Republic of the Philippines This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it
SUPREME COURT introduces in General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years
old, by striking him with automobile that he was driving, the
herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by
reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and
one day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court
alleging that the court below committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of
the fact that the appellant was being prosecuted in
conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine
Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and
gave no jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the
complaint after the presentation of the evidence in the
case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No.
2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in
the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a
prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over
the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of
the crime charged and in sentencing him to one year
and one day of prison correccional and to the
payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we
have examined the record and find that the conclusions of the
trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are
sufficiently sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles
an hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact
that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing
on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side
where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the
precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his
machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under
the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order
to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately
did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo
who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there
cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen
that they deal with the fundamental questions as to whether or
not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present
case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend
General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.
Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the
name of the United States against the persons
charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of
the Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this information,
contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders,
Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen hundred, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses
shall be in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands against the persons
charged with the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the
hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and
of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.
It would probably never be understood by the public.
(M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4
L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United
States, each States, each State has the authority, under its
police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the
rules of criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a
large measure of discretion in creating and defining
criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a
denial of the equal protection of the laws if it
prescribes a different procedure in the case of
persons in like situation. Subject to this limitation,
however, the legislature has large measure of
discretion in prescribing the modes of criminal
procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs.
Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L.
ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218
U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs.
Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress
possesses over the territories and possessions of the
United States may be exercised by that body itself, or,
as is much more often the case, it may be delegated
to a local agency, such as a legislature, the
organization of which proceeds upon much the same
lines as in the several States or in Congress, which is
often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited
by the Organic Act; but within the scope of such act is
has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general,
Page 1 of 119
 to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of
the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived
from Congress. By act of Congress their power
extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States;" and this includes the power to define
and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of
the army of occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature,
thought it convenient to establish new rules of procedure in
criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the
preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil
liberties of the inhabitants of these Islands, the
criminal code of procedure now in force therein is
hereby amended in certain of its important provisions,
as indicated in the following enumerated sections.
(Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and
its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of law in
criminal matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and
effect of law in criminal matters in the Philippine
Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900, but
existing laws on the same subjects shall remain valid
except in so far as hereinafter modified or repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of
this General Order do not the nature of constitutional law either
by reason of its character or by reason of the authority that
enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because
this order was made its own by the Congress of the United
States for, as a mater of fact, this body never adopted it as a
law of its own creation either before the promulgation of Act
No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character
of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-
evident, even if the question is considered only on principle.
Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the
subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military
Government as a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines
the legislative branch of our government has undergone
transformations and has developed itself until it attained its
present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the
army of occupation which, in accordance with international law
and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in fact
did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of
President McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec.
1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the
Military Government were transferred to the Philippine
Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was
created and it functioned as a colegislative body with the
Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of the provisions of
sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known
as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the
Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House
of Representatives, and thus was formed the present
Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the
aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that
amends General Orders No. 58. The Philippine Commission, at
various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among
which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary
investigation, Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act
No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of the
peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the
enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the
Legislature had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by
the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to the
Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace
courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of
accused persons from the information in order to be utilized as
state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine
Commission as well as by our present Legislature are perfectly
within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as
the successors of the Military Government that promulgated
General Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present
Legislature had, and had, the power to enact and amend laws.
(U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on
criminal matters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of
the Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall
have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by
due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any
law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as
it may from time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attributed of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also
true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in
the supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to
subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. As we
have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures have the
power to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by
the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections
7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial
governments are local agencies of the Federal Government,
wherein sovereignty resides; and when the territorial
government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public
crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the
supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of
the several States of the Union and incorporated territories like
Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with the
Philippines, which is an organized territory though not
incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no
demonstration. As a matter of fact, the crimes committed within
our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58
was amended, were prosecuted and punished in this
jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the
repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the
sovereign authority of the United States, whose name appears
as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in other
judicial papers and notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form
1 of section 784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal
causes the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction
established its use; and in notarial matters its use is provided
by section 127 of Act No. 496. This long continued practice in
criminal matters and the legal provision relating to civil cases
and notarial acts have not been amended by any law, much
less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the
Philippines prescribing the name to be used as party plaintiff in
criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet
undetermined and in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion,
responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our
Page 2 of 119
constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People
of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal
prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective
constitutional charters of the States of the Union and
incorporated territories — a situation which must not be
understood as depriving the Government of the Philippines of
its power, however delegated, to prosecute public crimes. The
fact is undeniable that the present government of the
Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is
autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches
all judicial actions, the case at bar being one of them; as an
example of such autonomy, this Government, the same as that
of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y
Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
352) cannot be sued without its consent. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon
& Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid down in
these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality in
the Government of the Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to
shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name unless
it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently
authoritative in law, to give that government the right to
prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within
its territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form
of the complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as
long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by
like provisions in the constitutions of the various
states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a
constitutional provision to prescribe the form of the
indictment or information, and such form may omit
averments regarded as necessary at common law.
(22 Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a
posteriori by the important reason disclosed by the following
fact — that the Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886.
Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the
Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19, provide that all the
laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines or its
Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United
States, which body reserves the right and power to annul them.
And presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions of these
laws have been complied with, it is undisputed that the
Congress of the United States did not annul any of those acts
already adverted to — Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine
Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one now in question No.
2886 (of the present Legislature) — all of which were
amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under
discussion (No. 2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and
the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920.
The silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of
the said General Order must be considered as an act of
approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any
territorial legislation the reasonable inference is that it
approves such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs.
Englebrcht, 13 Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L.
ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32
L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the
mention of the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in
the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the same
is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to
in the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express
statutory or constitutional provision, show by its title or
by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the
prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the
state, the commonwealth, or the people of the state,
according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions;
but omissions or defects in this respect may be
supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and
the omissions of such a recital or defects therein,
even when required by the constitution or by statute,
is a defect of form within a statute requiring
exceptions for defect of form to be made before trial.
(23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders
No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the
same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said
Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional
provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the
errors assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant
being furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment
of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a
policeman of the municipality of Balanga, went by order of his
chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game which,
according to the information lodged, was being conducted in
that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players,
perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away;
however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there
found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low
table. After a search of the premises he also found thereon
a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding
that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no
material proof that the game was being played, he refrained
from arresting them, and on leaving the place only arrested
Francisco Daro, who had remained there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman
presented a memorandum containing the following statement:
"In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized
a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw
the two cabecillas escape."
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22,
1915, filed a complaint in the court of justice of the peace
charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having
gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5.
As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but
were afterwards admitted to bail.
Page 3 of 119
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The
other two accused, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo,
pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of police
presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman
Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date
mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to
raid a jueteng game, but that before they arrived there they
saw from afar that some persons started to run toward the hills;
that when witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot
they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table
caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being carried
on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lot
a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused
Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they see them run;
and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter
were the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from
information given him by an unknown person. In view of this
testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of the
other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the
defendants Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and
sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court
the policeman Andres Pablo had an interview and conference
with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of Valentin
Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed not to testify
against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through
Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary
investigation the provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging
Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the provisions of
section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract from the
complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the
municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres
Pablo, during the hearing in the justice of the peace
court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787,
entitled the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and
Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance
No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga, did, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in legal
form before the justice of the peace court as follow:
`We did not there overtake the accused Antonio
Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see
them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as
the accused well knew that it was, and material to the
decision of the said criminal cause No. 787, United
States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An
act committed with violation of law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court
rendered judgment therein sentencing the defendant to the
penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and,
in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was also
disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from
testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said
disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he
appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the
policemen Andres Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the
place where the jueteng was being played, they found the
defendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the
hearing of the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi
and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together
with witness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they
held a conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of
the peace court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement made
between himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo,
who promised him that they would support his family during the
time he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not
know that they were gamblers, because he did not find them in
the place where the game was in progress, but that when
witness was being taken to the municipal building by the
policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run
away and whom Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and
further stated that, on the arrival of the policemen who made
the arrest and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he
succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a
long time and could have arrested him had he wished to do so;
that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and
Dato, did in fact meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which
occasion they agreed that they would give the policemen
Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and Rodrigo were
excluded from the charge; and that only P15 was delivered to
the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was
corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about what
amount of money he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his
being asked by the justice of the peace how he could have
seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he
did not see them at the place where the game was being
conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for he
only found the table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco
Dato; that he did not surprise the game because the players
ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteen
minutes' search, he found only the tambiolo and the bolas; that
on arriving at the place where the game was played, they
found only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street, and
as Dato had already gone away, witness' companion, the
policeman Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after
him; and that he found the tambiolo at a distance of about 6
meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant
Andres Pablo, who pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under
oath in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in
saying he had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where, according to the
complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and
where the defendant and his companion, the policeman Tomas
de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the
game of jueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did not
them and did overtake them while they were still in the place
where the game was being played. But notwithstanding his
having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause
prosecuted against these men and another for gambling, he
stated that he had not seen them there, knowing that he was
not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had taken, and
he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement
with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a
bribe of P15 which he had received in payment for his false
testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the
assertion that the policeman Andres Pablo undertook to
exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge
and from his testimony in consideration for P15 which he
received through Gregorio Ganzon.
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was
afterwards convicted under Act No. 1697, which (according to
the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that
are already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions
contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to
false testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article
of the Administrative Code, or Act No. 2657, there was
repealed, among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said
Act No. 1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the
said Administrative Code does not say under what other penal
law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of
perjury, shall be punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of
false testimony go unpunished, and is there no penal sanction
whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be freely
perverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the very
Page 4 of 119
reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment, may
also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocent
person? If all this is not possible and is not right before the law
and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must
be acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the
crime of perjury or of false testimony — a crime which can
produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and
cause infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of
the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign
power instinctively charged by the common will of the members
of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of
every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or
challenged, as the necessity for its existence has been
recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the
criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel,
barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and
inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the
imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole
human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves,
who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as
interpreted by this court in its decisions, was deemed to have
repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating
to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not
expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the
said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing
Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned
articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the
legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect
to the complete or partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal
Code, in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act
No. 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is
imperative that society punish those of its members who are
guilty of perjury or false testimony, and it cannot be conceived
that these crimes should go unpunished or be freely committed
without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there
must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that
punishes perjury or false testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false
testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of
false testimony has been punished under the said articles of
the said Code, which as we have already said, have not been
specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its
enactment, have not been applied, by the mere interpretation
given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the
moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, the
needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles
318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the
Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act relating to
perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the
Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes
applicable to the crime of false testimony or perjury is in
harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of
the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by
other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and
the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for
the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in
numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on
different occasions, and even though they were
repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the
decree which I issued in conformity with them
although they were not expressly designated. The
council will be informed thereof and will take account
of the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are
in force and are properly applicable to crimes of false
testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the
case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven
that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause
prosecuted for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the
purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the
crime being committed through bribery, for it was also proved
that the defendant Pablo received P15 in order that he should
make no mention of the said two gamblers in his sworn
testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold
that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there
concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No.
3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to
offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the
defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision
correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment
appealed from and sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of
two years four months and one day of prision correccional, to
pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall
not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay
the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan
de Oro City), and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A.
Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City
for petitioner.
Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa
cases.
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar
Puerto with estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for
having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for
the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976
noted that the accused had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit
Criminal Court.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of
February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in
its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took
cognizance of the case, should try it.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city
judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of
the case. His view is that the case falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because
estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision
Page 5 of 119
mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took
effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for
certiorari filed in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the
city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.
We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court
which has original jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to
Caesar Puerto is punishable under article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum or four months and one day to two years
and four months.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one
day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818,
applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks
which was committed or after October 22, 1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed
by Puerto on October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would
make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive
application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised
Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because
the penultimate paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law,
as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides
that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine
not exceeding six thousand pesos or both."
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with
the court of First Instance which is empowered to try "all
criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than
two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs.
Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531).
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the
preliminary investigation of the case. The filing of the
information by the fiscal presupposes that he had conducted
the requisite preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 77.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance,
returning the case to the city court, is affirmed and the two
orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to the
Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed
to try the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Santos, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L.
PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by
JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S.
MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in
the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive
Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for
the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers,
transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April
2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot,
Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the
destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the
provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the
Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533,
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport
large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial
commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from
the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were
not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals;
one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates,
the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were
confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's
police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda,
provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the
aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides
"that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported
in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five
farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal
nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an
action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly
valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin
order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April
25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case
at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced
against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months
later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of
the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code)
includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil.
640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573;
Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
Page 6 of 119
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial
court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and
sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was
published in the Official Gazette three months after his
conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A
because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction
makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the
public must be informed of that provision by means of
publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive
order can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January
30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs.
Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the
respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal
regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential
executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order
or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed
to have general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive
orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations
and orders shall become effective only when approved by the
Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil
Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public
Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of
Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been
expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of
the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The
recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas
because they are now bound by the said executive order.
Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and
dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the
confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and
set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to
restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the
petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same,
with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the
value of each carabao which is not returned for any reason.
The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for each
carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The
farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the
Pesigans.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the
value of each carabao which is not returned for any reason.
The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for each
carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The
farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the
Pesigans.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38,
59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415,
427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644,
658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835,
836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-
1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72,
107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202,
204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-
269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
Page 7 of 119
 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327,
343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445,
473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-
839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60,
62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147,
1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695,
1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-
1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-
1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414,
427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538,
543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-
852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10,
11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348,
352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not
being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any
tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use
a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or
at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject
of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the
1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held
that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would
be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he
has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which
he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the
weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public
right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar
for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to
apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the
rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for
applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the
duty of the law officer of the Government to
appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
Page 8 of 119
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when
the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability;
[3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may
be required so to be published by law; and
[5] such documents or classes of documents
as the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he
may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and
letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and
publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific
contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether
the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the
theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the
most difficult of those which have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal and
it is manifest from numerous decisions that
an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
Page 9 of 119
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it
appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners
to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs
has ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the
Penal Code now in force by arresto mayor and a fine of from
325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United
States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First
Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a
fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The
offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the
fact that the appellant was at the time of its alleged commission
an employee of the United States military authorities in the
Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon
whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of
war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive
it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these facts are
true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the
admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the court below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line
of duty" at the time the alleged offense was committed, which
is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which
appears in the record, the contention that the court was without
jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two
propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier or
military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense
under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under
the Code, nevertheless the military character sustained by the
person charged with the offense at the time of its commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel,
that an assault of the character charged in the complaint
committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner
of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of
Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that under the
provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals
have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state,
exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely
military nature or otherwise, committed by military persons. But
the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be
punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation
does not render them any less an offense under the article of
the Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language
of that article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and
5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military person
could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault
upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense
he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable
only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility,
however, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws,
although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also,
if committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the
military code. We are unable to see how these provisions of
the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which
indeed never had any application to the Army of the United
States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for
them by counsel for the appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense
was committed by an employee of the United States military
authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been
cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none
in the local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as
respects employees of the United States military
establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the
Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States
Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not aware of
the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open
to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of
the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle
firmly established in the law of England and America and which
must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence
unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United
States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that
the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by
him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may,
if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the
trial in the court below, but can not under this principle affect
the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in
this case a court of one of the United States would have
jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In
re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider.
The present is not a case where the courts of one government
are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents
or employees of another and distinct government, because the
court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and
powers from the same Government under the authority of
which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to
have been performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between
the two jurisdictions in the present case nor any claim of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the contrary
it appears from the findings of the court below that the
complaint was entered by order of the commanding general of
the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as
regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves
the case from any practical embarrassment which might result
from a claim on the part of the military tribunals to exclusive
cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the
appellant.
G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Page 10 of 119
 RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the petition for
review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A
POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF
THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE
COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000
ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON
THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A
PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER'S
CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations 1 for grave
oral defamation filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who
was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January
28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered
defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical
staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the
Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity
from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations
against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160,
annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
dismissing the criminal cases. 2
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court.
On January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision
denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not
absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity.
Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the
commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in
the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were
heard. This Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were
directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals
with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff,
from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well as
the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic
immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather,
boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by
petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official
functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the
provisions of Section 45 (a) of the "Agreement Between the
Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian
Development Bank," to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the
purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect
to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in
petitioner's and intervenor's Motions for Reconsideration, we
find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28,
2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by
any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview
of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging
the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to
stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that
slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed
in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's
utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court
to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department
of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4
of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two
years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject
of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun
Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at
the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from
the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium
in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang,
and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to
Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April
25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight
cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the
boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that
he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it
in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in
buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to
import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other
evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine
Islands, was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial
court, but with the intimation that there exists inconsistently
between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However,
neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
Page 11 of 119
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil.,
573), in the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is
found —
That, although the mere possession of a thing of
prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the
same rule does no apply when the article, whose use
is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open
violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place
of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case
and the facts in the present instance is readily observable. In
the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession
and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal
importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel
was in transit — in the present case the foreign vessel was not
in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from
the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United
States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the
one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution
based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited
drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient
to raise a presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is
discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign
country with the drug on board. In the Jose case, the
defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the
opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case
there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to
Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the
following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is
interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when
the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not
necessary that the opium discharged or that it be
taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium
was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands
on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which
subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the
views just quoted, we return to an examination of the
applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4
of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully
import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands."
"Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal
Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of
going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence
of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And
again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the
custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.
S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U.
S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we
expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited
drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has
come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a
person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary
circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied
to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused
was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and
Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be
impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an
amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation
being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant
intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands.
We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium
from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate
any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these
statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation
not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of
the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results
that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS
COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus
Miquiabas against the Commanding General Philippine-
Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to
have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a General
Court-Martial to try petitioner in connection with an offense
over which the said court has no jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged
with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to
the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of
the United States. He has been arrested for that reason and a
General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found
him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This
sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a
sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed
within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within
certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America, entered into an agreement concerning
military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as follows:
JURISDICTION
1. The Philippines consents that the United States
shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
following offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person
within any base except where the offender
and offended parties are both Philippine
citizens (not members of the armed forces of
the United States on active duty) or the
offense is against the security of the
Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases
by any member of the armed forces of the
United States in which the offended party is
also a member of the armed forces of the
United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases
by any member of the armed forces of the
United States against the security of the
United States.
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside
Page 12 of 119
the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States.
3. Whenever for special reasons the United States
may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to
it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer
holding the offender in custody shall so notify the
fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in
which the offense has been committed within ten days
after his arrest, and in such case the Philippines shall
exercise jurisdiction.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may
desire not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in
paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting
attorney) of the city or province where the offense has
been committed shall so notify the officer holding the
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest,
and in such a case the United States shall be free to
exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under
paragraph 2 of this article is committed by any
member of the armed forces of the United States.
(a) While engaged in the actual performance
of a specific military duty, or
(b) during a period of national emergency
declared by either Government and the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) so finds from the
evidence, he shall immediately notify the
officer holding the offender in custody that
the United States is free to exercise
jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense
was not committed in the actual performance
of a specific military duty, the offender's
commanding officer shall have the right to
appeal from such finding to the Secretary of
Justice within ten days from the receipt of the
decision of the fiscal and the decision of the
Secretary of Justice shall be final.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises
jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial
and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to
the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall
acknowledge in writing that such accused has been
delivered to him for custody pending trial in a
competent court of the Philippines and that he will be
held ready to appear and will be produced before said
court when required by it. The commanding officer
shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
with a copy of the information against the accused
upon the filing of the original in the competent court.
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is
naturally agreed that in time of war the United States
shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over any offenses which may be committed by
members of the armed forces of the United States in
the Philippines.
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant
asylum in any of the bases to any person fleeing from
the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such
person be found in any base, he will be surrendered
on demand to the competent authorities of the
Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense
is exercised by the United States, the offended party
may institute a separate civil action against the
offender in the proper court of the Philippines to
enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the
Philippines may arise from the offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have
jurisdiction over the criminal case against petitioner if the
offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1
(b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the
General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had
been committed by a "member of the armed forces of the
United States" there being no question that the offended party
in this case is the United States. It is not necessary therefore,
to consider whether the offense is against "the security of the
United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether petitioner
committed it in "the actual performance of a specific military
duty" or in time of a declared "national emergency" under
paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under
paragraph 6, for in all these instances the military jurisdiction
depends also upon whether the offender is a member of the
armed forces of the United States. We shall then determine in
this case (1) whether the offense has been committed within or
without a base, and, in the second instance, (2) whether the
offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of the
United States.
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides
that "bases are those area named in Annex A and Annex B
and such additional areas as may be acquired for military
purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the
areas specified in Annexes A and B, there is none that has
reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has
allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex
A that "army communications system" is included, but with "the
deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area."
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The
whole article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall
retain the right to occupy temporary quarters and
installations now existing outside the bases
mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such
reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be
necessary to develop adequate facilities within the
bases for the United States armed forces. If
circumstances require an extension of time, such a
period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two
Governments; but such extension shall not apply to
the existing temporary quarters and installations
within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no
case exceed a period of three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation with
boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the
United States armed forces until such time as other
arrangements can be made for the supply of the
bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases
shall be applicable to temporary quarters and
installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article
while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the
United States; provided, that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located
within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not
be considered as offenses within the bases but shall
be governed by the provisions of Article XIII,
paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines
shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed
that the United States shall have full use and full
control of all these quarters and installations while
they are occupied by the armed forces of the United
States, including the exercise of such measures as
may be necessary to police said quarters for the
security of the personnel and property therein.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is
"Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary
Page 13 of 119
quarters and installations existing outside the bases specified
in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the United
States armed forces for such reasonable time as may be
necessary not exceeding two years in duration, extendible fro
not more than three years, the extension not being applicable
to existing temporary quarters and installations within the limits
of the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila
Reservation, which will be available for use to the United
States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and
installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of
time, but "until such time as other arrangements can be made
for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that
may be construed as placing the Port of Manila Reservation in
the category of a permanent base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located within
the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered
as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the
provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the
offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but
without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of
Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in
Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely temporary
quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be
considered as a member of the armed forces of the United
States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the
United States Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of the
Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a
member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI,
XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian
employees separately from members of the armed forces of
the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under
said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian
employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the
United States, which enumerates, among the persons subject
to military law, persons accompanying or serving with the
armies of the United States. But this case should be decided
not under the Articles of War, but under the terms of the Base
Agreement between the United States and the Philippines. And
not because a person is subject to military law under the
Articles of War does he become, for that reason alone, a
member of the armed forces under the Base Agreement. And
even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian
employee is in the service of the United States Army does not
make him a member of the armed forces of the United States.
Otherwise, it would have been necessary for said Article to
enumerate civilian employees separately from members of the
armed forces of the United States.
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action
because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer
holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines
desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of
the Military Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this
connection that in cases like the present where the offender is
a civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States
armed forces, no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting
attorney of by the Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and
4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of
the Agreement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General
Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try
petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and,
consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing
the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by
respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which may
be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the
Honorable, Secretary of Justice.
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO
AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C.
Abaya for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by
petitioners, five in number, for their release from imprisonment.
Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v.
Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an
offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not handed
down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this
the first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted,
as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 2 likewise a petition for
habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer
given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on
the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial of
equal protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover
they did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines,3 necessarily
resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit
mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having
such character even if at the time of their application a final
sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the
same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion.
Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to
overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was
sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno
Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other
offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in
decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and,
as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12,
1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners
has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above
convictions. Each of them has served more than 13 years. 5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this
Court ruled that the information against the accused in that
case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery
was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no such complex offense. 7 In the recently-
decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the
ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the
contention of each of the petitioners that he has served, in the
light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could
have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom,
his continued detention being illegal. 9
Page 14 of 119
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their
release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted petitioners,
as had been mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and,
if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there
being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed
vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the
existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice
to raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive
effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised
Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We
have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the
writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its
latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not
known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on
judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is
any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom.
Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby
cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a
moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law.
Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of
the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most
important human rights provision" in the fundamental
law. 10Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of
the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby,
it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law
against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever
detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a
similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important
bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him,
"without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule
of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas
corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may
be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices
Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad
Santos, 17 Paras, 18Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief
Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize
quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy came in handy to
challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor
of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal
justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150
inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the
writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm continued:
"The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas
corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face
devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm,
stated: "As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was
fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its motion,
ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case
entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to
Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera, 25 to whom is
traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the
operation of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right
to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles the
accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief
Justice Marshall put the matter thus: "The writ of habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this
affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice
Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for
centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom." The passing of the years has only served
to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty.
Only the other year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States
Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and
flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of
the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within
its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice Fortas
explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the
great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement."
Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his
adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v.
Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and
goes to the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin
in what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a
habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That
principle dates back to 1902, 32 when this Court announced
that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained
was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time
the Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily
an adherence to authoritative doctrines of constitutional law
there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of
jurisdictional defect. As summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex
parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on which
this court, or any court, without some special statute
authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner
under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of
jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some
other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be
kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional
right, namely, the denial of equal protection. According to their
petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by
Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law
under which they were convicted is the very same law under
which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been
changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
how can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life
imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal
protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt
with. What is required under this required constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
Page 15 of 119
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring.
The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when
such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance
with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted
have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an
identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the
other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would
be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the
petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners
who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for
perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had
been duly considered as having paid their penalty to society,
and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset,
would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which
requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In
support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v.
Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People
v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the
above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to
legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be
merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a
case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As
was previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as
legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would
even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them."
It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial
