EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of
the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be
utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada
was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing
attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied
for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision
Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an
original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action [2] for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and
reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment[3]nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes
had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil
case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent
complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon, an information for perjury[5] was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.[6] On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter
alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal case,
respondent Paredes was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for
preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution[8] recommending the
criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his
aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:

x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal
Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under
the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was
ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of
Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready
reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein x x x. (Italics supplied.)
[9]

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan [10] charging
respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury
and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking
the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public
documents.[12] He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a
notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. [13] These
falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of
the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support
his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that
said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon
was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. [14]
 Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently
discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-
called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the
ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the
trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case
in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in
the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness
in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing
of falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on
this evaluative legal position:

x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the
absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to
commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had
control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to
present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle
of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected
to, if presented in the trial.

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall

any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each of
which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed
in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the
requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied
insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for
the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to
prove the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory
of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two
other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny
the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts
surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by
accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense
charged in the information is privileged. [19]

Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, [20] the controversy
was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are
therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed
state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
I
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have
been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters
consent.[21]
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute
an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first
sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification
before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to
witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to any communication, without distinction or
qualification.[22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is
no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to
his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by
the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means.[23]
 Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and
existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such
falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet
on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed
fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes
to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before
the Tanodbayan.[24]Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not
have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes
in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes
intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his
attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify
on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate
basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent
court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is
the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect
to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does
not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future
and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the
cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney
and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying
words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the
criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and
in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications
are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It
is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence
of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. [26] In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made
to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances
may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that
such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators
are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a
conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to
whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the
criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court,
having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this
second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our
resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary
questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to
whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent
this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative
facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally
resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious
administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the
trial court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand
charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February
24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of
public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but,
reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each
of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of
falsification.
 This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations
in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:

Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state

witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate
information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were
all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.Section 2, Rule XV of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases
arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of
law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as co-
accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was
charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or
joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In
criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.

As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there
having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate
identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same
as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense was too broad and
indefinite; hence the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the
fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same manner
in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or more, as
involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more working
together, or shared by or affecting two or more.[30] Had it been intended that all the accused
should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so
with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all,
the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative
mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification,
and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty
shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a
state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty. [31] not that he must be the
least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be
whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is
eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he
persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee.Although he did
not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a
state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a
conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators charged with
five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used
as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information
charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was
not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his
two co-accused to open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of
the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu
was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear
to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the
gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to
those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is
imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found
expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we quote in extenso:

Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the
discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a
conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of
them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts
that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the
others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For,
despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively
identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway
heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even
the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the
case for the prosecution.Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was
available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated
by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming
that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most
guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean the highest
degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not
necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take
into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there
is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

xxx

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the
discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have
been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused.Since Bermudez was not
individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except
by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most
guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
(Italics ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a
criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and
translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of
depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is
the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that
the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the
procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on
other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that
not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused
regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons,
the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been
favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of
the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There
is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for
that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the
purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable
witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as
follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal;
Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-
complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur,
who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate
case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification
of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the
confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to
testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must
be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the
disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not
merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed,
after the retirement of two members of its Second Division [37]and the reconstitution
thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995,
as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new
members thereof [39] declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon
which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by
Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate
Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by
the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the
arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the
matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We
are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions
motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to that effect within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE
the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases
by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149495. August 21, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and JOSE JAIME
POLICARPIO JR., respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The consolidation of cases is addressed to the sound discretion of judges. Unless the
exercise of such discretion has been gravely abused, an appellate court will not disturb
their findings and conclusions thereon.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the Order[2] of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) dated June 28, 2001
in Criminal Case No. 26566. The assailed Order denied petitioners Motion to Consolidate
the said criminal case for indirect bribery with Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder, filed
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. The SBN disposed as follows:

