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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO


398 SCRA 567, 5 March 2003, EN BANC
(Appearance to establish age)

DOCTRINE:

A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence,


the same being addressed to the senses of the court.

FACTS:

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape


before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal
knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of age, a minor and against her will and
without her consent.

“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and
matter-of-fact manner in her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that
she was only three years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution
did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in
evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death.
The case was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death
upon Rullepa.

HELD:
YES. A person‘s appearance, where relevant,
is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, the
Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.

Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of
the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a)
and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof
of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative‘s
testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to
her true age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the
age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable
doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another
matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can
easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony
of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can
be imposed upon him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL ULZORON
R. No. 121979 March 2, 1998
(Absence of marks of physical violence)

DOCTRINE:

The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case


were manifested clearly not only in the victim’s testimony but also in the physical
evidence presented during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear
as well as the medico-legal report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more
eloquent than a hundred witnesses.

FACTS:

Samuel Ulzoron was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.

On the strength of the testimony of the complaining witness Emily Gabo,


the trial court convicted the accused. It found the latter’s testimony
straightforward and credible. It rationalized that she would not have filed her
complaint for rape if her accusations were not true, for to do so would only
expose herself to public shame or ridicule. No improper motive on her part to file
the case had been shown. The findings of the examining physician also lent
credence to her claim. On the other hand, the trial court found the defense of
the accused too weak, anemic.

Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is


inherently weak. Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for convicting him on the
basis of his defense. He argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances
made it more likely that Emily was involved in an adulterous relationship with
him. He also invites attention to the circumstance that the judge who wrote the
decision did not personally try the case hence appellant claims that the former
lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and their
witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant’s guilt was sufficiently established.


Whether or not the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not
personally try the case tainted his decision.

RULING:

YES. Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim that he was convicted because


of his weak defense, his conviction was actually founded on the overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution.

The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case


were manifested clearly not only in the victim’s testimony but also in the physical
evidence presented during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear
as well as the medico-legal report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more
eloquent than a hundred witnesses. The fact of carnal knowledge is not
disputed. It was positively established through the offended party’s own
testimony and corroborated by that of her examining physician.

Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following


the assault clearly established the truth of her charge that she was raped by
accused-appellant.

NO. The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not
heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his
decision. After all, he had the records of the case before him including the
transcript of stenographic notes. The validity of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided at the trial unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of the facts, and none exists in the present case.
The records amply support the factual findings of the trial court and its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
Abalos vs. CA
Dec. 22, 1999
(Absence of gun powder)

DOCTRINE:

Anent the paraffin test, it is true that it produced a negative result but
such fact does not Ipso facto merit A’s acquittal. The absence of powder burns
in a suspect’s hand is not conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun.

FACTS:

On 26 February 1993 an Information was filed before the Regional Trial


Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, charging petitioner Delfin Abalos with murder for
the killing of Liberato Damias. The Information alleged that the accused, using
an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, employing treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, shot and killed Liberato Damias. It further
alleged that Delfin Abalos should be considered a recidivist having been
previously convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.

The bereaved Veronica Bulatao (girlfriend of the victim) testified that she
had known petitioner Delfin Abalos for several years as they were neighbors,
their houses being only fifty (50) meters from each other. According to her,
Delfin was courting her since June 1992 but she jilted him since she was already
involved with the now deceased Liberato Damias. In fact, she said, Delfin was
enraged when she rejected him that he even threatened to kill her if she decided
to marry Liberato. She also testified that a few days before he shot Liberato
Delfin went to her house ostensively to watch television. But when she learned
that his real intention was to see her she told him not to visit her again.

Abalos was convicted of murdering Damias, who was shot. He was


convicted despite the negative result of the paraffin test conducted on him. He
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused should be acquitted.


HELD:

NO. A witness was able to identify A as the shooter. Anent the paraffin
test, it is true that it produced a negative result but such fact does not Ipso
facto merit A’s acquittal. The absence of powder burns in a suspect’s hand is not
conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates can
easily be removed by the simple act of washing one’s hand.

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