International Phenomenological Society

The Liar
Author(s): Alexandre Koyré
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Mar., 1946), pp. 344-362
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 THE LIAR

The Cretan, Epimenides, said "All Cretans are liars." But Epimenides
is a Cretan, therefore he is a liar and, consequently, his assertion is false.
Ergo, Cretans are not liars-and this implies that Epimenides did not lie
but spoke truly. Accordingly....
The paradox of the Liar, it seems, was popular among the Greeks. In
the Middle Ages its popularity did not wane; medieval logicians unfailingly
mention it, and propose solutions for the "insoluble" sophism.' Slowly,
it was put aside and was asleep2 when, in our times, Lord Russell noticed
that its logical structure was identical with that of the mathematical
paradoxes which he discovered.3 The Greek sophism was, on this occasion,
elevated to the rank of an antinomy.
*

In the twentieth century, the logico-mathematical paradoxes played an

important r6le, as is well known, in the evolution of mathematical or, more
precisely, metamathematical thought. It was their discovery which
determined the ' crisis of the foundations" of mathematics; and we owe the
rich development of symbolic logic, the intuitionism of Brouwer, the axio-
matics of Zermelo and Hilbert to the desire to solve or to avoid them.4
In his brilliant and important paper, A. Fraenkel5 says that this discovery
has had a "terrifying" effect. The most secure foundations of science,
indeed, of reason itseif, seemed to be undermined.
Today it is different. -No longer does the mathematician feel himself in
danger. "It was recognized rather soon that the paradoxes were not of a
purely mathematical nature."' Moreover, "now we know that the authen-
tically mathematical theorems and disciplines are not touched by the
antinomies; that the fear of Poincare that the mathematicians in their
attempt to found the classical analysis and the theory of aggregates had
built a wall around mathematical concepts-a wall which protects them
1 V. Alexander Rtstow, Der Ligher, Diss., Erlangen 1907 (Lpz. Teubner, 1908);
Ch. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. Insolubilia.
2 B. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, I, cap. IX, I. pp. 96 ff. App B. pp. 525
ff., Cambridge, 1903;Principia Mathematica,2 Vol. I, pp. 8 ff.; 23 ff.; 41 ff.; 64 ff., ete.
Cambridge, 1925.
3 Cf. bibliography of Rftstow, op. cit.; Cf. also Jorgensen, Treatise of Formal Logic,
3 v. Copehhagen, 1931;J. Cavailles, Remarquessur la formation de la thborieabstraite
des ensembles, Paris, 1937; and Me'thodeaxiomatique et formalisms, Paris, 1937.
4Cf. Heyting, MathematischeGrundlagenforschung,Berlin, 1934.
5 A. Fraenkel, "Le probleme des antinomies et son d6veloppement recent," Revue
de Metaphysiqueet de Morale, 1939.
6 Ib., p. 227. Cf. also the report by M. Jean Cavailles on M. R. Poirier's book.

Le Nombre,Paris, 1938in the Revuede MWtaphysique et de Morale, 1939.

344

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 THE LIAR 345

from external dangers, but leaves inside unsuspected elements of decomposi-

tion-was unfounded. We know how to restrict the operations in order to
avoid the antinomies, and it has been recognized that the mathematician
never penetrates the dangerous area, because it is, for him, without any
interest whatever. The warning given by the antinomies has been, never-
theless, of lasting value, showing, in the first place, the necessity for a
systematic limitation of mathematical operations and, furthermore, for a
reform of the traditional Aristotelian logic. Therefrom logic received an
astonishing impulse and developed itself in an extremely fecund way,
following a direction that has been foreseen only by Bolzano and Leibniz."7
So all is for the best in this best possible world. Still, the uneasiness
continues-the threat was not destroyed, it was only avoided. The math-
ematician has contained the scourge; he has built a fence around it.
Nevertheless he is still in jeopardy. In the No Man's Land of pure logic,
the Liar, negotium perambulans in &enebris,hides out and continues in his
role of the ghostly Sword of Damocles.8 Hence, it is not a cause for aston-
ishment that the discussion of the problem has not been abandoned.9
7K. Grelling, Der Einfluss der Antinomien auf die Entwicklung der Logik im 20.
Jahrhundert. Travaux du IXe Congres International de Philosophie (Congres
Descartes), fasc. VI, p. 9., Paris, 1937: "Das Problem der Antinomien . . . hat ...
wie mir scheint, auf den Gang der Entwicklung der Logik in unserem Jahrhundert
einen beherrschenden Einfluss geuibt, der sich bis in die letzten Jahre verfolgen
hisst und wohl auch heute noch nicht ganz aufgeh6rt hat." Ibid., p. 15: "Wie
Hilbert selbst an verschiedenen Stellen hervorhebt, war der Wunsch, die Logik und
Mathematik von Antinomien zu reinigen, der Hauptbeggrund fur die Aufstellung
seines Lehrgebandes." According to Mr. Grelling (ibid., p. 9.)-the solution of
antinomies is accomplished in three steps. 1) Russell founds the theory of types
with the axiom of reductibility. 2) Ramsey divides antinomies into two groups.
The first group receives its solution from the simple theory of types; alone, the
enlarged groupe requires the axiom of reductibility. 3) Hilbert founds the meta-
mathematical theory of the proof, which the Polish logicians elaborate into a metho-
dology. Godel discovers arithmetisation and proves the existence of insoluble
propositions. Tarsky shows that the concept of truth can be defined without contra-
diction only in meta-language. Carnap generalizes this result, and it thus comes
about that syntactic antinomies are of no harm to science. According to Mr. Grelling
(op. cit. p. 17), "die Ueberwindung von Antinomien zu den wissenschaflichen Ruh-
mestaten unseres Jahrhunderts." Cf. also K. Grelling, "The Logical Paradoxes,"
Mind, vol. XLV (1936), p. 485.
8 H. Behmann, Zu den Widerspruichender Logik und der Mengeniehre," Jahres-

bericht der deutschen Mathematiker Verenigung, vol. 40, 1931), p. 38; speaking of
solutions to paradoxes says that: "Sie alle sich damit begnilderi . . dem entscheid-
enden Punkt in mehr oder weniger weitem Bogen aus dem Wege zu gehen, die Wider-
spriiche zu vermeiden,statt zie im eigentlichen Sinne aufzuldsen."
9 Ch. Perelman, Une solution des paradoxesde la logique et ses consequencespour la
conception de l'infini, Travaux du IXe Congres de Philosophic (Congres Descartes),
fasc. VI, p. 206, Paris, 1937. "Plusieurs solutions ont et6 proposes pour sauver des
paradoxes la th6orie des ensembles, telle qu'elle a et6 d6volopp6e par Cantor et par

