G.R. No. 109780.

August 17, 1998] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RODOLFO BERNALDEZ @ Dolfo,

accused-appellant.

FACTS: Rodolfo Bernaldez was accused of raping his 10 yo niece. The prosecution presented as its
witnesses the victim and her father Pedro Bernaldez. However, Dr. Nancy de la Paz, who examined the
victim and issued the medical certificate, failed to testify. The victim narrated that she was carried by
her uncle upstairs who then removed her clothes and let her lie down on the floor. While she was lying
down, her uncle opened the zipper of his pants and laid on top of her, inserted his penis inside her
vagina and made a push and pull movement while on top of her. After a while, a sticky and warm object
came out from his penis. After the rape, accused-appellant gave her P5.00 and threatened her not to tell
anybody otherwise, he would kill her parents, brothers and sisters. Complainant further claimed that
accused-appellant had been abusing her since five (5) years ago and these repeated acts were done in
the same place The very next day after the last rape incident, complainant was sent by her father to go
to accused-appellants house in order to borrow P10.00 from him. However, complainant refused to go
prompting her father to beat her. It was only then that she revealed to her father the cause of her
reluctance and narrated to him the repeated rape and assaults of her uncle. Immediately after learning
of the rape, her parents brought complainant to the Polangui Police Station to report the incident and
file the complaint. Afterwards, she was brought for treatment to Pio Duran Memorial District Hospital, a
government hospital where she was examined by Dr. Maria Nancy de la Paz who issued a Medical
Certificate dated September 3, 1990 (Exh. B). The trial court gave weight to the medical certificate
issued on 3 September 1990 by Dr. De la Paz, who was a government doctor at the time. In considering
the medical certificate despite the failure of Dr. De la Paz to testify thereon, the trial court reasoned that
such document, being an act done by a public officer, was presumed to be done regularly unless proved
otherwise. It concluded that the finding of [o]ld lacerations at 3:00 and 9 oclock and newly-healed
lacerations at 11 oclock on the hymen of MARIA TERESA proved that someone had carnal knowledge of
her. Nevertheless, a medical examination was not an indispensable requisite in the prosecution for rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued?

YES. HELD: The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. De la Paz despite
the failure of the latter to testify. The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could
not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be presented in court to show his
qualifications. Here, a distinction must be made between admissibility of evidence and probative value
thereof. Nevertheless, a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone
testimony of the victim is sufficient if credible
People v Sanchez

Facts:

In an information dated December 15, 1997, 17-year old Arlene Sanchez accuses her brother, Bobby
Sanchez y Paguia, of rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of September 1997, in the morning, at Barangay Lorugan, Municipality of
Valencia, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, prompted with lewd design, armed with a sharp bladed weapon and by means
of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally hold the right hand of
ARLENE SANCHEZ, and at knife point tied and box (sic) her and brought her inside the sugar plantation
and have sexual intercourse with ARLENE SANCHEZ his 17 year old sister against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of ARLENE SANCHEZ in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to law and in violation of Republic Act No. 7659.

Issue:

Whether or not accused was adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

Held: Yes.

In the present case, the Information alleges that Arlene was 17 years old and a sister of appellant. The
prosecution had established Arlene’s minority and her relationship with appellant. Arlene’s Certificate
of Birth shows that she was seventeen years old when she was raped. Her testimony, corroborated by
that of her father, Emvencio Sanchez, proved that appellant is her brother, not to mention the fact that
appellant himself admits that Arlene is his sister.

We have held in People vs. Ferolino, that:

If the offender is merely a relation – not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common law
spouse of the mother of the victim – it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity
or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to
further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.

The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino case, the
victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister of the offender. It was
deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information
that the offender is “a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil
degree” because we acknowledge the fact that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the
third civil degree, in which case, death penalty cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape.
However, a sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother
relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in
this case that the Information should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the
Ferolino case.
People v. Ceredon