review as well as the jurist John Chipman Gray, were much
impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above
observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for
present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised
Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive
application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be
given a retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for
which they could have been legally committed, is habeas
corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in
doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was
announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus: "The courts
uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in
excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is
void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the
sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess
imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the
petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as
was valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle
in Director v. Director of Prisons 47 where it was explicitly
announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused
... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While the above decision
speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar
as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic
affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused
by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true.
Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden
of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it
is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.
G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983
ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO
BERNARDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Alberto Mala, Jr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
RELOVA, J.:
FIRST DIVISION
Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in
her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from October 1972 to August
1974. At the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his
family's dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo,
was staying with him in said house as his helper in tilling the
land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred
to San Nicolas, Bulacan without the knowledge of the
landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the landholding,
however, Isidro transferred his tenancy rights to his son, co-
petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, who continued to reside in
subject house. Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of
the whole riceland, through her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against
herein petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano Bernardo,
before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost
before the inferior court as well as in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. Likewise, petitioners lost in their petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to
petitioners telling them to vacate the house and the land. When
the latter failed to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against
them for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 with the
fiscal's office. After a preliminary investigation of the case, the
provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3022-M, as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of April 1974,
in the municipality of Plaridel, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano
Bernardo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without the
knowledge and taking advantage of the
tolerance of the owner Ledda Sta. Rosa y
Cruz, succeed and/or continue in possessing
and squatting on a parcel of land of the said
owner, by erecting thereon their residential
house and failing to remove the said
residential house despite demand to do so
made by the said owner.
Upon arraignment, herein petitioners, father and son, entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits of the case proceeded
and, after both parties have submitted their cases, herein
petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a case for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, inasmuch as the
same applies to squatters in urban communities only and not to
agricultural lands; that in the case of People vs. Echaves, 95
SCRA 663, it was held that "Presidential Decree No. 772 does
not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal construction in squatter areas made
by well-to-do individuals."
The motion to dismiss was denied and the trial court rendered
judgment convicting herein petitioners of the crime charged
and sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,500.00 each, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this
Page 16 of 119
petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the lower court
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the criminal
case for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 since
the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offense or
violation of said law.
Indeed, in the case of People vs. Echaves, supra, this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, held that
Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that
despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction
No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public
Works and Communications, Social Welfare
and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant
on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency,
Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and
City and District Engineers, 'to remove all
illegal constructions including buildings on
and along esteros and river banks, those
along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property,'
squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found
to have been unlawfully occupying public
and private lands belong to the affluent
class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further
intensify the government's drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice.
The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply
only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.
The Solicitor General in his comment to the petition manifests
that "the intent and purpose of PD 772 is to prohibit and
penalize squatting or similar acts on public and private lands
located in urban communities. ... ['that no person should be
brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which
is not clearly made so by the statute (US vs. Abad Santos, 36
Phil. 243). ... Consequently, the decision of the lower court in
Criminal Case No. 3022- M, convicting herein petitioners of the
offense of violation of PD No. 772, is null and void and should,
therefore, be set aside."
ACCORDINGLY, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED, the
judgment of conviction is SET ASIDE, and said Criminal Case
No. 3022-M is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional
Trial Court, correct in ruling that Subversion is
the main offense in a charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under P.D.
No. 1866, as amended, and that, therefore, the said charge
should be quashed in view of a previous charge
of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as amended by P.D. No.
885, against the same accused pending in another court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with
the same offense in both cases, which would justify the
dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double
jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal
by certiorari interposed by the People under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) dated May 27, 1991,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, entitled THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL,
as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and
ANTONIO A. TUJAN, Respondents.
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was
charged with Subversion under Republic Act No. 1700 (the
Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 45), National Capital Region, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 64079.[2] As a consequence thereof, a
warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29, 1983,[3] but it
remained unserved as he could not be found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio
Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the
subversion case.[4] When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber
special revolver and six (6) rounds of live ammunition were
found in his possession.[5]
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 148), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1789. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being a member of a communist party of the Philippines, and
its front organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, in
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38
special revolver with Serial No. 1026387 and with six (6) live
ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or
permit thereof from competent government authority.[6]
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio
Tujan, which recommendation was approved by the trial court
in an Order dated June 19, 1990.[7] The same order also
directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a
motion[8] invoking his right to a preliminary investigation
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court
and praying that his arraignment be held in abeyance until the
preliminary investigation is terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio
Tujans motion for preliminary investigation, his counsel
withdrew the motion since he would file a motion to quash the
Information, for which reason counsel requested a period of
twenty (20) days to do so. This was granted by the trial court
on that same day.[9]
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to
quash[10] the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 on the
ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being
convicted of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 64079
(for subversion) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
45). The said ground is based on Sections 3 (h) and 7, Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of the
motion, Antonio Tujan contends that common crimes such as
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition should actually
be deemed absorbed in subversion,[11] citing the cases
of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G. R. No. 83341, January 30,
1990, 181 SCRA 648) and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G. R. No.
92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217). Antonio Tujan then
avers that the present case is the twin prosecution of the
earlier subversion case and, therefore, he is entitled to invoke
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.[12]
The petitioner opposed[13] the motion to quash, arguing that
Antonio Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a
second time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned in
the subversion case, and (b) the offense charged against him
in Criminal Case No. 64079 is for Subversion, punishable
under Republic Act No. 1700; while the present case is for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance
of Subversion, punishable under a different law (Presidential
Decree No. 1866). Moreover, petitioner contends that Antonio
Tujans reliance on the Misolas and Enrile cases is
misplaced.[14] Tujan merely relies on the dissenting
opinions in the Misolas case. Also, the Enrile case which
Page 17 of 119
involved a complex crime of rebellion with murder is
inapplicable to the instant case which is not a complex
offense. Thus, the absorption rule as held applicable in
the Enrile ruling has no room for application in the present case
because (illegal) possession of firearm and ammunition is not a
necessary means of committing the offense of subversion, nor
is subversion a necessary means of committing the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.[15]
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the
motion to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the
dispositive portion of the order reading:
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby
GRANTED, but only in so far as the accused may be placed in
jeopardy or in danger of being convicted or acquitted of the
crime of Subversion and as a consequence the Information is
hereby quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of Illegal Possession of Firearm.
SO ORDERED.[16]
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in
quashing the information and dismissing the case:
xxxxxxxxx
In other words, the main offense the accused is being
charged in this case is also Subversion considering that
the alleged Illegal Possession of the Firearm and
Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been
previously held by the Supreme Court, the fact that the
accused has been previously charged of Subversion before
another court before the institution of this instant case is just a
continuing offense of his former charge or that his acts
constituting subversion is a continuation of the acts he
committed before.
The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by
the prosecution that this case is very different from the other
case and that double jeopardy will attach in this particular case.
This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that
double jeopardy will attach to the accusation of subversion,
punishable now under Republic Act 1700, as Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof, provides:
Time to move to quash- At any time before entering his plea,
the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information.(1a)
In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should
be arraigned first before he can move to quash the
information. It is before he pleads which the accused did in this
case.
On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the
possession of firearms and ammunitions is not a necessary
means of committing the offense of subversion or vice versa,
then if the court follows such argument, there could be no
offense of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
furtherance of Subversion, for even the prosecution admits
also that in subversion which is an offense involving
propaganda, counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and
mind of the people does not need the possession or use of
firearms and ammunitions.
The prosecution even admits and to quote:
The defense of double jeopardy, while unquestionably
available to the accused, had not been clearly shown to be
invokable(sic) at this point in time.
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for
under Section 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a
firearm and ammunition which is separate and distinct
from the crime of subversion and is not a necessary
ingredient thereof and the court believed so, the
prosecution will have to file another information as they
may wish. The court therefore has to grant the motion to
quash on the aforestated grounds, subject to Section 5 of
Rule 117, considering that the only offense to which the
accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is
Subversion and not Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions.
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within
ten (10) days from receipt of this order otherwise the court will
order the release of the accused, unless he is in custody for
some other offense.[17] (Emphasis ours)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[18] was also denied in an
order dated December 28, 1990.[19]
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
24273. However, the appellate court found that the trial court
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the questioned
Information. In dismissing the petition, the appellate court, in its
decision dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the
aforequoted ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law
and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due
process to prosecute and prove its case against private
respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information
for violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent
Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the
Makati court shows that the main case is subversion
considering that there is an allegation that the alleged illegal
possession of firearms was made in furtherance of or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Also, the
information alleged likewise that the accused is a member of a
communist party of the Philippines and its front
organization. Basically, the information refers to the crime of
Subversion qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. x x x.[20]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which
Antonio Tujan is charged in Criminal Case No. 1789 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), provides as
follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearms, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any
public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person
or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor. (Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and
simple. Under the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere
possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the
crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph
of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion a
circumstance to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the
allegation in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the
unlicensed firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan, a
member of the communist party of the Philippines and its front
organization, was used in furtherance of or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion does not charge him
with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the
same Information, but simply describes the mode or
manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 was committed[21] so as to qualify the penalty to
death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned
information, that is, the illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance of
Page 18 of 119
subversion.[22] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically
Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by implication
that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the
very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title of
the law itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized
under it:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING
IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED
IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT
PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against
Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 64079, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), is based on a different law,
that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as amended. Section 3 thereof
penalizes any person who knowingly, wilfully and by overt act
affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive
association or organization x x x. Section 4 of said law further
penalizes such member [of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive
association] (who) takes up arms against the
Government. Thus, in the present case, private respondent
Antonio Tujan could be charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or
R.A. No. 1700,[23] or both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent
Antonio Tujan was placed in double jeopardy with the filing of
the second Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter
which he may raise in a motion to quash to defeat a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The pertinent
provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxxxxxxxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours)
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure
to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must have
obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge;[24] and (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[25]
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondents
motion to quash filed in the trial court did not actually raise the
issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not arisen
yet. It is noteworthy that the private respondent has not even
been arraigned in the first criminal action for
subversion. Besides, as earlier discussed, the two criminal
charges against private respondent are not of
the same offense as required by Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with the law and
jurisprudence and thus should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No.
1700, as amended, and the one for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 7636 on
September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as
amended, has substantially changed the complexion of the
present case, inasmuch as the said repealing law being
favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a
habitual delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.[26]
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-
respondents case has never been raised as an issue by the
parties obviously because the said law came out only several
months after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
was promulgated and while the present petition is pending with
this Court we should nonetheless fulfill our duty as a court of
justice by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it
regardless of whether or not the accused or any party has
sought the application of the beneficent provisions of the
repealing law.[27]
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-
private respondent is beyond question. The repeal by said law
of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical, definite and
absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The
legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion
law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for the trial courts to try
and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense
that no longer exists.[28]
As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:[29]
There is no question that at common law and in America a
much more favorable attitude towards the accused exists
relative to statutes that have been repealed than has been
adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish
doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be
criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco
Commentaries, 296) (Emphasis ours)
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute
and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be
criminal under the new law, the previous offense is
obliterated.[30] It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a
total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to
the repeal.[31]
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion
against the accused-private respondent has no more legal
basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this charge should be
amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer
a crime.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is now bailable under Republic Act No. 8294
which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. No. 8294 has
amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, by
eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed
firearm is used in furtherance of subversion, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.[32] Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294),
the penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of firearm
(.38 caliber) is now reduced to prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00).[33]The reduced penalty of imprisonment -
which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years - entitles the accused-private respondent to
bail. Considering, however, that the accused-private
respondent has been detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990
up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or more
than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in
order. This is so because even if he were convicted for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, the length of his
detention while his case is pending has already exceeded the
penalty prescribed by the new law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273, including the
orders dated October 12, 1990 and December 28, 1990 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), National Capital
Page 19 of 119
Region, in Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The subversion charge against accused-private respondent
Antonio A. Tujan in Criminal Case No. 64079 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED.
The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition in furtherance of subversion against the same
accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED to Simple
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The
accused-appellant is hereby ordered RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY from detention for the reason stated above,
unless he is being detained for any other offense.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III,
RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006
NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING
CO., INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO,
TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J.
AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN
EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE
R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB.
CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G.
VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA,
FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V.
PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF
PNP, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY
GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS – KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-
KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND
THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN.
GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA,
ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA
A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P.
LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L.
DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006
LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO
SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather
than rigid formula are necessary. 1 Superior strength – the use
of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the
courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional
rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is
thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the
scales of justice should weigh heavily against government
and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized,
the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that
restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy
presumption against their constitutional validity." 2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
Page 20 of 119
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently
modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people
combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes
tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes
license?3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State –
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted
and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down
the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been
recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State
– by obstructing governance including hindering the growth
of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the
economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both
the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic
Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes
the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and
the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute
a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of
the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme
Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical
enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and who are now
in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the
duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly
magnified by certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine
State by obstructing governance, including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence
in the government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the
economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the
extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the
defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the
State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a
clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the
Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has
been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by
virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-
in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby
call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts
of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of
the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a
state of national emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued
Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national
emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated
February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of
rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented,
suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and
rebellion;
Page 21 of 119
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that
the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. 4 They considered the aim to
oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor
General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners’ counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution
is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP
1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is
not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned
Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated
hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in
the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to
remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called
upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the
sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by
going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands
on our left arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document
entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings
and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni
Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate
selected targets including some cabinet members and
President Arroyo herself. 6 Upon the advice of her security,
President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a
bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a
communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the
meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the
National People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette
cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive
documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced
through DZRH that the "Magdalo’s D-Day would be on
February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force
were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF
Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any
defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public
statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and
unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping
Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and
mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the
Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine
reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a
U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President
Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named
Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim,
Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was
all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo." 8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel
Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number
of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and
armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there
was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they
too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has
remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain
of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and
directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines
Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and
revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and
key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal
declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement
and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the
coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing
down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable
to rule that it will not take much longer to end it." 9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National
Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly
announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police
are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties
suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel
who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He
claimed that with the forces of the national democratic
movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties,
coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since
June 2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing
its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan
was also considered as additional factual basis for the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army
outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers.
And also the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro
Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her
security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the
gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She
directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men
and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and
undivided. To protect the young students from any possible
trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President
suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital
Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed
after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked
the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that
political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized
for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief
of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public
assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-
KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the
intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were
already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge
clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used
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truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear
gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the
massed participants. The same police action was used against
the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to
the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening,
hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally
held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati
City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP
1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006,
operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures,
and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. 13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily
Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the
tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor, is "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels
in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it
would take over any media organization that would not
follow "standards set by the government during the state of
national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if
they do not follow the standards – and the standards are - if
they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they
do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc.
No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’" National
Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the
government for the duration of the state of national emergency.
He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when
covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the
government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to
recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates
rules set out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman
Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his
farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his
arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the warrant,
which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during
the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however,
is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit
Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and
detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest
when the police went after him during a public forum at the
Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as
Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the
Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and
golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in
Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur
Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela
Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel
Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City.
Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay
indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the
rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not
being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring
that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the
constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this
Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of
these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law;
and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of
raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship"
or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term
"emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and
similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency"
that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative
Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other
members of the House of Representatives, including
Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative
powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo
"gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces
without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do
so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their
members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance
was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble
to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
(ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 15 of Article
II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c)Section 23 19 of
Article VI, and (d) Section 17 20 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et
al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise
by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming
that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law,
petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without congressional
approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes
beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined
under the Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional
for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its
cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to
Page 23 of 119
access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances
prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest
pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being
moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424
(Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and
171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not
necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis;
and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free
expression and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and
heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may
be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the
petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et
al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual
bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to
this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated
in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the
extraordinary simple foundation --
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the
people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers
limited powers on the national government. x x x If the
government consciously or unconsciously oversteps
these limitations there must be some authority competent
to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt,
and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the
people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the
courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the
theory of judicial review.22
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the
courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may exercise such
power only when the following requisites are
present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are
absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right,
an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
"definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief. 25 The Solicitor General
refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy,
contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and
academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021
did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During
the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional
or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These
are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is
not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative."30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 31second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; 32 third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; 33and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. 34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this
Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the
people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and
the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are
capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case,
respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief
Justice’s very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may
still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case
has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a
direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within
this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief
Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various
personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more
than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
Page 24 of 119
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of
the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In
either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and
"taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first
laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the
plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People
ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right,
however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished,
and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to
restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex
Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The
same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction.
In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of
the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la
Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949
Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the
"transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the
Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor
accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass
upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications"
of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that
petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed,
there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,
and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. 51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental
importance." Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the
Court ruled that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to information and the
equitable diffusion of natural resources are
matters of transcendental importance which
clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved,
the Court may relax the standing requirements
and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of
direct injury to the parties seeking judicial
review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court
noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their
capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that
"Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress’
taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 55that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases
must be settled promptly and definitely and
standing requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the
cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the
Court’s attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status
of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line
lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of
constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent
any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it
sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific
injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct
injury" test with respect to concerned citizens’ cases involving
constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that
the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
arising from the alleged illegal official act."
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the
petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a
real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to
itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
Page 25 of 119
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only
the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to
sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of
rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of
Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to
petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice
Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing,
equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present
petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly
David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with
petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury"
resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed
by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there
was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the
issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial
Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen
in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of
their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality
rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,63 and Tañada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a
citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be
granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by
the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national
officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no
legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential
injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer
as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 66 the
Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This
is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental
importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner
have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a
taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations
of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a
former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue
as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her
claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her
because there was no showing that the enforcement of these
issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her
submission that she has pending electoral protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She
has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more
the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court
may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus
standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise
of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the
"liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that
the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question
which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now
waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very
critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017
cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus
standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, 67 may not be sued
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes
the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does
not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like
any other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but
he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by
law and that is by impeachment. 69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence,
it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of
the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has
reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon
v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era
of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line
defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government."75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in
declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency
has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is
final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the
opposite view. There, the members of the Court were
unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to
inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine
their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of
separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of
checks and balances, "under which the President is
supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court
of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. 77 There, the Court
was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity
of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable
question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly
diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine
the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control
for the very life of the nation and the government is in
great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to
his conscience, the People, and God."79
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The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 80 -- a recent
case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle
similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the President’s
"calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance
on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government." The
latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government. 81 It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise
of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go
no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s
decision is correct," but that "the President did not
act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness,
but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this
Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support
his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of
the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape
of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President
Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of
the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various
political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate
backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government,
called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the
problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation,
positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or
even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to
avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a
prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the
public good, without the proscription of the law and
sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this
moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative
powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the
prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here,
Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people
have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where
they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary
suspension of democratic processes of government in time of
emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting
themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render
them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis,
the ruin of the State…
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as
strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation.
Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws
are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate
a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend
for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is
no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people’s
first intention is that the State shall not perish. 86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship
or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it would
more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling
to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a
tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of
the dictatorship.87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative
government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in
the form of a temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one
element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished
an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He
recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic
political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to
resort to extra –constitutional measures; for although they may
for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if
the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a
little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil
purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not
by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every
emergency and fixed rules for applying it. 89
Machiavelli – in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill – sought
to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of
standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks
and controls in time of national danger. He attempted
forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious
reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time
of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints. 90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the
problem of response to emergency by constitutional
democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional
dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why
absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense
of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect
established institutions from the danger of permanent
injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed
by a prompt return to the previous forms of political
life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem
of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional
governance: increasing administrative powers of the
executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation
upon that power."93Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme
of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of
success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship
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must be relatively short…Dictatorship should always be
strictly legitimate in character…Final authority to
determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must
never rest with the dictator himself…"94 and the objective of
such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political
conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of
Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating power – in a
government where power has consciously been divided – to
cope with… situations of unprecedented magnitude and
gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to
equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers,
when, for how long, and to what end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered
criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of
emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must
be appointed by constitutional means – i.e., he must be
legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the
existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be
exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the
objective of emergency action must be the defense of the
constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the
employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France,
Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a
description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as
solution to the vexing problems presented by
emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the
conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of
constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it
is necessary or even indispensable to the
preservation of the State and its constitutional order…
2) …the decision to institute a constitutional
dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man
or men who will constitute the dictator…
3) No government should initiate a constitutional
dictatorship without making specific provisions for its
termination…
4) …all uses of emergency powers and all
readjustments in the organization of the government
should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
requirements…
5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no
right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more
than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the
particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a
constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent
in character or effect…
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons
representative of every part of the citizenry interested
in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for
every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship.
..
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional
dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should
never be in the hands of the man or men who
constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend
beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was
instituted…
11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by
a complete return as possible to the political and
governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation
of the constitutional dictatorship… 99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the
oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He
would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the
existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great
faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating
committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories
in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, "the
suggestion that democracies surrender the control of
government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave
danger to the nation is not based upon sound
constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in
terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the
problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether
the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to
authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief
executives administering emergency powers. However used,
"constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the
implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism.
Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism"
articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the
analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is
consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by
Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means
necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the
substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed
upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility.
McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate
power in government. And in discussing the meaning of
constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper
test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate
processes for keeping government responsible. He refused
to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government
by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and
substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that
the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in
the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of
it; between which there is a great and very significant
difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited"
as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant
government limited to the orderly procedure of law as
opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental
correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all
lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to
arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of
government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of
the above political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of
prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship"
and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of constitutionalism" ---
ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency
governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of
discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring
that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political
responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from
the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to
create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s
"balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and
judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress,
and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within
its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve
as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the
language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency,
our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief
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Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate
within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of
its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached
on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the
citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is
uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical
tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First
Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US
Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment" (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful"
and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a
law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such
summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our
cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’
toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive –
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
"spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and
only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The
reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be
applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations
not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional
Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique
is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable
until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth
doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint
its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of
the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above
all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results
in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not
even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the
ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for
vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid
if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject
to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For
one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it
is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if
it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that
men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning
and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce
VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
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"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr.
Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the
Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the
President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these
conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier,
considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her
Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the
armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action.
But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction
between the President’s authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as
Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was
Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date
or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision
on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed,
PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is
actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines
the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein
that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that
the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the
emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render
more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of
law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on
March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 114an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of
the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare
Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a
strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It
cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government.
It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of
enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore
order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact,
Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration
of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such,
it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid
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declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act
done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not
a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the
primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well
as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as
President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its
laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if
needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the
Department of Interior and Local Government. 119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño,
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is
unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the
power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact
laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction."
\ Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding
Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP
1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP
1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
"decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter
2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary
interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on
matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government,
for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of
the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
special orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing
issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued
by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
force as statutes because they were issued by the President in
the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial
Law under the 1973 Constitution. 121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and
laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority
to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
Page 31 of 119
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national
emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the
state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all
decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of
Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the
above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of
national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,
without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over
or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as
a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. 122 In effect at the time of its
approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2
dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National
Defense to take over "the management, control and operation
of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air
Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to
contain, solve and end the present national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the
legislature’s emergency powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority
to declare "a state of national emergency" and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by
the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
provision refers not only to war but also to "other national
emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution
was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
"state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article
VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend
that Congress should first authorize the President before he
can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical
conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare
the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution
which relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each
other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section
23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national
emergencies, they must be read together to determine the
limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised
to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v.
Sawyer,125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order
he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.
And it is not claimed that express constitutional language
grants this power to the President. The contention is that
presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his
powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on
provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power
shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States.
Page 32 of 119
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a
number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of
war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though
"theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property in
order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.
This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military
authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the
several constitutional provisions that grant executive
power to the President. In the framework of our
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who
shall make laws which the President is to execute. The
first section of the first article says that "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term
"emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami,"
"typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a
limited view of "emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger
to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety,
and perception. 127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under
three (3) principal heads: a)economic,128 b) natural
disaster,129 and c) national security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the
same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is
evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee’s definition of
"national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It
reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external
aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los
Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the
term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that
they would paralyze government service. 132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national
emergency" refers to military national emergency or could
this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or
economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency,
Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to
delegate to the President the power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that
legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are
exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the
efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group
of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as
the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government,
legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting
periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of
the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution
have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the
legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to
another department – unless we regard as legislating the
carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed
standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total
war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to
preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than
in normal circumstances ‘the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial,’ given the ability to act, are called upon
‘to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities
committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked
by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that
which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the
guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible.
Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights
are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against
warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of
Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
Page 33 of 119
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that,
on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on
their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People
Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the
arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25,
2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without
warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard
their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the
basis was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et
al. alleged that their members were "turned away and
dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala
Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said
petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O.