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346 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

Although much ingenuity has gone into the study of the paradoxes, no
completely satisfactory solution has been achieved. Indeed, in my opinion,
no genuine progress has been made in this direction (with the exception,
perhaps, of F. M. Ramsay's analysis), since Lord Russell's attempts to
solve it. Russell was, in my judgment, already in possession of the basic
elements of the answer. But his belief in the virtue of formalization and
symbolization, and his contempt for traditional logic-which landed him
in the labyrinth of the theory of types-barred the way to his unfoldment
of that answer. I do not share these Russellian prejudices and, accord-
ingly, I shall analyze them without translation into symbols. For anti-
nomies neither merit the honor of a symbolic translation nor the euphemism
of the name itself. They are just plain sophisms, for the most part, and a
reformation of logic is not necessary to solve them.'0 The principle of
identity suffices, i.e., the phrases and terms used should have a clear and
certain meaning, and not be shifted in the progress of the argument.
It would be a work of supererogation to narrate the history of the dis-

ses successeurs ayant conserve le concept naif de 'classe' ou 'd'ensemble.' Ces

diverses solutions ont pour but de limiter la theorie des ensembles 'classique," de
sorte que l'on obtienne un system d6ductif exempt de contradictions et aussi riche
que possible. Cependant tout le monde se rend parfaitement compte du caractere
arbitraire de ces limitations. En 6vitant la contradiction on parvient, certes, de
cette fagon a formuler une condition suffisante pour que les antinomies ne se pro-
duisent plus, mais cette condition suffisante n'est nullement n6cessaire. II en result
deux consequences regrettables: d'une part, ces limitations, trop importantes,
4cartent des propositions dont l'affirmation ne present aucun inconvenient; d'autre
part, comme ces regles limitatives ne constituent pas des conditions suffisantes et
necessaires pour 6viter les antinomies, il est impossible de comprendre pourquoi
leur transgression entrainerait, dans chaque cas, des contradictions dans le syst6me."
10Ch. Perelman, "Les Paradoxes de la logique," Mind, vol. XLV (1936), p. 205,
remarque, par contre: "Voici de problem pose par ces antinomies: on suppose que
les hypotheses dont on part sont parfaitement valables pour la logique classique,
et que, malgr6 leur legitimit6, on parvient a en deduire des consequences contradic-
toires. On en conclut qui'il faut restreindre les regles de la logique classique qui
tolerent ces hypotheses nous entrainnant dans d'inextricables antinomies; on les
modifie; on impose des conditions suppl6mentaires a la construction de propositions
valables. On cherche A rem6dier aux antinomies par telle ou telle modification des
regles de la logique classique, ce qui malheureusement, entraine d'ordinaire l'obliga-
tion de sacrifier d'autres propositions logiques ou math6matiques, pr6cieuses celles-la
et qui deviennent d'innocentes victimes de l'oeuvre de purification entreprise sans
piti6. Si l'on veut sauver ces propositions, dont personne n'avait auparavant
contestedni la l6gitimit6 ni la f6condit6, on en est r6duit a des expedients plus ou
moins ing6nieux et rarement convaincants ... ce ne sont pas les regles de la logique
classique qu'il faut rendre responsables des paradoxes, mais bien les transgressions
de ces regles, commises en posant les hypotheses qui menent aux antinomies."

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 THE LIAR 347

covery and the analysis of the logico-mathematical paradoxes; and it is

unnecessary to study each and every one of them: this would be both use-
less and impossible. It would be impossible because one may construct
them freely and ad libitum: the pattern of paradoxes is simple-it is the
pattern of the causa sui or of the suicide. It would be useless, because
most of them are formed on the basis of that pattern. I shall discuss only a
few, but the few which are important-especially that of the Liar.

* *

The paradox of the Liar may be presented in a number of different forms.

However, the most important are: (a) the Epimenides form, which heads
this article; (b) the simplified and condensed form: If I say that I am lying,
do I lie or do I speak the truth? These two forms are not equivalent, and
it is interesting, therefore, to analyze them in turn.
The Liar appears as a typical antinomic judgment: the truth of the
asserted proposition entails its falsehood; its falsehod, in turn, entails its
truth. But, importantly, the reasons why its pretensions to be one must
be rejected are not the same in both cases. The Epimenides is not an
antinomy, it is a self-contradictory judgment, a counter-sense"; the I am
lying is not an antinomy because it is not a judgment.
A. Epimenides
To grasp the structure of this form, attention must be given to, first, the
meaning of the proposition asserted by Epimenides and, secondly, the fact
that it is Epimenides who asserts it.
Consider first the meaning of the proposition, "All Cretans are Liars."
Epimenides does not thereby wish to convey any appreciation of the moral
character of the Cretans. Indeed, if his assertion carried this meaning and
had this purport, the major "All Cretans are liars" coupled with the minor
"Epimenides is a Cretan" would give the conclusion "Epimenides is a
liar." This conclusion would be unobjectionable, the reasoning would find
its end then and there, exactly as the case would be if Epimenides had
characterized the Cretans as "braves" or "cowards," "sober men" or
"drunkards."" The syllogism would be perfectly legitimate, exactly as
the case would be if Socrates, from the general proposition that all men are
mortal, and the fact that he is a man, deduced his own mortality. The
fact that Epimenides himself characterizes the Cretans as liars does not
change the situation. A man can be a liar and admit it, without ceasing
U The reasoningwouldalso end if Epimenideshad said: "All Cretansalwaystell

the truth.'!

