Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DIGESTED CASES
III. VENUE
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint was correctly dismissed due to improper
venue.
HELD:
The Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. The order dismissing the
Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI
has not yet attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal.
Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the
Republic’s complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that
the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the
instant case." Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial
Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides
that a petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court
of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or
to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that
where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed
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in the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any
portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located,
at the option of the petitioner. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil
forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to
an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located.
Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is
situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR).
Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in
any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of
the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil
forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.
(2)
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
In the instant case, no restrictive words like were stated in the contract.
It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive
venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment
contract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that while
they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule
4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement
or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They
are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties
were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly
and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them. Pacific
Consultants contend that Schonfeld should have filed his Complaint
in his place of permanent residence, or where Pacific Consultant holds
its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was
signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible
venues where Schonfeld could have filed his complaint, however,
Pacific Consultants itself admitted that the provision on venue in the
employment contract is indeed merely permissive.
(3)
SPOUSES FELIPE VS FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC
G.R. No. 150470 August 6, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
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Corporation, (FERC) et al. with the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna and docketed as Civil Case No. B-3973.
On 25 June 1993, Felipe Layos along with his wife and other
individuals filed another case for Injunction and Damages with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. B-4133, this time against the
correct party, FEGDI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC of San Pedro Laguna is the proper venue for the
reconstitution of the Title.
HELD:
The principal parties in both cases are the Spouses Layos, on one
hand, and La Paz and FEGDI, on the other. The Spouses Layos and
La Paz both claim title to the subject property, while FEGDI is the
partner of La Paz in a joint venture to develop the said property. There
may be other parties named in both cases, but these parties only
derive their rights from the principal parties.
Resultantly, the San Pedro RTC is left with no other option but to order
the dismissal of LRC Case No. B-1758.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly
issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon
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the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties
without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of
Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of annulment and/or
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely
by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence
that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have
no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered
by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered
owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles
covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as
anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land
to two different holders thereof.
It should be pointed out that the validity of the title to the subject
property herein had already been squarely put in issue in Civil Case
No. B-4194, the quieting of title case, instituted by the Spouses Layos
before the Bian RTC, and resolved definitively and with finality when
appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, in favor
of La Paz. It is a ruling irrefragably beyond the jurisdiction of the San
Pedro RTC to overturn or contradict in LRC Case No. B-1784, the
reconstitution case.
The prayer of the Spouses Layos to have LRC Case No. B-1784
remanded to the San Pedro RTC for trial, if granted, would only be
farcical. Should the San Pedro RTC subsequently grant the
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 after the trial, it would only be an empty
victory for the Spouses Layos, for a reconstituted certificate of title,
like the original certificate, by itself does not vest ownership of the land
or estate covered thereby.[56] The valid title to the subject property
would still be that of La Paz, as determined by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, over which the reconstituted certificate of title
of the Spouses Layos cannot prevail. The reconstituted OCT No. 239
would be a mere piece of paper with actually no title to evidence
ownership.
(4)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION VS LIM
G.R. No. 154338 October 5, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
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demands from Universal Robina. This prompted the latter to file with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint against Lim for a
sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing the complaint motuproprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an
amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper
venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The
trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended complaint.
Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to
file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon
motion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the
former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still
unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order directing
Universal Robina to file memorandum of authorities on whether it can
file a complaint in Quezon City. Still undecided concerning the venue
of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined
in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
Rules of Court explicitly provide that improper venue not impleaded in
the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a
court may not dismiss an action motuproprio on the ground of
improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may
dismiss an action motuproprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial
court may not motuproprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus: Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely
the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
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(5)
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD VS. DAKILA TRADING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172242 August 14, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
(6)
MARCOS-ARANATE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008
VELASCO, JR, J.:
FACTS:
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mfr) CA set aside RTC orders and dismissed the amended complaints
of M-A. M-A went to SC under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
HELD:
(7)
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC VS. CRUZ
G.R. No. 171456 August 9, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
RTC grants the motion to dismiss, hence this present petition with UHI
contending that nowhere in the agreement is there mention of FPC
and USWCI, and neither are parties thereto, hence, and they cannot
be bound to the stipulation on “exclusive venue”
ISSUE:
HELD:
(8)
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., VS SPOUSES BENEDICTO
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
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FACTS:
On petition for certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that “a suit
for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in
the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to
enforce the mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon
an obligation of the mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency which is
created by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of
deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.”. Thus the action should have
been filed before the RTC of Manila.
ISSUE:
HELD:
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We grant the petition for review on certiorari. It is basic that the venue
of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature
have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence.
According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action.
(9)
GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
The RTC ruled that Elise, who by that time have already attained legal
age, should be granted letters of administration over the estate of
Eliseo. It brushed aside Amelia’s objections over the venue of the
petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA denied Amelia’s
petition, ruling that venue was properly laid as it was shown that Eliseo
resided and established residence at Las Pinas City from 1975 up to
his death in 1992.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC
of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
(10)
OPPEN VS COMPAS
G.R. No. 203969 October 21, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
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On September 28, 2005, Alberto filed a petition for cancellation of TCT
Nos. S-100612 and S-100613 before the RTC of Las Pinas
City. When he learned that TCT No. 95712 had been issued in lieu of
TCT No. S-100612, Alberto filed his Motion to Admit Amended
Petition. EOI filed two motions to dismiss the Amended Petition of
Alberto, the first grounded on alleged failure to state a cause of action,
which was denied by the RTC on the ground that Alberto can enforce
his lien on the property under EOI’s name.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The principal issue in this case is whether the RTC has jurisdiction to
hear the amended petition of EOI. Petitioner EOI contends that, by
virtue of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, it is the court where the original
registration was filed and issued which has jurisdiction over the
petition because it is a petition after the original registration. Thus, the
amended petition of Compas should have been filed with the court
which heard the proceedings for original registration docketed as LRC
No. N-1238.
