Facts:

Hermogenes Mariano, the appointed liaison officer of a municipality inthe Province of Bulacan was
charged with estafa of goods amountingto no more than 6,000 pesos. Mariano then filed with the court
amotion to quash all information. The respondent judge then grantedthe motion on the basis that the
court indeed had no jurisdiction overthe case, citing that a military commission had already ruled on
amalversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the sameproperties questioned at bar. The
respondent judge noted that casehaving been heard and decided by a competent tribunal gives no
jurisdiction to his court to pass anew judgment on the same subjectmatter. The PEOPLE then appealed
and the Supreme Court havingciting the Judicial Act of 1948 and the fact that Estafa and
Malversationare 2 different and distinct offense and that the military commissionhas no authority over
the charges placed on Mariano, decided thatlower court committed a grave error in saying that they had
no jurisdiction over the matter. As so ordered by the Supreme Court therespondent judge was to
continue the criminal case against Mariano.

The issues presented:

Does the civil court & military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the case of the estafa
of goods amounting to notmore than 6,000 Pesos.

The Ruling:

Military commissions have no authority over estafa cases and the courtof first instance has original
jurisdiction as so implied by the JudicialAct of 1948.

Ratio:

The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of First Instanceshall have original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases in which the penaltyprovided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months or
afine of over 200 pesos. Estafa more than meets with requirementsneeded for the Court of First
Instance to acquire original jurisdiction.

Auyong Hian Vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et. al.

Zaldivar, J.

Fact: On December 30, 1961, 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco arrived in the
Port of Manila. As the Import Control Law was already expired, the Collector of Customs
in Manila refused to release the shipment of the subject goods. The shipment was then,
declared illegal upon the ground that the importation was made long after the expiration
of the effectivity of the Import Control Law and that the importation contravened the
government policy as declared in Republic Acts 698 and 1194. The goods were
declared forfeited to the government and its sale was ordered for public auction which
the CTIP took advantage of. The petitioner prayed for several errors by the CTA. One of
them is the petitioner’s contention that the sale to the CTIP was invalid on ground that
the amount paid by the CTIP was insufficient in respect with the petitioner’s claim that
the goods’ value was Php 7,000,000 and what CTIP paid was only Php 1,500,000.

Issue: Whether the sale of the tobacco from the public auction to STIP was invalid?

Ruling: No. The sale of the tobacco from the public auction to CTIP was valid. Even if
the consideration paid for the forfeited tobacco was inadequate, such inadequate
consideration is not a ground for the invalidity of a contract. Article 1355 of the Civil
Code provides the law for this matter. It was not shown that the instant sale is a case
exempted by law from the operation of the aforementioned Article; neither has the
petitioner shown that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence in the sale. Therefore,
the SC can only conclude with the CTA that “In these circumstances, we find no reason
to invalidate the sale of said tobacco to CTIP.”
Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas
17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect
and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law
and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred
that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the
PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of
the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may
arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to
the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President
or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to
the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as
may be established by law”
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial
branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the”
judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the
power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members
of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs
for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said
controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the
court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon
the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the
determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

G.R. No. L-22488 October 26, 1967

MATEO C. BACALSO and CESAR GONZALEZ, petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and
CELESTINO BACALSO, respondents.

Bacalso and Gonzales for petitioners.

Hilario C. Davide, Jr. for respondents.

ANGELES, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain the
respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 7278 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, entitled Celestino Bacalso versus the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar Gonzalez.

Culled from the pleadings and annexes thereto before Us, the following are the facts pertinent to
the issue involved in the present petition:

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Director of Mines, which was affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources, declaring that Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar Gonzalez,
petitioners herein, have established superior location rights on certain mining claims situated in
the City of Toledo, Cebu, which were in dispute between Celestino Bacalso, on one hand, and
Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar Gonzalez, on the other hand, and pursuant to which decision, the
claims of the latter were given due course, on November 10, 1961 Celestino Bacalso filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar Gonzalez, docketed as Civil Case No. 7278.

The respondents filed separate motions to dismiss the case, based on a common ground, that the
decision of the administrative body had become final and executory. The motions were denied.
The private respondents moved to reconsider the order which was also denied. Before the trial on
the merits, the private respondents filed an "Ex-parte motion to order the clerk of court, Atty.
Vicente Miranda, to transfer civil case No. 7278, . . . from branch V to Branch VII, Barili,
Cebu", alleging that ". . . in virtue of the Administrative Order No. 302 of the Department of
Justice, Series of 1962, as amended by Administrative Order No. 337, in the sense that the City
of Toledo be included under the Seventh Branch in Barili, Cebu and considering that the
properties involved in the litigation are located in Toledo City as above-stated — compliance to
the said Administrative Orders of the Department of justice by the clerk of court is necessary."

Resolving the motion, the court denied the same in an order which reads as follows:

Defendants Mateo Bacalso and Cesar Gonzales, in their motion ex parte dated May 15,
1963, ask this court to order the clerk of court to transfer this case to Branch VII of this
court at Barili, Cebu, alleging as grounds that after the said additional branch was
created, the Department of Justice ordered that all cases originating from Toledo and
other southern towns of this province should be heard by the said branch; that this case
involves mining claims which are situated in Toledo City, within the jurisdiction of the
said branch at Barili, Cebu; and that the trial of this case has not been started yet. The
movants attached to their motion certified copies of their mining claims showing that the
said claims are situated in the City of Toledo.

The same motion was submitted for resolution to the Honorable Judge Amador E.
Gomez, presiding as vacation judge.