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348 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

to be one; and without creating by his avowal an antinomy or even a

paradox.
In order to create a paradox and establish a kind of reasoning which can
go on forever, or better, which is not able to stop at a conclusion, the sen-
tence, "All Cretans are liars," must be differently interpreted, namely, as
a logical and not as a moral judgment. The meaning must be, "All Cre-
tans lie always," i.e., all judgments or all assertions made by Cretans are
false.
All this, of course, goes without saying; but, as it will be shown herein-
after, to dot all the i's and to cross all the t's, is of supreme importance to a
correct analysis of the problem. The implicit meaning of each assertion
must be made explicit, for thought is unstable and volatile-it glides easily
and without notice from one intention to another.'2
Thus, "All statements made by a Cretan are false," we admit, is what
Epimenides wants to say. This assertion affirms the essential and uni-
ver~al falsehood of each and every judgment made by a Cretan and, as a
proposition, it is formally unimpeachable. If Epimenides were an Athe-
nian or a Spartan and not a Cretan, the sentence, "The Spartan, Epimen-
ides, says that the Cretans always err," would not be paradoxical. It
would, of course, be a false assertion, for even the almighty Cartesian God
could not create a being who would always be in error. Nevertheless, this
falsehood would be material, not formal.
Consider next that it is Epimenides who asserts it. Epimenides is
neither a Spartan nor an Athenian; he is a Cretan. Therefore, from the
major, "All Cretans, etc." and the minor, "Epimenides is a Cretan" it
follows:-"Epimenides lies always," i.e., "All the assertions of Epimenides
are false." But this last proposition, taken as a major, together with "the
assertion 'all Cretans, etc.' is an assertion of Epimenides," entails the
conclusion,-the assertion 'all Cretans, etc." is false.
But this conclusion is equivalent to the assertion, Not all the Cretans
are liars, i.e., the statements of Cretans are not all and necessarily false.
We must conclude from this that there are certain Cretans who speak the
truth, i.e., that certain judgments made by Cretans are (or can be) true.
However, it does not follow therefrom that Cretans are always truthful,
and that all the judgments of the Cretans are true always.
Thus, we are not entitled to the conclusion that Epimenides is a truthful
Cretan, and consequently that his assertion about the Cretans is true.
On the contrary (and be it as it may as to other Cretans), as Epimenides's
statement is certainly false, Epimenides is without doubt a liar-which is
the unique and only conclusion we can draw from what he says!
12 Mr. Perelman very justly observes (op. cit., p. 207) how much the formalization

favors this gliding.

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 THE LIAR 349

The proposition, "Epimenides the Cretan says, 'all Cretans, etc.,' "
considered in its entirety, is necessarily false; for, either the Cretans are
not all (and always) liars, or it is false that Epimenides has said it. Or,
again, if he did say it, he could not be a Cretan.
Thus, the composite proposition, "Epimenides, etc." is false in that it
contains incompatible members, subassertions that cannot be true to-
gether and at the same time. Then, what is it? A witty story, a "coun-
ter-sense," a sophism: but not an antinomy.
To Epimenides the assertion, "All Cretans, etc." is forbidden. He can-
not make it. In his mouth it suffers a perversion, it becomes a contre-sense,
a self-contradiction. However, this case is not unique. If someone said,
"The boat that I travelled on was lost with all hands,"we could, and should,
doubt either the truth of the assertion or the truthfulness of the speaker,
or both. Certainly, to extend these doubts to a doubt of the validity of the
laws of logic, is an exaggeration. It is curious and even strange, perhaps
(but not incomprehensible or contradictory), and it has not been sufficiently
noticed, that some propositions may not be uttered by everybody, that
certain verbs may not be used in the first person. It is not permissible, for
example, truly to say, "I am silent," "I am absent" or "I am dead." Nor
is it permissible meaningfully to say, "I am lying."
B. "I am lying"
The meaning of the assertion "I am lying" is not quite identical with the
meaning of the assertions "I am silent" or "I am dead." The latter are
self-contradictory statements, but the former is not self-contradictory-it
is meaningless. This is old lore; and long before Lord Russell13recognized
it anew, the medieval logicians were fully aware that this utterance, taken
verbatim, means nothing at all, therefore, being no judgment, is neither
true nor false.
Although this was widely admitted in the Middle Ages, none the less
the meaninglessness of "I am lying" has often been doubted, even denied.
Let us look into it more closely.
At first sight, it appears that the assertion "I am lying" is meaningful.
This error arises because, in the last analysis and in general, language ex-
presses our thought in a very imperfect and incomplete manner. We
seldom say what we mean, or mean what we say. Moreover, we do not
often know what we mean and intend to say. Besides, the words we speak,
the sentences we hear, take their complete and full meaning only in and
through the context-we do not say or hear everything. Consequently,
in order to interpret the words we hear we have to reconstitute and to re-
store the whole of the intended meaning; since, however, we are accus-
13 Principia Mathematica,I, p. 39 sq., cf. Ru~stow,op. cit.