No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects
in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the
President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to
command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there
is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed
illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the
validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the
essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical.
Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe
declared unconstitutional just because the officers
implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so,
judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases
passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code would have been declared
unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the
provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal
rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates
precisely for the proper and efficientadministration of
law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except
between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a
relationship in which power is their source, and obedience,
their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these
rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary
or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately
carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant
in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably
associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase
"acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept.
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of
terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an
agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our country,
but the international community as well. The following
observations are quite apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the
"fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans
when it comes to the justification of the use of force against
certain states and against groups operating internationally.
Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist
organizations are set up and constantly being updated
according to criteria that are not always known to the public,
but are clearly determined by strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions – or
threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United
States against Iraq – consists in the absence of an agreed
definition of terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal
categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed
groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One country’s
terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter." The apparent
contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term
"terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact
that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson
Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or
Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were
originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the
territory at the time, but later became internationally respected
statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts –
the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from
eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-
defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations
Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on
the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its
efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between
those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-
state groups against civilians, state functionaries or
infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in
the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance
against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of
ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be
illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of
organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel and a
liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims – the Kashmiri
resistance groups – who are terrorists in the perception of
India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier Contras
in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists
for the Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani
Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during
the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for
the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang
for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating
examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be
reconciled in any way – because of opposing political interests
that are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting
perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its
actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for
these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of
states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an
occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an
Page 34 of 119
occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism
will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as
protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its
territory and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not
of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are
concerned, and vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a
decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these
conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each
and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a
non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom
fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital
issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable
consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of
sovereign states – and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis
in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! – has become
even more serious in the present global power constellation:
one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security
Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as
medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the
problem has become even more acute since the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States. 141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An
illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a
drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the
act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them
pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and
oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act
can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the
same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty
thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal
laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by
President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is
entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and
Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the
following provision: "That one who conspires with any other
person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be
punished by reclusion temporal x x x."
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws
the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however,
do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining
"acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No.
5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest
without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking
over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts
go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly,
they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,
this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O.
No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the
military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary
and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence,
the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order.
Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be
secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain
import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision
is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse
to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 143
In the Brief Account 144 submitted by petitioner David, certain
facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis
of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon
City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like
a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by
policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an
unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to
Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours;
and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of
evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies
petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all
that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation
that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-
shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to
charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated
that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of
BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was
the leader of the rally. 147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is
that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated,
but also their right to peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and
complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other
Page 35 of 119
words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression,
the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or
censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance
of a permit or authorization from the government authorities
except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a
public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were
arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was
there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted
the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought.
Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to
justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be
made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action
cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly
are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which
the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have
committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are
engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order,
they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations
of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State,
instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes
upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise
considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et
al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal
was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive
canceling all permits previously issued by local government
units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits
to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on
a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the
rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that
an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the
State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed,
respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the
rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits,
the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies
was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies
and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such
permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of
the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners
were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their
permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of
the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a
person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair,
reasonable, and according to procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another
facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press.
Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed
to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant;second, the
police operatives seized several materials for publication; third,
the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning
of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the
absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves
at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as
saying that such raid was "meant to show a ‘strong
presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do
anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if
they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if
they would contribute to instability in the government, or if
they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5
and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’"
National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the
government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to
recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage during times
when the national security is threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of
search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the
search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two
(2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the
press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in
the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v.
Chief of Staff152 this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business
and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We
Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with
the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and
sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the
CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The
search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain
censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if
allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is
permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash
as to disobey.153Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-
government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant
disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most
defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the
duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
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the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
The motto should always be obsta principiis.154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General
admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the
seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are
illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose,"
thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that
the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of
gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were
able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the
admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the
Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally
seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are
inadmissible for any purpose. 155
xxxxxxxxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily
Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why
do you have to go there at 1 o’clock in the morning and without
any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the
evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my
instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not
based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because
there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go
and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any
other newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don’t
know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If
the people who have been injured by this would want to
sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the
police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and
cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your
theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I don’t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed
illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I
said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President
for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of
the police officers, that is their responsibility. 157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no
constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their
letter."
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these
issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented.
At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the
calling out by the President of the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military
and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights
under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s
concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral
part of this ponencia.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021
– a supervening event – would have normally rendered this
case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still
operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance
thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one
similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been
media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would
be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and
violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the
parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to
prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional
insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the
relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with
public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an
Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief
– addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid
standard – that the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the
words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been
legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should
thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism"
has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
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enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this
portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated
earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the
dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on
media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical
seizures of some articles for publication and other materials,
are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot
impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the
individual police officers concerned. They have not been
individually identified and given their day in court. The civil
complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court.
Elementary due process bars this Court from making any
specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an
end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves.
How to give the military the power it needs to protect the
Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights
is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic
state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in
breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be
arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists
who studied the various competing political philosophies is
that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope
with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to
arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court
rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard
by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas;
the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that
these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant,
SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON,
intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination
clause,1 whenever appropriately invoked, has been accorded
due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the
Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided in 1937, was
quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the
opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under
consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead
letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation
favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice
Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it
was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in
favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is
the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held that a
respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-
Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at the
instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where
petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he
could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct
decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1,
1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative
case7 for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness herein
petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such
malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took
note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee
would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel
him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was
guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure
to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the
administrative proceeding against him, which could result in
forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in
character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent
Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his
adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond,
he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing
or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding
with such an administrative case, to await the judicial
Page 38 of 119
disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts
stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to the witness
stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination
being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated
the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that
petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance
of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton
and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the
administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee,
asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors.
Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was
duly filed by them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of
respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion,
from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself.
They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination
cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965,
finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to
act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence
this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the
Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner-
appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does
manifest fealty to the principle announced by us in Cabal v.
Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to
annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an
administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed
against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act,9the complainant
requested the investigating committee that petitioner be
ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted.
Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge
for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent
Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he
initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in
a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice
that while the matter referred to an a administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the
forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may
acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The
proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is
not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He
could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus
distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme
Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language
of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as
to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by
imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a
livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a
principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could
possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the
medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken
assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-appellants
that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions
the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right,
to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is the
protection against "any disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution
or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If
that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.ñet
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence
cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12Only last year,
in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice
Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of
a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is
predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or
compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion
places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to
privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the observation of
the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly
appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised
against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We
hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of
Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to
take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2,
1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX
CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM
SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal,
but only civil liability shall result from the commission of the
crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:
Page 39 of 119
 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants,
or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the
crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the
relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the
blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one
spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed
administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased
mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit
read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of
legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory
Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after
being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-
23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of
the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is
hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part
hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to
preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to
recover such funds and/or properties as property
belonging to the estate but are presently in the
possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able
to confer with some of the children of my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died
in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato
and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death
of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their
father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature
and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of
Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who
was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable
pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of
the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and
thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato
told her that the documents she was being made to
sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10)
years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was
signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my
other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana
Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later
became the second wife of my sister’s widower
William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my
mother signed the document in the belief that they
were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since
she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special
Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of
Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property
and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three
(3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng
(Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992
of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng
(Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of
1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c)
Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II,
Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x
x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the
considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute
sale were not the true and actual considerations
received by her father William Sato from the buyers of
her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita
Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the
property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid
proceeds were turned over to William Sato who
undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to
my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000.00 for the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-
0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned
over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of
sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has
actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the
buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the
signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was
not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father’s
orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the
properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total
₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the
same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June
8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to
make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of
the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s
estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to
refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which
include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special
power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were
attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
Page 40 of 119
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal, however,
the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution
dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of
Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus,
the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: 6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of
ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of
deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said
Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already
then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special
power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe
that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing
fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located
at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One
(1,871) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No.
7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No.
7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters
more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735,
Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special
power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused
made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of
Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No.
3148 for ₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00 and
[Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in
possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,
said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the
same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of
the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from
₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to
₱22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship
to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who
was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated
March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, 8 the trial court granted Sato’s
motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of
the accused severed the relationship of affinity between
accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no
longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the correctness of
the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of
accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and
mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-
law even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and
states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1)
spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity
in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to]
Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and obviates
scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief,
where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his
stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son
against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the
accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40
OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original
Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed
for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in
an order dated June 2, 2006. 11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of
Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals 12 which, however, in a decision13 dated
August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of
Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between
her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother
Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting
circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing
jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact
of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity
between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus
removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato
remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law
of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG,
the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private
respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the
Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s
daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt
[Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other
children of private respondent, William Francis and Belinda
Sato, took the side of their father.
Page 41 of 119
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries
elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear
that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of
swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita,
they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article
332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that
following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent
Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude
the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in
Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is
the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be
no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated.
The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction
or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give
effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of
the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction
that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple
language is most favorable to Sato. 14
The appellate court denied reconsideration. 15 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not
reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the commentary
of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting
the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the
law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the
property between the offender and the offended party.
Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by
Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s
wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never
became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to
the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her
mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother,
Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer
existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the
relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the spouse
at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the
death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did
not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship
between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is
covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided under
Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports
petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the
criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members
of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be
particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a
family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief
from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil
aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the
determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the
relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and
the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent
of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory
Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of
theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from
criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended
party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first
paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions are
parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children. 17 By virtue
thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who
commits malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; 19 by the
stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the accused
who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son
who steals a ring from his mother. 23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives
of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive
kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the
blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship
by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the
issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and
appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence
and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the
American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As
one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the
spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some who
believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether
there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell,
N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by
most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the
spouses have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows
the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution
of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657,
659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by
affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses
where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in
whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the
relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the
issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331,
333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that
relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably
and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it.
Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such
that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by
affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by
affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale is that the
relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
Page 42 of 119
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that
relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the
kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death
of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not. 29 Under this view, the relationship by
affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that
produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the
said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie
of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-
marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of
one of the married parties. 30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of
the two views, we hold that the second view is more consistent
with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied
in cases of jury disqualification and incest. 31 On the
other hand, the continuing affinity view has been
applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree
covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks
of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in
general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one’s living child
and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in
case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to
his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing
violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection
and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State
and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the
solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed
as a State and national policy that courts shall
preserve the solidarity of the family. 34 In this
connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve
family harmony and obviate scandal. 35The view that
relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of
one of the parties to the marriage that created it is
more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in
interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt,
rule for the accused. 36 This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of
lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is
more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is
viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1)
is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application
or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this
case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created between
the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased
spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2]
of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against
one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the
absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under
Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said
crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the
felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa.
However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the
offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say
what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by
the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the
court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that
Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by
means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as
follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was
already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and
thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document
was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor
daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation,
Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third
parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused
to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice
of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa
was committed by attributing to Manolita (who participated in
Page 43 of 119
the execution of the document) statements other than those in
fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and
affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very
expression of her specific intention that something be done
about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the
affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she
could not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the
document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking
the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted
the representations of Sato as to what the document was all
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s
proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it
appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special
power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief
that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to
Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power
of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato]
made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds
of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of
the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that
Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and
the one who benefited therefrom, was the author
thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for
the amendment of the Information so as to increase the
amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This
was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information
would now state that, while the total amount of consideration
stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato
actually received the total amount of ₱22,034,000 as proceeds
of the sale of Manolita’s properties. 45 This also meant that the
deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also
falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of
consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially
charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power
of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to
commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not
simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of
the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal
Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he
not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public document is required for a
proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo
v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that
the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document
as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a
complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory
cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address
specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory
cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory
cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of
the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of
negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly
expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article
332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of
estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime
that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of
public document, not as a single charge for the single
(complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives
its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers
the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the
offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not
apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved
through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach
of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity
of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. 47 Thus, the action provided under the said
provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as
family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the
offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter
acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the
respective rights and liabilities of family members among
themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act
that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, it
would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately
from each other. While there may be two component crimes
(estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent
for which there is only one criminal liability. 48 That is the
concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two
crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single
criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or
interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to
life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a complex
crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or
interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple
crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the
diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered
as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the
Page 44 of 119
correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or
ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent results
in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime
for which there is only one criminal liability. 51 (The complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls
under this category.) This is different from a material (or real)
plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two
or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal
liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept
of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal
plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or
more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single
penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the
same are more conveniently termed as component
crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender
has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of
the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through
falsification of public document requires that the elements of
both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the
criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa
and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes
but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa
and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally
liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document, the liability for estafa should be considered
separately from the liability for falsification of public document.
Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime
and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between
formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the
plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality
where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be
punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary
Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article
315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a
document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party
sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document
and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, the law does not require that the document be falsified
for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a
necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote
indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means"
merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other. 57 In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate
and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his
mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the
Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime,
like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be
a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent
to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to
the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the
falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. 61 The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in
the Information show that the falsification of public document
was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to
Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention
in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was
consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the
properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the
falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said
document. That is why the falsification of the public document
was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary
means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same
inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the
properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that
case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly
the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been
the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any
inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for
her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature
was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime
of falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186080 August 14, 2009
Page 45 of 119
JULIUS AMANQUITON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay
Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As a purokleader and
barangay tanod, he was responsible for the maintenance of
cleanliness, peace and order of the community.
At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an
explosion. He, together with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador
Amante1 and a certain Cabisudo, proceeded to Sambong
Street where the explosion took place. Thereafter, they saw
complainant Leoselie John Bañaga being chased by a certain
Gil Gepulane. Upon learning that Bañaga was the one who
threw the pillbox2 that caused the explosion, petitioner and his
companions also went after him.
On reaching Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante
knocked on the door. When no one answered, they decided to
hide some distance away. After five minutes, Bañaga came out
of the house. At this juncture, petitioner and his companions
immediately apprehended him. Bañaga's aunt, Marilyn
Alimpuyo, followed them to the barangay hall.
Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to
the police station, Gepulane suddenly appeared from nowhere
and boxed Bañaga in the face. This caused petitioner to order
Gepulane’s apprehension along with Bañaga. An incident
report was made.3
During the investigation, petitioner learned Bañaga had been
previously mauled by a group made up of a certain Raul, Boyet
and Cris but failed to identify two others. The mauling was the
result of gang trouble in a certain residental compound in
Taguig City. Bañaga’s mauling was recorded in a barangay
blotter which read:
10-30-201
Time: 10-15 p.m.
RECORD purposes
Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen4 Bañaga
is Alimpuyo 16 years old student nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi
St. M.B.T. M.M.
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at]
Cris at yong dalawang sumapak ay hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito
kaninang 10:p.m. araw ng [M]artes taong kasalukuyan at yong
labi ko pumutok at yong kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa
bandang kanan. Ang iyong kaliwang mukha at pati yong likod
ko ay may tama sa sapak.
Patunay dito ang aking lagda.
Dossen Banaga (sgd.)
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article
VI, RA5 71606 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed
against petitioner, Amante and Gepulane. The Information
read:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
Julius Amanquiton, Dominador Amante and Gil Gepulane of
the crime of Violations of Section 10 (a) Article VI, Republic Act
No. 7610 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed
as follows:
That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy
with one another, armed with nightstick, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the person
of Leoselie John A. [Bañaga], seventeen (17) years old, a
minor, by then and there manhandling him and hitting him with
their nightsticks, thus, constituting other acts of child abuse,
which is inimical or prejudicial to child’s development, in
violation of the above-mentioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty.
Gepulane remains at-large.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Dr. Paulito Cruz, medico-legal officer of the Taguig-
Pateros District Hospital who attended to Bañaga on October
30, 2001, Bañaga himself, Alimpuyo and Rachelle Bañaga
(complainant’s mother).
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Amante
and Briccio Cuyos, then deputy chief barangay tanodof the
same barangay. Cuyos testified that the blotter notation
entered by Gepulane and Bañaga was signed in his presence
and that they read the contents thereof before affixing their
signatures.
On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.7 The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article VI
Sec. 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610 in relation to Section 3 (j) of
Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences accused JULIUS
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE a straight penalty
of thirty (30) days of Arresto Menor.1avvphi1
Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante are
hereby directed to pay Leoselie John A. Banaga the following:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
2. Moral Damages in the amount of P 30,000.00; and
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 20,000.00.
The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to
the ARCHIVES to be revived upon the arrest of the accused.
Let [a] warrant of arrest be issued against him.
SO ORDERED.
Amanquiton’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 8
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course.
On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision9which
affirmed the conviction but increased the penalty. The
dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor
minimum as maximum. In addition to the damages already
awarded, a fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) is
hereby solidarily imposed the proceeds of which shall be
administered as a cash fund by the DSWD.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Page 46 of 119
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 10
Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts
of the case as established did not constitute a violation of
Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160 and definitely did not
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.11 An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt
is shown beyond reasonable doubt. 12 It is the primordial duty of
the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion,
so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty. 13
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was
discussed in People v. Berroya:14
[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it
enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands;
with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, as
therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not
for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by
the rule that there is to be no conviction where there is
reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt (of the crime of child abuse) solely
on the supposed positive identification by the complainant and
his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner and his co-accused as the
perpetrators of the crime.
We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he was apprehended
by petitioner and Amante, there were many people
around.15 Yet, the prosecution presented only Bañaga and his
aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the mauling incident itself.
Where were the other people who could have testified, in an
unbiased manner, on the alleged mauling of Bañaga by
petitioner and Amante, as supposedly witnessed by
Alimpuyo?16 The testimonies of the two other prosecution
witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz and Rachelle Bañaga, did not
fortify Bañaga’s claim that petitioner mauled him, for the
following reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s
injuries, while Rachelle testified that she saw Bañaga only after
the injuries have been inflicted on him.
We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the
validity of the barangay blotter he signed regarding the mauling
incident which happened prior to his apprehension by
petitioner. Neither did he ever deny the allegation that he
figured in a prior battery by gang members.
All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were
really inflicted by petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other
people. In fact, petitioner testified clearly that Gepulane, who
had been harboring a grudge against Bañaga, came out of
nowhere and punched Bañaga while the latter was being
brought to the police station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could
very well have caused Bañaga's injuries.
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused
the bloodied condition of Bañaga’s face because she had to
first put down the baby she was then carrying when the melee
started.17 More importantly, Alimpuyo stated that she was told
by Bañaga that, while he was allegedly being held by the neck
by petitioner, others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously
testifying not on what she personally saw but on what Bañaga
told her.
While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the
lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there
appear in the records facts and circumstances of real weight
which might have been overlooked or misapprehended, this
Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift fact from fiction.
We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this
case. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or
there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused. 18 If inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a
conviction.19
Time and again, we have held that:
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program for the
survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall
defend the right of the children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of
legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating
crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal
Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for
strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and
exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission,
and a means by which child traffickers could easily be
prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child
abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of
neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development."20
However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp
sword, ready to be brandished against an accused even if
there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The
right of an accused to liberty is as important as a minor’s right
not to be subjected to any form of abuse. Both are enshrined in
the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.
There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a
child from any and all forms of abuse. While unfortunately,
incidents of maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills,
care has to be likewise taken that wayward youths should not
be cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through its
laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather
than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress to a culture of
juvenile delinquency and errant behavior, laws for the
protection of children against abuse should be applied only and
strictly to actual abusers.
The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses
against children will be best achieved if parameters are set in
the law itself, if only to prevent baseless accusations against
innocent individuals. Perhaps the time has come for Congress
to review this matter and institute the safeguards necessary for
the attainment of its laudable ends.
We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:21
We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and
procedure is not to send people to the gaol but to do justice.
The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
defense. Thus, when the evidence of the prosecution is not
enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the
accused absolved and released at once.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August
28, 2008 decision and January 15, 2009 resolution of Court of
Appeals are reversed and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius
Page 47 of 119
Amanquiton is hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7160.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Wilfred D. Asis for defendant-appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was
charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1809 of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius
Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of December
30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring, and confederating with one
another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery and with intent to
kill, attack, assault and shoot with firearms
one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on
the vital parts of the body thereby inflicting
mortal wounds, causing the direct and
instantaneous death of the said Julius
Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not
guilty. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code,
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in
the evening of December 30, 1980, while Cagampang, his wife
and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to
their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of
Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald,
arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a
sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the
floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina,
upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her
husband's name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later
Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store
through the main door and demanded that she brings out her
husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out
his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two more shots
at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the
"maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden.
She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its
contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was
summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused
as the man who killed her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his
father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay
Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the
night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00
o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31,
1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the
dreaded NPA (New People's Army) were not apprehended
earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with
other members- followers of the New People's Army. Temblor
surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass
surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by
the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal
jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow,
Victorina, did not know him by name. That circumstance
allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the
perpetrator of her husband's killing, insufficient. However,
during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the
widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter
away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by
a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp
outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another
prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal —
who was a long-time acquaintance of the accused and who
knew him as "Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of
Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December
30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the store,
and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination
report certified that the victim sustained three (3) gunshot
wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a
Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel
Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time
Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not
at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at
work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening
up to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The
accused did not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal
evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified
by the prosecution witness as the killer of the
deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively
Identified as the killer of Cagampang? The settled rule is that
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of
its superior advantage in observing their conduct and
demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly
credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed
on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<äre||anº•1àw>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness
Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility,
especially because she had positively Identified the accused as
her husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by
the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and
entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail
over the positive Identification made by the prosecution
witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of
the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to
be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant
Page 48 of 119
was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must
be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was
admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is
accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle
via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The
testimony of the witnesses who had positively Identified him
could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs.
Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146
SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was
rejected by the trial court which opined that the defendant's
knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive
enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the
New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more
arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in
Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as
the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive
is not essential when the culprit has been positively Identified
(People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his companion
fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in
the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325;
People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of
the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII,
dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN
HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon
Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the
costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death
Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident of
Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981,
the deceased was employed as manager of the sand and
gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was
an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever
brightest when they are applied with more jealousy to the poor,
the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the
herein accused-appellant, belongs to this class. At the time of
the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor,
marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of
violence, following the odyssey of his widowed mother from
one poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the
ravages of internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur.
In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to
evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His
existence in this world has not even been officially recorded;
his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births
because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see
the importance of registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone
eyewitness for the prosecution and the sloppiness of the
investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police
Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section of
the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the
prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must, therefore, be
set free.
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24
years old when he testified, married, and a resident of
Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at
the sand and gravel business of the father of the deceased but
was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February
3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was a backrider
in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at
Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City
that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab
Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which
was parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand
where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the
assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing,
the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the
cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I
know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While
Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle with both of
his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand
and stabbed him from behind on his chest while the victim was
sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see
the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was
facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these
happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7
meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-
sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not see if the
aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed
Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see what kind of
knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said
he brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City
General Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed
Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the
hospital you came to know
that he was already dead,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already
dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by
the police?
A They just asked the
description of that person
as to his attire and his
appearance.
Q And it was while in the
hospital that you told them
the description of the one
Page 49 of 119
 who stabbed Ramon other and immediately
Pichel, Jr.? thereafter, he fled the area
toward the Philippine
A Yes, Sir. National Bank (PNB). That
this unidentified person
was sporting a semi-long
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was hair, dressed in White
brought to the Funeraria La Merced? Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve),
maong pants height to
A Yes, sir, more or less 5'5, Dark
Complexion. That as this
Q Can you recall what time was that? unidentified person fled the
area I immediately came to
aid my companion, Ramon
A I do not know what time was that. Pitcher, Jr., and rushed
him to Zamboanga
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that General Hospital, on board
the police brought to you the accused? a Tricycle. That may
companion (Ramon) did
not whispered (sic) any
A...
words to me for he was in
serious condition and few
Q For Identification? minutes later, he expired.

