700 Petition Bautista Reyes

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BY: _ _ _ _ __
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT 2U5 DEC 28 AH ID: 27
MANILA
EN BANC
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD

S. POE-LLAMANZARES,
Petitioner,
GR ',) "'' 1 c. r1 r;; /1 .LI
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-versus- · . No. ""' "" . n '"' o UV
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
and AMADO D. VALDEZ,
Respondents.
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PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

-with-
Extremely Urgent Application

for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order I
Status Quo Ante Order and/ or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
Petitioner Senator MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-

Li,Al\.fANZARES ("Sen. Poe"), by counsel, respectfully states:
PREFATORY
This is a matter of extreme urgency. Through arbitrary,

capricious, and, seemingly orchestrated, acts over the past two
months, the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") has single-
handedly imperiled the sovereign right of the Filipino people to
elect the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines. By a
stroke of the pen, the members of the Philippine electorate are in
imminent danger of being deprived of that which is m0st
precious in any election: A CHOICE.
Sen. Poe, a candidate for the Presidency in the 9 May 2016

elections, is before this Honorable Court because, through two
Resolutions (one issued by the COMELEC's First Division on 11
December 2015 and the other, issued by the COMELEC En Banc
2
just days later, or on 23 December 2015), Sen. Poe's Certificate

of Candidacy ("COC") for President in the 9 May 2016 elections
was ordered cancelled. The ground, according to the COMELEC,
was that Sen. Poe supposedly made "false material
representations" in her COC when she asserted therein that she
is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN" and that her "PERIOD
OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE
MAY 09, 2016" is "1 O" years and "11" months.
Sen. P~e will leave, for the time being, the baselessness of
COMELEC's order of cancellation, so that she can immediately
bring to the attention of this Honorable Court the questionable
and oppressive timing with which the COMELEC En Banc
released its 23 December 2015 Resolution, which affirmed the
COMELEC First Division's 11 December 2015 Resolution in the
consolidated cases of Tatad vs. Poe-Llamanzares (SPA No. 15-
002 [DC]; the "Tatad Petition"), Contreras vs. Poe-Llamanzares
(SPA No. 15-007 [DC]; the "Contreras Petition") and Valdez vs.
Poe-Llamanzares (SPA No. 15-139 [DC[; the "Valdez Petition").
Applying Section 8 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of

the COMELEC (the "COMELEC Rules"), the 23 December 2015
Resolution would be "deemed final and executory" if "no
restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court within five (5)
days from receipt of the decision or resolution."
/
Sen. Poe does
not concede the validity of this rule, as it contravenes the
Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court2 which uniformly state that
a decision of the COMELEC may be brought to this Honorable
Court by way of certiorari within thirty days3 from receipt of a
copy thereof. Moreover, Section 257 of the Omnibus Election
Code ("OEC") states that the "decision of the Commission shall
become final thirty days after receipt of judgment."
That said, the fact of the matter is that upon the lapse of
the 5th day from Sen. Poe's receipt of the 23 December 2015 En
Banc Resolution), there will be a real, pressing and imminent
threat that the COMELEC will remove her name, not simply
from the official list of candidates, but from the ballot, which
will be used in the 9 May 2016 elections. This is precisely the
!" ~·,,.,~· danger which the COMELEC Commissioner Ma. Rowena Amelia _.,,
1 Section 7, Article IX A., 1987 Constitution
2 Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
3 Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court "(t)he petition shall be filed within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if aliowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall
interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from notice of denial." (Underscoring supplied)
3
V. Guanzon pointed out to the media last 22 December 2015, in

the following quote: 4
Once we are finished promulgating the decision, the rules

only afford 5 days within which you can get a TRO from the
Supreme Court. Pag inabot po sila ng deadline at di sila
nakakulta ng TRO ay ltindi Ito sila masasama sa balota. I'm not
speaking about any particular candidate, yan lang po ang rule.
Mas maganda na po na umakyat sa Supreme Court ang mga
. 5
kasong zto.
To Sen. Poe's knowledge, none of the other members of the

COMELEC has contradicted Commissioner Guanzon's public
statement above. At a press conference of the COMELEC held
on 23 December 2015, Chairman Andres Bautista could only
say that Sen. Poe's name would, for the time being, remain in
the official list of candidates. He said "(r)ight now, her name is
on the ballot as we speak. She is still in the list."6 However, he
could not give any assurance that Sen. Poe's name would
continue to remain in the official list of candidates in the 9 May
2016 elections after the lapse of the 5th day following Sen. Poe's
receipt of the En Bane's 23 December 2015 Resolution. Instead,
he chose to explain what he believes Sen. Poe's remedies are
against the COMELEC's assailed Resolutions (including a
temporary restraining order, preliminary . injunction and
mfffidatory injunction). So, when did Sen. Poe receive th~ 23 .·~ . ~"'
,71 D~cember 2015 Resolution? · ;r;/ :
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Sen. Poe received the COMELEC En Bane's 23 Decem~r~··~:

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2<Jl'5 Resolution on that same day. Therefore, following t\;ie ~i·t·
COMELEC understanding of its rules, she has until· 2'S. "·. ~~/· .t\
December 2015 to attempt to seek injunctive relief from tlti$.. ,;'~j.)
.· Hot;ldrable Court to stop the implementation of the COMELEC's ,,. r·
R~solU,tions. However, this Honorable Court had earlier publ1~
declared that it would be closed for business on 23 Decemll~r ~- +
2015. Therefore, Sen. Poe had no chance to immediately ·try'~~ 4 1*'
seek relief from this Honorable Court on that day (assuming she
was ready with her petition that day). The 23rd of December wa~
likeJVi§~ the eve of a publicly known four-day holiday stretaJJ:
(ft6m.·2·4 to 27 December 2015). Sen. Poe is therefore left,w\th
. 'only the fifth day- 28 December 2015-to file the inst~~.
petit,on with, and to ask for a temporary restraining or~1 <iii'·"
o~er teHef from, this Honorable Court. When the COMELEt
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guanzon -grace- poe-di sq ualifica ti on
s ~rµphasis supplied
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Banc decided to release its Resolution on 23 December 2015, it

also chose to deprive Sen. Poe of 4 out of the 5 days within
which (in the COMELEC's view) Sen. Poe could try to secure
injunctive and other relief from this Honorable Court.
Suffice it to state that it is not easy to secure injunctive

relief from any court, much less, the Highest Court in the land,
in a single day. Under these circumstances, Sen. Poe was
definitely injured and prejudiced when she received the En
Banc resolution on 23 December 2015. Can anyone be faulted
for thinking that the timing of the release of the En Bane's
Resolution was meant to ensure the immediate removal of Sen.
Poe's name from the ballot for the 9 May 2016 elections?
To make matters worse, the COMELEC En Banc actually

released two Resolutions on 23 December 2015. The other
Resolution was rendered in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled
Elamparo us. Poe-Llamanzares, originally handled by the
COMELEC's Second Division, separate from the Tatad, Contreras
and Valdez Petitions handled by the First Division. Sen. Poe had
asked for consolidation of all four cases, as after all they all
concerned one and the same COC and involved common
questions of fact and law. Sen. Poe asked for consolidation both
at the division level, and before the En Banc; all to no avail. Now,
Sen. Poe is doubly damaged by the COMELE;,C's oppression as
she is burdened with filing two petitions on the 28th of
December, only days left of her five (5)-day period. That the
assailed Resolutions all commonly cancelled one and the same
COC, anyway, and yet Sen. Poe is forced to file two petitions,
shows the utter unreasonableness of the action taken by the
COMELEC.
Under these circumstances, Sen. Poe humbly prays for the

immediate intervention by this Honorable Court. She asks that
the COMELEC be enjoined, without any further delay, from
inflicting even more damage to her and the right of the Filipino
people to choose their next President. She prays that, while this
Petition is pending, the COMELEC at least be prevented, in any
·-·~her; from tre·atirtg·tts Resolutions as final and executory·an.d·-
deleting her name from the official list of candidates and the
official ballots to be printed in relation to the 9 May 2016
elections.
Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that

"(s)overeignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." Sen. Poe submits that the will of the
people as expressed, not only through the ballot, but a judicious
..._
application of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence, will be

best served if this Honorable Court issues a temporary
restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing or
implementing its assailed Resolutions, while this Petition is
pending.
Sen. Poe will demonstrate briefly below how the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in the proceedings a quo.
The COMELEC categorically held that Private Respondent

Tatad had availed himself of the wrong remedy in the
proceedings a quo. He should have filed a petition to cancel Sen.
Poe's certificate of candidacy ("COC") for President in the 9 May
2016 elections, under Section 78 of the OEC, in relation to Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules, and not a "Petition to Disqualify"
under Section 68 of the OEC, in relation to Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules. Since the Tatad Petition was undoubtedly a
wrong remedy, the COMELEC had the sworn and positive duty,
under Section 1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules, to dismiss it
outright. However, the COMELEC unjustifiably chose to be
liberal in favor of Private Respondent Tatad and ignore its own
rules. This unsolicited liberality was particularly disturbing
because he did not even acknowledge that he had availed
himself of the wrong remedy and likewise qid not bother to
justify his error. This is a clear act of grave abuse of discretion
on the COMELEC's part, because it amounts to an unwarranted
evasion of a positive duty under the law, which only a writ of
certiorari can rectify.
If the Tatad Petition is taken out of the picture, this

Honorable Court does not have to decide (in this case) whether,
as a foundling, Sen. Poe is a natural-born Philippines citizen.
Notably, among the three cases elevated before this Honorable
Court in this specific petition, only the Tatad Petition raised this
issue. The Contreras and Valdez Petitions did not do so and,
thus, presumed that Sen. Poe is natural-born. The contention of
Private Respondent Valdez was simply that, after Sen. Poe had
lost her Philippine citizenship, she could no longer be restored to
that status.
Assuming arguendo that there is reason to disregard the

fatal procedural defects of the Tatad Petition, and that Sen. Poe's
natural-born citizenship as a foundling may be tackled in this
Filipino.
.
case, Sen. Poe respectfully submits that she is a natural-born
Her stance is, not only pursuant to elementary
principles on the burden of proof, disputable presumptions,
6
conventional international law and "generally accepted

principles" of international law, but also the language and spirit
of the fundamental law of the land.
The COMELEC, applying the the Latin maxim "expresio

unius est exclusio alterius," maintains that Sen. Poe is not a
natural-born Filipino because she supposedly does not fall
under any of the five categories of citizens under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution (which was in force at the time
of Petitioner's birth in 1968).
The COMELEC ruled that since Sen. Poe is a foundling

whose parents are unknown, she cannot show that she is a
Filipino under paragraphs (3) or (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the
1935 Constitution. She supposedly cannot rely on jus sanguinis
because she cannot establish that her biological parents are
Filipinos. She is unable to show a blood relation. Private
Respondent Tatad's theory is based on her misconception of the
nature and essence of a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a COC. It is premised on the erroneous assumption that a
candidate has the burden of proof whenever her qualifications
are questioned.
It is settled that the burden in an action under Section 78

of the OEC lies first and foremost with who'"ever questions the
qualifications of a candidate. Upon him or her lies the burdeB oC~-
'i "."proving that a candidate is disqualified. A candidate ~s :.,t ·
reqµi;red to prove his or her qualifications for the office, bee a$~ >~.
tp.e
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law presumes that he or she is being truthful when he or sit~'~
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;;i.C,complished his or her COC. Just as a person enjoy~,~.a ~~t

presumption of innocence, he or she also enjoys the f:·t
presumption of being innocent of any wrong. 7 It is also a basic,,:.f,
rul,e:Sfi litigation that the party who initiates the case, and wpt :r
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therefore stands to lose if neither party presents evidence, ~s)i;

the burden of proof. This rule is applied in favor of persbns ·, .
accused of the vilest crimes in criminal cases and of defertdabts't·" ..
in civil and administrative cases. If the COMELEC would hive·
.,, ~~.~ay, the .r11:~ ~Jtould be denied to Sen. Poe with respec;.t_to ~~~~
, cligib~l,i,ty for public office simply because she is a foundling. ;i;J~ ·~~T
.?w ,., '.:\if'.~: '<h. ,to;.
- ...
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, ins

of ~~quiring Private Respondent Tatad to prove, in th(t:
~~;taqce.' his allegation that Sen. Poe is n?t. ~ natural~i..
-c;ihzen, 1t placed the burden on Sen. Poe to 1n1tially pro~: ..
she ~j~ born of Filipino parents. But the only way that Ji?riv-.,
~~spondent Tatad can prove that Sen. Poe committed a~'
~.·' l .
. f'§ec. 3 (~), Rule 131, Rules of Court
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representation, with the intent to deceive (which are mandatory

element in a petition under Section 78 of the OEC), is for her to
prove that Sen. Poe indeed was born of alien parents, and hence
cannot be a natural-born citizen. It is not enough for Private
Respondent Tatad to prove that Sen. Poe is a foundling, for all
that this proves is that Sen. Poe's parents are unknown, not
that they are not Filipino citizens, and that therefore Private
Respondent Tatad cannot prove that Sen. Poe is an alien. Under
the circumstances, all that Private Respondent Tatad was able to
accomplish is to create doubt on Sen. Poe's qualifications. But a
doubt as to a candidate's qualifications is not sufficient
justification for the COMELEC to cancel a COC. The candidate's
disqualification must be proven, and the material
misrepresentation proven as a fact, before it can cancel a COC.
Sen. Poe is an incumbent Senator who enjoys a mandate

from over 20 million Filipino voters-the highest number of votes
cast for a Senator in Philippine election history. Her mandate
was challenged, but ultimately upheld, by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the sole and exclusive judge of Petitioner's
qualifications as Senator, including that she is natural-born
citizen. Even before she was elected a Senator of the Republic,
Sen. Poe's life story has been an open book. The Filipino people
knew that she is a foundling, abandoned as a new-born infant in
Iloilo City and later adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
("Fernando Poe, Jr.") and Jesusa Sonora Po~ ("Susan Races").
The Philippine government, if not the Philippine state, has
consistently recognized Petitioner, from infancy until adulthood,
as a Filipino, if not a natural-born Filipino, citizen.
Sen. Poe submits that the issue of whether a foundling is a

natural-born Filipino transcends her candidacy for President.
What is at stake in this case is not only a foundling's right to
run for high public offices, but the enjoyment of a host of even
seemingly ordinary rights or positions which our laws reserve
only for natural-born citizens. The reality that a foundling will
be deprived of these, simply because she was abandoned at
birth, without any trace of her biological parents, (a
•
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~ .. •'·eirc~m~tance that is not of her uwn doing) is highly material irr· -- -~
this case. In the words of the Hon. Justice, later Chief Justice,
Artemio Panganiban in the landmark Frivaldo vs. COMELEC,
"(i)n cases where the sovereignty of the people is at stake, we
must not only be legally right but also politically correct."
The COMELEC also ruled that Sen. Poe could not be

restored to her natural-born status after she was repatriated on
7 July 2006, under R.A. No. 9225. This ruling amounts to grave
8
abuse of discretion because it was rendered in defiance of

jurisprudence, and in usurpation of this Honorable Court's
power to overturn judicial precedent. It is settled that a person
who is repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 (a law applicable only to
former natural-born Filipinos) reacquires her "original" natural-
born Philippine citizenship. There are only two types of citizens
under the Constitution: (a) natural born Filipinos; and (b)
naturalized Filipinos. There is no separate category for those
who lose their citizenship and then reacquire it (See Benqzon vs.
HRET and Parreno vs. COA). Therefore, on 7 July 2006, Sen. Poe
was restored to her natural-born status as a Filipino.
Assuming arguendo that Sen. Poe's representation about

her natural-born Philippine citizenship in her COC for President
was "false," there was no factual basis for the COMELEC to
conclude that she intended to mislead the electorate in making
that representation. Sen. Poe was raised a Filipina, and the
circumstances surrounding her birth revealed to her that she
was so. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
likewise repeatedly recognized her, through official acts and
issuances over the years, as a natural-born Filipino and/ or a
Filipino. And recently, the SET issued a final and executory
ruling that a foundling, like Sen. Poe, is a natural-born Filipino.
While the SET's Decision is in conflict with the COMELEC's own
opinion on the matter, this, together with tq,e on-going intense
public debate on this issue among numerous legal experts and
the public at large, shows that the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship
is far from settled. Only this Honorable Court can finally decide
this issue of first impression. These facts, taken together, show
that when Sen. Poe declared in her COC for President that she is
a natural-born Filipino, she was acting with all honesty and in
good faith.
On the issue of Sen. Poe's residence in the Philippines, all

three Private Respondents argued that it was supposedly "false"
for Sen. Poe to assert in her COC for President that, by 9 May
2016, she would be a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and
11 months (reckoned from 24 May 2005).
However, the same three Private Respondents could not_

agree on when Sen. Poe started residing in the Philippines.
Tatad argued that it should either be in "November 2006"
(following Sen. Poe's COC for Senator) or on 20 October 2010,
when Sen. Poe formally renounced her U.S.A. citizenship before
a notary .public. Contreras gave no specific date, but simply
argued that the "earliest" that Sen. Poe could have started
residing in the country was on 7 July 2006. Valdez, offered
9
three options: (a) 20 October 2010, or the date of Sen. Poe's

renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship, (b) November 2006, following
Sen. Poe's COC for Senator; or (c) July 2006, when Sen. Poe (at
the earliest) could supposedly reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines. The COMELEC, however, had a completely different
idea as regards this issue and held that Sen. Poe started residing
in the county only on 31 August 2006, when she was registered
as a voter.
In the midst of these multiple, varied and highly technical

theories, Sen. Poe simply followed the clear, settled and
common-sense law on the reestablishment of domicile of choice,
which requires the concurrence of three (3) basic requisites: (a)
physical and bodily presence in the country; (b) the intent to
stay in the Philippines (animus manendi); and (c) that intent to
abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi). Sen. Poe
argued that, like all past decisions of this Honorable Court, her
residence should be treated as an issue of fact, applying these
three elements.
As discussed extensively in this Petition and in the

proceedings a quo, as early as 24 May 2005, Sen. Poe complied
with all three (3) requisites to reestablish her domicile of choice
in the Philippines. She arrived in the country on 24 May 2005
and lived with her mother at the latter's hou~e in San Juan City.,
for ~few months. She enrolled her two older children for the-<;/i-
'Academic Year 2005 to 2006 (starting June 2005). She sec:1jfed.
a .·Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of IpteiA,al.,.,
:i:.·. ~&venue on 22 July 2005. She and her husband acquir~~
i:condominium unit in San Juan City and, later, they built ~~"
house in Quezon City, where her family presently resides~ . Int~
April 2006, they sold their home in the U.S.A. Based on,$~\
~foregoing, and other matters detailed in this Petition, Sen. 1'.Joe+ ·
' ~ .; ~H ,.., ..,,
was ·~cting in good faith and telling the truth in her COC ~,erl::kV
she represented that by 9 May 2016, she will be a residei;it o't~he··:·
Philippines for "10" years and "11" months. ,,,.:.,. '· ··&:·
1; ·For this and other reasons, this Petition must be gra!l.fe<i;~::

i
· ~~be.;.·~ssailed Resolutions of the COMELEC reversed anq~~:~~!f

aside, and Sen. Poe must be allowed to continue her candicjJncj1:/'
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" and the electorate allowed to decide for themselves whetht.;.« .,;:i,,.;....,..,
' ,is ~lialified to be the President of the Republic of the Phili,pf;
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I.
PARTIES
1. Petitioner ("Petitioner" or "Sen. Poe") is a Filipino, of

legal age, married and a resident of 106 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Brgy. Ugong Norte, Quezon City. She may be served with
pleadings, processes, orders and the decision in this case
through undersigned counsel.
2. Public Respondent Commission on Elections