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350 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

tomed to meaningful speech14to hearing sentences that have a meaning

(or at least, that pretend to have one), nothing is more difficult for us than
to apprehend a pure nonsense. We give a meaning even to what has none.',
Accordingly, when someone says "I am lying" we interpret this utter-
ance, we substitute, we add, we qualify. We understand the sentence as
meaning either "I have been lying" or, "I sometimes lie" or "I often lie,"
which can be true or false and, in any case, is a perfectly correct statement;
or even "I am always lying," a judgment of the type of Epimenides,-self-
contradictory, but therefore meaningful.
Yet, the expression "I am lying" means or pretends to mean something
else, something quite different, which does not extend its application to the
past or to the future, but confines itself to the present. This expression
claims to mean "I am lying now, in this moment" or, "It is in this moment
that I am making a false assertion" or, "The assertion that I am making
in this moment is false."
But, as Russell has rightly pointed out,'6 this expression contains not
one but two assertions, namely, (a) there is an assertion that I am making
in this moment, and, (b) this assertion is false. Now, where is the assertion
(a) to which the qualification "false" is applied in the assertion (b)? Obvi-
ously, there is no such thing; the assertion which is declared to be false
simply does not exist. The problem may be elucidated by comparing this
assertion with the assertions "I am silent" or "I am dead."
If I say, "I am silent," or "I am dead," I say something that can be as
"X is silent," or "X is dead"; for example, "Epimenides is silent" or "Epi-
menides is dead." Here we deal with authentic judgments-something
is said about something; a predicate is asserted about a subject. Even
were I to substitute myself for the subject we would still have an authentic
judgment, though a necessarily false one, for in this case it is impossible to
link the subject to the predicate-it is impossible to speak (as I am speak-
ing) being silent or dead.
But if I say "I am lying" the objectivation reveals a much more complex
structure, viz., "The assertion Y that the person X is making, is false,"
e.g., "The assertion Y which Epimenides is making,is false." Still, this can

14 Even when we speak "in order to say nothing."

15 Just as we put order and logic into our dreams.
16 Cf. Principia Mathematica, I, p. 30 sq. As a matter of fact, if I say: "the
expression written between the ( ) is true or false," that assumes that something
is written there. Or, if nothing is written there, we have no judgement; unless the
formula is interpreted as meaning 1) there is a judgment written between the ( )
and 2) that this judgment is false. In that case we shall have a false assertion,
because its first term is false.

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 THE LIAR 351

be an authentic judgment if Epimenides, in this moment, genuinely makes

an assertion; and, correspondingly, our judgment will be true or false
according to the falsehood or truth of this assertion. Here everything is
perfectly correct: a predicate is asserted about a subject. But, if Epi-
menides does not make any assertion, the subject about which we speak,
the subject of our judgment, does not exist. In its place there is a void-
something (falsehood) is predicated of nothing.
Yet (as was sometimes advocated by logicians), the non-existence of the
subject does not prevent a proposition to be meaningful: it prevents it
from being true only. For example, if I were to say "The king of France is
living in Versailles" or "is bald," this proposition would be false, since
there is no king of France; nevertheless it would be perfectly meaningful.
In the same manner the judgment "The assertion being made by Epi-
menides is true (or false)," or "The proposition written on the blackboard
is false (or true)" does not become meaningless if it turns out that Epi-
menides does not make an assertion, or that nothing is written on the black-
board-it becomes false. It is to be observed, however, that from the
falsehood of one of these propositions, we have no right to conclude to the
truth of its opposite: i.e., from the fact that it is not true that the king of
France lives in Versailles, it does not follow that he lives elsewhere; nor
does it follow from the fact that it is not true that the sentence written on
the blackboard is false, that this sentence is true. If no sentence is written
on the blackboard, this affirmation would be just as false as the previous
one, the validity of the law of excluded middle to the contrary notwith-
standing.
Now, the expression "I am lying" (equivalent to "I am making a false
statement"), may be interpreted to mean, "The statement that I am mak-
ing is false." But here there is no statement, Y, to which this judgment
could be applied, therefore the judgment will be a false one. However, no
paradox arises. If, for example, I were to say instead, "The song I am
singing is a French one," that statement too would be false, for no song is
now being sung by me-(it is impossible to speak and to sing at the same
time), the qualification "French" possesses no object to which it can be
applied. Similarly, it is impossible to make two judgments, namely, a
judgment, and also a judgment about this judgment that it is false or
true. Further, if from the fact "It is false that I am singing a French song,"
it cannot be concluded that I am singing an English one, so too, from the
fact that "It is false that the statement Y that I am making is false," one
cannot conclude that I am making a true statement. The proposition-
"The statement Y that I am making is true"-is equally, and for the same
reasons, as false as the first one.

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352 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

Yet it is claimed that the expression "I am lying" leads to a paradox.

It pretends to be a judgment about itself, that is to say, it claims to be its
own subject. In this case (to be carefully distinguished from the preced-
ing one) it becomes nonsense, a "meaning" impossible to realize, or, what
amounts to the same thing, it is an expression which falsely pretends to
have a meaning.
It is self-evident that a judgment cannot be its own subject. This im-
possibility was clearly perceived by Russ-11.17 Quite unnecessarily, how-
ever, he raised this fact to the rank of a principle, the famous "vicious
circle principle," which (although quite mistakenly) rules out every appli-
cation of a judgment to itself.18 Nevertheless, as it is not yet the com-
munis opinio of the logicians, let me quote at some length the excellent
analysis by C. K. Langford19of the situation which would arise if a judg-
ment were to become its own subject.
"Let us take, to begin with, what is perhaps the simplest and best known
example in connection with which we get a logical paradox; namely, that in
which we consider what significance the words "I am speaking falsely" or,
perhaps better, "This proposition is false" can have, where, if we had a