A Yes, sir. Q-15. Was tills unidentified

person was with
Q And he was alone when you Identified companion when he attack
him? (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?

A Yes he was alone. A-15. He was alone Sir.

Q Aside from working with the Pichel family Q-16. Can you really
in their sand and gravel business, do you Identified (sic) this person
have any blood relationship with them? who attacked and stabbed
your companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr., that evening in
A Yes. sir. 6
question?

(Emphas
A-16. Yes, Sir,
is
supplied
) Q-17. Do you still
remember that
confrontation we made at
xxx xxx xxx
the Office of La Merced
Funeral Homes, wherein
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which you were confronted with
was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing, one Usman Hassan, whom
and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was this Officer brought along?
taken, or four days after the killing, was never presented or
mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was
A-17. Yes, Sir.
practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a
witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The
sworn statement contained the following questions and Q-18. Was he the very
answers: person, who attacked and
stabbed your companion,
Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
xxx xxx xxx

A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the

Q-14. What and please
narrate it to me briefly in
your own words, the
incident you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy
selecting some mangoes, I
saw unidentified person
whom I can recognize by
face if seen again
embraced my companion
Ramon Pitcher Jr. while
the latter was aboard his
motorcycle parked within
the area. That this person
without much ado, and
armed with a knife
suddenly stabbed him
(Ramon). That by
coincidence to this
incident, our eye met each
very person who attacked
and stabbed my
companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr., that evening in
question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face
and other physical
appearance were fully
noted by me and this I
cannot forget for the rest of
my life.
Q-20. Before this incident,
was there any altercation
that had ensued while in
the process of buying
Page 50 of 119
 some mangoes in that
area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to
note what kind of knife
used by said Usman
Hassan in stabbing your
companion, Ramon
Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing
more to ask of you, do you
have anything more to say,
add or alter in this
statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to
give a supplemental
statement if needed in the
future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his
statement 10 is substantially the same as that embodied in the
"Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also
admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for the prosecution
confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an
unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face,
appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the
victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of
the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the
confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the
funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and
prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within
the premises of the Old Barter Trade,
wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y
AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was
arrested in connection with the above stated
incident. That this Officer and companions
arrested this person Usman due to his
physical appearance, which was fully
described by victim's companion. Jose
Samson. During his arrest, a knife,
measuring to more or less seven (7) inches
in blade was confiscated in his possession.
The person of Usman Hassan was brought
along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a
confrontation with victims companion, Jose
Samson and in this confrontation, Jose
Samson positively Identified said Usman
Hassan as the very person who stabbed the
victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied
the charges levelled against hub and
admitted ownership of said knife; claiming
among other things that he used said knife
for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety
does not satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable
doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable
jurisprudence to convict an accused person. The said evidence
denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to
pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan
y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y
Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect
turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in
which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness
for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused,
value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally
guaranteed presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and
the evidence for the accused are weighed,
the scales must be tipped in favor of the
latter. This is because of the constitutional
presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys
as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of
the State that is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this
case, must operate against the inference of
guilt the prosecution would draw from its
evidence. That evidence, as it happens,
consists only of the uncorroborated
statement of the two policemen which, as
previously observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak
and unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be
introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for
example, that the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez,
presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points,
the testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While
Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant
stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the
NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the
front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and
another stab wound located at the left arm posterior
aspect." 14 The same medical expert also concluded from the
nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause
of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the
alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of
the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City,
particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much
to be desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure
adopted by the police investigators in the Identification of the
accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman
Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police
investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio,
and his police companions, at the office of the La Merced
Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the
very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure adopted by
the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination,
Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was
brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor.
However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by
saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police
line-up;" this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought,
more the result of an over or careless cross-examination,
augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather
than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of the police
investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and
the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman
was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was
no such police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly
correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The
fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified
clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when
Page 51 of 119
presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police
investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront
and Identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor, without
being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as
eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method
of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles
of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just
man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator
between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did
violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its
most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a
confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales
of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and
disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this
case in which only the accused was presented to witness
Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the
grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the
constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement
alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the
rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the
evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily,
and superficially. Samson was not investigated thoroughly and
immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his
statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the
murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it
had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to
show that the fruit vendor—from whom Samson and the
deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who
certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was
investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any
explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused
at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a
pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according
to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime,
was not also investigated when he could have been a material
witness of the killing or of the innocence of the accused. In
addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio
from Usman (tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time
of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to
determine the presence of human blood which could be typed
and compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime
laboratory test — had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even
the trial judge, insisted on it — would have revealed whether or
not the knife in question (confiscated from the accused by
Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had
indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police
investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission
by saying that the knife could have been cleaned or the
bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of
the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is
tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by
a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of
Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo
Murillo, which clearly reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after
the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at
Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the
suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar
Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga
City, with a long record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal
Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a
suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and the
stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this
City." The said resolution further states that "with regards to
this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible
reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981.
Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on August 28,
1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of
liquor armed with a knife (was) molesting and extorting money
from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of
the case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of
Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or
question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr.
Was it fear of the notorious police character that made the
police officers disregard the possible connection between the
slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang
of the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly
stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.?
And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link to
the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should
the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was
already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman
Hassan, instead, became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed,
Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his
innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve
an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police investigation
with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not
scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the
authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by
Usman "that he was arrested at the former barter trade, which
is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit
Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore strange that on
the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the
barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he
usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the
morning and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that,
at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation
to take him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy and
weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that
evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The
trial judge did not propound any single question to the accused,
and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of
clarification, if only to put on record what the mother and son
could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty
and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not more,
help, than the trial judge extended to the prosecution witnesses
during their examination by asking them clarificatory and
mostly leading questions. In that sense and to that extent, the
accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the
innocence of the accused but the importance of which was
brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the
accused near the scene (about 100 to 150 meters away) soon
after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although
Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was
found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the
assailant, he would have fled. But the trial court instead
indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused
'was lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the place
(of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately
responded and appeared at the scene of the crime," adding
'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals return to
the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can
explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that
Usman has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be
generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial
court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by
human nature and endorsed with approval by this Court that
"(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are
as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but
note the total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for
stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a
general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a
conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with
the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the
accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is
Page 52 of 119
especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the
culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as
in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier
manner in which the trial court disregarded the claimed young
age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman
Hassan is a minor, basing such claim on the
testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of
said accused, who declared that her son
Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4)
children, was born in the year 1967. She
testified that she was just told by a person
coming from their place about the year of the
birth of her son Usman. However on cross-
examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even
remember the date or year of birth of her
other children. The failure of Lahunay
Hassan to remember the date or year of birth
of her children is of course understandable,
considering that she is unschooled and she
belongs to a tribe that does not register
births, deaths or marriages, however, it is
strange that she only took pains to find out
the year of birth of her son Usman. For this
reason, the Court granted a motion of the
defense on September 13, 1982, to have the
herein accused examined by a competent
dentist to determine his age. However, the
findings of the dentist of Zamboanga General
Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5"
shows the following: "age cannot be
determined accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14
to 21 years of age." This simply means that
the herein accused could either be 14 years
of age or 21 years of age, or any age in
between those aforestated years. From the
observation of this court, the accused Usman
Hassan was about 18 years of age at the
time he committed this crime and this
observation is based on his personal
appearance, his size and facial features and
other personal characteristics, hence he can
not be classified as a youthful offender under
Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No.
603, as ammended by Presedential Decree
No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29
Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and
Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the
Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the
Supreme Court that "In cases where the age
of the culprit is at issue as a basis for
claiming an exempting mitigating
circumstance, it is incumbent upon the
accused to establish that circumstance ad
any other elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him
from punishment or cause the suspension of his sentence
under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal
Code, if found guilty, more meticulousness and care should
have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less
reliance on the observation of the judge as had happened in
this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the
accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one
years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate
determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have
placed the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that
the accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to
his young age. All the foregoing indicates that the accused had
not been granted the concern and compassion with which the
poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It
is when judicial and police processes and procedures are
thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law
and justice being denied the poor are heard. In any event, all
this would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal
of the accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the
accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered,
unless he is held for another legal cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135919 May 9, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated October 2, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos
Santos guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death.
In the Information2 dated February 23, 1998, appellant was
charged with murder, thus:
"That on or about the 6th day of November 1997, in
the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill one Rod Flores y
Juanitas, with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said kitchen knife said Rod
Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which directly caused his death."
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty."3 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented
Marcelino de Leon, Marvin Tablate, Dr. Benito Caballero and
Romeo Flores as its witnesses. Appellant and Sonny Bautista
took the witness stand for the defense.
Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of
November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking "gin" with
Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the
latter's house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.4 As he was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet,
he approached them and borrowed Flores' cart. 5 While waiting
for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and
conversing with the group. 6Suddenly, appellant emerged from
the back of Flores and stabbed him with a knife, 7 making an
upward and downward thrust. 8 Flores ran after he was stabbed
twice.9 Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many
times.10As a result, Flores' intestines bulged out of his
stomach.11 Appellant ceased stabbing Flores only after he saw
him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire against Jayvee Rainier
and chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid
himself and later on reported the incident to the police.12
Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leon's testimony. On cross-
examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help Flores by
separating him from the appellant who ran away. 13 He also
testified that the latter joined his group at about 11:00 a.m. and
kept on "coming back and forth."
Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores
suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the frontal, posterior
and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were fatal. Dr.
Caballero said it was possible that appellant was behind Flores
considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back.14 According
to the doctor, Flores died because of "massive external/internal
hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax and
Page 53 of 119
abdomen penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen
and intestines."15
Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then
working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning P600.00 every
15th day of the month; 16 that he spent P100,000.00 for his
son's burial and wake; that he has receipts in the amount of
P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and the cost of the
cemetery lot17 and a list of other expenses in the amount of
P35,960.00;18 and that his family has been grieving for the loss
of a loved one.
Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the
accusation and declared that on November 6, 1997 at 8:00
p.m., he was in his auntie's house in Muson, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, 19 forty (40) meters away from the scene of the
crime. He was then fetching water. 20 Earlier, at about 5:30
p.m., he and Flores met but they did not greet each other.
There was no altercation between them. Hence, he could not
understand why De Leon and Tablate testified against him.
Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time,
he and appellant were in their auntie's house in San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. 21 They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and
then went home. At about 10:00 p.m., appellant was arrested.
Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching
television in their auntie's house at the time the crime took
place. Neither did he accompany appellant to the police
station.22
On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"All premises considered, this Court resolves and so
holds that the prosecution has been able to establish
the criminal culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny delos Santos is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
"In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby
takes into account the brutality in the manner by
which the life of the victim was taken, and if only to
serve as deterrent to others who might be similarly
obsessed, it is believed that the higher of the two
penalties provided should be meted to the accused
herein. Absent any circumstance that would mitigate
the severity of his criminal act and pursuant to Articles
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 6, Republic Act no. 7659, the accused Danny
delos Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Death by lethal injection.
"Further, the accused is condemned to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 for
the victim's death. Moreover, accused delos Santos is
ordered to pay the said heirs of the deceased Rod
Flores the following sums of money:
1. P264,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;
2. P55,070.00 for actual and compensatory
damages;
3. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
4. P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.
"With costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."
In his Appellant's brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the
following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES,
AND IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
"II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE
HEIRS OF VICTIM THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00
FOR VICTIM'S DEATH; P264,000.00 FOR LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY; P55,070.00 FOR ACTUAL
AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; P50,000.00
FOR MORAL DAMAGES; AND P50,000.00 FOR
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES."23
Appellant contends that there are some inconsistencies
between the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate, the
prosecution witnesses. Also, there is no evidence that he has a
motive to kill Flores. In fact, there was no previous heated
argument or altercation between them. That the prosecution
witnesses executed their sworn statements only after two
months from the commission of the crime raises doubt as to
their credibility. Finally, the evidence for the prosecution failed
to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, hence, the trial
court should not have ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
Flores.
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's brief, counters that: (a)
the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor and do
not vitiate the fact that he was the one who killed Flores; (b)
appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are worthless since he
was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses; (c) he
failed to proffer any explanation why the prosecution witnesses
implicated him; (d) the crime was aggravated by cruelty
because he "butchered" Flores until his intestines bulged out of
his stomach; and (e) the heirs of Flores are entitled to
indemnification as it has been shown beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant killed him.
The first assigned error involves a determination of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that
when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter
are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity
and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation
of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior
in court.24
We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the
testimonies of De Leon and Tablate. While De Leon testified
that appellant did not join Flores' group, however, Tablate
declared that he was drinking "gin" with them at about 11:00
a.m. De Leon testified that no one assisted Flores when he
was being attacked by appellant. However, Tablate stated that
he attempted to separate Flores from appellant after the former
had sustained two stab wounds.
The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike
Tablate who was with the group in a drinking spree, De Leon
approached Flores only when he borrowed the cart from the
latter at about 8:00 p.m. He stayed with Flores' group only for
about thirty minutes, 25 or up to 8:30 p.m. Thus, he could not
have observed that appellant joined the group earlier, or at
about 11: 00 a.m.
The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does not
enfeeble the prosecution's theory that appellant killed Flores.
Evident from De Leon's testimony is the fact that he was so
shocked in witnessing the gruesome killing of his companion.
With such a state of mind, it would be too much to demand
from him a full recollection of the details surrounding the event.
Page 54 of 119
Many times we have ruled that inconsistencies in the testimony A Yes, sir.
of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their Q What did the accused do?
veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 26 They only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for
they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 27 What we A Again, he started stabbing at the back, sir.
find important in the case at bar is that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was appellant who Q So the stabbing was inflicted at the back of
stabbed Flores with a knife. We quote the clear and the victim?
straightforward account of the incident by De Leon and
Tablate. During cross-examination, De Leon testified as A Not all, sir, because he turned him face up
follows: and stabbed him again, sir." 28

"Atty. De la Cruz: Tablate's direct testimony reads:

Q You did not see the accused because it "Fiscal Vicente:

was dark in that place, is it not?

xxx xxx xxx

A No, sir, he suddenly appeared from the
back of Rod Flores and started stabbing Rod that
is why we were surprised. Q How did Danny delos Santos stab Rod
Flores?
Court:
A "Patalikod," sir.
Q How did the accused thrust the weapon to
the victim? Q What do you mean?

A (Witness demonstrating by making upward, A Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at
downward thrust at the back of the victim) the back, sir.

Atty. De la Cruz: Q When you said Danny delos Santos

stabbed Rod Flores at the back, are you saying
that Danny delos Santos was at the back of Rod
Q Where was Rod Flores hit, if you know? Flores at the time?

A At the back, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q How many times? Q How many times did the accused stab Rod
Flores?
A At first, twice, sir.
A I saw him stabbed the victim twice, sir.
Court: (Witness demonstrated in downward position as if
he was holding something).
Q That was the time when Rod Flores ran away
after having been stabbed twice. Q What was he holding?