FACTS:
Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape under Article
266-A and B of the Revised Penal Code. The informations are summarized as follows:
1. It occurred at mid-day in 10-year-old AAA’s own home at Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagaya.
She was playing with her brothers BBB and CCC when appellant beckoned to her. She ignored
him for fear of getting whipped. Appellant came out of the house and ordered their two brothers
to go down to the river and the latter did as they were told. AAA ran towards her brothers but
appellant pulled her away where he gagged her and whipped her with a belt and proceeded to
penetrate her vagine which caused her great pain. Appellant only stopped when he heard AAA’s
sister’s voice and concealed AAA’s nudity and left the room, leaving her siblings to find her in
such form.
2. AAA was tending to their youngest brother when appellant summoned her to extract his
armpit hairs. When she turned a deaf ear, appellant instructed BBB to take their youngest sibling
to the river to bathe him to which he complied. Appellant dragged her inside and forcibly undressed
her at knife-point, mounted her, and penetrated her vagina with his penis.
3. At the time of the third incident, their parents were out of the house. While sleeping on
top of their trunk, AAA was awakened when appellant started undressing her. She cried and
begged him to stop, but he disregarded her pleas and proceeded to sexually abuse her.
4. A few days after the third rape, AAA was again sexually abused by appellant inside their
house, in the same room and upon the same bed. Appellant poked a knife at her to compel her. Out
of fear, she did not struggle or resist.
5. Appellant was already married but his bestial acts towards his own sister nonetheless
continued. It was noontime and AAA had just come from visiting their grandfather. When she
entered the bedroom, appellant quickly followed her in, closed the door behind him and locked it.
He poked his knife at her, told her to strip, and when she refused, he forcibly undressed her and
proceeded to rape her.
6. AAA had turned eleven (11) years old. She was playing in front of the house when she
saw appellant approach their house. As she was afraid of him, she tried to run away but stumbled
and appellant was able to catch up with her. Appellant the dragged her inside and proceeded to
have carnal knowledge of her.
7. The family had just transferred to a new house situated at the foot of a mountain in the
same village. They were forced to relocate to a new house after their old home was swept away in
a flood. When probed by the prosecutor to the details of the seventh incident, AAA disclosed that
she could no longer remember the exact manner how appellant perpetrated the rape.
8. AAA was already thirteen (13) years of age. She was lying alone inside their house when
appellant suddenly appeared and moved closer to her. She tried to push him away but failed. After
removing his own clothes, appellant went on top of her and commenced raping her.
9. The rest of their family had gone to their kaingin and AAA was left alone in their house
at the foot of the mountain. As in the previous offenses, appellant forced AAA to undress. After
ridding himself of his clothing, appellant mounted her and penetrated the young girl’s vagina.
10. The tenth and last incident happened in 2000 during the wake of their father who had
passed away. AAA was then 15 years old. It was committed in their new house in Baraoidan,
Gattaran, Cagayan where they transferred. Appellant had his own house situated about 500 meters
away. On said date at noontime, their mother sent AAA home to feed the chickens. She obeyed
and went inside their house to fetch the rice when appellant followed and grabbed her. She resisted
and tried to run but he was able to grab her foot causing her to stumble and fall. He undressed her
an kissed her several times, then sexually violated her. All the while flaunting his perversion by
saying “I derived so much satisfaction from my sister”.
All ten (10) incidents ended with appellant threatening to kill AAA and her family if she
decided to tell anyone about the incident.
On September 18, 2000, AAA, notwithstanding appellant’s threats, revealed to her sister
DDD, friend Giselle and teacher Teresa about the rape incidents. Together, they reported the matter
to the police.
The trial court charged appellant guilty of the 10 informations. Appellant, however,
contends that the informations filed against him do not sufficiently charge the offenses committed
because the exact dates of commission are not alleged. Hence, his conviction is not warranted.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in the ten (10) informations
considering that the said informations failed to sufficiently establish with particularity the dates of
the commission of the offense

RULING:
No.
The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be alleged with precision. It is
enough for the information or complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a time as
near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Failure to allege the exact date when the
crime happened does not render the information defective, much less void. An information is valid
as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive acts or omissions. The
exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for
rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time
of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not
ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission of rape
is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of
a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute
accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed
at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO BAJAR, appellant.

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, at
sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis
Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and
with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him
on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by
law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength,

disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and
relationship attended the commission of the crime.

Upon his arraignment on 8 February 2000, Alejandro pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution presented as witnesses Alejandros wife, Lolita Bajar, and their two children, Ana Bajar
Rabor and Alma Luna Bajar, to testify on the events surrounding the commission of the crime.

The prosecutions last witness was Dr. Angelita Enopia, the Health Officer of
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. She confirmed the findings she made on the postmortem
examination she conducted on the cadaver of Aquilio [18] and on the death certificate she
issued.[19] She claimed that Aquilio suffered three big wounds: one on the maxilliary area
on the right cheek which was slanting towards the mouth, one on the anterior chest left
side downwards to the armpit, and one straight to the scapular area at the back. She
opined that the injuries were probably caused by a sharp object such as a bolo or a knife. [20]
The defense presented Alejandro as its lone witness. Alejandro testified that on the
date and time in question, he left his two daughters, Ana and Alma, and his two
grandchildren, Mary Joy and Ann-Ann, at his house. He proceeded to his father-in-laws
house to look for his wife. Upon arrival, he greeted Aquilio with respect: Pa, good
evening. The latter replied that Lolita was not there and invited him (Alejandro) to go up
and see for himself. Alejandro went up, and not finding his wife, said: She is not
here Pa. Aquilio angrily retorted: Everytime you are drunk you come here to ask
me. Aquilio then suddenly clubbed Alejandro on the head with a 2 x 3 coco lumber he
saw near the door.[21]
Alejandro then touched his head, and saw blood on his hand. He felt dizzy. Seeing that
Aquilio was about to attack him again, he drew out his hunting knife and defended
himself by moving his hand from the right to left. He felt he hit something before he lost
consciousness. He regained consciousness at
the Northern MindanaoMedical Center and discovered that a policeman brought him
there for the treatment of his head wound.
In its decision of 17 July 2000, the trial court found Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged against him, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. It
concluded that his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated self-defense theory was self-
serving and could not stand over the positive, categorical, spontaneous, and
straightforward declarations of his daughters and wife on how Aquilio was killed.
Considering the presence of the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of his age, relationship, and
habitual intoxication, the trial court sentenced Alejandro to suffer the penalty of death.
Contention of the accused:
Alejandro assails the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance in that the
alleged eyewitness Ana could not have seen how the attack commenced. Also
maintains that, other than the fact that Aquilio was then 85 years old, no specific fact or
circumstance was proved showing disregard of age. In the same vein, there was no
clear proof that his alleged intoxication was habitual or intentional.
OSG:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with these propositions: (1) the
uncorroborated plea of self-defense was inconsistent with the established evidence on
record; and (2) the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of intoxication, dwelling, disrespect of the victim on account of his age,
and relationship were properly appreciated. The OSG argues that treachery was
properly, validly, and sufficiently alleged in the information.