17 Cf. Principia Mathematica, I., p. 171: "A proposition can never be about itself."
18 As an example of difficulties and confusion produced by the non-distinction of
the two meanings of the "I am lying" analysed by us, we shall quote B. Russell,
"Les paradoxes de la logique," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, vol. XIV (1906),
p. 643: "Nous pouvons maintenant resoudre le paradoxe de l'homme qui dit: 'je
mens." Ce jugement est susceptible de diverses interpretations; la plus simple
est: 'II y a une proposition p que j'affirme et qui est fausse." Ce jugement contient
une variable apparante p; il n'enonce done pas une proposition definie, au sens que
nous avons donned au mot 'proposition.' Cette 6nonciation peur etre fausse si
j'affirme une proposition p, qui est vraie, ou si je n'affirme pas de proposition. La
premiere hypothese entraine la contradiction. La second n'est possible que si une
enonciation generate n'affirme pas une proposition d(terminee. C'est cette derniere
hypothese que nous adoptons. Donc l'enonciation de l'homme qui dit: 'je mens' est
fausse, non parce qu'il enonce une proposition vraie, mais parce que tout en faisant
une 6nonciation, il n'enonce pas une proposition. Ainsi quand il dit qu'il ment, il
ment, mais on ne peut pas en conclure qu'il dit la verit6. II ne peut pas vouloir
dire: 'je fais en ce moment une enonciation qui est fausse,' parce qu'il n'y a pas
moyen de parler d'enonciations en gertnal; on peut parler d'6nonciations de proposi-
tions contenant une, deux, trois variables apparentes, mais non de propositions
en general. Si l'on veut dire 'je fais une enonciation fausse contenant n variables
apparentes,' il faut dire quelque chose comme ceci: 'il y a une fonction proposition-
nelle p (X1, X2 ... X-) telle que j 'affirmeque p (X1, X2 ... X.) est vraie pour n'importe
quelles valeurs de X1, X2 *- X., et cela est faux.' Cette enonciation contient
n + 1 variables apparentes, savoir X1, X1 ... X. et p. Donc elle ne s'applique pas a
elle-meme. De cette maniere nous evitons tous les paradoxes du type de 1'Epime-
nide, puisque pour toute dnonciation propose, nous pouvons montrer qu'elle ne
s'applique pas a elle-meme."
19C. Lewis and C. Langford, Symbolic Logic, New York-London, 1892, pp. 438 if.

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 THE LIAR 353

genuine statement, we should have one that was its own subject. In the
expression "this proposition is false," the words "this proposition" pretend
to designate the whole statement as well as the subject, since these would
be the same; and it is clear, therefore, that we can represent the situation
in the following way. Let P be the name of a proposition, and let the propo-
sition of which it is the name be "P is false," so that we can write

P = P is false

It looks as if these words expressed a genuine statement, and yet, in view of

certain considerations, it would seem that this could not possibly be the
case; so that we have two incompatible appearances, both claiming assent.
If P names a proposition, then it could be replaced by its meaning, and we
should have "(P is false) is false," that is, P is true. But, if in turn P were
replaced by its meaning in "P is true," we should have "(P is false) is true,"
that is, P is false. Thus, not only would P imply its own contradiction,
but this contradiction would in turn imply it. That is to say, one should
have both P < P and - P < P and this is what is known as a vicious
circle. So if P stood for a proposition it would have to stand for one that
was both true and false: from which it follows, of course, that P does not
stand for a proposition at all."

Yet the contradiction, the vicious circle or the vicious regression, is by

no means relevant. Exactly the same situation would arise if instead of
writing P = P is false, we would write

P = P is true.

In this case, exactly as in the former one, we would have "an infinite se-
quence of more and more complicated expressions, each of which requires
explanation before its import becomes definite; so that no one of the expres-
sions can be significant unless the sequence terminates, which it does not
do ... owing to the fact that the sequence of substitution never ends; and
so never ends in any undefined expression. What has happened is, of
course, that" the symbol P has no meaning at all.

* *

Thus, the statement "I am silent" has both a predicate and a subject;
the vice is that it is impossible to link them together. Therefore, it is a
false judgment. However, and on the one hand, the statement "I am
singing a French song," has a predicate, but it lacks an existent subject;
it too, is a false judgment. On the other hand, the expression "I am
lying," has no subject and, accordingly, it is not a judgment. Concisely
put: every proposition must have a subject; no proposition can be its own
subject.

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354 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

The validity of this rule has sometimes been contested. It has been
urged20that the expression "The phrase that I am uttering is false," is not
any more destitute of meaning than the expression "The phrase that I am
uttering is composed of English words" a sentence which, concededly,
not only has a meaning but is even true. Here, however, the sentences
are not analogical. It is not true that the latter sentence is its own sub-
ject, any more than the sentence "The words I am uttering are English
words." These propositions are not about themselves, but about their
verbal contents or their verbal forms. Such propositions are as legitimate
as propositions about "the movements I am executing."
It is not the temporal coincidence of the judgment and its subject, but
its claim to identify them, which empties the expression "I am lying" of
meaning. It attempts to put the judgment within itself or in its own
interior.
Although sentences such as, "I am speaking" "I am singing" have legiti-
mate structures and clear meanings,2'it is not so as to "I am lying." More-
over, the negative moment within the notion of "lying" (falsehood)-
which play so preponderant a role in the apparently paradoxical structure
of the Epimenides and entailed its self-contradiction plays no role in "I
am lying." Indeed, the proposition "I am speaking the truth," and even
the neutral one "I am making a judgment" are just as objectionable on the
same grounds.
I maintain, therefore, (with B. Russell) that the expression "the proposi-
tion that I am uttering is false (or true)" is meaningless. The meaning
which it seems to have is an illusion. The longer the sentence, the more
easily we succumb to that illusion. For sentences are atomistically con-
structed of meaningful parts (words), and we start off with an unclear
understanding and vague impression of a meaning of the whole. This
impression of meaning endures, although the effort to unite the parts
would disclose that it is not a meaningful whole. As Husserl, and Plato
before him, pointed out, the effort to realize what is meant by a sentence,
the earnest effort needed to effectuate the intentional contents of the
thought, is postponed or avoided as long as possible, and consequently it
is seldom, if ever, made, and this initial illusion of meaning is never dis-
sipated.
When objectionable or paradoxical expressions are presented in the form
of symbols particularly where, instead of pointing directly to itself it does
so by means of a long circuit (and the longer the better), in which every
20 Cf. R. Poirier, Le Nombre, Paris, 1938. The term "phrase" is used here in a
vague sense, and should not be understood as meaning: "judgment." To be entirely
exact, it would have been necessary to say, as a matter of fact, "the words which I am
pronouncing are French words."
21 The first one is even necessarily true, and the second necessarily false.

