FACTS
MADEJA vs Judge CARO and JAPZON
Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy. The complaining witness(Carmen Madeja)
who is the widow of the deceased, reserved her right to file a
separate action for damages. While the criminal case is still
pending, Carmen sued Dr. Japzon for damages in the same court
alleging that her husband died because of Dr. Japzon’s gross
negligence.
The CFI(RTC) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and said
that the instant civil action may be instituted only after final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action invoking Sec.
3A of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: “Sec. 3. Other civil actions
arising from offenses. XXX (a) Criminal and civil actions arising
from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action. ”
Carmen then filed this petition before the SC which seeks to set
aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not the civil action
against Dr. Japzon may proceed
independently of the criminal action
against her.
RULING
YES. SC granted Carmen’s petition stating Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision.
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
SC in this case also cited Carandang vs. Santiago: The Article in question uses the
words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so
that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart
to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general
and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries'
should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. Thus, if the intent has
been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states,
the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death,"
Therefore, the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of
the criminal action against her.
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO Whether or not National Coconut NO. NCC is not guilty of any offense at all as it entered the premises and occupied it
DE FILIPINAS vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION Corporation has an obligation to pay with the permission of the entity which had legal control and administration, the
rentals to Sagrada Orden for its USAPC and neither there was negligence on its part. Obligations must arise from any
On Jan 4, 1942(during Japanese occupation), Taiwan Tekkosho (a
occupation of the property of the of the four sources of obligations: Law, Contract, Quasi-contract, crime or
Japanese corporation) acquired the plaintiff’s property (land
latter since August 1946. Negligence. (Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code) There was no privity of contract or
with warehouse in Pandacan, Manila). On April 4, 1946, after the
obligation between USAPC and Taiwan Tekkosho, which secured the possession of
liberation, US took control and custody of the said land under
the property by the use of duress. US APC acquired the control and administration of
Sec. 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act(TEA) . In same year,
the property not as a successor to Tekkosho but by express provision of the law,
Copra Export Management Company occupied the property
TEA. Neither is it a trustee of the former owner but a trustee of the then
under custodianship agreement with the US Alien Property
Government of the US. Even if NCC were to assumed to be liable to the Alien
Custodian. In August 1946, when the Copra Export Management
Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of
Co. vacated the property, the National Coconut Corporation
Sagrada Orden but to the United States Government.
(NCC), the defendant, occupied it next. Sagrada Orden files
claims on the property with the CFI of Manila and against the Also, there was no agreement between the APC and the NCC for the latter to pay
Philippine Alien Property Administrator seeking to annul the sale rentals on the property. CEMC, which preceded the NCC, does not appear to have
of the property to Taiwan Tekkosho as it was executed under paid rentals as it occupied it in a “custodianship agreement”. TEA was purely a
duress. Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene but measure of conversation, hence, it is very unlikely that rentals were demanded for
the case did not come for trial as the parties presented a joint the use of the property.
petition for which the CFI rendered judgment releasing the
Claim for rentals may not also be predicated on any negligence or offense of NCC or
defendant and the intervenor from the liability but reversing to
any contract, express or implied, because USAPC was neither a trustee nor a privy to
the Sagrada right to recover from NCC reasonable rentals for the
the obligations of the Tekkosho – title is based by legal provision as that of
use and occupation of the premises. Plaintiff files action in CFI to
authority to seizure enemy property. NCC entered without any expectation of
recover the rentals from August, 1946, the date when the
liability of such use and occupation, thus, it is only fair and just it may not be held
defendant began to occupy the premises.NCC does not contest
liable.
its liability for the rentals but resists the claim prior to the date
of judgment in civil case interposing that it occupied the
property in good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay
rentals for the use and occupation of the warehouse. CFI
rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover from the
defendant P3,000 a month, as reasonable rentals, from August,
1946, to the date the defendant vacates the premises and that
plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese
purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien Property
Administration never acquired any right to the property, but
that it held the same in trust until the determination as to
whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen. The judgment is
appealed to the SC.
MA-AO SUGAR vs BARRIOS
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the
respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint
of the other respondents which seek to recover amounts of
money due then from the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.(herein
petitioner) before the outbreak of the war and for prohibition to
forbid the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
on the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to
try and decide it. The ground for the motion to dismiss filed by
the Ma-ao Central is that the complaint of the respondents does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because
the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the
defendants' alleged debts until after the termination or legal
cessation of the moratorium provided in Executive Order No. 32,
the pertinent part of which reads as follows:
III. DEBT MORATORIUM
1. Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and
other monetary obligations, entered into in any area after
declaration by Presidential Proclamation, that such area has
been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily
suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.
-CFI dismissed motion to dismiss filed by Ma-ao Sugar Central
prompting the latter to file this petition for certiorari
Whether or not the complaint of the
plaintiffs-respondents states no
cause of action and the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed in the
present case do not entitle the
petitioner to said reliefs.
The complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent in the court below does NOT state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; its essential elements
are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the present case the
complaint alleges the legal right of the plaintiffs to be paid the amount due them
from the defendant, as well as the correlative obligation of the defendant to pay said
debts to the plaintiffs when it becomes due and payable; but not the omission on
the part of the defendant to pay in violation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be
paid, because according to the said provision of EO No. 32, said debts are not yet
payable or their payment can not be enforced until the legal cessation of the
moratorium, which is still in force. As the defendant herein petitioner is not yet in
default, plaintiffs have no cause of action against him. While the debt moratorium is
in force the defendant-petitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the
latter can not file a suit against him in the courts of justice requiring him to recognize
his debts to the plaintiffs and to pay them (after the moratorium) not only the
amount of the indebtedness, but the legal interest thereon from the filling of the
complaint, the attorney's fees of ten per centum of the amounts due, and the costs
of the suits. There is no such action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or
recognize his debt which is not yet payable. To allow the plaintiffs' action and grant
the relief demanded in the complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay
legal interest of the amount claimed from filing of the said complaint, as well as the
attorney's fees of 10 per cent of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs of
the suit, as if the defendants' obligations to the plaintiffs were already payable and
he had failed or refused to pay them. However, after stating SC’s opinion that the
complaint of the private respondents states no cause of action, SC has to hold that
the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case
do NOT entitle the petitioner(Ma-ao Co.) to said reliefs since SC, in special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition, can only determine the question whether or
not the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its
discretion in doing the act complained of. SC cannot correct errors committed by the
lower courts in their judgments, decrees or orders rendered in the exercise of their
jurisdiction.
SWAGMAN HOTELS & TRAVEL, INC. vs CA & NEAL B. CHRISTIAN Whether or not a complaint No. When the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial
that lacks a cause of action at the court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the
Swagman Hotel, Inc., through its representatives, obtained from
time it was filed be cured by the petitioner had not violated the terms of the 3 promissory notes as modified by the
Neal(reespondent) a loan which is payable after 3 years with
accrual of a cause of action during renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent
interest per annum payable every 3 months evidenced by three
the pendency of the case had no right to maintain an action in court and case should be dismissed.SC cited
promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14
Surigao Mines vs Harris stating “Jurisprudence states that unless the plaintiff has a
July 1997. After a year, Swagman suffered business reverses
valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
prompting it to renegotiate the terms of the loan. In Dec.1997, it
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is
was agreed that Neal waives the payment of interests and that
pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such
the principal loan shall be paid every month instead of quarterly.
after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.”
After the renegotiation, the cash receipts acknowledged by the
parties state that the payments therein represent “Capital
Investment” and “Capital Repayment”. Barely 2 years after, Neal
sent a letter informing the Swagman that he is terminating the
loans and demanding that the total amount of the loan and
unpaid interests be paid. In Feb.2, 1997, Neal filed a complaint
for sum of money and damages. Swagman answered that the
complaint is dismissible for lack of cause of action since the loan
is not yet due and demandable and that there was novation in
the contract. RTC held in favor of Neal, reasoning that although
there was no cause of action at the filing of the complaint, the
debt has already matured during the days the hearings were
held, thus making it due as of date.