People v. Montesclaros
Facts:
2 informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13 years old, and Ida Montesclaros, mother of
ABC, for giving permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape ABC. The trial court convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape,
as principal. Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in one of criminal cases. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s favor
the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the
consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the RPC.

Pending resolution of the appeal before the CA, Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed. Thus, the appeal before
the CA dealt only with that of Ida. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived
of intelligence. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia
was determined by both the trial court and the CA to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did
not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.

Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated although the same was not alleged
in the information.

Ruling:
No. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time of the incident—could
have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to
death, under Article 266-B of the RPC. Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender
to the victim, either as the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B
of the RPC.

Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter
was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the
offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule
that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending
the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the
Information did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special
qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.

People v Collado9

The accused, Fernando Collado, Crisanto Lara, Felix Collado (alias Elex Collado) and Romeo Gloriani,
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. SC-3180 before the Regional
Trial Court, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna. The information filed in said case reads
(p. 23, Rollo):

"'That on or about January 20, 1985 at Barangay Mojon, Municipality of Pila, Province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
 the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, (with) violence against or intimidation of person, in an uninhabited place and
while conveniently armed with a piece of wood and knife did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
(P5,570.00) in cash and one Seiko Wrist watch worth P500.00 with the total value of P6,070.00
against the will and consent of the owner thereof, Mrs. Maria Regay,
 and by reason and on occasion of such robbery, said accused with treachery, abuse of superior
strength and in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her age and sex
being an old woman, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and stab with said piece of wood and knife Maria
Regay who as a result thereof sustained multiple injuries in the different vital parts of her body
which directly caused her death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Maria Regay.

"'CONTRARY TO LAW.'"
Upon being arraigned on April 15, 1986, Fernando Collado and Crisanto Lara pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged and the case against them was set for trial while Felix Collado and Romeo Gloriani
remained at large. On September 8, 1986, Fernando Collado withdrew his former plea of not guilty and
pleaded guilty as an accomplice. The judgment with respect to him was promulgated on September 9,
1986. Thereafter, trial on the merits proceeded against Crisanto Lara. On May 4, 1989, the trial court
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads (p. 43, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused, CRISANTO LARA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the accessory penalties imposed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal by Crisanto Lara.

The antecedent facts, as stated in the plaintiff-appellee's brief are, as follows (pp. 4-18, Appellee's Brief; p.
97, Rollo):

"On January 18, 1985, appellant Crisanto Lara went to the house of Honorio delos Santos in Pila, Laguna
and proposed to the latter that they hold-up Maria Regay. The following day, January 19th, at around
6:00 o'clock P.M., appellant returned to his (delos Santos) house to follow up the proposal. On both
occasions, however, delos Santos told appellant that he did not want to go as he did not like that kind of
work (pp. 10-11, 16, TSN, April 21, 1987).

"On January 20, 1985 at around 7:00 o'clock A.M., Josefina Buenaflor, a resident of Mojon, Pila, Laguna,
and a daughter of the victim Maria Regay saw Crisanto Lara on the road walking to and fro between his
house and her house while conversing with the neighbors. Afterwards, Nanding Collado came out from
his house and went over to Crisanto (p. 6, TSN, October 14, 1986).

"At about 9:30 to 10:00 A.M. of the same day, January 21, (sic) 1985, Mario Marasigan, son-in-law of the
victim, was at the coconut plantation he was tending which was about 100 meters from the barrio
road. He was cutting trees which he would use as posts for his house. He climbed up a tall madre de
cacao tree and after he had cut a branch, he saw Felix Collado and Fernando Collado standing on either
end of the pathway leading to Barangay Pansol and Concepcion as if waiting for somebody. He also saw
Crisanto Lara and Romeo Gloriani at the middle of this pathway about 40 meters away from
him. Crisanto Lara was holding a piece of wood and Romeo Gloriani was hiding behind a coconut tree
(TSN, September 15, 1986, pp. 5-6, 8; TSN, September 30, 1988, p. 11).

"After a few minues (sic), he saw the victim Maria Regal (sic) walking along the pathway at a distance of
more or less 40 meters from him on the way back to Mojon from the direction of Barangay
Concepcion. Felix Collado who was on that end of the pathway hid himself and she continued walking to
where Crisanto Lara was now positioned hiding behind a coconut tree (TSN, Sept. 30, 1986, p. 15). Then
Crisanto Lara struck her on the face with a piece of wood, a guava branch with a diameter of around 2 1/2
inches, with such strong force that the old woman fell on the ground. Crisanto Lara then hid himself and
Romeo Gloriani dragged the stricken victim for about 5 (sic) meters to a coconut tree where Gloriani
pulled out his knife and after stabbing her once she appeared to regain consciousness and began
struggling on her back and rolling on the ground as Gloriani continued stabbing her. The weapon used by
Gloriani for stabbing was a double bladed dagger around 6 to 7 inches long excluding the handle (TSN,
Sept. 15, 1985, pp. 7-9; TSN, Sept. 30, 1985, p. 16).

