[G.R. No. 9964. February 11, 1915.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEON BANDINO, Defendant-

Appellee.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellant.

Maximo Oliveros for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. FAITHLESSNESS IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS; CONNIVANCE ON

PART OF GUARD. — Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the
person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of
faithlessness in the custody of prisoners. If the public officer charged with the duty
of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law
and is not guilty of the said crime of faithlessness in the discharge of his duty as
the custodian or guard of the prisoner.

2. ID.; ID. — When the custodian, maliciously failing to perform the duties of his
office, and conniving with a prisoner, permits him to obtain a relaxation of his
imprisonment and to escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus
making the penalty ineffectual, there is real and actual evasion of service of a
sentence (quebrantamiento de una condena), even though the convict may not
have fled, inasmuch as the prisoner’s leaving the prison and his evasion of service
of the sentence were effected through tolerance of the guard, or rather by
agreement with him.

3. ID.; CARELESSNESS; PENALTY. — Even though the accused committed the

crime of faithlessness with carelessness, in violation of regulations or with culpable
negligence, he should not go unpunished, but should suffer the penalty prescribed
by the penal law.
DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On December 4, 1912, the municipal president of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed

a written complaint in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, charging
Leon Bandino with the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners committed
with reckless negligence. After making the proper investigation, the justice of the
peace transmitted the record of the proceedings to the Court of First Instance.
Thereafter the provincial fiscal, on July 30, 1913, filed an information wherein he
charged the said Leon Bandino with the aforementioned crime, alleging that the
accused, a municipal policeman having under his care and guard one Juan
Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the municipal jail of the said pueblo, did,
with great carelessness and unjustified negligence, grant him permission to go and
buy some cigarettes near the place where he was held in custody; that the prisoner,
taking advantage of the confusion in the crowd there, fled from the custody of the
accused; with violation of article 358 in connection with article 568 of the Penal
Code.

A demurrer was filed to the complaint on the grounds that the facts therein alleged
did not constitute a crime, but, on the contrary, proved the innocence of the
accused. The court held that the prisoner’s escape was not effected with the
connivance of his custodian, so that the said crime could not exist, nor did that of
escape accompanied by reckless imprudence. He consequently sustained the
demurrer and ordered the prosecuting attorney to file a new complaint.

The provincial fiscal then reproduced the previous complaint, adding thereto the
words "in tacit connivance with the said prisoner," that is, that the accused did, with
exceeding carelessness and unjustified negligence, permit the prisoner to buy
cigarettes outside of the jail. Counsel for the accused likewise demurred to this
new complaint, on the ground that it was not drawn up in conformity with the legal
provisions governing the crime charged and because the facts therein set forth did
not constitute a cause of action, but completely exempted the accused from
responsibility.

After trial of the case and consideration of the arguments of the provincial fiscal
and the attorney for the accused. the court, by an order of the 19th of January of
last year. sustained the demurrer filed by the defense and, in view of the fact that
the provincial fiscal’s statement that he could not further amend his complaint as
he believed it to be sufficient as it was, the court finally dismissed the case,
ordering the release of the accused and the cancellation of the bail bond, with the
costs de officio. The provincial fiscal excepted to this order and appealed therefrom.

Article 358 of the Penal Code prescribes that "any public officer guilty of
connivance in the escape of a prisoner in his custody shall be punished," etc.

If there was connivance or consent on the part of the policeman, Leon Bandino, in
Juan Lescano’s leaving the jail, it is unquestionable that he is responsible for the
crime with which he is charged on account of the escape effected by the said
prisoner who took advantage of the leave allowed by his custodian on June 30,
1912.

In the existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of

prisoners, it is essential that there should have been, on the part of the custodian,
connivance in the escape of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with guarding
the fugitive did not connive with him, then he did not violate the law and is not guilty
of the crime of faithlessness in the discharge of his duty to guard the prisoner.

The renowned juridical writer Escriche, in his dictionary "Legislacion y

Jurisprudencia," defines the word "connivance" to be "dissimulation or tolerance, in
the superior, of infractions or transgressions committed by his inferiors or
subordinates against the institutions or laws under which they live."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It may perhaps be true that the accused had no knowledge that the prisoner
Lescano would escape, and that he did not permit him to do so, but it is
unquestionable that he did permit him to go out of the municipal jail, thus affording
him an opportunity to get away with ease. Therefore the prisoner’s escape was
effected through the tolerance of his custodian, and is deemed also to have been
by connivance with the latter.

According to the rules established by the courts, there is real and actual evasion of
service of a sentence when the custodian, failing intentionally or maliciously to
perform the duties of his office, and conniving with the prisoner, permits him to
obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment and to escape the punishment of being
deprived of his liberty, thus making the penalty ineffectual, although the convict
may not have fled, and where the prisoner’s leaving the jail and his evasion of
service of the sentence were effected with the consent and tolerance of the
custodian, or rather in agreement and connivance with him.

Even though the accused committed the crime of faithlessness with carelessness,
in violation of regulations or with culpable negligence, the case should not be
dismissed nor should the crime go unpunished.

For the foregoing reasons the order appealed from is revoked and the record will
be remanded to the court from whence it came in order that such proceedings be
had as the law requires.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980

EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA 1st Asst.

Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur
and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminay injunction,
to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970,
directing the petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the
Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor
Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines
Sur; as well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said order.

In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio
Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of
Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed, as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod,
municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of keeping
under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then and there
with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded
while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as
in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the
custody of the said accused. 1

In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination
of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines
Sur, the defense brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as
exhibit, purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to
send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house at Taculod,
Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official
guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who
ahnded the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature
appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made and
signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made
possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and
Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had
been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment
of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein. 3

Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution officers 4 and
finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order the inclusion of Gov.
Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless an investigation is made," the
respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days from date, to cause
the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of
Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to
determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his
assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of Pablo
Denaque's escape from judicial custody. 5

In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for
December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda,
Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present
thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the reinvestigation of the case,
only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The accused
Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no
additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2,
1970 that "after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and
intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged. 7

On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated December
11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to reinvestigate this case, on the
basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he be ordered to
amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on
record that their inclusion is warranted. 8

On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about by the
prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in the information
the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the person or persons who carried out the said
orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224
of the Penal Code. 9

The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion
was denied on February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the instant recourse.

From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge
committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include
Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the rule that a fiscal by the
nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof.
12 Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not
the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person
committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be
embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case
when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does not have the
necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of
the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the
Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.

Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically refused
to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further reinvestigation of the
case, the respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without a reinvestigation of the
case, he cannot determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera
and Jose Esmeralda in the information. Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was
conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses were issued. But, no additional fact
was elicited since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note (Exh.
2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny the
genuineness of the signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such
being the case, the prosecuting officers had reason to refuse to amend the
information filed by them after a previous pre examination and investigation.

Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case
against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend the information is
based upon the following facts:

1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while working at the

Guest House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;

2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the province and its
maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur,

3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or
entrusted with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the residence
of the governor.

4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of the Governor

(Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and

5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked the group of
Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails.
maximum period to prison correccional in
upon any person who shall remove from
person confined therein or shall help the
violence, intimidation, or bribery.
— The city Of arrests mayor in its
its minimum Period shall be imposed
any jail or penal establishment t any
escape of such person, by means of

If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the
escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the
guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.

The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined
in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To
remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or
without the active compensation of the person released To help in the escape of a
Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that person with
the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his
escape. 15 The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider
who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable
for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province,
16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be
prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised
Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution
under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads, as follows:

ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any Public officer who
shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be
punished

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary

disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the
fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only
held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is

necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of
the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner
on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of
the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer
charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he
has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in
the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be
deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to
work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names of
the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio
Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda

under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public
officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his
negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non-
performance of duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent Judge said:

We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of Denaque
was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence. According to law, if
there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the
custody and guarding of the ... 19

We find no reason to set aside such findings.

WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled:
"The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby
annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his
stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

General Order No. 12, s. 1972

Signed on September 30, 1972
GENERAL ORDER NO. 12

WHEREAS, martial law has been declared under Proclamation No, 1081 dated
September 21, 1972 and is now in effect throughout the land;

WHEREAS, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of

lives and property, widespread lawlessness and anarchy, and chaos and disorder
now-prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been brought, about by
groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political
and state power in the Philippines in order to take over the Government by force
and violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war
against our people and their legitimate Government, and;

WHEREAS, pursuant to General Order No. 3, dated September 22, 1972 issued
under Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, I have ordered that
certain criminal cases shall not be heard and decided by civil courts;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Commander-in-Chief of all the

Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, do hereby order that the military tribunals authorized to be
constituted under General Order No. 8 dated September 27, 1972 shall try and
decide the following cases exclusive of the civil courts, unless otherwise provided
hereunder;
1. Those involving crimes against national security and the laws of nations as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.

2. Those constituting violations of the Anti-Subversion Law as defined and

penalized in Republic Act No. 1700.

3. Those constituting violations of the Law on Espionage as defined and penalized

in Commonwealth Act No. 616.

4. Those constituting violations of the Hijacking Law as defined and penalized in

Republic Act No. 6235.

5. Those involving crimes against the fundamental laws of the State as defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code, if committed by members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.

6. Those involving certain crimes against public order as defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, namely:

a. Rebellion on insurrection (Art. 134)

b. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection (Art. 136)
c. Disloyalty of public officers or employees (Art. 137)
d. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection (Art. 138)
e. Sedition (Art. 139)

7. Those involving other crimes committed in furtherance or on the occasion of or

incident to or in connection with the crimes of insurrection or rebellion.

8. Those involving crimes constituting violations of the law on Firearms and

Explosives found in the Revised Administration Code and other existing laws.
9. Those involving crimes on usurpation of authority, rank, title, and improper use
of names, uniforms and insignia as defined and penalized, in the Revised Penal
Code, including those penalized under Republic Act No. 493.

10. Those involving certain crimes committed by public officers as defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, provided that civil courts and military
tribunals shall have concurrent jurisdiction thereon if the accused is a civilian,
namely:

a. knowingly rendering unjust judgment (Art. 204)

b. Judgment rendered thru negligence (Art. 205)
c. Unjust interlocutory order (Act. 206)
d. Malicious delay in the administration of justice (Art. 207)
e. Prosecution of offenses, negligence and tolerance (Art. 208)
f. Direct bribery (Art. 210)
g. Indirect bribery (Art. 211)
h. Corruption of public officials (Art. 212)
i. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses (Art. 213)
j. Prohibited transactions (Art. 215)
k. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (Art. 216)
I. Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217)
m. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art. 218)
n. Illegal use of public funds or property (Art. 220)
o. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property (Art. 221)
p. Conniving with or consenting to evasion (Art. 223)
q. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. (Art. 226)
r. Officer breaking seal (Art. 227)
s. Opening of closed documents (Art. 228)
t. Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229)

11. Those constituting violations of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law as
defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 3019: Provided, that the civil courts shall
exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the military tribunals if the accused is a civilian.

12. Those constituting violations of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
“The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”, provided that civil courts and military tribunals
shall have concurrent jurisdiction thereon if the accused is a civilian.

13. Violations of all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally

or upon my direction pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972.

cution of Proclamation No, 1081 dated September 21, 1972 or of any decree, order
and regulation issued or promulgated by me personally, or by my duly designated
representative, pursuant thereto.

In cases under Nos. 10, 11 and 12 above where jurisdiction is concurrent between
civil courts and military tribunals, the court or tribunal that first assumes jurisdiction
shall exercise it to the exclusion of all others.

Transitory Provisions.-

1. Cases now pending in civil courts, whether or not there has been arraignment,
shall be tried and decided by said civil courts except criminal cases involving
subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion and those committed in furtherance
of, on the occasion of, incident to or in connection with the commission of said
crimes which shall be transferred to military tribunals.
2. Cases filed on or before September 22, 1972 (when General Order No. 3 was
promulgated) with the offices of City or Provincial Fiscals or the courts for
preliminary investigation except cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection
or rebellion, shall be investigated by the City or Provincial Fiscals or the Judges
concerned, and the corresponding information shall be filed in the proper civil
courts. Cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion shall
immediately be forwarded to the military tribunals through the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, Armed Forces of the Philippines.

3. Cases involving crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of military courts, which
are filed after September 22, 1972 with the offices of City or Provincial Fiscals or
the courts for preliminary investigation, shall be investigated by the City or
Provincial Fiscals or the judges concerned, but the corresponding information will
be filed with military tribunals.

This General Order accordingly modifies General Order No. 3 dated September 22,
1972 issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972.
General Order No. 2-A dated September 26, 1972 shall remain in force.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of September, in the year of our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy two.

G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988

ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Santiago R. Robinol for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition brought by Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc asking for the reversal of a
decision of the Sandiganbayan which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224, RPC).
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Alfredo Rodillas y

Bondoc GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Evasion
through Negligence, as defined and penalized under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, hereby
sentences him to suffer the straight penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor, to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day of temporary
special disqualification and to pay the costs of this action.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

Petitioner Rodillas was charged with having committed the said crime in an
information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, being then a
policeman duly appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer, specially
charged with the duty of keeping under his custody and vigilance and of conducting
and delivery from the City Jail, Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and return, one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner
being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888, did then and there
with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and permit said
Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter the comfort room at the second
floor of the Genato Building, Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said
case, v,,ithout first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and
without any egress by which the said detention prisoner could escape, thereby
enabling said Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away and escape thru the window
inside the comfort room, as in fact she did run away and escape from the custody
of said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 6)

The prosecution's evidence upon which the court based its finding of guilt is
summarized as follows:

... accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of

Caloocan City and assigned with the jail section thereof. On March 27, 1980, when
he reported for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano,
officer-in-charge in assigning police officers to escort prisoners, to escort Zenaida
Sacris deadline Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo
Pardo of the Court of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato Building,
Caloocan City, to face trial for an alleged Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as the policewoman officer who was supposed to escort the said detainee
was then sick. He and the detainee proceeded to the court building and arrived
thereat between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock in the morning. while waiting for the arrival
of the judge at the courtroom, Pat. Orlando Andres, who happened to be in the
court and a relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida, approached
the accused and requested the latter if he could permit Zenaida to talk to her
husband. The accused consented and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her
husband. After a short while, the presiding judge deferred the decision against her
because of a new Presidential Decree revising some provisions regarding
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the
accused to allow them to have lunch as they were already very hungry. He
consented to the request and they proceeded to the canteen located at the
mezzanine floor of the court building (Exhibit 1).<äre||anº•1àw> He took a seat
beside Zenaida and Pat. Andres while the relatives of said detainee were seated at
a separate table. While eating, the husband of Zenaida asked him if he could
accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like
defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the
ladies' comfort room located at the second floor of the building (Exibit 2). Zenaida
and her lady companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the
alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the door thereof (Exhibit 5). Not long
after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him
that she was going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then
bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go out of the comfort room.