-Petitioner appealed to CA. CA denied petitioner’s appeal,

affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.

-Petitioner then filed MR to CA. CA still denied MR.

-Petitioner appealed to SC

MARIA ESPAÑOL vs. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Maria Español was the widow of the veteran German Español,
who died in the service during World War II. She applied for
monthly pension under R.A. No. 65 with the PVA (now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office). Her application was approved and she
with her minor children received their monthly pension. But on
WON the action of Maria Espanol to
compel restoration of her monthly
pension and that of her children,
effective from the date of
cancellation on November 1, 1951,
has already prescribed.
No. The contention of PVA that the action of Español to compel the restoration of
her monthly pension and that of her children, effective from the date of cancellation
on November 1, 1951, has already prescribed, inasmuch as the same was filed more
than 10 years from the date of cancellation, is without merit.
Article 1144 of the NCC provides that actions based on an obligation created by law
shall be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. It is
important to reckon the date, when the right of action accrues, as the same is the
November 1, 1951, the PVA, because of its administrative policy, beginning for counting the 10-year prescriptive period.
providing that those veterans’ beneficiaries pensions from the
U.S. Veterans Administration are no longer entitled to receive
pension from the PVA, cancelled Español's monthly pension and The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
that of her then minor children. On February 25, 1974, or after elements, namely:
more than 22 years from the date when her monthly pension
was cancelled, petitioner filed with CFI(Manila) mandamus a)a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
against PVA for the restoration and continued payment of her or is created;
monthly pension including that of her dependents effective from
b)an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
the date of cancellation.
c)an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff (Cole vs. Vda. de Gregorio, 116 SCRA 670 [1982];
After PVA filed its answer, in which factual issues were admitted,
It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
judgment on the pleadings was rendered by the CFI, on January
cause of action has arisen. Español cannot be said to have a cause of action, in
14, 1975 ordering the restoration of petitioner's monthly
compelling appellant to continue paying her monthly pension on November 1, 1951,
pension plus whatever increase are allowed by law except that
because PVA's act of cancellation, being pursuant to an administrative policy, cannot
of petitioner's children who are now above 18 years of age.
be considered a violation of appellee's right to receive her monthly pension.