A Yes, Your Honor. A A knife, sir.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Court: Court:

Q How did the accused thrust for the second xxx xxx xxx
time the weapon at the back of the victim.
Q Are you sure that when Rod Flores fell to
A Both at the back, sir. the ground, he was not able to rise nor was he
able to run away?
xxx xxx xxx
A He was able to run but then he was drunk
Atty. De la Cruz: and the accused was able to catch and stab him
again, sir.
Q Was Rod Flores able to ran away?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you positive to the identity of Danny
delos Santos that he was the one who stabbed
Q Where were you when Rod Flores was Rod Flores?
running away?
A Yes, sir." 29
A We were left behind, sir. I was not able to
move anymore.
Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified
that there was no altercation between him and Flores, it follows
Q And was the accused able to reach Flores? that no motive to kill can be attributed to him. This is an

Page 55 of 119
inconsequential argument. Proof of motive is not
indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the
accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his
participation is adequately established.30 In People vs.
Galano,31 we ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an
element of the offense, it becomes material only when the
evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some
doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In the case
before us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate
positively identified appellant.
In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, appellant questions why their
statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the
incident happened on November 6, 1997. The two-month delay
is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for
witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding
particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to
show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience,
the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the
witnesses.32 Thus, in People vs. Dacibar,33 we held that the
initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially
declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a
valid reason exists for such hesitance.
Anent the second error, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in indemnifying the heirs of Flores since his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to state at this point
that the evidence for the prosecution produces moral certainty
that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, hence, should be
answerable for all its consequences.
As earlier mentioned, appellant's defenses are mere alibi and
denial. He testified that at the time the crime took place, he
was in his auntie's house in Muson; San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. When probed by the trial court, he categorically
stated that the house is only 40 meters away from the scene of
the crime and may be traveled in about three or five
minutes.34 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident. 35 Certainly, the required
impossibility does not exist here.
Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-à-vis that of the
defense, the scale of justice must tilt in favor of the former.
Time and again, we ruled that positive identification, where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. 36 With marked
relevance is the fact that appellant did not present any
evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses, in testifying
against him, have improper motive.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant's attack
on Flores was from behind without any slightest provocation on
his part37 and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a
clear case of treachery. Where the victim was totally
unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no
weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as
treacherous.38 There being treachery, appellant's conviction for
murder is in order.
However, in the imposition of penalty, we cannot appreciate
the aggravating circumstance of cruelty considered by the trial
court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, every Information must state not only the qualifying
but also the aggravating circumstances. 39 This rule may be
given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule
that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. 40 The aggravating circumstance of
cruelty, not having been alleged in the Information, may not be
appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
Under Article 24841 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
the consummated crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. In this case, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties
shall be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending the crime.42
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores
are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity ex delicto.43 As regards the actual damages, it
appears that out of the P55,070.00 awarded by the trial court,
only P19,170.0044 was actually supported by receipts. The
other amounts were based solely on a list prepared by Romeo
Flores. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party. 45 In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to present receipts for the other
expenses incurred. Thus, in light of the recent case of People
vs. Abrazaldo,46 we grant the award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages inasmuch as the proven actual damages
is less than P25,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the
amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proofs that
because of Flores' death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings,
mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury. 47 However, we
reduce to P25,000.00 only the trial court's award of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages.48
The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based
on the income at the time of death and the probable life
expectancy of the victim. In the case at bar, the trial court
found that Flores' annual gross income is P14,400.00
computed at the rate of P1,200.00 a month for twelve (12)
months. From this amount is deducted the necessary and
incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance of
P7,200.00. His net income would then be multiplied by his life
expectancy, using the following formula: 2/3 x 80 - 25 (age of
the victim at time of death). Considering that he was 25 years
old when he died, his life expectancy would be 37. Multiplying
the net balance of his annual income by his life expectancy, the
loss of his earning is P266,400.00, thus:
"In computing the life expectancy and loss of earning
capacity of a person the following formula is used:
Life expectancy -
2/3 x (80 - the age of the victim at the time of death)
2/3 x (80 - 25)
2/3 x 55
= 36.66 or 37
Loss of earning capacity -
net annual income x life expectancy
P7,200 x 37
= P266,400.00" 49
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal
Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos y
Fernandez guilty of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late
Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P266,400.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Costs de oficio.
Page 56 of 119
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this
case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself,
because from the very nature of these facts and from the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think,
however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the
following statement of the material facts disclose by the record
may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at
"Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and
at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as
an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the
two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with
a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of
the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the
defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room.
He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will
kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the
blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of
after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant,
who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that
Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long
prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which
took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these
repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who
appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion
with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the
evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to
his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated,
Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps
fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran
back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who
immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the
part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a
spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room,
refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make
Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was
conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the
effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination,
tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and
one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by
law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he
killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he
struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore
exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt
that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from
criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in
fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed
him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the
right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
Page 57 of 119
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat
that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it
will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing
upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself
from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting
for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a
thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property
nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at
the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this
question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold
that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such
ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular
intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent,"
and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for
any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133
and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of
discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and
expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order
that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of
the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to
the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption.
But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential
ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of
article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and
acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that
even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There
is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a
disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be
looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is
greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the
crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the
same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in
its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p.
11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always
presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that
which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the
meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that
a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or
criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which
were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in
the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because,
as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."
(Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit
the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be
done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes
in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that
in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol.
1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions
insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article,
which declared that where there is no intention there
is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if
there is no act, an act which must fall within the
sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the
Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882,
in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a
crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from
the operation of the will and an intent to cause the
injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held
that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the
inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
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intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it
made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime,
that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or
malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and
misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as
follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an
act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision
correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a
crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall
proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if
the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto
in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially
equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any
criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code
would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as
used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly,
yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is,
it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once
said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily'
but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice,"
"malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general
malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting
out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed
"voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought,"
or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles
it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with
an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ
more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a
criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil
mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither
in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so.
It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law,
equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act
itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus,
"an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and
others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same
thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to
the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man
guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the
dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent
is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who
differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And
—
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the
nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing
an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of
the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads
the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that
the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as
good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself
proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal
unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an
apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result
from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a
limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is
sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that
unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission
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of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer
is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and
77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is
at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the
law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in
fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases
cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no
pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be
dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all
cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to
have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is
no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1
Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54
Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46
Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55
Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say,
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at
the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise,
upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one
has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in
accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense
and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they
appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are
in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for
the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks
of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked
and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road,
"holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled
pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and
property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of
any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if
he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his
innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of
malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is
a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of
homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act
punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for
believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him,
although it should afterwards appear that there was
no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be
either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according
to the degree of caution used and the probable
grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the
doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B
rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms
and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces
against his life as he advances. Having approached
near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club
in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the
instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B
dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is
more criminal that he would have been if there had
been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such
doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain
how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-defense.
And when it is considered that the jury who try the
cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the
reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger
can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full
because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the
case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused
was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire,
and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and
took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him
another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the
unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in
consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from
the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had
always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-
law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall
he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as
having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor,
without sufficient provocation, and that there did not
exists rational necessity for the employment of the
force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and
87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty
months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted
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by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to
have been proven, that the accused was surprised
from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who
was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and
beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent,
because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and
when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife
and child, more especially because his assailant was
unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was
attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense,
nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in
the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was
not given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred,
etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February
28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his
house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light,
heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8
paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he
fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing
immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried,
"Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a
joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his
friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall
he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to
eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal
from this sentence, holding that the accused was
acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of
fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and
that under the circumstances, the darkness and
remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational
and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court,
March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a
remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head
out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is
answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise
his house would be burned" — because of which, and
observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on
the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with
all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal,
the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding
that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who
attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-
defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence
of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at
bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal
blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his
charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be
he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted
by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the
trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of
the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-
appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres
for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the
accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police
of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower
court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed
separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo
Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: "Information received escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his
first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo,
Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their
sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector
where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas.
They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of
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police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name.
Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police
tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary
soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to
see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking
the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house,
Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene
was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling,
immediately returned to her own room which was very near
that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and
.45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where
the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he
asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to
himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy
by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by
a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body
which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully
supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version
of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and
chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place,
and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the
curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand
up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and
as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him.
Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis
receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at
Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the
curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are
Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and
continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was
only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon
seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently
watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at
him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their
testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime,
but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently
watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something
from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis
shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta
testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when
the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is
apparent from these contradictions that when each of the
appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is
at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when
he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain
extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their
mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after
he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe
and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the
two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is
not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her
cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put
which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth
in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances,
we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of
fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was
sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively,
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact
in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them
believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal
liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and
so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that,
under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by
appellants is murder through specially mitigated by
circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest
mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but
this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open
the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from
his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair
which had been placed against the door and believing that he
was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck
and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is
the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and
in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his
friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that
the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and
property were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the
accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further
inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing.
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which
would press them to immediate action. The person in the room
being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and
could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using
such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified
Page 62 of 119
in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The
doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule
109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753;
U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from
justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these
facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in
effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect,
is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be
taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has
by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this
standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance
or does something which places his captors in danger of
imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the
present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a
criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law.
Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness
and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost
of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character
in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not
condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a
premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In
the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera
calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que
no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil.,
16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed
is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There
is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in
the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No.
5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal
provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance
may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in
the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the
first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of
a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest
Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by
him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or
over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from
him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall,
in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants
are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000,
with costs.
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the May 6,
2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol (Magsumbol),
questioning his conviction for Theft.
The Facts
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino
(Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio
Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of Theft in the
Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The Information indicting
Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay
Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true
names and real identities are still unknown and whose physical
descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and
who are all still at large, and mutually helping one another, with
intent togain and without the consent of the owner, Menandro
Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty
three (33) coconut trees from the coconut plantation of the said
owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (₱44,400.00), Philippine currency,
belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and
prejudice in the aforesaid amount. 3
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto
Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro
Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1
Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning
of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare
unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and
co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with
seven others, cutting down the coconut trees on the said
property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco
lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting
down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered.
Instead, Caringal left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City
to inform Menandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the
incident to the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by
SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover
that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject trees) had
been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area.
They took photographs of the stumps left by the men.
Page 63 of 119
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado
(Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay
Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused
Inanoria, to substantiate its claim of innocence for all the
accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law,
Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within
the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land
co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never
set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he
was not present whenthe cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on
January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and
Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the
coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them.
Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees
which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of
the private complainant, were cut down on that morning of
February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber
trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees
planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in
the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the
same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for
the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the
coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the
cutting down of the coconut treesbut confirmed the presence of
Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the
accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Inanoria
corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all
the felled trees were planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio.
Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint
for theft due to his refusal to accede to latter’s request for him
to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present
criminal charge.4
Ruling of the RTC
On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that
the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of
all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected
the defense of denial invoked by the accused in the face of
positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the
perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of
Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on account
of his relationship with accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The
trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the
accused Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo
Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and
applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby
sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1
day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally
Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of Norberto
Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the
33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to accused Ramirez.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011
judgment of the RTC before the CA insisting that the
prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof
necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged.
They posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack
of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime of simple
theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was
presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA
sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the
RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against
the accused. The CA was of the view, however, that the crime
committed in this case would not fall under the general
definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision
which penalizes theft of damaged property. The CA ruled that
the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have been
motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It
agreed with the RTC that Atanacio’s testimony should not be
given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with
Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for
him to suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of
intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the accused
cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into
coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done with
intent to gain. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants Erasmo
Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and
Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of tw0
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as maximum;
and to pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro
Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (₱13,200.00).
SO ORDERED.7
The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14,
2012 Decision but their motion was denied by the CA on May
6, 2013.
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition
before this Court and imputes to the CA the following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER
ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:
I
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES
THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY
OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
II
MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT
HAND.8
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court
with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the
demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
Though it is true that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a
Page 64 of 119
hard and fast one. The exception is observed if there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance
that would have cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The
said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the
elements of each crime under the RPC, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench, petitioner
Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of
the crime of theft of damaged property under paragraph (2) of
Article 308 of the RPC which provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
xxx.
[Emphasis Supplied]
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft
of damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property
belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the
fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of
damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal
liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor
acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent
substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-
accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is
adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution
claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted
within the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on the
other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the
land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-
accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that
delimit the boundaries between the adjacent lots11 while
Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks were
just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary
of his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these
witnesses, no concrete and competent evidence was adduced
to substantiate their respective submissions. In view of such
conflicting claims and considering the meager evidence on
hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of
the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact
location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the
criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were
within Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent could be
rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The
RTC and the CA overlooked one important point in the present
case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay
KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees
belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to
financial reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land to
Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to
the site due to health reasons, he authorized Magsumbol and
Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of
the felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and
even offered to pay for the damages that he might have
sustained as some of his (Menandro’s) trees could have been
mistakenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his
offer of compensation and replied that a case had already been
filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an
audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to
him anymore.13
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing
unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and
considered him a biased witness simply because he is related
by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family relationship,
however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony
inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight. 14To warrant
rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be
clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the
testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that
improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate
the accused falsely. 15
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not
impair his credibilty.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that while
Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacio’s brothers-in-law,
Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the accused and
the accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have
bearing with regard to his decision, why would then Atanacio
support one over the other? The logical explanation could only
be that Atanacio had indeed ordered Magsumbol and Magsino
to cut the trees on his land. The Court is convinced that
Atanacio was telling the truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions,
Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on the land co-
owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable
boundary between the two lots, and cut down some of
Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or
judgmental error. The following pronouncement in the case of
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the
person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be
rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite
with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal
mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from
felonious responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in
the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is
equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of
malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and
imprudence.17
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where
Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought prior permission
from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees
which was done openly and during broad daylight effectively
negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies
reason that the accused would still approach the barangay
captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of
Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their
criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to
avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the
mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point
is that courts should carefully scrutinize the prosecution
evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned.
An allegation, or even a testimony, that an act was done
should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really
done. Evidence adduced must be closely examined under the
lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only
flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been
satisfied.1âwphi1 The prosecution miserably failed to establish
proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with
Page 65 of 119
his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with
malice and deliberate intent and then removed the felled
coconut trees from the premises.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus
est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for
serious physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence), overruling a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La
Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur
Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly
because of his negligence — and recklessness, the vehicle
driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of
Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn
turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered
slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9
days: three other riders came out with serious bodily injuries
that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep
was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried
and acquitted on December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal,
however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of
First Instance the information in the case now before us, for
serious physical injuries, and damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the
same highway collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First
Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges on the
ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense
by the Justice of the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed
the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to
secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second
case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for the same
offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred
in not dismissing the information for "serious physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view
of the appellant's previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity
of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the
constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that
of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962,
where as the result of the same vehicular accident one man
died, two persons were seriously injured while another three
suffered only slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal
on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide
through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518,
March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the
Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second
information of damage to property through reckless
imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.
In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information
for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of
a collision between two automobiles was declared, to block two
other prosecutions, one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries
arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was
reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In
none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as
material that the various offenses charged for the same
occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that
the complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in
his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to
say:1äwphï1.ñët
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se
originen males diversos, como el hecho culposo es
uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta
es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo. De
acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente
que atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y
ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de
lesiones y uno de daños por imprudencia, sino de un
solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte
de una persona y ademas se ocasionan daños, existe
un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun
cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a
consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se
produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de
daños, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto
culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and
rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
Page 66 of 119
 ... The prosecution's contention might be true.
But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant has been previously cleared by
the inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the
exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and
dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO
PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA
were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No.
L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town
plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province
of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of
their superior strength, and with the decided
purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
combustible liquid to the body of Bayani
Miranda and with the use of fire did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is
the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision
finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting
in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando
Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the
death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating
the aforestated mitigating circumstance in
favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison
term ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and Samson to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the
accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages
of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be
deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the
present appeal and assigned the following errors committed by
the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY
THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE
IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO
GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY
SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the
accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for
Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May
19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was
a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion
was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with
his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
Page 67 of 119
several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be
drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the
deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They
made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the
accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body
of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter
was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the
accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch
out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water
the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also
poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the
same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer
Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario
Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon
inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the
persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson
as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for
treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought Gabion,
the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo
Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two
accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused
remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied
upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision
of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident,
accused-appellants gave their written statements to the police.
The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that
he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the
contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set
the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on
Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy
of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any
participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the
offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants
repudiated their written statements alleging that they were
extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated
them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged
in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the
commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-
appellants were mentioned and discussed in the decision of
the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the
sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The
said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F'
and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and
convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of
Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution
suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the
incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other
persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented
as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that
the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the
prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who
witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears
on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same
facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline
and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as
testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as
prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that
their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-
presentation does not give rise to the presumption that
evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize
as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness
Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested by the
mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual
event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the
deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth about
the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that
she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the
first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the
accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both
Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had
no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion
had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the
effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and
then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-
appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination
that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased,
he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only
when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a
commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination,
Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the
Court on cross-
examination that you were
reading comics when you
saw Pugay poured
gasoline unto Bayani
Miranda and lighted by
Samson. How could you
possibly see that incident
while you were reading
comics?
A. I put down the comics
which I am reading and I
saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also
before Bayani was poured
with gasoline and lighted
and burned later you had a
talk with Pugay, is that
correct?
A. When he was pouring
gasoline on Bayani
Miranda I was trying to
prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify.
According to you a while
ago you had a talk with
Pugay and as a matter of
fact, you told him not to
pour gasoline. That is what
Page 68 of 119
I want to know from you, if
that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani
being tickled with a stick
on his ass, do you mean to
say you come to know that
Pugay will pour gasoline
unto him?
A. I do not know that would
be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k)
Pugay in the first place not
to pour gasoline before he
did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani,
sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay
tickling Bayani with a stick
on his ass you tried
according to you to ask
him not to and then later
you said you asked not to
pour gasoline. Did Pugay
tell you he was going to
pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to
know..... how did you
come to know he was
going to pour gasoline that
is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was
holding on a container of
gasoline. I thought it was
water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while
Pugay was tickling Bayani
with a stick on his ass, he
later got hold of a can of
gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up
the can of gasoline, was
that the time you told him
not to pour gasoline when
he merely pick up the can
of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the
gasoline on the body of
Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you
told Pugay not to pour
gasoline he was already in
the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of
Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30,
1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was
reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading when the
group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the
engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the
process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased
when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later
saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there
was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately
before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity
between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson.
Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely
wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and
not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386;
U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal
responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from
under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused
knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may be committed by his companions
who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree
with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et.
al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and
exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if
not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, all those
of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed
to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an
indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the
accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends
that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act
in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just
been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim
was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself
against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused
Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the
incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.
For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be
deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very
well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was
gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve
Page 69 of 119
him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim
would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on
his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his
act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the
instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of
the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing
any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only
guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed
to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as
there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be
drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused
Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the
deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-
17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an
indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for
P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his
hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the
aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications
above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the
full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from
the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating
the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread -
asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to
flourish with very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties
is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to
withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of
the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would compel
obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for
non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with
it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more
attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in
threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law
as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous
attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its
severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official
to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA
7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all
of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are
Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired
by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the
Page 70 of 119
 damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as:
(a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562,
inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e)
and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA
No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in
the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the
grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to
prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the
charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder
Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable
cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June
2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than
one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or
on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires
less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to
the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle
that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with
the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes
its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by
the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of
a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation
is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that
as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and
the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the
force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must
be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is
indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by
Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has
miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements
of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by
himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
Page 71 of 119
 of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining,
receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended
to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f)
by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-
gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application;
the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and
more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a
public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the
language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to
have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain
and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by
himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a.Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE
DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR
LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS,
OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE
OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous
- as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
Page 72 of 119
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the REP. GARCIA: Two.
innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of
defense. the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being combination, two acts.
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute
is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and are two.
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
REP. GARCIA: A series.
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will
is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but
meaning to those words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers - who we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to So x x x x
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be
combination. Series.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series"
to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991 REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of REP. GARCIA: Yes.
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES
OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean
to say that number one and two or number one and something REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
these be included also?
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result
in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
Page 73 of 119
the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts
are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several
or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts
of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered
by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination"
and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4,
in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at
least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall
unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal.
As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with
him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The
doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can
only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But
the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. 12It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity,
is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine,
on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context
of the First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
Page 74 of 119
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law
on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in
sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of
case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is
generally disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined
than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more