After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the
accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he
found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of
said comfort room was not provided with window grills. He tried to peep out of the
window by stepping on the flush tank which is just about 3 feet from the window
and noticed that outside of the window there was a concrete eave extending down
to the ground floor of the building which he presumed that Zenaida might have
used as a passage in escaping (Exhibits 2-A, 3 and 4 to 4-C). He immediately went
out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres but they
were not able to see her. Pat. Andres advised him to go to Zenaida's house as she
might be there, which home is located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Pat.
Andres having told him that the husband of the escapee is from Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
the accused borrowed the car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to said town.
Upon arrival thereat, they contacted the relatives of Zenaida and asked for
information as to her whereabouts, but they answered in the negative. They went
back to Caloocan City and went again directly to Bagong Barrio to the house of
Zenaida, arriving thereat at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. While at the
residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano arrived and the accused related to him about
the escape of Zenaida. He formally reported the matter of his superior officer at the
City Jail Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared further that as a jailer, he
never had any training nor lecture by his superiors regarding the manner of
delivering prisoners. However, he admitted that he did not inspect first the comfort
room before he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were many females going
in and out of said comfort room, and that he did not promptly report the escape
earlier because they were then pressed for time to intercept Zenaida at the
highway. (Rollo, pp. 18-21).

The petitioner assigns the following errors:

I

WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN BASED

ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION HAVING
PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL LIE.

II

WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS DEFINITE

LAXITY AMOUNTING TO DELIBERATE NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO
SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION. (Brief for the petitioner, p. 5)

In essence, the sole question to be resolved in the case at bar is whether, under
the foregoing facts and circumstances, the respondent Sandiganbayan committed
a reversible error in holding the petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a
prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was
based merely on his admissions without the prosecution presenting evidence to
prove his negligence.

Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act, declaration, or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The
admissions and declarations in open court of a person charged with a crime are
admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578).

The records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted are present. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have
taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or
custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification.

The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are: a) that the
offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of
a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such
prisoner escapes through his negligence (See Reyes, L.B., Revised Penal Code,
Book II, 1977 ed., p. 407).

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any
dispute as to the fact that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was
being tried for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of
detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised
Penal Code is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-
performance of duty on the part of the guard (Id., p. 408).

It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the
scope of his authority when he permitted his charge to create the situation which
led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations compelled
him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch and to go to the comfort room
to relieve herself.

As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to
jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.

In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner
and her family when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even
allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-
officer.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary
precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake
these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting
to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the
prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have
aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.

The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an opportunity for the
prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out an earlier plan by which she could escape.
The plan was in fact carried out with the help of the lady who accompanied his
prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of the most familiar and
common place methods of escape. It is inconceivable that a police officer should
fall for this trick. The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the
petitioner's suspicion because the only pretext given by the petitioner was that she
was going to answer the call of nature. It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be
accompanied by anyone especially by someone who was not urgently in need of a
toilet if the purpose was merely to relieve herself. Despite this, the petitioner
allowed the two to enter the comfort room without first establishing for himself that
there was no window or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed
the prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse that the prisoner
was having her monthly period and that there was a need to buy sanitary napkins.
And he patiently waited for more than ten minutes for the companion to return. This
was patent negligence and incredible naivette on the part of the police officer.

Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts
and,circumstances which were not foreseen and were not unnatural in the course
of things. Not only should they have been foreseen but they should have been
guarded against.

Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it was only 11:30 a.m.,
it would not have been inhuman for the petitioner to deny the prisoner's request to
first take lunch. Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of
female occupants and checked all possible exists first and if he did not allow the
lady companion to go with Zenaida Andres to the comfort room. These human
considerations, however, are immaterial because the fact remains that as a police
officer, he should have exercised utmost diligence in the performance of his duty.
The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability. That he was not
trained in escorting women prisoners is likewise unacceptable as there are no hard
and fast rules of conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers acting
as guards. However, they are expected to use prudence, diligence, and common
sense. That Judge Pardo did not immediately pronounce judgment so the
petitioner could have immediately brought Zenaida back to jail is inconsequential.
In the first place, the escape would not have materialized had he immediately
escorted her back to jail after the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside
the comfort room because it would create a commotion, he being a male, is a lame
excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the ladies for permission so he could
check the comfort room first to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. The fact
that the building is made of concrete and the outside windows covered with grills
should not make a police officer complacent especially because well-planned
escapes are not uncommon. Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so that
two (2) guards are usually assigned to a prisoner. (Tsn, August 4, 1981, p. 40)

There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of the petitioner to
recapture the escapee. Instead of promptly reporting the matter so that an alarm
could immediately be sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures
followed, he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in Caloocan and
failing in this, proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was only later in the evening that he
formally reported the matter to his superior. This even gave the escapee greater
opportunity to make good her escape because the chances of her being
recaptured became much less. Such action requires concerted police effort, not a
one-man job which petitioner should have been or was probably aware of.

The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was no
connivance between him and the prisoner. In support of his claim, he cites the
case of Alberto v. dela Cruz, (98 SCRA 406). The citation, however, is erroneous.
It creates the impression that for one to be held liable under Art. 224, there must be
a showing that he first connived with the prisoner. This was not the ruling in said
case. Conniving or consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for
evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not
necessary that connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in
the custody of prisoners.

We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's observation regarding

escaped prisoners is relevant and timely. The Court stated:

It is high time that the courts should take strict measures against law officers to
whom have been entrusted the custody and detention of prisoners, whether
detention prisoners or prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the
performance of their duties resulting in the mysterious escapes of notorious
criminals have become common news items, involving as it does the suspicion that
monetary considerations may have entered into the arrangements which led to the
successful escape of such notorious criminals even from military custody. No
quarters should be extended to such kind of law officers who, deliberately or
otherwise, fail to live up to the standard required of their duties, thus directly
contributing not only to the clogging of judicial dockets but also to the inevitable
deterioration of peace and order. (Brief for Respondents, pp. 17-18)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the

Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 192698-99 April 22, 2015

RAYMUNDO E. ZAPANTA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the October 29, 2009 Decision1 and the June 10, 2010 Resolution2 of the
Sandiganbayan Fifth Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case Nos. 27502 and
27503, which found accused-petitioner Raymundo E. Zapanta (Zapanta) and his
co-accused, Atty. Aludia P. Gadia (Atty. Gadia), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act; and Infidelity in the Custody of
Documents, defined and penalized under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

The Antecedents

Zapanta, together with Atty. Gadia, was indicted for the crime of Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27502, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That [on] or about August 2000, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused ALUDIA P. GADIA,
a high ranking public officer, being then the Registrar of Deeds, and RAYMUNDO
E. ZAPANTA, vault/records keeper, both of the Registry of Deeds, Davao City,
conspiring and confederating withone another, with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cause the issuance of TCT NO. T-285369, deleting the encumbrance
annotated in TCT No. T-256662,from where the former title was derived, thereby
affording unwarranted benefits to First Oriental Ventures, Inc., the owner of TCT
No. T-285369, to the damage and prejudice of Manuel Ang, Sr., the mortgagee in
TCT No. 256662 in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

[Emphasis Supplied]
In Criminal Case No. 27503, Zapanta and Atty. Gadia were charged with the crime
of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC. The
accusatory portion of the Information states:

That [on] or about August 2000, in Davao City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused ALUDIA P. GADIA,
a high ranking public officer, being then the Registrar of Deeds and RAYMUNDO E.
ZAPANTA, Vault/Records Keeper, both of the Registry of Deeds, Davao City,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause the removal and disappearance of TCT No.
256662, which public document is under their custody and officially entrusted to
them, thereby causing damage to the mortgagee of TCT No. 256662, in the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) which amount is
duly annotated in TCT No. 256662. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

[Emphasis Supplied]

On June 18, 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued the Hold Departure Order and the
Order of Arrest against Atty. Gadia and Zapanta. Both accused posted bail for their
provisional liberty.5 On October 13, 2003, Atty. Gadia was arraigned and she
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges. Zapanta also pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
charges when arraigned on November 12, 2003. After pre-trial was terminated, trial
on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented private complainant Dr. Manuel T. Ang, Sr. (Dr.
Ang),PO3 Steve Bohol Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz)and Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra
(Atty. Cruzabra).

Dr. Ang was a physician who was also engaged in a lending and investment
business using the business name Cebu Sterling Lending Investors, Inc.
(CSLII).He recalled that sometime in January 1996, a certain Erlinda Galvez-Sultan
applied for a loan in the amount of P500,000.00 and offered to mortgage a 27,442
square-meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. T-256662 in the
names of Zenaida Galvez-Lamparero, Nelia Galvez Comendador, Ricardo Galvez,
Pancho Galvez, Ismael Galvez, Erlinda Galvez-Sultan, Olympio Galvez, and Edwin
Galvez (Zenaida Galvez-Lamparero, et al.), to secure the said loan. TCT No. T-
256662 was registered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City (RD) and was duly
signed by Atty. Gadia, the Register of Deeds.

Dr. Ang agreed to extend the loan and, on January 29, 1996, caused the
annotation of the real estate mortgage in favor of CSLII at the back of TCT No. T-
256662 in the office of the RD. Later, Dr. Ang was informed that the mortgaged
property had been the subject of a sale transaction; that TCT No. T-256662 was
already cancelled; and that two new derivative titles were issued bearing the same
technical description as that of TCT No. T-256662. On August 24, 2000, to check
the veracity of the report, Dr. Ang made a formal request to the RD for the
issuance of a certified true copy of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 which
was in the custody of the said office. He reiterated his request on October 23, 2000.

Zapanta told Dr. Ang that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 could not be
located in the particular volume where it was filed in the vault of the RD. Dr. Ang
made a follow-up on his request for three consecutive days, but to no avail.
Suspecting an irregularity, Dr. Ang filed a complaint before the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF),Davao Satellite Office, and requested for
an investigation. Results of the investigation confirmed that the original copy of
TCT No. T-256662 was missing from the vault of the RD. Dr. Ang then filed a
complaint against Atty. Gadia and Zapanta before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman).6

PO3 Dela Cruz was the Chief Investigator of the Legal Department, Davao City
Police Station in 2000, after serving as the Chief Investigator of the PAOCTF,
Davao Satellite Office, from 1988 to 1991. He narrated that after conducting an
investigation in connection with the complaint filed by Dr. Ang, he prepared his
Investigation Report/Memorandum and submitted the same to the Ombudsman. In
the said report, he highlighted the commission of irregularities by Zapanta and Atty.
Gadia, and recommended the filing of appropriate administrative and criminal
charges against the two. He came to know of the existence of TCT No. T-285369,
the derivative title of TCT No. T-256662, when it was showed to him by Dr. Ang
during the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman. He
noticed that the signatures of Atty. Gadia appeared on all the pages of TCT No. T-
285369 and that it was registered in the name of First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc. (FOPVI) whose president was former Congresswoman and Governor, Atty.
Corazon N. Malanyaon (Atty. Malanyaon).7

Atty. Cruzabra, the Acting Register of Deeds of Davao City, testified that while both
criminal cases were awaiting trial, she conducted an investigation regarding the
missing title in compliance with the directive of the Office of the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), dated October 13, 2003. She instructed the
employees of the office to look for the missing original copy of TCT No. T-256662.
She specifically asked the vault keeper, Zapanta, and the records officer, who were
tasked with the safekeeping of the documents in the office, about the missing title
but she was told that the same was nowhere to be found inside the vault. In her
letter-report,8 dated November 25,2003, addressed to Administrator Benedicto
Ulep of the LRA, Atty. Cruzabra stated that the missing TCT No. T-256662 was
found in the "pending transactions" steel cabinet located outside the vault but
within the premises of the office of the RD. She observed that the original copy of
TCT No. T-256662 did not bear any signs of cancellation. She added that another
certificate of title, TCT No. T-285369, was also found within the "pending
transaction" files together with TCT No. T-256662.

Atty. Cruzabra explained that TCT No. T-285369 was issued in lieu of TCT No. T-
256662 and was registered in the name of FOPVI. She opined that TCT No. T-
285369 was spurious because: 1] TCT No. T-256662 had never been cancelled; 2]
the Deed of Absolute Sale9 executed between the original owners, Zenaida
Galvez-Lamparero, et al., and FOPVI (subject deed of sale), which could have
been the basis for cancellation of TCT No. T-256662, was not registered and
annotated at the back of the latter title; and 3] the encumbrance in favor of CSLII
was not carried over to TCT No. T-285369. She concluded that the issuance of
TCT No. T-285369 was without any legal basis. TCT No. T-285369 was registered
with the RD on May 28, 1997 and was signed by Atty. Gadia.10

In her defense, Atty. Gadia countered that she was no longer the Register of
Deeds of Davao City on August 24, 2000, when Dr. Ang requested for a certified
true copy of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662. She admitted that, as the
Register of Deeds, she signed TCT No. T-256662 as well as the encumbrances
annotated at the back page. She also admitted that she signed the derivative title
TCT No. T-285369 on May 28, 1997, which bore the following certification: "This
certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above described land is concerned."