In view hereof, the Court is constrained to deny, as it hereby denies, the motion to
consolidate the instant matter with Crim. Case No. 26558, the plunder case in the Third
Division. x x x.[3]

The Antecedents

On April 4, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed three separate cases
before the SBN: 1) Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder[4] against former President
Estrada and others; 2) Criminal Case No. 26565 for illegal use of alias [5] against Estrada;
and 3) Criminal Case No. 26566 for indirect bribery[6] against herein private
respondent. The cases were raffled to the Third, the Fifth and the First Divisions of the
SBN, respectively.
Thereafter, petitioner filed separate Motions to consolidate Criminal Case Nos. 26565
and 26566 with Criminal Case No. 26558, which bears the lowest docket number among
the three cases.
 The Fifth Division, in a Resolution[7] promulgated on May 25, 2001, granted the Motion
to consolidate Criminal Case No. 26565 with Criminal Case No. 26558. However, in an
Order[8] dated June 28, 2001, the First Division denied the Motion to consolidate Criminal
Case No. 26566 with Criminal Case No. 26558.
Hence, this Petition.[9]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts consideration:

I

Respondent Court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it denied petitioners Motion to Consolidate the trials of Criminal Case
No. 26566 (indirect bribery case) and Criminal Case No. 26558 (plunder case) despite
clear showing that the consolidation will promote the public interests of economical
and speedy trial.

II

Respondent Court gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioners Motion for
Consolidation despite clear showing that consolidation will preclude conflicting factual
findings on identical factual issues between its First and Third Divisions. [10]

Respondent, on the other hand, asks for the dismissal of the Petition, because grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the SBN had not been demonstrated, and because
petitioner had resorted to forum shopping.

Supervening Events

While this case was pending completion -- the period during which the parties were
preparing and filing their respective pleadings before this Court -- the parties brought to
our attention certain events that had transpired in the SBN.
Firstly, petitioner and private respondent filed on November 15, 2001, a Joint Motion
for Provisional Dismissal[11] of Criminal Case No. 26566, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. This Motion was, however, denied by the
First Division.
Secondly, petitioner filed before the SBN another Urgent Motion for
Consolidation[12] dated July 10, 2002, praying anew for the consolidation of the indirect
bribery case with the plunder case pending before the Special Division of the anti-graft
court.[13] The purpose of this Motion was supposedly to allow the testimony of Luis Chavit
Singson in the latter case to be taken as testimonial evidence for the former.
Thirdly, Respondent Policarpio filed on August 6, 2002 a Manifestation with Motion,
praying that petitioner be found guilty of willful and deliberate forum-shopping.[14]
Lastly, the Special Division trying the plunder case had already heard the testimonies
of Carmencita Itchon, Emma Lim and Singson -- the same witnesses the prosecution
would have presented in the indirect bribery case.[15]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit; the SBN did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Order.

Main Issue:
Consolidation of Trial

The consolidation of criminal cases is a matter of judicial discretion, according to

Section 22 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses - Charges of offenses founded on the
same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly
at the discretion of the Court.

Similarly, Section 2 of Rule XII of the SBN Revised Internal Rules[16] reads:

Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. - Cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the
Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.

x x x x x x x x x.
The counterpart rule for civil cases is found in Section 1 of Rule 31 [17] of the Rules of
Court.
Similarly, jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases. As
held in Caos v. Peralta,[18] joint trial is permissible x x x where the [actions] arise from the
same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases
to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. x x x.[19]
Querubin v. Palanca[20] has ruled that consolidation is proper in the following
instances:
x x x where the offenses charged are similar, related or connected, or are of the same or
similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected
acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based
on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the
same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element
of substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same,
evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their reproduction of
substantially the same testimony will be required on each trial. (Italics supplied)
[21]