("COMELEC" or the "Commission") is a body established under
Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. It holds office at
the Palacio del Gobernador, Gen. Luna St., Intramuros, Manila,
where it may be served with pleadings, processes, orders and the
decision in this case.
3. Private Respondent Francisco S. Tatad ("Private

Respondent Tatad" or "Tatad") is, on information and belief, a
Filipino and of legal age. He may be served with pleadings,
processes, orders and the decision in this case, through his
counsel of record, Atty. Manuelito R. Luna, at Rm. 412 FEMII
Building Annex, A. Soriano Sr. Ave., Intramuros, Manila.
3.1 Private Respondent Antonio P. Contreras

("Private Respondent Contreras" or "Contreras") is, on
1
information and belief, a Filipino and of iegal age. He may
be served with pleadings, processes, orders and the
decision in this case at Unit F, Shorea Homes, Jose St.,
Lopez Village, San Antonio, Los Banos, Laguna.
3.2 Private Respondent Amado D. Valdez ("Private

Respondent Valdez" or "Valdez") is, on information and
belief, a Filipino and of legal age. He may be served with
pleadings, processes, orders and the decision in this case
through his counsel of record, Valdez Law office, at 6A
Vernida-1, 120 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City.
, .. « .. " ., • ~ II"""""•
......,. k:,
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
4. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in

relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It seeks
to nullify for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the COMELEC's Resolution dated 11 December
2015, rendered through its First Division, and the Resolution
11
dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, in the

consolidated cases of SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S.
Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio
P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled
Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.
4'\ 1. Certified true copies of the 11 December 2015

Resolution and the 23 December 2015 Resolution are
attached hereto as Annexes "A" and "B".
III.
TIMELINESS OF THIS PETITION
5. On 11 December 2015, Petitioner, through her

counsel of record at the COMELEC, received a copy of the
Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC's First Division on
even date. Under Section 7, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedures ("COMELEC Rules") as amended, Petitioner had five
(5) days from receipt thereof within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner timely filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration on 15 December 2015. ,,.
6. Petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in the 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which her counsel of record received on even date. Under
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, Petitioner has thirty
(30) days from notice of judgment or final order or resolution to
be reviewed within which to file a petition for certiorari with this
Honorable Court, which period is interrupted by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration if allowed by the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned. Under the same Rule, if the motion
for reconsideration is denied, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari within the remaining period, which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of denial. Hence, this Petition is timely filed.
s As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523

.....
12
IV.
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS AT THE COMELEC,
THE FACTS, AND THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS
A. Antecedent Proceedings
7. On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed her Certificate of

Candidacy9 for President in the 9 May 2016 elections. In the
following days, several persons, including herein Private
Respondents 10 filed petitions questioning Sen. Poe's candidacy.
8. Under date of 19 Octa ber 2015, herein Private

Respondent Tatad filed a Verified Petition11 ("Tatad Petition") to
disqualify Sen. Poe under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules, in
relation to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code ("OEC").
The Tatad Petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), questioned
Sen. Poe's citizenship and residence qualifications. In gist, Tatad
argued that as Sen. Poe was a foundling, she is not a natural-
born Filipino; foundlings are not included in the enumeration of
natural-born citizens in the Constitution, evincing an intent to
exclude them; being a foundling, Sen. Poe could not have
regained natural-born citizenship under Rep. Act No. 9225; and
conventional and customary international law cannot be relied
on to support a claim that foundlings are natural-born. Tatad
likewise argued that Sen. Poe did not have ,.the required ten- ,
years'. residence in the Philippines, as she was bound by. th~,,,·~"'·
d~claration in her 2012 Certificate of Candidacy for Sen?,~{;'. ·
("2012 COC" or "COC for Senator") that her residence ip tlf~' . . . 1
·fi~~ppines before the May 2013 elections was ~ix (6) years >a~'~
, · s~ (6~ months only. He further argued that residence should Ul".~-· ·
fact be counted only from either 2010 (when Sen. Poe executed~
sworn renunciation of American citizenship before a local nti>t~ . ·
p~blic), or 2011 (when Sen. Poe, though not required uhder
\ ft »,.; .\ ..
PhilippJne law, made a sworn renunciation of her U :s.~:;A.*

citizenship before a U.S. consul). · ,•..
'·~
9.
Summons was served on Sen. Poe on 12 November
,.,. 1 .• ·~~.1.5t t'\1~ tilJlely file~.~~[ Verjfied Answer12 on 23 l'i81v~a,1tje~. ~~ ....~
·~~)5:.1.3 In gist, Sen. Poe argued that the Tatad Petition dig ~~·t :.ti
.state':· a cause of action as it did not state ground_~: J~e;('
"disqualification under Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC; tqat;.'t, J.
• ~>~
9. .t;nnex'"C" hereof . · ' ·~
, .,; ·1 Q;Apart from herein private respondents, Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo filed SPA Nd;~li:-,
· (DC) which was handled by the COMELEC's Second Division ·
11 A •h ., "D" h
nnex ereo f . ·..:
'•'"'~;;· . ,.
l'.2 .Annex "E" hereof ·· ·:• °''~/ !~ "' ·
t~./fhere were non-working holidays in view of the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting f~om
18.to . 19 November 2015.
'~
~ ,; N
,1;,
13
cannot be treated as a petition to deny due course to or to cancel

petitioner's COC as it did not allege Sen. Poe made false material
misrepresentations, nor did it pray for such relief; that insofar as
it constitutes a collateral attack against Sen. Poe's re-acquisition
of her natural-born Filipino citizenship under Rep. Act No. 9925,
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction as it is the Department of
Justice which has primary jurisdiction over the Bureau of
Immigration's ("B.I.") Order approving Sen. Poe's application
under said law; that the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction because it
is actually a petition for quo warranto which may be filed only if
Sen. Poe wins the presidency; Sen. Poe did not make any
material misrepresentation in her COC as she is a natural-born
citizen, and by 9 May 2016 she will be a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven ( 11) months;
and the petition sought to usurp the sovereign's right to decide a
political question-who to elect as their next leader.
10. Under date of 17 October 2015, herein Private

Respondent Contreras filed a Petition 14 ("Contreras Petition")
under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules and Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the OEC. The Contreras Petition, which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), did not assail Sen. Poe's
citizenship, instead limiting the attack to residence. Contreras'
ground was that Sen. Poe was short of the required ten-year
period of residence in the Philippines, as she. could reestablish
residence in the Philippines only from 18 Jufy 2006 when the
Bureau of Immigration approved her application under Rep. Act
No. 9225.
11. Summons in SPA No. 15-002 (DC) was served on

herein petitioner also on 12 November 2015 and she filed her
Verified Answerl5 seasonably on 23 November 201516. Sen. Poe
argued that she did not commit any material misrepresentation
in stating that her residence up to the day before the 2016
elections would be ten years and eleven months; that she
complied with all three requisites for reestablishment of domicile
(physical presence, animus manendi and animus non revertendz);
she could legally reestablish residence even before reacquiring
-her-rtal:llr<11-born: citizenship· urider Rep. Act No. 9225 be-cal!'s-e
......---
_,.
that law treats citizenship independently of residence; the
situation in Coquilla vs. COMELEC relied upon by Contreras was
different from Sen. Poe's case, because there was a dearth of
evidence of evidence in Coquilla establishing the candidate's
14 Annex "F" hereof

15 Annex "G" hereof. In SPA No. 15-007, Atty. Pearlito B. Campanilla filed a Motion for
Intervention and to Admit Opposition-in-intervention dated 10 November 2015, attached
hereto as Annex "H".
16 There were intervening public holidays due to the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting.
14
intent to permanently stay in the country; there was no intent to

misrepresent; the COMELEC had no jurisdiction because the
petition was essentially one for quo warranto; and the petition
sought to usurp the sovereign's right to decide a political
question.
12. For his part, herein Private Respondent Valdez filed a

Petition to Deny Due Course/ Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of Hon. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe- Llamanzares for Not
Being a "Natural Born Filipino" and/ or for Lack of Residency
("Valdez Petition").17 The Valdez Petition was docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC) and essentially argued that Rep. Act No. 9225 did
not confer upon Sen. Poe natural-born citizenship; and that her
residence can be counted only from any of the following: 7 July
2006 (when she took her oath under Rep. Act No. 9225),
November 2006 (six years and six months counted back from
May 2013) or 20 October 2010 (when she renounced her
American citizenship).
13. Sen. Poe received summons in SPA No. 15-139 (DC)

also on 23 November 2015. In her Verified Answer, 18 herein
Petitioner argued that if Valdez's theory that Rep. Act No. 9225
does not restore natural-born citizenship, then the Supreme
Court has created unconstitutional jurisprudence over the last
fourteen years such as Bengson III vs. HRET, I'
19 Parreno vs.
20
Commission on Audit, and Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals2 1 ; there
are only two kinds of citizens, natural-born or naturalized, and if
one is not naturalized then one is necessarily a natural-born
citizen; there is no separate class of repatriated citizens; Sen.
Poe complied with all three requisites for reestablishment of
domicile (physical presence, animus manendi and animus ncn
revertendi) as early as 24 May 2005, and thus can reckon her
residence in the Philippines since that date; she could legally
reestablish domicile even before she regained her natural-born
citizenship in July 2006, and even before she renounced US
citizenship in October 2010; she committed an honest mistake
when she put six years and six months in her 2012 COC for
Senator; assuming that her representations on citizenship and
residency were false, they had not been made to mislead,
· .· misinferm or hide a fact of ineligibility from the electorate~ the,,,
COMELEC has no jurisdiction because the petition was
11 Annex "I" hereof

is Annex "J" hereof. On the same day, Sen. Poe filed an Urgent Motion to Consolidate SPA
No. 15-139 (D~) with the three (3) other existing petitions filed against herein Petitioner. A
copy of this Urgent Motion is attached hereto as Annex "K".
19 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
20 G.R. No. 162224, 7 June 2007
21 G.R. No. 125793, 29 August 2006
15
essentially one for quo warranto; and the petition sought to

usurp the sovereign's right to decide a political question.
14. Pre-marking of evidence was set on 23 November

2015 in the Tatad and Contreras cases, and on 25 November
2015 in the Valdez case. Sen. Poe pre-marked her evidence 22 on
both dates. Notably, a number of them were common exhibits.
15. A clarificatory hearing was held on 25 November

2015, where the parties exhaustively discussed their positions.
At the end of the hearing, the parties were given time to file their
respective memoranda with formal offers of evidence23, which
they eventually did.
B. The Facts
16. The following facts are culled from the admissions of

the parties in the pleadings or otherwise supported by the
evidence or found by the COMELEC itself. The respective bases
are appropriately footnoted.
17. Sen. Poe is a foundling; she does not know who her
biological parents are. She was born on September 3, 1968 in
Jaro, Iloilo. However, immediately after her mpther gave birth to ·~
.her, she was abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, wh,ere ''a·d'
'cert8fn Mr. Edgardo Militar found her.24 Mr. Edgardo,~- ,; ·
chose to place herein petitioner in the care and custody of Pi.is ~1.
:relatives, the spouses "Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar." 25
;;• .: ..
·.. ~ ··~
. f..¥-
· 18. On 6 September 1968, Mr. Emiliano Militar reporte,:~ l:+i'.

to th1e Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City ("OCR-Iloilo"t ~~;~'., ~·
J~ct that, on 3 September 1968, herein petitioner was fou11.d'in •·
J ... ·' ~
' ,"#
.f.c
.;•. ';; ~
22 Sen. Poe's marked exhibits in the proceedings a quo, which were also marked in the .
proceedings for SPA No. 15-002 (DC) (entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Ma7"!ii Grac;e.
_ .. ......_ .~idad Sonora Eq,,~-Llamanzares, re~pq_n4,e1].t), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) (entitled_A!J:{Qn#9, f; ... 'i.•
· '' Contrems, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent): arid ,
'~PA ~o, 15-139 (DC) (entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace NatjvifJ:qd ;,
Sonom Poe- Llamanzares, respondent), are summarized in a table attached to this P~tfti~·- ,;~
'' as Annex "L". Faithful reproductions of Petitioner's exhibits which were ma~~ed ~d ~;;
offeredjn the proceedings a quo are attached hereto as Annex "M-series". :.. ·. ·~,.;.
23 Gor'ies of Sen. Poe's Memoranda (with Formal Offers of Evidence) in the Tatad/
::¥.id V~dei cases are attached hereto as Annexes "N", "O", and "P" respectively.
r:~ ..
'fatad's,. Contreras' and Valdez' Memoranda are attached Annexes "Q", "R" and~.
"
; ~ copy of the Memoran~um submitted by volunteer amicus curiae Dean Arturo "O~.· . ·.~Pi.·.
m SfJ\ No. 15-139 (DC) is attached hereto as Annex "T" " · _··rf:\'\ :y,:~'
24 Tatad Petition, p. 6; Valdez Petition, par. 6; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad e,a~, 'W·i
, '.4.~J; Sen. Poe's Foundling Certificate/Certificate of Live Birth, which was nia~ ris
, ;:;Exhibit" 1" in all three cases. , ?!
· ~ See Bxhibit "l"
~;·
~
t;
16
the Parish Church of Jaro.26 In her Foundling Certificate, 27

herein petitioner's full name was indicated to be "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar."
19. When herein Petitioner was five (5) years old, the
spouses Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Races) filed a petition for her
adoption. On 13 May 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan
("San Juan Court") rendered a Decision granting the petition of
the Spouses Poe, 28 and ordering a change in herein petitioner's
name "from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."29
19.1. In a Certificate of Finality dated 27 October

3 °
2005, Clerk of Court III, Eleanor A. Sario, certified that
the San Juan Court's Decision dated 13 May 197 4 "has
never been supplemented, amended or modified by any
subsequent Order coming from the Court and therefore has
already become FINAL."
19.2. On 11 April 1980, the OCR-floilo received

the San Juan Court's Decision which was "included in the
Official Record File of the Office."31 Thereafter, OCR-floilo
noted on herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate 32 that she
had been adopted by the Spouses Poe. on 13 May 1974.
The following hand-written notation appears in the column
on the right-hand side of herein petitioner's Foundling
Certificate reserved for "accomplish(ment)" by OCR-floilo:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe

and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San
Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May
13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.
19.3. In compliance with the San Juan Court's

Decision, the OCR-floilo also appears to have indicated on
herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate that her middle
name ("Contreras") and last name ("Militar") would be
replaced with "Sonora" and "Poe," respectively. The names
26 Tatad Petition, p. 6; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.2; COMELEC
Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.2
27 See Exhibit "1"
28 Tatad Petition, p. 7; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.3; COMELEC Resolution
dated 11 December 2015, p.2; Exhibit "2" in the Tatad case
29 See Exhibit "2" in the Tatad case
30 Exhibit "2-A" in the Tatad case
31 A copy of OCR-Iloilo's Certification dated 11 November 2005 is Exhibit "2-B" in the
Tatad case
32 See Exhibit "l" in the Tatad case
17
--
of Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe were also
written on herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate, in the
boxes or spaces reserved for the names of those legally
considered as herein petitioner's parents.
20. Soon after herein Petitioner turned eighteen, she

applied for registration as a voter with the local office of the
COMELEC in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, the
COMELEC issued in her favor a "Voter's Identification Card" for
Precinct· No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 33
21. On 4 April 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Republic of the Philippines issued to herein Petitioner a
Philippine Passport (with No. F927287)34 which was valid for five
(5) years, or until April 4, 1993. This passport stated, in part,
that "(t)he Government of the Republic of the Philippines
requests all concerned to permit the bearer, a citizen of the
Philippines to pass safely and freely and, in case of need, to give
(her) lawful aid and protection."
22. Petitioner initially pursued a college degree in