She further testified that the original copies of the certificates of title were kept in a
vault and the person in charge was the vault keeper. The chief of the vault keeper
was the records officer. She named two (2) vault keepers, Zapanta and Mrs.
Dimaquias, but the one in charge was Zapanta. She claimed that she had nothing
to do with the removal and disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-
256662. She identified Epimaco Gambong (Gambong) as the examiner who
inspected the subject deed of sale and its attachments, for registration. Incidentally,
Gambong had already passed away at the time of the trial.

Atty. Gadia further averred that the subject deed of sale was not registered
because there were some requirements that had not been submitted, particularly
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-256662. She admitted to have written the
following notation on the routing slip attached to the subject deed of sale: "Pls.
don’t deliver the title unless requirements are complied." She would usually write
such cautionary notice because it always took some time before the registering
parties could complete the submission of the required documents. Atty. Gadia
explained that there were occasions when she had to leave her station for some
meetings in Manila or to report to Region XI where she was the Regional Register
of Deeds, and so as not to prejudice the public for want of signature, she would
usually sign the title but cautioned the examiner not to release or deliver the title
until all the requirements were completed.

According to her, TCT No. T-285369 should not have been delivered because
certain requirements were still lacking. She asserted that transactions, which were
not completed or transactions in which the requirements were not complied with,
were filed in the "pending transaction" cabinets. She denied knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of TCT No. T-285369 despite her
signature on it.11

Zapanta, on the other hand, proffered the defense of denial. He alleged that he
was the vault keeper of the RD, whose duty was to safeguard the archives and the
original copies of certificates of title. He claimed that the original copy of a title
could be pulled out from the vault upon the written request of the examiner or
records officer, indicating the title and volume numbers. The said officer would then
take custody of the same until the transaction would be finished. He stated that
Atty. Gadia, being the Register of Deeds, could also order the pull out of the
documents from the vault. He denied participation in the removal and
disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault. He insisted
that he did not participate in the processing of TCT No. T-285369. He pointed out
that aside from him, three utility workers were allowed by his office to pull out titles
from the vault. His only link to the missing title incident was that he was the one
who helped Jimboy Ibañez, the person approached by Dr. Ang, to look for the
missing title. He assured Dr. Ang that he would continue to look for it. He denied
that he conspired with Atty. Gadia in the commission of the crimes charged.12

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two additional witnesses, namely, Jorlyn B.

Paralisan (Paralisan)and Johanessa Maceda (Maceda).

Paralisan testified that she was the Land Registration Examiner from March 1992
until March 1998. The primary function of an examiner was to determine whether
the requirements for registration were complete. The documents that must be
presented for the registration of a sale of real property were the transfer tax fee,
realty tax certification, capital gains tax certification, deed of sale and the owner’s
duplicate copy of the certificate of title. She said that if the requirements were
incomplete, the documents so far submitted shall be placed in the files for "pending
transactions" until full compliance was made by the registering party. Paralisan
added that the Register of Deeds reviewed the findings of the examiner and signed
the title or document only after the latter was satisfied as to the completeness of
the requirements. As the Register of Deeds of Davao City, Atty. Gadia was tasked,
among others, to review deeds and other documents for compliance with the legal
requirements of registration.

According to Paralisan, her office has adopted the following regular procedural
steps in the registration of land titles and deeds: 1) the presenting party would first
bring the deed of sale and its attachments to the entry clerk, who would stamp the
corresponding entry number, as well as the date and time of receipt; 2) the
submitted documents would then go to the cashier for payment of registration and
other fees; 3) thereafter, the documents would be handed to a Records Officer II
who would assign an examiner for examination; 4) if the documents were complete,
the same would go to the administrative officer for assignment of title, otherwise,
the documents would be forwarded to Records Officer II for stamping of the words,
"pending document"; 5) for complete documents, the administrative officer would
assign a new title for typing by the office typist; 6) the document would afterwards
be returned to the Records Officer II, who would assign another examiner for the
cancellation of the mother title; 7) after the proper cancellation of the mother title,
the new title and other pertinent documents would then be submitted to the
Register of Deeds for review, examination and signature; 8) then the documents
would go to Record Officer I, who would release the owner’s duplicate copy of the
title to the presenting party and forward the original copies of the new title and the
cancelled title to the vault keeper for archiving. The above procedure was
sanctioned by the Manual for Registration of Land Titles and Deeds of the LRA.

Continuing her testimony, Paralisan recalled that when she examined the
documents for registration in 1997, the reference and assessment slip/routing slip
did not contain any handwritten notations. After noting the attached documents to
the subject deed of sale, she wrote down on the slip, "Pls. submit owner’s copy of
TCT," and forwarded all the documents to the administrative officer. She claimed
that because the documents were incomplete, the title should be kept in the
"pending transaction" cabinet by Records Officer II, who was Maceda at the time in
1997.

Paralisan further stated that it was vault keeper Brigido Musqueta who found the
missing original copy of TCT No. T-256662 in the "pending transaction" files. Upon
inspection of the documents, she noticed that the entry number and the date "5-28-
1997" were handwritten on the face of the reference and assessment slip/routing
slip.13 She found it odd that the date of registration, May 28, 1997, was the same
as the date written on the reference and assessment slip. Furthermore, the name
"Mr. Gambong" was also written after the word "Examiner." She claimed that these
entries were in the handwriting of Atty. Gadia. When following proper procedure, it
should have been the entry clerk who would stamp the entry number and the date
of receipt of the document/s for registration on the reference and assessment slip.
Also, it should have been the records officer who would assign an examiner to
determine the registrability of the document. She noticed too that the slip now bore
the handwritten notation of Atty. Gadia, "Pls. don’t deliver title unless requirements
are complied." She clarified that the so-called cautionary notice by Atty. Gadia was
never recognized in the regular procedure for registration of land titles and deeds.
She observed that there was obvious deviation from the procedure because
despite the non-submission of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-256662,
the derivative title was still signed and registered by Atty. Gadia.14

Maceda testified that she was appointed Records Officer II on March 2, 1998. She
stated that, contrary tothe testimony of Paralisan, she was only the Clerk II in 1997.
The Records Officer II was responsible for assigning the documents submitted for
registration to an examiner for further scrutiny. If the documents were not complete,
the examiner would give them to the administrative officer who, in turn, would
forward them to the Records Officer II for safekeeping in the "pending transaction"
files. Maceda averred that Atty. Gadia had access to the documents in the
"pending transaction" files. She claimed that her logbook or record book did not
contain any entry involving TCT No. T-256662.15

By way of surrebuttal evidence, the defense presented Atty. Malanyaon who

testified to the supposed satisfaction of any pecuniary damage suffered by Dr. Ang.
The prosecution strongly objected and moved that her testimony be stricken off the
record on the ground that it absolutely had no connection with the proof presented
on rebuttal. The Sandiganbayan merely noted the opposition and motion of the
prosecution.16

The Sandiganbayan Decision

On October 29, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding
Atty. Gadia and Zapanta guilty as charged. The anti-graft court stated that the
prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of Violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the elements of Violation of Art. 226 of the RPC.
It found sufficient evidence inculpating Atty. Gadia and Zapanta for conspiring and
confederating with one another in the anomalous registration and issuance of TCT
No. T-285369 in favor of FOPVI, which resulted in undue injury to private
complainant Dr. Ang in the sum of P500,000.00. Also, it held that Atty. Gadia and
Zapanta conspired with each other in causing the removal and disappearance of
the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault of the RD, which was then
under their official custody, to the damage and prejudice of the mortgagee, Dr. Ang.
The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

a.) In Criminal Case No. 27502,finding accused ALUDIA P. GADIA and

RAYMUNDO E. ZAPANTA, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10)
years as maximum;

b.) In Criminal Case No. 27503, finding accused ALUDIA P. GADIA and
RAYMUNDO E. ZAPANTA, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of Infidelity in the
Custody of Documents, particularly violation of Article 226 of the Revised Penal
Code, or removal or concealment of documents and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00).

c.) To indemnify, jointly and severally, private complainant Dr. Manuel T. Ang, in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

d.) Accused Aludia P. Gadia and Raymundo E. Zapanta, being public officers, are
henceforth perpetually disqualified from holding public office.

SO ORDERED.17

Zapanta moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing judgment but his motion
was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its June 10, 2010 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Zapanta imputes to the Sandiganbayan the following errors:

Criminal Case No. 27503, Violation of Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code

I. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the petitioner had no custody [of] the
Original Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 (marked as Exhibit "V-
Rebuttal") while outside the vault.

II. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the petitioner could not have
"removed" the subject record (Original Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
256662 marked as Exhibit "V-Rebuttal"), as it was not in his custody in the first
place.

III. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the Original Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-256662 (marked as Exhibit "V-Rebuttal") was not
lost.1âwphi1

IV. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that there was no proof of conspiracy
and there was no certainty that it was the petitioner who pulled out that Original
Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 (marked as Exhibit "V-Rebuttal").

Criminal Case No. 27502 Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended

V. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the petitioner had no physical
custody of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 (marked as Exhibit "A") since
the time it was pulled out from the vault until it was found.
VI. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the participation of the alleged crime
committed by his co-accused, Atty. Gadia, was not necessary and indispensable in
the alleged perpetuation thereof.

VII. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the petitioner had no participation
in the review of Deed of Absolute Sale (marked as Exhibit "U-Rebuttal"); the
release of the form of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-285369 (marked as Exhibit
"J"); the typing, review, and approval of the entries of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-285369 (marked as Exhibit "J"); the release of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-285369 (marked as Exhibit "J") to its purported new owner; and the safekeeping
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-256662 (marked as Exhibit "A") while outside
the vault; and thus he could not have committed the crime of violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, by himself or in conspiracy with Atty.
Gadia.

VIII. The Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the crime committed, if ever there
was any, was only criminal negligence, not violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended.18

Zapanta’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: 1] whether or not the
prosecution was able to establish his guilt of the offenses charged beyond
reasonable doubt; and 2] whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support
the charge of conspiracy between him and Atty. Gadia.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

At the outset, it has been emphasized that, as a rule, the Court does not review
factual questions in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In appeals from
the Sandiganbayan decisions, only questions of law and not issues of fact may be
raised. Issues on whether the prosecution evidence proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt; whether the presumption of innocence was properly
accorded the accused; whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge
of conspiracy; or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated are
all, in varying degrees, questions of fact.19 As a rule, the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this Court, subject to the following limited
exceptions: 1] the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, and conjectures; 2] the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3] there
is grave abuse of discretion; 4.) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and 5] the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.20 The foregoing
instances attend the case at bench.

This Court spelled out in Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman21 the following
elements of the offense falling under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019:

1] The offender is a public officer;

2] The act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or
judicial functions;

3] The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and

4] The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.22

On the other hand, in Fajelga v. Hon. Escareal,23 an accused may be held

criminally liable of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the
RPC, provided that the following elements are present:

1] The offender must be a public officer;

2] There must be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed;

3] The document destroyed or abstracted must be entrusted to such public officer
by reason of his office; and

4] Damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third person must be

caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document.24

In convicting Atty. Gadia for Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
Sandiganbayan held that the series of acts she had performed in obvious disregard
to the established rules in land registration were badges of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality towards FOPVI. According to the anti-graft court, scandalous
irregularities in the procedure were committed by Atty. Gadia in registering and
issuing the derivative title, TCT No. T-285369, but without the proper cancellation
of TCT No. T-256662, and the carrying over of the mortgage encumbrance
annotated as Entry No. 930010 in the latter title in favor of mortgagee Dr. Ang. In
so doing, she gave unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference to FOPVI, to
the damage and injury of Dr. Ang in the sum of P500,000.00.

Anent the charge of Infidelity in the Custody of Document, the Sandiganbayan held
that Atty. Gadia, who was entrusted with the safekeeping of TCT No. T-256662,
caused the removal of its original copy from the vault of the RD and, thereafter,
concealed the same to facilitate the issuance of TCT No. T-285369. This caused
damage to Dr. Ang and eroded public trust and confidence in the Register of
Deeds. Citing the case of Kataniag v. People,25 the Sandiganbayan wrote that
damage under Art. 226 of the RPC may also consist in mere alarm to the public or
in the alienation of its confidence in any government agency. The Sandiganbayan
added that Atty. Gadia’s act of concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a breach
of trust in the official care of the said certificate of title.

Regarding the guilty verdict against Zapanta, the vault keeper, the Sandiganbayan
explained that the series of acts of Atty. Gadia would not have been completed or
their criminal purpose would not have been achieved were it not for the
disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault which was
amply covered by the active participation of the said petitioner. It added that those
series of acts smacked of conspiracy which showed their common design to
achieve one common goal to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Ang. The pith of the
assailed October 29, 2009 decision of the Sandiganbayan relative to Zapanta’s
criminal liabilities states: Verily, where the acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals. While it may be true that accused Zapanta
did not sign in any of the two (2) titles, he nevertheless had allowed that TCT No.
T-256662, be withdrawn or removed from the vault which he was expected to safe
keep and thereafter allowed that the same be concealed not only from the private
complainant but also from the public.

This Court gives weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The strength of their testimonies was bolstered by the details shown in
the documentary evidence that they have presented. They testified to the effect
that the title indeed was missing for a certain period of time and that accused
Gadia issued a new title without the mortgage being cancelled. They demonstrated
how these were made possible by the concerted efforts of accused Gadia, as
Register of Deeds, and accused Zapanta, as the Vault Keeper.26

A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and

conclusions of the Sandiganbayan with respect to the criminal culpability of
Zapanta.

In People v. Bautista,27 the Court had the occasion to elaborately discuss the
concept of conspiracy, to wit:

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern
prosecutor's nursery." There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring
criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of
proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After
all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the
English Court in Regina v. Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. [Emphases Supplied]

To reiterate, in order to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy can be inferred from, and established by,
the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests. What is determinative is proof
establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.28
There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must, like the crime
itself, be proven beyond reasonable doubt29 for it is a facile device by which an
accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. Suppositions based on
mere presumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.30

In the case at bench, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Zapanta conspired with Atty. Gadia in committing the crimes
charged. No testimonial or documentary evidence was presented to substantiate
Zapanta’s direct or indirect participation in the anomalous registration of TCT No.
T-285369, and in the concealment/disappearance of the original copy of TCT No.
T-256662.