than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all
about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively
deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees
by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with
full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty
unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details,
and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Actfor being vague. Petitioners posited,
among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition
by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does
not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function and
that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was violated because they were left to
guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and
inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes
by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute
may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the
same Information does not mean that the indictment charges
three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of
the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x
(Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted
penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in
giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference
which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or
adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague
or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation.
Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was
held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Page 75 of 119
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.
It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by
a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our
free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30 The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo
Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the
House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our
criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act
and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused
especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is
less than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is
₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of
public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of
jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he
was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the
offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but
considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the
amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt
criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the
crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million.
Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence,
it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to
prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved
is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts
of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be
₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not
be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in
these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100
million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on
the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these
fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two
(2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that
they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing
hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a
by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to
make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it
necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or
combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of
Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive
element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot
be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on
the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual
crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of
the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application
of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4
lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of
Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the
acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two
pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no
way by which we can avoid Section 4.
Page 76 of 119
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned
that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4
contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and
that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood
from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and
opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that
moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and
vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply
be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily
resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides,
Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application
of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act
from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of
its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be
treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so,
the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice
Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in
se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution
for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on
the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required
to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels
that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting
the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime
must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any
person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder."
There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is
a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a
straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death,
are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government]
terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual
threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
Page 77 of 119
context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government officials,
employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of
plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though
they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the
acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice
it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the
State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time
as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more
ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic
and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly
tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will
spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the
moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law,
indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society
against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history
of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that
may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion
call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices,
shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November
2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of
Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a
suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric
Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer,
Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings 3 from its operations in a pit
in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It
appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near
the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged
petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6
of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 8 6 of Presidential Decree No.
984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD
984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),9 and Article 365 10 of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property. 11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following
grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the
Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a
single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul
Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations
contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or
justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the
MTC12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners’ motion for lack of
"indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x
x." The MTC scheduled petitioners’ arraignment in February
1997. However, on petitioners’ motion, the MTC issued a
Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"),
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants
pointing to "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged
into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on
the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to
institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and siltation of
the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of
evidence required to prove the single fact of pollution
constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law
which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the
same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements
constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant
to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and
conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were
Page 78 of 119
allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is
required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending
arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that
as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the
Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of
Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067)
should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same
elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
(RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46
for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-
47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x
x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[]
Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine
Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full
blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the
damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent
act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the
prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage
to property.13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the
remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of
28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to
be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they
intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of
record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the
charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion
of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch
94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with
the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.
Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public
respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s
appeal consolidated with petitioners’ petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
respondent’s appeal but denied petitioners’ petition. Branch 94
set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered
those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated
Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of
the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of
the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws
are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of
proving each violation are not the same with each other.
Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which
resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was
the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each
charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule
in this jurisdiction that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the
elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of
these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not although they stemmed from a single
act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of
discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD
1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC
"proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. 16Petitioners further
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same
acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of
the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals
affirmed Branch 94’s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion
to quash the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous
in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides the grounds upon which an information
may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x
[Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public
respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Relova for being violative of their right against multiple
prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s
argument with respect to the variances in the mens rea of the
two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however,
decided the case in the context of the second sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first
sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely
apply to the case at Bench since the Informations filed against
the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct
laws which are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s
understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been
[charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the
elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws
require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
Page 79 of 119
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of
evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial
Court’s quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for
violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no
error in the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to
quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of
Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE
(P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D.
984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION
OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984),
THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942)
AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE
BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT
OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING
OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS
FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE
CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS.
RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN
ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED
BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT
FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY
A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS
OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE,
RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER
ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners
except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges
and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or
information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of
Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a
single Information charges more than one offense. 21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 22 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of
such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
his defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging
only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this
score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one
offense only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property — because (1) all the charges filed against them
"proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of
necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled
that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying
the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v.
Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from
the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its
elements are present. 28 However, for the limited purpose of
controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged
with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94’s
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and
Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on
which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element
not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element
to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without
prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of
the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump
said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA]
7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water
Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
Page 80 of 119
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must
be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is
the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on
its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that
must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on
the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the
Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there
was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily
proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be
liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these
laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be
established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of
necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage
to property. This element is not required under the previous
laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river
system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the
terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover,
the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in
contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which
are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against
petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent
with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony
(such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals
that their prosecution contravenes this Court’s ruling in People
v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in
Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the
accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by
a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting
City Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia")
with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did,
not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the
same but because the act giving rise to the charges was
punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling
within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the
same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereofand that the
second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course
correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved – which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioner’s position is that it must be examined, not under the
terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the
general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for
an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first
or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to
the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged
under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same
act or set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against
multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because
the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being
prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national
statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In
short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section
21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the
same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14
March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction
of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court 2of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of
Republic Act No. 6646. 3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated
March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray,
Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with
violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
Page 81 of 119
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the
canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal
Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District
Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and
Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by
senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly
disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-
nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of
said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419,
008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine
hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement
of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of
Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five
thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all
the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who
was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court
pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for
decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034
and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a
violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is
the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however,
accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further,
she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and
the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the
Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila,
until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum
penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one
(1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as
errors of the appellate court:
I Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED
THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE
MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED,
AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE
TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID
NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE
IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE
REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE
PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is
erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and conjectures,
instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on
her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a
defense in the violation of an election law, which falls under the
class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act
No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could
good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law. 8Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in
crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue
is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 11provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts
and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume
of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount
of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it
could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional
election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or
decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
Page 82 of 119
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to
injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person
who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear. 13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995
before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the
municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results
thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal
Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in
each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of
Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman,
reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as
secretary of the Board, entering the number in the
Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six
Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each
candidate for each precincts were entered by accused
Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were
added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de
Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed
to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received
by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the
subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of
Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused
Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added
all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine
tape on which the grand total was reflected was
handed to appellant who reads the same and accused
Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column
for grand total in the Statement of Votes. 14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number
of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts
listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in
the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes
received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No.
008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant,
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or
5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant
actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of
Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and
Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was
indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was
subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as
secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she
was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it
was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it
was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the
erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the
Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6")
and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921
votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure
accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves
not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a
matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the
law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual
votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve
petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646.
The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in
an election is already punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual
conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has consistently
held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the
trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be
exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in
canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part
would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal
board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose
entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. 22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been
received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and statement
of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes.
The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error
due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass
is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record
unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere
transfer of totals from one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence
to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed
by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla,
against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch
115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision
due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting
said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign
currency out of the country.
Page 83 of 119
 Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent
French Franc
judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his
"commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his US Dollar
appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4,
1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge onEnglish Pound
February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary
after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointedMalaysian
to Dollar
his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor
(in checks)
and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations
of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter
Australian Dollar
did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him;
that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated byPound
British
respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against
him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication USof Dollar
malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject respondent to
Canadian Dollar
harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision,
of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is
based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights
and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the
questioned decision, they are committed in good faith.
Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition
(should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent
judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the
law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be
held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively,
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of
acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a
Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended
by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9,
1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines
bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was
found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in
various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss
Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder,
French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar,
Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without
any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations
which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival
in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration
No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and
Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No.
06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of
Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No.
960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in
the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO
CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out
of the Philippines through the Manila
International Airport the following foreign
currencies in cash and in checks:
se Yen Y 32,800,000.00
ranc SW. FR 6,9000.00
an Dollar A$ 17,425.00
ore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
he Marck DM 18,595.00
an Dollar CS 13,330.00
ng Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
ilder HFL 430.00
F/6,860.00
US$ 73,950.00
5,318.00
M$. 14,760.00
A$ 7,750.00
700.00
US$ 17,630.00
C$ 990.00
without authority from the
Central Bank.
Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-
10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by
herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as
follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange;
exceptions. — No person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit
foreign exchange in any form, out of the
Philippines directly, through other persons,
through the mails or through international
carriers except when specifically authorized
by the Central Bank or allowed under
existing international agreements or Central
Bank regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take
out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. For purposes of establishing the
amount of foreign exchange brought in or out
of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival
in the Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883,
which reads as follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign
Exchange .— That any person who shall
engage in the trading or purchase and sale
of foreign currency in violation of existing
laws or rules and regulations of the Central
Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal,
(minimum of 12 years and I day and
maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less
than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a
businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million
Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0
times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2,
1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the
reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in
business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that
Page 84 of 119
he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in
business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi
Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had
their own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he
came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought
US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried
to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to
accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to
the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his
bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on April 3,1986
(Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and
4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986
which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00
Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He
also testified that his business associates, as per their
agreement to invest in some business with him in the
Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a
common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the
Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing
in, and all declarations were handed to and kept by him; these
currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for
the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present
all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the
airport, his answer was that he was not asked to present the
declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also
testified on cross-examination that the reason he was going
back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to
be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of his
group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become
widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged by
his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the
money out of the Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused,
stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine
is whether or not the accused wilfully violated
Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that
the accused had in his possession the
foreign currencies when he was about to
depart from the Philippines did not by that
act alone make him liable for Violation of
Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which
the act of bringing foreign currencies out of
the country was done the very intention. It is
that which qualifies the act as criminal or not.
There must be that clear intention to violate
and benefit from the act done. Intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is shown
by overt acts of a person.
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which,
according to him, tended to show that the accused had no
wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent
in his decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the
explanation of the defense that the
currencies confiscated and/or seized from
the accused belong to him and his business
associates abovenamed. And from the
unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of
Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question
came from abroad and not from the local
source which is what is being prohibited by
the government. Yes, simply reading the
provisions of said circular will, readily show
that the currency declaration is required for
the purpose of establishing the amount of
currency being brought by tourist or
temporary non-resident visitors into the
country. The currency declarations,
therefore, is already (sic) intended to serve
as a guideline for the Customs authorities to
determine the amounts actually brought in by
them to correspond to the amounts that
could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed,
this Court is amazed and really has its
misgivings in the manner currency
declarations were made as testified to by the
Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of
Customs representative never took part in all
these declarations testified to by no less than
five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly,
these employees are the favorites of these
travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the
authorities must do something to remedy the
evident flaw in the system for effective
implementation of the questioned Central
Bank Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court
would not be able to pin criminal
responsibility on the accused. This is due to
its steadfast adherence and devotion to the
rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost
lost faith and erosion of confidence of the
people in the administration of justice. Courts
of Justice are guided only by the rule of
evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution
must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of
malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In
requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross
ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at
the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport
had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in
assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central
Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he
was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations made by him on the
occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in
a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused
based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing
out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the
customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him
and his alleged business associates on several previous
occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be
used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or
undetermined business ventures; that this money was kept in
the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take
the money out as he and his alleged business associates were
afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July
6,1986 might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally
irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused
under the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge
"hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that
the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in
the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at
the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign
exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not
matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story
admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for
other people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that
the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the
possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension
consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash
in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all),
which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were
part of the funds which he and his supposed associates had
brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored
the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented
by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other
Page 85 of 119
people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his
having the foreign exchange in his possession. Although
contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the
respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale
of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had
brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the
Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in
cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for
the purpose of investing in business even before they knew
and had come to an agreement as to the specific business
venture in which they were going to invest. These and other
circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused
so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the
respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of
the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he
rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this
case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of
sound and fair administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in
his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount
of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under
Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that
forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the
Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information,
which according to the respondent should be respected since
the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the
matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the
alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular."
In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge
again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of
the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be
taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount
of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited
CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the
Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the
purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00
or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their
foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the
Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely
provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of
foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist
upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is
bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the
amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify
returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is
caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of
said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial
Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct
affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the
responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration
of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining
the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135
SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be
DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits
and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited
with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of
government service, including government-owned and/or
controlled agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live
ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP
131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y
with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D.
18662 thru the following Information:3
That on or about the 26th day of October,
1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby
Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
long and one (1) short magazines with
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver
Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6)
live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the
same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of
petitioner,5 but granted his application for
bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a
plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any
plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be
present in any and all stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered
judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime
charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28,
1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of
Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on
December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond.
The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now
assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's
conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances
considered, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the
P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-
appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU
Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2)
6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is
Page 86 of 119
 directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
accused-appellant and thereafter his
transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons
thru the Philippine National Police where the
said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his
appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme
Court. This shall be immediately executory.
The Regional Trial Court is further directed to
submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26,
1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of
arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by respondent
court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution 18 copy of
which was received by petitioner on September 27,
1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari with application
for bail 19followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed
by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental
petition" 21 and an urgent motion for the separate
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the
Solicitor-General 22 sought the denial of the
application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a
Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The
Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to
file a consolidated comment on the petitions and
thereafter required the petitioner to file his
reply. 24 However, after his vigorous resistance and
success on the intramural of bail (both in the
respondent court and this Court) and thorough
exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in
the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now
makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation
In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's
acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by
evidence on record and given credence by respondent court, is
as follows: 26
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his
compadre Danny Perez were inside the
Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto.
Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter
from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN,
February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their
ride on motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along
McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the
restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a
Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the
highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. (p.
7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus:
"Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota
makaaksidente ya." (p. 7, ibid). True enough,
immediately after the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a
screeching sound produced by the sudden
and hard braking of a vehicle running very
fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening
sound of the vehicle hitting something (p.
8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had
happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying
that Manarang had been right in his
observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate
and immediately saw the vehicle occupying
the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it
a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid).
Manarang, being a member of both the
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay
Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to
report the incident to the Philippine National
Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took
out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
controller of the Philippine National Police of
Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time
Manarang completed the call, the vehicle
had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p.
11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the
accident and found out that the vehicle had
hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while
he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p.
11 ibid). During the chase he was able to
make out the plate number of the vehicle as
PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1193).
He called the Viper through the radio once
again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle
heading north with plate number PMA 777
was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20,
TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person
of SP02 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the
second radio call flashed the message to all
units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of
the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by
the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake
Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp.
5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C.
Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda
immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle
(Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves
near the south approach of Abacan bridge
since it was the only passable way going to
the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about
ten (10) seconds to cover the distance
between their office and the Abacan bridge
(p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that
responded to the flash message from SPO2
Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the
Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then
conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue
(pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board
were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan
and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben
Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to
proceed to the MacArthur Highway to
intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA
777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to
chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and
run incident, even passing through a flooded
portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2)
feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo
church but he could not catch up with the
same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993).
When he saw that the car he was chasing
went towards Magalang, he proceeded to
Abacan bridge because he knew
Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-
14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan
bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all
vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). He approached them
and informed them that there was a hit and
run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that
the two police officers already knew about
the incident, Manarang went back to where
he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When
Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant,
he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit
Page 87 of 119
and run incident emerging from the corner
adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN,
February 15, 1993). He saw that the license
plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the
identifying number PMA 777 and he followed
it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p.
10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the
vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away
from their position, the two police officers
boarded their Mobile car, switched on the
engine, operated the siren and strobe light
and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p.
11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle
forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted
from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle
with plate number PMA 777 and instructed
its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver
rolled down the window and put his head out
while raising both his hands. They
recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla,
appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was
no one else with him inside the vehicle (p.
24). At that moment, Borja noticed that
Manarang arrived and stopped his
motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant
(p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to
alight to which appellant complied. Appellant
was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16,
TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he
alighted with both his hands raised, a gun
(Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of his
waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February
23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid).
SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the
gun but appellant held the former's hand
alleging that the gun was covered by legal
papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however,
insisted that if the gun really was covered by
legal papers, it would have to be shown in
the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit
and run incident which was angrily denied by
appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd
had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2
Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and
find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were
arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on
board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8,
1993). As the most senior police officer in the
group, SPO Mercado took over the matter
and informed appellant that he was being
arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact
that the plate number of his vehicle was
dangling and the railing and the hood were
dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant,
however, arrogantlydenied his misdeed and,
instead, played with the crowd by holding
their hands with one hand and pointing to
SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan,
kinuha ang baril ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid).
Because appellant's jacket was short, his
gesture exposed a long magazine of an
armalite rifle tucked in appellant 's back right,
pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this
and so when appellant turned around as he
was talking and proceeding to his vehicle,
Mercado confiscated the magazine from
appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that
appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside
the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2
Mercado prevented appellant from going
back to his vehicle by opening himself the
door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He
saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat.
It had a long magazine filled with live bullets
in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid).
He asked appellant for the papers covering
the rifle and appellant answered angrily that
they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO
Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of
firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then
read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp.
28-29, ibid).
The police officers brought appellant to the
Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard
(pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta
pistol (Exhibit "L") with a single round in its
chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid)
loaded with seven (7) other live bullets.
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a
black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits
M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant
had been interrogated by the Chief of the
Traffic Division, he was transferred to the
Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario
Street beside the City Hall Building where he
and the firearms and ammunitions were
turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio
(pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession
of the firearms stating that he used them for
shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum
receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-
18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification
(Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record
Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms
confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a
.380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p.
6, ibid). A second Certification dated
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain
Espino stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood
C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was
illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken
in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized,
under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is
convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands
on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change
of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his
arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the
arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Page 88 of 119
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following
instances: 28
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it
has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run — an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds
at once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang,
he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud,
saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the
erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report
to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to
the Abacan bridge where he found responding
policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already
positioned near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest
by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were
not at the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent
action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring
petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an
arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability,
could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained
civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own
life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains
more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the
offense herein involved fortunately did not become an
additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved
crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set
in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police
was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take
action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
raining nighttime — all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. 36 Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and
ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually committing another
offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could
likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's
report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as
reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's
Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea. 41 Petitioner's
belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his
arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently
waived such irregularities and defects. 43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from
petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in
evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search
and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing
jurisprudence 46,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the
elements of which are: 47
(a). a prior valid
intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b). the evidence
was inadvertently
discovered by the police
who had the right to be
where they are;
(c). the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence
without further search. 48
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
Page 89 of 119
 4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms
and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search
which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith
& Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for
they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine
tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when
he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle
which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took
a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the . . .
police officers should happen to discover a
criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and
the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by
law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant. 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag
containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture
of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to
quash the information estopped him from assailing
any purported defect. 57
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were
products of an active search done by the authorities on the
person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful
arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers in the
vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of
immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was contemporaneous
with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible
evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before
the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could
not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an
appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the
subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission
Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt.
Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force
Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions 66 were
seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless
search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the
second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift
from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the
assumption that the Memorandum Receipts
and Mission Order were issued before the
subject firearms were seized and confiscated
from him by the police officers in Angeles
City. That is not so. The evidence adduced
indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order were prepared and executed
long after appellant had been apprehended
on October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not
show any document as proof of his authority
to possess and carry the subject firearms.
During the preliminary investigation of the
charge against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions he could not,
despite the ample time given him, present
any proper document showing his authority.
If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at
the time of apprehension, at least during the
preliminary investigation. But neither
appellant nor his counsel inform the
prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At
the initial presentation of his evidence in
court, appellant could have produced these
documents to belie the charged against him.
Appellant did not. He did not even take the
witness stand to explain his possession of
the subject firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence
filed after the prosecution rested contain no
allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order authorizing appellant to
possess and carry the subject firearms.
At the initial presentation of appellant's
evidence, the witness cited was one James
Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued.
Superintendent Gumtang was not even
mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court
but was not presented by the defense.
Subsequent hearings were reset until the
defense found Superintendent Gumtang who
appeared in court without subpoena on
January 13, 1994. 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and
present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if they
were really issued and existing before his apprehension.
Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were
intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by
the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound
their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused
claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the
earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the
long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering
inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well
as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in
providing that:
Page 90 of 119
 VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested approved at the PC Regional Command
for verification by enforcement level or its equivalent level in other major
units/personnels such as PNP, Military services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at
Brigade and other Military Police Units of higher levels of command. 75Circular No. 1,
AFP, the Mission Order should be shown dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry
without resentment to avoid embarrassment of Justice likewise provides as follows:
and/or misunderstanding.
If mission orders are issued to civilians (not
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the members of the uniformed service), they
injunction that the confidential instruction will must be civilian agents included in the
be carried out through all legal means and regular plantilla of the government agency
do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. involved in law enforcement and are
In the latter event, this Mission Order is receiving regular compensation for the
rendered inoperative in respect to such service they are rendering.
violation. 68
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
explanation. accentuated all the more by the testimony and
certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring
Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed
Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied or registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission
Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to Q. In all these files that
sign in his you have just mentioned
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly Mr. Witness, what did you
misspelled as find, if any?
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of
Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and A. I found that a certain
Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance Robin C. Padilla is a
of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who licensed registered owner
issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is of one 9 mm pistol, Smith
neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere and Wesson with Serial
deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized No. TCT 8214 and the
source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt following firearms being
are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission asked whether it is
Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas outside Supt. registered or not, I did not
Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior find any records, the M-16
approval "by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in and the caliber .357 and
this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a the caliber .380 but there
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of is a firearm with the same
the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that: serial number which is the
same as that licensed
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for and/or registered in the
a CCS firearms without corresponding name of one Albert
certification from the corresponding Villanueva Fallorina.
Responsible Supply Officer of the
appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has Q. So in short, the only
been officially taken up in that units property licensed firearms in the
book, and that report of such action has name of accused Robin C.
been reported to higher AFP authority. Padilla is a pistol, Smith
and Wesson, caliber 9 mm
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been with Serial No. TCT 8214?
authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present
the corresponding certification as well. A. Yes, sir.