Development Studies at the University of the Philippines,
Manila. However, in 1988, she transferred to the Boston College
in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, U.S.A. In 1991, she graduated
from Boston College with a degree of Bachel~r of Arts in Political
Studies.35
23. On 27 July 1991, herein Petitioner married Teodoro

Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares 36 at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish
at San Juan City, Metro Manila. Petitioner's husband is a
citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S.A. from birth.3 7 When
Petitioner married her husband, he was already based in the
U.S.A.
24. Petitioner had been raised a Filipina, and her parents

had instilled Filipino values in her.3 8 Petitioner thus willingly
chose to live with her husband in the U.S.A. and to raise their
33
-
Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.4; Exhibit "3" in the Tatad case .
3
• _ :'.~~r,k~~'"a~,E"hibJ.t.:~4" ig the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad cas~, ~!3E:., 2.5 - ·
.,.~.~'· 35 ~oe tiemorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.6; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December ·
2015, p.2
28 Tatad Petition, p. 7; Contreras Petition, p.4; Valdez Petition, par.7; Poe Memorandum
in the Tatad case, par. 2.7; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.1; Poe
Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.1; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015,
p.3
3 7 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2. 7; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case,
par.2.1; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.1; COMELEC Resolution dated 11
December 2015, p.3
38 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.8; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par.
2.2; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.2

18
children there. Thus, on 29 July 1991, Petitioner left for the

U.S.A. 39
25. Petitioner and her husband have three children. Their

eldest child, Brian Daniel ("Brian"), was born on 16 April 1992 in
the U.S.A. Their daughters, Hanna MacKenzie ("Hanna") and
Jesusa Anika ("Anika"), were both born in the Philippines, on 10
July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.40
26. Although Petitioner and her family lived in the U.S.A.,

they kept close ties to the Philippines. They travelled frequently
to the country to visit relatives and friends. Petitioner and her
husband had always intended to return to the Philippines. 41
27. After July 1991, herein Petitioner continued to secure

Philippine Passports from the DFA. On 5 April 1993, the DFA
issued to petitioner Philippine Passport No. L88151 l ,42 and on
19 May 1998, the DFA issued in her favor Philippine Passport
No. DD156616.43
28. Despite living in the United States for more than ten
(10) years, it was only on 18 October 2001 that Petitioner
became naturalized as a citizen of the U.S.A. 44 On 19 December
2001, the U.S.A. "Passport Agency" in Washington issued U.S.A.
Passport No. 017037793 45 to her. ,. .,.;
-~ .
..~. ··i,fl, ·~ ..+:,
29. In 2003, Petitioner's father declared his candidacy Jor

President of the Philippines in the May 2004 elections. 46. 41 " <·; ·~
};· '~... y:;~-~~~ ·;.:~).
',
,.._: 30. On 8 April 2004, Petitioner travelled til~ to ,
·-";• • ; 'f,.,
~
Philippines together with her daughter, Hanna. 47 Petitioner~~

pregnant at the time with her youngest daughter,~ '1-:m,J~,
#Petitioner returned to the Philippines as she wanted "(t? ~g~ve
,i.\ ··~
':"
Valdez Petition, par. 8; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.8; Poe Merri~randum
39 ·4
in Contreras case, par. 2.2; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.2; COM.r>LBC
Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.3 ",
40 Valdez Petition, par. 8; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2J~. l; .Poe
~!\i~morandum in c:mtrera~ cas.e,yar. 2.2.1; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case.: p~r;,~:2.l; .·
· ~OMEL~C Resolution dated '11 December 2015, p.3 '*:· • , ;, · "'.,.- ""'""
' ,f 41 ~o~ Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.9 ·: ~·. ·!;,~·- _
~ ;, ~ arked as Exhibit "4-A" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tat~qJts;~;'~:·•
91
43
~arked as Exhibit "4-B" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tat.~~:]I:~
1..9. l . \··ii'".~}"~
,
4
~E}.t.p,dPetition, p. 4; Contreras Petition, p.~; Valdez Petition, par.9; Poe MerJQr.a;J'fl~ll. . ;"~.-.'.-..·
¥ the Tatad case, par. 2.10; Poe Memorandum m Contreras case, par. 2.3; Poe lYl~n!t~\J.l,;.Q
-· in. Valdez case, p~r.. 2.3; .cOMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.3'::.-\.(:.::·: ·.·"':,..·<-;;.,?;·~':·. .
4;~ !\farked as Exh1b1t "5" m the Tatad case _ _ ···t\~tlt · ·'·"
46 See also Exhibit "41" in the Tatad case, p. 2, par. 5; Poe Memorandum ~ -fohe:f:Jt,
, case, par. 2.11; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.4; Poe Memorandtl~x~e'Z
1
. ~ ' > case, par. 2 .4 J.it·· ·
47 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2"- ~2
.("
.3 ' "
·f,.·
'~f ~, .·
:\.":'
tt., .it'
19
moral support to her parents during her father's campaign. She

also wanted to give birth to Anika in the Philippines. As
discussed earlier, Anika was born on 5 June 2004. On 8 July
2004, petitioner returned to the U.S.A. 48 with her two daughters.
31. In May 2004, in an election marred with controversy

and widespread reports of cheating, Petitioner's father lost the
Presidency. 49
32. A few months later, or on 11 December 2004,

Petitioner's father was admitted at the St. Luke's Medical Center
in Quezon City. 50 He eventually slipped into a coma. 51
33. As soon as she was informed of her father's fast-

deteriorating medical condition, Petitioner, who was then in the
U.S.A., rushed to leave for the Philippines.52 She arrived in the
country in the evening of 13 December 2004, but her father died
shortly thereafter, on the fallowing day. 53
34. The untimely death of petitioner's father was a severe

emotional shock to the family. Thus, Petitioner stayed in the
country to comfort her grieving mother.5 4 She also wanted to
assist in taking care of the funeral arrangements for her father
and settling his estate. Petitioner stayed in the Philippines until
3 February 2005.55 I'
35. As a result of the untimely demise of her father, and

her desire to be with and to comfort her grieving mother,
Petitioner and her husband, sometime in the first quarter of
2005, decided to return to the Philippines for good.56 They
48 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case par. 2.12
49 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.13; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case,
par. 2.5; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.5
50 See also Exhibit "41" in the Tatad case, Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.14;
Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.6; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.6;
COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.3
51 Id., p.2, par. 5; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.14; Poe Memorandum in
Contreras case, par. 2.6; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.6; COMELEC Resolution
dated 11 December2015, p.3
........ ~l!;l..,..f·~2i. par. 6; Poe Memorandum i£J.1JS Wfl.d case, par. 2.15; Poe Meryo.rf_i~uji.lll... 7 :. ~"'
~eras case, par. 2.T; Poe Memorandum m ra1dez case, par. 2.7
53 Id., p. 2, par. 6; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.15; Poe Memorandum in
Contreras case, par. 2.7; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.7; COMELEC
55 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.16; Poe
Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.8; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.8;
56 See also Exhibit "41" in the Tatad case, p. 2, par. 8; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad
case, par. 2.17; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.19; Poe Memorandum in
Valdez case, par. 2.9; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.3
20
consulted their children, who likewise expressed their wish to

relocate permanently to the Philippines. 57 The children also
wanted to support their grandmother and Petitioner.
36. In 2004, petitioner had already resigned from her

work in the U.S.A. and she never again sought employment
there. In early 2005, Brian and Hanna's schools in Virginia,
U.S.A., were likewise notified that they would be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester.58
37. As early as March 2005, Petitioner and her husband

began obtaining quotations and estimates from property movers
regarding the total cost of relocating to Manila all of their
household goods, furniture, and cars then in Virginia, U.S.A.
One of these property movers was Victory Van International, a
private freight forwarding company, with whom Petitioner and
her husband had a series of email correspondence from 2005 up
to 2006. 59 The spouses also intended to bring along their pet dog
and they inquired with Philippine authorities on the procedure
to accomplish this in August 2005.
38. On 24 May 2005, or shortly before the start of the

academic year in the Philippines, Petitioner returned to the
country. 60 Her three (3) children also arrived in the country in
the first half of 2005.6 1 Petitioner's husband, 9n the other hand,
stayed in the U.S.A. to finish pending projects, and to arrange
for the sale of the family home there. 62
39. After their arrival in the Philippines from the U.S.A.,

Petitioner and her children initially lived with Petitioner's mother
par. 2.10; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.10; COMELEC Resolution dated '1
December 2015, p.3
59 These email correspondence were marked as Exhibits "6-series," in the Tatad case and
Exhibit "2-series" in the Contreras and Valdez cases, and attached to the Affidavit of
Teodoro V. Llamanzares, which was marked as Exhibit "42" in the Tatad case and Exhibit
"27" in the Contreras and Valdez cases. See also, Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par.
~
"
2.19; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.11; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case,
par. 2.11; COMtLECResolUtio~ dat~d 11December2015, p.3-4
..
60 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case, at p. 10; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par.
2.20; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.12; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case,
par. 2.12; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4
61 See also Exhibit "41" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "26" in the Contreeras and Valdez
cases, p. 2, par. 9; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.20; Poe Memorandum in
21
at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City.63 The existing

living arrangements at the house of Petitioner's mother even had
to be modified to accommodate Petitioner and her children. 64
Petitioner's mother also assigned to Petitioner her father's long-
time driver, because Petitioner and her family would henceforth
be based in the Philippines.65 Meanwhile, Petitioner and her
children prepared for the start of the school year, with Brian and
Hanna attending Philippine schools starting June 2005.
39. 1 Petitioner enrolled Brian in Grade 8 at the

Beacon School in Taguig City, for the Academic Year 2005
to 2006.66 In 2006, Brian transferred to La Salle Green
Hills, where he graduated from high school in 2009.6 7
39.2. Hanna was enrolled in Grade 2 L.t

Assumption College in Makati City for Academic Year 2005
to 2006. She eventually finished her elementary and
secondary education at the same school. 68
39.3. Anika was just under a year old when

Petitioner and her family relocated to the Philippines in
May 2005. Anika was therefore not yet of school age at the
time. However, she celebrated her first birthday (not to
mention her succeeding birthdays) in the Philippines on 5
June 2005. Anika eventually attended 1 pre-school at the ,
Learning Connection in San Juan City, from Januanr tP,"
March 2007,69 and thereafter, at the GreenmeE\~owiS
Learning Center in Quezon City, for Academic Year 2qp7:~~tb :',
·, . if
;,· -~!~
63 Id., f. 2, par. 8; Poe Memorandum in the Tat~d case, par. 2. 21; Poe Memorahdtln\,:~ ':';
· ,C9n;treras case, par. 2.13; Poe Memorandum m Valdez case, par. 2.13; COM. EEEC·.
'Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4 <l!i~·~ ,1;; ~
64 Id., ~pp. 2 to 3, par. 10: Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.2.~; , ;Poe
Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.13; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par:..,2.13;
COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4 .,i. ,l,,.!i.''
65 Id., pp. 2 to 3, par. 10; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2;'2f; Poe
Memorandum in Contreras case, par. 2.13; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2 . 13;
COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4 '' .'
66 Exhibit "7" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "3" in the Contreras and Valdez case&; ls
. ~I}tian/s,Official Transcript of Records from the Beacon School; COMELEC Resoluti~q£~t:\.j
. · .I:I! December 2015, p.4 · . 'i '"
., 6 7 Exhibit "7-A" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "3-A" in the Contreras and Valdez C<;lifts'i
Cettification dated 15 April 2015 issued by the Registrar of La Salle Green .-·-·
~qdta Bernadette F. Firmalino
6 ~ E;xh,ibjts "7-B" and "7-C" in the Tatad case and Exhibits "3-B" and "3-C"in the
. ·;Ind Valdez cases are Hanna's Permanent Records at the Assumption CoL
·'·'Elementary and Secondary Student, respectively; COMELEC Resolution '.~°"
· De9~JIJber 2015, p.4 , . ~!'!""-~""
69 Exhibit "7-D" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "3-D" in the Contreras and Valdez~a~$·~.~ff'
., ~ertificate of Attendance dated 8 April 2015 issued by the Directress of the~~~"'··

· . ·\·.~Connection, Ms. Julie Pascual Penaloza; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 Decembey.,2015,
, p.4 ,,
~· ,, ~·
' . ,.
v , ..
-t,:,'
~~
._
22
2008.70 Anika's Kindergarten and Elementary school

years71 were spent at Assumption College (the same school
as her sister, Hanna), which is where she is currently
enrolled as a sixth grader.
40. Shortly after arriving in the Philippines, Petitioner

immediately submitted herself to the local tax jurisdiction by
registering and securing a TIN from the BIR. 72
41. Sometime in the second half of 2005, Petitioner's

mother discovered that her former lawyer who had handled
Petitioner's adoption in 1974, and who was then already
deceased, had failed to secure from the OCR floilo, a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Petitioner's new name ("Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe") and stating that her parents are
"Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora." Thus, on 8
November 2005, Petitioner's mother executed an affidavit7 3
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR floilo. Eventually, on 4 May 2006 OCR floilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth 74 in the name of "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe."
42. In the meantime, in the second half of 2005, Petitioner

and her husband had acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium (and its corresponding parkinp; slot), located at
194 Wilson Street, San Juan Metro Manila, to be used as the
family's temporary residence.75
42.1. On 20 February 2006, the Register of Deeds for

San Juan City issued to Petitioner and her husband CCT
No. 11985-R76 covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, and
CCT No. 11986-R77 covering the parking slot for Unit 7F.
10 Exhibit "7-E" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "3-E" in the Contreras and Valdez cases is a
Certification dated 14 April 2015 issued by Directress of The Greenmeadows Learning
Center, Ms. Anna Villaluna-Reyes; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4
, •
7
1._Whj.bit "~·F;' in t~~~~~,al'lc!.~xhibit "3-F" in the Contreras and Val~ez ~a~e! i::; -.,,,•
~nika's Permanent Record at the Assumption College as an Elementary Student. · ' ·
72 Marked as Exhibit"S" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "4" in the Contreras and Valdez
cases; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.22; Poe Memorandum in Contreras
case, par. 2.14; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par. 2.14
73 Marked as Exhibit "9" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.23
74 Marked as Exhibit "10" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.23
par.2.14; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.14; COMELEC Resolution dated 11

December 2015, p.4
76 Marked as Exhibit "11" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "5" in the Contreras and Valdez
cases
77 Marked as Exhibit "12" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "6" in the Contreras and Valdez
cases
23
42.2. On 25 April 2006, Unit 7F of One Wilson Place

and its corresponding parking slot were declared, for real
estate tax purposes, in Petitioner's and her husband's
names .78
42.3. Petitioner and her family lived at One Wilson

Place until the completion of their family home at
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City.79 This matter is discussed
in paragraph 46 below.
43. In 14 February 2006, Petitioner briefly travelled to the

U.S.A. for the purpose of supervising the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings. Around this time,
Petitioner and her family's furniture and other household goods
were still in the process of being packed for collection, storage
and eventual transport to the Philippines. 80 Petitioner donated to
the Salvation Army some of the family's personal properties
which could no longer be shipped to the Philippines. 81 Petitioner
returned to the Philippines shortly after, or on 11 March 2006. 82
44. In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially

informed the United States Postal Service of the family's change,
and abandonment, of their former address in the U.S.A. 83 The
family home in the U.S.A. was eventually sold on 27 April
2006.8 4 1·
45. In April 2006, Petitioner's husband resigned from his

work in the U.S.A., and on 4 May 2006, he returned to the
78 Marked as Exhibits "13" and "14" in the Tatad case and Exhibits "3" and "8" in the
Contreras and Valdez cases are Declarations of Real Property Nos. 96-39721 and 96-
39722 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City, respectively covering
Unit 7F and its parking slot.
7 9 See also Exhibit "41" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "26" in the Contreras and Valdez
cases, p.3, par. 11

80 Exhibit "6-series", e-mails dated 8 February 2006, 10 February 2006, and 15 February
2006 from Victory Van International to Petitioner.
81 Marked as Exhibits "15" and "15-A" in the Tatad case and Exhibits "9" and "9-A" in the
Contreras and Valdez cases are receipts dated 23 February 2006 issued by the Salvation
Army showing the donation of these household belongings.; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad
7 ........~~' .par. 2.26; Poe Memora'1~1l1 in,.Contreras case, par.2.16; Poe Merrior~i:t~;;m Jn,,. _,1$,, ~
Valdez case, par.2.16; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4
82 COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4
83 Exhibit "16" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "10" in the Contreras and Valdez cases is an
e-mail from the U.S.A. Postal Service, sent on 28 March 2006 to petitioner's husband,
confirming the latter's submission of a request for change of address to the U.S.A. Postal
Service ; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.27; Poe Memorandum in Contreras
case, par.2.17; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.17; COMELEC Resolution dated 11
December 20°15, p.4
8 4 Exhibit "17" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "11" in the Contreras and Valdez cases is a
Final Statement issued by First American Title Insurance Company which indicates as
Settlement Date: "04-27 /2006"; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.4
24
Philippines. Beginning July 2006, he worked in the Philippines

for a major Philippine company.ss
46. Meanwhile, in early 2006, Petitioner and her husband

acquired a vacant 509-square meter lot at No. 106, Rodeo Drive,
Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon City (the
"Corinthian Hills Lot") where her family could finally establish
their new family home. 86
46.1. On 1 June 2006, the Register of Deeds for

Quezon City issued to Petitioner and her husband Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 29026087 covering the
Corinthian Hills Lot.
46.2. Petitioner and her husband eventually built a

house on the Corinthian Hills Lot. To this day, this house is
their family home. ss
4 7. After Petitioner and her family settled themselves, she

turned her attention to regaining her natural-born Filipino
citizenship. She was advised that she could legally reacquire her
natural-born Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."89 ,..
' '" .i;i,~, -~...:..,;..;.
48.
On July 7, 2006, Petitioner took her Oat.Jr ;·~f
All~giance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required,llfiq~t
. \±:$.ettion 3 of R.A. No. 9225,90 to wit:91 · ·
·~ :\'
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I wifl .,

support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of th~ r: "·\,·
:Jt
,'f'~
." ~ *· 'Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the •'·
<;July constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby.,!',:: ~'~.. ;;,! .