Expediency was the reason for the consolidation of the criminal cases against the
accused in Querubin. As there was only one accused (who himself moved for
consolidation) and one offended party, and the 22 separate cases of estafa were
committed in substantially the same way over the same period of time and with the same
witnesses, the Court deemed the consolidation to be proper.
Sideco v. Paredes[22] allowed a consolidated appeal of 16 cases involving a common
question of law. Joint trial was deemed necessary to minimize therein appellants
expenses in pursuing his appeal.
Other cases were consolidated, as they had sought the same reliefs[23] or involved the
same parties and basically the same issues.[24]Another purpose was to avoid the possibility
of conflicting decisions.[25] These reasons are in line with the object of consolidation, which
is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear
congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessary costs and
expense.[26]
On the other side of the spectrum were cases in which consolidation was found to be
improper. Republic v. Mangrobang[27] struck down the consolidation of an original action
for ejectment with an appealed case for eminent domain, because consolidation would
have only delayed the resolution of the cases, which had raised dissimilar
issues. Moreover, one or both cases had already been partially heard.
Meanwhile, we ruled in Dacanay v. People[28] -- a case in which separate trial was
requested -- that the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government
could not be given preference over the right to a speedy trial; or over the protection of a
persons life, liberty or property. Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases[29] can
also be affected by consolidation.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that the SBN did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to Consolidate the indirect bribery
and the plunder cases. As correctly ruled by the anti-graft court, their consolidation would
have unduly exposed herein private respondent to totally unrelated testimonies, delayed
the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddled the issues therein, and exposed him
to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case.
Consolidation has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening events -- in particular,
the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the
plunder case.
 Verily, no indiscretion has been shown by the court a quo in refusing to consolidate
the cases. There is no showing that it evaded or refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. Neither has it been shown that when the SBN denied the Motion to
Consolidate, it exercised its power in a manner that was arbitrary or despotic by reason
of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.[30]

Forum-Shopping

Additionally, respondent argues that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping, which is

reason enough to dismiss the Petition. We agree.
As required by the Rules,[31] the Petition in this case was accompanied by a
Verification/Certification against forum-shopping, in which petitioner made the following
representation:

4. That there is no other case pending in any tribunal, commission or agency or court
involving the same case and that should there come to our knowledge that there is a
case involving the same cause and parties pending before any tribunal, commission,
agency or court, we will inform the Honorable Court of the matter within five (5) days
from knowledge thereof. [32]

Petitioner did not inform this Court that it had filed an Urgent Motion for Consolidation
on July 10, 2002, while the instant Petition was pending. Undeniably, it failed to fulfill the
above-quoted undertaking.
Moreover, a scrutiny of the Urgent Motion reveals that petitioner raised the same
issues and prayed for the same remedy therein as it has in the instant Petition -- to
consolidate Criminal Case Nos. 26566 and 265558.
Such move clearly constitutes forum-shopping. As held by Candido v.
Camacho,[33] forum-shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising
substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties.[34]
A becoming regard for this Court should have prevailed upon petitioner to await the
outcome of the instant Petition. Making petitioner attend to separate trials is an all too
familiar plaint of prosecutors. This fact does not, however, justify a disregard of the rule
against forum-shopping or relieve petitioner from the negative consequences of its act.
Violation of the forum-shopping prohibition, by itself, is a ground for summary
dismissal[35] of the instant Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140633. February 4, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN

(Fourth Division) and GERONIMO Z. VELASCO, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated October
[1]

11, 1999 of public respondent Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal

Case No. 13006 (People of the Philippines v. Geronimo Z. Velasco) granting
the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused and dismissing the said criminal
case for insufficiency of evidence.
The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco, then Minister of Energy, for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), as amended, reads:

That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986, in Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the
Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Board and President of the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC), a government owned and controlled corporation, did then and
there deliberately and unlawfully, in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of his
administrative official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC
President and Chairman of the Board, spend funds and utilize equipment and personnel
of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of P3,032,993.00 in the
construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach Resort located at Bagac, Bataan,
Philippines, managed by Telin Development Corporation and owned by Gervel, Inc., a
corporation wholly owned by said accused, thereby giving himself unwarranted
benefits and causing undue injury to PNOC, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount of P3,032,993.00, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]

Upon arraignment, Velasco pleaded not guilty.