What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as Q. And the firearms that
certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not were the subject of this
even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the case are not listed in the
list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could names of the accused in
justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by this case?
petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866
issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus: A. Yes, sir. 77

No Mission Order shall be issued to any xxx xxx xxx

civilian agent authorizing the same to carry
firearms outside residence unless he/she is
included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law
enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is
rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian
agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which specifically
required the use of firearms(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local
Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
Page 91 of 119
 PNFEO5 28 November 1992
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla
of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith
and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number
TCT8214 covered by License No. RL
M76C4476687.
Further certify that the following firearms are
not registered with this Office per verification
from available records on file this Office as of
this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380,
Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva
Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig,
MM under Re-Registered License.
This certification is issued pursuant to
Subpoena from City of Angeles.
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:(Sgd.)OSE MARIO
M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch 78
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated
that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in
fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that
petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was
overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification
may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidences 81 that
an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber
pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore,
entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction
especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was
presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial
court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by
the Court with respect and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in
applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-
subversive context" and adds that respondent court should
have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of
firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17
years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial
court and the respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the
offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal,
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866
which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty
for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for
simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel
and excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
"The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188).
Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment
must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive",
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community" 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional
prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the
nature of the punishment that determines whether it
is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not
cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of
the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of
P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just
recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal
possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the
Constitution. . . " 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of
the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress
which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to
interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the
fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en
banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for
simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation by
the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances have been
alleged or proved, In accordance with the
doctrine regarding special laws explained
in People v. Simon, 94 although Presidential
Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the
penalties therein were taken from the
Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or
determining the proper period should be
applied. Consequently, the penalty for the
offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex
penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8
months and 1 day to 20 years.
Page 92 of 119
 This penalty, being that which is to be
actually imposed in accordance with the
rules therefor and not merely imposable as a
general prescription under the law, shall be
the maximum of the range of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum
thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any
period of the penalty next lower in degree,
which is, prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court
of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court
of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-
appellant.
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some
"illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing
forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers.
These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay exorbitant
"placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably,
they find themselves unable to leave for their purported country
of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves
unceremoniously repatriated. This Court once described their
plight in a local proverb as being "naghangad ng kagitna, isang
salop ang nawala." 1
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, 2appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley,
seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable
under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal
recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by
the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised
Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and
stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1397 3 (Francisco T. Labadchan —
P45,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria
Asil — P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
(Cherry Pi-ay — P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-
1426 (Corazon del Rosario — P40,000.00); (5) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan — P24,200.00); (6)
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega —
P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B.
Salbino — P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
(Mariano Damolog — P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino — P25,000.00); (10) Criminal
Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega — P25,000.00) and (11)
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge —
P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount
involved and the date of the commission of the crime, the
following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
typified the other informations for the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December,
1991, and sometime prior to or
subsequent thereto, at Buyagan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to
defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS
and by means of deceit through false
representations and pretenses made by
her prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS, by then and there representing
herself as a duly authorized or licensed
recruiter for overseas employment, when
in truth and in fact she was not, thereby
inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS to give and deliver to her the
total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00),
Philippine Currency, for placement
abroad and after having received it, she
appropriated and misappropriated the
same for her own use and benefit and
despite-repeated demands made upon
(her) to return the same, she refused,
failed, neglected, and still refuses, fails
and neglects to comply therewith, all to
the damage and prejudice of ADELINE
TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum
aforesaid.
Contrary to law. 4
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of
the Labor Code, five separate informations were also
instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases
(with the names of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No.
92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in
these indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991
and subsequent thereto at Buyagan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit
one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas
employment, by then and there ably
misrepresenting herself as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiter when in
truth and in fact she fully knew it to be
false but by reason of her said
misrepresentations which were
completely relied upon by Arthur Juan,
she was able to obtain from the latter the
total amount of TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to
the damage and prejudice of Arthur Juan
in the total sum aforesaid.
Contrary to Law. 5
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal
recruitment in large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1, of
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended,
filed on 16 April 1993, read:
That in or about the months of August
and September, 1992, in the Municipality
Page 93 of 119
 of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly recruit the
following: PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO
BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL
OPDAS, BRANDO B. SALBINO, DEMBER
LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for
overseas employment, by then and there
misrepresenting herself as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiter when in
truth and in fact she was not and by
reason of her said misrepresentation
which was completely relied upon by the
said complainants whom she recruited,
either individually or as a group
amounting to illegal recruitment in large
scale causing economic sabotage, she
was able to obtain and received from
them the aggregate total amount of ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P175,000.00), Philippine
Currency, all to the damage and prejudice
of the foregoing complainants in the total
sum aforesaid.
Contrary to law. 6
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal
recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed were
raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated at
the instance of the prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she
was soon arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation
Service ("CIS").
The Evidence for the Prosecution. —
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1396
Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy
Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to appellant
by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the
house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad,
Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for
abroad. After Labadchan had expressed interest in
applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to
prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid
that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his
departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount of
P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991. Appellant, in turn,
received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to
"brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on
the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by
then the balance of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle
the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When he
requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the
amount in the old receipt for the P30,000.00 previously
given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers
to fill up and gave last-minute instructions before she
boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to
Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince
Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in
Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other people, among
them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of
09 October 1991, Labadchan and the others were told to
go to the airport with Tagle, where appellant was
supposed to give the travel papers including passports
and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however,
appellant told the group that their flight had been re-
scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to
Baguio City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport
only to be told this time, however, that his passport was
still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told
her husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign
Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he
saw that while his picture appeared on it, the passport was
made out in the name of a person from Negros Occidental.
Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the passport
just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed
inside the terminal but only to be later sent out because
the ticket he had was one intended for passage from
Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and company
were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all
home with a promise that another departure date would be
set. She also took back the "show money" of US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but
nothing tangible came out of her assurances. Finally,
Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the
money he had given her would be refunded. When this
promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported
the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI").
In that office, appellant executed a promissory note stating
that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which
included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for
getting a passport, to Labadchan. 7
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1416
Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village,
Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder sister,
Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for
abroad. During the second week of January 1992, she,
along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellant's house
in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she
could have a job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for
an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee.
Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January
1992 at her (Victoria's) shop in Shopper's Lane, Baguio
City which appellant acknowledged by issuing a receipt
for the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house
in Buyagan after three weeks.
When Victoria went to appellant's house as so directed,
appellant told her that her flight had been postponed
supposedly because prior applicants had to be
accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven more
times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been
allegedly "fooled" by the "main office" in Manila.
Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional
P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April
1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at
her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave a
corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still "nothing happened," Victoria
demanded from appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an
"advance" of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with
appellant's signature affixed thereon would evidence that
payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of
the promised refund. 8
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal
Case No 92-CR-1415
Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop,
Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by
appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a
textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a monthly salary of
US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she
would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she could be
deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave
it to appellant at the latter's residence during the first week
of April 1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after
having paid the total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told
Page 94 of 119
her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in
Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead
met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellant's friend
and accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a
Korean. There, Cherry met, among other compatriots,
Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized
that she was not going to have a job in the factory
promised by appellant. Instead, she was made to work for
the Korean applying rugby on and folding leather jackets.
About a month later, men from the Korean Immigration
accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by
Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were
informed that they were illegal workers. After the
investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but
on 08 August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by
appellant that they would get a refund of their money.
Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her
experience in Korea. 9
Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherry's "boyfriend" who later was to
become her husband, corroborated Cherry's testimony
that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry.
Thereafter, appellant also received P27,000.00 from
Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which
amount came from him. In both instances, appellant
signed receipts for the payments. The receipts were
among Cherry's papers confiscated in Korea. 10
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1426
Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48
Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known appellant, an
acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she
happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone
booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant,
representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to
persuade Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed
interest. From then on, appellant would visit Corazon in
her brother's house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant
was able to convince Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00,
she could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant the
amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance of P25,000.00
in May 1991. The payments were both made in the
presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued
the corresponding receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991.
Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea,
to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon,
including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept
on dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman
would answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain
Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellant's friend, took
them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their "show money" of
US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and
the following morning, a Korean took them to a house
proximately two hours away by car from the airport. For
about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on
leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a
policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the airport.
All that the immigration and airport personnel would tell
them was that they should be thankful they were only
being repatriated home. Immigration and airport
authorities confiscated everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazon's money.
Not having received the promised refund, Corazon went to
the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992,
she executed her sworn statement. 11
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in
whose house the latter would stay whenever she was in
Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she
gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand
pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina,
and that some time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew
P25,000.00 from the bank which she likewise paid to
appellant. 12
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1428
Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay,
Benguet, first met appellant in her house at Buyagan, La
Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez,
Tirso Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see
appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea.
Juan promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told
that he could work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a
month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00.
Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991.
On 09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan
went to the airport and gave appellant another P15,000.00;
the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to
be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction basis.
Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that
day (09 October 1991) because the airplane was already
full. Appellant took back Juan's passport, telling Juan that
he should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant,
however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five
more times until it became clear to Juan that he had been
deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00,
including the US$100.00 that would have been his pocket
money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the
amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the
unfortunate incident. 13
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao,
Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting
workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister,
went to see appellant at her house in Buyagan some time
in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also
went to see appellant. When she produced the required
identification pictures and P1,500.00 for passport
processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a
factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of
US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by Adeline the
additional P35,000.00 balance by installment. The first
installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992,
evidenced by a receipt signed by "Antonine Saley," with
the remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on
her flight for abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure.
Adeline, together with some other applicants, thrice went
to appellant's office at the Shopper's Lane to check. She
also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa
terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that
she just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated,
finally demanded a refund of the amount she had paid but
appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to
Benguet. 14
—0—
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-
CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had been
submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish
the People's case, respectively, in —
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M.
Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker,
Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for
overseas employment. Interested, he, in the company of
his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellant's house in
Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants
Page 95 of 119
Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and Brando Salbino.
Appellant assured the group that they could get employed
in Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00.
She told them that the processing and placement fees
would amount to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his
companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in
Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for
the amount. She told Arcega to just wait "for the results."
On 30 September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for another
P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time
were his nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon,
Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino.
Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon her
signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his
employment abroad was assured. She stressed, however,
that the balance of P15,000.00 should be paid before his
departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with
appellant in October 1992 and then in December 1992, he
finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in
Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned that
appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he
also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit
before Atty. Justinian Licnachan. 15
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill,
Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July
1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his
brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she was
recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she
could help him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00
monthly salary. Salbino submitted various documents
required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid
appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
"temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel
papers could be processed. The payment was receipted.
On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for
which appellant again issued an acknowledgment receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When
she failed to show up, he went to appellant's house in
Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week,
he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her.
Appellant's where abouts could not be determined. Having
failed to locate her, Salbino and his companions went to
the POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the
POEA office that they were to learn that appellant was not
in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others,
then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty.
Licnachan. 16
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos
Street, Baguio City, went to appellant's residence in
Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his
co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was
recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told
Damolog that she was licensed to recruit workers. He
forthwith applied for a position at a factory in Taiwan with
a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a month.
He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the
amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office.
Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog was then
supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog
went to Manila to see what had happened to his
application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in
Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had
meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant
in Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-
data form for "screening purposes." Like Peter Arcega,
Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was
also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went
back to Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00
each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and
Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino,
returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his P15,000.00
to appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt,
signed by "Annie Saley" which, according to appellant,
was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be
among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting
Damolog and his companions to repair to appellant's
house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog
proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to wait a few
more days. When still "nothing happened," Damolog and
his companions went to the POEA office where Atty.
Licnachan issued a certification stating that appellant was
not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his
companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed
before Atty. Licnachan 17against appellant.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992 looking
for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to
Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant could help.
Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect
of getting employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to
see her on 20 September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog,
Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo
Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellant's residence
in Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of them
if they wanted her to be "responsible for representing"
them to get themselves employed in Taiwan with a
monthly income of P15,000.00. When the group agreed,
appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form.
Appellant also made them understand that they would
each have to pay her the total amount of P40,000.00,
P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid and the
balance to be paid as and when everything would have
been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount
of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a
cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City.
Five days later, Belino went down to Manila after appellant
had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30
September 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of
P15,000.00 demanded by appellant. Appellant signed her
name as "Annie Saley" on the receipt. Appellant informed
Belino that he should wait for her telephone call regarding
the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls
came, Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant in her
house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until
January to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came,
and still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993,
Belino and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino,
Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega, 18 decided to file a
complaint against appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn statements were
taken.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00
to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher
was signed by appellant to acknowledge the payment.
Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to
appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by
"Annie Saley." He was among those who signed the
affidavit-complaint before the POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CN-1645, 19 as a
corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25 year-old
unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City,
Page 96 of 119
said that he, desiring to get an employment abroad,
likewise went to see appellant at her residence in
Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by
appellant to complete the necessary papers, including his
bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon
applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a
monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him,
he should commit to pay a placement fee of P40,000.00 of
which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon
paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was
issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid
appellant another P15,000.00 for which another
acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining
P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his
flight to Taiwan. No further word came from appellant.
Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called
her up, appellant informed them to wait until January 1993.
January came and still nothing happened. In March 1993,
Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a
complaint against appellant. 20
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional
Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request for
verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed
recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was not
authorized to recruit "in the City of Baguio and in the
region" from 1989 "to the present." Atty. Matias issued a
certification to that effect.
—0—
The Case for the Defense. —
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely
assisted the complainants in applying for overseas
employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and
from which she derived a commission. 21
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the
liaison officer of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from
1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the
POEA "contracts for processing job orders for applicants"
and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport.
When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to
Baguio where she engaged in the purchase and sale of
vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she would
not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas
employment by recommending licensed agencies which
could assist said applicants in going abroad. She named
the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings
International as such licensed agencies. She had, in the
process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay,
Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco
Labadchan to name some, sent abroad. 22
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry
went to see her again, this time asking for assistance in
getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry
to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her
to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave
Cherry her tourist visa. For Cherry's visa and plane ticket,
appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00.
Appellant issued a receipt therefor and delivered the
amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn,
issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in
Manila confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry
came back and asked her to look for another travel agency
saying she did not like the work she had in Korea. 23
Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship
Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to
appellant. Since the agency had already been closed,
appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in
Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for
Abu Dhabi where she worked as a domestic helper. In
1991, Corazon again sought appellant's assistance in
getting an employment in Korea. Appellant introduced her
to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped
Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for
P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these
amounts, being for Corazon's ticket and hotel
accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel and
Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to leave for
Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her
tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from
Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was
also issued a receipt by that travel agency showing that
she had turned over to it the amounts received from
Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and other
documents from her. When Corazon returned home in
1991 after going to Korea, she again sought appellant's
help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in
going back to that country. 24
Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable
vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in
securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him
and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and
Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours. Appellant asked from them the amounts of
P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which she turned over to the
travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that
agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents
who arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in
going abroad, seven "were able to leave." The others had
been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the
airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of
January 1993. She gave them back the plane ticket and the
amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund
from the travel agency. The next time she saw Labadchan
was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited
her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a
job for Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast
International failed to push through. 25
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The
latter's sister was a former client at the Friendship
Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia
in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and
Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and
US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel accommodation.
Victoria gave appellant the amount, and the latter issued
corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the
travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant.
The CIS, however, confiscated all the documents in her
attache case. 26 Appellant was able to process
Victoria's visa for Korea but when someone informed the
latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted
to change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that
her visa and ticket for Korea had already been obtained
but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant
returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the
amount to be exchanged into dollars for her "show
money." Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but
appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant
handed over the plane ticket to Victoria. 27
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to
Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was
interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant
took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked
from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket.
Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a
passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that
she was no longer interested in going to Korea and that
her passport application should, instead, be "diverted to
Hongkong." In fact, Adeline was able to leave for
Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because
when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and
Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of
the P10,000.00 she wanted. 28
Fidel Opdas was appellant's client at the Friendship
Agency who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked
her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When
Page 97 of 119
appellant told him that she knew someone who could help,
Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant
introduced them to Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of
Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and Damolog to
submit the necessary documents for their application for
work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando
Salbino who also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas
submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites
and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites
and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he
brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino.
Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two to
Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would
be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later
when Opdas came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to
see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and
Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00
which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two
gave her receipts but these were in the same attache case
that was seized by the CIS agents and never returned. The
group subsequently withdrew their applications although
it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund. 29
In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her
attache case containing documents that could bail her out
of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one
of the three policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch
8, the policemen went to the house of appellant's cousin at
2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25
August 1993. According to Deladia, however, they did not
get anything from appellant because their mission was
only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the
CIS, he did not even hear appellant requesting for the
return of a brief case. 30 Apparently because of what had
turned out to be Deladia's adverse testimony, the defense
presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the
boarding house when appellant was arrested. Santiago
said that he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the
boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have
happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that
when the agents all came out, they had with them an
attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty.
Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one of
the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant.
Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but one of
the men told them that they would "produce" appellant
and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount
of P50,000.00. 31
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that
the P50,000.00 was meant for "bonding purposes" and that
they did not make a formal request for the release of the
brief case. 32
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully,
the responsibility for the crime from appellant to Maritess
and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar
Gaoyen, a 30-year-old farmer, who testified that appellant
had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work
"because it was difficult." While following up his
application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front of
the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that
they knew someone who could "transfer his application to
Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid appellant
P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him to file
charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the
money to him. 33
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its
decision, a "Motion to Reopen Trial" with an urgent motion
to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. 34 In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court,
noting that the "newly discovered evidence" consisted of
affidavits of desistance of seven complainants, found no
merit in the motion. It held that "presentation of the same
does not give valid ground for possible amendment of the
decision as the private complainants had already
testified." It agreed with the prosecutor that "the affidavits
of desistance only (had) the effect of satisfying the civil
liability." 35
The Judgment of the Trial Court. —
On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that
she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours
and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she
claimed were true, said the court, appellant could have
presented her principals; instead, that failure exposed her
to the "adverse inference and legal presumption that
evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced." It
also found "hard to believe," the "self-serving" claim of
appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing
receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was
confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The
trial court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct
assurance, albeit false, that she had the
ability to send the complainants abroad
for work deployment, thereby employing
false pretenses to defraud them. This was
despite her knowing very well that she
was not legally authorized. The
complainants willingly parted with their
money in the hope of overseas
employment deceitfully promised them by
the accused. What makes matters worse
is that these amounts given to the
accused come from hard-earned money,
or worse, could have been borrowed from
money lenders who have no qualms
about collecting usurious interest rates.
Complainants who faithfully relied on the
accused did not hesitate to painstakingly
raise or even beg or borrow money just
so they could give a decent future to their
families even to the extent of leaving
them for far-off lands. But now, all their
dreams are gone, their hopes shattered.
Some may not have even been able to
pay back what they borrowed nor recoup
their losses. Now, more than ever, their
future appears bleaker. But this time, a
glimmering light appears at the end of the
tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down
the iron fist of the law so as to serve the
accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the
hope that those who are trekking or those
who are about to trek the same pilfered
path that the accused took will reconsider
their pursuits before it would be too late,
and in the end, this form of fraud which
invariably victimizes the poor will forever
be stopped. 36
All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned
cases, the Court finds accused Antonine
B. Saley, also known as Annie B. Saley,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
corresponding crime as charged in the
informations and hereby sentences her in
each case, except in Criminal Case NO.
93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate
sentence is not applicable, to suffer an
indeterminate sentence for the duration
hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as
well as the damages due the private
complainants, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
Page 98 of 119
 Imprisonment from Four Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425
(4) Years as MINIMUM to
Six (6) Years as Imprisonment from Four
MAXIMUM and to pay (4) Years as MINIMUM to
Francisco T. Labadchan Six (6) Years as
P45,000.00 for actual MAXIMUM and to pay
damages, plus costs. Corazon del Rosario
P20,000.00 for moral
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 damages, plus costs.

Imprisonment from Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426

Three (3) Years, Six (6)
Months and Twenty-One Imprisonment from One
(21) Days ofprision (1) Year, Seven (7)
correccional as Months and Eleven (11)
MINIMUM to Seven (7) Days of prision
Years, Four (4) Months correccional as
and One (1) Day MINIMUM to Six (6)
of prision mayor as Years, Five (5) Months
MAXIMUM and to pay and Eleven (11) Days
Francisco T. Labadchan ofprision mayor as
P45,000.00 for actual MAXIMUM and to pay
damages, plus costs. Corazon del Rosario
P20,000.00 for moral
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 damages, plus costs.

Imprisonment from Four Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427

(4) Years as MINIMUM to
Six (6) Years as Imprisonment from Four
MAXIMUM and to pay (4) Years as MINIMUM to
Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 Six (6) Years as
for moral damages, plus MAXIMUM and to pay the
costs. costs.

Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428

Imprisonment from One Imprisonment from One

(1) Year, Eight (8) (1) Year, Eight (8)
Months and Twenty-One Months and Twenty-One
(21) Days ofprision (21) Days ofprision
correccional as correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months Years, Five (5) Months
and Eleven (11) Days and Eleven (11) Days
of prision of prision
correccional as correccional as
MAXIMUM and to pay MAXIMUM and to pay the
Victoria As-il P15,000.00 costs.
for actual damages, plus
costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
Imprisonment from One
(1) Year, Eight (8)
Imprisonment from One Months and Twenty-One
(1) Year, Eight (8) (21) Days ofprision
Months and Twenty-One correccional as
(21) Days ofprision MINIMUM to Five (5)
correccional as Years, Five (5) Months
MINIMUM to Five (5) and Eleven (11) Days
Years, Five (5) Months of prision
and Eleven (11) Days correccional as
of prision MAXIMUM and to pay
correccional as Alfredo C. Arcega
MAXIMUM and to pay P25,000.00 for actual
Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 damages, plus costs.
for moral damages, plus
costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
To suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to
Imprisonment from Four pay a fine of One
(4) Years as MINIMUM to Hundred Thousand
Six (6) Years as Pesos (P100,000.00),
MAXIMUM and to pay with subsidiary
Victoria As-il P15,000.00 imprisonment in case of
for actual damages, plus insolvency, and to pay
costs. the costs. She shall also
Page 99 of 119
 pay Twenty-Five Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) each to Imprisonment from One
Peter Arcega, Lorenzo (1) Year, Eight (8)
Belino, Mariano Months and Twenty-One
Damolog, Brando (21) Days ofprision
Salbino, Dembert Leon correccional as
and Alfredo Arcega for MINIMUM to Five (5)
actual damages, plus Years, Five (5) Months
costs. and Eleven (11) Days
of prision
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 correccional as
MAXIMUM and to pay
Imprisonment from One Adeline Tiangge y
(1) Year, Eight (8) Marcos P17,000.00 for
Months and Twenty-One actual damages, plus
(21) Days ofprision costs.
correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) With respect to accused Conchita Tagle
Years, Five (5) Months in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and
and Eleven (11) Days 92-CR-1397, let these cases be sent to the
of prision files without prejudice to their revival as
correccional as soon as she shall have been arrested and
MAXIMUM and to pay brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Brando B. Salbino
P25,000.00 for actual In order that Conchita Tagle may not
damages, plus costs. escape the clutches of the law,
let Alias Warrants of Arrest issue
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La
Trinidad, Benguet and the National
Imprisonment from One Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila
(1) Year, Eight (8) and in Baguio City. Further, the
Months and Twenty-One Commission of Immigration and
(21) Days ofprision Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to
correccional as include her name in the its Hold-
MINIMUM to Five (5) Departure List.
Years, Five (5) Months
and Eleven (11) Days SO ORDERED. 37
of prision
correccional as Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the
MAXIMUM and to pay decision asserting that the trial court had erred in giving
Mariano Damolog credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses
P25,000.00 for actual and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged despite the
damages, plus costs. "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements
of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt. 38 Finding no
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03 April 1995, denied
a reconsideration of its decision. 39 The following day,
Imprisonment from One appellant filed a notice of appeal. 40 The trial court gave
(1) Year, Eight (8) due course to the appeal on 17 April 1995. 41
Months and Twenty-One
(21) Days ofprision The Instant Appeal. —
correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Appellant continues to profess before this Court her
Years, Five (5) Months innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her assertion
and Eleven (11) Days that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the
of prision testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding
correccional as her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various
MAXIMUM and to pay offenses she has been charged with by the
Lorenzo Belino prosecution. 42 She avers that her transactions with the
P25,000.00 for actual complainants have been "limited to her assisting them
damages, plus costs. secure their respective travel visa specifically for tourist"
and that "her assistance to them (has been) only to refer
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 them to travel agencies" such as the Dynasty Travel and
Tours and the Mannings International. She insists that she
Imprisonment from One has remitted the amounts solicited from the complainants
(1) Year, Eight (8) to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol
Months and Twenty-One Cornelio, earning only the commissions "for bringing in
(21) Days ofprision clients interested in getting tourist visas." 43
correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal
Years, Five (5) Months involves the conviction of appellant not only for the crime
and Eleven (11) Days of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of
of prision life imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses
correccional as for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial
MAXIMUM and to pay court upon appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction
Peter Arcega P25,000.00 over ordinary appeals in criminal cases directly from the
for actual damages, plus Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed
costs. is reclusion perpetua or
Page 100 of 119
higher. 44 The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal 2) That
of criminal cases involving penalties lower than reclusion the
perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances offender
stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of underta
Criminal Procedure. Thus — kes
either
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in any
cases where the penalty imposed is life activity
imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty within
is imposed but involving offenses the
committed on the same occasion or meanin
arising out of the same occurrence that g of
gave rise to the more serious offense for recruitm
which the penalty of death or life ent and
imprisonment is imposed shall be by placeme
filing a notice of appeal in accordance nt
with paragraph (a) of this Section. defined
under
Article
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed 13(b), or
by appellant, the trial court has directed that the any
"entire records of the seventeen cases" should be prohibit
forwarded to this Court. 45 It might be observed ed
that this appeal, which has been assigned only practice
one docket number, involves cases, although s
spawned under different circumstances could be enumer
said to somehow be linked to the incident giving ated
rise to the case for illegal recruitment in large under
scale. The cases have thus been correctly Article
consolidated and heard jointly below. The appeal 34. 46
made directly to this Court of the seventeen
cases, each of which incidentally should have
been assigned a separate docket number in this Any person who commits the prohibited acts
Court, is properly taken. enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code
shall be liable under Article 38(a)
thereof. 47 The proviso in Article 13(b) "lays down
Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
recruitment activity "undertaken by non-licensees or non- consideration of a promise or offer of employment
holders of authority." Recruitment is defined by Article 13, to two or more prospective workers, the individual
paragraph (b), of the same Code as referring — or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be
engaged in the act of recruitment and
. . . to any act of canvassing, enlisting, placement." 48 The article also provides that
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring recruitment includes the act of referral or "the act
or procuring workers, and includes of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for
referrals, contract services, promising or employment after an initial interview of a selected
advertising for employment, locally or applicant for employment to a selected employer,
abroad, whether for profit or placement officer or bureau." 49
not; Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed,
for a fee employment to two or more violated the law against illegal recruitment.
persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming
evidence that appellant did represent herself as being in a
Illegal recruitment is committed when two position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers
elements concur: good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to
demand and receive various amounts from the applicants.
1) That The latter would then be briefed by appellant on the
the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant herself
offender testified, thus:
has no
valid Q From 1986 when
license separated from
or Friendship Recruitment
authorit Agency and before you
y were put to jail did you
required have any occupation?
by law
to
enable A Yes, sometimes we
one to brought vegetables and
lawfully flowers to Manila for
engage resale.
in
recruitm Q Aside from buying and
ent and selling vegetables down
placeme in Manila did you have
nt of any other source of
workers income?
; and

