CORPORATE POWERS

Jimenez v. City of Manila 150 SCRA 510

Facts: Bernardino Jimenez was the unlucky said who fell in an uncovered opening o the ground located within the premises of
the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which prevented the opening form
being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an injury due to a rusty 4-
inch nail which pierced his left leg.
Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana
Market at that time was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with the
City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila. Is the City of Manila indeed not liable?
Held: The City of Manila is liable. Reasons:
1) Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public building.
2) Also, Art. 2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for it to be held
liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of Manila retained
supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing
admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says that public markets shall be
under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer.
3) Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner will comply with
his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven to have been
negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.
NOTE: It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control and supervision is
sufficient.

Quezon City Government v. Dacara, Jr.

Facts:
Dacara Jr.‘s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City,
which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr., his son who was likewise on board the
car, sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children filed a
complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon before RTC. He prayed for damages. The LGU
contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable.
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.
Issue: Whether the Quezon City Government is liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.
Held:
Yes. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Negligence of a person, whether natural or juridical, over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances
so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to
comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the
maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and
equitable.

Municipality of San Juan v. CA

Facts:
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service Construction (KC).
On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the
corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of
water to the respective houses of water concessionaires.
Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the
tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires.
Between 10 o‘clock and 11 o‘clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate
No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as it was then
raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations.
As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.
Issue: Whether the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable
Held:
Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality
has control or supervision thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that
the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road
It must be emphasized that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code, the phrases ―regulate the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes‖, and ―adopt measures to ensure
public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property‖, are not modified by the
term ―municipal road‖. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioner‘s power of
regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be performed in municipal
roads. To our mind, the municipality‘s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on
a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its territorial jurisdiction.
Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and the condition of the
road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It must be borne in mind that the
obligation of the [petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one which is not
suspended while a street is being repaired.

Dumlao v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
On February 28, 1964, about 11:30 in the night, Isauro Elizalde accompanied by his wife Hanidena Elizalde, while driving s jeep
southwards from Davao City, thru Talomo Bridge, suddenly and unexpectedly came upon a hole on the south end of said bridge
right on his way, about 1 meter in diameter and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by boulders, thus blocking his lane. To avoid it he
swerved his jeep abruptly to the left side of the road where he was confronted by a steep embankment. He swerved his jeep
back to the right to get into his lane after passing the boulders and the destroyed portion of the road but he collided with the
truck of Hermanos de Yap driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who came from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Isauro
Elizalde died on the spot in his jeep while his wife who was found on the road, severely injured but was still alive, died soon after
in the hospital.
By reason of this incident, the heirs of both deceased sued Hermanos de Yap but the suit was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs
to prosecute. However, same plaintiffs a complaint on May 16, 1966, which, aside from the original defendant, now includes the
City of Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao alleging that while Hermanos de Yap was negligent not only because its driver
operated their truck carelessly, recklessly, and negligently, but also because it was itself negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees, the City of Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao were also negligent in not repairing the road
where the accident took place and in not taking the necessary precautions to warn the public of the hazards on said road,
thereby causing the collision which resulted in the destruction of the jeep and also in the death of its occupants.
Issue: Whether Dumlao may be held personally liable for damages
Held:
Dumlao is not personally liable for damages. Damages are recoverable only from the City of Davao per Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, which does not include the city officials for purposes of liability for damages to persons caused by defective public works.
A public official is only personally liable for whatever damage he caused by his act done with malice or bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority. Dumlao was sued in his official capacity, with no imputation of malice or bad faith. The question,
therefore, is whether petitioner did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not sued in his personal capacity,
but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him in the complaint, much less proven by the
evidence, as the respondent court made no such finding of malice or bad faith.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to say that petitioner was sued
in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in
the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly
proven.

PLDT v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound and fell in an open trench on the road resulting to
slight injuries to the husband and serious injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the accident.
Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning signs placed near the manhole dug resulting on the
earth mound on the road causing injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the negligence of the
independent contractor the company hired (Barte) and should be the one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour
of the spouses while the CA under Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban
Held:
Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right
to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages
for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The
presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and
warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said
excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.

Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte 102 Phil. 1186

Facts: Palafox filed a suit to recover damages from the provincial government for the death of his son caused by the negligence
of a regular chauffer of the provincial government. The accident occurred while the chauffer was working at the highway
construction. The questions now are: 1) May the province be held liable? 2) Does the doctrine of respondent superior apply?
Held: The answers to both questions are given below (obviously):
1) To attach liability to the State for the negligence of its officer or employee, the latter must be not upon whom properly
devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion. This principle applies both to the national and municipal governments.
The province is liable.
2) The doctrine of respondeat superior or corporate liability for the negligence or tort of its officers, applies only where the
government is engaged in proprietary or business functions. When engaged in government functions, as the construction and
maintenance of roads, the doctrine does not apply. The reason for the exemption is the government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve in all its operations
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses subversive of the public interest.

LIABILITY FOR TORTS, IF ENGAGED IN PROPRIETY FUNCTION

Torio v. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599

Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolution celebrating a town fiesta for 3 days on January,
1959. The resolution created on Executive Committee which would oversee the operations of the town fiesta.
The Executive Committee in turn had a sub-committee in charge of building 2 stages, one of which was for a zarzuela program.
Vicente Fontanilla was one of the actors of the zarzuela. While the zarzuela was going on the stage where the play was set
collapsed. Fontanilla, who has at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneath and died the following day. The family and heirs
of Fontanilla filed a complaint against the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council and the individual members of the
Municipal Council. Can they be held liable?
Held: The Municipality of Malasiqui is liable and the individual members of the Municipal Council are not liable.
Reasons:
1) The basic rule to be first followed is that a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for an injury caused in the course of
performance of a governmental function. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation
can be held liable upon contracts and in torts.
2) The next question to be answered is that whether the fiesta above-quota was performed by the municipality in the exercise of
its governmental or proprietary function. According to 2282 of the revised Administrative Code, municipalities are authorized to
hold fiesta, but it is not their duty to conduct such. Thus, the fiesta is proprietary in nature. The same analogy can be applied to
the maintenance of parks, which is a private undertaking, as opposed to the maintenance of public schools and jails, which are
for the public service. (The key word then is duty.)
3) Under the doctrine of respondent superior (see first paragraph of Art. 2180), the municipality can be held liable for the death
of Fontanilla if a) the municipality was performing a proprietary function at that time and b) negligence can be attributed to the
municipality’s officers, employees or agents performing the proprietary function. The evidence proved that
the committee overseeing the construction of the stage failed to build a strong enough to insure the safety of zarzuela
participants. Fontanilla was entitled to ensure that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.
4) Finally, the municipal council is not responsible. The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-
responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquillana committed by the corporation’s employees of agents
unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. To make an officer of a corporation liable for
the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to or elped to bring
about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act.

Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firing 195 SCRA 692

Facts: Laurence Banino, Sr., along with several other passengers in a jeepney they were riding in, died after collision involving
said jeepney, a privately owned graved and sand trucks and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union, driven by Alfredo Bislig, a regular employee of said municipality. The heirs included in its complaint the municipality and
the dump trucks driver. The municipality invokes non-suability of the State. Is it correct?
Held: Yes.
1) The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of
express of implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the
State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be
passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi – delict.
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting
party, and also when the State files a complaint thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations for example, like
provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a State is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held allowing itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”
3. About the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental of propriety
functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue
and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a propriety capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant is not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
4. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on his way to Naguilian River to get a
load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3 (m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Read RA 7678 – DIGITEL Franchise

The title states: Republic Act no. 7678, February 17, 1994: An Act granting the Digital Telecommunications Philippines,
Incorporated, a franchise to install, operates and maintains telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines and for
other purposes.
Section 13 states: “Warranty in Favor of the National and Local Government. The grantee shall hold the national, provincial, city
and municipal governments harmless from all claims, accounts, demands or actions arising out of accidents or injuries, whether
to property or to persons, caused by the installation and operation of the telecommunications systems of the grantee.”
* Liability for Contract
Municipal corporations are liable on contracts entered into in their behalf by their authorized agents acting within the scope of
their authority, provided that the municipal corporations are authorized to enter into said contracts by their charter.
* Section 24, LGC. Liability for damages
LGU’s and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury or damage to property.

LIABILITY FOR CONTRACT

Quisumbing v. Garcia
Facts:
COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu and found out that several contracts were not supported with a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22
of R.A. No. 7160. Gov Garcia sought reconsideration of this finding. However, without waiting for its resolution, filed an action for
declaratory relief with the RTC. Gov claimed that the no prior authorization is required because the expenditures incurred are
already authorized by the appropriation ordinances of the previous year which are deemed re-enacted. RTC ruled that no prior
authorization is required.
Issue:
Whether the Provincial Governor is required to obtain prior authorization of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Cebu before she
can enter into the questioned contracts
Held:
Yes. As it clearly appears from the Sec 22 (c) of the LGC, prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before
the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely
contains a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local chief executive to make
disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations. The
"ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government unit‘s budget, for which reason no further
authorization from the local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization of the
budget.
To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the requirement of prior
sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would be no instance when such prior authorization would
be required, as in contracts involving the disbursement of appropriated funds. Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had
in mind when it required, as a condition to the local chief executive‘s representation of the local government unit in business
transactions, the prior authorization of the sanggunian concerned. The requirement was deliberately added as a measure of
check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate
powers of the local government unit are wielded as much by its chief executive as by its council. However, the sanggunian
authorization may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which specifically covers the project, cost or
contract to be entered into by the local government unit.

City of Manila v. IAC 179 SCRA 423

Facts: The City of Manila leased a lot of the North Cemetery to Irene Sto. Domingo. The period of the lease is
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2001. Irene’s husband died and was buried in said lot on June 6, 1971. The authorities of the North
cemetery hoever, ordered the lot exhumed on January 25, 1978, according to their interpretation in good faith of AO No. 5,
1975, which provided for a uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.
Naturally, Irene and her family were shocked, Adding to their dismay was that the remains of her husband was callously dumped
in a warehouse of a cemetery were thousands of other sacks of bones were kept. The risk, according to her, of claiming the
wrong set of bones was high. Irene filed a claim for damages against the city. Will the suit prosper?
Held: Yes, reasons:
1. In connection with its powers as a municipal corporation, the City of Manila may acquire property in its public or governmental
capacity, and private or propriety capacity. The NCC divides such properties into property for public use as provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
2. In the absence of special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila, which was created by
resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. With its acts of dominion, there is therefore no doubt
that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its propriety of private haracter.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial was leased in favor of the Sto. Domingo. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages
even of no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
3. It should also be noted that the Charter of Manila states that it may sue and be sued. By virtue if this and the doctrine of
respondent superior, the City is liable for the negligent acts of its agents in failing to verify the duration of the lease above-
quoted. The agents’ reliance in AO No.5 is unavailing because said AO covers only new leases.

Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability (Contra personal liability)

To hold a municipal corporation for benefits received under an implied contract:

a. It is necessary to show that the implied contract be within the contractual powers of the corporation and that the officers who
entered into contract were fully authorized.
b. It must be further shown that the benefits were voluntarily accepted under such circumstances as will indicate that payment
was intended by the parties or that justice and equity would require the payment of compensation.

Inciong v. Domingo 211 SCRA 139

Facts: This case basically concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an attorney it hired. But
first, the useless facts.
The Philippines Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) owned a sugar refinery at Barangay Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas.
However, PHILSUCOM failed to pay the real state taxes due on said sugar refinery. So the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas
scheduled for the sale of the sugar refinery thru a public auction.
PHILSUCOM, however, was granted a restraining order maintaining the status quo. In the meantime, Barangay Caloocan, thru
Atty. Ceferino Inciong, intervened in the case as it had 10% property tax share to be collected form PHILSUCOM. To make the
long story short, Atty. Inciong eked out a compromise agreement for both warring parties so everybody went home happy except
for Atty. Inciong.
It seemed that the request of the Barangay Captain of Caloocan for petitioner’s legal assistance was not taken up nor approved
by the Sangguniang Barangay nor was there any showing that it was approved by the Solicitor General and concurred in by
COA as required under COA Circular No. 86 – 255, dated April 2, 1986. Also it seemed that the hiring of petitioner by the
Punong Barangay did not carry with it the approval of the Sangguniang Barangay as required under Section 91 (1-1) of the B.P.
377, nor was there any appropriation therefore; the hiring was not approved by the Solicitor General and concurred in by COA.
In other words, Barangay Caloocan doesn’t want to pay Atty. Inciong. Is that correct?
Held: Our companero must be paid. Reasons:
1. We don’t want to see a kindred spirit get unpaid or else we lawyers will have to go on strike.
2. As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the position of respondent Chairman of the COA disallowing
payment of attorney’s fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the light of the following considerations:
a. The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by the Sangguniang
Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioner’s employment.
b. The decision of the RTC directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney’s fees to petitioner has become final and executory
and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan.
c. COA Circular No. 86 – 255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover attorney’s fees under the final and
executory decision dated August 9, 1989 of the RTC
3. The respondent COA Chairman states that PHILSUCOM paid the amount of 7,199,887. 51 pesos to the Municipal Treasurer
under the Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, the Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its
share the amount of 719,988.75 pesos. This allocation is erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay
Caloocan should only share from the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go to the
Special Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of Barangay Caloocan should be 359,944.38
pesos only.
The Chairman prayed that in the event the Court orders the payment of attorney’s fees to petitioner this amount of 359,944.38
pesos should be made the basis therefore. The Court replied in a booming voice, “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
respondent is ordered to direct the payment of attorney’ fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong in an amount equivalent to 10%
of 359,994.38 pesos.”

Province of Cebu v. IAC 147 SCRA 447

Facts: Again, this case concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an attorney hired – but the
attorney ended up with only a pittance.
There was a time when Cebu City almost became the owner of practically the whole of the Province of Cebu. This happened in
Feb. 4. 1964 when the Vice – Governor and the Provincial Board of Cebu, taking advantage of Governor Rene Espina’s
absence (he was away on an official business trip) donated 210 lots or 380 hectares of provincial patrimonial land to Cebu City.
When Governor Espina finally heard of the donation, he filed a case to declare the donation void for being illegal and immoral.
The defendants in the case were Cebu City, City mayor Sergio Osmena and the dumb provincial officials responsible for the
donation.
Governor Espina hired Atty. Pablo Garcia, a private lawyer, as his counsel. Atty. Garcia toiled for 8 years on the case, but for
some reason, he was no longer counsel when the parties settled for a compromise agreement.
Nevertheless, Atty. Garcia claims he is entitled to fees worth 30% of the worth of the properties or 36 million pesos (a
staggering amount, considering that the amount was based on the peso - dollar rates of 1979). The province of Cebu City
however refused to give him even one centavo. They said Sec. 1683 of the RAC and Sec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law is clear
that only the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. More importantly, if
the province of Cebu were to hire a private lawyers (such as when the provincial fiscal is disqualified) the Provincial Board must
pass a resolution to allow such a move.
The Trial court awarded attorney’s fees based on quantum merit. On appeal, the IAC awarded 5% worth of properties. The
questions now are 1. Should the province pay Atty. Garcia and 2? If so how much is Atty. Garcia entitled to?

Held: The province must pay Atty. Garcia but he is entitled only to quantum merit. Reasons:
1. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haee exception, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque. (Where anything is granted generally,
this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). This simply means that every rule, no matter how strict
or harsh, must have an exception. Here, equity comes into play. To deny Atty. Garcia compensation for his professional services
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

2. The argument that the hiring of private lawyers by a province must first gain the approval of the Provincial Board is absurd.
First of all, the service of the Provincial Fiscal has already been engaged by the Provincial Board. More importantly, it’s so stupid
for the Provincial Board to pass a resolution grant the hiring of a private lawyer who would litigate against them. The Provincial
Board may just not pass such a resolution. The legal maxim which we can use as a basis for this situation is “Nemo tenetur ad
impossibile” (The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility)

3. Until the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to
represent. His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will
be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. Even where an
attorney is employed by an unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact
that it is being represented by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed
authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification. The act of
the successor provincial board and provincial officials in allowing Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him
in the suit led the counsel to believe his services were still necessary.

4. Atty. Garcia is entitled only to quantum merit. He simply was not counsel when the compromise agreement was made. He
gets only 30,000 pesos,

* Instances where the municipal mayor was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to
the exclusion of the municipality
Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals – the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had
dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refuse to reinstate him in defiance of an
order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.
Nemenzo vs. Sabillano – the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the
necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.
Rama vs. Court of Appeals- the governor, vice – governor, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor,
provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity
damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party
affiliations.
* Instance where the municipality was also held liable along with municipal mayor
Pilar v. Sangguniang Bayan ng Dasol, Pangasinan
Facts:
Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. On March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan
adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per
annum respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such
position is entitled to an annual salary of P16,044.00.
Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary. He wrote
letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter. The proper provincial and national officials endorsed compliance
with Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in giving the revised rate of salary
for petitioner. In fact, the mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the Commission advising him that the
Municipality should pay the Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal Treasurer per Circular No. 15.
On December 12, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as the
salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to P774.00 per month in December, 1981. Then, on October 26, 1982,
amount of P15,144.00 was appropriated as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December
31, 1982. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this petition.
Issue: Whether respondent Espinosa is solely liable
Held:
Yes. The mayor acted in gross evident bad faith. Petitioner is enititled damages and attorney‘s fees because the facts show that
petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the
Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner‘s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. (Article
2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code). That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible
for the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the
Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. Respondent Mayor exceeded his authority in an
arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of the
petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor‘s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial
Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the
prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent
Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.

Laganapan v. Asedillo 154 SCRA 377

Facts: Solano Laganapan was appointed Chief of Police. However, he was summarily dismissed from his position by
respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo of Kalayaan, Laguna on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no
civil service eligibility. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day
in place of the petitioner.
Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police of
Kalayaan, Laguna. Laganapan thus filed a complaint against Mayor Asedillo and the Municipality of Kalayaan for reinstatement
and payment of back wages. May Laganapan be reinstated? Is the Municipality also liable?

Held: The municipality is liable but Laganapan cannot be reinstated. Reasons:

1. Laganapan was summarily dismissed without any semblance of compliance with due process. No charges were filed, no
notice or hearing was made, no nothing. The Court finds no merit in the mayor’s contention that, since the appointments
extended to Laganapan as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, were all provisional in nature, and not permanent, his services
could be terminated with or without cause at the pleasure of the appointing officer. While it may be true that Laganapan was
holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official
who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after receipt by the
appointing officer of a list of eligible form the Civil Services Commission. Here no such certification was received by Mayor
Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of Laganapan.
Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of Laganapan by Asedillo, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan
instead of opposing or at least protesting Laganapan’s summary dismissal of his position, even abolished the appropriation for
the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan – Laguna. The Court considers this act of the Municipal Council as an approval or
confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing Laganapan, as to make said municipality equally liable as
the mayor for the reinstatement of Laganapan and for the payment of his back salaries. Finally it should be noted that Asedillo
was sued not personally, but in his capacity as mayor.

2. Laganapan cannot be reinstated. PD 482, recently enacted at that time, calls for the appointment of a permanent Chief of
Police (known as Station Commander), in certain provinces including Laguna. His reinstatement is not feasible. The Mayor and
the municipality are instead liable for payment of back salaries.

Maderazo v. People
Facts:
Verutiao had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She paid a monthly rental of P200.00. She was allowed to
finish the construction of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.
Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development of the public market, in the absence of
adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other structures for commercial purposes may be
allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for
business.
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the itemized statement of expenses. She was not,
however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract,
renewable every year with a monthly rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed
shall be sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired.
The Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall. However, considering
that she had not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent. Verutiao closed
her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the Christmas holidays and returned a month after.
She and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall within 24 hours
because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall. The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
Issue:
Whether the Mayor could immediately recover possession of the market stall since the lease contract has already expired.
Held:
No. Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on January 13, 1997 without having been renewed,
and petitioner Mayor ordered Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to P2,532.00. Under
Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had
to file an action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and cause her eviction from said
premises.

Liability of a Mayor if driver assigned to him commits negligence

Jayme v. Apostol
Facts:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano,
an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was
then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport
at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato.
The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was
driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin
expired six (6) days after the accident.
Issue: Whether a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him
Whether an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
Held:
No. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano‘s employer notwithstanding Lozano‘s assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held
liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish
that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. Mayor Miguel was neither
Lozano‘s employer nor the vehicle‘s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the
vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin‘s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
No, he municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence,
immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that
municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they
are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered
owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a
consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle
is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is
directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.