The record shows that this case was filed on November 22, 1961, long before the said
Branch VII at Barili, Cebu was created by law, and since then several important incidents
have taken place, one of which was a motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was resolved by this court denying the same. Several motions
for reconsiderations had been submitted to, and considered and resolved by this court.
Although it is true that the mining claims in this case are situated in Toledo City, within
the jurisdiction of this court at Barili, Cebu, the said motion to transfer the case to that
branch is not considered well taken by this court by reason of the following grounds:

1. This case had already been assigned to the Fifth Branch of this court long
before the Seventh Branch was created and before Administrative Order No. 337
of the Department of Justice was issued;
 2. Several important incidents had taken place and resolved by this court, and it is
necessary in order to avoid variance and conflict in the rulings on the previous
incidents resolved by this court, that this case should remain to be tried by this
Branch;

3. The agreement of the judges of this court concerning cases pertaining to the
different branches of this court does not cover the present case where several
incidents have already been acted upon by this Branch.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing considerations, the ex-parte motion to order the
clerk of court to transfer this case to Branch VII of this court is hereby denied for lack of
merit.

A motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied, the present petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction was filed before this Court on February 28, 1964.

The question presented for review expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case is,
whether or not the respondent Judge presiding over branch V of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, to which the case No. 7278 has been assigned by agreement of the Judges presiding over
the other branches of the same court, and before whom the case had been partially heard on
matters other than the merits, has lost jurisdiction to try and decide the said case by virtue of the
Administrative Orders Nos. 302 and 337 of the Secretary of Justice, transferring the cases
assigned in branch V, one of which is the case No. 7278, to branch VII of the same court which
is stationed at Barili, Cebu.

Administrative Order No. 302, dated August 20, 1962, states that, in view of the addition of two
branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu from six to eight branches by virtue of Republic
Act No. 2613, approved in August 1, 1959, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 57 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended, that the cases coming from the different municipalities of the
Province of Cebu are hereby distributed between the eight branches of the court as follows:

("Here follows the list of cities and municipalities, included among them the City of
Toledo, as corresponding to the six branches of the court; the municipality of Barili,
among other municipalities, corresponding to Branch VII.")

As already stated, the case No. 7278, by agreement of the judges presiding over the six branches
of the court, was assigned to Branch V, presided over by the respondent Judge. On September
10, 1962, Administrative Order No. 337 was issued by the Secretary of Justice, amending
Administrative Order No. 302, providing that "the City of Toledo be included under the Seventh
Branch in Barili, Cebu."

We start with the statement that it is a settled rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired
through, enlarged or diminished by any act of omission of the parties. Constitutionally viewed,
apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress. As this Court has said, thru Justice
Concepcion (now Chief Justice) in Gumpal v. CFI of Isabela, et al., L-16409 and L-16416,
November 29, 1960:

It is trite to say, however, that the validity of a given judicial action is dependent upon the
jurisdiction of the court taking it, and that, by specific constitutional mandate, the power
to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, is subject to the
limitations set forth in the fundamental law, within the exclusive province of Congress.
Since, being legislative, said power cannot be delegated to the Secretary of Justice. . . .

The foregoing statement of the law on the fountain source and extent of the jurisdiction of the
Court is beyond debate. It is incorrect to assume, as the respondent Judge did assert in his order
complained of, that because the case No. 7278 has been assigned to Branch V, by agreement of
the Judges presiding over the six branches, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, that he has
acquired exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide the case to the exclusion of the other Judges
presiding over the other branches of the same court. The various branches of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and
the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57
of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power
to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and
for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment
and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; the jurisdiction
attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials
may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

In the case at bar, the respondent Judge grievously erred in not complying with the directive of
the secretary of Justice in Administrative Order No. 337, on, a flimsy, nay, self-conceited reason
that because —

2. Several important incidents, had taken place and resolved by this Court, and it is
necessary, in order to avoid various and conflicting rulings on the previous incidents
resolved by this Court, that this case should remain to be tried by this Branch.

The apportionment of cases among the different branches of the same court, as ordained by the
Secretary of Justice, must be respected by the Judges in the interests of order and coordination in
the dispatch of cases.

Be all that as it may, however, the legal question under consideration has become moot and
academic, because on June 22, 1963, or more than a, year before the present petition was filed,
Republic Act No. 3729 amending Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, went into effect, increasing the number of branches of the Court of First Instance in the
14th Judicial District, comprising Cebu, Toledo and Bohol from 11 to 14 branches, and as
ordained in Section 6 of the law —
 Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court of First Instance is or are
established in this Act in the same place where there is an existing court or courts of first
instance, all cases already filed in the latter court or courts shall be heard, tried and
decided by such latter court or courts. (Emphasis ours.)

which means that branch V of the Court of First Instance of Cebu shall retain jurisdiction to try
and decide the case No. 7278.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
is hereby dissolved. On equitable considerations, no costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro
and Fernando, JJ., concur.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R.

No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation
may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the
idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810
without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also
directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It
is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a
newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years
after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and
the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that
the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the
action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1)
to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the
subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within
the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at
the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of
the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding
to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking
actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in
rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used
only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem
differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the
property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the
action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

G.R. No. L-26816 February 28, 1967

PABLO DE JESUS, ENGRACIA DE JESUS and MANUELA DE JESUS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, Branch I
THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., MAXIMA DE Jesus and SALVADOR
BARRIOS,respondents.

Feria, Feria, Lugto & La'O for petitioners.