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 THE LIAR 355

step in and of itself is legitimate and understandable-the illusion that we

deal with meaningful statements is especially strong. For an example of
such a circle, I quote the "very elegant form" given to the Liar by the well-
known Polish logician, Professor Lucasievicz:22
"Let the letter Q be an abbreviation for the phrase: 'the proposition
occupying the 12th line of this page." Then let us write:
(1) Q is a false proposition.
By counting the lines we can verify:
(2) Q is identical with the proposition (1).
As definition of the concept "false" we assume, in accordance with M.
Perlman, Def.: P is a false proposition is equivalent to non-P. By sub-
stituting Q for the variable P in this definition, we get:
(3) Q is a false proposition is equivalent to non-Q.
The first member of this equivalence (printed in italics) is our proposi-
tion (1). Thus we have:
(4) The proposition (1) is equivalent to non-Q.
But in virtue of (2) the proposition (1) can be replaced by Q. Thus
results the contradiction:
(5) Q is equivalent to non-Q.
The operations performed by us in this deduction are all legitimate in
classical logic, i.e., according to classical logic they lead from the premises
to a true conclusion. We have substituted the constant Q for the variable
P in the definition of a false proposition and we have replaced the proposi-
tion (1) by (4) by the description Q (this letter was introduced only for the
sake of typological brevity) whose identity with the proposition (1) can be
verified by the reader himself. ..."
Thus, Grelling writes: "The paradox of the Liar does not presuppose
anything but the rules of classical logic, the definition of falsehood, and an
easily verifiable empirical proposition."
Now, I submit, it is perfectly clear that the use of the letters P and Q-
the substitution of "Q" as an "abbreviation" for a certain proposition or
expression-is not only useless but even worse than useless. The letters
substituted in lieu of the proposition enable the reader to follow the subse-
quent reasoning, the prospective operations, without obligation to account
to himself for the meaning of the proposition with which he deals. The
steps which beguile him into the region of meaninglessness are thereby
made more difficult to recognize.
On the one hand, we are entitled to write: "The proposition occupying
the 12th line of this page is false." This expression can stand for a true or
false proposition, for it depends upon what we find or do not find on the
12th line. On the -other hand, we can write this expression itself on the
12th line of the page-and even fill the whole page with it. This expres-
22 Cf. K. Grelling, "The Logical Paradoxes," Mind, 1936, p. 485 ff.

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356 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

sion, written on the 12th line, will then indirectly point to itself and raise
the claim to be its own subject. The fact that this claim is expressed in a
circuitous and not in a direct way, does not make its fulfillment any more
possible than in the case of the simpler direct form. Nothing is changed
logically: the expression written on the 12th line is as objectionable as the
expression "I am lying." It is no cause of wonderment, therefore, that,
when the rules of classical logic (rules made for meaningful propositions
and judgments) are applied to it, there is obtained a paradox, even an an-
tinomy. Consider more closely the "elegant form" Professor Lucasievicz
has given to the Liar.
Q is said to be an abbreviation of "The proposition occupying the 12th
line of this page." The formula (1) says: "Q is a false proposition," which
means: "The proposition occupying the 12th line of this page is a false proposi-
tion." The formula (2) is "Q is identical with the proposition (1)." But
this is quite false. Q is not identical with the proposition (1), and Q is
not a proposition. Q is an abbreviation for an expression forming only
the subject of the proposition (1). Q does not stand for "The proposition
occupying the 12th line of this page is a false proposition," but only stands
for "The proposition etc. . ." In other words, Q does not mean "Q is a
.

false proposition." Therefore Q cannot be identical with the expression

written on line 12. Or, vice versa, if it is, then the expression written on the
12th line is not "The proposition occupying the 12th line of this page is a
false proposition," but only "The proposition occupying the 12th line of
this page." Which expression is not a proposition at all. It is therefore
impossible to operate with it as if it were one. The paradox-if only we
are careful enough not to change the meaning of our symbols-does not
arise. If, on the other hand, we substitute for the original meaning of Q
the "meaning" "Q is false," we have no right to identify it with Q. Fi-
nally, if we start from the identification of Q and "Q is false," i.e., Q and
non-Q, we must not wonder that we come to contradictions. And we have
no right to incriminate the rules of classical logic.
*

* *

We must now turn to another attempt-that of Professor A. P. Ushenko

-to improve the presentation of the Liar and thus to vindicate its legit-
imacy. In his article, "A New Epimenides"23Professor Ushenko writes:

All propositions written within

the rectangle of Fig. 1 are false.

Fig. 1 Fig. 2
23 Cf. A. P. Uchenko, "A New Epimenides,'! Mind, 1937,p. 545 ff.