Legislative Powers

6 REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE

Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

Facts:
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court
issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the
contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed
the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The
flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no
mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: Whether Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held:
No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing
that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are.
1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily,
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case
now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

Distinction between an Ordinance from a Resolution

An ordinance prescribes a permanent rule of conduct government; whereas a resolution is of temporary character only

Article 107, IRR. Ordinances and Resolutions. The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
1. Legislative actions in a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those temporary
characters shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to propriety functions and to private oncerns shall be
enacted in a resolution.
2. Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall begin writing and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption, an enacting
or ordaining clause and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinance shall be accompanied by a
brief explanatory note contain the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the author or authors and submitted to the
secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunian at the next meeting.
3. A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through a third
reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of the sanggunian members.
4. No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second reading in any regular meeting unless it has been reported out by
the proper committee to which it was referred or certified as urgent by the local chief executive.
5. Any legislative matter duly certified by the local chief executive as urgent whether or not it is included in the calendar of
business, may be presented and considered by the body at the same meeting without need of suspending the rules.
6. The secretary to the sanggunian of the province, city or municipality shall prepare copies of the proposed ordinance or
resolution in the form it was passed on second reading and shall distribute to each sanggunian member a copy thereof, except
that a measure certified by the local chief execute as urgent may be submitted for final voting immediately after debate or
amendment during the second reading.
7. No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purpose shall be valid
unless approved by majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing
the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of all the sanggunian members for its passage.
8. Upon passage of all ordinances and resolution directing the payment of money or creating liability, and at the request of any
members, of any resolution or motion, the sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Each approved ordinance or resolution
shall be stamped with the seal of the sanggunian and recorded in a book kept for the purpose.

*Article 108 – 144, IRR, LGC

Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, et al.

Facts:
Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide and
render arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels berthed thereat, from
September 1992 to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration of petitioner‘s application for renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the PPA
through its Port Manager Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban Port Management Office issued a 90-day holdover authority to
petitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90day period aforementioned, the authority shall be deemed
ipso facto revoked if an earlier permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause
pursuant to PPA Administrative Order No. 1081. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an application for the
renewal of its business permits, which, in turn, was denied.
Issue: Whether respondent mayor’s issuance of the permit is a discretionary duty?
Held:
Yes. It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code that the limits in the exercise of the power of a
municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same can be contained in a law or ordinance The
said section is pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated
police power to local government units. Thus, under the LGC, the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.
The fact that there only was the Resolution No. 93-27, and no ordinance nor law, petitioner‘s cause still cannot prosper because
the proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave of abuse of discretion had been committed, and not mandamus. It may
be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an
ordinance but merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently —a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

QUORUM

Zamora v. Caballero
Facts:
Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special session on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor
Jose R. Caballero, however, the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a written notice.
On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things, allow the Governor to deliver his State
of the Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, no resolution was
considered.
The Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 054 declaring the entire province of
Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 075 authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province,
enter into a construction contract. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation
submitted by Board Member Gemma Sotto.
Petitioner thus filed a petition before the RTC against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian
on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian
nonetheless "conducted official business without a quorum. Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board
Member Sotto was in the United States at the time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual
number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of the determination of a quorum.
The RTC dismissed the petition as Sotto should not be counted as member for the purpose of determining the number to
constitute a quorum because she is in the USA. Quorum should be determined on the basis of the actual number of members of
the body concerned rather than upon its full membership which is fourteen Therefore, in this case, with seven members of the
thirteen members present in constitutive of a quorum.
Issues: Whether there was a quorum in the sessions
Whether Board Member Osorio, who presided the session in behalf of the vice governor, can cast his vote for the resolution.
Held:
There was no quorum. The present case involves a local legislative body, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley
Province, and the applicable rule respecting quorum is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC.
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the
body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or
ordinance or do any valid act. "Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the
LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute
a quorum. The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the total number of members
of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto.

No. The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie. While acting as presiding officer, Board
Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting
even when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could
not have greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of a tie.
Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.

SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD HAS NO CONTEMPT POWERS

Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete

In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in
the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order
the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is
the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies,
the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision
for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-
members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative
power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative
bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners
Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise
these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.

Facts:
Consunji Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina Davao City. On June 13, 1981, David
Consunji Inc transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc in whose favor a TCT was
issued.
Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built the Habagat Grill in December 1993, DMC filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo.
The Complaint alleged that as owner, DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993, that on
that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and
constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present,
that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000 a month. Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in
question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of cause of action.
Issue: Whether the MTC can take judicial notice under Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No. ―Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.‖ Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not
ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunal‘s
general knowledge or from a slight search on its part. Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal
ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states.
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such
location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondent‘s allegation that the supposed lot
covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known of
the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under
Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of
public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial
notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey
team that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation
to respondent‘s lot.

Batangas CATV v. CA
Facts:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct,
install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge
its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, ―provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,
respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No.
205, the National Telecommunications Commission has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether a local government unit may regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction
Held:
No. The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. There is no law authorizing LGUs
to grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously
granted by local governments. Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations, partnerships,
corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and
maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the
constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given
by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF PUBLIC CORP

1. Between the national government and local governments

Hebron v. Reyes
Facts:
In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D.
Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a term of 4 years,
beginning from January 1, 1952, on which date they presumably assumed the aforementioned offices. Petitioner discharged the
duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received a letter from the Office of the President
informing him of an investigation to the administrative charge filed against him. Said letter also informed him of his suspension
until the termination of the administrative proceedings.
Thereupon, Reyes acted as Mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the charges referred to in the
above-quoted letter. After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on
July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not
appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he
instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
Issue: Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or
suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Held:
No. The President has no "inherent power to remove or suspend" local elective officers. Removal and suspension of public
officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitation.
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By
article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local
governments", but supervision does not contemplate control. (People vs. Brophy) Far from implying control or power to remove
the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by law", a clear
indication of constitutional intention that the provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And
the limitation does not stop here. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in conferring on
the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to law, which we
assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the
procedure.

Ganzon v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and
misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue
to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
Held:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, ―supervision‖ is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government
officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized
that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. ―In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.‖ But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials
does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He
however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

2. With the PNP

Angeles v. Mamauag
Facts:
Housemaids Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay, were brought by a certain Agnes Lucero to the Baler Police Station 2, Central
Police District Command (CPDC), Quezon City after they were found wandering aimlessly in a bus terminal. The incident drew
the attention of the media and spawned a complaint for grave misconduct filed by petitioner against P/ Insp. Roberto V. Ganias,
SPO1 Jaime Billedo, herein respondents SPO2 Eugene V. Almario, P/Insp. John A. Mamauag, SPO1 Vivian M. Felipe and
SPO4 Erlinda L. Garcia.
The administrative complaint sought the summary dismissal from service of the police officers on ground of alleged serious
irregularities committed by them in the handling of petitioner‘s criminal complaint for qualified theft against the two housemaids.
Allegedly, while the housemaids were under police custody, several items of jewelry and clothing materials belonging to and
stolen from her were found in the possession of housemaid Proclyn Pacay. Hence, petitioners witnesses requested that the
respondent police officers register the discovery of the stolen articles in the police logbook but the latter did not heed to the
request. Moreover, the police officers allegedly refused to act upon the incident and to conduct further investigation.
The case was initially investigated by the Inspection and Legal Affairs Division of the CPDC which recommended the dismissal
of the charges against the respondent police officers.
Displeased with the outcome of her complaint, petitioner moved for a re-investigation of the case before the PNP Chief. The
PNP Chief issued a decision finding Respondents P/CINSP Roberto Ganias, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, SPO1 Roberto Cario guilty of
Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service; P/INSP John Mamauag and SPO2 Eugene Almario
guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety (90) days
with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether the PNP Chief could modify his June 7, 1996 decision and issue another with a higher penalty of dismissal from service
Ruling:
No. In The National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) v. P/INSP John A. Mamauag, et
al.
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of
RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is
the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting
the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or
tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal in the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP
Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by him pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the April 10, 1995 resolution of the CPDC
District Director, dismissing the charges against respondents, stands and is now final and executory.

3. With component cities and municipalities

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas

Facts:
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo,
Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at
its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts
power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a
land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its
date of issuance or until 30 June 1999. Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the
cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,
and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC
applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. TC dismissed
complaint.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the
issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in the
implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void,
then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring
facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility
becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an
injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed
without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.

SPECIFIC OFFICES

THE CITY LEGAL OFFICER VIS-A-VIS PRIVATE REPRESENTATION

Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta

Facts:
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of
public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the
contractor was allegedly paid P95 million.
APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city‘s Answer,
joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. For Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim
and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City In its Order dated September 11, 2002,
the Regional Trial Court, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of
the City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del
Castillo‘s complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city‘s complaint.
It also granted Capalad‘s motion to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as
defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo
and Urdaneta City.
Issue: Whether Lazaro Law Firm’s representation of the City Government was proper.
Held:
No. Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under
Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and
special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 34 (1997), we
cited that under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185, city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to
whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. In
the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter was enacted way back in
1998. Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor‘s appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor
remains as the city‘s legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer.
Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City
Prosecutor. Notably, the city‘s Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared
the city‘s pretrial brief and represented the city in the pretrial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor‘s
actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.
The appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC
provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality
is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan.
And we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel as only public officers may
act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. Pro bono representation in
collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.

Ramos v. CA G.R. No. L-53766

 The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the services of the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia (now Cruz Durian
Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a case for land recovery against Maria C. Ramos et al
 Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their appearance as supervising counsel in the case
for land recovery
 Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as counsel for the municipality
 Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that private counsel only wanted to serve his native town
Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certoriari with the Court of Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the trial court, thus
the case is appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to represent LGU is correct
HELD:
Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes, Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them
the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting,
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction. There are two specific laws
prohibiting private counsels representing the government- Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code states "the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original
jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse
to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney
may be employed by its council.”
Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the
legal division or office of a municipality, "shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such
powers as may be assigned to him by the council"

THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR

Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales

Facts:
Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then-Governor Roy Padilla on April
1991, with her appointment on a permanent capacity. After almost 8 years, on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel
sent Gonzales a memorandum to explain why administrative charges should not be filed against her for ―gross insubordination/
discourtesy in the course of official duties‖ and ―conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service‖. After Gonzales
submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her. Therefore, on
September 1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.
This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which issued a Resolution,
which modified the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspended Gonzales for 6 months. A
subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC. Upon motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution directed
the reinstatement of Gonzales upon clarification of service of the 6-month suspension. Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales,
however she was dismissed the next day for ―lack of confidence‖. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of his compliance to
the CSC‘s order and Gonzales‘ subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC Resolution where the
CSC held that the position of provincial administrator was highly confidential and coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales‘ reinstatement, stating that while the LGC (RA 7160)
made the position of provincial administrator coterminous and highly confidential in nature, the conversion cannot operate to
prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC.
Gonzales had acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment and is entitled to continue holding the office despite its
subsequent classification. The conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales‘ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the
Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing.
Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee‘s dismissal or discipline under existing laws.
However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC alleging that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco,
Jr., refused to reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which ordered Gonzales‘ reinstatement to the provincial
administrator position, or to an equivalent position.
Issue: Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte.
Held:
No. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All
permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service
category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural
due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due
to the nature of a ―primarily confidential‖ position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily
confidential employee‘s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the
confidential employee is not ―removed‖ or ―dismissed‖ from office. The term merely ―expires‖ and the loss of trust and
confidence is the ―just cause‖ provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where
the trust and confidence has been irretrievably ―eroded‖, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his discretion when he decided that he
could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except
for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in
the nature of the office held. The CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales‘ right to
security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been
changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing
at the time of the termination of her service. She was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had
to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales‘
termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte
or to any other comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales‘ entitlement to retirement benefits, leave
credits, and future employment in government service.

REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

CIRCULAR NO. 12 June 30, 1988

TO: ALL JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION OF GOVERNORS AND MAYORS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the reply, dated June 1, 1988, of Secretary Luis T.
Santos of the Department of Local Government to a query posed by the Office of the Court Administrator on whether governors
and mayors, who are lawyers, may be allowed to practice law during their term of office, to wit:
. . . please be informed that it is the established policy of the Department to strictly enforce Memorandum Circular No. 17 dated
September 4, 1986 of the Office of the President, more particularly as it concerns local elective officials who, by the nature of
their positions, are required by law to render full-time service to their contituencies during their term of office. Provincial
governors, city and municipal mayors whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
government are classified under the said category and are, therefore, covered by the absolute prohibition imposed by the afore-
cited issuance of the Office of the President.
Accordingly, this Department does not allow governors, city the municipal mayors who are lawyers to practice law during their
term of office.

Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475

Facts: Attorney Edwin Javellana was a city councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. He was accused of engaging in the
practice of law without securing authority form the Regional Director of the Department of Local
Government. He also filed a case against the City Engineer, obviously a fellow city official. Javellana contends that the 2
ordinances and Sec. 90 of the LGC of 1991 which served as the basis of the charges against him were unconstitutional
because, according to Article VIII Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court may promulgate rules and
regulations for the practice of law. He also attacked the said laws for being discriminatory for they ganged upon lawyers and
doctors when other similar professions like teachers and morticians were not affected.
Held: Javellana is wrong. Reasons:
1. His contention that Section 90 of the LGC of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VII, Section 5 of
the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and
authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90- 81 simply prescribes rules
of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
2. Section 90 of the LGC does not discriminate against the lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials
in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members “may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in school except during session hours”. If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than other to relate to or affect the
area of public service

Villegas v. Legazpi 113 SCRA 39

Facts: Raul Villegas was an Assemblyman of the Batasang Pambansa form the province of Cebu. Estanislao Fernandez was
also an Assemblyman (from where, the case doesn't say, but that's not important). Both were accused of violating Sec. 11
Article VIII of the 1973 Charter which states that: “No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court without appellate jurisdiction. The records show they appeared as counsel for cases which were
exercised by the CFIs in their original jurisdiction. Did they violate the constitutional prohibition?
Held: Yes. Stated positively, the constitutional provision allows Assemblyman to appear only when the court handling their case
exercise appellate jurisdiction. Only Appellate jurisdiction is permitted because the office of the Assemblyman carry so much
influence and prestige that they might unduly influence upon the administration of justice.

Noriega v. Sison 125 SCRA 293

Facts: The name of the guy here is Emmanuel Sison. We place emphasize on the name here coz the complainant Hermino
Noriega made such a big deal out of it Noriega claimed that Sison, an attorney who works as a Hearing Officer for the SEC, held
himself out to the public as “Atty. Manuel Sison” and under such a gross
misrepresentation of his name handled a case for a close family friend. Noriega said that Sison violated the prohibition on
government employees’ form practicing their professions. Sison replied that the SEC, thru associate commissioner, authorized
him to allow as counsel for such and that he did it for free.
Held: Sison's appearance as counsel as cited was an isolated case, the same therefore did not constitute practice of law since
he did not receive pecuniary benefit (Note that this case took place before the advent of the Cayetano v Monsod ruling). The
case against him seemed more like an instrument of harassment Noriega since the latter once lost to Sison in a SEC case.
There is simply no evidence that the interchanges his name for a fraudulent purpose (the guy's entitled to use a nickname like
everybody else, right?) nor this pleading which revealed his name to be “Manuel Sison” be tainted with deception since it was a
mistake of Sison's part and he consistently tried to correct the same by pointing it out in court.

Teves v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Edgar Teves, Mayor of Valencia, Negros Occidental and his wife Teresita Teves was charge of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act. While in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions
and conspiring with his wife, issued a license in favor of Daniel Teves to operate Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center, said
accused having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and
operated by him and a wife Teresita.
On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita Teves of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-
one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and
participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government, as well as
perpetual disqualification from public office
Issue: Whether Teves’ interest in the cockpit was sufficiently established
Under what law should Teves be penalized
Ruling:
Yes. The prosecution has established that Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in
question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and
manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership
thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.
His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to
Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work
pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit
was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest
thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code
declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his
interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee,
directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit….
Teves should be penalized under the LGC 1991.

Social Justice Society v. Lina

Facts:
Petitioner is a political party and respondent is then the Secretary of Interior and Local Government. Sometime in 2002,
Petitioner filed a petition for Declaratory Relief against respondent praying for the proper construction of Sec. 90 of R.A. No.
7160 (LGC). The pertinent provision provides that Sec. 90 Practice of Profession. xxx (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives. Petitioner points out that, actors, who were elected as public officials, should be disallowed to appear in
movies and TV programs for it will give them undue advantage over their political opponents and considerably reduce the time
that they must devote to their constituents. Petitioner further impleaded respondents Mayor Vilma Santos (Lipa), Pampanga
Gov. Lito Lapid and Paranaque Mayor Joey Marquez.
Respondent DILG thru the Sol. Gen. moved for the dismissal on the grounds that (1) it had no legal standing as it was not the
party affected by the statute; (2) not the real party in interest; (3) no judicial controversy; (4) no need for construction of said
provision; (5) there is already a breach of the statute alleged in the petition; and (5) declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.
RTC dismissed the petition for Declaratory Relief. Petitioner filed a petition for review on Certiorari. Petitioner alleges that it has
locus standi as being a registered political party composed of citizens having legal interest to be informed and enlightened WON
public officials can appear in TV shows during their tenure.
Issue: Whether petition for Declaratory Relief should prosper.
Held:
No. SC found the dismissal by the RTC proper for being an inappropriate remedy for enforcing compliance of said Sec. 90 of
R.A. 7160 or LGC. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of
the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties
rights or duties thereunder. For the action to prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. In the case at bar, SC said that petitioner failed to allege the
ULTIMATE FACTS which satisfy these requisites. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner, the said provision (Sec. 90, LGC) to
which interpretation is sought HAS ALREADY BEEN BREACHED, therefore DR cannot be availed of.

People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Villapando

Facts:
Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed. On
July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal Administrator of the said
municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the
provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Held:
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave
abuse of discretion.The legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code where ―any
public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos‖ simply means disqualification under the law.
Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due
process is void, and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

Frivaldo v. COMELEC 257 SCRA 727

Facts: The dissenting opinion by Justice Davide here is both prophetic and ironic because he spoke that
sovereignty cannot be fragmentized because such fragment cannot be treated as a whole. Davide was talking about the rule
that the popular will of the people (of Sorsogon) in electing Juan Frivaldo as governor should not be frustrated since he garnered
the most votes. Yet Frivaldo won under a cloud of doubt because he may not have legally reacquired his citizenship in time for
the elections. To allow Frivaldo as governor just because the popular will of the electorate should not be frustrated – but setting
aside the rule of law in the process – would be anarchy. Davide said (How ironic that it was Davide himself who swore in GMA
as President during EDSA II)
The majority opinion however, fortunately or otherwise, is the prevailing rule, Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for
governor on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee, the eventual second placer, filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify Frivaldo
because he was not yet a Filipino citizen at the time. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Lee but since Frivaldo moved for
reconsideration, his candidacy continued. Frivaldo eventually topped the elections but on June 30, 1995, the COMELEC acting
on Lee's petition, proclaimed Lee as governor.
A week later, Frivaldo filed a petition claiming that on June 30, 1995 (day of Lee's proclamation), he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen after his August 17, 1994 petition for repatriation has been granted. The COMELEC thus proclaimed
Frivaldo as winner.
Lee contends: 1. that Frivaldo's disqualification due to his lack of citizenship is a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible
to run for governor; and 2. the alleged repatriation of Frivaldo cannot be retroactive.
Held: Lee is wrong (or maybe, wronged). Reasons:
1. Under Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991, there is no showing that a candidate for an electoral position must be a Filipino citizen at
any particular date and time. Admittedly, there was the objection that since a candidate must have been a registered voter
beforehand, he must have therefore possessed Filipino citizenship in order to become a registered voter. The Court gave an
explanation – that the qualification of citizenship for a registered voter and that for a candidate are separate. The registration
requirement of a candidate moreover, is for the purpose of registering him as a voter in the area or requirement of a candidate
moreover, is only for the purpose of registering him as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to govern. He does not actually
have to vote. The issue is citizenship, not voting. The issue of being a registered voter was merely raised to bolster the claim
that the qualification of citizenship is a continuing one and thus cannot be acquired at a later time. The Court is saying, “Run
now, acquire citizenship later,” which is lousy. Is this the way we treat our precious citizenship?)
2. The alleged repatriation of Frivaldo can be retroactive. PD 725 declares that repatriation creates a “new right” in order to cure
a defect in the existing naturalization law. In Frivaldo's cause he was stateless at the time he took his Filipino oath of allegiance
since in his comment, he has long renounced his American citizenship (a self
serving statement). Moreover since he ran for governor several times prior to 1995, he necessarily must have taken the Filipino
oath of allegiance several times as well, which is another indication of renunciation of his
American citizenship (Davide countered that it is the US, not Frivaldo, who decides who is and who is not her
nationals, a principle in international law). Therefore, to prevent prejudice to Frivaldo by letting him remain
stateless for a substantial period of time while in the meantime being deprived of his rights, it is clear then that PD 725 was
intended to be retroactive. In short, Frivaldo's repatriation retracted to Aug 17, 1994, the day he filed his application for such and
not just on June 30, 1995.