Salvador Barrios for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Before us upon an original action of certiorari and prohibition, are two jurisdictional issues: first,
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and second, the power of the City Court of Manila to issue a writ
of preliminary or final injunction — upon the factual averments hereinafter to be recited. The problem
cropped up because petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction upon the above grounds, in that case filed by principal individual respondents
against them in the city court,1 was denied, and their motion to reconsider rejected. The pivotal
disputed allegations of the verified complaint below are these: Ten persons,2among whom are
petitioners and respondent, Maxima de Jesus, are co-owners of six (6) parcels of land running along
España P. Campa and Adelina Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Administratrix thereof and co-owners
attorney-in-fact is Maxima de Jesus. Her stipulated compensation is 10% of the rentals. The monthly
receipts signed by each co-owner, for his/her rental share, is in a form reproduced in the complaint
as follows:

RECEIVED from Mrs. Maxima de Jesus Barrios the sum of .................. as my share, in the
rental collected for this month, on the properties of which I am a co-owner. Ten per cent
(10%) of said rentals had been previously deducted as agreed upon by me, for her
administration fee together with her expenses concerning a collector and an Attorney that
she may employ to INCREASE rate, prevent arrears, and eject stubborn tenant. 1äwphï1.ñët

Lessee of the property is Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. The original lease contract was
dated August 23 and 29, 1953. This lease was renewed by instrument executed on January 10,
1966, where under, through the efforts of Maxima de Jesus, the monthly rentals were increased from
P850.00 to P3,500.00 during the first ten (10) years and to P4,000.00 for the subsequent five (5)
years. Shell pays the rentals by issuing a check for P3,500.00 in the name of Maxima de Jesus who,
in turn, distributes the shares of her co-owners. Petitioners' monthly shares on the basis of
P3,500.00 monthly rentals are:

Manuela de Jesus 9/54 of P3,500.00 — P 583.33

Pablo de Jesus 9/54 of P3,500.00 — P 583.33

Engracia de Jesus 10/54 of P3,500.00 — P 684.14

P1,850.80

Petitioners (defendants below), in October, 1966 — so the complaint further avers — sought to
unjustly deprive Maxima de Jesus of her 10% compensation. And, to fraudulently escape such
obligation, they surreptitiously instructed Shell not to pay their share in the rentals through said
Maxima de Jesus but directly to them.

As against Shell, the complaint states:

... Pero ahora la compania demandada esta vacilando si va a cambiar esa FORMA DE
PAGO, para seguir dicho aviso de los 3 demandados individuales, de que ella pague
directamente a ellos sus "shares" de P1,850.80 mensuales dejando a la demandante
fraudulentamente privada y despojada de su 10% de compensacion que asciende a
P185.08 mensuales.

The complaint winds up with the prayer:

POR TANTO, pedimos respetuosamente al Hon. Juzgado se sirva expedir una inmediata
orden de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar a la pagadora compañia demandada, para que se
abstenga de cambiar la presente FORMA DE PAGO, ...; y, despues de los tramites
judiciales correspondientes, que el Hon. Juzgado se sirva dictar sentencia
declarando definitivo el mismo interdicto prohibitorio, y condenando a los 3 demandados
 individuales Manuela de Jesus, Engracia de Jesus y Pablo de Jesus a pagar dicho 10% de
compensacion, deduciendolo de sus P1,850.80 de "shares" o participaciones respectivas en
la renta mensual, de acuerdo con la presents forma de pago. x x x x3

Upon the foregoing complaint filed on October 3, 1966, the respondent judge, on a P500.00-bond,
issued ex-parte, on October 4, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction, which reads:

It is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of the Court of Manila City that, until further
orders, you, the said The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and all your attorneys,
representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you, refrain from modifying the
present "FORMA DE PAGO"; The Shell Co. of the Philippines, shall pay the monthly rentals
with check to be issued in the name of Maxima de Jesus alone, who shall cash and distribute
the amount of same, among the ten co-owners, previous deduction of ten per cent (10%)
thereof.

On the same date, October 4, 1966, in obedience to the writ of preliminary injunction, Shell delivered
to Maxima de Jesus the sum of P3,500.00, covering the October, 1966 rental.

The jurisdictional question having been brought direct to this Court, we issued, on application, a
cease-and-desist order bearing date of November 18, 1966.

1. As starting point, we have the rule-long in standing and frequent in application — that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be
fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or
diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of
the court.4 Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in
Congress.5 Congress may not delegate that power.6 We may not even look to the Rules of
Court in search of jurisdiction jurisdictional boundaries. For indeed, the constitutional
authority of the Supreme Court on this point is circumscribed in the zone properly
denominated as the promulgation of "rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts and the admission to the practice of law";7 and, consequently to determine the
"means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of
Congress, shall be exercised".8 Rules of Court must yield to substantive laws9 of which
jurisdiction is a segment. A mistake in statutory jurisdiction may not be corrected by
executive fiat, "but by legislation".10

Well may we profit from the wise pronouncement in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General, supra, at pages 529-530, thus: "Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or
authority. Others provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is projected into
judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the court in the real and substantive
sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is the
thing itself ; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to the
parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice. ... The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous
action. ..."