"Marasigan was taken by surprise seeing his uncle hit his mother-in-law that he was not able to shout (p.
15, ibid).

"When the old woman stopped struggling, Romeo Gloriani pulled up her skirt and cut a cord tied around
her waist where she kept her money (p. 17, ibid) and at that time Crisanto Lara reappeared and came near
and both Crisanto Lara and Romeo Gloriani left followed by Fernando Collado and Elex Collado who took
the same route through the fence and towards the house of Fernando Collado (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Marasigan then went down the tree but did not go near the victim. Neither did he tell his relatives about
the incident in consideration of appellant Crisanto Lara who is his uncle. He left the place at around
10:30 A.M. and returned to his house and did his normal work there (pp. 19-20, 26, ibid).

"In the same morning at around 10:00 A.M. Josefina Buenaflor was told by her sister that their mother
who attended a wedding feast at Mojon had not yet returned home. So they started to look for her at the
coconut plantation as this was the route she usually took in going to Mojon. They failed to find her. They
inquired from their neighbors who also did not know the whereabouts of their mother (pp. 9-10, TSN,
October 14, 1986).

"At around 3:00 o'clock P.M., a certain Ugid Balatibat told Josefina Buenaflor that he saw the latter's
mother sprawled on a coconut plantation. She and her sister ran to the place, crying. But before they
reached the place, about three coconut plantations away from the place where they eventually (sic) found
their mother, Crisanto Lara stopped them telling them, not to touch the body of their mother as there
were no policemen yet at that time (pp. 9, 10, 14, ibid).

"Finally, on January 21, 1985, Josefina Buenaflor was able to see the body of her mother at the
plantation. She was then with policemen and with her barrio mates (p. 10, ibid).

"Her mother had a 'kacha' tied on her waistline where she kept the money she earned from the sale of the
pigs and chickens that she raised. When her mother was found dead, there was no more 'katsa' wrapped
around the latter's waist (pp. 12-13, ibid).

"Maria Regay also had a Seiko watch valued at P500.00 which she placed in her pocket. The watch,
however, was not anymore in her pocket when she was found dead (pp. 13-14, ibid).

"The wake of Maria Regay lasted for 5 days. Crisanto Lara attended the wake and even often looked at the
cadaver of Maria Regay. He even solicited contributions from tricycle drivers (pp. 10-11, 15, ibid).

"Dr. Rosauro Framil, a Municipal Health Officer of Pila, Laguna and a resident of Pila, Laguna conducted
an autopsy on a certain Maria Regay on January 21, 1985, at the Laguna Provincial Hospital Morgue, Sta.
Cruz from 9:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight of January 21, 1985 (pp. 4-5, TSN, September 9, 1986).

"The victim had already shown sign of putrefactive changes as shown by the appearance of small worms
on the eyes, nose and ear openings. The body was already emitting unfavorable odor which suggest (sic)
death for more than 24 hours. In his opinion the incident took place at more or less 10:00 A.M. of
January 20, 1985 (pp. 5-6, 19, ibid).

"There was a depressed fracture on the head region and on the left temporal with contusions. There was
also a periorbital contusion on the side of the head (p. 6, ibid).

"He further testified that on the chest and back, there were multiple stab wounds, about 9:2 stab wounds
on the left and right area below the clavicle, one on the right breast, a stab wound on the left breast, a stab
wound on the right side of the chest just above and medial to right arch, a stab wound on the mid portion,
on the left side of the chest just above the left subcostal arch, and another stab wound on the left side of
the chest along mid auxilary line about the level of the 7 th intercostal space. Length of the stab wound on
both sides of the scapular area on the back and abdominal region, there was no external injury seen on the
area. On the extremities, the right forearm had a fracture closed and complete at its 3 rd radio/ulna
bones. The left upper arm was almost macerated which could be the result of some animal bites probably
a stray dog. These were the external findings (p. 6, ibid).

"As to internal findings, there was extradural hemorrhage on the left temporal area; on the chest
intrapleural hemorrhage bilateral due to the wound inflicted on both lungs, right middle lobe has been
hit. Left lung middle and lower lobe have both stab wounds which produced more hemorrhage than that
of the left. The heart was not hit (p. 7, ibid).

"The affected internal organs of the body of the victim were: fracture on the head region, so there was
involvement of the brain, the extradenal hemorrhage of the left temporal area is the result of the
depressed fracture on the head. On the body, the internal organs severed were the lungs, right and left
and in the abdominal region, there were none and also the bones which were evidenced by the fracture on
the right forearm and the right upper arm (p. 8, ibid).

"On opening the skull, there was extradenal hemorrhage on the left temporal area. It is located on the
side. Extradenal means that the brain is covered by denal matter and outside of that is the place where
the hemorrhage sets in (p. 11, ibid).