Moreno v. COMELEC
Facts:
Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months by the RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of Imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and
restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 elections.
The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be disqualified
from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en
banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed.
Issue: WON Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on WON his sentence was served
Held:
Moreno‘s sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase ―within two (2) years after serving
sentence‖ found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC.
The accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office
because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of
the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all
the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

Salomon v. NEA 169 SCRA 507

Facts: Natividad Salomon was a Director for the La Union Electric Corporation (LULECO). Because she was also a Barangay
Captain of Natividad, Naguilan, La Union, the Minister of Local Government of La Union appointed her as a member of the
sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union. The National Electrification Administration, however, disqualified her from further acting
as LULECO director by authority of Sec. 21 of PD 269 which says, “Elective officers of the government, except barrio captain
and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any (electric cooperative).” (Section 21 PD 269). The
legal provision is also incorporated in section 3, Article IV of the LULECO's by – laws which runs: “No persons shall be eligible to
become or to remain a board member of the cooperative who holds an elective office in the government above the level of a
barangay captain.”
Salomon simply argued that she is not an elective officer but an appointive officer as the facts above show. Is she therefore
exempt from the prohibition?
Held: No, the spirit of the law would be undermined – that incumbents of elective offices be prevented form exerting political
influence and pressure on the management of the cooperative. The spirit of the law is as much a part of what is was written.

Bautista v. COMELEC
Facts:
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay
elections. TheElection Officer, Josefina P. Jareo refused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a
registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the
Regional Trial Court, which the Trial Court granted on 1 July 2002, ordering Jareo to accept Bautista‘s certificate of candidacy
and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of
candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise.
Bautista won.
COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the
official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3)
direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the
position which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584.
The Board of Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay.[11] Alcoreza thus assumed the post of Punong
Barangay of Lumbangan.
On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions.
On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Issue: Whether a candidate for Punong Barangay should be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run.
Held:
Yes. Under the Local Government Code of 1991an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a
qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a registered voter.
These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which prescribed the
guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. Section 7 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are registered voters and possess all
the qualifications of a candidate.
It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the barangay
where he intends to run for office.
Bautista admitted that he was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbanga. It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty
to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer
included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he
needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong Barangay.

Cayat v. COMELEC
Facts:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat
misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is
serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.
Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat
failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.
Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues
that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.
Issue: Whether the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.
Held:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the
elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast
for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan‘s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat‘s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty
candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat‘s disqualification became final only after the
elections.

Rivera III v. COMELEC

Facts:
A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for
the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.
Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd term), he was
merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an
election protest.
Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14,
2004.
Issue: Whether Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.
Held:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June
30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by
petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables
him "to stay on indefinitely".
With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of
votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as
the mayor.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On Nov. 22,
2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application
was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was
denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a
petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of
the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show
ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Ruling:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for
at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has
a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a
person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for
provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the
decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their
manifest will.

Jalover v. Osmeña
Facts:
On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC,
Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for 15 years prior to the May 2013 elections.
Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification."
The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeña made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter‘s COC and
likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. In particular, the
petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Toledo City 15
years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections.
In his defense, Osmeña argued that even prior to his actual transfer of residence to Ibo, Toledo City, in 2004, he had been able
to establish ties with Toledo City in view of his family‘s business interests and his political linkages.
Issue: Whether Osmeña committed misrepresentation in his certificate
Held:
No. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this
intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one‘s fixed
and permanent place of abode.
Osmeña‘s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house
and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña‘s substantial and real interest in
establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in
the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community‘s socio-civic and
political activities.
To successfully challenge a winning candidate‘s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.

DISQUALIFICATIONS

RA 8295 June 6, 1997

Section 3. Assumption of office. – In the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or cancel the certificate of
candidacy in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for under Sec.s 69 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 also
known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, the candidate referred to in the preceding paragraph shall assume
office not earlier than the scheduled election day. Certificates of candidacy filed in violation hereof shall not be given due course.
For this purpose, the Commission shall decide petitions for disqualifications not later than election day; otherwise, such petitions
shall be deemed dismissed.
Section 4. Disqualification. – In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in Sec.s 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason which
he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation; and
b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or
produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to
become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all
other potential candidate.

RA 9165
Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained
from the Unlawful Act Committed. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public
office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated,
seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as
provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as
prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons
found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified
from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including
government-owned or –controlled corporations.

Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. – The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided
for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of
such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC

Facts:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against
Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after
he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen,
such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts
that even if he‘s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is
disqualified.
Held:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It
was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of
allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines
in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this
happened.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by
reason of Labo‘s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on
March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office
on March 25, 1992.
Petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino
citizen. Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo‘s COC.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992
subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
Respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the
City Mayor of Baguio.
Issue:
Whether Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
Whether disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as
the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
-No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling
his (Labo‘s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution
having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining
order was issued by this Court.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not
being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
-No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was
not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the
belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec seeking to deny due
course to petitioner‘s candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then,
was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree
of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

De la Torre v. COMELEC
Facts:
Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a
ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position – i.e. ―when the conviction is for an offense involving
moral turpitude.‖
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense
whose nature involves moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation
granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing
therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held:
Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that ―the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the ―fence‖ of the fact that property received as stolen displays the
same degree of malicious deprivation of one‘s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time
and in degree, both the ―fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one‘s peaceful dominion for gain –
thus deliberately reneging the process ―private duties they owe their ―fellowmen in a manner ―contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.

Mercado v. Manzano
Facts:
Respondent Edu Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections. However, upon petition of a certain
Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by Comelec on the ground that he is a dual citizen.
Issue: Whether Manzano is eligible to be Makati’ Vice Mayor even if he is a dual citizen.
Held:
Sec.40 of the LGC provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective position. However, the
court ruled that dual citizenship under Sec.40 must be understood as dual allegiance. The former arises when different laws of
citizenship of different countries are applied to a person without any voluntary act (jus soli, jus sanguinis) while the latter arises
out of a positive act of a person who simultaneously owes loyalty to different countries.
To terminate the status of dual allegiance, it must conform with the strict processes of law while in dual citizenship, the mere
election of Philippine Citizenship upon filing of the COC is sufficient to terminate the previous status.
By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

Maquiling v. COMELEC
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of
the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued
in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of his foreign citizenship.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as ―USA-American.‖ The COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is
still using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for
public office.
Held:
Yes. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political
rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
COMELEC En Banc was correct in holding that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one‘s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado‘s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective
local position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time
of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
Jacot v. Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division2 disqualifying him
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Held:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of
a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino
has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be
executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections.

De Guzman v. COMELEC
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007
Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14,
2007 elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon
approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having
reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for
having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
Held:
Yes. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
Petitioner‘s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires
those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.

Valles v. COMELEC
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez who was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother, ran for
governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner Cirilo Valles filed a petition for disqualification against Lopez on the ground that she is an
Australian Citizen.
Issue: Whether Lopez is eligible to run as governor.
Held:
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the laws effective at the time of birth of Lopez before the 1935 Constitution,
her father is considered as Spanish subject and a Filipino citizen. As such, she is also a Filipino Citizen.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The principle of jus sangguinis has been adopted also by the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Hence, Lopez is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Also, the mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation
to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.

Coquilla v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla is a Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American Citizen after joining the US Navy.
He then applied for repatriation and on Nov.2000, his application was approved and he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
On February 2001, he filed his COC to run as a mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar where he stated that he has been residing in the
place for two years.
Another candidate Neil Alvarez filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Coquilla but the Comelec failed to resolve the issue
so the petitioner later on was declared the winner.
Alvarez argues that Coquilla has not complied with the residency requirement for the position of mayor.
Issue: Whether Coquilla complied with the residency requirement.
Held:
Although Coquilla was born and grew-up in Oras, Eastern Samar, he is deemed to have lost his residence together with his
citizenship when he was naturalized as American citizen.
He is only deemed to have acquired his citizenship and residence until his re-acquisition of his Philippine citizenship when he
took oath on Nov.2000.
As such, when he filed his COC, he is considered as resident of the place for a few months and not two years as he stated
therein. Hence, his disqualification is valid on the ground of misrepresentation.
Coquilla cannot invoke the ruling in Bengzon v. HRET that upon repatriation, he is deemed to have reacquired his original
status. This is because the issue here is his false statement in his COC.

Justimbaste v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Pricila Justimbaste filed a disqualification case against Rustico Balderian, a mayoralty candidate in Tabobtabob Leyte
on the ground of material misrepresentation in his COC and that he is not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner argues that Balderian‘s real name is CHU TECK SIAO but it was not the name reflected in his COC.
Comelec denied the disqualification case and Balderian won the election. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Balderian committed misrepresentation in his COC.
Held:
The petition is without merit because SEC. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that cancellation of COC is allowed only if
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
Although the birth name of the respondent is CHU TECK SIAO, there is already a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) granting his change of name to Rustico Balderian.
The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material
misrepresentation" under Sec.78 refers to "qualifications for elective office."
There was also no intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent‘s identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the
voting public was thereby deceived.

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Kare v. COMELEC
Facts:
Salvador Moll and Avelino Ceriola are candidates for mayor in Malinao, Albay.
Ceriola filed a petition for disqualification against Moll on the ground that he was previouslt sentenced by final judgment to suffer
the penalty of 6 months to 1 year and 9 months for the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions.
Moll won the May 2001 election but on March 2003, Comelec issued a resolution disqualifying him from office and declared
Ceriola to be the mayor.
The vice-mayor Emiliana Kare filed a petition to against the resolution on the part of the proclamation of Cariola. She argues that
she is the rightful successor the the position of mayor.
Issue: Whether the proclamation of Ceriola is valid.
Held:
Moll argues that his judgment is not yet final but since he was not able to seasonably file his MR, it did not stay the
implementation of the judgment.
On the issue of who should be the mayor, the court ruled that Comelec was wrong in proclaiming Ceriola because the resolution
disqualifying Moll took effect after the election, that is on March 2003.
Comelec argued that under the OEC Sec.24, ―any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final
judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot." Moll, according to Comelec,
was disqualified when he was convicted by final judgment long before the election and so Ceriola is the lone candidate in the
election.
The court however disagrees. The court said that it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued
Resolution to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as
mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the subsequent invalidation
of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the
right of the people to elect officials of their choice. As such, in case of permanent vacancy, the elected vice mayor should be
proclaimed as the mayor.