2. And now we come to the jurisdictional area allocated to inferior courts. A rule, the validity
of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; "it must
appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist."11 Such jurisdiction cannot be
broadened upon "doubtful inferences" drawn from statutes. Absent a statutory grant, neither
convenience nor assumed justice or propriety of the exercise thereof in a particular class of
cases "can justify the assumption of jurisdiction" by said courts.12

3. Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what
determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction.13

But just exactly what does Maxima de Jesus desire in her complaint below? In plain
language, she asks of the court to compel two sets of defendants to toe the line: Shell to
continue with the previous manner of payment (forma de pago) of rentals by means of a
check drawn in her favor alone; and the dissenting co-owners to pay her the 10% of the
rentals as compensation to which she claims she is entitled as administratrix of the property
— per agreement. By this she hopes to pay herself, as against her defendant co-owners, the
10% of the latter's share in the monthly rentals (P1,850.80 from October 1966, to December
31, 1975; and P2,074.07 from thence to December 31, 1980). A careful and considerate
examination of the complaint below as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiff
Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective
commitments. Implicit, too, in the complaint is the demand that her said co-owners recognize
her as administratrix. It is in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within
the concept of specific performance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that
jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance. For, specific performance — the subject of
the litigation — "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".14

A case with factual environment similar to the present is Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs.
Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. There, plaintiff sued defendant in the City Court of
Manila to accept delivery of 74,500 pieces of plastifilm bags, balance of 100,000 pieces
ordered by defendant, which the latter for no justifiable reason refused to accept. The prayer
of the complaint is that defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff P3,376.00, total value of the
100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags. Defendant moved to dismiss. Ground: The subject matter
of the litigation is "specific performance" and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
court of first instance. The City Court upheld defendant, dismissed the complaint. And the
Court of First Instance affirmed. Before this Coat, plaintiff contended that "the subject of the
litigation was the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags contracted for by defendant at a total
price of P3,376.00, and, therefore, it was susceptible of pecuniary estimation". This Court, in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, ruled that the City Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction, and declared:

That plaintiff's complaint also sought the payment by the defendant of P3,376.00 plus
interest and attorney's fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for
the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific
performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident
or consequence of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no such liability is
judicially declared, the payment can not be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do
not represent the value of the subject of litigation.

This Court there lifted from Mebane Cotton Breeding St'n vs. Sides, 257 SW 302; 21 C.J.S.,
59, note, the following, which is indeed illuminating:

The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract, although
the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the amount of which that
court has jurisdiction.
 It will avail respondents nothing when they say that what they seek is to prevent Maxima de
Jesus from being defrauded of her 10% compensation to only P185.08, covering the
October, 1966 rental; and that should defendants below insist in defrauding her of her share
corresponding to any other month, in respondents' language, "entonces se podra repetir
igual demanda por ese mes".15 Reasons there are which will stop us from giving our
imprimatur to this advocacy. Courts will be swamped with her complaints. Multiplicity of suits
is obnoxious to the administration of justice. Besides, the breach of contract charged against
defendants below is total and indivisible. Monthly rentals will have to run through a number of
years. There is an unqualified refusal to perform the contract. Such refusal goes to the entire
contract. It is treated as a complete breach. Therefore, but one action — specific
performance — may be presented. For that action may not be split; successive actions may
not be maintained.16 Especially is this principle true in the case before us. For, nowhere in
the complaint filed on October 3, 1966, is there an averment that at the time jurisdiction was
sought in the City Court, the October, 1966 rental was already due and payable. As a matter
of fact, in Annex 2 of respondents' answer before this Court, which is Shell's answer to the
complaint below, the following averment in paragraph 13 appears: "SHELL has to pay the
monthly rentals of P3,500 within the first ten (10) days of each contract month."

Nothing in the statute books would confer jurisdiction on city courts over actions where
specific performance of contract is primarily sought. Result: The city court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.17

4. Nor does the law grant the city courts power to take cognizance of a case for final
injunction. On the contrary, such authority is expressly granted by statute to courts of first
instance in the exercise of their original jurisdiction.18 And the city court is without jurisdiction
to hear and determine the case for final injunction against Shell. .

5. But let us assume that what plaintiff below claims, as against her co-owners, is but a
judgment for the small sum of P185.08, her compensation for the month of October, 1966.
Nonetheless, the city court remains without jurisdiction. This is because the sum of money
action may not be divorced from the injunction suit. Both of them are the subject of only one
complaint. For, really, without a mandatory injunction to Shell to issue the checks in plaintiff's
favor, the certainty of collecting her alleged compensation becomes problematical. The
action then is indivisible. And, the city court's jurisdiction must yield to the jurisdiction of the
higher court of first instance. Expediency and convenience so demand.19

6. Where much space was devoted by counsel for the parties herein is on the question of the
power of the city court to issue the disputed writ of preliminary injunction earlier transcribed.

Historically speaking, the 1901 original organic act of courts in the Philippines (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission) was silent on the power of the city (Justice of the peace) court to issue
preliminary injunction. Neither did the old 1901 Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) grant this power to
said court. When a later statute, Act 2041 of the Philippine Legislature (1911), did empower said
court to issue preliminary injunction, its exercise was limited to cases involving forcible entry. And,
subsequent legislation's also carry this provision, viz: Act 2131, effective February 1, 1912; Act 3764,
effective November 26, 1930; Act 3881, effective November 14, 1931; and the present Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended.

To be sure temporary injunctions could also be issued in cases other than forcible entry; but then
only municipal courts in provincial capitals are privileged to grant the same, and solely in the
absence of the district judge.20
In Piit vs. de Lara, 58 Phil. 765, 766-767,21 this Court was asked to rule on the question of whether a
justice of the peace may issue a writ of preliminary injunction in an illegal detainer suit. The answer
was "No". Because the law limits the issuance of such writ only to forcible entry cases. We then
ruled out the preliminary injunction in the illegal detainer case as in excess of his jurisdiction.

The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which
reads:

SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals
or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in
any action pending in an inferior court within his district.