"By the nature of the total injuries, the instruments used by the assailant could be that considering the
fracture on the head, it could be due to some hard object like a piece of wood or metal which most
probably could give rise to the depressed fracture. With respect to the stab wounds, probably a double
bladed knife could have been used because (sic) of the nature of the stab wounds itself (p. 8, ibid).

"The cause of death was pulmonary failure secondary to lung damage. Severe hemorrhage
intrapleural secondary to lung damage brought about by the penetrating stab wounds on the chest, most
probably, the weapon used was a knife. Since the hemorrhage on the brain is not as much as that to the
hemorrhage on the lungs, he presumed that the cause of death was more due to the damage on the
lungs. Assuming, however, that there were no other wounds and that the only wound was on the skull
which caused hemorrhage, the hemorrhage on the skull would be sufficient to cause death (p. 11, ibid).

"He could not tell the relative position of the victim and the assailant but as to the wound on the head,
however, his honest guess was that when the victim was hit, the latter was not facing the assailant (p.
13, ibid).

"On February 5, 1985, Mario Marasigan finally reported to Pfc. Villanueva that he witnessed the killing
and robbery committed against Maria Regay. He said that he reported the matter which he kept to
himself for 15 days because he was bothered by his conscience behind the death of his mother-in-law (pp.
22-23, 24-25, TSN, September 30, 1986).

"In April of 1985, Fernando Collado was apprehended at the Pacita Complex, San Pedro,
Laguna. Raymundo T. Matiola, a policeman and a resident of Pila, Laguna took the sworn statement
(Exhibit C) of Fernando Collado on April 8, 1985 that there were four who were responsible for
the slaying and robbing of Maria Regay, namely: one alias Elee, Fernando
Collado Crisanto Lara and Loriana, whose first name he did not remember (pp. 3-4, TSN,
December 12, 1986).

"The defense of appellant Crisanto Lara is one of alibi. He testified that he was a resident of Balat-atis,
San Antonio, Quezon. On January 20, 1985 at around 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., he was at the Laguna
Provincial Hospital in Sta. Cruz. He visited his nephew, Romeo Marasigan as the latter's body become
(sic) swollen. He stayed in the hospital up to more or less 2:00 o'clock P.M. (pp. 3-4, 9, TSN, March 11,
1987).

"When he left the hospital, he went to Barangay Pansol, Pila, Laguna and arrived there at 3:00 P.M. He
went to the house of the father of his nephew. After that he rested and then he cooked food. After
cooking, he again rested for more or less one (1) hour and then he ate (pp. 5-6, ibid).

"He spent the night of January 20, 1985 in the house of the father of his nephew. He went to sleep at
more or less 6 (sic) or 6:30 P.M. He woke up at 5:00 A.M. of January 21 (p. 6, ibid).

"After that, he went to the house of his niece at Barangay Mojon, Pila, Laguna and arrived there at more or
less 10:00 A.M. While there, he heard that a certain Maria was missing (p. 7, ibid).

"He admitted seeing Josefina Buenaflor on January 21, 1981 (sic) while she was on her way to see her
mother and told her that it would be better to call first the police (p. 7, ibid) but denied the testimony of
Mario Marasigan that he was one of those who participated in the slaying and robbing of Maria Regay and
the one who allegedly struck Maria with a branch of guava tree because he cannot hold a branch as it is
heavy and his left hand is amputated and his other hand is 'pasmado.' For the record, appellant's right
hand was shown the forefinger is severed and there is a scar at the back of his palm, and
the middle finger is also damaged as well as the ring finger. The other fingers are
deformed (p. 8, ibid).

"His left hand was amputated and right hand damaged on March 13, 1981 when he caused palay
to be milled that day and he was waylaid while going to the ricemill. Since then and prior to February 20,
1984 (sic) that was the condition of his left and right arm (p. 2, TSN, March 17, 1987) but he continued to
have a job of 'buying banana fruits' (p. 7, ibid).

"But while he claimed that his right hand could not hold a knife, when asked to handle a
stamp pad in open court, he was able to grasp the same (pp. 7-8, ibid).

"During the wake, he solicited from the tricycle drivers because he was told to do so by Honorio, a
member of the barangay council and an 'alalay' of the barangay captain. The one who gave his collection
to the family of Maria Regay was Honorio (pp. 4-5, TSN, April 2, 1987).

"Fernando Collado who pleaded guilty as an accomplice in this case claimed that he knows appellant
Crisanto Lara only by face; that it was only at the provincial jail that they came to know each other (pp. 2-
3, TSN, January 14, 1987).

"On January 20, 1985 at around 9:00 A.M. to 10:30 A.M., he remembered being in the land of a certain
Jun at Mojon, Pila, Laguna whose full name he did not know and while there, his uncle, Romeo Gloriani,
called him and told him that he was waiting for the old woman, Maria. At that time, aside from he (sic)
and his uncle, there were no other persons around (pp. 3-4, ibid).

"When Matandang Maria showed up, his uncle pointed a balisong knife at her. After that his uncle got
her money and gave the money to him. After he received the money, he ran away. He did not anymore
see what his uncle did to Matandang Maria (p. 5,ibid).

"He proceeded to the irrigation site of Mojon, Pila, Laguna where his uncle followed him and he gave him
the money who in turn gave him P200.00 (pp. 5-6, ibid).