.f.
·. };
;;, i~· ·..f
85 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.28; Poe Memorandum in Contreras'.case,
. "" Dec.ember 2015, p.5 , 1
"' "-. l,-s&> Poe~'1e'fn~randum ~n'1"H1e Tat~d" dtse, par:'"T.2~; 'Poe Memorandum in Corr~18'8i*ca;., .,:tllll!B • ~"0
'p~.2J$); Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.19; COMELEC Resolution qat!d~;~lt.~,.
:;·· ,, ......,. ',· ~- . ·::-&-.·~·~ :~
Pecember 2015, p.5 . . . · · .. ,,, :K~ " .
· " 87 Marked as Exhibit "18" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "12" in the Contreras anq~J,ak'"':'l·' .. ,
cases . 1'· ·~
88. ~rer~iso Exhibit "42" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "27" in the Contreras a~
cases, p. 3, par. 11 ~;' ,/
·8' Poe 'Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.30; Poe Memorandum in Contrer
' ;par.2.20; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.20 · ;'1'.
9o Poe ;Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.31; Poe Memorandum in Contrera_
. par.'2.21; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.21; COMELEC Resolution c;iai~u"
p~c.ember 2015, p.5 .:·· t~~ ./~I:·
\~.\· Herein petitioner's Oath of Allegiance under R.A. 9225 was marked as Exhibit ? 9" 'ip
.
·' the Tatad case and Exhibit "13" in the Contreras and Valdez cases
·.! .i;
'" '· ·
~
J ·i:;
" 1lilf
25
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the

Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
49. On 10 July 2006,92 petitioner filed with the B.I. a

sworn petition93 to reacquire her natural-born Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its implementing
rules and regulations. Upon advice, and simultaneous with her
own petition, petitioner filed petitions for derivative citizenship9 4
on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18)
years of age at that time. 95
49.1. In support of her application, and in compliance

with the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No.
9225, Petitioner submitted to the B.I. a copy of her
Philippine Passport which the DFA had issued to her on 19
May 1998.96
50. On 18 July 2006,9 7 the B.I. issued an Order98 granting

herein Petitioner's applications, which states in pertinent part:
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of

the instant petition indicate that the petitioner was a former citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine cilizen; thereafter,
became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American
passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and
so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine
..
C1tizens h"Ip. 99
December 2015, p.5
ft'. f''1"'
93
~A fe:rt~fi~d true.copy ~f iPep.~Pil.'~~iOJ:lfMS mar~ed as Exhibit "20" in t~e~ la~i 1 1 . ....
and 'Ex'lub1t "14" m the Contreras ai1d Valdez cases
94 Certified true copies of these Petitions were marked as Exhibits "21", "21-A" and "21-B"
in the Tatad case and Exhibits "15", "15-A" and "15-B" in the Contreras and Valdez cases
December 2015, p.5
96 See Exhibit "4-B" in the Tatad case
9 7 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.33; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case,
December 2015, p.5
98 A certified true copy of Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 dated 18 July 2006 was marked as
Exhibit"22" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "16" in the Contreras and Valdez cases.
99 Underscoring supp lied
26
In the same 18 July 2006 Order, Petitioner's three children,

Brian, Hanna and Anika, were "deemed Citizens of the
Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. 9225."
51. On 31 July 2006, loo the BJ. issued Identification

Certificates ("1.C.") in Petitioner's name and in the names of her
three children.101 Petitioner's I.C. states, in part, that she is a
"citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) in relation to
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed
by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."
52. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC registered

Petitioner as a voter at Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. 102
53. On 13 October 2009, or over two (2) years before her

U.S.A. Passport was set to expire (on 18 December 2011), 103
Petitioner secured from the DFA her new Philippine Passport
with No. XX4731999 104 (which was valid until 12 October 2014).
54. On 6 October 2010, 1os President Benigno S. Aquino III

appointed Petitioner as Chairperson of the MTRCB, 106 a post
which requires natural-born Philippine citizenship. Petitioner
did not accept the appointment immediately,,.,. because she was
advised that, before assuming any appointive public office,
Section 5(3), R.A. No. 9225 required her to: (a) take an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (b) renounce
her U.S.A. citizenship. She complied with both requirements
December 2015, p.5
101 Certified true copies of Identification Certificate Nos. 06-10918 (in herein petitioner's
name), 06-10919 (in Brian's name), 06-10920 (in Hanna's name), and 06-10921 (in
Anika's name), were marked as Exhibits "23", "23-A", "23-B" and "23-C" in the Tatad case
and Exhibits "17", "17-A", "17-B" and "17-C" in the Contreras and Valdez cases.
102 The stub of herein petitioner's application form, showing the date of such application
was marked as Exhibit "24" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "18" in the Contreras and
Valdez cases. See also, Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.35; Poe Memorandum
in Contreras case, par.2.25; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.25; COMELEC
!03 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.36;
104 Marked as Exhibit "25" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par.
2.36; COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December 2015, p.5
10s Poe Memqrandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.37; Poe Memorandum in Contreras case,
December 2015, p.5
106 Petitioner's Appointment was marked as Exhibit "26" in the Tatad case and Exhibit
"19" in the Contreras and Valdez cases.
27
-
before assuming her post as MTRCB Chairperson on 26 October
2010.107
55. On 20 October 2010,108 Petitioner executed before a

notary public in Pasig City an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" of even date. 109 The affidavit states:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of

legal age, and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive,
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state
that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily
renounce my United States nationality/ American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance
and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation
intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any
duress or undue influence.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my

signature this 20th day of October 2010 at Pasig City,
Ph I'l'1ppmes.
. 110
55.1. Petitioner, through counsel, submitted 111 the

above affidavit to the B.I. on 21 October 2010.112
I" l
55.2. At no time after Petitioner executed the :above···"

-r ' ,.,.. ' ~'
affidavit did she ever use her U.S.A. Passport agaih:t13

'Ji,,• Thus, Petitioner's U.S.A. Passport No. 017037793 1 l 4 u,,~ . :•;
.J:fer travel records from the B.1. 1 1s indicate no use ,.Of ~

petitioner's U.S.A. Passport after her renunciation of U.S.A.
citizenship on 20 October 2010.116 " ,, .· ,
·~· :::." '
it
55.3. On page 21 of its 23 December 2015 Resolution,
the COMELEC En Banc stated that Sen. Poe "like\Vis~ ,~,
' ·' "~'•""' ~·
107 A certified true copy of petitioner's Certificate of Assumption of office as ·MTRCB
Chairperson was marked as Exhibit "26-A" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "20" in .the
'· i: ront:r;trjils i:inrl Val~ez cases. ·'
,·~· :t. ¥ ~ _..,..........,..,'1~~- •. ~ ·~
· • 108 Poe Memorand m m the9ffiaci !ase, par. 2.38; Poe Memorandum m Contreras· Cl\~•
t. . . . . . ff: 4 - ,J< ' • ) ';. '
:.J£
, ''µ!:ir.2.~6• Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.26; COMELEC Resolution dasedtp
December 2015, p.5 .. '' J";
109 Petitioner's Affidavit of Renunciation was marked as Exhibit "27" in the Tatad ca$e ·1\
Exhibit "21" in the Contreras and Valdez cases. ., ; '-.; '
11.0 t,Jntlerscoring supplied '~.r; .l;
1 11 Pay M.emorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.38.1; COMELEC Resolution ~ed"'
:Jl5ecember 2015, p.5 ., '·~ .

·· •· li 2 The transmittal letter to the B.I. was marked as Exhibit "28" in the Tatad ca~
affiqavj.t referred to therein was marked as Exhibit "28-A". .·.. ,
1 13 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.38.f2
l(,:4 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case · '\

•:;l.1 5 Sen. Poe's travel records with the 8.1. were marked as Exhibit "J" below by Tatadi!
116 Poe Memorandum in Tatad case, par. 2.38.2 "
~~.
·$;
~
---
28
repeatedly used her US passport in her travels until 2011."

Based on the footnote (No. 31) to that statement, Sen. Poe
supposedly "clarified" in her Motion for Reconsideration (of
the First Division's 11 December 2015 Resolution) "that her
travels to the US using her US Passport covered a six (6)-
year period from 2005 to 2011." The COMELEC also stated
that "(d)uring this time (24 May 2005), (Sen. Poe)
continuously used her US Passport in her travels up to
2011." These factual findings are not based on the
evidence on record.
55. 3. 1. In her Motion for Reconsideration

(par. 82.4), Sen. Poe simply stated that "(t)he five @
trips referred to in the (11 December 2015) Resolution
actually cover a longer 6-year period, i.e. from 2006 to
2011." In making that statement, Sen. Poe was
clarifying that when her counsel mentioned 5 trips to
the U.S.A. (during the clarificatory hearing on 25
November 2015, and as stated on page 39 of the 11
December 2015 Resolution), he was not referring to
the period from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006, but a
longer period of "2006 to 2011." However, nowhere in
her Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 December
2015 Resolution (in par. 82.4 thereof or elsewhere) did
Sen. Poe state that she travelled tq,. the U.S.A. in the
year "2011," or that she "used her U.S.A Passport" in
2011.
55.3.2. The period "2006 to 2011" was taken

from par. 2.18 of Sen. Poe's Verified Answer to the
Tatad Petition, wherein she denied Private Respondent
Tatad's allegation in par. 5.38 of the Tatad Petition
that Sen. Poe had "frequent trips to and from the
U.S.A. between 2006 to 2010 and 2011." In par. 2.18
of her Verified Answer, Sen. Poe stated that "(b)ased
on records, the truth is that Sen. Poe travelled to the
U.S.A. no more than five (5) times during this entire
six-year period." She wanted to stress, as she did in
her Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 December
2015 Resolution, that she did not travel to the U.S.A.
"frequently." However, she did not mean to convey
that she also travelled to the U.S.A. (much less using
her U.S.A. Passport) in the year 2011.
55.3.3. As discussed earlier, evidence shows

that Sen. Poe, indeed, did not use her U.S.A. Passport
in 2011. Moreover, based on the travel records which
29
Private Respondent Tatad himself submitted (his

Exhibit "J"), Sen. Poe travelled only 5 times to the
U.S.A. between "2006 and 2011," i.e. on 14 February
2006,11 7 on 20 April 2009,11s on 19 October 2009, 119
on 27 December 2009120 and on 27 March 2010.121
The only two trips noted in her travel records for the
year 2011 were to Bangkok, Thailand (on 14 July
2011122) and Hong Kong (on 11 August 2011123), and
during these two trips, she used her Philippine
Passport No. XX4731999.
55.4. Petitioner's "Affidavit of Renunciation of

Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" dated 20 October
2010 has never been recanted or withdrawn and, therefore,
remains in full force and effect. 124 In fact, this affidavit of
renunciation was effectively affirmed and reiterated on 12
July 2011 and on 14 October 2015, as discussed in the
paragraphs below.
56. On 210ctober 2010, in accordance with Presidential

Decree No. 1986 and Section 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225, Petitioner
took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB, before
President Benigno S. Aquino III. Her oath of office12s states:
,
PANUNUMASAKATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na

itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na
nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa
abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas; na
117 Flight No. "NW020", which Sen. Poe took on 14 February 2006, is a flight to the U.S.A.
_, __
118 Flight No. "PR104", which Sen. Poe took on 20 April 2009, is a flight to San Francisco,
U.S.A.
119 Flight No. "PR102", which Sen. Poe took on 19 October 2009, is a flight to Los Angeles,
• • .U.. S.,/\ .._ ,.,..,_ •., • • " "*··' ,4... •..

12 ° Flight No. "PRl 12", which Sen. Poe took on 27 December 2009, is a flight to Los
Angeles, U.S.A.
121 Flight No. "PR102", which Sen. Poe took on 27 March 2010, is a flight to Los Angeles,
U.S.A.
122 Flight No. "PR300", which Sen. Poe took on 14 July 2011, is a flight to Bangkok,
Thaland
12 3 Flight No. ".PR732", which Sen. Poe took on 11 August 2011, is a flight to Hong Kong
12 4 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.38.3

125 A certified true copy Sen. Poe's Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson was marked as
Exhibit "29" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.39; COMELEC
30
tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga

batas, mga kautusang legal, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga
sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng
Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang
walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMP AAN sa harap ko ngayong

ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas. 126
57. To ensure that even under the laws of the U.S.A., she
would no longer be considered its citizen, Petitioner likewise
renounced her U.S.A. citizenship in accordance with the laws of
that country. However, Petitioner was not legally required under
Philippine law to make another renunciation, as her earlier
renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship on October 20, 2010 was
sufficient to qualify her for public office.121
57 .1. On 12 July 2011, 12s Petitioner executed before

the Vice Consul at the U.S.A. Embassy in Manila, an
Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.129
57.2.0n the same day, Petitioner accomplished a .

sworn "Questionnaire"130 before the D.S. Vice Consul, ·~ ., ·~ ,,...,,,,_ ~ ..'fl~
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as M'F~QB ·
·Chairperson
.
on 210ctober 2010, with the intent, arricf~
' !· • ..•
~;.
:i>: others, of relinquishing her U.S.A. citizenship. · ,,f'~
.·. $•";
57 .3. In the same Questionnaire, Petitioner stated that
she had resided "Outside of the United States," i.e., in tl:»e.
4
f # Philippines," from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 arf<l
f~om "05 2005" to "Present." On page 4 of<i: the
Questionnaire, Petitioner stated: · ·•.: ..
I became a resident of the Philippines once again since

-~
2005. My mother still resides in the Philippines. My · ''i .'
. • t •1•1· husband and1"-f~~ployecf'and own properties ih"tl'\e..,..,~tt~.A<·i!<'
.#'
1i' •'; ~ :, , _-"'~:~~· . "~:~L
If<.
-~ 126 Underscoring supplied

12'. Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.40; Poe Memorandum in Contre\.
par.~.2'7; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.27;
~28,P9e~tAi::111orandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.40.1; Poe Memorandum in Contre,.,.~ .
·µ~r.2.27;1; Poe Memorandum in Valdez case, par.2.27.1; COMELEC Resolution"'.~a~
December 2015, p.6 t~-( ·
.129 P$tili.oner's Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United ~tatei
marked as Exhibit "30" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "22" in the Contreras and Valzj,ez
cases below.
:1~0 The Questionnaire was marked as Exhibit "30-A" in the Tatad case and Exhibi.~ "~3''.. in
the Contreras and Valdez cases. · ' ·, '\. ·
:?· ;t,
31
Philippines. As a dual citizen (Filipino-American) since

2006, I've voted in two Philippine national elections. My
three children study and reside in the Philippines at the time
I performed the act as described in Part I item 6.131
58. On 9 December 2011,132 the U.S.A. Vice Consul

issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States." 133 Said Certificate attests that under U.S.A. laws,
Petitioner lost her U.S.A. citizenship effective 21 October 2010,
which is when she took her oath of office as MTRCB
Chairperson. This fact is likewise reflected on the last page of
Petitioner's former U.S.A. Passport.134
59. On 27 September 2012, Petitioner accomplished her

COC for Senator, 135 which she filed with the COMELEC on 2
October 2012. Section 12 of the COC was, again, an affirmation
of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which
Petitioner had taken on 7 July 2006 (and which she had re-
affirmed on 21 October 2010 when she took her oath of office as
MTRCB Chairperson). Section 12 of the COC states:
I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO. I
WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS, AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES. I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION.
60. During the 13 May 2013 National Elections,

petitioner ran for and was overwhelmingly elected as Senator.
She garnered over 20 million votes, the highest among her fellow
Senatorial candidates, and a record in Philippine election
history. On 16 May 2013, Petitioner was proclaimed Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines.136
131 Undescoring supplied

December 2015, p.6
133 Petitioner's Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States was marked as Exhibit
"31" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "24" in the Contreras and Valdez cases.
134 See Exhibit "5" in the Tatad case
135 A copy of petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for Senator is marked as Exhibit "32" in
the Tatad case. See also, Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.42
December 2015, p.6
32
61. On 19 December 2013, the DFA issued to Sen. Poe

Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530137 (valid until 18 December
2018), and on 18 March 2014, the DFA issued in her favor
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861138 (valid until 17 March
2019). Like her earlier Philippine passports, these two (2) most
recent passports uniformly state that Sen. Poe is a "citizen of the
Philippines."
62. On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed with COMELEC

her COC as President ("COC for President") in the 9 May 2016
national and local elections. 139 In her COC, she stated that she
is a "NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN' and that her
"RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY
09, 2016' would be "10" years and "11" months (counted from
24 May 2005).
62.1. In her COC for President, Sen. Poe again

affirmed the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines which she had taken on 7 July 2006 (when she
reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship), on 21
October 2010 (when she took her oath of office as MTRCB
Chairperson) and on 27 September 2012 (which she
executed her COC for Senator in the 13 May 2013
election). Item No. 13 of Sen. Poe's COC for President
states: /
I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO. I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS, AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES. I IMPOSE
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION.
62.2.Attached to Sen. Poe's COC for President is an

"Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
----~ on 14 O~t9p~r,.. 201 ~.>'.~ In this affidavit, Sen. Poe """
stressed, among others, that her "Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and
137Marked as Exhibit "33" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par.
138 Marked as ~xhibit "34" in the Tatad case; Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par.