 After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed, with leave of court,
a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However,
[3]

it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by
the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated October 11, 1999. Consequently,
the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Hence the present petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it granted
respondent Velascos motion for reconsideration and dismissed Criminal Case
No. 13006. According to petitioner, respondent Velasco cannot invoke the rule
on double jeopardy since the assailed Resolution is null and void for failure of
the Sandiganbayan to state therein a summary of the facts proved by the
prosecutions evidence, in violation of Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, and Section 7 of P. D. No. 1606, as amended, and Section
[4] [5]

2, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. [6]

The petition has no merit.

Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a
[7]

demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order
[8]

amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would

violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
[9]

exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. [10]

In People v. Velasco, this Court had the opportunity to stress the finality-
[11]

of-acquittal rule, thus:

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court
cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of
the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x.
Thus, Green expressed the concern that (t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the
innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for
repose, a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.

Such is the magnitude of the accuseds right against double jeopardy that
even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial
court will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
[12]

when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the prosecution
was denied the opportunity to present its case, as in Gorion v. Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Br. 17, People v. Bocar, Portugal v. Reantaso, People
[13] [14] [15]

v. Albano, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, People v. Court of Appeals, or that

[16] [17] [18]

the trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. However, while [19]

certiorari may be resorted to cure an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such

extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. [20]

Here, respondent Velasco filed his demurrer to evidence after the

prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. Obviously, petitioner was
not deprived of its right to due process. Thus, respondent Velascos plea of
double jeopardy must be upheld.
Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. One of the purposes of the
constitutional requirement is to assure the parties that the judge arrived at his
decision through the processes of legal and factual reasoning. Thus, it is a
shield against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding
by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
[21]

but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on

the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend
on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his
decision. [22]

A careful review of the assailed Resolution shows that

respondent Sandiganbayan painstakingly and exhaustively passed upon,
considered and evaluated the evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
adduced by the prosecution. It likewise cited factual and legal bases for its
conclusions, thus:

The Information charges the accused with having by himself committed the offense,
without any allegations that he has conspired with others in doing so. Moreover, that
the accused committed the offense in evident bad faith is the sole mode or means of
commission alleged. Perforce, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce
evidence that the accused directly and personally committed the crime charged through
evident bad faith.

However, there is a complete vacuum as to any evidence of direct personal

participation by the accused in the subject transactions. An element of the offense
is that the act of the accused must have been in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions, i.e., that said public officer committed the
prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public
position. This is absent here. No evidence has been presented to show that the
accused himself, in his capacity as Minister of Energy and/or as Chairman of the
Board and President of PNOC, spent government money and used government
equipment and personnel for the construction and maintenance of the Telin Beach
Resort. No evidence has likewise been presented that the accused, in his capacity
as Minister of Energy and/or as Chairman of the Board and President of PNOC,
directed, ordered, induced or caused others to do so. What the evidence does show
is that the transactions relating to Telin, while they were duly approved by top
management, did not require approval by the accused and were not approved by
or at the level of the accused and that not one of the hundreds of documents
presented was signed or approved by the accused. In short, no nexus exists between
the evidence presented and the liability sought to be imputed against the accused.

Of great significance is the manner by which PNOC has characterized the account as
advances approved by operating management, which were duly recorded and fully
documented as such in the usual manner, and were complete and regular, and
which upon audit were found to be regular. These circumstances are wholly
inconsistent with, and inherently contrary to, any notion that the transactions
were made with evident bad faith or with intent to injure PNOC.
We reject the prosecutions theory that since the accused knew of the work that was done
or being done at the Telin Resort, it follows that he had caused the same to be done. In
the first place, the evidence is not enough to lead to any conclusion or inference that
the accused knew that work was being done at the Telin Resort by the PNOC.
Indeed, even assuming that the accused did have knowledge of such work being
done, it would be too tenuous to conclude on the sole basis thereof that he had in
fact caused such work, much less that he did so with evident bad faith.

xxx

We also are unconvinced of the existence of the element of undue injury in this
case. There is no reason to deviate from the very manner by which PNOC itself
has chosen to treat the account as advances approved by operating management,
duly recorded and fully documented as such, and which passed muster upon audit.
The alleged unpaid amount of P3,032,993.00 was not even considered a collectible
or receivable, nor was the same billed or such account considered delinquent by
PNOC. Given this state of facts, injury suffered by the PNOC, if any, is hardly of
an undue nature.

