1
III.
A. 1. JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. VERANOAC NO. 8198, JULY 15, 2014
FACTS:
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the “Alabang Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In
a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped
for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to
ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of them case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in
investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during
one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three
clients using the letterhead of the DOJ. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as
founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use
the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the
bar. For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed
disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it
to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government
prosecutor. Atty. Lozano’s verified Complaint-Affidavit was filed with the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. The Commissioner noted that both
complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges. However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.
HELD:
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding
reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the
provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that “a lawyer shall rely
upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.” We believe that other
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in
the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a
member of the bar. The statements and others made during the hearing establish
respondent’s admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary
despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and
2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on
official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in
view of “expediting the case. ”The way respondent conducted himself
manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from
a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively
avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence , the outcome
of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted. Rule
1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule
15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.” The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a
lawyer “to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness. ”Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause
must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to
remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short
of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap
on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense. Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in
relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately.
2. A.C. No. 10579 – Legal Ethics – Borrowing From Clients Not Appropriate
Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a
realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He
also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge

and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s
demands.
On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his
personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being
prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s
negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out that the
filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang
was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her
the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative
complaint against Agtang.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to
return the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed
from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for
three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD:
No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light.
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that
“a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value
of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In
other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and
even had the temerity that it was all the client’s idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various
amounts from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not
deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
2
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his
client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from
Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to
the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other
judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise
would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases
are filed directly with the Court.

3. A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
Facts:
Three separate complaints were filed against the following:
1. Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission. He never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, RTC San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission,
however, was never renewed upon expiration. Also, he had delegated his notarial
authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas
(Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
2. Atty. Pedro L. Santos - Complainant executed an affidavit of loss which
was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for
authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty.
Santos was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of
Manila.
3. The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that
a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents
for and on behalf of several lawyers.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyers violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Commission
Ruling:
Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or
the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, it is clear that Atty Siapno violated the 2004 rules on
Notarial Commission. The Court ruled, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being
commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative
cases.
3
4. FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving
his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services
included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC. Atty. Guico
asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Chu called Atty.
Guico to inform him that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. On that
occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00,
which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office. The amount was received without issuing
any receipt.
ISSUE: Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?
RULING OF THE IBP: IBP found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu. and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of
his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt
for the legal profession.
RULING OF THE COURT:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant
to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant
evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as
penalty.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his
witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft
decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office,
sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by
demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision.
In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal
Profession. Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his
professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others,
and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment,
because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain
faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception,
including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients
and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the
Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S.
GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
5. Antonina S. Sosa Vs. Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza; A.C. No. 8776; March 23, 2015
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel
V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms.
Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising
from non-payment of debt.[1]
This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2]
On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation. The
IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six (6) months,
likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest.[3]
On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution and the records of the case.[4]
4
The Factual Background
Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They
agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall
accrue in case of default.[5]
To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note
and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.[6]
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to
pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and
deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise that he would
later pay. The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally
deposited it sometime in October 2006; it was “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.”
Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty.
Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendoza’s failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter[7] to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored
the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry
Return Receipt.[8] Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain
why he failed to pay.
In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the
complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on the
complaint in a Resolution dated January 10, 2011.[9] He filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension on March 18, 2011,[10] which this Court granted in a Resolution dated
October 19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief Comment on January 10,
2012.[11]
Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and that it
is a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of the
complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor any
evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.[12]