Not a scintilla of proof was adduced to show with absolute certainty that Zapanta
was the one who actually withdrew the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the
vault of the RD. Prosecution witness Atty. Cruzabra testified that there were
several vault keepers in the RD31 and they were all authorized to pull out titles
from the vault at the instance of the examiner or the records officer.32 The
prosecution’s rebuttal witness, Paralisan, testified that there were five personnel
employed as vault keepers but she could not pinpoint who among those vault
keepers pulled out the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault.33 At best,
the prosecution witnesses only identified Zapanta as a vault keeper of the RD but
not necessarily the vault keeper who pulled out the subject title. Prosecution
witnesses neither testified that he was present during the withdrawal of the subject
title from the vault nor mentioned or referred to Zapanta in any manner to show his
probable complicity or involvement in the crimes charged. Further, there is no
showing that Zapanta was instrumental or that he ever participated in the
registration process of the spurious derivative title or had foreknowledge of any
irregularity therein or of its fraudulent nature.

Granting, in gratia argumenti, that it was Zapanta who took the original copy of
TCT No. T-256662 from the vault, this alone would not suffice to prove the
conspiracy theory advanced by the prosecution. Plainly, the accusation against
Zapanta rests upon his alleged act of pulling out the subject title from the vault
which the Sandiganbayan considered as necessary for Atty. Gadia to attain her
criminal design of entering TCT No. T-285369 in the Registry Book of the RD in the
name of FOPVI and concealing the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 to prevent
the discovery of the aberrant registration of the said derivative title. The only
deduction extant from the prosecution evidence is that, being then the vault keeper,
Zapanta had the duty to safeguard the documents kept inside the vault and to
withdraw any title therefrom upon the request of any proper officer of the RD.

It must be emphasized, however, that what he did here was the very function he
had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. Also, once the title was
released from his custody, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon the
recipient to keep the document until the transaction was finished. Hence, Zapanta
could not be faulted if after the subject title was released to the requestor, it was
subsequently utilized in the furtherance of an illegal and fraudulent design as he
had no control or participation over the registration process or in the issuance of
TCT No. T-285369.

Verily, it is also too sweeping to conclude the existence of conspiracy against

Zapanta from the evidence on record. Besides, a public officer is presumed to have
acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Well-settled is the rule that
good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil
Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the
fountain of good conscience.34 The burden is on the prosecution to prove bad faith
on the part of Zapanta or that he was impelled by malice or some evil motive but
the prosecution failed to do that. To repeat, it is sheer speculation to perceive and
ascribe corrupt intent and conspiracy of wrongdoing for Violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and Violation of Article226 of the RPC, solely from the mere pulling
out of a title from the vault of the RD because Zapanta was just performing one of
his duties as a vault keeper.

The Sandiganbayan believed that Zapanta took part in the conspiracy to commit
the offenses charged because of the following circumstances: 1] Zapanta was then
the vault keeper and as such had access to the certificates of title kept therein; 2] It
was the official duty of Zapanta to pull out a title from the vault upon request of
authorized and proper officers of the RD; 3] Dr. Ang was informed by Zapanta that
the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 could not be found in the particular volume
where it was supposed to have been filed inside the vault and that he promised to
look for the missing title; and 4] Zapanta confirmed during the preliminary hearing
at the PAOCTF-Davao Satellite Office that the subject title was indeed missing.

An accused may be convicted on the basis of credible and sufficient circumstantial

evidence provided that the proven circumstances lead to the inescapable and
reasonable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime. The settled rule is that
a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences were derived were proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.35 The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.36

Here, the pieces of circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to convict Zapanta of
the crimes charged. When the four circumstances are examined with the other
evidence on record, it becomes clearer that these circumstances do not lead to a
logical conclusion that Zapanta lent support to the alleged conspiracy. Moreover,
there is no proof that he allowed an outsider inside the vault or that he knew of the
unauthorized withdrawal of the subject title and consented to it. There is nothing to
indicate that he was simply negligent in securing the safety of the subject certificate
of title under his custody. If Zapanta were negligent, this would be incompatible
with conspiracy because negligence denotes the absence of intent while
conspiracy involves a meeting of the minds to commit a crime.37
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Zapanta because the
prosecution failed to produce the evidence necessary to overturn the presumption
of innocence. Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to
indicate that he had taken part in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged. Otherwise, a careless use of the conspiracy theory could send to jail even
innocent persons who may have only been made unwitting tools by the criminal
minds really responsible for those irregularities.

The evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of the judicial
microscope and that conviction flows only from moral certainty that guilt had been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, that quantum
of proof has not been satisfied. Hence, the Court must reckon with a dictum of the
law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed October 29, 2009 Decision
and the June 10, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
27502 and 27503 are MODIFIED in that petitioner Raymundo E. Zapanta is
ACQUITTED of the crimes of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
and Infidelity in the Custody of Documents, defined and penalized under Article
226 of the Revised Penal Code, on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the bond of
the petitioner posted for his provisional liberty be released to him. The Hold
Departure Order, dated June 18, 2002, issued by the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner, is hereby lifted and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

ERNESTO M. FULLERO,
Petitioner,
-versus

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. NO. 170583

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[1] petitioner Ernesto M. Fullero seeks to set aside the Decision[2] dated 19
October 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, affirming in toto
the Decision[3] dated 9 October 2003 of the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding petitioner guilty of falsification
of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.

In an Amended Information[4] dated 14 October 1997, petitioner was charged with

falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud, being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City
Telecommunications Office, while acting in said capacity and taking advantage of
his official function, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is when he prepared
his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of
Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he
passed the Civil Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation
Commission on May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon
verification issued by PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and
another one [in] May, 1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.
When arraigned on 5 January 1998, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de
parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charge.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the Bureau of

Telecommunications Office in Iriga City (BTO, Iriga City). In 1982, he became the
Acting Chief Operator of the same office until 1994.[6]

A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) [Civil Service Form 212] dated 8 January 1988,
purportedly accomplished and signed by petitioner, states that he passed the Civil
Engineering Board Examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of
75.8%.[7] It appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau of
Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City).[8]

A letter dated 7 March 1988 and signed by petitioner shows that he applied for the
position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor with the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), Region 5, Legazpi City.[9]

Upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado (Magistrado), a subordinate of

petitioner in the BTO, Iriga City, with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC), it was verified that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil
engineering and that petitioners name does not appear in the book of registration
for civil engineers.[10]

Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS containing the
statement that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil
engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein.
He claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the
stroke of his genuine signature.[11] He added that the letters contained in the PDS
he accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his
typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his
because it had both small and capital typewritten letters.
Moreover, petitioner claimed that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant
case against him because he issued a memorandum against her for misbehavior in
the BTO, Iriga City.[12] He further argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try
him there being no evidence that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi
City.[13]

After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2003 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Ernesto M. Fullero is hereby

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification defined and
penalized under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional
maximum to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium as the maximum and to pay a
fine of three thousand P3,000.00 Pesos. Costs against the accused.[14]

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 October 2005, the appellate

court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC
Decision. The appellate court decreed:

In sum, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established all the
elements of the offense of falsification of a public document and that the trial court
correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal at bench is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
appealed 09 October 2003 decision is AFFIRMED.[15]

On 21 November 2005, petitioner lodged the instant petition before us citing as

errors the following:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT SAID LOWER COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE I.E., PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE
ACCUSED ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE ACT OF FALSIFICATION HE IS
ACCUSED OF;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED FILLED UP
THE PERSONAL DATA SHEET (PDS) INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE
IS A LICENSED ENGINEER, ACCUSED WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO
STATE SAID DATA AND NO CRIMINAL INTENT WAS SHOWN.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT SAID RTC ADMITTED EVIDENCES NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED AND THEREAFTER CONSIDERED THE SAME IN DETERMINING
THE ALLEGED GUILT OF THE ACCUSED;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE
VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA
CITY, WHERE THE ALLEGED PERSONAL DATA SHEET WAS
ACCOMPLISHED NOT IN THE RTC OF LEGAZPI CITY.
Apropos the first issue, petitioner maintained that none of the prosecution
witnesses actually saw him accomplish and sign the PDS; that the prosecution
failed to establish that he took advantage of his position in falsifying the PDS; that
a person need not be an Acting Chief Operator to be able to falsify a PDS; that he
never became the custodian of the PDS nor did he have any special access to it by
reason of his office; and that the identity of the person who falsified the PDS has
not been established by the prosecution.[16]

In establishing its charge of falsification against petitioner, the prosecution

presented the following witnesses, namely: Magistrado, Joaquin C. Atayza
(Atayza), Romeo Brizo (Brizo), Emma Francisco (Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir
(Avenir).

Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the BTO, Iriga City, testified that prior to
the filing of the instant case against petitioner, she sued the petitioner for unjust
vexation as the latter kissed her on one occasion. While the case for unjust
vexation was pending, her lawyer, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. (Atty. Baranda),
asked her if petitioner was indeed a licensed civil engineer since some persons
simply referred to petitioner as Mr. Fullero whereas in the BTO, Iriga City, petitioner
was known as Engineer Fullero. Suspicious of the true status of petitioner, she
went to the Records Office of the BTO, Legazpi City, and requested therein if she
can see petitioners PDS. Upon being shown petitioners PDS, she observed that,
under Item No. 18 thereof, petitioner appears to be a licensed civil engineer having
passed the board examination for civil engineering given on 30-31 May 1985.
Unconvinced of the veracity of petitioners statement in the PDS that he is a
licensed civil engineer, she sought the advice of Atty. Baranda. Atty. Baranda then
proceeded to the main office of the PRC in Manila to check the records of
petitioner. Subsequently, Atty. Baranda obtained a certification from the PRC
attesting that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil engineering.
Atty. Baranda showed the said certification to her. Thereafter, she instituted the
instant case against petitioner.[17]

Atayza, Regional Director of the PRC in Legazpi City, testified that petitioner is not
registered as a board passer for the civil engineering examination given on 30-31
May 1985.[18]
Brizo, Human Resource Management Officer and Acting Records Officer of the
BTO, Legazpi City, testified that his duty as acting records officer was to safeguard
the records and files of the BTO, Iriga City, and BTO, Legazpi City. He said he
personally knows the petitioner and is familiar with the latters signature because he
regularly received petitioners daily time records and other documents bearing
petitioners signature. He confirmed that the signature appearing in petitioners PDS
was the signature of petitioner.[19]

Francisco was the Officer-In-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila.
She declared that petitioners name was included in the master list of examinees in
the May 1984 civil engineering licensure examination where petitioner obtained a
failing grade of 56.75%. She affirmed that petitioners name also appears in the list
of examinees for the 30-31 May 1985 and May 1990 civil engineering licensure
examinations where he got failing marks.[20]

Avenir was the Special Investigator III in the Legal Affairs Division of the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City. As the duly authorized representative of the
Regional Director of the said office, Avenir brought to the court the letter of
petitioner applying for the position of either Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor, and a certification submitted by the
petitioner stating that the latter is a licensed civil engineer. Avenir stated that the
letter and the certification were taken from the records of their office and that these
documents were being kept as part of the records of an administrative case of
petitioner with the said office.[21]

The prosecution also presented documentary evidence to bolster the foregoing

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) a certification issued by Jose A.
Arriola, Director II, PRC, Manila, attesting that petitioners name is not registered in
the book of registry for licensed civil engineers; (2) certifications issued by
Francisco affirming that petitioner failed in the 30-31 May 1985 board examination
for civil engineering;[22] (3) the PDS where petitioner stated that he passed the 30-
31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering with a rating of 75.8% and
which was signed by him;[23] (4) certifications issued by Francisco attesting that
petitioner failed the May 1990 board examination for civil engineering;[24] (5)
transcript of stenographic notes in the perjury case filed by petitioner against
Magistrado which states that, during the trial thereof, petitioner affirmed before the
court hearing the case that he is a licensed civil engineer;[25] (6) a letter signed
and submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Regional Office
No. 5, Legazpi City, claiming to be a licensed civil engineer and applying for the
position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor;[26] (7) an Order dated 20 December 2001 of the CSC, Regional
Office No. 5, finding petitioner administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and imposing upon him a penalty of six months
suspension for falsifying his PDS which is also the subject matter of the instant
case;[27] (8) a certification submitted by the petitioner to the CSC, Regional Office
No. 5, Legazpi City, showing that he is a licensed civil engineer;[28] (9) the daily
time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner as the formers superior;[29] and
(10) other documents bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.[30]

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as its sole witness. No
documentary evidence was proffered.

Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support his contentions. Petitioner denied
that he executed and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he
passed the board examinations for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the
signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred that the PDS he
accomplished and submitted was typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter
does not have small letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since the letters
were typewritten in small and capital letters; that the stroke of the signature
appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature; that
Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him since he issued a
memorandum against her for the latters misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City; that he
is not a licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the
BTO, Iriga City.

Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the exact date when he issued the alleged
memorandum against Magistrado[31] and when during the trial of his perjury case
against Magistrado, he claimed that he is a licensed civil engineer.[32] He cannot
also remember if he submitted a letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi
City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor[33] and the fact that he submitted therein a
certification that he is a licensed civil engineer.[34]
The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and
defense is credible.

Case law dictates that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is

available as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by the
prosecution.[35] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[36]

Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner falsifying
the PDS, they, nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with the
petitioners handwriting and signature. Magistrado testified that, being a
subordinate of petitioner, she is very familiar with petitioners signature and actually
witnessed petitioner affixing his signature on her daily time records for September
1987 to May 1988.[37] Brizo testified that he is also familiar with petitioners
signature because he personally knows petitioner and that he regularly received
petitioners daily time records and other documents bearing petitioners
signature.[38] Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the signature in the PDS
belongs to petitioner.