139 See Exhibit "K" for Tatad, Exhibit "B" for Contreras, Exhibit "A" for Valdez
140 Poe Memorandum in the Tatad case, par. 2.46.2; COMELEC Resolution dated 11
December 2015, p.7

33
Renunciation of American Citizenship"1 41 executed on 20

October 2010 had not been recanted. She also emphasized
that, effective 21 October 2010, she was no longer a U.S.A.
citizen, even under U.S.A. laws.
62.3. However, in order to obviate any further

objection to her qualifications, in paragraph 3 of said 14
October 2015 affidavit, Sen. Poe affirmed and reiterated
her renunciation of her former U.S.A. citizenship, to wit:
Although I have long ceased to be a U.S.A. citizen,

and without implying that my previous renunciation of
U.S.A. citizenship was in any manner ineffective or
recanted, but solely for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for filing my Certificate of Candidacy
('COC') for President in the 9 May 2016 election
(specifically. Item 10 of the COC) and in light of the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Amado vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015) that
'(t)here is no law prohibiting (me) from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only avert
possible questions about (my) qualifications." I hereby
affirm and reiterate that I personally renounce my previous
U.S.A. citizenship, together with all rights, privileges,
duties, allegiance and fidelity pertaining thereto. I likewise
·.•Y
declare that, aside from that renounced U.S:A. citizenship, I
J!'jf.I
have never possessed any other foreign citizenship. 142 ,4.:~,..;:
,;::
1~ :r 'i<.t~_,
~;~; -1~· ~1,·
.'.0)..~:
/
The COMELEC Resolutions
·-/
·.·};-
63. In its Resolution dated 11 December 2015, the First

Qivi~ion of the COMELEC (by a vote of 2-1) granted all thr~
pehtio:r;:is. On the procedural issues, the First Division ruled 't11fl~
though the Tatad Petition is denominated as a petition :~for ...
disqualification, the grounds invoked are for cancellatiori Otjf?r.,·-~ ¥iJ'
.r
denial of due course of herein petitioner's COC; the COMELEC
,khas jurisdiction as it is not bound by the Bureau. ;;pf\;
:Iµimigration's Order (approving Petitioner's application fpr· \'
re:~cquisition of natural-born citizenship under Rep. j\ct ~~p.~k},
1
9225); and the cases are under Section 78 of the OEC, an<f:Wt
· there, is no merit in the assertion that they are really f~~"
wafranto. ')'"' :•~
:a-
If ' : ·-~, i{~j
r~· ~·
;_,.:.
14 \ Exhibit "27" in the Tatad case and Exhibit "21" in the Contreras and Valdez cases"·:·"'·
;···:,
142 Underscoring supplied
'.t
:l ·,t·._
34
64. On the substantive issues, the First Division found

herein petitioner's assertion in her 2015 COC that she is a
natural-born citizen, and that she will have a residence of ten
years and eleven months on the day prior to the 9 May 2016
elections, to be both false.
64.1 On the matter of citizenship, the First Division

ruled that to be a natural-born citizen, herein Petitioner
must definitively show a direct blood relationship with a
Filipino parent and demonstrate that no other act was
necessary for her to complete or perfect her citizenship;
herein Petitioner has the burden to positively show she has
all the qualifications; she can never show a direct blood
relationship because her parents are unknown; the
probability that herein Petitioner might be born of Filipinos
is not enough as she has the burden of proof; there is
nothing in international law which supports herein
Petitioner's claim of natural-born Filipino citizenship;
treaties and covenants cannot supplant the Constitution;
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child does not
provide that the child ipso facto becomes a citizen from
birth and does not grant natural-born citizenship; the
Philippines is not a party to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness and the 1930 Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Con:(lict of Nationality
Laws; there is no proof that the recognition of foundlings as
natural-born citizens of the country where they are found
has become an established, widespread and consistent
practice among states; as herein petitioner is not a natural-
born citizen, she could not have availed herself of
repatriation under Rep. Act No. 9225; repatriation as a
mode of reacquiring citizenship is a form of naturalization
since it requires the performance or an act, i.e., the taking
of an oath; and Bengson vs. HRET applies only to
repatriation under Rep. Act No. 2630, which specifically
applies to persons who lost Filipino citizenship by service in
the American armed forces.
64.2 On residence, the First Division ruled that - -

Petitioner's return in May 2005, the enrolment of her
children in local schools in 2005, the purchase of the
condominium unit in the second half of 2005, the
construction of their house in 2006 and the advice to the
US Postal Service in 2006 of the abandonment of their US
address are not conclusive evidence that Sen. Poe had
decided to reestablish and in fact reestablished permanent
residence here; Sen. Poe's husband remained a US resident
35
in May 2005; herein Petitioner travelled to the US five times

between 2006 to 2010; she was still a US citizen when she
commenced reestablishment of residence in the
Philippines; her being an alien prevented her from
reestablishing residence pursuant to Coquilla v. COMELEC;
her residence can be counted only from 31 August 2006
when she became a registered voter anew; and because of
her statement in the 2012 COC, herein Petitioner's
residence can be counted only from November 2006.
64.3. The First Division ruled that there was deliberate

attempt to deceive and mislead the electorate because
herein Petitioner had knowledge that she was foundling, an
adopted child and without a known blood relative; the
requirement of being a natural-born citizen is
straightforward; the Constitution clearly defines who are
citizens and foundlings are not one of the categories
enumerated; that the principle of jus sanguinis is followed;
there is no presumption of natural-born citizenship to any
person seeking the presidency; all these circumstances
should have already alerted petitioner that she is not a
natural-born Filipino.
64.4. The First Division also said that there was a

deliberate attempt to misrepresent the period of residence
because of the inconsistency between the 2012 and 2015
COC; herein petitioner is a well-educated woman and could
not been confused about the information sought in the
2012 coc.
65. Sen.Poe promptly filed a Verified Motion for

arguing that the Tatad Petition should have
Reconsideration 14 3
been dismissed out for being an improper remedy; and that it is
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and not the COMELEC which
has primary jurisdiction over the validity of the B.I. Order.
65.1 On the issue of citizenship, Sen. Poe argued that

the SET Decision negated any falsity of her claim that she
is a natural-born citizen; Tatad (who was the only one who
_..-,, Q."Yestioned Selly Poe's natural-born status at birtJ:it had the"'. ~
burden to prove that Sen. Poe was not in fact a natural-
born citizen; as a foundling, herein petitioner was a citizen
from birth who did not have to perform any act to acquire
or perfect her Philippine citizenship; Sen. Poe reacquired
her .natural-born citizenship when she was repatriated
Annex "U" hereof. Faithful reproductions of the Annexes to this Verified Motion for
14 3
Reconsideration are likewise attached.
36
under R.A. No. 9225; Sen. Poe did not intend to deceive
anyone when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-
born citizen; and the position that foundlings are not
natural-born citizens is at most a disputed legal issue.
65.2 On the matter of residence, Sen. Poe contended

that it was not false for her to state that she will be a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) months and eleven
(11) years on the day before the May 2016 elections; that
she has been a resident since at least 24 May 2005; that
she could re-establish residence even before she regained
her citizenship under Rep. Act No. 9225; that Coquilla v.
COMELEC does not apply as the factual milieu in that case
is vastly different from herein Petitioner's; the statement in
her 2012 COC on the period of residence was a mistake in
good faith; residence is an issue of fact and the COMELEC
ought to have considered her evidence of residence instead
of focusing on the mistake in the 2012 COC; there was no
deliberate intent to hide anything false with respect to her
claim of residence, as several months before the filing of
her 2015 COC, Rep. Toby Tiangco of the United Nationalist
Alliance ("UNA") had already brought out in public the
matter of petitioner's stated period of residence in her 2012
COC, and Sen. Poe had already acknowledged the mistake
and publicly explained how she committ~d such error; that -~
several months before the filing of the 2015 COC, a petition~·
. '"·"""'
for quo warranto had been filed against her at the Sen~'f~. , :·
Electoral Tribunal ("SET") by one Rizalito David who, h8'1 ''·
also questioned her 2012 COC, and that in her 31 Augt.lSt-·~ 't
· · . 2~,15 Verified Answer in that case, she already made it df "'':\~
record that as of 13 May 2013, she had been residing in the
Philippines "for more than six (6) years and six (6) montlfs~; .,
.arrea
I L dy. •·
Jt'~~"-~
~ 4&.-\ ~.
66. On 23 December 2015 (or on a day that tliis ~·

Honorable Court was closed and therefore unable to grant ~· F
relief to Sen. Poe, and just before the start of the 4-day lohg
••• , Jri\nliday ~tretch fro)ll 24 to 27 O~c~rpber 2015), the C91\J,EL~€ .:.Jll!lm:"'"
En ,Bar!-C by a vote of Five (5) to Two (2) (with Chairman A~~$ , :,
Bautista and Commissioner Christian Robert Lim dissenti~ }rt'
. ·ipro~:i~gated its ~esol~tion . ~f even date denying Se~ ...,~Q~,l ~. .
~otu:;n for Reconsideration, citing. the reasons already disc~.s· -ri
1nlhe :11 December 2015 Resolut10n, and further noting th:(: ~"<~ ,:;;~~~
r '.~:'., ft:.~:;,~~ }~,'I ~~
+ * 66.1. The First Division, indeed, representt?il "\"
·excerpt from the dissenting opinion of the Hon. Justile
, . Antonio T. Carpio in Tecson vs. COMELEC, as the maJoti$Y
)1
·;-,).'·1~. .
.r
!:'
. ~;1;
'"~·t~:
........ -;
37
op1n1on. However, it insisted on applying the dissent of the

Hon. Justice Carpio because it was based on Paa vs. Chan
where this Honorable Court supposedly ruled that "the
burden to prove natural-born citizenship" belongs Sen. Poe.
66.2. The excerpt from Paa (which the COMELEC

relied on) was not obiter because it supposedly "bears upon
the main issue disposed of in the said case; that is, it is a
ruling on the question of Respondent Chan's citizenship."
66.3. The jurisprudence which Sen. Poe cited in

support of her position that Private Respondent Tatad had
the burden of proving that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born
Filipino, are allegedly not applicable. The case of Jalosjos
vs. COMELEC is also not applicable to Sen. Poe's case.
67. Hence, this Petition. Sen. Poe has no other plain,

adequate and speedy remedy apart from this Petition, especially
considering the undue haste with which Petitioner's opponents
would like her name stricken out from the list of candidates and
the ballots. This Petition for Certiorari is in fact the only remedy
she has, given by Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and recognized by applicable jurisprudence.
1·
v.
GROUNDS FOR THIS PETITION
THE COMELEC 144 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF SEN. POE'S CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT IN THE 9 MAY 2016
ELECTIONS.
r Al I I I ••• ~ .Lit;& '

A.
.,.,_.,.
THE COMELEC EVADED ITS POSITIVE

• "" Jt<
-
DUTY UNDER THE LAW, AND UTTERLY
DISREGARDED ITS OWN RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, WHEN IT REFUSED
144 In the succeeding paragraphs, the COMELEC's First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc will be collectively referred to as "COMELEC", unless otherwise indicated.

38
TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT THE TATAD

PETITION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
A.1. The Tatad Petition admittedly did

not state a cause of action and did
not cite applicable grounds under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code ("OEC"), in relation to Rule 25
of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC ("COMELEC Rules"); and
A.2. Under the plain mandate of Section

1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules,
the COMELEC is mandated to
summarily dismiss a petition for
disqualification which invokes
grounds for a petition to cancel or
deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the
OEC, in relation to Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules.
B.
THE COMELEC ACTED WHIMSICALLY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY, IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IN RULING
THAT SEN. POE MADE A FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN HER
COC FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT SHE IS A
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
B.1.
The COMELEC disregarded the

legal impact of the 17 November
2015 Decision of the Senate
., -...... · , ·~ .,, , ,,_... ElectptaJr.:I'rillq.r.r.aJ ("SET") in SET -ey ,w,•, •~"'-' '*"' ,~-
Case No. 001-15, which became
final and executory on 3
December 2015, or on the same
day the petitions a quo were
deemed submitted for resolution.
The SET Decision negates the
falsity of Sen. Poe's
39
representation in her COC for

President that she is a natural-
born Filipino. If it is true that
Sen. Poe is a natural-born
Filipino as a Senator, it must be
equally true that she is a natural-
born Filipino as a candidate for
the Presidency.
B.2.
The COMELEC disregarded long-

standing jurisprudence,
repeatedly referred to a non-
binding dissenting opinion in
Tecson vs. COMELEC (instead of
the majority decision therein),
and then cited an obiter dictum
in Paa vs. Chan which this
Honorable Court had long
overturned and abandoned (even
assuming it used to be legal
doctrine), when it ruled that Sen.
Poe had the burden of proving
her natural-born citizenship. ,,- It
is elementary that the burden of
proof in proceedings under
Section 78 of the OEC, in relation
i
" to Rule 23 of the COMELEC

t Rules, is on the petitioner
"' (Private Respondents herein), and
not on the respondent (Sen. Poe).
:•
,l.~;
~
B.3. *
>¢' "· .
~. ' .!>:.
<y ·~
The COMELEC acted whimsically,
capriciously, contrary to common
~~ ·.;\ ,\, '.i
sense and logic, and in '?,~"" '
-,, ~~
contravention of the letter and
spirit of the fundamental law, in
concluding that a foundling like
,, ... Sen. Poe is excluded from the
f
• enumeration of Philippine
""
citizens under Section 1, Article
:f IV of the 1935 Constitution.
.l '\:f:
; .i
'~· ~
.c ""'~
;~ ·'
~
40
B.4.

basic international law concepts
of "transformation" and
"incorporation," and ignored
applicable settled jurisprudence
on the matter, when it ruled that
the Philippines must first pass
domestic or municipal legislation
before a foundling may enjoy the
inherent and fundamental right
to a nationality (which is
unquestionably afforded to all
persons, without distinction,
under international law).
B.5.
The COMELEC disregarded

applicable international human
rights instruments ratified by the
Philippines which create an
affirmative obligation to consider
foundlings as natural-bprn
I'
citizens of the country.
B.6.
The COMELEC ignored decades of

jurisprudence when it restricted
"generally accepted principles of
international law" (in Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution) to
the concept of "customary"
international law, excluding
therefrom "general principles of
law recognized by civilized
nations" under Article 38 1 (c) of
the ICJ Statute.
B.7.
The COMELEC ignored Sen. Poe's

evidence, in the form of
international conventions and
instruments, and sixty (60)
41
nationality statutes passed in

various countries in Asia, the
Americas and Europe. This
evidence establishes that: (a) the
presumption that a foundling is a
citizen of the country in which
she is found; and (b) the
presumption that a foundling is
born of citizens of that country,
have risen to the level of
"customary" international law
and may also be considered
"general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations."
B.8.
The COMELEC ignored the

Constitutional and settled
jurisprudential definition of a
"natural born Philippine citizen"
when it concluded that, although a
foundling is considered a Filipino
citizen under international law,
she cannot be considereJI a
"natural born" Filipino.
B.9.
The COMELEC acted beyond its

jurisdiction, and in violation of
the DOJ's primary jurisdiction,
when it effectively revoked the
B.I. 's 18 July 2006 Order which:
(a) found Sen. Poe to be
presumptively a former natural-
born Filipino; and (b) approved
her petition for reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino citizenship.
· ~ - -..... _ • •· ·,.,, , ·~ -lasofar .. as . the • .COMELEC held ,,...,.. -- """~-- ~' ~>
that Sen. Poe was not qualified

for the B.I. 's Order, the same is a
prohibited collateral attack on
Sen. Poe's natural-born Filipino
. citizenship.
42
B.10.
The COMELEC unceremoniously

usurped the power of this
Honorable Court, and took it
upon itself to create new legal
doctrine and to reverse settled
judicial precedent (i.e., Bengzon
vs. HRET and related
jurisprudence), when it ruled that
Sen. Poe did not reacquire her
"original nationality," or her
natural-born Filipino citizenship,
when she was repatriated under
R.A. No. 9225.
B.11.
The COMELEC ignored evidence

of Sen. Poe's honesty and good
faith when it ruled that she
supposedly intended to mislead
or deceive the Philippine
electorate, when she stated in
her COC for President that she is "'!f'
!
a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO ·~c.';..4''~
CITIZEN." ,.
~·
:""4~.
~·-
< !' ~ c.
THE COMELEC ACTED WHIMSICALLY
.i
,>
' ,z AND CAPRICIOUSLY, IGNORED SETTLED
~·~""~
JURISPRUDENCE AND GROSSLY .~ 4\!f'•' ~
.\IL
MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE ON
'~·
RECORD IN RULING THAT SEN. POE ),•
MADE A FALSE MATERIAL

--~
"':t..
...
i "
,, '
/,
..;,:' J.,:
REPRESENTATION IN HER COC FOR
·-PRESIDENT ··-WHEN SHE STATED l ..- -
·;i
i~,.;'4~;
~·-'"·. ·~~.\J.t_',
~~f.
--· THEREIN THAT HER "PERIOD OF ;~·~: 'ft.t:~'.