The Proceedings before the IBP
On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the Notice
of Mandatory Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.
When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty. Cabrera
marked the complainant’s documentary exhibits and the mandatory conference
was subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then directed to submit
their respective verified position papers, documentary exhibits and/or affidavits of
their witnesses, if any, within fifteen (15) days.
In her position paper,[13] Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her Complaint-
Affidavit. She argued that Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also
civilly.
Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation,[14] admitted that (i) he arrived late during the
scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
(iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate with the complainant’s
counsel; and (iv) the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same.
Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express
manifestation he made.[15]
The IBP Findings
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only
administratively but also civilly. He gave credence to Ms. Sosa’s allegations that
Atty. Mendoza failed to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosa’s attempts to collect. He
also took notice of Atty. Mendoza’s admission that the obligation is valid.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP ruled:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that [the
respondent] is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty.
Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) to [the complainant] with legal interest.
5
The Court’s Ruling
We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in
his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission
to and continued practice of law.[16] Any wrongdoing, whether professional or
non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary
action.[17]
Gross misconduct is defined as “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment.”[18]
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in
character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of
P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt
showing he received P500,000.00.[19] Although he initially denied getting this
amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any
evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without
qualification as to the amount.[20]
Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon
maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the
postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he
would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse,
the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did
not dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing
with the IBP Investigating Officer.[21] He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to
Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late.

We find Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him
to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact,
Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his
obligation because of his manifestation that he already had the money.[22]
It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa’s request for settlement
after claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying he had
the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place. Atty. Mendoza was also
not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00
and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation
remains outstanding after all these years.
In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez[23] this Court sitting en banc held:
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times,
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis supplied.]
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his
obligation,[24] Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his
admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire
financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.
[25]
We also reiterate that –
[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
6
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent
and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him.[26] [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well.[27]
To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza’s act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to
pay a valid and just debt.[28]
While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its
recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal
interest.
We take exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is
solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for
collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases
alone deters us from agreeing with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative
complaint before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of
liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance
of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.[29]
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to
continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of
justice.[30] The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from
the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[31]

We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case
to collect an outstanding debt from a lawyer.[32] However, in the recent case of
Heenan v. Atty. Espejo,[33] this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP’s
recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from
the complainant. We said in this case:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only
concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings
have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do
not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the complainant.[34][Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.]
We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the
Heenan case also did not deny the validity of her loan nor did she proffer any
reason for issuing unfunded checks.
As a final note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in
her present situation. However, because the matter before us is not a civil action
for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding
loan. We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any
future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty.
Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without prejudice to any action we
may take that is not based on the violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
SO ORDERED.
7
6. ACA v. SALVADO A.C. No. 10952 | January 26, 2016
FACTS:
Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for disbarment against
Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty.
Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty.
Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several
businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same
occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a
guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the
latter had various clients and investors.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-
dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal
amount plus interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank.
Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient
funds or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty.
Salvado. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant’s
calls and text messages. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his
lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.
Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado,
directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00. Atty.
Salvado refused to receive the said notice.
Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to personally serve the
demand letter. A certain “Mark” who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty.
Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in the province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado.
Complainant quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about
to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he
had not forgotten his debt. During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured
complainant that he was working on “something” to pay his obligations. He still
refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had previously
entered into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in
some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting business.
Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his business,

but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an
investment.
The checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence of
investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he
would request complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed
up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the
checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as
collateral.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.
IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification –
increased the period of suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.
ISSUE: WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he violated CPR and the
Lawyer’s Oath
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by
lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to
make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For
the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant’s being beguiled to part
with his money and believe Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical
human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person
like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado’s
stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or another, influenced
complainant’s decision to invest.
The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence” deserves scant consideration.
Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and
the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the
worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended
and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote
that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the
erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his
professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty.
Salvado’s business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject
8
checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated
Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado’s deceiving attempts to evade
payment of his obligations.
DISPOSITION: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
7. A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016
BIENVENIDO T. CANLAPAN v. ATTY. WILLIAM B. BALAYO
Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before
Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection with a money claim filed
by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council
(Mayon Council), respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant
while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai mo makua
ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you
want!")
Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by
respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly
considering that respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by
Higino M. Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the Mayon Council, who executed an
Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission, including the
security guard.
Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for
justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer actively participating in
the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was authorized by
the Mayon Council to appear on its behalf.
Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition,
Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances and resolutions
submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay.
When Fajut was elected Chair of the Mayon Council, he asked respondent to help
him on legal matters concerning his new role.
Issue: WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Held:
As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the
example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers

who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law" Respondent's
display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by this
court.
Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave
in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful
and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.42
Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and
pestering on the part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint.
Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant's claims, it was
improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many)
lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his claims against the Mayon
Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the
administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal
profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and
words uttered cannot be taken back."
Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to
influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards
suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are
expected to be always above reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive
personalities. They should always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in
speech and conduct, not only towards the court but also towards adverse parties
and witnesses.
It has been ruled:
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity.
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's
public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
9
8. Myrna M. Deveza Vs. Atty. Alexander M. Del Prado; A.C. No. 9574; June 21,
2016
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for disbarment filed by Myrna
M. Deveza (complainant) against respondent Atty. Alexander M. Del Prado (Atty.
Del Prado) for dishonesty and for acts unbecoming a lawyer.
In her complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged, among others, the
following:
2. The charge arose from the following facts:
(a) In February 2003, Atty. Alexander del Prado bought my lot located at No. 3242
Malvar St., Bragy. Pagasa, Camarin, Caloocan City, consisting of 633.80 sq. meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 178828 of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City for P1,500.00 per square meters on installment basis.
(b)To evidence the said sale, we executed a Contract to Sell. Atty. Del Prado took all
the copies of the Contract to Sell on the pretext that he will have the document
notarized but he never gave me a copy of the said document.
(c)Atty. Del Prado defaulted in his obligation to pay me the purchase price of the
said lot by leaving a balance of P565.950.00.
(d)When I sent him a demand letter for the payment of his obligation and/or
rescission of sale, he called me and told me that he will meet me and my son at
Jollibee, Muñoz Branch, where he will pay his unpaid balance. He likewise asked me
to bring the title over the property.
(e)Upon meeting Atty. Del. Prado at Jollibee Muñoz Branch, he asked for the title of
the property and I showed it to him. Then Atty. Del Prado brought out a completely
filled up Deed of Sale and he asked us to sign it before he will give us his payment.
(f)After we have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, he gave us P5,000.00 and he
told us that he would have the document first notarized before he will give us his
complete payment. x x x
(g)At that juncture, Atty. Del Prado tried to put inside his bag our title over the
property but I was able to grab it from him.
(h)Atty. Del Prado never paid us the balance of the purchase price for the lot he
bought from us.
(i)[Worst], Atty. Del Prado used the Deed of Absolute Sale that he made us sign by
means of fraud as evidence in the civil case I filed against him for rescission of
contract [that misled] the court.
x x x.[2]
In a Resolution,[3] dated September 3, 2012, the Court required Atty. Del
Prado to comment on the complaint-affidavit but failed to do so.
Pursuant to the Court Resolution,[4] dated November 18, 2013, the
complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On June 18, 2014, the case was set for mandatory conference but only
the counsel of complainant appeared. Despite due notice, Atty. Del Prado did not
attend the mandatory conference. The parties were then required to submit their
respective position papers but Atty. Del Prado again did not heed to the order of
the IBP.
On September 2, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation,[5] stated that Atty. Del Prado’s failure to answer the complaint
despite several notices and his continuous absence in the scheduled hearings
shows his flouting resistance to the lawful orders of the court and illustrates his
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Del Prado be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law and as a
member of the bar for a period of two (2) years.
In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-014,[6] dated January 30, 2015,
the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report
and recommendation of the CBD and suspended Atty. Del Prado from the practice
of law for a period of five (5) years.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only to those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. As vanguards of
our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[7] Because of their
important role in the society, the Court shall not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
whether such conduct was committed in their professional or in private capacity.[8]
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates
all lawyers to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same code proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. They should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[9]
In the present case, Atty. Del Prado committed an act which fell short of
the standard of the norm of conduct required of every lawyer. He deceived the
complainant by making her sign the deed of sale and making her believe that he
would pay in full the balance of the purchase price after he had the document
notarized. Complainant waited for Atty. Del Prado to make good his promise to pay
but despite several demands, he continued reneging on his obligation which
prompted her to file a case against him.
Moreover, Atty. Del Prado wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the
Court and IBP-CBD to file his comment and position paper and to appear in the
10
mandatory conference despite due notice. His continued defiance of the orders of
the Court and the IBP-CBD is a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court’s
authority which cannot be tolerated.[10] Atty. Del Prado should bear in mind that
he is a lawyer and an officer of the court who is duty bound to obey and respect
the court processes. He must acknowledge, at all times, the orders of the Court and
the IBP-CBD in deference to their authority over him as a member of the bar.[11]
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for Five (5)
years effective upon receipt of this decision with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Let also a copy
of this decision be appended to the personal record Atty. Alexander Del Prado in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
9. PEREZ VS. CATINDIG A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
FACTS:
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process
of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and
that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce
decree from the Dominican Republic.
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia
in the United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is
a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic
by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997, Dr.
Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous
letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty.
Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by
Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig
professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is
removed.”