The Court’s Ruling is that it is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts
is conferred by law.5 The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land
registration cases is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It
expressly provides:
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Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders,
and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days
from the filing or issuance thereof.
A closer scrutiny of Section 2 and Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 will
show that the former pertains to the grant of jurisdiction to regional
trial courts while the latter refers to the venue where the action is to
be instituted. EOI’s second motion to dismiss was supposed to be on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It, however, alleges that the petition
should not have been filed with the RTC of Las Piñas under LRC Case
No. LP-05-0089, but with the RTC where the original title was filed and
issued under LRC No. N-1238. Based on the allegations thereof, it
appeared that the second motion was invoking the ground of improper
venue.
Granting it to be so, the second motion to dismiss was rightfully denied
as EOI waived the ground of improper venue after it had filed its first
motion to dismiss pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule. Section 8 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a motion attacking
a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding shall include all objections
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.
In Spouses de Guzman v. Spouses Ochoa,9 a second motion to
dismiss on the ground of defective verification was denied pursuant to
the Omnibus Motion Rule. The Court held:
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judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription.
(11)
ANG VS SPOUSES ALAN
G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Ang owe the other spouses Ang the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Dollars (US300,00.00). The Lender (Ang, the
lenders) reside in the United States, so when The Borrower (Ang, the
borrowers) failed to pay despite being sent a demand a demand letter,
The Lenders executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating
The Attorney as their duly designated representative to file the case
for collection of money against The Borrowers, who reside in Bacolod
City.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denied the Motion to Dismiss,
holding that since the representative holds office in Quezon City, the
case should be filed in Quezon City. Despite filing a motion for
reconsideration, the RTC denied t again. The Borrowers elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, who sided with them, citing the rules on
venue in civil action, and said that The Attorney, being a mere
representative, is not the real party in interest. The Lender is the real
party in interest, therefore, the matter of venue should be a choice
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between the residence of The Lender or The Borrower. Since The
Lender is not a resider of the Philippines, there is no other choice but
to file the case in Bacolod City, since it is where The Borrower reside.
ISSUE:
HELD:
(12)
SPOUSES RENATO VS LANTION
G G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from Planters
Development Bank (PDB) and executed mortgages and promissory
notes to cover the loans. The Lantins defaulted on their loans so PDB
foreclosed on the properties to partially satisfy the Lantin’s debt.
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damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas against
PDB.
According to the Lantins, the REM only covered the peso loans which
they have already paid off, and not the dollar loans. PDB filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of improper venue since according to their
agreement the venue of any suit should be Metro Manila. Judge(Jane
Aurora) Lantion dismissed the complaint because of improper venue.
Lantins asked for a reconsideration which was denied. Lantins claim
that since they are assailing the validity of the loan documents, then
the venue stipulated stating at Metro Manila should be the venue of
any suit is also in question. They also argue that the venue stipulated
in covered by Section 4(b) of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive
venue stipulation under Sec. 4 (b) of the Rules.
HELD:
Under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties,
before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action
however is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation
is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Under the agreement, it is clear that the Lantins and PDB agreed that
any suit arising from the contract should be brought exclusively in the
proper Makati Court (or to any court that PDB wants to), as the Lantins
had waived the right to choose the venue of the action. The Lantins
only assailed of the coverage of the loan agreement and the validity
of the loan agreement itself, since the issues of whether these also
cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan documents, the
stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.
(13)
LEGASPI VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 160653, July 23, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA plainly erred and acted contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence in ordering the dismissal of civil case before the
court a quo considering that venue is properly laid.
HELD:
(14)
AUCTION IN MALINTA INC., VS LUYABEN
G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
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Whether the stipulation in the parties' Bidders Application and
Registration Bidding Agreement effectively limited the venue of the
instant case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City.
HELD:
(15)
PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT AND DEV'T CORP VS UNION BANK
G.R. No. 179018, April 17, 2013
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
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ISSUE:
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. Issues raised for the first time in a
motion for reconsideration before this Court are deemed waived,
because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.7
Nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration
or modification of our 18 June 2012 Decision.
(16)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping.
What the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the
trial court.
HELD:
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
(17)
PBCOM VS. LIM AND CALDERON
GR. No. 158138, April 12, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
The Court in the affirmative; Since the cases pertaining to both causes
of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue,
petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically provides
otherwise, or when — before the filing of the action — the contracting
parties agree in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not
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jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to
venue does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless
qualifying or restrictive words are used in the agreement.
(18)
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM
G.R. No. 154338, October 5, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined
in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the
defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
Rules of Court explicitly provide that improper venue not impleaded in
the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a
court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of
improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may
dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial
court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue, thus: Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely
the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
(19)
UNION BANK VS MAUNLAD HOMES, INC
G.R. No. 190071 August 15, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
FACTS:
Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful
detainer action which was filed in Makati City while the contested
property is located in Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes claimed that the unlawful detainer
action should have been filed with the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city where the real property involved is situated. Union
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Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint with the
MeTC of Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract which
states that "the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in
connection with this Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City
ISSUE:
HELD:
(20)
DOLOT VS PAJE
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers
of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon, against Global Summit Mines Dev't Corp, for its mining
operation.
n dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order
dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial
Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the environmental courts "to try
and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within
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their respective territorial jurisdictions." Thus, it ruled that its territorial
jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the
neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and
Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and
decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal
court
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the
RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically
states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed
with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." In this case, it appears
that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been
filed in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the outright
dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.
Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature
where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.
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