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95
Phil. 500.
RAYTHEON V ROUZIE, GR 162894, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against
petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents
appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of
the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected
by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI
and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.4 On 28 September
1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment
ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon
appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was
dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case
No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially
reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally
employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in
government projects and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he
secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI
and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned
as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s
claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming
the alleged obligation of the said companies.9 Petitioner also
referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated
as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint
on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for
Summary Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of
action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of
the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken
before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied
petitioner’s omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted,
were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment
thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens
was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on
petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which
motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July
2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a
Rule 65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside
the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31
July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further
proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It
also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not
have confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should
have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s
omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that
is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of
determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the
other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner,
named as defendants in the case had indeed merged together
based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held
that the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the
latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the
ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non
conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated
notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for
respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty.
Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even
before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no longer
find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite
diligent efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the
Court resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local
courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign
elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-
laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the
Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to
be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to
enforce its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where
the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may
or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or
the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the material
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature
of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction
and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice
of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant
only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-
laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not
the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s
averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle
of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it
is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is
within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require
the court’s desistance.35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of
Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over
the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same
manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower
courts because their findings are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-
BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to
state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to
state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which
if true would justify the relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and
RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the
deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this
score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as
well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these
evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing
and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors,
Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust
International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City, after CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC. Associate Justice
Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise
meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have Associate Justice
combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon
International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held
liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid ATTESTATION
commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise.38
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the opinion of the Court’s Division.
presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on
the merits can afford. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. Acting Chairperson
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
CERTIFICATION
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
DANTE O. TINGA Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
Associate Justice conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
*ANTONIO T. CARPIO Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

**ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

TAMANO V ORTIZ, G.R. NO. 126603, JUNE 29, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J.
Tamano.
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano)
married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death,
particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del
Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her
son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it
was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively,
thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and
fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda
and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the
decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never
became final and executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and
nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage"
could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other
spouse, 1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that
since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in
Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was
vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the
instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance
with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner
filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18
July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22
August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371.
Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the
Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts only when filed in places
where there are shari'a court. But in places where there are no
shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be
filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is
the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations. 4 Personal actions, such as the
instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. 5 There should
be no question by now that what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. 6 In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private
respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never
was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in
her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim
laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in
the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were
likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the
answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration,
but only upon the allegations of the complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of
the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 8
Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the
instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which
provides —
Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the
Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the
essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce,
paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support
and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal,
breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and
wife, parental authority, and the property relations between
husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of
petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming
that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under
Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently,
the shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil
and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not
divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6)
of BP Blg. 129 which provides —
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995
orders of the Regional Trial Court — Br. 89, Quezon City, denying
the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let
the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of SO ORDERED.
origin for further proceedings until terminated.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.