Case No. 2 The Diocese of Bacolod vs.

COMELEC (January 21, 2015)

Topic: Scope of Freedom of Expression

Facts: The petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to
the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)
Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team
Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay". Respondent Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra.

IssueS: 1. Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form or expression (protected speech)

2. Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, whether the
COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the same

Held:

1. Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are
fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not
speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate
telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right
to suffrage. This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all
deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The
expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.

2. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the

tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of
the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be
no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s
infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

Notes:

1. Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the

Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.

 No law. . .While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an
opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
 Shall be passed abridging. . .All regulations will have an impact directly or
indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech
should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary
and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a
compelling state interest clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test
depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society
framed by our Constitution.
 of expression. . . Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom
of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of
the press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression" was added
in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope.

2. On Communication and Speech

 Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.143
Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses
conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that such
actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the
audience so takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer
may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims
or opposing them with criticism or requests for justification."

 Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a

form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’"146 such that
"‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
 course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be
‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].

 The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of

speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction
itself as a symbolic manner of communication.