Amora v. COMELEC
Facts:
On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
To oppose Amora, the Nationalist People‘s Coalition fielded Trygve L. Olaivar for the mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S.
Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality.
On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that
Amora‘s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax certificate (CTC)
to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Amora was
victorious in the local elections. A week later, COMELEC en banc granted Olandria‘s petition. Thus, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified by presenting his community tax certificate as competent evidence of identity in
executing his COC.

Held:
No. An improperly sworn COC is not equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.
Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of
the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the
foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of
a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate
"for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary
public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly
disposes of the core issue. He said that according to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.
Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public,
which is the case herein.
People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Villapando
Facts:
Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed. On
July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal Administrator of the said
municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the
provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Held:
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave
abuse of discretion.The legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code where ―any
public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos‖ simply means disqualification under the law.
Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due
process is void, and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.

TERM OF OFFICE

Borja v. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Jose Carpo is the vice-mayor of Pateros for a term ending June 1992. When the mayor Cesar Borja died, Carpo
became the mayor by operation of law.
In 1992, Carpo ran and elected as mayor and in 1998 he again filed his COC for re-election but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr.
contested it on the ground that he had already served the three-consecutive term allowed by law.
Issue: Whether Carpo has already served three consecutive terms.
Held:
The contention of Borja is unmeritorious.
The three term limit of local officials must be taken to the right to be elected and the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms but he must also be elected in the to the
same position in the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
In this case, the first term of Carpo cannot be included in the computation because he was not elected in that instance but rather
only served the remaining term of the deceased mayor by virtue of operation of law.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC
Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was the mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for two consecutive terms. In 1995, he ran again for his third term
and won. However, after an election protest has been filed by his opponent Juan Alves, the Comelec declared a failure of
election and the position vacant but Lonzanida still continued to function as such.
After the recounting of votes, Comelec declared Aves as the winner of the election and issued a resolution for such in February
1998, a few months after the next election. Lonzanida acceded to the resolution and Aves took over the position.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his COC to run as mayor of the place but his opponent this time, Eufemio Muli
filed a disqualification case on the ground that he has already served his three-term limit.
Muli contends that even though Aves has been declared as the winner in the 1995 polls, Lonzanida still functioned as the mayor
for almost the entire term.
Issue: Whether Lonzanida has already served his three-term limit.
Held:
The argument of Muli is without merit.
The three-term limitation provided by the Constitution and the LCG provides that ―The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.‖
In the present case the assumption in office of Lonzanida in 1995 cannot be considered as part of the three-term limit because
of the absence of two requisites. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply

.
Montebon vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and 2004
elections. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of
Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007
elections, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.
In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule because his second term
was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the retirement of elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an
interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
Issue: Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?
Held:
Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does
the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as
permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that
he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed
and occupy the post vacated.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a
public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal
charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.
Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption
of office as vice--mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an
interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)
Note:
● Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation
of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

Dizon vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P.
Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous
consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March
2007 for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not
elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said
position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second
term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC‘s ruling in the Rivera
case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in
that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the
same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007)
should be considered his fourth term
Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his
Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May
2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.

Bolos vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994,1997,
2002).
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004
leaving his post as Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the
same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term
hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
Pending the resolution of the case before the COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
Issue: Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the
post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
YES. The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after
the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan
members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioner‘s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol,
as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is avoluntary
renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned.
Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give
up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as
such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Adormeo v. COMELEC
Facts:
Raymundo Adormeo filed a petition for disqualification against the incumbent mayor of Lucena City, Ramon Talaga Jr., from his
re-election bid for the 2001 polls on the ground that he has already served three consecutive terms.
Talaga was the mayor of the place in 1992-1995 and again on 1995-1998. In his re-election bid in 1998, however, he lost to
Bernard Tagarao. In a recall election in 2000, Talaga run against Tagarao and won and he served the unexpired term of the
latter.
The Comelec first denied the petition of Adormeo but granted it after a motion for reconsideration has been filed.
Issue:
Whether Tagala already served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
Talaga served two consecutive term at most and then lost. After two years as a private citizen, he ran again in the recall election
and won. As such, his term cannot be considered as consecutive although he merely served the unexpired term of Tagarao
after the recall polls. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
The comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that ―if
one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one
term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed‖ is only applicable to members of Congress where
there is no recall election provided.

Latasa v. COMELEC
Facts:
Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995 and 1998.
In September 2000, a plebiscite was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of the term of
Latasa as mayor of the municipality. However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay in position in a hold-over
capacity until the next election.
In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three consecutive
term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor.
His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga filed a disqualification case against Latasa in the Comelec on the ground of violation
of the three-term rule. Comelec granted the petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not acted upon until the day of election and
hence, he won and proclaimed as the mayor.
Issue: Whether Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos.
Held:
The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction
of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years.
The Court believes that Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as
city mayor unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office. In this case,
there was no interruption in the holding of office and hence, the three consecutive term is completed.
Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on disqualified, the second placer Sunga, cannot assume the position but the vice mayor.

Aldovino vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive
suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on
the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the
three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive
suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong
seeking Asilo‘s disqualification.
―Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore
not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,‖ held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat
―more potent‖ than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to
undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.

ABUNDO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Ablardo Abundo,
Sr. vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served
the corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres‘ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007,
or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. Torres filed a petition to disqualify
Abundo predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
ISSUE: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the
duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three
consecutive term limit for elective local officials?
RULING: NO. The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo‘s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the LocalGovernment Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective officialconcerned was elected.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory
provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Naval vs COMELEC
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second
District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in
Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The
present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First
District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. He filed before the COMELEC
a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province
of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
from. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
ISSUE:
WON Naval‘s, a provincial board member, election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation
of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule.
RULING:
YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional Commission approved that there is no immediate reelection after three
successive terms. For the Body believed that the imposition of term limits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of
seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official‘s stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. The ―limitation‖ under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative—―no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.‖ This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a
clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and
of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority
constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of
less than equal constitutional worth.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would
be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the
one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional
Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further, sustaining Naval‘s arguments
would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.

VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION

1. Permanent Vacancies

* Sec 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the governor, vice – governor, mayor and vice mayor.
a. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs on the office of the governor, vice –governor, mayor, or vice –
mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by other sangguniang members
according to their ranking as defined therein.
b. If a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member or,
in the case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member shall become the punong barangay.
c. A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots
d. The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired portions of their predecessors.

For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.

* Sec 45. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian

a. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled by
appointment in the manner provided:
1. The President, thru the Executive Secretary, in the case of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sanggunian Panlungsod
of highly urbanized cites and independent component cities;
2. The governor, in case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cites and the sangguniang bayan
3. The city or municipal mayor, in case of the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniang bayan
concerned
b. Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sangguniang member
concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the
sanggunian shall be appointed in the same manner herein provided. The appointee shall come form the same political party as
that of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the
appointment herein mentioned a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the
political party concerned are conditions sine qua non and any appointment without such nomination shall be null and void and
shall be a ground for administrative action against the official thereof.
c. In case the permanent vacancy in the representation of the youth and barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall
be filled automatically by the official next in rank by the organization concerned

2. Temporary Vacancies

* Section 46 Temporary vacancies in the office of the local chief executive

a. When the governor city or municipal mayor or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical
or legal reasons such as but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or
municipal vice-mayor or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and
perform the duties of the local chief executive concerned except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which
can only be exercised if the period of the temporary incapacity exceeds for 30 working days
b. Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the local
chief executive concerned that he has to return back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes
the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents that said legal causes no longer exist.
c. When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for period not
exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing an officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall
specifies the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the local chief executive
except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees
d. In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor,
the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right
to assume powers, duties and function of the said office on the 4th day of absence of the said local chief executive, subject to
the limitation provided in subsection (C) hereof.
e. Except as provided above the local chief executive in no case authorized any local official to assume the powers, duties and
functions, other than the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, the highest sangguniang barangay member, as the
case may be.

3. Resignation

* Article 82 IRR. Resignation

a. Resignation of elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance of the following authorities:
1. By the President, in the case of governor and vice-governor, mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities,
independent component cities and municipalities within the Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions as
may be created by law.
2. By the governor, in case of municipal mayor, municipal vice-mayors, mayors and vice-mayors of component cities
3. By the sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members: and
4. By the city or the municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials
b. The DILG shall be furnished copies of the letters of the resignation letters of elective local officials together with the action
taken by the authorities concerned
c. The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within 15 days from receipt thereof
d. Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session of the
sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records. This provision shall not apply to sanggunian members who are subject to
recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed of acting upon such resignations.

Panis v. Civil Service Commission 229 SCRA 589

Facts: The Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) is a government hospital of Cebu City. One day, a new office in said hospital was
created by virtue by a valid reorganization – the Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration. Two candidates for the appointive
position cropped up. Jaime Panis and Bella Veloso, Panis loved to crow about his seniority status and thought he would be
chosen for the position. However, the city mayor appointed Veloso, Panis now claims that the appointment of Veloso was made
in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudence because the seniority and next in rank rules were
disregarded.
Held: Panis is wrong. First, even if granting that Veloso was originally an outsider as she came from the private sector, it will not
prohibit her employment as long as she has her civil service eligibility. Second, the next rank rule applies only in cases of
promotion. The position being fought was newly created. Assuming however, that said position could only be filled up through
promotion, still the next in rank rule is not mandatory – it nearly gives preferential treatment.
Ultimately, the power to appoint lies within the discretion of the local chief executive vested with the power, provided that
appointee possesses the minimum requirements provided by law.