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son;
he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty.
Baydo was frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May
18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez
showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that
the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in
the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour.
Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.
IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross
immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for dearth of
evidence.
ISSUE: WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
grossly immoral conduct.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing
any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members
11
of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts
to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of
conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it
matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still
remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least,
so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the
various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of
validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate
lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to
pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such
fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged
not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the
penalty of disbarment.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the
respondents.
As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim
was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were

indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.
DISPOSITION: Catindig – disbarred. Baydo – dismissed.
10. A.C. No. 10676: September 8, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other
unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal
profession."
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from
the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part
of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with
whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin,
respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from
1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to
1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
3. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from
May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with
CCC.
12
Issue: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
Ruling:
Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only
required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain
one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several
adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between
the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies
of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills
by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of
him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

11. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula Vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula; A.C. No.
9226; une 14, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment
dated June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma.
Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).
In her complaint,[1] Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula
committed unlawful and immoral acts;[2] that while Atty. Advincula was still
married to her, he had extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga
(Ms. Gonzaga);[3] that the extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma.
Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria);[4] that Atty. Advincula failed to give
financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea
Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources;[5] that he
admitted in the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he had
contracted another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga;[6]that even should Atty. Advincula
prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration of birth was motivated
by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent
marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in itself still
unlawful;[7] that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was
conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer;[8] that
contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved
was also an unlawful conduct;[9] that making a false declaration before a notary
public was an unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code;[10] and
that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed
his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer.[11] Dr.
Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be disbarred.[12]
In his answer,[13] Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted
that during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth
of their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that
they could not agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends,
and respective careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with
the two children to live with her parents; that despite their separation, he regularly
gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their children; that during their
separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not
contract a second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga.[14]
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship
with Ms. Gonzaga, a child was bom and named Alexandra;[15] that in consideration
of his moral obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra;[16] that he only
learned that the birth of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the
13
child was already enrolled in school;[17] that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him
that she had the birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll
the child;[18] that he strived to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a
reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once
again decided to live with her parents, bringing all of their children along; that
nevertheless, he continued to provide financial support to his family and visited the
children regularly; that Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she had planned to take
up nursing in order to work as a nurse abroad because her medical practice here
was not lucrative; that he supported his wife’s nursing school expenses;[19] that
Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a nurse;[20]
that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to such
arrangement to avoid further division of the family;[21] that during the same
period he was also busy with his law studies;[22] that Dr. Advincula proposed that
he and their children migrate to the USA but he opposed the proposal because he
would not be able to practice his profession there;[23] that Dr. Advincula stated
that if he did not want to join her, then she would just get the children to live with
her;[24] that when Dr. Advincula came home for a vacation he was not able to
accompany her due to his extremely busy schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the
General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of Investigation;[25]and that
when they finally met arguments flared out, during which she threatened to file a
disbarment suit against him in order to force him to allow her to bring their
children to the USA.[26] Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be
dismissed for utter lack of merit.[27]
Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD
After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and
observations, and recommended the following sanctions, to wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers comes this provisions (sic): “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character.
Remember we must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment
that a lawyer no longer has the required qualifications foremost of which is the
presence of that character earlier mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may
revoke the said practice
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the
weakness of the flesh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith
Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.