They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents:
Since the case is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This
ratiocination suffers from infirmities. First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein. Second, the
first sentence of Section 2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute,
namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action
pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that the city court, except in the
cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminary injunction. Third, as
adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the city
court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction. At any rate, the
party plaintiff is not without speedy remedy. He may seek injunctive assistance from the court of first
instance.

Upon the view we take of this case, we hereby grant the petition for certiorari and prohibition; the
preliminary injunction we issued herein is declared final; and the respondent court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 153460, entitled "Maxima de Jesus, asistida de su marido Salvador Barrios,
Demandantes versus Manuela de Jesus, Engracia de Jesus, Pablo de Jesus, y The Shell Company
of the Philippines, Ltd., Demandados". Costs against respondents other than the respondent judge.

So ordered.

FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for unlawful

detainer against private respondent Francisco T. Sycip. The case was filed in
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to
private respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the Francel Townhomes, at 22
Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for P451,000.00. The Contract to Sell
provides inter alia that in case of default in the payment of two or more
installments, the whole obligation will become due and demandable and the
seller will then be entitled to rescind the contract and take possession of the
property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity of any court
action and the downpayment will be treated as earnest money or as rental for
the use of the premises. Petitioner alleged that private respondent failed to
pay the monthly amortization of P9,303.00 since October 30, 1990 despite
demands to update his payments and to vacate the premises, the latest of
which was the demand made in the letter dated September 26, 1992, and that
because of private respondents unjust refusal to vacate, petitioner was
constrained to engage the services of counsel. Petitioner prayed that private
respondent be ordered to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of
P9,303.00 beginning October 30, 1990 until he shall have vacated the
premises, and P25,000.00 as attorneys fees plus appearance fee of P
1,000.00 per hearing and expenses of litigation.
On November 9, 1992, private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
but his motion was denied by the MTC. On January 20, 1993 he filed his
answer, in which he alleged that he had stopped paying the monthly
[1]

amortizations because the townhouse unit sold to him by petitioner was of

defective construction. He alleged that he had in fact filed a complaint for
unsound real estate business practice in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80) against
petitioner. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P75,000.00 as attorneys fees and that he be given all other remedies just and
equitable.
In its resolution dated February 24, 1993, the MTC ruled that the answer
was filed out of time on the ground that it was filed more than ten days after
the service of summons. On March 17, 1993, however, it dismissed the
[2]

complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The MTC held that the case was cognizable
by the HLURB. But it also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent
P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P3,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay costs.
On appeal the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MTC. It
held that the case was exclusively cognizable by the HLURB which had
jurisdiction not only over complaints of buyers against subdivision developers
but also over actions filed by developers for the unpaid price of the lots or
units.
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, alleging that:
(a) The amounts of damages prayed for by the private respondent in his Answer are
enormous and way beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court; and

(b) Since the inferior court and the respondent court ruled that it has no jurisdiction
over this case, then it has no reason, much more jurisdiction to award damages in
excess of the P20,000.00 jurisdiction of the inferior Court. [3]

The appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that the MTC had
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of
the amount of damages on unpaid rentals sought to be recovered in view of
1A(1) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. [4]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It contended that since the MTC had
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over this case, then it had no jurisdiction either
to grant the counterclaim for damages in the total sum of P23,000.00. Its
motion was, however, denied for lack of any cogent reason to reverse the
appellate courts resolution of June 15, 1994. [5]

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

It is important to first determine whether the MTC has jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint. For if it has no jurisdiction, then the award of damages
made by it in its decision is indeed without any basis. It is only if the MTC has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action that it is necessary to determine
the correctness of the award of damages, including attorneys fees.
Petitioners complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking
such action falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the
determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration of the
rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private
respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying
monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or developer of his
decision to do so because of petitioners alleged failure to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time for complying with the same. The case thus involves a
determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate
under P.D. No. 957. Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against
petitioner for unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the
failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply with the conditions of a lease
agreement or vacate the premises after the expiration of the lease. Since the
determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question
of the right of petitioner must be determined by the agency.
 Petitioners cause of action against private respondent should instead be
filed as a counterclaim in HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80 in accordance
with Rule 6, 6 of the Rules of Court which is of suppletory application to the
1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure per 3 of the same. In the case of Estate
Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte the [6]

developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought
on installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing
the appeal, we held:

The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint
to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a
subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and
industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business
practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before
the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing
suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good
its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting
amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint
against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a
subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended. It must
accordingly fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We
find that the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular
court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.

Accordingly, we hold that the MTC correctly held itself to be without

jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. But it was error for the MTC to grant
private respondents counterclaim for damages for expenses incurred and
inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a result of the filing of the
ejectment case. [7]

Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may file a counterclaim only if the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot be filed. [8]

Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of
damages to private respondent must be disallowed for the following reasons:
(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its counterclaim
was filed out of time or more than 10 days from private respondents receipt of
summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent did not make any
counterclaim.
 (2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for
the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As held
in Buan v. Camaganacan, an award of attorneys fees without justification is a
[9]

conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation

and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the
award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft of any proof that
petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which
would warrant such an award. [10]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and

the complaint against private respondent is DISMISSED. The private
respondents counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108115 October 27, 1995

PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ELSTON YABUT, represented by his
father, GEMINIANO E. YABUT, JR., and ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Amended Decision dated December 9, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 22347
reversing the Regional Trial Court's decision sentencing petitioner Philippine Soap Box Derby, Inc. to
pay the sums of P25,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs to the private respondents. The facts are undisputed:

On July 3, 1983, the defendant Philippine Soap Box Derby, Inc., a duly organized
non-stock corporation, held a soap box derby on the grounds of the Folk Arts
Theater. Jose Elston Yabut, a ten-year old student and son of Geminiano Yabut, Jr.,
joined the contest as one of the racers, sponsored by the Roadway Express, Inc.
(Roadway for brevity). The young Yabut won first place in one of the morning races
and was (sic) qualified to run for the second race. After lunch and preparatory for the
second race, Yabut was weighed while seated on his race car and was found
overweight by the derby officials. The derby rules provide that the maximum
combined weight of car and driver should not exceed 206 pounds. The derby officials
removed a half-pound weight at the back of the soap box car, which was handed to
the boy and the boy gave it to his father. The father kept the half-pound weight. The
boy lost in the second race. Thereafter, the father returned the weight to the boy in
order that it could be screwed back to where it was originally attached. He was to
participate again in the third race in the afternoon of the same day so his father
instructed him to put back the half-pound weight at the back of the derby car. The
boy did not screw the weight to its proper place and instead, he placed it inside his
back pocket. With the half-pound weight in his back pocket, he was weighed for the
third time with the box car. While he was about to climb the ramp to ride the soap box
 car, a derby official tapped his back pocket and discovered the half-pound weight
inside the pocket. The official removed the lead weight from the boy's pocket. When
confronted, the boy admitted that he did not screw the lead weight. The boy was not
allowed to participate in the third race inspite of the efforts of the father to talk with
the derby officials.1

As a result of his son's disqualification private respondent Geminiano Yabut, Jr. (together with
Roadway Express, Inc.) filed a complaint for actual, moral and exemplary damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City alleging that the arbitrary disqualification of his son "became a
nightmare,"2 resulting in his son's embarrassment and humiliation, "not only to relatives, classmates
and friends but (also) to the public in general,"3 resulting in "mental anguish, serious anxiety, social
humiliation and sleepless nights."4 Additionally, as "the father of plaintiff and a representative of
Roadway Enterprises," who paid the P5,000.00 fee both to sponsor his son and to advertise his
business as a common carrier, and who consequently demanded — but was refused — an
investigation of the incident, he was entitled to moral and compensatory damages because the
resulting unpleasant publicity of the incident affected the goodwill of his company before the public in
general.5 Exemplary damages and attorney's fees were likewise sought by private respondents from
the trial
court. 6

On January 23, 1989 the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit,
and ordering petitioner to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. It found that "the
discovery of the unbolted half pound lead weight in the body of plaintiff Jose Elston Yabut was
a brazen violation which undoubtedly was a valid reason for his disqualification."7 The trial court
concluded:

Indeed the plaintiffs are wanting in good faith. After plaintiff John Elston Yabut had
created a cause for his disqualification in the race, he should not be expected to
complain when he was eliminated from the contest much less put the blame on
herein defendant. The latter merely implemented and promulgated the rules
governing the derby. Likewise, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the return of the
registration fee after the young Yabut was allowed to race for two (2) games. If he
was prevented from pursuing the third race, it was already through his own fault. The
court is therefore constrained to deny the grant for damages in favor of the plaintiffs
because Art. 21 of the New Civil Code must necessarily be construed as granting the
right to recover the damages only to aggrieved persons who are not themselves at
fault.8

The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the trial court's decision and dismissed respondent's appeal in
a 3 to 2 decision by a division of five promulgated on March 6, 1992.9 Not satisfied, the private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. With the elevation of Justice Jose C. Campos to the
Supreme Court and the retirement of Justice Filemon M. Mendoza, a new majority then amended
the original Court of Appeals' decision, reversing on December 9, 1992, the lower court' s earlier
dismissal of herein respondents' complaint. The dispositive portion of the said amended decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the decision of this

Court dated April 6, 1992 is GRANTED; and said decision is accordingly AMENDED
and MODIFIED in that the judgment of the lower court is hereby REVERSED and
instead, this amended decision is hereby rendered finding merit in the plaintiffs'
complaint and sentencing appellee corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages, the additional sum of P25,000.00 by way of
 exemplary damages, the amount of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of
this suit.10

Hence, this petition, in which the principal issue raised is whether or not, generally, in a private
sports competition a court may substitute its judgment for that made by the competition's officials in
the interpretation and enforcement of competition rules.

We find for petitioner.

Alongside formal education, society values the primacy of sports in the formative years crucial to the
molding of an individual's personality. The clarity of sports rules and the absence of shadings of gray
in the otherwise black and white simplicity of the enforcement of those rules normally facilitate the
gradual absorption in the yet-pristine and formative minds of children, society's otherwise complex
web of governing rules. Before he begins to master the rules of society, the child must first learn to
distinguish between right and wrong, good or evil. In a sense, the sports of those formative years
play a role in this process of learning.

As the games become much more complex and as they involve more complicated things like bets,
money, appearance fees and the trading of professional athletes, the games and the rules which
govern them lose their innate simplicity. The legal rules of contract and obligations and torts and
damages take over, and courts are sometimes called upon to deal with questions which appear to
fall beyond the competence of referees and umpires, or seconds or arbiters. And yet, even within
this sphere, the essential rules governing most sports remain simple and unadulterated. A sprinter
loses by a hairbreadth of a second on a difference which would otherwise be dismissed as
statistically insignificant in other areas. A Ben Johnson is kicked out of athletics and divested of his
Olympic gold medal because a banned substance appears in a laboratory assay of his urine. A
weight-lifter is taken out of Olympic competition because weeks before, he had a bad cold and
injudiciously took a cough preparation which contained a prohibited compound which later showed
up on tests. Our young national team, after winning the Little League World series is divested of its
championship on an allegation that certain rules were violated.