Menson v. Petilla 197 SCRA 251

Facts: For a time, the province of Leyte had not proclaimed any governor. So on February 16, 1988, the secretary of local
government appointed vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla as acting governor of the province of Leyte. Now the position of vice-guy
was vacant. The secretary of local government thus appointed Aurelio Menson, a senior member of sangguniang panlalawigan
as vice-governor.
Everything would have been fine except for one thing: the LGC of 1983 does not provide for succession of the office of the vice-
governor (even the LGC of 1991 as well). Still, Menzon did serve for more than a year as vice-governor. On July 7, 1989, after
some serious debate on the legality of Menson's appointment, the sangguniang panlalawigan issued a resolution holding invalid
the appointment of Menson as vice-governor. Their reasoning: legally speaking, there is no vacancy in the office of the vice-
governor cause no law recognizes its existence. And granting that such vacancy legally exists, the law does not authorize
secretary of local government to have an appointment thereto. As a result, poor Menson was not paid emoluments attached to
his office as vice-governor. Was there really a vacancy? Is Menson entitled to the emoluments?
Held:
1. Menson was appointed precisely to avoid such scenario. Besides, the law on public officers is clear on the matter. There is no
vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. In a scenario there is a vacancy when there is no
person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
Applying the definition of vacancy in this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the vice-governor was left vacant when the
duly elected vice-governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed acting governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was
elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the vice-governor
2. It may be noted under commonwealth act no. 588 and the revised administrative code of 1987, the President is empowered to
make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Admittedly, both laws deal only
with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the local government
code and in the best interest of public service, the SC saw no-cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case. Petilla et. al. contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power.
This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local government as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, the SC has no problem ruling in favor of the president, until the law
provides otherwise.
3. In view of the foregoing, Menson's right to be paid the salary attached to the office of the vice-governor is indubitable. And,
even granting that the President, acting through the secretary of local government, possesses no power to appoint the
petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is de facto officer entitled to compensation.
4. The SC explained that the vacancy must always be filled, in this wise: “A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds
no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of the right of the representation and governance in their own local
government. In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated
or absent, etc, the management of governmental affairs, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the governor or the vice-governor is missing”

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA 284 SCRA 276

Facts: Augusto Antonio was a barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes in March 1989. This guy later
became president of the Association of Barangay Councils or ABC. Thanks to the LGC of 1983, his position also entitles him to
be a member of the sangguniang bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.
Meanwhile, the election for president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) was for the municipality.
FABC was for the province was declared void for lack of quorum so the provincial council was forced to reorganize. As a result,
the DILG secretary, in recognition of Antonio as a power hungry politician, designated him as a temporary member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nenito Aquino, the ABC vice-president took his place. Antonio however, never questioned Aquino
as his replacement. Antonio tendered his resignation from the sangguniang bayan
(but not as ABC president) and would later on serve the sangguniang panlalawigan for 2 years.
Some time afterwards, the election for president of FABC above quoted, which was once declared void, was reversed by the
SC. Also, was found to unqualified for membership in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan so he got promptly kicked-out.
A year passed. Then Antonio heard that Aquino resigned from the presidency of the ABC. Antonio now wants his old job back
as ABC president. The Sangguniang Bayan refused to take him back, saying he resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan a long
time ago. Antonio replied that the third requirement for his valid resignation – acceptance by the president or his alter ego was
missing. Moreover, if his resignation was valid he did not resign as ABC president – and said position still carries with it the
benefit of being an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Sangguniang Bayan countered that he either did one of
two things – resignation or abandonment of his old post.
Held: Antonio did not effectively resign but he did abandon his post. Reasons:
1. Resignation as the “Act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to
use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form expressed or implied or the intention to surrender renounce and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority.” To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be:
a. An intention to relinquish a part of the term;
b. an act of relinquishment; and
c. an acceptance by the proper authority.
The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. Antonio did not effectively resign because the third
element is missing. While it is true that the LGC is silent as to who shall accept the resignation of a Sanggunian Bayan member,
jurisprudence has held that in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom resignations shall be submitted, the appointing
person or body shall receive the resignation. The president or his alter ego is the appointing person in this case and there was
no evidence that either of them have received Antonio's resignation.

2. Antonio however, abandoned his post. Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an
office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. The following clearly manifest the
intention of private respondent to abandon his position: 1. his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. 2. his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration for the position, 3. His failure to object to the appointment of
Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, 4. his prolonged failure to initiate any act to re assume his post in the
Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On the other hand, the following, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had affected his intention 1. His letter of
resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan, 2. his assumption of office as member of said Sanggunian Panlalawigan 3. his faithful
discharge of his duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian and 4. his receipt of the remuneration for such post.
While it was true that Antonio was designated as member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan – meaning his appointment there
was merely to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities as a Sanggunian Bayan Members – still his express and
implied acts clearly indicate hi abandonment of the latter.
3. Lastly, Antonio, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member of the Sangguniang Bayan by virtue of
Section 146 of BP Blg 337. However, his right thereto is not self – executory, for the law itself requires another positive act an
appointment by the President or the secretary of local government per EO 342. What Antonio could have done in order to be
able to re assume his post after Aquino's resignation was to seek a reappointment form the President of the secretary of local
government. By large, Antonio cannot claim an absolute right to the office which. By his own actuations, he is deemed to have
relinquished.

Gamboa Jr. v. Aguirre Jr. 310 SCRA 867

Facts: In the 1995 elections, we have the following winners from Negros Occidental: Rafael Coscolluela as governor; Romeo
Gamboa as vice governor; and Marcelo Aguirre and Juan Araneta as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). Now, under the LGC of
1991, the vice governor shall also be the officer of the SP. Keep this in mind later on. The governor went away on an official trip
abroad. Before he left, he designated vice governor as acting governor. So the vice governor became acting governor. But when
vice governor Gamboa, who was now acting governor as well, tried to preside over SP sessions, some SP members resented
and even filed a case in court to prohibit him from doing so. The court even declared Gamboa as “temporarily legally
incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the acting governor.” Was the trial court
correct?
Held: Yes, if you'll look at the composition of the SP, no presence of the governor. can be found. Since Gamboa became acting
governor., he technically had given up his SP membership notwithstanding him being still vice governor. Since the LGC of 1991
is clear that the composition of the SP should not have even the slightest hint of governor's presence – not even his smell. What
the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. An acting give smells like a governor. For all other purposes however,
Gamboa still remains as vice governor. In such case, since the vice governor. cannot preside, the SP members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect a temporary presiding officer form among themselves (Sec 49b, LGC)

GOV. FARIÑAS vs. MAYOR BARBA

FACTS: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he
resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the
recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the
resolution ―for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the governor.
Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8,
1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor
Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor
Barba.
ISSUE: Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
HELD: The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of the
Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in
the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox
was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.

MIRANDA vs. CARREON, et. al

FACTS:
In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the
suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed respondents to various permanent positions in the city government and which
appointments were based on the evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) pursuant to RA
7160.
However, when Mayor Miranda resumed his office on March 5, 1998, he formed a three-man special performance audit team, to
conduct a personnel evaluation audit to those who were screened by the PSPB including respondents hereof. After which, the
audit submitted a report stating that respondents were found ―wanting in their performance.‖ Thus, on June 10, 1998, three
months after, Mayor Miranda issued an order terminating respondents‘ services effective June 15, 1998 because they
―performed poorly‖ during the probationary period.
Respondents appealed to the CSC , contending that being employees on probation, they can be dismissed from the service on
the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months, not after three (3) months. They also denied
that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the service violated their right to due
process.
Thereafter, CSC issued a Resolution reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and ordering that the respondents be reinstated to
their former positions with payment of back wages. This was appealed by petitioner to the CA and which the CA rendered a
Decision affirming in toto the CSC Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES: Whether the CSC erred in its decision to reinstate respondents and pay back wages.
HELD:
NO. The Constitution provides that ―no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.‖ Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from the
service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity.
While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential
Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service.
Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents
were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or employee
from the service.
But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of
six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires
enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This condition, however, was not
observed in this case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor Jose Miranda could finally determine the
performance of respondents for only the first three months of the probationary period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
36997 is AFFIRMED.

DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR

FACTS:
The case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him. The appointmentwas
issued on November 19, 1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Docena took his oath of
office before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and assumed office as member
of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by
Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passed Resolution No.
75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following day, the
SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991, SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar
and declaring void the recall issued by Secretary Santos. Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents
(SPES) to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether Docena‘s appointment was already complete?
HELD
YES. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as
per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner‘s appointment had already become
complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been ―superseded‖ by the appointment in favor of Alar.
Docena‘s appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not
thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired
portion of the deceased predecessor‘s term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be
removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code.
These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.

Limbona vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik ―Bobby‖ T. Alingan were mayoralty candidates in
Pantar, Lanao del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition to disqualify the husband of
petitioner for non-compliance with the one-year residence requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition,
this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed for withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC
granted the disqualification of petitioner‘s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her
husband which was approved by the COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought Petitioner‘s disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower
Kalangaan.
ISSUE: WON petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement
HELD:
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must be residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there, and an intention to abandon the old domicile. A person‘s
domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner‘s domicile of origin is Maguing , Lanao del norte, which is also her
place of birth; and that her domicile, by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapasun, Marawi City. The COMELEC Found
that Petitioner‘s Husband effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006.
Since it is presumed that the Husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that Petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.
Hence, failure to comply with the residency requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao
del Norte.

Recall (See 69-75, LGC and Art 154 – 162, IRR)

Garcia v. COMELEC 227 SCRA 100

Facts: Enrique Garcia was elected Governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice mayors and Sangguniang
Bayan members of the 12 municipalities of Bataan however convened and constitute themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall of Garcia. The PRA's first resolution calling for the recall of Garcia was however shot down by the
SC because it was found that the backers of the PRA sent only selective notices to local officials most likely sympathetic to their
cause. The PRA thus cured this defect in their second resolution. Scared, Garcia now assails the constitutionality of Section 70
of the LGC of 1991, which allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate a recall of an elective official. Garcia says that it’s
highly possible that the dominant political party in government can use a recall as a tool in ousting their incumbent opponents; 2)
the RPA is not reflective of the people’s will; 3) the right to initiate recall rests with the people itself.
Held: Garcia is wrong reasons:
1) All powers are subject to abuse anyway. To deny power because it can be abused by the grantee is to render government
powerless and no people need a toothless government. This is the reason behind the presumption that public officials are
actually performing their duties in good faith.
2) The PRA is merely a step in the recall process. The recall it self still has to be submitted to the people for affirmation thru an
election. The PRA is not the recall itself, thus it cannot be said to be reflective of the people’s will.
3) The PRA is also initiation of recall by the people themselves, although done indirectly through their representatives. The
reason for using PRA as a mode for initiating recall is because admittedly, initiating recall thru direct action by the people is
difficult and expensive.
4) Davide’s dissent: the power to initiate recall includes the power not to initiate. The power to initiate becomes meaningless if
another body is authorized to do it for the electorate. It’s not hard to see that in reality, it’s far easy get majority of the PRA to
initiate a recall proceeding. In effect a small group can easily negate the power of the vast electorate to initiate recall (therefore,
the good justice is doubtful of the republican system of the government). What congress should have done is to reduce the
minimum 25% requirement down to 15 or 20% (which is good idea).