The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence submitted
by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of
Magistrado and Brizo as trustworthy and believable.

More significant are the documentary evidence consisting of petitioners signature

in certain authentic instruments which are apparently similar to the signature in the
PDS. The RTC and the Court of Appeals have compared petitioners signatures in
Magistrados daily time records and petitioners signature in his application letter to
the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, with that of petitioners alleged
signature in the PDS. They observed that the slant position of the writing, as well
as the stroke and the last rounding loop of the signature in the PDS, does not differ
from petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily time records and in petitioners
application letter.[39] They noted that petitioners signatures in the said documents
are strikingly similar, such that through the naked eye alone, it is patent that the
signatures therein were written by one and the same person. The observation of
the Court of Appeals is worth noting, viz:

Appellants allegation that he did not execute the subject PDS is unavailing. First,
the informations entered in the PDS, such as his accurate personal data and
precise employment history, are matters which only the accused could have known.
Second, a visual analysis of appellants signatures in the Certificate of Arraignment
and Notice of Hearing, vis-a-vis his signature in the PDS would show no significant
disparity, leading to the conclusion that appellant himself prepared the PDS and
affixed his signature therein. Third, the signature of appellant in the PDS and in the
Daily Time Records (Exhibits J to Q) of prosecution witness Florenda Magistrado,
were glaringly identical. x x x.[40]

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies
of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.[41] This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court.
When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally binding upon this Court.[42]

In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised of denials.

Petitioner denied having accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that
someone else had filled it up. However, aside from this self-serving and negative
claim, he did not adduce any convincing proof to effectively refute the evidence for
the prosecution.
It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and positive testimony on
affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.[43]

The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for

which petitioner is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements

in a narration of facts;
b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; and
c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[44]

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer
or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification.
In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken
advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official
custody of the document which he falsifies.[45]

All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4,

Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.

First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the
BTO, Iriga City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988
at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is settled that a PDS is a public document.[46] He
stated under Item No. 18 of his PDS that he passed the civil engineering board
examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%. Thereafter,
petitioner submitted his PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City.

Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan,[47] we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS

being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection
with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein
was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment. Hence, the filing of a
PDS is required in connection with promotion to a higher position and contenders
for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing
their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified
aspirants to the same position.[48]

Petitioner was legally obliged to disclose in the PDS that he is not a licensed civil
engineer since, as evidenced by his application letter, he was applying for positions
to be occupied only by licensed civil engineers. Further, petitioner was also legally
obliged to make truthful statements in his PDS since he affirmed therein under the
penalty of perjury that his answers to the queries are true and correct to the best of
[his] knowledge and belief.[49]

Third, petitioners statement in the PDS that he passed the civil engineering board
examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8% is
absolutely false. As Officer-in-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila,
Francisco declared that petitioner was included in the master list of examinees in
the May 1984 civil engineering licensure examination wherein petitioner obtained a
failing grade. She affirmed that petitioners name also appears in the list of
examinees for the May 1985 and May 1990 civil engineering licensure
examinations where petitioner also got failing marks. She also submitted
certifications and authentic documents in support of her statements. Further,
petitioner admitted that he never passed the board examination for civil
engineering.[50]

Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and

submit his PDS pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.[51] Were it
not for his position and employment in the government, he could not have
accomplished the PDS. In People v. Uy,[52] Santiago Uy, a field agent of the
National Bureau of Investigation, was charged with falsification of public document
under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for making false
statements in his Personal Information Sheet. We ruled therein: [T]hat the
defendant (Santiago Uy) took advantage of his position may be gathered from the
fact that he himself filled the information sheet which obviously was to be submitted
by each and every officer or employee of the NBI. In the same vein, petitioner also
had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS at the time he
made a false statement therein that he is a licensed civil engineer. Hence, it is
clear that petitioner took advantage of his position as Acting Chief Operator of BTO,
Iriga City when he falsified his PDS.

Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that being a licensed civil engineer is not
a qualification for him to hold office and such is not a requirement for his
promotion; that the false statement caused no prejudice to any private person as
he did not have any competitor in his position nor was the government damaged by
such false statement; that the false statement would not in any way redound to his
benefit and, as such, no criminal intent could have impelled him to make such false
claim; and that no evidence was produced showing that he had intent to cause
injury.

The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document.[53] It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason
that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.[54] In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any
prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial.[55]

The fact that the petitioners false statement in the PDS did not redound to his
benefit, and that the government or any private individual was not thereby
prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear and decisive in this case is that
petitioner made an entry in his PDS that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board
examination for civil engineering despite his full awareness that such is not true.

Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecutions documentary
evidence, consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R and
their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:

(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998,
confirming that petitioners name does not appear in the registry books of licensed
civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to
identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was PRC
Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the
execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present
when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial.
Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; (2) Exhibit C, which is,
according to petitioner, a machine copy of the PDS, does not show that it was the
petitioner who prepared and submitted the PDS to BTO, Legazpi City. There was
nothing in the PDS which requires a periodic submission of an updated PDS.
Prosecution witness Brizo does not know whether petitioners PDS was personally
delivered or mailed. Hence, the identification and subsequent testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on the PDS are mere hearsay; (3) Exhibit F, which is the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by
petitioner against Magistrado where petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil
engineer, lacks proper identification as the stenographer or records officer was not
presented in court; (4) Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the
Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of
either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic
Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is a machine copy of a certification allegedly
issued by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which
was allegedly submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region
5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are merely
machine copies and the loss and unavailability of their original were not proven;
and (5) Exhibits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R, which are the daily time records of
Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were offered to compare petitioners
alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are devoid of factual basis.
Petitioners signatures in the said exhibits are, with the use of naked eye, not the
same as his signature in the PDS. The Legazpi City RTC should have submitted
these documents to a handwriting expert for examination instead of relying on the
testimony of Magistrado.[56]

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge,
that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify
as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or
heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[57] This is known as the hearsay rule.

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the
exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer.[58] In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence
regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and
testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and
trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions
in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty by a public officer.[59]

Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by
Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila.[60] Although Arriola was not presented in
court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such
certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is
therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible
proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that an evidence
is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or rules.
Exhibit C, which according to petitioner is the machine copy of the PDS, is very
relevant to the charge of falsification and is not excluded by the law or rules. It was
offered precisely to prove that petitioner committed the crime of falsification by
making false statements in the PDS. Further, the information specifically accuses
petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit C would show that it is the
very PDS which petitioner falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by
petitioner. Being the original falsified document, it is the best evidence of its
contents and is therefore not excluded by the law or rules.[61]

Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a
transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer,
stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie
a correct statement of such proceedings.

Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic

Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against
Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, is not
what it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier
elucidated, one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official
records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. Exhibit F, being an
official entry in the courts records, is admissible in evidence and there is no
necessity to produce the concerned stenographer as a witness.[62]

Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional
Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a
Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor;
and Exhibit I, which is the machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by the
PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly
submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City,
as his credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of
their original documents recorded or kept in the CSC, Regional Office No. 5,
Legazpi City[63] and, thus, admissible to prove the contents of their originals.
Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner
and which were offered to compare petitioners alleged signature in the PDS with
the said exhibits, are admissible in evidence since they are relevant and material to
the charge of falsification against petitioner. The signatures of petitioner in the said
exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied by petitioner, were presented to
prove that these signatures were similar to petitioners signature in the PDS where
he made the alleged falsification.

Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.

Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwritings or signatures.[64] This is so since under Section 22, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he
has seen the person write; or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or has been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Moreover, the opinion of a non-expert witness, for
which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding the handwriting
or signature of a person with which he has sufficient familiarity.[65]

The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to put a handwriting expert on
the witness stand and direct the latter to examine petitioners signatures in the
foregoing exhibits before ruling on their admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar with petitioners
handwriting/signature in determining the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It
can, by itself, also compare petitioners signature in the PDS with the petitioners
signatures in the subject exhibits with or without the aid of an expert witness and
thereafter rule on the admissibility of such exhibits based on its own observation. In
short, it can exercise independent judgment as regards the admissibility of said
exhibits.

As to the fourth issue, petitioner argued that since none of the prosecution
witnesses testified that they actually saw him fill up the PDS, then there is no
evidence showing that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City; that
when the PDS was allegedly falsified, he was stationed at BTO, Iriga City, and was
a resident of Iriga City; that, even assuming without admitting that he filled up the
PDS, the same was, in all probability, filled up in Iriga City and, as such, the crime
of falsification was consummated therein; that, consequently, the instant case
should have been tried in the Iriga City RTC and not in the Legazpi City RTC.[66]

There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can
acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases. First, the court must have jurisdiction over
the offense or the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed. And third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[67] There is no dispute that the
Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of
petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the
petitioner impugns.

The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the

complaint or information as regards the place where the offense charged was
committed.[68] It should also be emphasized that where some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province or
city and some in another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try
the case, it being understood that the court first taking cognizance of the case will
exclude the others.[69]

In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges that the
falsification was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, as heretofore discussed, the
testimonies and documentary evidence for the prosecution have sufficiently
established that petitioner accomplished and thereafter submitted the PDS to the
BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing circumstances clearly placed the locus criminis
in Legazpi City and not in Iriga City.

We find no reason to disturb the prison term and fine imposed on petitioner by the
Legazpi City RTC and the Court of Appeals, as they are in accord with law and
jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated 19 October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ART. 229 - Revelation of Secrets (Leaking of a Confidential Internal Document)

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN
BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
Facts:
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations
on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v.
Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v.
Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was used by this Court as a working basis
for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further objections to the draft, the En
Banc approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number
of Justices manifested that they were concurring in the result, Justice Reyes
immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that
seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred in the result with the
ponencia of Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyess ponencia or
ponencia or unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur
only in the result. Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur
only in the result, the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of
the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority concurred only in the result, the
ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a
sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal
basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T.
Carpio then volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyess ponencia for
discussion in the following weeks En Banc session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios
Reflections which had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the
Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the
date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in
the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to
hold oral arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta
Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an
undated letter signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of
the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the
instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other Justices,
unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia
infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted
contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed:
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee to investigate the unauthorized
release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are
responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and
to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate actions thereon;
2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why he should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated
letter and circulating the same together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice
Reyes.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Courts above-quoted Resolution dated
December 10, 2008, Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated
December 22, 2008 to which he attached the following: an undated photocopy of a
3-page printed letter addressed to Dear Mr. Biraogo which purportedly was sent by
a Concerned Employee on a June 12, 2008 note handwritten on a memo pad of
Justice Reyes together with a copy of Justice Reyess Revised Draft ponencia for
the June 17, 2008 agenda; a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing
the signatures of 14 Justices; and a photocopy of Justice Carpios Reflections.
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts:
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under his
misimpression that Justice Nazario had concurred in the result and that she would
finally remove such qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty.
Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the signature page 36 (where the names of
Justices Nazario, Nachura and three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the
Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature as Justice Nachura, who
was not participating in the oral arguments on the case scheduled at 1:30 that
afternoon, might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to
reprint the second signature page (page 36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the Gilbert
copy, was then given by Atty. Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn,
gave the Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted signature page 36, to Manabat
whom he instructed to go to the Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix his
signature thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the Gilbert
copy to Fermin Segotier, the receptionist at Justice Nachuras office. As the Gilbert
copy was a door-to-door document, Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa
Tolentino who recorded it in her logbook. She then brought the Gilbert copy to
Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of the Gilbert copy was brought out
from Justice Nachuras chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in her
logbook that it was already signed.The whole process took not more than five
minutes. The Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat, who had waited outside the
office of Justice Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from him if
Justice Nachura had signed the reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the
affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario.
When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case
scheduled that afternoon, went down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30
p.m., he and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed that Justice Nazario did
not, after all, qualify her concurrence on the original signature page 36 of the
Gilbert copy with the words in the result. Since neither Atty. Evangelista nor Del
Rosario was advised by Justice Reyes that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy
was on hold, Del Rosario brought the Gilbert copy, together with the rollo, records
and diskettes to the OCJ to be promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to Ramon
Gatdula of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of
the Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del
Rosario to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from
the OCJ, informing him for the first time that the promulgation of the ponencia had
been put on hold. Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of Justice
Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for the same reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert copy. As
Gatdula had already forwarded the same to the Chief Justices secretary for the
Chief Justices signature, Gatdula retrieved it from the secretary. Del Rosario
retrieved all that he submitted the previous day, except the rollo which had, in the
meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it.
Del Rosario informed Atty. Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold. After Atty. Evangelista verified the
matter from Justice Reyes, he (Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case
would be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario made a note in his logbook to
that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for
July 29, 2008 where the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover
page reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus prepared and attached to the
Gilbert copy bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained in
the sole custody of Del Rosario until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing
conducted by the investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained inside his
unlocked drawer, in a brown envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and
white seal used by all Justices. He opened it only on December 10, 2008, after
Justice Reyes informed his staff that there was a leak of the ponencia.
When news of Biraogos conduct of a press conference on December 9, 2008
bearing on the leakage came out, Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff
and Del Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they knew anything about the
leakage. He called for a second meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and
Del Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the investigating
committee took place in the afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a
one-on-one talk with Del Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios
Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and related documents when they
were sent to the OCJ, to which he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative.
Issue:
WON Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are liable for the
leaking of a confidential internal document:
Ruling:
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was
reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of all the
members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are on official leave.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and
APPROVES WITH MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the Investigating
Committee as follows:
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for
leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00,
to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T.
Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of
the aforementioned findings.
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for
SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of
P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
Held:
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes Judicial Staff Head, was
remiss in his duties, which includes the supervision of the operations of the office,
particularly with respect to the promulgation of decisions. While it is incumbent
upon him to devise ways and means to secure the integrity of confidential
documents, his actuations reflected above evinced a disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference.
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of draft
ponencias in an unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to make sure
that the unused portion of confidential documents like the second signatory page of
the ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of or shredded. He was
not on top of things that concerned the promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to
ascertain the status and procedural implication of an on hold order after having
been apprised thereof by his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008. Despite
his awareness that the Limkaichong case would eventually be called again, he
admitted that he was not privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the
subsequent session on July 29, 2008.
Liability of Armando Del Rosario
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to
exercise the required degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario
admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16, 2008 to
December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the
document in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His carelessness
renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as
the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from
either carelessness or indifference.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility
which court officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
(simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to
six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the
penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative.[284]
Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty,[285]
we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount of
P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable.
Justice Reyes’ Liability for Violating his Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise
finds Justice Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating
his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be
disbarred or suspended per Section 27,[279] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only
violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal
deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the administration of justice.
The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was committed by no
less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example
to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of
no moment. The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against
an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the
bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not
create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. Once the said
impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation,
retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and
impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure,
pursuant to the Courts power of administrative supervision over members of the
bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may
penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their
incumbency.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes’ infractions may have been, the committee
finds the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the
determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the
Court takes into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is
to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6615 - AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT AND

PRIVATE HOSPITALS AND CLINICS TO EXTEND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN
EMERGENCY CASES

Section 1. All government and private hospitals or clinic duly licensed to operate
as such are hereby required to render immediate emergency medical assistance
and to provide facilities and medicine within its capabilities to patients in
emergency cases who are in danger of dying and/or who may have suffered
serious physical injuries.