.r:;' . 'I' .
RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO ~''"
~-~·
r.
~ THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016"
.lf * WOULD BE "10" YEARS AND "11"
~·.·;_
MONTHS.
·' . ~"
ih· ~
i, !~~·
,,
:. ~' J .,~" '1,1.

'. f' . t
,j
43
C.1.
The COMELEC had the positive

duty to consider and weigh Sen.
Poe's evidence showing that she
had reestablished her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as early
as 24 May 2005. The COMELEC's
refusal to perform this positive
duty, and its gross and
inexcusable misappreciation of
Sen. Poe's evidence, are
unquestionably acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which warrant setting aside the
COMELEC's finding of fact on the
issue of Sen. Poe's residence.
C. l .a. The COMELEC acted

illogically, arbitrarily and
in disregard of the
evidence when it found
that Sen. Poe had not
abandoned her domicile1· in
the U.S.A. simply because
her husband (whose
domicile is not even in
issue) stayed in the U.S.A.
after 24 May 2005 up to 4
May 2006, and that he
remained "a citizen of the
US." The evidence on
record undoubtedly shows
that Sen. Poe's husband
stayed in the U.S.A.
primarily to sell and
dispose of the family
1 ........ nr ••1r~"'"•....:A~ " ..fto:ft'le -there and that he :...,.. At & ...... _;Al;. ,. . . .
returned ' to the

Philippines 7 days after
the sale (on 27 April
2006). Moreover, the
citizenship of one's
spouse cannot possibly
negate one's own
44
residence in the
Philippines.
C.1.b. The COMELEC ignored

settled jurisprudence and
disregarded the evidence
when it found that Sen.
Poe's travels to the U.S.A.
between 24 May 2005 and 7
July 2006 constitute proof
that she had not abandoned
her domicile in the U.S.A.
C. l .c. The COMELEC disregarded

the settled principle
enunciated in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,
reiterated in Perez vs.
COMELEC, that a
candidate's statement in
her certificate of candidacy
is not decisive of the issue
of residence. The fact of
residence always prevails
over a candidate's
statement about his or' her
residence.
C.2.

basic principle that residence is
primarily an issue of fact, and
cited inapplicable jurisprudence,
when it ruled that the
commencement of Sen. Poe's
domicile in the Philippines
should start, at the earliest, when
she reacquired her natural-born
Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225.
C.3.
In ruling that a person's domicile

of choice may commence only
upon repatriation and/ or the
45
possession of a permanent
resident visa, the COMELEC
applied a "very legalistic,
academic and technical approach
to the residence requirement"
which "does not satisfy" and is
completely divorced from the
"simple, practical and common-
sense rationale for the residence
requirement."
C.4.
The COMELEC ignored evidence

of Sen. Poe's honesty and good
faith when it ruled that she had
concealed her supposed
"ineligibility" for the Presidency,
and that she supposedly intended
to mislead or deceive the
Philippine electorate, when she
stated in her COC for President
that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY
~
09, 2016" would be "10" yetars
·~ and "11" months.
D.
THE COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT

JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE
t PETITIONS A QUO, DESPITE THE
,;,;
ABSENCE OF ANY FALSE MATERIAL •-i;,·
REPRESENTATION IN SEN. POE'S COC *" ~ ·,,,,.J.c

FOR PRESIDENT. ,: ·;J
£;h11
D.1. '·!,.
: t • , . . . . . 'I'll
.:,.,,.
In the absence of a false material
representation in Sen. Poe's COC
for President, the petitions a quo
:~
should have been dismissed
~·
outright for being premature "f'sil2.S~I#;_;)
;1-
petitions for quo warranto which '
.:.,
..
, ·'"".":' ,..,.,
~
·' 1',·i:.:
~~
';#l.' : ;.
are within the sole and exclusive <i'··; ).:\0;

"'·."".1>
I+ ~
t. !-· ..~r
.;;., •'
46
l
jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal ("PET").
D.2.
In the absence of a false material

representation in Sen. Poe's COC
for President, the cancellation
thereof effectively deprives the
Filipino people of their sovereign
prerogative to decide a purely
political question, that is-who
will be the 16th President of the
Republic of the Philippines?
VI.
DISCUSSION
THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF SEN. POE'S CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY FOR THE PRESIDENT IN THE 9 MAY
2016 ELECTIONS. I"
68. The extraordinary writ of certiorari which Sen. Poe

respectfully prays for in this Petition may be issued if the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of her
COC for President.
69. In Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs.

COMELEC, 14 s this Honorable Court defined "grave abuse of
discretion," as "the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
. la'.'W~'·IJl6..,. .. . .. ~. ' • - --..
70. The COMELEC gravely abuses its discretion when it

acts in contravention of settled law, jurisprudence and rules of
evidence or procedure.
14s G.R. No. 206987, 10 September 2013

-
47
70.1.In Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, 14 7 this Honorable Court
held that there is grave abuse of discretion "when an act is
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence."
70.2.Regio COMELEc,1 4s is authority for the

vs.
proposition that the COMELEC commits grave abuse of
discretion when it "ignor(es) the rules on evidence" or
"issue~ a ruling in "gross contravention of established rules
on evidence."
70.3 In Varias vs. COMELEC, 14 9 the Supreme Court

held that the "(u)se of wrong or irrelevant considerations in
deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision makers
action with grave abuse of discretion." In footnote 25 of the
Varias case, the High Court noted that in Pecson vs.
COMELEC,150 citing Almeida v. Court of Appeals, 151 the High
Court ruled that "a court abuses its discretion when it ...
relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers
clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too
much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions
of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal
conclusions."
70.4. In Jalover vs. Osmena and £0MELEC,15 2 this
Honorable Court held that "when the COMELEC's action on
the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene." In De Guzman v.
Commission on Elections, 153 this Honorable Court held that
an administrative body commits grave abuse of discretion
when it "grossly misappreciate(s) evidence of such nature
as to compel a contrary conclusion."
71. The COMELEC correctly held154 that the elements of a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, in relation to Section
74 of the OEC and Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules, are three-
.,......,....,..... rfol9:.. ~"' "'#?•t""'!'·~'" 11!.,tr •
........."'...... I!' • :P<i
""'•: ' ,,-, y~
147 G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004

148 G.R. No. 204828, 3 December 2013
149 G.R. No. 189078, 11 February 2010
150 G.R. No. 182865, 24 December 2008
151 489 Phil 649.(2005)
152 G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014
153 G.R. No. 159713, 31 March 2004
15 4 11 December 2015 Resolution, p. 44
48
a. First, there must be a "false" representation in the

COC. Both Section 78 of the OEC and Section 1, Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules state that the "exclusive"
ground that may be raised in the Petition is that a
"representation contained (in the COC) as required by
law is false."
b. Second, the false representation must pertain to a

"material" fact, or those which concern the
"candidate's qualifications for elective office,"
including her citizenship and residence.155
c. Third, the false material representation in the COC

must amount to a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible," or it should have been made
"with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate's qualifications for public
office." 156
72. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the
first and third elements were established in the proceedings a
quo. Sen. Poe's evidence based on settled and applicable law
and jurisprudence, which the COMELEC did :rpot consider, show .,,
without doubt that Sen. Poe's assertions in her COC for ·
President about her citizenship and residence were neither false
. nor intended to deceive. The COMELEC ignored basic law; ru~ ..;,;:
<P1P jurisprudence on the definition of "natural-born" citize~Jhi~ .
tl\e burden of proof in petitions under Section 78 of the OEC,· t};ie· ,,
intern~tional law doctrines of "transformation" ' and
"incorporation," the legal consequences of repatriation,., tq~· ·
c:lo.cttihe of primary jurisdiction, the basic elements . ~'[
re~stablishment domicile of choice in the Philippines and·'l) fu6
non-"d.ecisive" or non-binding nature of statements on resideb.~)e . *·
in a certificate of candidacy. «il. ' ·::!;
.ms .• "r •• 7~, • ~~ ~ "'c<?n~~51u~I]<;:.,e• tJJ~ .CQl\f.ELEC evaded its,,..J?osi~fr~~ "'

duJy to dismiss the petitions a quo and, instead, ordered tij;e. ·"'
; :- ,'·' ' . ,· . ·-:;. ~' ~.·. ·i ~
c~celiation of Sen. Poe's COC for President. For these, and tllC.:
"reasons to be discussed in detail below, Sen. Poe respec~f11;:'
subn\its that a writ of certiorari is in order in this case. '
·i
+f
-:".'~"'~ . ' . ~:~fl;~~· '
~S)i
Mitra VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Dela Pena VS. Osmooa ,jlls,ii·
G,QMELEC, G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014
i.5'6 ld .
.-.
" '·~"*, tl
';'r:
~ I
i$'
r· ct;
..tf~·~ ';}:
~ ·~ il:'i·lfa
/-~
' '
--·~t~r:~'}:~1l;~
""' ~.;· .$.•
49
A. THE COMELEC EVADED ITS

POSITIVE DUTY UNDER THE LAW,
AND UTTERLY DISREGARDED ITS
OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, WHEN
IT REFUSED TO DISMISS
OUTRIGHT THE TATAD PETITION.
A.1. The Tatad Petition admittedly

did not state a cause of action
and did not cite applicable
grounds under Section 68 of
the OEC, in relation to Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules.
74. On page 12 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC stated that it "agrees with Sen. Poe that the Tatad
Petition, although captioned as a petition for disqualification,
does not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case." It
acknowledged that "(l)ack of residency and natural-born status
is not a ground for the disqualification of a candidate to an
elective office," and that "a petition for disqualification is based
on grounds enumerated under Section 68 and J2 of the OEC, as
well as Section 40 of Republic Act ('R.A. ') No. 7160." The
COMELEC En Banc simply adopted these findings in the 23
December 2015 Resolution. In other words, it was clear to the
COMELEC that the Tatad Petition did not state a cause of action
COMELEC Rules, in light of Fermin vs. COMELEC, 1s7 where the
Supreme Court held that since the petition therein "d(id) not
state any of these grounds for disqualification, it cannot be
categorized as a 'Section 68' petition."
75. It was incumbent upon the COMELEC to perform its

positive duty to dismiss the Tatad Petition. In Munder vs.
COMELEc,1ss the Supreme Court held that a petition for
- -acTisqlialificati6n"10sleiiSil51yTifed under Section 68 of tne1JECr'"'-
based on a "wrong ground" or a ground not included among
those enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC, should be dismissed
outright.
76. However, instead of dismissing the Tatad Petition, the

COMELEC chose to be liberal. It found that "while (the Tatad
157 G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008

158 G.R. Nos. 194076 & 194160, 18 October 2011
so
-
Petition) is denominated as a Petition for Disqualification, the
ground (sic) invoked are really for the cancellation of or denial of
due course of Sen. Poe's COC."
77. There was neither factual nor legal basis for the
COMELEC to adopt a liberal approach in ruling on the fatal
procedural defects in the Ta tad Petition. There[ore, the decision
to do so was clearly arbitrary and whimsical, and tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
77.1.It is elementary that procedural rules may be

applied liberally only when there are "persuasive reasons"
or "compelling justifications" for a party's failure to adhere
thereto (such as fraud, mistake or excusable negligence). 15 9
However, liberality does not apply to those who
intentionally violate rules of procedure.
77.2.Tatad, the party who clearly violated the rules,

did not even pray for liberality. He did not care to
acknowledge or address the fact that he had availed himself
of the wrong remedy under COMELEC Rules. Contrary to
the COMELEC's finding, the Tatad Petition was not a case
of "improper denomination," nor was it the COMELEC's
function to supply an excuse for a non-compliant litigant.
Tatad has never argued "mistake" and neither has he
asserted that his petition ought to have1·been labelled as
one for cancellation of, or denial of due course to, Sen.
Poe's COC for President. Tatad totally ignored this
procedural issue when he filed his Memorandum, despite
the fact that Sen. Poe had already raised this issue
squarely in her Verified Answer to the Tatad Petition.
Worse, Tatad repeated the same procedural violation in his
Memorandum.
77 .3. Private Respondent Tatad was not content with

seeking the cancellation of Sen. Poe's COC for President.
He wanted Sen. Poe to be "disqualified" from the
Presidential race in 2016. He chose instead to file a petition
COMELEC Rules. Publicly, he declared that his petition
·----was supposealy ..more potent" (as compared to the-·Three·-
petitions filed with the COMELEC against Sen. Poe under
Section 78 of the OEC) because his petition sought to
"disqualify" Sen. Poe from public office for the rest of her
life. Tatad's objective from the very beginning was to file a
"petitron for disqualification" under Section 68 of the OEC,
159 Limpot vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44642, 20 February 1989; Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-42679, 25 May 1979
51
and he maintained this intent until the very end when he

filed his Memorandum. Conversely, Tatad intentionally
avoided raising grounds applicable to a petition under Rule
78 of the OEC, because he was mindful that doing so
would result in the summary dismissal of his petition
(pursuant to Section 1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules).
77.4. Under these circumstances, Tatad should not be

allowed to benefit from a liberal application of the
COMELEC Rules. His deliberate violation of the COMELEC
Rules was not the result of fraud, mistake or excusable
negligence. He chose to violate the rules and he did not
even bother to present "persuasive reasons" or "compelling
justifications" for his obvious violation. Therefore, the rules
should have been applied to him strictly, not liberally. The
Tatad Petition should have been dismissed outright. The
COMELEC's repeated refusal to do so was a blatant evasion
of its positive duty under the law and, thus, amounts to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
77.5.When Sen. Poe asked the COMELEC En Banc to

reconsider the First Division's 11 December 2015
Resolution, she pointed out that there was neither factual
nor legal basis to apply the rules liberally in favor of Private
Respondent Tatad. However, instead of addressing this ·f ·.:',
new argument, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the:.,fj1i11~~J' """-

Division had supposedly already addressed this mattet>r1~ "
'Jl<,' cursory perusal of the First Division's 11 December' 20!);~ ·
~esolution would have revealed to any one that the Fir.~i
r>ivision had never tackled the lack of basis to be liberql ,,in
favor of Private Respondent Tatad. . ,, .....
. ~'
"
7_8. The COMELEC obviously ignored the elemen~~
!'
1
"
principle in election law and jurisprudence that, for a petition,to

be classified under Section 78 of the OEC, in relation to Rule 1~-~· .;
of the COMELEC Rules, it must specifically and exclusive~y · ·

.
".,...,..
,,~·allege that the candidate (in this case, Sen. Poe) committed.~ a
. ''~"~matertai repre·sent'atioll'" in her Coe which is "false." ~ ···' c, . ; - " - ..
'1 t: jff' \-. .> '~:-.~\'. ~:.t.
f' 78.1. There were absolutely no such allegations ·in:. ttJ.~·, ~ ·''.f
:::; - .. ,,£,
~-,
,Tatad Petition (and even in his Memorandum). The ··
~no claim in his pleadings that Sen. Poe was dishot _ ...... .
.,. Jr· that she intended to deceive anyone whel)~::':h~~.
J. accomplished her COC for President. Until the ve~,~~ 1
1
Tatad maintained that he simply wanted the COMELEC\~ ·~
1. "disqualify" Sen. Poe as a candidate for the Presidencyt(. 'f.lli ~•' ·
~.. "sole issue" framed in his Memorandum (pp. 8 to ~)' is
"•
,i ?,
f
52
"whether Respondent, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, is

disqualified to run or to continue as a candidate for
President in the May 9, 2016 elections." Tatad did not even
bother to pray for the cancellation or the denial of due
course to Sen. Poe's COC for President. The sole reference
to Sen. Poe's COC in the Tatad Petition (which is not even
found in his Memorandum) is in the closing paragraph of
the section on "Relevant Facts" on page 9 of the Tatad
Petition, which mentions only the filing of the COC (but not
any supposed material misrepresentation therein) .160
78.2. In other words, based on the caption, form,

substance, prayer and all other extraneous statements of
Private Respondent Tatad himself and his counsel (at the
start and to the end of the proceeding a quo), the "true
nature" of the Tatad Petition is NOT that of a petition under
Section 7 8 of the 0 EC.
78.3. On page 14 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution,

the COMELEC ruled that, "(c)onsidering that the Tatad
Petition impugns the citizenship and residence of Sen. Poe,"
it follows that it "generally questions the truthfulness of her
COC stating that she has the qualification and eligibility to
run for and be elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines." This ruling is contrary to settled
jurisprudence on the nature and character of a petition
under Section 78 of the OEC.
78.3.1. In Tagolino vs. HRET,161 this

Honorable Court held that in a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC, "(i)t is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must
have also made a false representation of the same in
the CoC." Similarly, in Fermin,162 the High Court held
that "the denial of due course to or the cancellation of
the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but
on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the
------ qualifications.. :r;eqwred ...of the public office he/ she is
running for.
78.3.2. Tatad's claim that Sen. Poe lacks

certain qualifications is not the same as a categorical
assertion that she falsely represented her
qualifications in her COC for President. Only the

161 G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013
162 G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008
--- ·····-··- ··-···· -----------------
53
latter allegation would suffice in a petition under

Section 78 of the OEC, and anything short of that
assertion would not.
78.4. The Tatad Petition must be distinguished from

the petitions "for disqualification" in Fermin, Munder and
Amara vs. COMELEC163 which this Honorable Court
considered as petitions for cancellation of a COC under
Section 78 of the OEC (and which were dismissed for being
filed out of time).
78.4.1. Although the petition in Fermin was

captioned as one for "disqualification," it nevertheless
contained the "essential allegations of a 'Section 78'
petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a
representation in his certificate; (2) the representation
pertains to a material matter which would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run
for the election for which he filed his certificate); and
(3) the candidate made the false representation with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately attempted
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render him ineligible."
,;:.·
78.4.2. In Munder, this Honorable Court
found that "(t)he main ground of the said petition is
that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that
he was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong,
Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not." The
candidate himself argued that the petition should be
treated as one filed under Section 78 of the OEC.
78.4.3. In Amara, the candidate sought to be

disqualified also argued that the petition for
disqualification is actually one for cancellation of his
COC under Section 78 of the OEC.
78.4.4. In sum, in Fermin, Munder and Amara,

-.....~.
the petitions sufficien11"¥,. stated a cause of4 .~tion fu£ • .• l!t'.2•
cancellation of, or denial of due course to, the COC in
question. Also, the candidates themselves conceded
that the petitions could be considered filed under
Section 7 8 of the 0 EC.
163 G.R. No. 192280, 25 January 2011

54
78.4.5. In contrast, in his Petition and

Memorandum, Tatad did not even care to allege that
Sen. Poe had made a false representation as to a
material fact in her COC for President. Moreover,
Sen. Poe has never conceded that the Tatad Petition is
actuall.1.1 one filed under Section 78 of the OEC, in
relation to Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules.
78.4.6. Based on the foregoing, there is no

legal basis to consider the Tatad Petition as a petition
to cancel and or deny due course to Sen. Poe's COC
for President.
A.2. Under the plain mandate of

Section 1, Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules, the
COMELEC is mandated to
summarily dismiss a petition
for disqualification which
invokes grounds for a petition
to cancel or deny due course to
a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the OEC,
in relation to Rule 23 of the ,... ·A'
COMELEC Rules.
,, t>. '· . :"·

'1'~·~"
L t.. ·a~·~~
79. The COMELEC was bound (this time under its "f~.?·:~;·".
'.'l\tles)·,.to dismiss the Tatad Petition. The second paragraplj. o(l.:r~
Section 1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules states: ·· . ·
r A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a

'• !"
i
,' i
Petition to Deny to (sic) or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or·~·;· -.-
·p~tition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a '.~ ' ·~.·· ~;
I•
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.16 4 i'
79. 1. This particular section was brought to "" tbe\.