"After that, his uncle left. Before the latter left, however, he told him that if the event
would be discovered, witness should tell that it was Crisanto Lara and Felix Collado who did
it (pp. 6-7, ibid).

"After that, he stayed in the town proper of Pila for 2 weeks and he proceeded to San Pedro at the Pacita
Complex where he worked at a construction company. After 2 months of working there, however, he was
apprehended by the Pila Police in connection with the slaying and robbing of Maria Regay. He was
brought to the municipal building of Pila (pp. 7-8, ibid).

"He alleged that during his investigation, he was given blows, kicks, and bullets placed in
between his fingers and electric treatment by the police authorities of Pila, because he told
them that it was his uncle who was the culprit. After that he was asked to sign a confession
(Exhibit C) prepared by police authorities (pp. 8-10, ibid).

"While detained at the Provincial Jail, he wrote a letter (Exhibit 1) addressed to Fiscal Regaza, a portion of
which, marked as Exhibit 1-a, states as follows:

'x x x xxx xxx

'x x x aaminin ko na po ang aking pagkakasala sa harap ng hukuman, subalit kung bibigyan po ninyo
ako ng mababang sintensiya, labis na po akong naawa sa isang tao na napasangkot o isinangkot ng
aking complainant dahil sa katotohanang siya po ay wala sa lugar na pinangyarihan ng krimen.
'Ang tao pong ito ay si Ginoong Crisanto Lara, tatlumpu at apat na taong gulang ng Barangay Balat-
atis, San Antonio, Quezon.'
"While he initially denied being (sic) written Exhibit 1 claiming that it was written by Jojo Acosta from
San Pedro (p. 19, TSN, January 23, 1987), on subsequent questioning by the defense counsel, however, he
stated that the whole of Exhibit 1-a are his (p. 14,ibid)."
In this appeal, the accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors (pp. 51-52, Rollo):

"I

"The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Mario Marasigan.

"II

"The trial court erred in finding that accused Crisanto Lara struck the victim with a piece of wood and that
the prosecutor was able to demonstrate that the accused can still hold and grip a stamp pad.

"III

"The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of rebuttal witness Honorio Delos Santos.

"IV

"The trial court erred in not giving credence to the entire testimony of accused Fernando Collado."
I

The accused-appellant tries to destroy the credibility of Mario Marasigan by asseverating that: 1) if he
really searched the coconut plantation in looking for a suitable post, he would have seen the four accused
during that time considering that the tree where he got the post is about 50 meters away from the scene of
the incident, unless the four accused and the victim fell down from the sky; 2) the sound produced by
cutting the branches of a tree would not have escaped the sense of hearing of the four accused; 3) he
testified that the first time he saw the accused-appellant again since January 20, 1985 was when the
accused-appellant was apprehended by the police but according to the daughter of the victim, the
accused-appellant attended the wake and even solicited contributions; 4) his failure to help the victim and
report the incident immediately but instead proceeded to do his normal work is inconsistent with human
nature; and 5) his cross-examination is full of material inconsistencies as to the length of time he stayed
atop the tree and the place where the accused-appellant was positioned.

Mario Marasigan's failure to see the four accused at the time he was looking for posts could be due to the
fact that the coconut plantation was vast (p. 4, tsn, September 30, 1986). There were ten (10) coconut
trees, seven (7) lanzones trees, two (2) sampaloc trees and bamboo grass between the place where he and
the four accused were situated (p. 9, ibid). It was only when he was already on the top of a tree (p. 7, ibid),
about four (4) meters from the ground (p. 8, ibid), facing the direction where the four accused were
positioned (p. 10, ibid), that he saw them. His view while on the top of a tree was not in any way
obstructed by these trees because they were tall and far from one another (pp. 9-10, ibid).

Mario Marasigan has cut just one branch of the tree when he saw the four accused (p. 11, tsn, September
30, 1986). He used a bolo in cutting this branch (p. 7, ibid). The distance between him and the four
accused was about fifty (50) meters (p. 8, ibid). Taking into account these circumstances, the four
accused could not have heard the sound produced when Mario Marasigan cut a branch of the
tree. Besides, their attention was focused on the arrival of the victim (p. 5, tsn, September 15,
1986). Thus, the four accused could not have noticed the presence of Mario Marasigan.
It is probable that Mario Marasigan and the accused-appellant attended the wake on different dates and
time that is why the former saw the latter for the second time since the incident only when he was
apprehended by the police.

Mario Marasigan's failure to help the victim, his mother-in-law, and report the incident immediately but
instead proceeded to do his normal work, per se, is inconsistent with human nature. However, such
failure was satisfactorily explained by him. He failed to help the victim while the latter was being attacked
because he was taken by surprise when he saw his uncle, the accused-appellant, hit her (p. 15, p. 18, tsn,
September 30, 1986). He also failed to report the incident at once to the authorities because one of the
perpetrators of the crime is his uncle and he pities him (p. 12, tsn, September 15, 1986; p. 26, tsn,
September 30, 1986). He reported the incident on February 5, 1985 or after 15 days, when he was
disturbed by his conscience (p. 22, tsn, September 30, 1986).