Sec. 2. The expenses and losses of earnings incurred by a private hospital of

clinic for medicines, facilities and services beyond first aid extended to emergency
cases as required herein, and not to exceed fifty thousand pesos per year, shall be
deductible expenses and losses for income tax purposes which may be carried
over for a period of five years, any provision of law or regulation to the contrary
notwithstanding.

Sec. 3. Any hospital director, administrator, officer-in-charge or physician in the

hospital, medical center or clinic, who shall refuse or fail without good cause to
render the appropriate assistance pursuant to the requirements of section one after
said case had been brought to his attention, or any nurse, midwife or medical
attendant who shall refuse to extend the appropriate assistance, subject to existing
rules, or neglect to notify or call a physician shall be punished by imprisonment of
one month and one day to one year and one day, and a fine of three hundred
pesos to one thousand pesos, without prejudice to the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Twenty-three hundred eighty-two in the case of physicians.

In the case of Government hospitals, the imposition of the penalty upon the person
or persons guilty of the violations shall be without prejudice to the administrative
action that might be proper.

In the case of private hospitals, aside from the imposition of penalty upon the
person or persons guilty of the violations, the license of the hospital to operate
shall, whenever justified, be suspended or revoked.

Sec. 4. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of Health, the Bureau of Medical
Services shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of this Act.

Sec. 5. Any law or laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act is hereby repealed.

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

[G.R. Nos. L-8820 & L-8821. May 25, 1956.]

MARCIAL PUNZALAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent-Appellee.

DECISION

JUGO, J.:

We are asked to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in these
two cases, which were decided together by said Court, on the principal ground that
the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province which tried the case had no original
jurisdiction and, consequently, the Court of Appeals had no appellate jurisdiction
over the crime charged.

The above two cases were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province, Marcial Punzalan being the accused in both cases. In Case No. 11041,
the offended party is Moises Escueta, and in Case No. 11041, the complainant is
Isidro Capino. The information in Case No. 11041 is of the same tenor as that in
Case No. 11041, with the difference as to the offended party. Said information
reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“The undersigned, Provincial Fiscal, accuses Marcial Punzalan of the crime of

maltreatment with physical injuries, defined and punished under article 235 in
connection with article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“That on or about the 14th day of November, 1951, in the Municipality of Tiaong,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the
said accused, being the Municipal Mayor of said municipality, taking advantage of
his official position as such, without any justifiable motive, and with evident purpose
of extorting confession from one Moises Escueta, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously illtreat the latter, by then and there assaulting, beating
and striking the abdomen, face, breast and arms with an Automatic Pistol,
caliber .45 and his fist, while said Moises Escueta was kept in the Camp of the Phil.
Ground Force (PGF) located in the said municipality, thereby causing injuries in the
different parts of his body which required medical attendance for a period of seven
(7) days, and incapacitated the said offended party from performing his customary
labor for the same period of time”.

After joint trial, the Appellant was found guilty of slight physical injuries only, and
sentenced to suffer 30 days of arresto menor with the accessory penalties of the
law, and to pay the costs.

During the trial, the Defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that
the allegations contained therein do not constitute the crime of maltreatment of
prisoners, and that whatever offenses are charged therein do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

The trial court, in its decision, denied the motion to quash, but acquitted the
Appellant of maltreatment of prisoners with physical injuries as defined and
penalized in Article 235 in connection with Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
and convicted him of slight physical injuries under paragraph 1 of Article 266 of
said Code, sentencing him in each of the two cases to 30 days of arresto menor.

The Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found him guilty of grave
coercion, and, compensating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of authority
with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, sentenced him to
suffer 2 months and 21 days of arresto mayor to pay a fine of P150 with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In this Court, the Appellant contends that the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction over the crime alleged in the information, and, consequently, the Court
of Appeals had no appellate jurisdiction and asks for his acquittal with costs de
oficio.
The question at issue is whether the court of first instance had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case in view of the allegations of the information.

The first paragraph of the complaint accuses the Appellant of a violation of Article
235 in connection with Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 235, it
is necessary that the maltreated prisoner be under the charge of the officer
maltreating him. There is no such allegation in the information above quoted. The
prisoners, Moises Escueta and Isidro Capino, according to the information, were
simply kept in the Camp of the Philippine Ground Force in the municipality of
Tiaong; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it is not alleged therein that they were under
the charge of Punzalan as Mayor of Tiaong. Hence, one of the essential elements
of the offense under Article 235 was lacking. Had that allegation been made in the
information, the punishment being arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correcional in its minimum period, the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province
would have had jurisdiction, and, consequently, the Court of Appeals, appellate
jurisdiction.

The allegation in the information that the physical injuries suffered by the offended
party required seven days medical attendance with incapacity to work for the same
period only qualifies the crime as slight physical injuries, which come under the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court and not of the court of first instance.
However, the Appellant overlook the allegation in the information that the
maltreatment was committed by the accused “with evident purpose of extorting
confession” from the offended party, while the latter was kept in the Camp of the
Philippine Ground Force in Tiaong. This allegation amounts to grave coercion,
which is within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, as it is punished under
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
P500.

The Appellant claims that the coercion was not consummated but frustrated only
for the reason that the offended party did not confess the crime attributed to him.
This conclusion is contrary to the doctrine laid down by this Court in U. S. vs. Cusi,
10 Phil., 413, which says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary.
“Coercion. — The fact that an individual was maltreated for the purpose of
compelling to confess a crime which was attributed to him, constitute the crime of
consummated coercion, even if the agents of the authorities who carried out the
maltreatment did not accomplish their purpose to draw from him a confession,
which it was their intention to obtain by the employment of such means”.

This doctrine was reiterated in the case of U. S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil., 352, where it
did not appear that the offended party acceded to the purpose of the coercion. It is
unnecessary to say that inasmuch as the allegations in the information conferred
jurisdiction on the court of first instance, the fact that the accused was convicted of
a lesser crime included within those allegations did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs
against the Petitioner. It is SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery.
He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no
avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him
to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was
absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to
torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be
broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat
him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of
human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer
endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had
been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and
he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for
pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's

Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.

3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:

ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its

medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling of
a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments
in a cruel and humiliating manner.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some

information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the
case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the
practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave and
unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such
instances constitute the exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the
accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case
No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.

6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad
Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio
Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon
different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter,
police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an
ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the
murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the
alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein
accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by
NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of
the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the
following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay
admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay
and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe
and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and three of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and
by means of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad
Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando,
cash money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount;
that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling
them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in pursuance of
their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act,
with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of
her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which
directly caused her death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including
valuables and cash.

Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had
terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on
the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him
to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:

From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning
of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in
the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and
two others in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.

Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco

Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of
the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit
and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each
other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob
Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed among them to enter the premises
of the victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside
the premises, they will search every room, especially the aparador and filing
cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.

Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay
and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly
saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for
Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and
they waited at the side of the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00
o'clock that night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad
Fernando; that they entered the said premises through the back wall of the house;
that while entering the premises of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near
the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion
of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house
through the hole that they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him
was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three
were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find
anything valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed
the screen of the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the
room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad
Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was
then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and
accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim was
killed, the three accused began searching the room for valuables; that they helped
each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim, where they
found some money; that when the three accused left the room of the victim, they
brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw outside; that after
killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the premises of the
house, using the same way by which they gained entrance, which was through the
back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards the river bank
where they divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their
respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their
shares of the loot, the three accused left and went home.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of
accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about
the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he further
stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two
companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than
seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of
death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal
Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased
victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').

8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission
of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the
crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the
extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation
as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court
relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent
evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified
that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on
August 23, 1977, because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that
when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station
of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he
heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions
had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban,
Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter
was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two
handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning
of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and
reported to the police chief about what he had heard; and that a week later,
Montalban policemen went to their house and arrested the accused. 6

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest,
if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or
by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no

state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime.
The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us
therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng

Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo
magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong
sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na
maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa
pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung
sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka
ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay
ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy
the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known
to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not
permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters
and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay
that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel
of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims
having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever
action he may deem proper to take against the investigating officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET
ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the
crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other
charges. With costs de oficio.

17. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16782 May 30, 1963

SILVESTRE CUÑADO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
DAVID GAMUS, Mayor of Mabini, DOROTEO MONISA, Municipal Treasurer of
Mabini,
and PACIFICO RUIZ, Provincial Auditor, respondents-appellants.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-16783 May 30, 1963

INOCENTES VALLECERA and CRESENCIANO ASA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
DAVID GAMUS, Mayor of Mabini, DOROTEO MONISA, Municipal Treasurer of
Mabini
and PACIFICO RUIZ, Provincial Auditor, respondents-appellants.

Bonifacio Belderol for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.

PAREDES, J.:

In Case G.R. No. L-16782 (Mandamus), the following are gathered from the
stipulation of facts, Exhibit X-1: —

Prior to January 18, 1956, Silvestre Cuñado was extended a permanent

appointment as Chief of Police of Mabini, Bohol. As consequence of administrative
charges againsts him, on January 19, 1956, he was suspended by the respondent
Mayor David Gamus on the same date. On February 16, 1956, the municipal
Council of Mabini, rendered judgment, finding petitioner Silvestre Cuñado guilty of
the charges, recommending his dismissal, and in pursuance thereof, on February
22, 1956, respondent Mayor Gamus dismissed him from the service. Petitioner
Cuñado appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who exonerated him from
the administrative charges and ordered his reinstatement, which Mayor Gamus did
on April 17,1957. A criminal case was filed in the CFI of Bohol for an offense
identical to the administrative charges, in which the accused Cuñado was acquitted
on March 15, 1956, and that another administrative case was also filed against
Cuñado on April 1, 1956, for which he was suspended again, but the latter
received his accrued salary for this second suspension (Exh. C).

The only question submitted for reconsideration before the lower court was
whether or not petitioner Cuñado is entitled to receive his salary during his first
suspension, from January 19, 1956 up to April 16, 1957. Respondent Gamus
alleged that he refused to approve the voucher of petitioner Cuñado covering the
said period, because the theorize the payment of petitioner's back salary.

The lower court rendered judgment ordering the respondents Mayor of Mabini,
Municipal Treasurer of Mabini and Provincial Auditor, to approve the salary
voucher of petitioner Cuñado, covering the period from January 19, 1956 to April
16, 1957, and considering "that there is no proof that respondent Mayor acted in
bad faith in refusing to approve petitioner's voucher, the action for damages filed
against him is devoid of merit. On the other hand, petitioner's evidence is
insufficient to constitute a basis of his demand for damages. Without costs."

In Case G.R. No. L-16783 (Mandamus), the following are gathered from the
stipulation of facts: —

Petitioners Inocentes Vallecera and Cresenciano Asa, are veterans, but not civil
eligibles.

On August 1, 1951, Vallecera was appointed a temporary policeman of Mabini,

Bohol, with a salary of P480.00 a year. On November 5, 1951, he was appointed
Police Corporal at P42.00 per month, but this was superseded by another
appointment on the same day at P540.00 per annum, which was approved by the
Civil Service Bureau on April 15, 1953 with this annotation: "authorized under sec.
682 of the Revised Administrative Code, to continue until replaced by an eligible."
On January 1, 1953, another temporary appointment was extended to him, as
corporal, and his salary was raised to P576.00 per annum. This appointment was
approved by the Bureau of Civil Service, subject to section 682 of the Rev. Adm.
Code. On August 27, 1955, he was raised to P636.00, with the approval of the Civil
Service Bureau, a subject to the same section 682 of the Rev. Adm. Code.

February 21, 1948, petitioner Asa, was appointed temporary Policeman of Mabini,
with a salary of P360.00 per annum. On January 1, 1953, another temporary
appointment was extended to him as policeman, with a salary at P540.00 per
annum. And still on August 27, 1955, another temporary appointment was
extended to him as policeman, with a salary of P600.00 per annum.
In consequence of administrative charges filed against the two petitioners, they
were suspended by the respondent Mayor Gamus. On January 16, 1956, the
Mabini Municipal Council found the petitioners Vallecera and Asa, guilty, of the
administrative charges, and recommended their dismissal from the service, in
pursuance of which Mayor Gamus, on February 22, 1956, dismissed them. They
appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who exonerated them in a decision
promulgated on February 13, 1957.