·attention of the COMELEC En Banc when Sen. Poe asked,if
.;, ·i!,,·.,, . _f.'-
,, '
.i' ''reconsider and reverse the First Division's 11 Decerrtbci{
.... ···<"'<t. ~-
4 2015 Resolution. The COMELEC En Banc ignoreqJd~.~rt.

·~ection just the same when it issued the 23 Decembei;)~~ ~?~Jt.
Resolution. ·~;ii'Jf;; \ .... *':..,.~
. ·
' ,f
80. Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules ma.Pi'
. :\)I~''
.. ·1·
'· theitd}smissal of a petition ostensibly captioned as

',;.,·!(r'
.. t
.-
~;;:
,:.kc-:
.
:~11.
.'\'.•
'J6'\ Unde:rscoring supplied
~· ,:,,_
r ' if
i' ~· ,· .
. . 7t
SS
Disqualify" even if the allegations therein pertain properly to a

petition for cancellation of a COC under Section 78 of the OEC,
in relation Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules. In other words, even
if the Tatad Petition was, in substance, a petition for cancellation
under Section 78 of the OEC, the COMELEC was mandated
under its own rules to summarily dismiss the same.
81. The COMELEC's refusal to follow its own rules of

procedure smacks of bad faith and arbitrariness. The
COMELEC's "liberal" application of its own rules was clearly
uncalled for, as even Tatad himself neither prayed nor argued for
such liberal application, and was entirely unapologetic about
deliberately resorting to the wrong remedy.
82. It is true, as the COMELEC pointed out, that it is

theoretically an "independent" Constitutional body which has
the "power to enforce and administer elections laws." But does
that mean the COMELEC may use its power to arbitrarily ignore
law, jurisprudence, and even its own rules of procedure in order
to make unwarranted exceptions thereto in favor of a particular
party? Is that what "independence" means? "NO" is obviously
the answer to both questions. Even the COMELEC noted in its
23 December 2015 Resolution that it has the general "power and
authority to inquire into the merits of the case and determine
the real issues and resolve the same under applicable laws, rules
and jurisprudence." Having acknowledged'' its sworn and
positive duty to follow "law, rules and jurisprudence" (which
uniformly mandated the dismissal of the Tatad Petition), it was
grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to, instead, consider
and grant the Tatad Petition.
B. THE COMELEC ACTED

WHIMSICALLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY,
IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN RULING THAT SEN .
....-.-..-. PQE _ MADE. I\ F.t\.:tvSil aaNJ\~IAL ...._ .'.:t'""''!''".it.. _i
REPRESENTATION IN HER COC

FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT SHE IS A
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN."
56
83. Considering that the Tatad Petition ought to have been

dismissed outright as a wrong remedy, there should be no more
issue before this Honorable Court in the instant Petition as to
whether Sen. Poe (as a foundling) is natural-born Filipino. Sen.
Poe's alleged material misrepresentation about her natural-born
Philippine citizenship may be tackled only in the narrow context
of the Valdez Petition which raised the specific issue of whether a
former natural-born Filipino reacquires that status upon
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225. The Valdez Petition assumed
and conceded that Sen. Poe, as a foundling, was a "farmer
natural-born Filipino." The Contreras Petition, on the other hand,
does not even take issue with Sen. Poe's natural-born Filipino
citizenship.
84. Be that as it may, Sen. Poe respectfully prays that her

arguments below be considered, if this Honorable Court decides
to brush aside the COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion in
unjustifiably excusing the glaring and fatal procedural flaws
found in the Ta tad Petition.
B.1. The COMELEC disregarded the

legal impact of the 17
November 2015 Decision of the
SET in SET Case No. 001-15, ,,.
which became final and
executory on 3 December
2015, or on the same day the
petitions a quo were deemed
submitted for resolution. The
SET Decision negates the
falsity of Sen. Poe's
representation in her COC for
President that she is a natural-
born Filipino. If it is true that
Sen. Poe is a natural-born
Filipino as a Senator, it is
equally true that she is a
natural-born Filipino as a
candidate for the Presidency.
85. On 17 November 2015, the SET, in SET Case 001-15

entitled David vs. Poe-Llamanzares, declared Sen. Poe (and, by
inference,. other foundlings), as natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, to wit: 165
165 SET Decision, Exhibit "43", p. 26

57
We rule that [Sen. Poe] is a natural-born citizen under the

1935 Constitution and continue (sic) to be a natural-born citizen as
defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a "citizen of the
Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship."
86. The SET has sole jurisdiction to rule directly on the

qualifications of an incumbent Senator. In the words of the
Constitution, 166 the SET is the "sole judge of all contests relating
to the ... qualifications" of members of the Senate of the Republic
of the Philippines. In contrast, under the present state of the
law, the COMELEC may touch upon the qualifications of
candidates of specific public posts, but only for the narrow and
limited purpose of determining whether the candidate committed
a false material representation in his or her COC.
87. The SET's 17 November 2015 Decision (Exhibit "43"

in SPA 15-002 [DC]) is therefore the first and only ruling
rendered to date, which passed squarely upon the issue of
whether Sen. Poe, as a foundling, is a natural-born Filipino.
This Decision is the first and only ruling per se on Sen. Poe's
citizenship qualification, which just so happens to be exactly the
same citizenship qualification for the Presidency.
/ ~
88. On 3 December 2015, or on the same day th~., .
,;i'.J'ifpetitions a quo were deemed submitted for resolution, but b~te, .·~"'
' ·the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed 23 December ,, 4,CH~5- ,;, . . ,~.~ ··~ ,
.R~solution, the SET's Decision became final and execl.lt~r!(

t'.inder Rule 80 of the 2013 Rules of the SET, a decision becofues: ~,.,
·hAal and executory upon receipt by the parties of a copy o"f .tHe .~ ·.
resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of the decisioJt,/.i:'.A.
Or,J. .3, December 2015, the parties to SET Case No. 001''-}'5"
te~eived the SET's Resolution denying petitioner Rizalito Dalicl'~ ·. ;.t.
· motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the 17 November 2()1$·,, A
SET Decision became "final and executory" on that date. ;, Th:e ~.
fact that Mr. David elevated the SET's Decision to this Honorable·
i Col.J,rt· does not ch.ange the fi.nal. and executory nature of~.#~.:. t.:··:: . . .•.,
.. , .. '· · :: t5
•· ., e~I~ion,
LD . . f funless
" ' ~~~·
• tne n1g1i'• \.-.Curt
,.,,. "':; "~··"........-:
issues a temporary restr8}:q!~·- '.'" ........""'
~:
. , orqer:
'
'enjoining the implementation of the SET's Decision'.' t1<f(t Ii! .,-
.~ '" ,• ·~
~-Sen. Poe's knowledge, no such TRO has been issued by·/tH_)/

.. ·. Sugr~me Court. The SET's Decision was therefore "fin· ,
execut<?ry" as early as 3 December 2015 .
.' , 1;19. th~ COMELEC disagreed with th~4,,

In sum, even if
it_ could not have ruled that 1t was false and that Sen. Poe ::a~~i~J .
f,, ~..
~-
_· \,6t, Sectiop 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
:i:,'
p· · ;· . ~tf:_
,,
-
58
in bad faith with the intent to mislead, when she asserted in her
COC for President that she is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN," because the first standing, final and executory ruling
on this issue is that Sen. Poe is a natural-born Filipino. A person
can only assume one status. Sen. Poe cannot be a natural,..born
citizen as a Senator and at the same time, lack such citizenship
as a Presidential candidate, and commit deliberate
misrepresentation by stating that she is a natural-born Filipino
as found by the SET.
89 .1. Given that the SET Decision had already been

promulgated long before the COMELEC Divisions issued
any of their assailed Resolutions, and was already final and
executory long before the COMELEC En Banc promulgated
its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the SET
Decision in exercising its limited jurisdiction to determine
whether Sen. Poe made a material misrepresentation in her
COC. It cannot be overemphasized that the COMELEC is
not a court or a tribunal which possesses an original power
to interpret the law, such that it can freely ignore cl
Decision rendered by a co-equal constitutional body on the
same issue, and conclude with certainty that the
representation on Sen. Poe's COC was false.
90. Notably, at the time the COMELEC En Banc issued its

23 December 2015 Resolution, it was already of public
knowledge and widely reported in the media that the SET's
Decision had been elevated to this Honorable Court. In view of
that development, and in the spirit of showing due deference and
respect to this Honorable Court, the COMELEC En Banc should
have avoided making any categorical ruling on Sen. Poe's
citizenship.
91. Assuming arguendo that the COMELEC has the

power to render a separate ruling specifically, squarely and
finally on the issue of the citizenship of a foundling (as the SET
undoubtedly had the power to do), but which is in conflict with
• ·st!1M''bf the SEll,"'the CE>MBLEC's tulin!?; would create, at tl1e -~·'119<': "'
least, equipoise on the issue. Moreover, the two conflicting
rulings would show that the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship is
really an unsettled legal issue, of first impression, which only the
Supreme Court can decide with finality.
92. Since the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship is of first

impression and that this Honorable Court has yet to definitely
resolve the same, it follows that there was a distinct possibility
59
that Sen. Poe might be found to be a natural-born Filipino. In

light of that possibility, it would also follow that Sen. Poe, at th~
very least, might have been telling the truth when she stated in
her COC for President that she is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN." This is significant because someone who might be
telling the truth cannot be categorically found to be asserting a
falsehood (or, worse, telling a lie).
93. Considering that the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship is

still unsettled, the COMELEC acted illogically, whimsically and
capriciously when it considered as definitely false, Sen. Poe's
assertion in her COC for President that she is a "NATURAL
BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
B.2. The COMELEC disregarded

long-standing jurisprudence,
repeatedly relied on a non-
binding dissenting opinion in
Tecson vs. COMELEC (instead
of the majority decision
therein), and then cited an
obiter dictum in Paa vs. Chan
which this Honorable Court
had long overturned and I''
abandoned (even assuming it
used to be legal doctrine),
when the COMELEC ruled that
Sen. Poe had the burden of
proving her natural-born
citizenship. It is elementary
that the burden of proof in
proceedings under Section 78
of the OEC, in relation to Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules, is
on the petitioner (Private
Respondents herein), and not
on the respondent (Sen. Poe).
94. The COMELEC's ruling on citizenship is based on its

citizenship is based primarily on its finding that Sen. Poe had
the burden of proving that she is a natural-born Filipino.
95 . .When the First Division issued its 11 December 2015

Resolution, its principal legal bases for this legal conclusion
60
were passages supposedly lifted by its First Division from Tecson

vs. COMELEC.
96. In her Motion for Reconsideration, Sen. Poe brought to

the attention of the COMELEC En Banc that the First Division
had misrepresented the true import of this Honorable Court's
decision in Tecson, 16 7 and that what the First Division had
invoked and applied was not the majority decision of the High
Court in that landmark case, but a mere dissenting opinion.
Indeed, on pages 24 and 46 of the 11 December 2015
Resolution, the First Division of the COMELEC reproduced the
following paragraph which it claimed (in footnotes 78 and 122 of
the 11 December 2015 Resolution) to be an excerpt from
Tecson, 168 to wit:
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the

burden of proving his Philippine citizenship. Any person who
claims to be qualified to run for President because he is, among
others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving
he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is
natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional
requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express
qualification for election as President, must be complied with
strictly as defined in the Constitution.
r 4
The last sentence of the quoted paragraph was again quoted OlJ: ·
. """' I!-'.·
page 26 of the First Division's 11 December 2015 Resolu~? .,.¥
','
together with a quote from Paa vs. Chan, thus: · ' '· ,.
- "':.
The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being .an ·· ..

. eXpress qualification for election as President, must be complied;>:"
with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in, ,,, ' ""
·:!.\'
Paa v. Chan: "'
"'
~.
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
l .1 tr m " citizenstrip; and any douM' ~rdihg citizenship must " . a,,,.1; '•it.a.;;;·~
~- '
"'iE_,
J~ '11'
Ii} '.c•,
be resolved in favor of the State.
;, .IJ
..J.97. Based on the foregoing, Sen. Poe argued

COMELEC En Banc that the quoted passages cannot be Ci.
Jfrecedent or legal basis for any ruling that Sen. Poe 11
burde,n of proving that she is a natural-born Filipino.
;
<;;~.
·~
:·i~t G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004 {i

< 6$ G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004
1
'-.,.:
1tt
j «;
~·· ll!f'<
61
98. When it issued its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC En Banc acknowledged that the First Division had
cited the dissenting opinion of the Hon. Justice Carpio in Tecson
(and not the majority ruling). However, the COMELEC En Banc
did not find anything irregular in such reliance because the
dissenting opinion of the Hon. Justice Carpio supposedly
"explained a doctrine or ruling made by the Supreme Court in
the case of Paa vs. Chan ... (which) was quoted in the dissenting
opinion and likewise quoted and relied upon by the First
Division in its Assailed Resolution." This is grave abuse of
discretion.
99. First, in attempting to justify the First Division's

glaring and inexcusable error, the COMELEC En Banc allowed a
sole dissenting opinion in Tecson, to prevail over the majority
decision therein.
99. 1. It is clear from the concluding paragraph of the

majority decision in Tecson that it was the petitioner who
had the burden of proving that the late Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (Sen. Poe's late father) made a false material
representation in his COC for President in the May 2004
elections. The same paragraph found in the opinion of the
majority in Tecson also shows that it is not•
necessary for a
candidate to "definitively show" that he or she is a natural-
born Filipino, thus:
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish

conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
.. - • .. - _, • prove """Wheth~ .... ~i--~, •tnete has been materiT!J-c."'" ,,.,.,_
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.169
99.2.It is indeed curious that although the COMELEC

En Banc was quick to point out the supposed "doctrine"
enunciated in the case cited in the dissent of the Hon.