From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as
a moral obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had
committed an adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land
defined as immoral conduct: “that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.”[28]
xxxx
It is the Commissioner’s view that what he did pales when compared to
Respondent Leo Palma’s case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: “But what
respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged
to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity: and render help and
support.”
Deemed favorable to Respondent’s cause were the various exhibits he
presented evidencing the fact that he supported their children financially. Such
conduct could not illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the
blame why their marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together would
indicate that harmony between them was out of the question.
The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that
ignited the flame of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend
the supreme penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such honored station in
life would result in irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest degree
pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court’s ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470
SCRA 186 (2005), he must be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent’s
own admission of having committed an extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it
is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for at
least one month with the additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a
more severe penalty would be imposed.
14
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of
disbarment. What he did was not grossly immoral.[29]
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of the
penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A” and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent’s admission of engaging in a simple immorality and also taking into
account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) months.[30]
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as
final and executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as
follows:
That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution
suspending the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two (2) months
under “A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C.
Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) x x x
That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting November up
to December thereby refraining himself from the practice of law as Legal Officer on
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x
That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of his
compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to practice his
law profession again.[31]
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at
the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until
retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the
Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is
to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in
its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.[32]
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[33]
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for
immorality based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-
Alejandro v. Alejandro,[34] the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the
respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with
another woman. Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on
an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial declaration that
her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also married.[35] In another
case we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child
with a former client.[36] In Samaniego v. Ferrer,[37] suspension of six months from
the practice of law was meted on the philandering lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although
his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted
immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The
degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the
immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot
escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into proper
context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for three months
to be condign and appropriate.
15
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated
February 26, 2013 that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as
final and executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two
months starting in November and lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that
such leave from work involved refraining from performing his duties as a Legal
Officer of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought
to know that it is only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP
Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its recommendation
against him incapable of finality. It is the Court’s final determination of his liability
as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As
such, his supposed compliance with the recommended two-month suspension
could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his
being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of
law should include his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice.
This is so considering that his position mandated him to be a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will not be
a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of the
suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer
by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue
to receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on leave for the duration
of his suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C.
ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same
offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his
receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from
office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine
the date of commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent
in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Service Commission for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Before his admission to the bar, respondent Atty. Leonardo C.
Advincula—who was married to complainant Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula—