In the case of the weightlifter, good faith or bad faith hardly comes into question. He may not have
known that the cough preparation he took contained an androgenic steroid. Many of the members of
our world series team hardly knew that violations were being made. The ideal simplicity of many of
these rules enabled the judges and arbiters, referees and umpires to rule on matters before them
with a finality which sometimes puts to shame the complex procedural rules which prevents courts
everywhere from dealing with otherwise simple controversies with the same swiftness and finality.
However, each belongs to its own sphere. Just as, at a certain stage in life, sports play a role in
forming character, the complexity of adult relationships and transactions requires more rules, and
then even more rules of greater complexity. Courts of law belong to the latter sphere. It is best, that
our courts, as a general rule, leave the former alone.

The idea of justice sometimes harkens to a pristine state in the course of the development of
society's ethical and legal norms, exemplified by the rules of the games which children play. Their
simplicity serves a purpose, and it would be wrong to impose either harsh legal rules or complicate
simple do's and dont's, with good faith and bad faith doctrines more appropriately applicable to adult
transactions. Such doctrines only disrupt and confuse, and would only be apt if the adult
enforcement of sport's rules were inherently unfair.

There was nothing unfair in the officials' enforcement of the soap box derby rules11 in the case before
us.
As the undisputed facts show, petitioner John Elston Yabut won his first race. In the second race, he
was found to be overweight, and an excess weight, a half-pound bolt, was itself removed by officials
of the race to bring him down to acceptable weight limits. He lost the second race. In the third race,
the offensive half-pound bolt found12its way into his pocket and he was disqualified.

The rule book governing the soap box derby race, as adopted and issued by the defendant firm,
provides a simple rule: any "additional weight (should) be securely bolted" to the car, and "[n]o
movable or lost weight is allowed." To make sure that the rule book covers every conceivable
violation, the rules warn that contestants are not allowed to do anything not specifically stated in the
rule book. In any case, the rule book clearly provides for the question of additional weights and the
rule is clear enough as to leave no room of interpretation.

The Court of Appeals' original Division of Five, which affirmed the trial court's decision was therefore
correct in stating that the presence of a half pound weight in petitioner's pocket was a brazen
violation of the soap box derby rules. Without reservation, we agree with the respondent court's
original majority's holding, written by former Supreme Court Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr., that:13

There is no need for a keen imagination or a stretch of unusual imagination to

comprehend that the keeping by Jose Elston Yabut of a half pound lead weight in his
back pocket was a brazen violation of the derby rules. The rules are prescribed and
enforced to prevent any participant from taking any unusual advantage of additional
weight to accelerate speed going downhill or prevent risks of serious or grave
injuries. Should any accident happen while the box car is coming down the high
altitude ramp at tremendous speed, the driver may lose control of the box car and
hurt himself.

The boy was not disqualified only for having the lead weight in his back pocket. This
is only one of the multi-violations committed by Jose Elston Yabut with the father's
unwitting assistance in not properly attaching the half-pound lead weight with the
screw prescribed for such purpose. We take note of the fact that the weight was
handed to the father after it was removed from its attachment at the back of the box
car. He knew that it was removed from the car because the car and his son were
overweight and that it could only be attached with the consent or approval of derby
officials. The father did not follow this rule. Why did he give it to his son instead of
asking the derby officials to put it back where it was removed? The father's actuation
in this regard is full of uncertainties replete with speculations that he intended to give
his son the added weight without knowledge of the derby officials and thus give the
boy an advantage over the others.

We can overlook the son's shortcomings or lack of detailed knowledge of the rules
but we cannot accept that the father was not aware of the derby rules or that his
giving back the weight to his son without putting the weight back where it was
removed was done in good faith. It was certainly a clear manifestation of bad faith in
giving the lead weight to his son knowing that there was no order from the officials to
attach it back.

The soap box derby is a worldwide sports competition for boys. Participation by the
minors is by sponsorship by some business or civic organization. The rules are strict
and the participants are required to comply strictly with said rules. Any deviation from
the rules is a ground for disqualification, unless, like all sports, the disqualification
was done arbitrarily to favor one or a few or to discriminate against others. Like all
kinds of sporting events, the rules must be strictly followed to insure equality in the
 sports competition; and respect for decisions of officials duly authorized to execute
the rules of the game must at all times be shown. Otherwise, there will be anarchy
and chaos and the event will cease to be a sport but a test of guile, trickery and
fraud. The rules of sports do not consider exceptions; it exacts obedience to the rules
to promote and develop a keen sense of fairness in the field of competition and in the
spirit of sportsmanship.

Moreover, the soap box derby race is a privately sponsored event with rules and regulations which
mirror the same rules and regulations followed by international soap box derby competitions. As
Justice Campos in hisponencia observed:14

It is not a public sporting event where everybody is free to join and compete. It has
rules which must be strictly followed and it has officials duly selected and authorized
to enforce the rules . . . Anyone who joins the derby, does so with the clear cut
understanding that he shall abide strictly by the rules . . .[D]ecisions may not be
pleasant to participants, like the plaintiffs, but the latter may not be allowed to
substitute their own judgments over those authorized by the sponsoring body, to
conduct the race.