Evardone v. COMELEC 204 SCRA 464

Facts: The guys here calling for a recall of an elective official failed because they initiated the recall a bit too late. Felipe
Evardone won as mayor of municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar in the 1988 election. 2 years later, Alexander Apelado and
friends filed a petition for the recall of Evardone. The COMELEC approved the signing of the said petition for recall.
There was some ballyhoo regarding a TRO issued by the SC retraining Apelado and friends from proceeding of the signing of
the petition, but that’s not important. What Everdone complaining about is that the COMELEC cannot formulate rules and
regulations governing the procedure of recall elections because according to the 1987 Constitution, Congress is supposed to
pass a new local government code which would provide for the procedure in recall elections.
Since such a code wasn’t passed at the time, the initiation for recall must fail because there’s no procedure in existence to
follow anyway.
Held: The initiation of recall must fail, but for a different reason.
1) Its true tat the LGC of 1991 has yet to be passed. However, the LGC of 1983 (BP 337) was still in force in that time as can be
shown in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission where the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized.
BP 337 authorizes the COMELEC to supervise and control recall elections and promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.
2) However, the SC promulgated this decision in 1991. The 1992 elections was only 7 months away, BP 337 disallows the
holding of recall elections one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Paras v. COMELEC 264 SCRA 49

Facts: Pati SK elections ba naman pinatulan ng recall.
Danilo Paras won as Punong Barangay in the 1994 barangay elections of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as
Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Paras managed to delay the holding of the recall elections
3 times (note that the term of a Punong Barangay is for 3 years only). The third attempt at a recall election was slated for
January 13, 1996. Paras gleefully noted that the recall action was barred by representation as no recall shall take place. 1 year
immediately preceding a regular election as managed by SEC.74(b), LGC of 1991.
Held: A Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election is not a regular local election, at least within the contest of Section 74 because
said Section 74, when taken together as a whole, is intended for elective positions with minimum terms of 4 years. Para’s
interpretation of the statute is too literal and absurd. The spirit, rather than the letter of the law, determines it’s contents.
However Para’s delaying tactics worked. The next regular elections concerning the barangay office concerned is merely 7
months away. Recall is no longer possible by virtue of same election 74(b). Para’s still merges as the winner (Moral lesson: Wag
mo ng patulan ang SK elections 3 taon lang naman natiis yan eh).

Mercado v. Board of Elections Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas 243 SCRA 422

Facts: Jose Mercado was proclaimed SK chairman of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan Batangas during the 1992 elections. His rival,
Crisanto Pangilinan, filed a protest with the Board of Elections Supervisors (BES) on the ground that some votes, were
invalidated by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) Chairman without insulting his fellow members. Pangilinan won in the recount.
Mercado assailed in the authority of the BES act on the protest filed by his rival. He said the ground created by
Pangilinan was in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court (as
mandated by Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code) and not by some never heard BES, a body created by the COMELEC
thru its Resolution No. 2499.
The RTC dismissed Mercado’s complaint saying that Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction
to try SK elections. Mercado then argued at the SC that Res. No. 2499 was null and void in the first place because SK elections
are governed by the Omnibus Election Code and not by some numb resolution passed without legal
basis by the COMELEC.
Held: Mercado is mistaken. Reasons:
1) The SK election is not an election involving elective barangay officials within the context of the Omnibus Election Code and
the Constitution. The position of SK chairman is not include as one of the elective members of the Sangguniang Barangay
(which consist of the punong barangay and 7 regular sangguniang barangay members). An SK chairman is at best merely an
ex-officer member of Sangguniang Barangay. Therefore, SK elections are not governed by the Omnibus Election Code.
2) Article 203 of the IRR of the LGC 1991 states that SK elections shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the
COMELEC. Therefore, the BES, as a creation of COMELEC Res. No. 2499, has legal authority to take cognizance of the SK
election protest.

ANGOBUNG VS. COMELEC, DE ALBAN

Facts:
1. Ricardo Angobung and Atty. Aurora S. De Alban ran for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Tumauini in Isabela in the
1995 local elections. Angobung won garnering 55% of all the votes cast.
2. In September 1996, Alban filed ―at her own instance‖ a ―Petition for Reall‖ with the Local Election Registrar in Tumauini.
The petition was forwarded to the Regional Office and to the Main office for approval.
3. COMELEC en banc issued Resolution N. 96-2951 which:
a. Approved the Petition for Recall;
b. Setting a date for the signing of petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini; and
c. Should it be signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, scheduling of recall election on December 2,
1996.
4. Petitioner files a petition for certiorari and attacked the resolution for being unconstitutional and therefor invalid. His
contentions was that the resolution:
a. scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections – in violation of one –year bar on
recall elections.
b. approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person – in violation of the statutory 25% minimum
requirement as to the number of signatures supporting and petition for recall.
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of the petitioner is meritorious.
Ruling:
1. As to contention (b), the date of recall election cannot be said to be barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. The
approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and
filled by the electorate.
2. As to contention (a), The SC stated that Sec 29(d) of the LGC of 1991, provides, in effect, that a petition of at least 25% of the
total number registered voters, not by one person only, may validly initiate recall proceedings.
The initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, but it
must at least contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may
sign the petition in the meantime.
In this case, the petition does not bear the names of all other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly become anxious to oust
petitioner from the post of mayor.
3. The recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of
disenchanted electors.

Claudio v. COMELEC 311 SCRA 388

Facts: Jovito Claudio won as mayor of Pasay City in the 1998 elections. In May, 1999, less than a year later, several barangay
chairs gathered to discuss the filing of a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio and the Convening of the PRA. It took only less
than 2 weeks for the members of the PRA to obtain a majority vote for the passing of a resolution calling for said recall.
Claudio however complained that what his opponents did was contrary to section 74 of the LGC 1991, because of the word
“recall” in said section should be interpreted not only to mean a recall election alone, but is also intended to include the
convening of the PRA and the filling by it of a recall resolution. If Claudio’s interpretation is correct, then his enemies may have
indeed violated the statutory prohibition that “no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption to
office” since the PRA did indeed convene less than a year from Claudio’s assumption into office.
Claudio also argued that the phrase “regular local election” in said Section 74(b) includes the election period for that regular
election and not only the date of such election.
Held: Claudio is wrong. Reasons:
1) The word recall in Section 74(b) refers to the recall election and not the preliminary proceedings to recall. Section 74 speaks
of limitations on “recall” which, according to section 69, is a power which exercised by the registered voters of an LGU. Since the
voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within
the 1 year period provided.
2) Another reason why the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the 1 year period provided in 74(b) is that to
hold the otherwise would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. Indeed, it would
be wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the
expression of confidence in incumbent.
3) The election period is not included in the phrase “regular local election.” Claudio’s interpretation would severely limit the
period during which a recall election may be held. Such an interpretation must be rejected because it would devitalize the right
of recall which is designed to make LGU’s more responsive and accountable

Afiado v. COMELEC
FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for the annulment of a resolution calling for the recall of the vice-mayor. The
barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed this resolution. The proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the
previous mayor who had already served for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4th term but withdrew, and was substituted
by the son. The opponent filed a petition asking for the annulment of the substitution. When the SC ruled that the substitution
was invalid, the vice-mayor became the mayor. Hence this petition.
HELD: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-mayor. However, the resolution does not
apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor.

Ong vs. Alegre

Facts:
 A candidate was disqualified by the COMELEC en banc to run for mayor for he has served for three-consecutive terms.
 During his second term, the opposing party filed a protest and the RTC declared the opposing party as the duly elected
mayor. However, such decision came out three years after and when the candidate has already started his third term.
 Since the COMELEC disqualified the candidate, his political party nominated the brother of the candidate as a substitute.
 The COMELEC denied due course the certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother.
Issues:
 Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
 Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to the certificate of candidacy
in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother.
Ruling:
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, "service for the full term", and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
 For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
 A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party as that of the former.
 A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who
has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

Socrates vs Comelec
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998
and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in
the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former‘s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought
Hagedorn‘s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule
HELD:
After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following
the same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
theprohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the
three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24,
2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the
same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn‘s service
as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
154512. November 12, 2002)

Goh v. Bayron & COMELEC

DOCTRINE:
Nature of the Petition: Certiorari + preliminary mandatory injunction assailing COMELEC Resolutions.
Brief Facts:
Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron
 due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by ―gross violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials etc. as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City.‖

COMELEC found it sufficient in form and substance but suspended the funding of any recall election until the funding issue is
resolved
LGC Sec 75 Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. - All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the
COMELEC. There shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the
COMELEC for the conduct of recall election.
However the COMELEC does not have an appropriation or line item for contingency fund. Hence COMELEC suspended the
recall election until the budget controversy is resolved.
Issues:
1. comelec says there is no budget in the 2014 general appropriations act for the conduct of recall election and therefore they
cannot conduct recall elections. is this correct?
2. to be valid an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. does the purpose ‗to conduct elections‘
cover recall elections?
3. can comelec tap its savings to fund the conduct of recall elections?
Ruling:
1. NO. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES THE LINE ITEM APPROPRIATION TO ALLOW COMELEC TO CONDUCT RECALL
ELECTIONS.
―We grant the petition. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and
9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections
for 2014.‖

2. YES. THE PURPOSE MAY BE BROKEN DOWN INTO DIFFERENT RELATED SUB-CATEGORIES. THEREFORE THE
PURPOSE ―TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS‖ COVERS, EVEN IF NOT EXPRESSLY SPELLED OUT, REGULAR, SPECIAL AND
RECALL ELECTIONS.
―Under these· factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC ‗s reasons why it is unable to conduct recall
elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the specific words ―Conduct
and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x‖ in the 2002 GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the phrase ―Conduct and supervision of
elections and other political exercises‖ was sufficient to fund the conduct of recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific
line item appropriation for the ―Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.‖
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has ―a line item for the ‗Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.‖‗ This admission of the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of
this specific budgetary appropriation.· To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.
However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature. For
example, the purpose can be to ―conduct elections,‖ which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall
elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific -to fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not
expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.

3. YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND
OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES. RECALL ELECTIONS ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES BECAUSE THE EXISTING
PERSONNEL ARE THE SAME PERSONNEL WHO WILL EVALUATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECALL PETITIONS.
However, contrary to the COMELEC‘s assertion, the appropriations for personnel services and maintenance and other operating
expenses falling under ―Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites‖ constitute a line item
which can be augmented from the COMELEC‘s savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall
elections requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC‘s existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the
same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the recall elections.