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Economy The Real Face of

Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Post 9/11 Middle East C risis

London C onference on
Afghanistan
Review US at A C rossroads
Strategic Paradigm Shift in
The 9/11 incident restructured international politics and thereafter it occupied a South Asia
Global War and Peace
centre-stage in conducting interstate relations. Pakistan due to its geo-strategic THE MYTH OF INDIA AS A
location and having diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, who was immediately GREAT POWER

labelled as a sanctuary of the terrorists headed by Osama bin laden, Pakistan IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN | Grand
Strategy, Grand Failures
was bound to be frazzled in days ahead. C lash of C ivilization in Middle
East
THE Inundated PAKISTAN Asian Infrastructure
Wednesday, September 01, 2010
Investment Bank | A C hallenge
for Bretton Woods
Kashmir Plebiscite | in the Light
of Scottish Referendum

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It is often argued that Pakistan’s post 9/11 shift in foreign policy w as an impulsive decision that precluded a
comprehensive forethought before extending an unconditional cooperation w ith the US and making a U-Turn in our
approach tow ards the Taliban’s Government. The purpose of this article is to establish that the decision to join the W ar
on Terror (W OT) w as the most appropriate among the available options and w as generally, if not entirely, in National
Interest. How ever, how w e could have utilized the available opportunities to maximize our w in-set is open for further
debate and intellectual research.

“The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre & the Pentagon”, argued Mr. Abdul Sattar, the then Foreign Minister,
in his book ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ “triggered a transformation of world Politics.” Those never-imagined and
devastating attacks on the US mainland traumatized the entire country and filled her w ith anger and urge for revenge.
W ithin no time, almost all the countries of the w orld condemned the despicable acts of terrorism, including Pakistan. This
event restructured international politics because terrorism w as unanimously identified as the biggest threat to humanity
and thereafter it occupied a centre-stage in conducting interstate relations.
Due to its geo-strategic location, its contiguity w ith Afghanistan, and one of the three countries having diplomatic ties
w ith her, w ho w as immediately labelled as a sanctuary of the terrorists headed by Osama bin laden, Pakistan w as
bound to be frazzled in days ahead. W ithin few days, the clairvoyance of Pakistani foreign policy and security experts
w as justified w hen it w as given a proverbial Hobson’s choice in the w ords of President Bush:
“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”
Since there w as no middle w ay, therefore Pakistan had to choose either of the follow ing tw o choices:
1. To exigently Join the US in Principle and w orkout the modalities later on
2. To refuse to submit in clear defiance and be ready for a w ar
In his book, In The Line Of Fire, Former President Musharraf mentions that his first reaction after being threatened to ‘be
sent back to the stone-age’ w as to order our valiant armed forces to w ar-game the U.S but later on, w hen better sense
prevailed and the overw helming disproportionateness of pow er difference w as calculated, it w as decided to toe-in-line
w ith the onerous demands of the U.S. Those demands w ere as follow :
1. To stop Al Qaeda operations at its border
2. To give blanket overflight and landing rights for military operations
3. To provide Intelligence information
4. To provide territorial access to allied forces

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4. To provide territorial access to allied forces
5. To continue to publicly condemn the terrorists acts
6. To sever ties w ith the Taliban, if the refuse to cooperate
7. To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan
Before calculating, the costs and the benefits of any decision, keep in mind the follow ing details:
1. W ithin 24 hrs of the attacks, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 that authorized the use of
force against the perpetrators, organizers and the sponsors of those terrorist strikes.
2. NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Art 5 (Joint defence).
3. Pakistan’s economy w as in shambles and it w as on the verge of being declared, a failed state.
4. Different sanctions w ere already imposed on Pakistan such as:

a. Pressler Ammendment: Enacted in 1985 and imposed in 1990. The president had
the power to ease the sanctions and for that, he had to testify each year before
giving aid, in front of congress, that Pakistan was not pursing the Nuclear Weapons
which he did till 1990 (until the Afghan-war was ended).

b. Glenn Amendment: it w as for those Non-Nuclear member states that detonate nuclear devices; a modern version of
Pressler Ammendent.
c. Democracy Sanctions: For the Military coup in 1999
Now in this context, let us estimate the impact in case w e had gone for the second option i.e. the cost of non-
cooperation. In that case, w e had to pay the follow ing price:
1. The U.S might have bracketed Pakistan w ith the Taliban w hile declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.