PVA appealed to CA, which elevated the appeal to SC, as only

It is elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and
errors or questions of law were involved.
policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, are entitled to great respect and have in
their favor a presumption of legality. Thus, PVA's act of cancelling Español's monthly
pension being presumed legal and valid, cannot be taken as a violation of appellee's
right to receive her monthly pension under R.A. No. 65.

In the case of Del Mar vs. The PVA (51 SCRA 340 [1973]), this Court did not consider
prescription in favor of PVA, even though the action of Del Mar was filed on June 20,
1964 or more than 10 years from the cancellation of his monthly pension in March,
1950; because the action of Del Mar was basically to declare the questioned
administrative policy invalid, which action does not prescribe.

It is only when this Court declared invalid the questioned administrative policy in the
 case of Del Mar vs. The PVA, promulgated on June 27, 1973, can the appellee be said
to have a cause of action to compel appellant to resume her monthly pension;
because it is at that point in time, when the presumption of legality of the
questioned administrative policy had been rebutted and thus it can be said with
certainty that appellant's act was in violation of appellee's right to receive her
monthly pension.

The 10-year prescriptive period, therefore, should be counted from June 27, 1973
when the case of Del Mar vs. The PVA, was promulgated, and not from November 1,
1951, the date of cancellation by appellant of appellee's pension. The action of
Español, which was brought on February 25, 1974, is therefore well within the
10-year prescriptive period.

DECISION OF THE CFI DATED JANUARY 14, 1975 IS AMENDED, AND APPELLANT,
CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD, PVA IS ORDERED TO:

1.PAY APPELLEE, MARIA U. ESPAÑOL, HER MONTHLY PENSION PLUS WHATEVER

INCREMENTS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1, 1951,
AS LONG AS SHE QUALIFIES; AND

2. PAY APPELLEE'S QUALIFIED MINOR CHILDREN THEIR MONTHLY DEPENDENT'S

PENSION PLUS WHATEVER INCREMENTS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW,
EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1, 1951.

ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK(ASB) vs FURIGAY Has the action for rescission already NO. In relation to an action for rescission, it should be noted that the remedy of
prescribed? rescission is subsidiary in nature; it cannot be instituted except when the party
ASB filed complaint for sum of money and damages with
suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same. Article
application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc.
1389 of the Civil Code simply provides that, The action to claim rescission must be
its president, his wife, and a "John Doe." The RTC rendered its
commenced within four years. Since this provision of law is silent as to when the
Decision in favor of ASB. While Civil Case No. 99-865 was
prescriptive period would commence, the general rule, i.e, from the moment the
pending, respondent spouses donated their registered
cause of action accrues, therefore, applies. It is thus apparent that an action to
properties in Alaminos, Pangasinan, to their minor children,
rescind or an accion pauliana must be of last resort, availed of only after all other
respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay. Claiming
that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of
creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of
Donation, Title and Damages against the respondent spouses
and their children. The RTC issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss filed by respondent on the ground that the ASB’s
action for rescission had already prescribed. ASB filed the action
for rescission only on October 14, 2005 or after 4 years from the
time the Deed of Donation was registered in the Register of
Deeds of Alaminos on April 4, 2001. The four-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the
deed of donation and not from the date of the actual discovery
of the registration of the deeds of donation because registration
is considered notice to the whole world. CA found that the
action of ASB had not yet prescribed, but was premature. The CA
noted that ASB failed to allege in its complaint that it had
resorted to all legal remedies to obtain satisfaction of its claim.
Thus, ASB appealed to SC (Rule 45).
legal remedies have been exhausted and have been proven futile. x x x Indeed, an
accion pauliana presupposes a judgment and the issuance by the trial court of a writ
of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment and the failure of the Sheriff to
enforce and satisfy the judgment of the court. It presupposes that the creditor has
exhausted the property of the debtor. The date of the decision of the trial court
against the debtor is immaterial. What is important is that the credit of the plaintiff
antedates that of the fraudulent alienation by the debtor of his property. After all,
the decision of the trial court against the debtor will retroact to the time when the
debtor became indebted to the creditor. From the foregoing, it is clear that the
four-year prescriptive period commences to run neither from the date of the
registration of the deed sought to be rescinded nor from the date the trial court
rendered its decision but from the day it has become clear that there are no other
legal remedies by which the creditor can satisfy his claims.
PETITION DENIED.