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 THE LIAR 357

"Let the expression within the rectangle of Fig. 1 be called A. Either

A is a proposition, or not. Suppose A is a proposition, then either it is
true or false. But if A is true, then it cannot be dealing with any other
proposition than itself (since there are no others within the rectangle),
and therefore it is false. But if it is false, then the only proposition within
the rectangle, viz. A, is true. Now this a vicious circle, and the familiar
resolution would be to the effect that A is meaningless and only appears
to be a significant proposition.
"But then, if A is not a proposition, there are no propositions within the
rectangle at all. The statement 'It is false that there are propositions
within the rectangle of Fig. 1, is true. But if it is true, then the statement
"It is false that there are true propositions within the rectangle of Fig. 1"
is also true. But this statement is the same as A, since, "- (3x) *fx * gx"
is the same as "(x)-fxgx." Hence, if A is not a proposition, A is true; but
since nothing but a proposition can be true, if A is not a proposition, then
A is a proposition. A vicious circle reappears."
Professor Ushenko's presentation of his analysis is interesting and in-
genious. Alas, again, it seems to show that symbolization does not bring
forth, necessarily, more clarity and precision in our thinking.
Indeed, from the fact (or proposition) that there are no propositions
written in the rectangle 1, Professor Ushenko deduces (rightly) that "It
is false that there are true propositions within the rectangle of Fig. 1;"
and therefrom, with the aid of symbolisation, he deduces that "All proposi-
tions written within the rectangle of Fig. 1 are false." It is rather strange
that Professor Ushenko does not notice that from the fact that there are no
propositions within the rectangle 1, we can deduce, just as rightly, that
"There are within the rectangle 1 no false propositions," and, therefore,
that "It is false there are no false propositions within the rectangle of Fig.
1," which, according to him, would imply that "All propositions written
within the rectangle of Fig. 1 are true. We would, then, have the super-
paradox of being able to deduce two obviously incompatible statements
from a single, and true proposition.... But if this reasoning were to be
accepted as correct, then, from the fact that no numbers are written within
the said rectangle and that, therefore, no even (or odd) number is written
within it, we would be able to deduce that all numbers written in the
rectangle are odd, or even, and, therefore, odd and even in the same time
and so forth. We would be able to deduce a great many interesting things.
It is even possible that from the fact that no cat has two tails we would be
able to deduce that all cats have three....
Professor Ushenko, as a matter of fact, forgets to take into account
the existential purport of his statements. He does not seem to notice
that the existence, or the non-existence of the object we are speaking about

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358 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

(or: the subject of a proposition) does make a difference and that positive
judgments about non-existent objects are all false. It is, therefore, not
true, but false that all propositions written etc. are false; and it is just as
false that they are true.
Professor Ushenko continues: "Observe that with reference to Fig. 2
the statement 'There are no true propositions within the rectangle of Fig.
2' will be recognized as a true proposition precisely because there are no
propositions within the rectangle of Fig. 2. But the meaning of this propo-
sition has no reference to, and therefore, should not depend on, the place
or date of its formulation. If it is meaningful and true as written above,
it should not cease to be true and meaningful when one chooses to write
it within the rectangle of Fig. 2." Here too we are forced to disagree with
him. The meaning of a proposition, even if it has no explicit reference to a
date or place, depends quite often on the place and date of its formulation
because it refers to them implicitly. We have already seen that some verbs
cannot be used in the present tense, some others not even in the past one.
There are things that I can say about "you," or "he," but not about "I,"
terms such as "this,") "here," "now," etc. cannot be understood without a
reference to date and place. Besides, if we admit Professor Ushenko's
contention that the meaning-and the truth-of the proposition "There
are no propositions within the rectangle 2" does not change, and will not
cease to be meaningful and true if we write it within the rectangle 2, we
must admit that, even if we do so, there still will be no propositions written
within the said rectangle....
*

**

Let us examine now another famous "antimony," that of Berry.24 I

must confess that, for my part, I cannot admit of its being anything but a
pure and simple sophism, built according to one of the classical modes of
sophism, which consists in taking as dictum simpliciter something which
is only dictum secundum quid.
The Berry paradox is formed in the following manner:25 "The number of
syllables in the English names of finite integers tend to increase as the
integers grow larger and must gradually increase indefinitely, since only a
finite number of names can be made with a finite number of syllables.
Hence the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteen syl-

24 I shall not study the Richard paradox which is perfectly analogous, nor the

paradox of the barber, etc. Cf. my "Ensemble and Category," to be published in

this journal.
25 Cf. Jorgensen, III, 132 sq. Cf. Russell-Whitehead, Principia Mathematica,
Vol. I, p. 63.

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 THE LIAR 359

tables and among these there must be a least. Hence 'the least integer
not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables' must denote a definite
integer; in fact 111 777.25 "One hun/dred and el/ev/en thou/sand se/ven
hun dred and se/ven ty se/ven" (19 syllables) is "the least integer not
nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" (18 syllables). But 'the least
integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables' can be named in
eighteen syllables, which is a contradiction." Undoubtedly. And yet
it is doubtful if the existence of this "contradiction" entitles us to proclaim
the doom of classical logic and the imperious necessity to reform it. The
contradiction, as a matter of fact, could be avoided on less onerous terms.
Thus, for instance, we could, in the first of the two expressions or "names,"
drop the two "ands", obviously superfluous. We would, in this way,
save two syllables and the contradiction would disappear. But I shall
not insist. That would be too cruel.
As for the "paradox" itself, it seems rather obvious that its existence is
based entirely on an equivocation, or still worse, on a complete lack of
precision and even of determination in the use of the term"nameable."
Nameable how? In what language? By what means? As long as this
is not told, nothing is told.
It is evident that there would be no contradiction (and even nothing
unusual) in the fact that a number "nameable" in 19 syllables in English
could be "named" in 15 syllables in French and in only two in Chinese.
Even if we were told that "to name" means to name in English and in
words, this specification would not give to the term "to name" a precision
permitting an unambiguous use. It is clear that the reader of Berry com-
pletes involuntarily and unconsciously his lax and unprecise expression.
He believes that we have to deal with proper or common "names" of the
numbers and, therefore, he accepts his method of classification. It is
quite certain that the "proper names" of the numbers (of which every
number has one and only one) can be ordered according to their length
(in syllables or even in letters). But it is at the same time just as certain
that this classification applies only to "names" properly so-called. There
is therefore nothing paradoxical nor even astonishing in the fact that a
given number whose "proper name" contains n syllables can at the same
time be designated by an expression which is no "name" and which con-
tains a different, larger or smaller, number of syllables.
Now this is just what Berry is doing. He starts by classifying the
(proper) "names" of the integers, thus creating in the mind of the reader
the-false-impression that the term "to name" is used by him in a certain
determined and univocal sense. Then, suddenly and without warning,
he changes the meaning of the term and extends it to any kind of designa-
tion. No wonder that this ambiguous use of the term produces an ap-
pearance of contradiction.