Page 101 of 119

 A Sometimes I helped worker and who are
some applicants who are ready to leave for abroad
interested to go abroad and they are being
and asked if I know issued tickets.
some agencies who can
assist them to go Q Were you actually able
abroad. to help or assist some
overseas worker-
Q Were you able to applicants?
assist some people to
look for an agency to A Yes, sir.
assist them to go
abroad?
Q Do you remember
some of them?
A Yes, sir.
A Cherry Piay, Corazon
Q Were you being paid del Rosario, Arthur Juan,
when you assist these Francisco Labadchan
people applying for and others." (Emphasis
overseas employment? supplied.) 50

A Yes, sir. Appellant at one point claimed that she had

helped complainants only in acquiring for them
Q By whom? plane tickets and tourist visas. On cross-
examination, however, she admitted that she had
A The travel agencies made referrals of job applicants to recruitment
give me some amount of agencies. 51 She evidently knew all along that the
commission. persons she was dealing with were applicants for
employment abroad.
Q What are the names of
these agencies which The law requires that the above activities of appellant
you know? should have first been authorized by the POEA. 52Rule II,
Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment provides:
A Dynasty Travel and
Tours and Mannings
International. Sec. 11. Appointment of Representatives.
— Every appointment of representatives
or agents of licensed agency shall be
xxx xxx xxx subject to prior approval or authority of
the Administration.
Q Do you know also if
this Dynasty Travel and The approval may be issued upon
Tours and Mannings submission of or compliance with the
International is duly following requirements:
licensed by the
government to recruit
applicants abroad? a.
Propose
d
A Yes, sir. appoint
ment or
Q Do you have any special
document to prove that it power
is registered? of
attorney
A Yes, sir. ;

Q Where is that? b.
Clearan
ces of
A Mannings International the
is a licensed agency and propose
Dynasty Travel and d
Tours is licensed to represe
issue tickets for ntative
applicants to go abroad. or agent
from
Q You said that Dynasty NBI;
Travel and Tours is
licensed to issue tickets c. A
for applicants going sworn
abroad what do you or
mean by applicants verified
going abroad? stateme
nt by
A Those applicants to the
work as a contract designa
ting or
Page 102 of 119
 appointi
ng
person
or
compan
y
assumi
ng full
respons
ibility
for all
acts of
the
agent or
represe
ntative
done in
connect
ion with
the
recruitm
ent and
placeme
nt of
workers
. prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for a
Approval by the Administration of the
appointment or designation does not
authorize the agent or representative to
establish a branch or extension office of
the licensed agency represented.
Any revocation or amendment in the
appointment should be communicated to
the Administration. Otherwise, the
designation or appointment shall be
deemed as not revoked or amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent
herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped
the complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make
her less guilty of illegal recruitment, 53 it being enough that
he or she gave the impression of having had the authority
to recruit workers for deployment abroad. 54
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving
Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the
complainant in each of the cases, have testified against
appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not thereby
make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has
always been that the testimony of witnesses is to be
weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not
an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt
reached on the basis of the testimony of a single
witness. 55 Corroborative evidence is necessary only when
there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness
has perjured himself or that his observations have veered
from the truth. 56
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an
indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not
warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as
the prosecution is able to establish through credible
testimonial evidence that the accused has involved
himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the
offense can very well be justified. 57
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established
beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is
indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts.
Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to
recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the
Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less
than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In
imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on the application of the circumstances that could
modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be
considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special
laws. 58
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 59 whenever the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall
impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the
same." 60 Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4)
years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five
cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted
correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is
perpetrated against three or more persons "individually or
as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged
with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities
as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a
license or authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act
is committed against three or more persons. 61 The
fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for
abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against
seven complainants. For this offense, Article 39(a) of the
Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This
penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant
by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor
Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for
estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense
where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires
criminal intent to warrant conviction. 62Under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a), 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. 64 Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been
shown in the cases under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first
to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as
follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if
Page 103 of 119
 such amount is over 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum
period, if such amount does not exceed
200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by
any of the following means: . . . .
In the case of People vs. Gabres, 65 the Court has had
occasion to so state that —
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum term of the penalty shall be
"that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly
imposed" under the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum shall be "within the
range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense. The penalty
next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without
any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the
instant case exceed P22,000.00 should
not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate
penalty; instead, the matter should be so
taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate
sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws
should be construed in favor of the
accused. Since the penalty prescribed by
law for the estafa charge against
accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision
mayorminimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus,
the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months . . . . 66
The Court reiterates the above rule, however, in
fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty
ofprision correccional maximum period to prision
mayor minimum period should be divided into
"three equal portions of time," each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period;
hence —
Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period
From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months
From 6 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and
21 days to 8 years
5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days —
in consonance with Article 65, 67 in relation to
Article 64, 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the
Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding
one year for each additional P10,000.00 although the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years.
The maximum penalty should then be termed as prision
mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be. In fine,
the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be added
to the maximum period of the principal penalty of
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by
the complainants who individually charged appellant with
illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would,
respectively, be, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant
defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount of
P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of
P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article
315 shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
toprision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside
from paying Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way
of actual damages, the Court deems it proper to sentence
appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days ofprision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded
Victoria Asil in the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside
from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way
of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to
five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccionalmaximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant
defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of P18,000.00,
appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way
of actual damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccionalminimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant
defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount of
P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant
fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from
Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in
that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days (imposed by the court a quo) of prision
correccional minimum period to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant
defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00,
appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual
damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum.
Page 104 of 119
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has
successfully established its case against appellant for
illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her
reputation in the community as a job recruiter, appellant
was able to make the seven complainants believe that they
could land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her
assurances, each complainant parted with P25,000.00 for
supposed processing and placement fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal
recruitment in large scale, only five 69 of them filed
separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly,
appellant was only and could only be held liable for five
counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Since appellant collected the
amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5) victims, she
must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period
or prision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on
account of the fact that the amount in excess of
P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is less than P10,000.00). 70 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending
circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days ofprision correccional medium as minimum
penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty
for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the five
(5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as actual
damages.
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to
diminution or cancellation should it be shown that
appellant had already paid the complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications hereunder
specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following
cases:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccionalmedium period as MINIMUM,
to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayormedium period as MAXIMUM and to
pay Francisco T. Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by
way of actual damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay
Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.
4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to
seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo
Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando
Salbino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano
Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo
Belino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter
Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay
Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396,
No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No.
92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-
CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, except for
the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to
Dember Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are
DELETED, either because similar awards have already
been provided for by the trial court, or for insufficiency of
proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
Page 105 of 119
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged
on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or
about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the
sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March
2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily
detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right
to a pre-trial conference, 3 after which trial on the merits ensued
and was duly concluded.
I detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant,
later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police
unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal
drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer
of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a
buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After
securing marked money from Bustamante, the team, together
with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had
coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers
thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer
pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached
appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant
answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea
bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter,
handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him
the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez
then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed
around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on
them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up
team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the
team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on
board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation,
with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he
saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant.
He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the
marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he
was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from
the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred
meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the
sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He
was likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation
of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant,
however, orally waived his right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt
of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed,
admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the
court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was
that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for
P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by
telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of
"20". He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who
were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the
marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's
apprehension, and the results were practically normal except
for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not
find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The
next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's
complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr.
Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer,
which causes him to experience abdominal pain and
consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came
back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the
attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around
4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his
family in their house when three persons, whom he had never
met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that
they would just inquire about something from him at their
that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that
they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told
that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by
Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He
admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed
that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping,
he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at
San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30
p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was
accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District
Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined
for three days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that
appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after
undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer
even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-
Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District
Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due
to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause
for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented,
the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves
were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned
judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of
errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of
"frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
Page 106 of 119
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real
theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold
only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other
two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his
possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected with
the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the issue
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of
selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and
does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is
not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale
must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell means
to give, whether for money or any other material
consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a
scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell
two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The
latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place
and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates.
As between the straightforward, positive and corroborated
testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to
mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless,
such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain
in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted
by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could
be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are
presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. 21 Such
lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should
prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
appellant of having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the
mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was
caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a
delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not
appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory
Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had
a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the corpus
delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from
him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing
to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he
signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who
confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is
not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged.
What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was
confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on
who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an
error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such,
neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution
evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses'
honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of
language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take
part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of
appellant, but he participated in the legalseizure or confiscation
thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso
bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for
finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in
buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily
explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard
operating procedure of
your unit that in conducting
such operation you do not
anymore provide a powder
(sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark
or identity of the persons
taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put
powder on these
denominations because
we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since
that item can be
purchased only in Manila
and only few are producing
that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your
office is within (the) P.C.
Crime Laboratory, CIS, as
well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only
adjacent to those offices
but we cannot make a
request for that powder
because they, themselves,
are using that in their own
work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to
mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under
no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of
his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure.
He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after
his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the
custody of any barangay official or police authorities. 31 These
are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that
an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers
having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only
authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Page 107 of 119
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an
arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his
apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling
two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the
confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized
property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills
from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned
exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to
these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in
violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. 34 Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing
and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory
admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides,
the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
arrest and during his detention there. 49Significantly, he also did
not even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate
charges against the alleged malefactors despite the
opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel
being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the
conclusion that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his
allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for
the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society
and it was providential that it came about after he was caught
in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of
the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No.
7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and
entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to
the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of are hereby amended to read as follows:
illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the xxx xxx xxx
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the
present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale Sec. 4. Sale,
has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt. Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would Transportation of
sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to Prohibited Drugs. — The
once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when penalty of reclusion
done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of perpetua to death and a
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. 40 It fine ranging from five
is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to hundred thousand pesos
a total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity to ten million pesos shall
between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts be imposed upon any
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana person who, unless
leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale could authorized by law, shall
be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse sell, administer, deliver,
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the give away to another,
incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that distribute, dispatch in
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars transit or transport any
are not present in this case. prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical such transactions.
and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him
to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under xxx xxx xxx
custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how
his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic
supposedly obtained by force and coercion. Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence amended to read as follows:
that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself Sec. 20. Application of
such as the common experience and observation of mankind Penalties, Confiscation
can approve as probable under the circumstances. 44 The and Forfeiture of the
evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's Proceeds or Instrument of
allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the the Crime. — The
prosecution45 and the other for the defense, 46 testified on the penalties for offenses
absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8
abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is and 9 of Article II and
evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and
ulcer from which he had been suffering even before his 16 of Article III of this Act
arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying shall be applied if the
that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48 dangerous drugs involved
is in any of the following
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp quantities:
Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the
same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his xxx xxx xxx
Page 108 of 119
 5. 750 grams or
more of indian
hemp or
marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range
from prision
correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon
the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the
sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8
grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only
two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the
patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the
lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law,
albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous
Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long
been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the
beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall
be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special
laws.54 The execution in said article would not apply to those
convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to
convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa
or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the
present case, a corollary question would be whether this court,
at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the
penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise
been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22
of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity
of penal laws in so far as they are favorable
to persons accused of a felony, would be
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice
were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the accused
has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the
crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the
reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has
already become final and executory or the accused is serving
sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ
of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of
imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the
drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law,
shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of
indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is
less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its
dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum
of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the
other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section
20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give
effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be
imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than
the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is
only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of
penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from
said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved
in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal.
In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form
a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next
as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second
paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate,
above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of
the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component
penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the
modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded.
Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will
have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity
of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be
used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as
shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20
in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless
there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of
the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into
three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to
the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below
250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500
to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed
as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject
of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is
consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and
cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to
6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods
as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by
Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
Page 109 of 119
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or
absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws,
the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses
punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from
or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since
the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did
not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article
64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that
the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by
degrees could not be given supplementary application to
special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or
physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense
is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the
penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code
in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties
native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved
speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the
Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to
posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable
penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses
under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional
practice in the United States but differently from the penalties
provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins,
provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with
definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any
technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the
American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special
law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished
under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner
provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act
No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with
the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his
employee or laborer as required by section
one of this Act, shall prima facie be
considered a fraud committed by such
employer against his employee or laborer by
means of false pretenses similar to those
mentioned in article three hundred and
fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall
be punished in the same manner as therein
provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses
defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as
technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code.
These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree)
where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor;
and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor,
reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not
more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not
less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years,
when committed with violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death,
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the
special law are different from and are without reference or
relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be
no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions
based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is
clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given
example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal,such
technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to
that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in
the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to
Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and
the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code,
as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and
applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory
effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that
the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in
the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to
give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the
Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special
laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible
judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under
the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have
been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law
(Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that
—
We do not agree with the Solicitor General
that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct
from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty
Page 110 of 119
 imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which
is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed
in special laws, the intent seems clear that
P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment
of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to
the offense of theft of large cattle (Art.
310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable
provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the
same Code should, likewise, be applicable, .
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act
No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we
have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this
Court held that where the special law
expressly grants to the court discretion in
applying the penalty prescribed for the
offense, there is no room for the application
of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the
application of the penalty prescribed by the
law. In such case, the court must be guided
by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code concerning the application of
penalties which distill the "deep legal thought
and centuries of experience in the
administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis
ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of
the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation
and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in
fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications
of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect
on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in
absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that
mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the
penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and
consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied
to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when
there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by
one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce
the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the
aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have
been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for
in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall
proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree
shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied,
and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that
is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion
temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be
no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the
penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances
may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly
addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it
does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the exceptions
to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that
the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how
the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal
Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that
this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was
not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it
may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties
under said laws which were not included or contemplated in
the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there
could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the
rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties
in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and
would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier
noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under
the rule of contemporanea expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for
purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said
law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code
Page 111 of 119
to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the
aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
(Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui
haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has
never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103
by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with
regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its
coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is
considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law, 70and that reclusion perpetua is
likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of
literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation,
as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation,
considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of
penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted
the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a
way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of
interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure
of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of
the accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at
which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute
the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to
continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions.
That minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility
for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole
may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he
has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar,
appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we
have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may
set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day,
is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against
accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but
with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is,
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the
Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in
Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing
Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068
alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB
Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of
NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and
thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount
of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to
Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned
checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason
that the account of the accused with the United Coconut
Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the
aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the
allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each
check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated
July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00; 3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated
July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55. 4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned
on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant
Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular
customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained
a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated
July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; 8 sometime in the last week of
April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated
Page 112 of 119
July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; 9 between May and June
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount
of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; 10 the three checks
bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the
check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced
because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was
closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were
issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that
Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks
and had no participation in the issuance thereof.14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding
the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and
Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand
charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an
imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a
fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an
imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a
fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an
imprisonment of one year for each of them and a fine
of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and
solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr.
Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing
actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant
cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount
of ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3)
subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the
other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover,
she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in
the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
of petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the penal code were
made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code
itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to
special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of
Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be
applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it
ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign
the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is
not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The
Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one
conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court
of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated November
16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for
resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO
WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE
THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-
ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S
ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS
CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE
FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY
INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO
THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR
APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG.
22 IS APPLICABLE. 23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally
liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no
participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks
subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks
themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under
the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the
application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the
scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or
intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance
of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner
and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to
special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. –
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that
offenses which in the future are made punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the
second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it
Page 113 of 119
seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the
special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses
therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the
elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal
provisions prevail over general ones. 24 Lex specialis derogant
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity,
and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause
contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of
the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs.
Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm
basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of
principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People
vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22 28 of the
Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with
reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the
participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by
Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45 30 of the same
Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments
used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence
of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of
the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable,
may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu
vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 32 of the RPC to B.P.
Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this
case is analogous to the application of the provision on
principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must
be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. 34 The overt act or acts of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. 35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness,
complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present
when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of
Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos.
7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of
petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either
by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that
may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when
the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. 37 Conspiracy transcends
mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent
any active participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent
vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken
lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that
imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it
must be established as clearly as any element of the crime.
Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing,
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by
which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of
conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be
founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The
Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its
evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and
pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of
conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission
of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction
must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged;
that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere
possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the
accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the
accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not
proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all
criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the
petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the
constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must
be upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the
charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004
Page 114 of 119
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217,
Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful
taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court
on appeal.
In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted
as follows:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of
the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December
up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused being
then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of
Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi
cabs with business address at corner 44
Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this
City, and as such has free access to the taxi
he being driven, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain,
with grave abuse of confidence reposed
upon him by his employer and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer
GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth
₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging
to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the
amount of ₱303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
4
Upon arraignment on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is
established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages
ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired
appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo
Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that
appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after
which he would return it to ESC Transport’s garage and remit
the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day.5
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work
and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as
he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you
report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your
duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the
boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: ₱780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any
taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what
procedure [do] you follow with that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company
and before we leave we also sign something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the
end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect (sic)
by your company when you return a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book
and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record
book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you
brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25,
1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was
short of my boundary, sir. 6
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to
appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi
there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband had not yet
arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the
Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi
was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of
ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned
in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City. 10 Cipriano lost no time
in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did
not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was short of
the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi
but actually returned it on January 5, 1997;12and that on
December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.0013 to his
wife whom he instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as
payment of the boundary fee 14 and to tell the latter that he
could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.15
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that
when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee on the
very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was already
demanding the return of the taxi. 17
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on
January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,18 which was
Page 115 of 119
company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and
gave his employer ₱2,500.00 19 as partial payment for the
boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to
January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in
the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work
he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and with the
obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering,
his wife started working on February 18, 1997 as a stay-in
maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00, 21 until
March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off
the balance of his obligation; 22 and that with his obligation
extinguished, his driver’s license was returned to him.23
Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on
January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total amount
of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May 17,
2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged,
and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered
credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no
showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned
errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN
WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS
GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
QUALIFIED THEFT.25
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the
whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of
a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with
respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND
PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia 28 or when they relate to the
same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or
things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,29 or have the same purpose or object,30 the rule
dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare
et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v.
Agna,33 viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of
statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of
the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to
the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts
the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have
enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having
thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new
law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in
accordance with the legislative policy embodied in
those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal
of the old and they all should be construed
together. In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be
compared with the new provisions and if possible
by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each. However, when the new
provision and the old relating to the same subject
cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it
is the latter expression of the legislative will . .
.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 35
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is
present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of
carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which
belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the
owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is
done with intent to gain. 37
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized
vehicle,38 the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping being the same.39
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a
Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized
tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor
vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by
the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is
a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It
particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
But a careful comparison of this special law with the
crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their
Page 116 of 119
 common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter's
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether
the taking was done with or without the use of force
upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall
within the purview of either theft or robbery which
was certainly the case before the enactment of
said statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law
penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from
its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys,
street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks
and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run
only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor
engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing
vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery,
respectively.43
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the
unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping
law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply
as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions
mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by
appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant
may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is
necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect
as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts
alleged in the information which determines the real nature of
the crime.44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with
intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the
latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element
of the crime of carnapping, 46 and the prosecution proved the
same.
Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and
did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is
admitted.47
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor
vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was
initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its
owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the
owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession
into an unlawful one.49 Appellant himself admits that he was
aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with
Cipriano’s consent as the latter was already demanding its
return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that
when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00, you also told
her to go to the company to ask the company for
permission for you to use the taxi since you were then
still short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to
your wife and after seeing your wife between
December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask
your wife what was the answer of the company to that
request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry
with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without
first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to
January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already
that the company was not agreeable to your making
use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning
the same to the company, you still went ahead and
make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5,
1997.
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was
intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the
owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to
return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his
earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no
intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in
character, he having returned it.
Appellant’s position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 51 Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain.52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary
benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense
may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner’s consent constitutes gain. 54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission 55 which was reiterated
in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee
(later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an
insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor
vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if the
motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being
intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken
constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate
evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a
"joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that
which holds that when a person, either with the object
of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or
enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its
owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking
possession of the personal property belonging to
another and using it, his intent to gain is evident
since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C.
Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that
the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello
Calon who calls it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
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Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he
in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he
returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the garage
and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial
payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten (10) days. He
could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid
the taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he
paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of
₱2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to
Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave
₱2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to the taxicab
owner.59
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court
are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial
court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and significance which, if
considered, would alter the result of the case. 60 The reason for
the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and
behavior during the trial. 61
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has
not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed returned the
taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5,
1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when
you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record
book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license
with them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because
you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over
any money to your employer when you returned the
taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much
was your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary
(sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay
₱4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of
payment for this ₱4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my
payment, and our agreement was that I have to
pay the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis
supplied)
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997
the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on the said
date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial
payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the
documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim.
That such alleged record book is in the possession of Cipriano
did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right
to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of
evidence on his behalf. 63
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft
instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the penalty.
While the information alleges that the crime was attended with
grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as
the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked
when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by
express provision or by necessary implication. 64
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are
different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the
said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based
on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the
Code.65
Thus, in People v. Panida 66 which involved the crime of
carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate
sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years
and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-
carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct
and without reference to the said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable
penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and
8 months and not more than 17 years and 4
months. There can be no suppletory effect of the
rules for the application of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on, or applicable only to, the
rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true
that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17
years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, such technical term under the Revised
Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not
correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily
apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that
the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years
and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months, as maximum.67(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first
clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14
years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4
months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily and,
therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse
of confidence cannot be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103, 69 as amended, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is
punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed
by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.70
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956,
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic
Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an
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indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8)
Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
Months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

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