The inconsistencies referred to are de minimus which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on Mario
Marasigan's straightforward attestations (see People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA
105, citing People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit his
testimony, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such
spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. L-41358, March 16,
1988, 158 SCRA 695). Whether Mario Marasigan stayed on top of the tree for ten (10) minutes or for
twenty (20) to twenty five (25) minutes and whether the accused-appellant was at the middle of the road
or behind a coconut tree is beside the point.

II

Still in relation to the questioned credibility of Mario Marasigan, the accused-appellant alleges that he
(Mario Marasigan) could not have positively identified the piece of wood (guava branch, about 2.5 inches
in diameter) allegedly used in hitting the victim because he was fifty (50) meters away, unless he
possesses the eye of an eagle. The accused-appellant is unable to hold a piece of wood with a diameter of
about 2.5 inches much more swing and strike it with such force as to cause a person to fall down because
his left hand is amputated, his right hand is "pasmado," with the forefinger severed, the middle and ring
fingers damaged and the other two fingers deformed. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, nothing in
the record shows that the accused-appellant was able to hold and grip a stamp pad. Had the proceedings
taken place before the judge who penned the decision, he could have taken judicial notice that at that
point in time when the fiscal put into the right hand of the accused-appellant a stamp pad, his right hand
was then resting on the arm rest of the chair with his palm open.

Mario Marasigan was able to specify the kind of wood used by the accused-appellant in hitting the victim
perhaps because of the fact that he is a carpenter (p. 2, tsn, September 15, 1986), resident in a rural area
and tends a plantation (p. 4, ibid). It is, therefore, to be expected that he is familiar with different types of
wood. At any rate, the specific kind of wood used by the accused-appellant is again of no moment. What
is material is the testimony of Mario Marasigan that the accused-appellant struck the victim on the face
with a piece of wood (p. 7, ibid). This was corroborated by the testimony of the physician that the fracture
on the head of the victim was most probably caused by some hard object like a piece of wood or metal (p.
8, tsn, September 9, 1986).

The alleged incapacity of the accused-appellant cannot overthrow the positive testimony of Mario
Marasigan that he saw him (the accused-appellant) strike the victim with a piece of wood which caused
her to fall to the ground (p. 15, tsn, September 30, 1986). The accused-appellant should have proven in
court his alleged incapacity. He merely testified that he is in a position to submit to a physical
examination with regard to the capability of his right hand should the trial court desire (p. 8, tsn, March
11, 1987). It was his duty to substantiate his contention and not rely on the desire of the trial
court. Anyway, in his cross-examination, the prosecution succeeded in eliciting from him the vital fact
that he is not left-handed and even after his hands were damaged, he was still able to work, that is, buying
banana fruits (p. 7, tsn, March 17, 1987). Moreover, when a stamp pad was thrown to him, he held it with
his right hand (p. 8, ibid). The counsel of the accused-appellant objected to the manner the fiscal
conducted the cross-examination because it was tantamount to making the accused-appellant the
prosecution's witness (ibid) and not because the right hand of the accused-appellant was then resting on
the arm rest of the chair with the palm open, as he now claims. The defense of incapacity which was weak
from the very start, collapsed during the cross-examination.

III

The accused-appellant likewise puts in issue the credibility of Honorio delos Santos because according to
him, he came to know of the plan to rob the victim on January 18 and 19, 1985 when the accused-
appellant made such proposal to him. However, it took him two years, three months and three days
before he revealed such proposal.

The delay by Honorio delos Santos to reveal the proposal made by the accused-appellant to him was
satisfactorily explained in his testimony that it was long after the incident happened that the children of
the victim needed him (p. 26, tsn, April 21, 1987). At any rate, the accused-appellant's conviction may be
sustained even without Honorio delos Santos' testimony. The testimony of Mario Marasigan, being
positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction (see People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, February
26, 1991).

IV

Finally, the accused-appellant maintains that since the judge who wrote the decision had no opportunity
of observing the demeanor of Fernando Collado when he testified in court, the most logical thing for him
to do was to consider his entire testimony or disregard it entirely.

It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record for the trial judge
might have died, resigned, retired, transferred, etc. (People v. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L-37147, August
22, 1984, 131 SCRA 237). The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the
judgment and that for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment
erroneous (Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188 and U.S. v. Abreu, 30 Phil 402). Actually, it was not
necessary for the trial judge, who wrote the decision, to have observed the demeanor of Fernando
Collado. He merely considered his admission in court that money was taken from the victim, P200.00 of
which was given to him (p. 35, Rollo), and disregarded his inconsistent testimony as to the participation
of the accused-appellant in the crime charged (pp. 40-41, Rollo):

"It is on record that Fernando Collado declared at the courtroom that Crisanto Lara was not with them at
the time of the robbery, (TSN, January 14, 1987, p. 5) but this appears to be a mere afterthought because
at the police station, he implicated the accused (Ibid, p. 7). Though this was later explained by him as
being the instruction of their uncle, Romeo Gloriani, his excuse imply lacks reliability and
acceptance. Why impute the crime, of all people, on a nephew, Feli(x) Collado, and a friend, Crisanto
Lara? Why will his uncle involve the two? Feli(x) Collado is is (sic) his brother. Why did he blindly follow
his uncle? (W)as it not more convenient to point to other persons not dear to them? This evidently goes
against the realities of life, unless of course, they were really in conspiracy with one another."
We note that the judge who rendered judgment in this case took on a painstaking task of scrutinizing in
great detail the records and wrote a comprehensive decision (pp. 34-41, Rollo):