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360 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

The objection will probably be raised that my solution is much too easy
and too simple, and that the paradox arises from the fact that Berry uses
for "naming" the numbers the classification itself that he is establishing.
This, of course, is quite particularly objectionable and sophistic; yet, in
my opinion, this is not the decisive point.
The paradox arises from the fact that Berry uses the term "to name"
in two quite different acceptations: the first time in the very precise sense
of "to name by a proper name," because otherwise he would not be able to
establish his classification of integers; and a second time in the perfectly
general and indetermined meaning of "to denote by whatever means,"
because otherwise he would not be able to claim that he has "named" the
number 111,777 by denoting it by the means of the classification of "proper
names."
Let us repeat once more: to say, "to name," "to denote," "to determine"
without saying how and by what means is to say nothing whatever,because
in this case all and everything can be "named" or "denoted." Indeed,
if in order to "name" a number we are entitled to denote it "by whatever
means," by the means of its "proper name" as well as by any other means,
for instance as the n th prime number, or as the n th power of m, or as the
sum, quotient, product or difference of m and n, or even as the number of
verses, syllables or letters of the Bible, the Iliad or the Koran, etc., etc.,
etc., the classification proposed by Berry would become, obviously, im-
possible. To the question: is it possible, or not, to "name" a certain num-
ber in less than n syllables, it would be impossible to give a determinate
answer because the question would have no determinate meaning. And
if, furthermore, in the process of "naming," we gave ourselves the right
to create new "names" new manners and patterns of "naming," the very
idea of such a classification would lose any meaning whatever.
In order that it may have one, in order that the question, "Is it or is it
not possible?" may be answered by a "yes" or a "no," it is first of all neces-
sary to give a precise meaning to the terms we are using, to determine the
means we are entitled to employ for the "naming." Then, our classifica-
26 B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, I, pp. 66 f., proposes a solution based on
the theory of types (cf. above, p. 352): "5. The paradox about 'the least integer
not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables embodies, as is at once obvious, a
vicious circle fallacy. For the word "nameable" refers to the totality of names,
and yet is allowed to occur in what professes to be one among names. Hence there
can be no such thing as a totality of names, in the sense in which the paradox speaks
of "names." It is easy to see that in virtue of the hierarchy of functions, the theory
of types renders a totality of names impossible. But on no stage can we give a
meaning to the word "nameable" unless we specify the order of names to be em-
ployed; and any name in which the phrase "nameable by names of order n occurs is
necessarily of a higher order than the nth. Thus the paradox disappears."

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 THE LIAR 361

tion having been established, nothing stands in the way of our using it as a
new means of denoting, a new means which is added, to or substituted for,
the previously employed means. The fact that some operations, impos-
sible to execute as long as we are employing the means N become easily
executable if we add to them a new one, the N + 1, involves no contradic-
tion. Thus, a problem, insoluble as long as we use only the rule and the
compass, may quite easily be solved with the aid of conic sections.

* *

Berry's paradox is the result of an equivocation and imprecision in the

use of the term "to name." If, on the contrary, we specify it every time
that it is employed, we shall find ourselves before the following statements:
let us make a classification of integers according to the length (in syllables)
of their "proper names." Among those, the "proper names" of which have
at least 19 syllables, there is at least one. This integer is 111,777. We
can also denote or name it as: the least integer whose "proper name" has
at least 19 syllables. It is obvious that this last expression is not a "proper
name" and, therefore, irrespective of the number of syllables, of which it is
composed, it cannot be compared with the first one. Thus no contradiction
whatever can possibly result from the fact that an expression of the second
type may be shorter than that of the first one.
To deny it, and to pretend that we are confronted with a paradox would
be the same as to pretend that there is a paradox (or a contradiction) in the
fact that, having classified the books in our library according to the length
of their titles (in words), we can denote or "name" a certain volume by the
expression: "the first volume (or the smallest, or the largest) the title of
which has at least a hundred words."

* *

Let us now return to the Epimenides. In our analysis of the assertion

"All Cretans are liars," we have found and submitted that this assertion
(in contradistinction to the "I am lying") is meaningful but self-destructive.
We have made a distinction, that is to say, between the cases in which, on
the one hand, a proposition-pretends to reflect directly upon itself, i.e , to
be its own subject; and, on the other hand, the differently constituted
sentence which formulates or expresses a general or universal proposition
that can be applied to itself as a particular.
It is the failure to distinguish these two cases that is at the root of Rus-
sell's theory of types; and also of the corresponding semantic theories of
Carnap and Tarski of a hierarchy of languages and meta-languages.
The distinction -which I have made, a distinction which is nothing else

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362 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

but Husserl's distinction between nonsense and counter-sense,27 enables

us to avoid all these painful consequences, to subject logic to its own rules,
to count numbers, and to write the grammar of a given language in this
language itself.
As I will show in a later publication,28this distinction, which, by the way,
is indispensable for the possibility of the theory of types itself-in order
that it should not rule itself out-leads us to the resolute abandonment of
the extentionalist (class extension) interpretation of logic, and by way of
consequence to a solution of all the logico-mathematical paradoxes dis-
covered by and since Bertrand Russell.
ALEXANDRE KOYRE.
SORBONNE, PARIS.

27 "Unsinn" and "Widersinn." Cf. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,Vol. I,

pp. 112 ff.; Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenornenology, pp. 120 ff.; 324 ff.,
Cambridge (March), 1943.
28 "Ensemble and Category."

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