At best, all that the prosecution has presented is circumstantial evidence. However,
(i)n order to convict a person accused of a crime on the strength of circumstantial
evidence alone, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to present such circumstantial
evidence which will and must necessarily lead to the conclusion that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, excluding all and each every
reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. Furthermore, if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged
and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. We believe that the
facts borne out by the evidence are entirely consistent with the proposition advanced by
the accused that the transactions are purely commercial in character, so much so that
any liability that the accused may have would be merely civil in nature. In this
connection, it appears that the prosecution has opted to pursue the issue of any such
civil liability in Civil Case No. 0003; hence, we are left with nothing to proceed with in
this case.

In fine, applying the standards set by Dramayo, we hold that the evidence of the
prosecution has failed to meet the degree of proof required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, and the case should thus be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
[23]
 Clearly, no trace of impetuosity or wantonness on the part of
respondent Sandiganbayan exists which would place this case within the
purview of the evil sought to be prevented by the said constitutional proscription.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals, this
[24]
Court, through Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., struck down a decision of a Regional Trial Court
for being starkly hollow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its
form. The challenged Resolution can hardly be characterized as such.
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of
respondent Sandiganbayan warranting the nullification of its October 11,
1999 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., abroad on official business.
Tuesday, April 11, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA II

G.R. No. 169004
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA

FACTS:

Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with
a salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, or the Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he
received.

Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense charged.
Private respondent contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he
does not belong the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines
committed by a public official below salary grade 27.

HELD:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed
by a public official below salary grade 27.

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The case having been instituted on March 25,
2004 the provisions of Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern.

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are
members if the Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides
that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
You might also like:
 Republic of the Philippines vs Mendoza G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010
 Civil Procedure Case: Republic of the Philipines vs Lim, Marcos, el. al. G.R. No. 164800 July 22,
2009
 Civil Case Procedure: Cudiamat vs Batangas Savings G.R. No. 182403 March 9, 2010
Wednesday, August 17, 2016

10 Cases in the Philippines that Shaped the System

10 Landmark Cases in the Philippines
These are one of the cases that are so memorable that its decisions became a set of standards and
precedents over time. This is a list of the top ten cases that have become landmarks in Philippine
jurisprudence. Here is a list of the top ten landmark cases in the Philippines.
Source: http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php/Top_10_Landmark_Cases_Decided_by_the_Philippine_Supreme_Court

(Note: You can check the Digested form of this cases also in this blog. You can click this page or
just use the search bar above)

10. In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974

This 1974 case, still cited today, said that in cases where a person needed to elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, the acts of registering to vote and exercising the right of suffrage were enough to
show that he elected Filipino citizenship, without need for any formal declaration.

9. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

In 1980, someone challenged an Executive Order issued by President Marcos because it imposed a penalty
without giving the violator a right to be heard. He succeeded in having the law declared unconstitutional and
was commended by the Supreme Court "for his spirit" in asserting his rights.

8. United States vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

The events in this case happened in 1908, during the American regime, yet it is still quoted today as the
textbook example of a "mistake of fact". The accused was absolved of stabbing and killing the person trying to
enter his room. He thought it was a robber, but it was only his roommate.

7. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent
to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women
were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of
residence.
6. Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

This 1991 case is often cited for its definition of what constitutes the practice of law.

5. Primicias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

In 1947, the mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. The Supreme Court
said that the mayor's fear that trouble may arise during the rally was not enough reason to suppress the
fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances.

4. People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004

This case, stemming from a wife's killing of her husband in 1995, is the first to use "battered woman syndrome"
as a defense.

3. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)

This 1940 case is known primarily for Justice Jose P. Laurel's definition of social justice.