2. Our territory w ould have surely been subjected to furious onslaughts and airstrikes to neutralize resistance under
the pretext of eliminating terrorist bases.
3. The Kashmiri freedom struggle might (read ‘surely’) have been labelled as a terrorist insurgency.
4. India w ould have been given a green signal to attack kahuta (KRL) as it had pondered such an attack in 1980s.
5. Even, despite all odds that w ere stacked against us, if w e had managed to put up a descent resistance and offered
aw e-inspiring sacrifices, w hat w ould have been the net result? W as that a justified cost of a decision based on idealism
and not on the principles of international law , exigencies of time, and pragmatism?
Before saying an obvious ‘No’ to this lopsided option that w as fraught w ith suicidal course, let us also examine the path
that w as selected. As far as the compliance of the demands of the U.S is concerned, Pakistan did not have to make
substantial concessions to the USA, as a couple of requests required no actions:

Pakistan had already condemned the terrorist attacks and it had not provided logistic
access to Bin Laden. Some misguided Imams in the border areas misled the fragile
youth, in the name or Religion, to join the Taliban but that was never approved or
encouraged by the Government.

Therefore, Pakistan had to make only a few concessions such as providing logistics etc that it gleefully did.
The then president successfully adopted public diplomacy by addressing the nation on 19th October in w hich he stated
that he w as taking this decision to forestall the possibility of earlier mentioned threats. In this w ay he managed to
contract the w in-set of US because he excluded the Missile and nuclear assets, and the Kashmir cause, from the agenda
of impending negotiations and included safe guard against the ‘external’ threat (read ‘Indian’) in it.
“Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary”
-President Musharraf
19th Sep 2001
The main benefits that this decision accrued w ere:
1. On 22 September, the Military and the Economic sanctions w ere lifted that w ere imposed under Pressler, Symington
and Glenn amendments and under Sec 508 of Foreign Assistance ACT.
2. All the outstanding debts w ere rescheduled and inflow of fresh economic aid, started w hich reinvigorated the
economy.
3. Pakistan started receiving new military hardw are including the F-16’s.
4. U.S generously donated during the post-quake crisis.

5. Pakistan’s standing at international forum w as improved and its role as a ‘Front line state in the W OT’ received w ide
spread accolades and kudos. After that enlightened decision, Pakistan w as visited by numerous Leaders of international
stature like UK’s Premier Mr. Tony Blair, Netherlands Premier Mr. W im Kokj, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and

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stature like UK’s Premier Mr. Tony Blair, Netherlands Premier Mr. W im Kokj, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and
Belgium Premier Mr. Guy Verhofstadt and many others, one on the heel of the other.
6. Bilateral relations w ith the U.S improved tremendously and on long term basis unlike on-again, off-again like
relations in the past.
7. The w orld became aw are of the sufferings of the people of Afghanistan.
“Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as a
‘frontline State’ in the war on terrorism, the
U.S, the EU and Japan dismantled nuclear
and democracy sanctions and resumed
assistance to Pakistan.”
-Dr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister in “Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy”

Therefore, after critically analyzing the pros

and cons of the decision it is clear that
Pakistan had timely made an apropos
decision. Though in our short but tremulous
history, our country has sw erved from one
crisis to another mostly due to unavoidable
circumstances but it has never faced such a
more excruciating dilemma. In retrospective analysis, it can be argued that had there been a mature and stable political
setup in Pakistan at that time, it w ould have enabled Pakistan to broaden its w in-set. The delay that is inherent in the
decision making process in a political setup w ould have w orked in favour of Pakistan and w ould have improved its
bargaining chips. Moreover, anfractuous events do happen but the most important thing is to w isely elicit the lessons
from such crises. It has almost become a fashion to vociferously deplore an ‘external factor’ (read ‘Amreeka’) for our ow n
shortcomings. It doesn’t mean that the cost that w e are paying as a nation in this w ar is equivalent to the benefits that
w e have reaped. Of course, the cost far outw eighs the benefits but instead of bursting into pointless polemics, w e have
to seek the reasons in visceral introspection.

Intelligent1pk@hotmail.com

Muhammad Azmat Farooq (CSP)

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