entered into a brief extra-marital relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga, with whom
he had a child.[1]
The standard of morality and the rules of conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility are applicable only to lawyers. These are not enforced
against persons who have not taken the lawyer’s oath.
A lawyer’s commitment to the lawyer’s oath or any standard of morality
and conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility starts only upon taking
that oath.
Oaths are not senseless utterances. Lawyers who take their oath consent
to this Court’s administrative jurisdiction over their actions. The oath is essentially a
promise to act consistently with the value-expectations of this Court.
The significance of the oath rests on many assumptions. Taking the oath
implies notice to the person of the standards he or she is expected to abide by. It
not only implies consent to, but also assumes consciousness of those standards.
The person allowed to take the oath is assumed to have the capacity to consider
and control his or her actions accordingly.
For these reasons, violation of the oath or of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is deemed to merit this Court’s imposition of a penalty.
When a lawyer takes the oath, any action inconsistent with the oath or
with the Code of Professional Responsibility may be interpreted as a willful
disregard of the standards embodied in the oath or the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As expressed in our Rules of Evidence, a person is presumed to
know and intend “the ordinary consequences of his [or her] voluntary act.”[2] The
oath places “penalty” under the great scope of “ordinary consequence” of a
lawyer’s actions.
On the other hand, without the taking the oath, we cannot presume a
person’s conscious and careful consideration of his or her acts in conforming with
this Court’s moral and behavioral standards. Without the taking the oath,
administrative penalties do not rise to the level of ordinary consequence of a
person’s actions.
This Court, as guardian of constitutional rights, should lead other
institutions by exemplifying through its processes the import of the principle of due
process.[3] A person cannot adjust his or her past actions now to conform to the
standards imposed by an oath he or she takes after. It is unreasonable to expect a
person to abide by standards that he or she cannot be presumed to know and
apply to actions he or she can no longer control.
Respondent cannot be expected to abide by the standards imposed by
the lawyer’s oath or by the Code of Professional Responsibility. At that time, this
Court had no administrative jurisdiction over his actions. He was not yet a lawyer
16
when he entered into a relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga during his marriage
with complainant.
Imposing a penalty for respondent’s actions before he took the lawyer’s
oath reduces the oath to nothing but a frivolous ceremony. We undermine the
significance of the oath if, on that basis, we penalize a person for his or her actions,
whether or not he or she subscribed to that oath.
While possession of good morals is required before and during one’s
membership to the bar,[4] the bases and effects of the finding that one meets or
does not meet the standard of morality are different in these instances.
For admission to the bar, good morals are solely based on a person’s
actions before his or her admission. A person found to be lacking of the required
good morals is disqualified from membership in the bar. A person’s actions, on
which the finding that a person has met the required good morals is based, are
looked into for purposes of admission—not penalty.
On the other hand, for retaining membership in the bar, the lawyer’s
actions while he or she is a member are looked into. These acts may be the bases
of administrative penalty.
However, this is not to say that a lawyer’s actions before his or her
admission cannot be the bases of his or her removal from the bar. After all, a
person who has not met the moral standards before admission should not even be
admitted to the bar. Thus, if for some reason, grossly immoral acts not considered
by this Court during application are later made known and proved to this Court,
this Court may choose to remove him or her without disregarding evidence of any
possible moral transformation that could have taken place later.[5]
However, this Court should not be too quick to judge a person’s actions
as grossly immoral so as to constitute unfitness to become a member of the bar.
In Reyes v. Wong,[6] this Court has ruled that for an act to be
administratively punishable for gross immorality, “it must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.”[7] Further:
[T]he same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing
a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. . . . Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well as
the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.[8]
There are different aspects of morality. Morality may be religious or
secular. In Perfecto v. Esidera:[9]
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance.
In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described morality as “‘how we ought to live’ and
why.”
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the
moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion.

Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, is “a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.” A conduct is religiously moral if
it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and
obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine
moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive
its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared
as humans.[10] (Citations omitted)
In the same case, this Court stated that the rule against immorality
should have a secular basis. Our jurisdiction to determine what is moral or immoral
should only be limited to conduct that affects public interest. Immoral conduct, if
made the basis for imposing administrative penalty, should refer to conduct as
officers of the court. It must be of such depravity as to reduce the public’s
confidence in our laws and in our judicial system,[11] thus:
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through
laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against
immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs.
When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws
and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose.
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on
secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts
should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious
morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights.
There is the danger of “compelled religion” and, therefore, of negating
the very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when religious
morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As explained in
Estrada v. Escritor.
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-
believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion” anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make
it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in
matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
17
....
. . . . We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it
involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and
judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the court.
To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the
Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the
administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s supervision. At
best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.[12] (Citations omitted)
Respondent had a relationship with another woman during his marriage
with complainant. Out of that extra-marital relationship, a child was born. All these
had happened before he became a lawyer.
Indeed, some may find respondent’s actions before becoming a lawyer
immoral. However, these do not constitute grossly immoral conduct that is so
corrupt and reprehensible for this Court to consider him unfit to be a member of
the bar.
The dubious character of respondent’s actions and his ill-motive were not
clearly demonstrated. Respondent’s extra-marital relationship happened during his
and complainant’s temporary separation. At the time of respondent’s application
for bar admission, his relationship with his alleged mistress, whom he claimed he
did not marry, had already ended. He was already reunited with” complainant, his
wife. As a result of their reconciliation, they even had their third child, Jose
Leandro.
In light of respondent’s reconciliation with complainant prior to becoming
a lawyer, his actions cannot be described as so depraved as to possibly reduce the
public’s confidence in our laws and judicial system.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result.