2. Chua-Qua vs. Clave, G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990

In 1976, 20 years before America's Mary Kay Letourneau made headlines, a teacher married her student and
got fired. The Supreme Court, quoting "The heart has reasons of its own which reason itself does not know,"
took her side!

1. Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

In 1990, 44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut
timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment. They brought the case in the name of all the children in
the Philippines and in the name of the generations yet unborn!

Source: http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php/Top_10_Landmark_Cases_Decided_by_the_Philippine_S
upreme_Court
Monday, November 23, 2015

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS,

MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO
and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that
rendered by the CFI Bulacan
MAKALINTAL, J.:

Facts: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus
and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a
passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the
morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus
lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo sentenced the
defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral damages; and counsel
fees. CA affirmed.

Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON petitioners are
liable for moral damages.

Ruling: Judgment affirmed.

(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the
accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi
masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained.
The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which
was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough check-up before it took to the
road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.

(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are
recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier,
as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
Saturday, July 29, 2017

Intent to Kill: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

The requisites in establishing intent to kill.

Facts:

A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the
victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the
left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang
claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The
victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for
one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on
the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for
medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the
victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the
Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the
nature or gravity of the wound”.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

Held:

Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by
independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without
timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal
without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this
situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the words
uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative
factors.

Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

You might also like:
 Case Digest of a Complex-Crime: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.FILOMENO SALUFRANIA
 Rules of Court: Criminal Procedure
 Case of Psychological Incapacity (Ngo Te vs Yu-Te); G.R. No. 161793; February 13, 2009)
Psychological Incapacity Case: Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA (G.R. No.
119190 Jan. 16, 1997)
Chi Ming Tsoi vs Court of Appeals and Gina Lao Tsoi
G.R. No. 119190 Jan. 16, 1997

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao married sometime on May 22, 1988. However, since their marriage and
cohabitation for 10 months, the wife stated that there was no sexual interaction between them. This
claim was also affirmed by the husband. Frustrated, Gina filed an annulment case against her husband
on the ground of psychological incapacity for being unable to fulfill the basic marital obligations. RTC
granted the annulment and was also affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the inability of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife for more than 10
months constitute a ground for annulment by reason of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

One of the basic marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of
the marriage. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation.

The prolonged and senseless refusal of the husband to fulfill such marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

Hereby, SC affirmed CA’s ruling.

You might also like:
 Psychological Incapacity Case: CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO.
119190 January 16, 1997
 Psychological Incapacity: Republic of the Philippines vs CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763
 Full Case: Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina
Link
Psychological Incapacity Case: Santos vs CA (G.R. No. 112019)
Jan 4, 1995
Santos vs. CA (Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia Santos)
240 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988, Julia left
for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leouel filed
with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.

ISSUE:

Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:

No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five
years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem
Petition is denied.
You might also like:
 Full Case: Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina
 Psychological Incapacity: Republic of the Philippines vs CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763
 Case of Psychological Incapacity (Antonio vs Reyes G.R. No. 155800; March 10 2006)
L
Case Digest: NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and
Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November,
1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the
President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are
accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said
school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages
of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage
and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her.
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for
its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws.
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on
various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims
against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the
day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the
constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to
affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation
which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization
given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment
for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of
the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA
6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth
elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
Criminal Case Digest: ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed
against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously
resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a
fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the
latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of
direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably,
petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a)
the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

==

Essential Requisites for Complete Self-Defense: CONRADO CASITAS VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having
heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You ought to be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and
peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He
looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970’s and
whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in
different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him.
Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11
wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and convicted him of
frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential
requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by
the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby
submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear
and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this
case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said wounds or the victim
were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have
bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.

==

Case Digest: SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005
SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and
Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local
weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day
of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon,
Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named
accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly
newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable
motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good
name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government
Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to
public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly
newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item
read by the public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE”. The trial
court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.

Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as
absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in
fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided
the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can
be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to
the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government –
public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and

==