They were not reinstated. On the contrary, petitioner Vallecera was replaced by
Amado Layong, a non-veteran and non-eligible, who in turn was replaced by the
present incumbent policeman Adolfo Villamor, who is a veteran but a non-eligible.
Petitioner Asa was first replaced by Paulino Tacal, a non-eligible veteran and
finally replaced by the present incumbent Saturnino Vallespin, who is non-eligible
and non-veteran.

Petitioners Vallecera and Asa were also prosecuted of an offense identical to the
administrative charges, and that on March 15, 1956, they were acquitted by the
CFI of Bohol. The two petitioners, raised the questions as to (1) whether or not
they — veterans, but not Civil Service eligibles — who were temporarily appointed
members of the Police force on August 27, 1955, can be replaced by persons who
are not civil service eligibles, and (2) whether or not both petitioners are entitled to
receive back salaries during the period of their separation from service.

The lower court rendered judgment, ordering the respondents Mayor and Municipal
Treasurer of Mabini and the Provincial Auditor, to reinstate petitioners Vallecera
and Asa to their positions, "provided that present incumbents who replaced them
have held said positions for a period of more than three months. The petitioners
shall be entitled to the payment of their salaries during the entire period of their
separation from service." The lower court explained that it refrained from ordering
the immediate ouster of the incumbents because they were not made parties to the
present case, and denied the award of damages, considering the absence of proof
that respondent Mayor Gamus acted in bad faith in refusing to reinstate both
petitioners. Without cost also.
Both parties appealed in both cases to the Court of Appeals, which certified said
cases to Us, as the issues involved raise purely questions of law.

Cuñado, Vallecera and Asa appealed from the judgment, in so far as it held that
the evidence of record is not sufficient to show that the respondent Mayor acted in
bad faith, in refusing to approve petitioner Cuñado's voucher and reinstate
petitioners Policemen Vallecera and Asa, dismissing, for this reason, petitioners'
claim for damages.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët

Upon the other hand, the respondents submit that the lower court erred (1)In not
finding that Cuñado has effectively abandoned his office, as not to entitle him to the
payment of back salary upon his reinstatement: (2) In holding Cuñado is entitled to
his back salary during the period of his suspension; (3) In holding that respondent
Mayor could be compelled by Mandamus to pay the said back salary,
notwithstanding the non-appropriation funds therefor by the Mabini Municipal
Council, which was not inpleaded as respondent; (4) In ordering the reinstatement
of petitioners Vallecera and Asa to their former positions, as Municipal Policemen,
notwithstanding the fact that they were merely veterans and not Civil Service
eligibles, and were simply temporary appointees to said positions, and (5) In
holding that petitioners Vallecera and Asa are entitled to reinstatement and back
salaries.

We will dispose, firstly, the appeal of petitioners. As stated in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals certifying the case to this Court, "petitioners do not dispute any
fact found by the trial court, thus limiting their appeal, as may be stated, to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bad faith on the part of
respondent Gamus". The lower court, after delving into said question, said —

Considering that there is no proof that the respondent mayor acted in bad faith in
refusing to approve petitioner's (Cuñado's ) voucher the action for damages filed
againsts him is devoid of merit. On the other hand, petitioner's evidence is
sufficient to constitute a basis for his demand for damages.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that there is no proof that Mayor David Gamus acted in bad faith in
refusing to reinstate both petitioners (Vallecera and Asa ), the action for damages
filed against him is devoid of merit. On the other hand, petitioners' evidence is
insufficient to constitute a basis for their demand for damages.

We are bound by the above findings and conclusions, there being no clear showing
that they are not supported by the evidence of record.

Regarding the refusal of Gamus maintains that he refused to approve the voucher
of Cuñado, the trial court states —

Respondent David Gamus maintains that he refused to approve the voucher of

petitioner Silvestre Cuñado covering the period from January, 1956 to April 16,
1956 on the ground that the judgment of the Commissioner of Civil Service did not
authorize the payment of petitioner's back salary.

Considering the above finding, We deduce that the Civil Service Commissioner,
neither authorized nor disauthorized the petitioners, to be paid of their back
salaries. Respondent Mayor might have really been in the honest belief that he
was not authorized to order such payment. At any rate, there was no clear
indication that respondent acted with malice in his actuations. We, therefore, hold
that damages were correctly denied the petitioners, by the trial court.

The next point in discussion, is the appeal of respondents. It is contended that it

was error for the lower court in not finding that Cuñado had abandoned his office,
and in granting him back salaries for the period of his suspension. It is claimed that
when the second of his suspension. It is claimed that when the second
administrative case was filed against said Cuñado, former Mayor Cadigal,
representing Cuñado, allegedly stated before the Municipal council that Cuñado
was no longer a municipal employee, by virtue of the order of dismissal from the
service, issued by respondent Municipal Mayor, in the first administrative case, and
hence could not be the subject of a subsequent administrative action, as he
became already a "civilian" after the said dismissal. The mere act, if true, of
considering himself a civilian, did not constituted abandonment. After his
exoneration from the first charge, the respondents wanted to subject him again to
an investigation of a second charge, to the jurisdiction of which, he did not want to
submit any longer. He "got bored", so to say. He might have abandoned his right to
his reinstatement, for factually, he did not ask for it at all, despite the fact that the
Civil Service Commissioner had ordered his reinstatement; but this attitude does
not necessarily imply, that he had also abandoned his right to the back pay, which
he is not claiming. It is true that a public office may be waived or may become
vacant by abandonment, but it is not less true that the abandonment must be total,
and under such circumstance, as clearly to indicate absolute relinqueshment
(Summers v. Ozaeta. G.R. No. L-1534, Oct. 24, 1948; 81 Phil. 754). The present
case, does not show that petitioner Cuñado had clearly relinquished his position as
Chief of polish the right to reinstatement and payment of back salaries of police
officers, who are not suspended or removed for cause, pursuant to Rep. Act No.
557 (Abella v. Rodriguez, 50 O.G. No. 7, 3039; People v. Bautista, 50 O.G. No. 11,
5286, Nov. 1954).

It is argued that there exists no practical advantage to compel the respondent to

approve the voucher for the back pay, because the Municipal Council of Mabini
was not impleaded and no funds were appropriated therefor. Asked in this
proceeding, was the approval of the voucher, which was within the power of the
respondent to do, and if he refused he could be compelled to do so by mandamus.
Mandamus is a remedy for official inaction. After the approval of the voucher, the
matter of payment will be another story.

Last on Our discussion, is the right of Vallecera and Asa to reinstatement and back
wages. It is evident from the stipulation of facts, that both Vallecera and Asa were
appointed in "temporary capacity". Even on this score alone, their rights to back
salaries and reinstatement topple. It has been repeatedly ruled that one who holds
a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show
that the termination is for cause; and if he is non-eligible, the temporary
appointment of another non-eligible is not prohibited (Quiatchon v. Villanueva &
City of Bacolod, G.R. No. L-9903, July 31, 1957; Paña v. City Mayor of Ozamis,
G.R. No. L-5700, 50 O.G. 146; Orais, et al. v. Ribo, G.R. No. L-4945, Oct. 28,
1953; 49 O.G. 5386; Montero, et al. v. Castellanes, 59 O.G. No. 11 [March 18,
1963] 1741-1743). It is true that these two petitioners are veterans and in
accordance with Rep. Act No. 65, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1363, they are
entitled to preferential rights over other appointees. In the case at bar, those who
were appointed in the place of Vallecera were veterans, although the substitute of
Asa is non-veteran and non-eligible. But these qualifications alone did not to confer
preferential rights to petitioners, who, although veterans, are non-eligibles also, It is
admitted that petitioners" temporary appointments were approved/or authorized by
the Civil Service under sec. 682 of the Administrative Code, effective "until
replaced by an eligible". Appointments under this section, however, "shall continue
only for such period not exceeding three (3) months, as may be necessary to make
appointment through certification of eligibles and in no case, shall extend beyond
thirty days from receipt by the Chief of the Bureau of Office of the Commissioner's
certification of eligibles". When petitioners were dismissed from the service,
because of the administrative charges against them, three months after their last
appointments on August 27, 1955 or November 27, 1955 (Paña v. City Mayor of
Ozamis, G.R. No. L-5700; 50 O.G. 146; Orais v. Ribo, supra). Their dismissal took
effect on February 22, 1956. Where a veteran's preferential right to appointment
under Rep. Act No. 65 has lapsed at the time he is given a temporary appointment,
under sec. 682 of the Rev. Adm. Code, he has no more standing than any other
temporary appointee under sec. 682, to object to being replaced by another
temporary appointee (Inocentes v. Ribo, G.R. No. L-4989; 50 O.G. 4853).

Again, under Rep. Act No. 1363 and Adm. Order No. 13 — "It is not enough that
one be a war veteran in order to enjoy preference in appointments in the service of
the government. Among other things, such veteran must be certified as such by the
Philippine Veterans Board, and must have qualified in an appropriate Civil Service
examination, and shall have filed application for preference with the Commissioner
of Civil Service" (Galon v. Cordova, G.R. No. L-11515, Nov. 29, 1958). As it was
not shown that petitioners had complied with these requisites, they are not entitled
to the payment of back salaries, as they did not have any such back or accrued
salaries to speak of, in the first place.

While it is true that the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated Vallecera and
Asa in the administrative complaint, no mention was made regarding their
reinstatement or right to back wages. On the contrary, the decision of the
Commissioner, pointed to the replacement of Vallecera and Asa at any time, by the
appointing authority with other non-eligibles. Thus the Commissioner said —

.... In view thereof and as evidence sufficient to sustain the charges in the instant
case is found wanting, respondents-appellants Silvestre Cuñado, Inocentes
Vallecera and Cresenciano as a are hereby exonerated thereof. It may be stated,
however, that as Messrs. Vallecera and Asa were appointed in pursuance of
Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, as ammended, they may be
replaced at any time by the appointing authority concerned with other non-eligibles
after the expiration of three months (Orais, et al. v. Ribo, 49 O.G. 5386) unless
they are duly accredited veterans who are entitled to preferential appointment
under Republic Act No. 65, as amended by Republic Act No. 1363.

WHEREFORE, in Case G.R. No. L-16782, "Silvestre Cuñado v. David Gamus, etc.,
et al., the decision appealed costs; in Case G.R. No. L-16783," Inocentes Vallecera,
et al., v. David Gamus, etc., et al., the decision appealed from is reversed, and
another entered, declaring that Vallecera and Asa are not entitled to reinstatement
and/or payment of back salaries. No costs.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE
VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15
and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.

In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner raises the following grounds:

I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI,

SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
THEREON.

II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS

RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.

III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL

HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.

V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE

COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INCUMBENT
OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED
CAPACITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.

In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE
OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE,
AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;

3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

HEARSAY RULE;

4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE PETITIONERS

INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION; and

5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT

TO FAIR TRIAL.

We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Court

Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails

the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to
reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test
to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and
analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking
of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-
established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up
the irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of
Governor Luis Chavit Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then
Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech
of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on
Justice; (4) the investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on
Public Order and Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of
Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops
conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of
respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign;
(10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior Economic
Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and
Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then
Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47)
representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission of
the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the unseating of
Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the
House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa
Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial;
(16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the prosecutors motion to open
the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank account under the name of Jose Velarde;
(17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation; (18) the indefinite postponement of
the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the House of Representatives to
resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA
Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of
support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief
of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services;
(21) the same withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP,
General Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of
resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and
bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and opening of
the controversial second envelope. All these prior events are facts which are within
judicial notice by this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The
reference by the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened
does not make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account
only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has
not singled out any of these facts as false.

We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath
taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to
resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for
courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them.
Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last
wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar
cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by
the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by
the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary
inadmissible as evidence.

We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some
events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed
the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which
was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing
its content, we ruled that petitioners issuance of the press release and his
abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation.[1] These are overt
acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.

In light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury
20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no
leg to stand on.

We also reject the contention that petitioners resignation was due to duress and an
involuntary resignation is no resignation at all.

x x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is

voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the
resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-
part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1)
whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been
expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the
circumstances it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation
effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be
considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some
alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the
choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable
time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the
effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances test, the
assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an objective
standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the
employee may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example,
because of concerns about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere
fact that the choice is between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example,
resignation or facing disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a
resignation was induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This
is so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination
for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds
for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a resignation
resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not
tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the employee is
given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed.
Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with misconduct is not given under
duress, though the appropriate authority has already determined that the officers
alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority to terminate
the officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress
to threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any
measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.[2]

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than
resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the
Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was
forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked
Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice of
whether or not to leave.

To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to
believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners
resignation. The Malacaang ground was then fully protected by the Presidential
Security Guard armed with tanks and high-powered weapons. The then Chief of
Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and other military officers were in Malacaang to
assure that no harm would befall the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no
harm, not even a scratch, was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family
and his Cabinet who stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage
was even able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade
goodbye to his followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street,
Greenhills. The only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone
throwing between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in
minor injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled through
the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence, no shooting,
no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the conclusion that
petitioner was coerced to resign.

II

Evidentiary Issues

Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by
this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to
determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates
the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner
cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign
surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the
parties in their pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from
February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the
Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February
20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as
Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated
February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply
Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,[4]
and the third part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It was also extensively used
by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had
all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still
its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule.[6] Evidence is called hearsay when its
probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.[7] There
are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.[8]
Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years,
a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their
relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The emergence of these exceptions
and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield,
Abrams and Berger as follows:

xxx

On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of
other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and
affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted
because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452, 454-455
(1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes
have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a
rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has
been to exclude categories of highly probative statements from the definition of
hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions to the
hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their
rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules
which authorize the admission of hearsay that does not satisfy a class exception,
provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).

Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished
altogether instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation
of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes
omitted):

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be
influenced by the evidence. However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as
merely a subdivision of this structure, and the Federal Rules do not conceive of
hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences
other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule
against hearsay questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate
inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude
testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be
no doubt as to the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices
recognized by the evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious
biases or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion
of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys function by
usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of information
routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.

Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are
either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a general
rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior.
More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay seem
insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the
function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay rules should be abolished.

Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now
available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting
hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value of
hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule:
Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655
(1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of
Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park, & Penrod, Jurors
Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992);
Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning
the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev.
65 (1991).

Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility,
question whether the benefits outweigh the cost:

The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It
also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a
cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the
court salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As
expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public
subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule
imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about
the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools, students
spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the
hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended on the rule.

Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay

Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish
rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-
Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[10]

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine

whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more
circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of
Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.[11] It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera
of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions
are not covered by the hearsay rule:[12]

Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys declaration has generally the probative
value of any other persons asssertion, argued that it had a special value when
offered against the party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys
statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a
witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued,
admissions pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial
assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-
examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to
cross examine himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied
since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand
and explain his former assertion. (Wigmore on evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn
Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
According to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself
rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the
trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party
can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is
unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath.

A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the
truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized
as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he
would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period
promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by
Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod
na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the
red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown
is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence,
non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another
person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones explains that the basis
for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification
or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made.[14]
To use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is
not mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the
petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him
as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to
ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of
dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but
simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other
related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him violated the
rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the
Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according
to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin.
(Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one Ive listened to.
And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This statement of full trust was made by the
petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he
would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at
about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary
Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)[18] Secretary
Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara
headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to
discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the
powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for
and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her
oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations
of Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are

binding on the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains the reasons for
the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as
through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a
contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any
act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in
the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or
in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.[20]

Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether
they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are
the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence
of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following:[21]

a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;

b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the
like;

c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of

mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the
latter;

d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and

e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered
by the prohibition against hearsay evidence:[22]

1088. Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of

comon issues, forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously
necessary that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any
exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is as of
course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as
motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the
particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method
of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person.
Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible
within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And
even where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or
transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they
become admissible of necessity.

As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which

reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It
also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably
deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered
by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and
petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.

Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best
evidence were violated in our Decision, viz:

The use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence,
such as the rule on authentication of private writings

xxx

A. Rule on Proof of Private Writings Violated

The rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law provides
that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.

xxx
B. Best Evidence Rule Infringed

Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara diary. It
is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was however used by this
Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the original or duplicate
original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should have been applied since the
contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.

The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.[23]

Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the
Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:

Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any

material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

Sec. 4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals.

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara
Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing
so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his
book on evidence, states that:

Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion,
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.[24]

xxx

In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned,

for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a
sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233).
Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has
been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis supplied)

Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor, viz:

Generally speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is

sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application;
and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of exclusion
might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection had been
taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the admission of
secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here that the objection should be
made in proper season that is, whenever it appears that there is better evidence
than that which is offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted.
The objection itself should be sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for
the courts consideration.[25]

He adds:

Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no

objection is made to its reception.[26]

In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in

section 20 of Rule 132, viz:

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

On the rule of authentication of private writings, Francisco states that:

A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that
is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as
a pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993, 52
A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of
a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it
was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266,
103 A.L.R. 835).[27]

Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which frowned on

reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was
dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is a significant
difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at bar. In the Muro
case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a
newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is)
not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is
palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however, the
petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the Angara Diary when
he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated
February 22, 2001, Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and
Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore
not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had been given
an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility. It is
already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the
Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the
basis thereof.

III
Temporary Inability

Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article
VII, of the Constitution in that congress can only decide the issue of inability when
there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President.
The situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the
President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his
inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet.
It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily
which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.

We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the
submission in G.R. No. 146738 that Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[29] We sustained
this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined
and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by
petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its
power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is
conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise
cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de
jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is
significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such
factors as the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern and the members of the international
community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has a constitutional
duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x. This political judgment may be
right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its
wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court
of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an
inseparable bar against this courts interposition of its power of judicial review to
review the judgment of Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still the
President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
Petitioner attempts to extricate himself from his submission that Congress has the
ultimate authority to determine his inability to govern, and whose determination is a
political question by now arguing that whether one is a de jure or de facto
President is a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is,
does not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of
whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific
issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by issue
basis. On the issue of resignation under section 8, Article VII of the Constitution,
we held that the issue is legal and ruled that petitioner has resigned from office
before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. On the issue of inability to
govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that the Congress
has the ultimate authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner
himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this
Court cannot review. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the
generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial
question.

Petitioner now appears to fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru
resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-
leave argument. He asserts that these acts of Congress should not be accorded
any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2) a declaration of
presidential incapacity cannot be implied.

We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which

states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a
priori or before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar,
special consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the
resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a
Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to
act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. To be sure, however,
the petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the
Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized respondent
Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the presidency post facto. Petitioner
himself states that his letter alleging his inability to govern was received by the
Office of the Speaker on January 20, 2001 at 8:30 A.M. and the Office of the
Senate at 9 P.M. of the same day.[30] Respondent took her oath of office a few
minutes past 12 oclock in the afternoon of January 20. Before the oath-taking,
Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker Fuentebella had prepared a Joint
Statement which states:[31]

Joint Statement of Support

and Recognition from the
Senate President and the Speaker
Of the House of Representatives
We, the elected leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
called upon to address the constitutional crisis affecting the authority of the
President to effectively govern our distressed nation. We understand that the
Supreme Court at that time is issuing an en banc resolution recognizing this
political reality. While we may differ on the means to effect a change of leadership,
we however, cannot be indifferent and must act resolutely. Thus, in line with our
sworn duty to represent our people and in pursuit of our goals for peace and
prosperity to all, we, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, hereby declare our support and recognition to the constitutional
successor to the Presidency. We similarly call on all sectors to close ranks despite
our political differences. May God bless our nation in this period of new beginnings.

Mabuhay and Pilipinas at ang mamamayang Pilipino.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.

Senate President
(Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of respondent Arroyo as the constitutional successor to
the presidency was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate and
the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. Thus, Resolution No. 176
expressed x x x the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption
into office by Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goal under the
Constitution.[32] Resolution No. 82 of the Senate and Resolution No. 178 of the
House of Representatives both confirmed the nomination of then Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as Vice-President.[33] It also passed Resolution No. 83 declaring
the impeachment court functus officio.[34] Both Houses sent bills to respondent
Arroyo to be signed by her into law as President of the Philippines.[35] These acts
of Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied
recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic. Petitioners
insistence that respondent Arroyo is just a de facto President because said acts of
Congress x x x are mere circumstances of acquiescence calculated to induce
people to submit to respondents exercise of the powers of the presidency[36] is a
guesswork far divorced from reality to deserve further discussion.

Similarly way off the mark is petitioners point that while the Constitution has made
Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vice-presidential
elections, this Honorable Court nonetheless remains the sole judge in presidential
and vice presidential contests.[37] He thus postulates that such constitutional
provision[38] is indicative of the desire of the sovereign people to keep out of the
hands of Congress questions as to the legality of a persons claim to the
presidential office.[39] Suffice to state that the inference is illogical. Indeed, there is
no room to resort to inference. The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on
how vacancies and election contest in the office of the President shall be decided.
Thus, section 7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails
to qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the beginning
of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have
become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the
death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President.
Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues
that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article
VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In
case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has
jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article
VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself
submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. In light of these clear
provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to
make inferences that simply distort their meanings.
IV

Impeachment and Absolute Immunity

Petitioner contends that this Court disregarded section 3 (7) of Article XI of the
Constitution which provides:

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.

Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the

impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A plain
reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two
uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a
limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second,
it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment
proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of
manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur submission that the provision
requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua
non to his prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing
before the respondent Ombudsman.

Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from the
impeachment proceedings should be considered failure to prosecute on the part of
the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case by the Senate is
equivalent to acquittal.[40] He explains failure to prosecute as the failure of the
prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on
the merits.[41] He then concludes that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute
amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double
jeopardy.[42]
Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject petitioners
submission.

The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the January 16, 2001
hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges
refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit
of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The next
day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to the Speaker of the
House tendering their resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal
of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco immediately
moved for the indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the
House of Representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public
prosecutors. The Roco motion was then granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr.
Before the House could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors or on
January 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio.

Prescinding from these facts, petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[43] Assuming arguendo
that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitioner failed
to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment
proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Petitioners claim of double
jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction for he was not convicted by the
impeachment court. At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in
light of a violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to
prosecute. As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens
when the accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to
prove the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.[44]

This Court held in Esmea v. Pogoy[45], viz:

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecutions
motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal
does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently fails to prove the
defendants guilt, the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss the case, such
dismissall amounting to an acquittal of the defendant.

In a more recent case, this Court held:

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases
on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering
that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy.[46]

Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against him.
Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not every
invocation of an accuseds right to speedy trial is meritorious. While the Court
accords due importance to an accuseds right to a speedy trial and adheres to a
policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be invoked loosely.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of
time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.[47] The following
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are apropos:

Rule 115, Section 1(h). Rights of accused at the trial. -- In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

Rule 119, Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.-- Trial once
commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It
may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the
earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial
period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment

proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of
time. Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was
suspended until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the
resignation of the public prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an
impeachment proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the
impeachment process. However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20,
2001, petitioners resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the
impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were therefore
terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day period from the time
the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the day petitioner resigned,
constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative of the right of the accused to
speedy trial.

Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination
of the case without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the
impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from
the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By
resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of
the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the
impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or
termination of the case is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double
jeopardy.[48]

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute

immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong
the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced
the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the
present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life
to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed
while a sitting President. Petitioners rehashed arguments including their thinly
disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President,
albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of
office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the
presidency and there is now a new de jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys
immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committees omitting in the draft proposal
the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that
the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least,
of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first
sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure,
considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be
spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez: So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by
the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez; On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam
President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.[49]

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.[50] From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term.

Indeed, petitioners stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the cases at
bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but just to take
advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus, derail the
investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Prejudicial Publicity on the Ombudsman

Petitioner hangs tough on his submission that his due process rights to a fair trial
have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. In our Decision, we held that there is
not enough evidence to sustain petitioners claim of prejudicial publicity.
Unconvinced, petitioner alleges that the vivid narration of events in our Decision
itself proves the pervasiveness of the prejudicial publicity. He then posits the thesis
that doubtless, the national fixation with the probable guilt of petitioner fueled by
the hate campaign launched by some high circulation newspaper and by the bully
pulpit of priests and bishops left indelible impression on all sectors of the citizenry
and all regions, so harsh and so pervasive that the prosecution and the judiciary
can no longer assure petitioner a sporting chance.[51] To be sure, petitioner
engages in exageration when he alleges that all sectors of the citizenry and all
regions have been irrevocably influenced by this barrage of prejudicial publicity.
This exaggeration collides with petitioners claim that he still enjoys the support of
the majority of our people, especially the masses.

Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur
rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact
for defendant to meet with an explanation.[52] It is not a rule of substantive law but
more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with the
requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present
along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to
thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[53]

We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually
applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole
world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of prejudicial
publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the alleged pervasive
publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the minds of the
members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid down in People
v. Teehankee,[54] to resolve this issue, viz:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the
case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.
Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible
to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as
the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x
x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds
of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as
hey happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news
form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our
idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage
of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.

Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails to prove
how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of the Ombudsman
has been infected by it. As we held before and we hold it again, petitioner has
completely failed to adduce any proof of actual prejudice developed by the
members of the Panel of Investigators. This fact must be established by clear and
convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and conjectures. In fact,
petitioner did not even identify the members of the Panel of Investigators. We
cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur as
suggested by the petitioner. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial
publicity) has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators
to prove that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity.
Such a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The cases are not wanting where
an accused has been acquitted despite pervasive publicity.[55] For this reason, we
continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice
but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to
sustain his plea. It is plain that petitioner has failed to do so.

Petitioner agains suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period
to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity against
him would die down. We regret not to acquiesce to the proposal. There is no
assurance that the so called 2-month cooling off period will achieve its purpose.
The investigation of the petitioner is a natural media event. It is the first time in our
history that a President will be investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman for
alleged commission of heinous crimes while a sitting President. His investigation
will even be monitored by the foreign press all over the world in view of its legal
and historic significance. In other words, petitioner cannot avoid the kleiglight of
publicity. But what is important for the petitioner is that his constitutional rights are
not violated in the process of investigation. For this reason, we have warned the
respondent Ombudsman in our Decision to conduct petitioners preliminary
investigation in a circus-free atmosphere. Petitioner is represented by brilliant legal
minds who can protect his right as an accused.

VI

Recusation

Finally, petitioner prays that the members of this Honorable Court who went to
EDSA put on record who they were and consider recusing or inhibiting themselves,
particularly those who had ex-parte contacts with those exerting pressure on this
Honorable Court, as mentioned in our Motion of March 9, 2001, given the need for
the cold neutrality of impartial judges.[56]
We hold that the prayer lacks merit. There is no ground to inhibit the twelve (12)
members of the Court who merely accepted the invitation of the respondent Arroyo
to attend her oath taking. As mere spectators of a historic event, said members of
the Court did not prejudge the legal basis of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the
presidency at the time she took her oath. Indeed, the Court in its en banc
resolution on January 22, 2001, the first working day after respondent Arroyo took
her oath as President, held in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
Take Her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to
the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved
unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath
of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines,
at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that
may be filed by a proper party.

The above resolution was unanimously passed by the 15 members of the Court. It
should be clear from the resolution that the Court did not treat the letter of
respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as a
case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case, then
petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the legitimacy of the
claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the erroneous notion, the
Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative matter and emphasized that
it was without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed
by a proper party. In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued
another resolution to inform the parties and the public that it xxx did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that
neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution. Thus, there is no reason for petitioner to request for the said twelve (12)
justices to recuse themselves. To be sure, a motion to inhibit filed by a party after
losing his case is suspect and is regarded with general disfavor.
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of
them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the
judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence.[57] The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.[58]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-

15 and his Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.