"After an evaluation of the evidentiary records, the Court finds, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
accused, Crisanto Lara, has committed the crime of Robbery with Homecide (sic). The prosecution has
sufficiently established by strong and persuasive evidence that the accused was one of four persons who
conspired to commit robbery against the victim during the perpetration of which the latter was
killed. The evidence shows that the accused is a principal by direct participation. No less than his
nephew, Mario Marasigan, testified that he saw him struck the victim on the face with a piece of wood
which appeared to him to be a branch of a guava tree (TSN, September 15, 1986, p. 7). This was
corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who testified that the victim also suffered a
fracture on the head due to some hard object, like a piece of wood (TSN, September 9, 1989, pp. 8 and 11).

"The overt act was the initial step of the conspirators in executing the crime charged. After the victim was
struck by the accused, she was later on dragged and stabbed several times by Romeo Gloriani (Ibid, p. 9)
who thereafter raised her skirt and cut the cord of muslim cloth (katsa) around her waist (TSN,
September 30, 1986, p. 17; TSN, October 14, 1986, p. 12) where she usually kept her money (TSN,
September 15, 1986, p. 11). Accused Fernando Collado confirmed that money was taken from the victim,
P200.00 of which was given to him (TSN, January 14, 1987, p. 5).

"x x x xxx x x x.

"The bare fact is that Mario Marasigan was very positive that it was the accused who struck the
victim. There could not have been a case of mistaken identity; the accused was his uncle, a brother of his
father, Dionisio Marasigan, on his maternal side (TSN, September 15, 1986, p. 3; TSN, March 17, 1987, p.
6). And it has not been shown that Mario Marasigan had an ill motive against his uncle.

"x x x xxx x x x.

"As the accused was positively identified, his defense that he was in a hospital at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, at the
time of the incident cannot prosper. Alibi is unavailing as a defense against the positive identification of
the accused by a witness (See Aportadera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 31358, March 16, 1988). It is an
inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate (Ibid). For alibi as a defense to succeed, it must be
shown that not only was an accused at some other place at the same time but it was physically impossible
for him to have been at scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People vs. Almario, G.R. 69374,
March 16, 1989; People vs. Reunir, G.R. 73605, January 29, 1988).

"In this case, assuming his assertion that he was at the Laguna Provincial Hospital at Santa Cruz is true,
such fact cannot eliminate him as a possible perpetrator. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Sta.
Cruz is just 9 kilometers away from Pila and can be reached within 8 to 12 minutes. Brgy. Mojon is even
nearer. In one case, it was held that the fact that the victim's house is accessible by jeep or tricycle via a
well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes from the place where the accused claimed to be at the
time the crime was committed, sufficiently demonstrates that it was not physically impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime (See People v. Temblor, G.R. 66884, May 28, 1988). In the case
of People vs. Almario, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the alibi of the accused who claimed that he was
at Tondo, Manila, which is one and half hour drive from the scene of the crime, Lumban, Laguna.

"Anyway, his self-serving defense of alibi was lacking in corroboration. His nephew, Romeo Marasigan,
whom he claimed to have visited at the hospital was never presented to confirm his version. Hospital
records could have been subpoenaed and presented to show that he was really confined in the said
hospital. In other words, his claim is lacking in convincing details to inspire belief.

"x x x xxx x x x.

"Moreover, his claim that he was at San Antonio, Quezon, before January 20, 1985 and arrived at Pila only
in the morning of said date is belied by the testimony of Honorio delos Santos whom he pointed to as the
person to whom he turned over his collections from the tricycle drivers (TSN, April 2, 1987, p.
5). Honorio delos Santos bluntly stated that the accused was the mastermind because on two occasions
before the incident, on the 18th and the 19th of January, 1985, the latter approached him at their house at
Mojon, Pila, Laguna and proposed to him that they rob the victim (TSN, April 21, 1987, p. 3 to 10)."
We find that the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence and establish the
guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged is adequate.

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of disregard of age and sex, uninhabited place,
taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation. Disregard of the respect due the
offended party by reason of his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes against persons
or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or
sex. It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Robbery with
homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of
the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal (People v. Pagal, et al., G.R. No.
L-32040, October 25, 1977, 79 SCRA 570; People v. Capillas, et al., G.R. No. L-27177, October 23, 1981,
108 SCRA 173; People v. Pecato, et al., G.R. No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14). Neither should
evident premeditation be considered against the accused-appellant. The requisites necessary to
appreciate evident premeditation have not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all
of the following: (a) the time when the four accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the four accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c)
the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow them to reflect
upon the consequences of their act (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA
46; People v. Iligan, et al., G.R. No. 75369, November 26, 1990).

The aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and taking advantage of superior

strength attended the commission of the crime. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
provides, inter alia, that any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. Correlating this provision with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1 which provides that when in the commission of the
deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and
Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty
whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion
perpetua (People v. Orita, supra; People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA
182). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article
63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA
615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R.
No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
that the civil indemnity is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.