Contrary to the assertions of the respondent court in its amended decision, the question of a
contestant's good faith or bad faith hardly comes into the picture in the enforcement of simple
competition rules and regulations in sports of this nature. The motive (or absence of motive) behind
the presence of the half pound weight in the private respondent's pocket was of no moment. If there
was intent to cheat, it was wrong and the rules disqualified him. If there was no intent to cheat, and
the offending weight found its way in his pocket for one or another reason, it was there and its
presence violated the derby rules, which led to private respondent's disqualification. Simple as that.
If legal notions were allowed to intrude at every level in the enforcement of rules of private (or even
public) sporting events, there will result anarchy and chaos, as virtually every decision by an umpire,
or referee or sports judge could be subject to question and every disqualification based on a clear-
cut rule would be qualified by the presence or absence of good faith or bad faith, or the question of
motive or intent. Spectators will then have to await the result of sporting events, not from rafters or
from media, but from announcements made by judges through court personnel reading aloud legal
decisions.

What will prevent our athletes for national or international competitions — when found to have a
banned substance in their urine — from asserting that the substance was taken as part of regular
medication in good faith? How may courts ascertain with definiteness a competitor's excuse based
on good faith in a claim for damages against his disqualification by the sponsors of a competitive
athletic event? In an increasingly litigious society, the ramifications of courts' increasing intrusions
into matters which ought to be settled by sports bodies are many. Encouraging the trend would
ultimately pervert the yet-untouched area of childhood sporting events. Unless a clear case is found
for arbitrary and brazen violations or applications of sports rules by officials and sponsors
themselves, and no such thing happened here, it is best for courts to prudently leave things where
they are.

Finally, petitioner's assertion that other contestants likewise violated the derby rules by placing illegal
weights on their caps or in other parts of their body (an assertion given credence by respondent
court in its amended decision) is a bare statement which was never supported or proven by
competent evidence in the trial Court. According to the respondent court, videotaped evidence was
supposed to have been introduced15 in support of the allegation that other contestants may have
been as guilty as the private respondent in possessing illegal weights during the third race. However,
no specific allegations as to whether or not specific contestants were allowed to race in spite of their
being overweight and it would be impossible to estimate even relative weights from a television
screen replaying a videotape of the event.

In fine, the circuitous route the case at bench has taken through our courts would have been
unnecessary had private respondents observed ordinary rules of sportsmanship and sporting play
following John Elston Yabut's disqualification. The maxim that "the judges decision is final" simplifies
sports adjudication to a degree which the larger arena of life does not ordinarily mirror. Nonetheless,
it is a simplicity in procedure which we of the courts ought to altogether idealize or sometimes aim
for.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated December 9,
1992 is hereby REVERSED and the trial court's decision REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO MATEO, DANIEL FRANCISCO, and
LEONILA KUIZON,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, and EDGAR STA.
MARIA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board
Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then
General Manager.1 On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He
was later dismissed on January 7, 1993.

On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction2 before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of
action. It reads:

xxx xxx xxx

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

II-2 Petitioner is the General Manager of the MOWAD since August 1984 with concomitant
security of tenure in office and could not be removed either temporarily or permanently,
except for cause and only after compliance with the elementary rules of due process;
 II-3 However, on December 14, 1992, contrary to the tenets of justice and fairness, as well
as for want of procedural due process, the respondents (petitioners) and members of the
Board of Directors of the MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically, and unilaterally stopped and
prohibited the petitioner from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General
Manager of the MOWAD and, in his place, have designated the respondent (petitioner)
Maximo San Diego as Acting General Manager . . .

II-4 On December 15, 1992, while petitioner was out of office on official travel, . . . thru
stealth and strategy, the respondents have conspired and helped one another in removing
the petitioner from the Office of the General Manager of the MOWAD by forcibly destroying
its door and locked it with a replaced door-knob and all attempts on his part to gain access
and entry proved futile; . . .

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

III-2 On January 7, 1993, . . . in confabulation with his co-respondents and members of the
Board of Directors of the MOWAD, the respondent Aniceto G. Mateo slapped the petitioner
with an Order terminating his services as General Manger . . .

III-5 Petitioner has a clear right to the Office of General Manager of the MOWAD which is
being usurped or unlawfully held by respondent Maximo San Diego in conspiracy with his co-
respondents; . . .

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

IV-1-a Petitioner is entitled to the relief mandated, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission, or continuance of the acts complained of more
particularly the continuous acts of repondents in stopping and prohibiting him from exercising
his rights and performing his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and from stopping
and prohibiting him to gain access and entry to office. 3

Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction
over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Commission; and (2)quo warranto was not the proper remedy.4 Respondent Judge Arturo Marave
denied the Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 1993, and the Motion for Reconsideration on June 9,
1993.5

Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which
was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for adjudication. In its Decision, dated November 24,
1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and in its Resolution,
dated January 11, 1994, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.6

The main issue in this petition for review is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has
jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No. 014-M involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public
corporation.

We hold that it has no jurisdiction.

There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended.7 In Davao
City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions 8 the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled that a water district is a
corporation created pursuant to a special
law — P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by
the Civil Service Law.

In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC), We ruled once again that local water
districts are quasi-public corporations whose employees belong to the Civil Service.
(emphasis omitted)

Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and
controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
Regulations. 9

Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, 10 and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum
Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private
respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a
decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent
could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by
the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, 11 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Service Commission, * and that parties aggrieved
thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote:

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to
this Court's certiorari judgment.

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as
amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any
event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
November 24, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 1, 1994 in CA G.R. SP No. 31530 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al.

G.R. No. L-21603. April 15, 1968
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter
bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued
against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety
moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of
the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case
to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time
upon appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost
fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also
been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it
is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to
quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary
hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted"
(83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear
what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the
parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the
date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in
court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of
four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or
objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ [217 SCRA 633; G.R.

NOS. 99289-90; 27 JAN 1993]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest
was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for
acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the
amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on
recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant
motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is
impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public
statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher
studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent
court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
(Manotoc v. C.A.)