62
Justice Carpio in Tecson (i.e., Paa vs. Chan), the COMELEC

En Banc did not even care to acknowledge (much less,
address) the doctrine laid down in Tecson itself. With the
realization that the First Division had relied on a dissenting
opinion in Tecson, shouldn't the first order of business for
the COMELEC En Banc have been to examine the majority
decision in the same case? After all, the majority of the
Supreme Court lays down legal doctrine, not the minority.
In the same manner, shouldn't it have been evident to the
COMELEC En Banc that since the principle relied on by the
First Division was found in a dissent, the prevailing and
settled rule would logically be contrary to that principle?
By turning a blind eye to how this Honorable Court ruled in
Tecson and, at the same time, finding an excuse for the
First Division's blunder in citing the dissent in the same
case, the COMELEC En Banc undoubtedly acted
capriciously.
99.3.What made the COMELEC En Bane's

incongruous and arbitrary stance worse is that it failed to
note that the majority (En Banc) decision in Tecson (2004)
was issued almost 40 years after Paa vs. Chan (1967).
Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Paa laid down a
doctrine that a person claiming citizenship has the burden
of proof, the same was overturned whe,,,n this Honorable
Court rendered its decision in Tecson. It is elementary that
later jurisprudence on an issue, overturns earlier
inconsistent ones on the same issue. Thus, when the
COMELEC En Banc relied on Paa, it was basing its ruling
on a case which had long been overturned. The COMELEC
En Bane's ruling was therefore not based on law. These
points are expounded on further below.
100. The passage in Paa which the COMELEC En Banc

relied on in its 23 December 2015 Resolution (that "filt is
incumbent upon respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino" and "no presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship- mtlst be -resolved in favor of the State") was mere
obiter dictum.
100.1. In its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC En Banc found that the aforementioned excerpt
from .Paa was not obiter because it supposedly "bears upon
the main issue disposed of in the said case; that is, it is a
ruling on the question of Respondent Chan's citizenship."
63
This pronouncement is whimsical because it ignores the

basic definition of "obiter dictum," and is belied by a careful
reading of this Honorable Court's ruling in Paa.
100.2. "An obiter dictum has been defined as an

opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law
that is not necessary in the determination of the case
before the court."1 7 o Was the "opinion" in Paa, which the
COMELEC relied on in issuing its assailed Resolutions,
"necessary" in the "determination of the case" in Paa? The
answer is "NO".
100.3. There was no "doubt" in Paa regarding the

alien citizenship of the candidate in question. Thus, it was
not necessary for the Supreme Court to rely on any
"presumption" in "determining" her citizenship. On the
contrary, the parties in Paa "stipulated on," and the
evidence proved, the following facts showing that the
respondent was not a Filipino (but a Chinese citizen), to
wit:
As against the circumstances relied upon by

respondent on his claim of Philippine citizenship, the record
shows that in 1941 respondent registered himself as an alien
(Exhibit M); and that on April 30, 1946, he1 and his father,
Leoncio Chan, whom respondent claims to be a Filipino, '··~-. ~
registered themselves as aliens in the Bureau of

Immigration, and had reported yearly to said Bureau, thr4
'[,;. the Municipal Treasurer of San Fernando, La Union, up to
1949; that in 1948 he filed a sworn a petition for . •" .i'""
naturalization (Case No. 6) before the Court of First

Instance of La Union, alleging that he is a Chinese citizen,·~ f
i that he was born in Amoy, China, on March 13, 1915, and .·
ff
that he emigrated to the Philippines in 1917; and that he "ii/ • •
filed war damage claim No. 997394 with the United States " r;_
Philippine War Damage Commission, but it was rejected ~ ·i'

because he is a Chinese. I 71
~~ -~'( ~ 3'
f~ ..... h d9t;«:~· ~··
.::i(
.Jk•'il.ti R '• • 1*00 4 - ·--I •.. . , h 1
;}'-
. . n contrast, t ere was no proo in t ¢ ~ "':~.'·· .;
proceedings a quo that Sen. Poe is a citizen of another · ·
.f~'
country,
.
or that she was born a foreigner or born of ....,;·~
..""'•' .~
~or~igners. Therefore, unlike in Paa,. the~e is nei~J:~.::··

.. :,, yJ~m nor proof that Sen.. Poe's bio~ogical par~ .. :.~ :l;ii'l '.~>
registered themselves as ahens. Precisely, she i~~S.{f"'~·~:.·,
'~~1~7" 1·
' .~:jf·#: .i .•.
· F~ Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Suntay, G.R. No. 188376, 14 December 2011
i:1111 nderscoring supp lied
~
,,.
·"
'·
.i¥,: ~'
64
foundling whose parents are unknown. Therefore, Paa

does not apply.
100.5. Besides, Paa originated from a petition

for quo warranto, and not a petition for cancellation of
COC under Section 78 of the OEC. Therefore, the
pronouncements in Paa, even if doctrinal, are not strictly
speaking, applicable to Sen. Poe's case.
100. 6. Finally, this Honorable Court's dictum in

Paa ( 1967) on the supposed absence of any presumption
of Philippine citizenship must be deemed to have been
superseded and overturned by the more recent En Banc
decisions of the Supreme Court (discussed in paragraph
101 et seq. hereof) Aznar vs. COMELEC (1990), Salcedo
II vs. COMELEC ( 1999), Tecson vs. COMELEC (2004),
Fermin vs. COMELEC (2008), Japzon vs. COMELEC
(2009), Mitra vs. COMELEC (2010) and Reues vs.
COMELEC (2013), where the Supreme Court ruled that
the petitioner questioning the qualifications of the
candidate has the "burden" of proving that these
qualifications are lacking.
101. Further aggravating the COMELEC's grave abuse of

discretion is its defiance of the decisions of thi~. Honorable Cou: t
(in addition to Tecson vs. COMELEq which have uniformly ruled
that the petitioner (not the respondent) has the burden of proof,
at the first instance, in a petition filed under Section 78 of the
OEC.
101.1. In Aznar vs. COMELEC, 172 this Honorable

Court held that it was "incumbent" upon the petitioner to
"positively establish," "by substantial and convincing
evidence," that the candidate "had lost his Philippine
citizenship." In other words, it was the burden of the
petitioner to prove that the candidate was an alien. It is of
no moment, as the COMELEC En Banc pointed out in its
.......... -
,,
23 December 2015 Resolution, that the candidate in Aznar
was· undoubtedly a Filipino 1ber0re he lost his citizen·sm:p:· · _,.•. ~
The point is that the High Court in Aznar placed the
burden on the petitioner therein to prove his allegation that
the candidate is "not a Filipino citizen." In the same
manner, the COMELEC should also have placed the
burden on Private Respondent Tatad to prove his allegation
that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
112 G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990

65
101.2. In Salcedo II vs. COMELEC,173 the High

Court found that "petitioner has failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly
made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy
pertains to a material matter." The COMELEC En Banc
pointed out that "it was not the falsity or the qualification
per se, but the materiality of the alleged representation of
the candidate that was in issue in the said case." The
COMELEC En Banc, again, missed the point. It clearly
ignored. that when this Honorable Court in Salcedo
dismissed the petition therein under Section 78 of the OEC,
it was because there was neither allegation (much less
proof) that the candidate therein lacked the citizenship
qualification (among other qualifications). In Salcedo, this
Honorable Court stated that "petitioner does not claim that
private respondent lacks the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification." In effect, the
High Court presumed that the candidate in Salcedo
possessed the citizenship qualification, otherwise it would
not have upheld the validity of his COC and his election
and proclamation as mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Should the
ruling in Sen. Poe's case be different from Salcedo simply
because Private Respondent Tatad alleged (without any
proof whatsoever) that Sen. Poe lacks the citizenship
qualification? It is elementary that alle~ation is not the
equivalent of proof. Therefore, like Salcedo, the petition in
the proceeding a quo should have been dismissed in the
absence of proof that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born
Filipino.
I
101.3. In Fermin, 17 4 this Honorable Court ordered
the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
petitioner had not made out a "prima facie case." M
~
According to the High Court, the petitioner had not
presented "(c)onvincing evidence" to "substantiate every
allegation," "sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called
on to answer it." Notably, unlike the cases of Aznar and
Salcedo, the COMELEC En Banc did not even attempt to
argue that Fermin does not apply to Sen. Poe's case. It is
·therefore reasonable to assume that the COMELEC agrees
that Fermin is applicable.
113 G.R. No. 135886, 16 August 1999

174 G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, 18 December 2008
66
101.4. In Japzon vs. COMELEc,11s the High Court

held that "Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines." This Honorable
Court upheld the En Banc resolution of the COMELEC
which had ruled:
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus

presumed that every person is a citizen of the country in
which he resides; that citizenship once granted is
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and
that the burden rests upon who alleges a change in
citizenship and allegiance to establish the fact. 17 6
That the candidate in Japzon was undoubtedly a natural-

born Filipino before he became an American citizen is again
immaterial. Sen. Poe's stance is that the High Court in
Japzon placed the burden on the petitioner therein to prove
his allegation that the candidate is not a Filipino citizen. In
the same manner, the COMELEC should also have placed
the burden on Private Respondent Tatad to prove his
allegation that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born Philippine
citizen.
101. 5. In Mitra vs. COMELEC, 17 7 this Honorable

Court placed the burden of evidence on the elected member
of the House of Representatives only after the private
respondents had "successfully established," and the elected
official had "admitted," that his domicile of origin was in a
city other than where he was elected to office. The burden
of proof was, initially, on the parties who asserted that the
official lacked the residence qualification. The COMELEC
En Banc, again, did not deny the applicability of Mitra to
Sen. Poe's. case.
101.6. In Reyes vs. COMELEC,178 the majority held

that the petitioner before the COMELEC (Joseph Tan)
initially had the burden of proof to show that the candidate
(Regina Reyes) was not a Filipino. The High Court held
that the "burden" shifted to Reyes only after Tan had
proven that Reyes was a U.S. Passport holder and a
"balikbayan." However, Reyes was not required to prove
that she was a natural-born Filipino to begin with. She
11s G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, cited in Sabili vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24
April 2012)
111 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010
11a G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013
67
only had to prove that she had complied with the

requirements under R.A. No. 9225 to qualify for public
office.
101.7. It bears stressing again that the COMELEC
En Banc did not find that Sen. Poe could not rely on Tecson
vs. COMELEC in support her position that Private
Respondent Tatad had the burden of proving the Sen. Poe
is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
101.8. In the last analysis, at least two (2) settled

principles involving the concept of "burden of proof'
support the above-mentioned jurisprudence. This
Honorable Court has held that "(t)he burden of proof is, in
the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the
action." 179 Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the burden of proof "is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. As the
initiator of an action, it is the claimant who must prove his
claim before the defendant is obliged to prove his defense.
Thus, Tatad had the burden of proof (in the first instance).
He had to initially prove that Sen. Poe's representations in
her COC concerning her citizenship and residence are
"false." Another oft-cited principle is that "(t)he burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
is given on either side."1so Thus, a party would not have the
burden of proof if she would prevail in the absence of
evidence from both parties. The burden of proof could not
rest on Sen. Poe, for she stood to prevail in the event that
neither party presented evidence in the proceedings a quo.
In contrast, since Tatad stood to be "defeated" if neither
party presented evidence, with him lied the "burden of
proof."
102. To reiterate, the "exclusive" ground that may be raised

in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC under
Section 78 of the OEC is that the "representation(s) contained (in
Sen. Poe's COC) as required by law (are) false." Therefore, if the
purported falsehood in the COC is Sen. Poe's statement that she
is a natural-born Filipino, the petitioner must prove that such
17 9Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702, 12 April 2011;
Republic vs. Vda. De Neri, G.R. No. 139588, 4 March 2004; See separate concurring
opinion of Justice Callejo in Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 & 161824, 3
March 2004
iso Spouses Hanopol vs. Shoemar, Inc., G.R. Nos. 137774 & 148185, 4 October 2002,
citing Borlongan vs. Madrideo, G.R. No. 120267, 25 January 2000, which in tum, cited
Summa Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175 (1996)
68
statement is false because she is not a natural-born Filipino.

While that statement is in negative form, it constitutes the very
basis of the claim that Sen. Poe is disqualified. "Whenever
petitioner's right depends upon truth of a negative, upon him is
cast the onus probandi." 181 Th us, Section 1, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court imposes the burden of proof on the claimant,
regardless of the form of his claim.
103. A candidate should not be compelled to prove the

truth of the representation in her COC that she is a "NATURAL
BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN." The law assumes that a person is
honest and truthful. A person is presumed innocent of any
wrong doing (including lying or deceiving).182 It is no wonder
that in proceedings under Section 78 of the OEC, jurisprudence
places the burden of proof squarely on the petitioner (the one
accusing the respondent of lying), and not on the respondent
(the one accused of lying). There are more reasons why Tatad
had the burden of proving that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born
Filipino.
104. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,

"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer" "are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein ... " 183
104.1. Thus, in Board of Commissioners, et al. vs.

Hon. Dela Rosa, 184 this Honorable Court applied a
"presumption of citizenship" in favour of a certain Mr.
William Gatchalian because the last official act of then
Acting Commissioner of Immigration was the issuance of
an order "admitting" Mr. Gatchalian as a "Filipino citizen"
and "revalidating'' his Identification Certificate. Conversely,
in Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 the Supreme Court held that
"loss of citizenship" could not be presumed for a "holder of
a valid and subsisting Philippine passport" who "ha(d)
181 Venzon vs. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 128308, 14 April 2004
182 Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
183 In Gonzles vs. Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, 5 March 2010, this section was applied to a
certificate of live birth which the Supreme Court held to be "valid unless declared invalid
by competent authority." See also Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, 3 March
1997, where the Supreme Court held that: "The execution of public documents, as in the
case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is
required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely
casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant
evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in
the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate
General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath
being of itself a performance of duty by a public official."
t84 G.R. Nos. 95122-23, 31 May 1991
18s G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
69
continuously participated in the electoral process in this

countrY since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and
as a candidate."
13 1 of the Rules of
104.2. Under Section 3, Rule are satisfactory if
Court, the following "presumptions
1illcontradicted .. ":
That a person acting in a public office was regularly:
(l)
appointed or elected to it;
That official duty has been regularlY performed;
(m)
x x x
186
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
105. The Philippine Government has, through official acts,

repeatedly and consistently recognized Sen. Poe as a natural-
born Filipino, or a Filipino. Taken together, these acts give rise
to a presumption that Sen. Poe is certainly a Filipino, and in
fact, a natural-born Filipino. The burden should have been
placed on Tatad to overcome this presumption.
i. Official acts in recognition of

Petitioner's natural-born
Philippine citizenship
105.1. On 18 July 2006, the B.I. issued an Order
granting Sen. Poe's petition for reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, which states that
Sen. Poe is "born of Filipino parents and is presumed to be
a natural born Philippine citizen." R.A. No. 9225 applies
only to natural-born Filipinos.
105.2. On 31 July 2006, the B.I. issued

Identification Certificate No. 06-1091818 7 which certifies
that Sen. Poe was "recognized as a citizen of the
Philippines as per (sic) pursuant to the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) xx x."
105.3. On 6 October 2010, the President of the

Philippines appointed Sen. Poe the Chairperson of the
MTRCB; 1ss a position which can only be occupied by a
"natural-born" Philippine citizen.189
1s1 See Exhibit "23"
tsa See Exhibit "26"
189 Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1986
70
105.4. Sen. Poe's coc190 for the 2013 Senatorial

elections was accepted by the COMELEC and no
disqualification case was filed against her. She stated in
her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter,
she was overwhelmingly elected by the Filipino people.
105.5. On 17 November 2015, the SET, in SET

Case 001-15 entitled David vs. Poe-Llamanzares, rendered
a Decision191 of even date which declared Sen. Poe a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.192 As discussed
earlier, the SET Decision became final and executory on 3
December 2015.
n. Official acts in recognition of

Petitioner's Philippine
citizenship
105.6. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan Court

issued a Decisionl93 granting the Spouses Poe's petition to
adopt Sen. Poe. Sen. Poe does not argue that her
citizenship is derived from her Filipino adoptive parents;
rather it is her position that the adoption affirms that she
was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court could
not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to
"family rights and duties" and to "status" of persons), if it
did not in the first place, consider Sen. Poe to be a Filipino
who would be "bound" by such laws.
105.7. On 13 December 1986, the COMELEC

issued to Sen. Poe a Voter's Identification Card19 4 for
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. On
31 August 2006, the COMELEC registered Sen. Poe as
voter. Under the 1973195 and 1987196 Constitutions, the
right of suffrage may be exercised only by those who are
"citizens of the Philippines."
105.8. The Ministry/Department of Foreign Affairs

of the Philippines issued passports to Sen. Poe on 4 April
1988, 5 April 1993, 19 May 1998, 13 October 2009, and 18
March 2014. t 97 A diplomatic passport 198 was even issued in
190 See Exhibit "32"
191 See Exhibit "43"
192 Id., at p. 26
193 See Exhibit "2"
194 See Exhibit "3"
195 Section 1, Article VI of the 1973 Constitution
196 Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
197 See Exhibits "4", "4-A", "4-B", "25" and"34"
71
I I
her favor on 19 December 2013. Passports typically state

that the bearer is "a citizen of the Philippines." Under R.A.
No. 8239, the Philippine government issues a passport only
if it is "satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen."199
A passport is a document certifying the citizenship of the
holder,200 and under R.A. No. 8293, is not issued in cases
of a doubtful claim to Philippine citizenship.201
105.9. The presumption that the San Juan Court,

the D.F.A., the B.I., the President, and the COMELEC
"regularly performed" their respective "official" duties in
issuing the above-mentioned documents in Sen. Poe's
favor, logically carries with it the presumption that she
qualified for their issuance. In other words, the application
of the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
aforementioned documents, and the regularity in Sen. Poe's
election (as Senator) and appointment (as MTRCB
Chairperson) necessarily entails the presumption that she
is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Therefore, it
was Private Respondent Tatad's burden to prove that Sen.
Poe is not a natural-born Filipino.
105.9.1. In its 23 December 2015 Resolution,

the COMELEC En Banc noted that, in Paa vs. Chan,
this Honorable Court held that "(t)he exercise by a
person of the rights and/ or privileges that are granted
to Filipino citizens is not conclusive proof that he or
she is a Filipino citizen." This statement is beside the
point. Sen. Poe has never argued that the mere
exercise of rights of a natural-born Filipino
"conclusively" proves that she is a natural-born
Filipino. Her position is simply that successive and
repeated official acts of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines recognizing her as a
natural-born Filipino or a Filipino collectively give rise
to the presumption that she possesses that status.
Moreover, implied in this Honorable Court's statement
in Paa is that, although not "conclusive" proof, a
person's exercise of rights and/ or privileges that are
granted to Filipino citizens is still proof that her or she
is a Filipino citizen.
19s See Exhibit "33"
199 See Sections 3(d) in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 8293 and Macguiling vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, 2 July 2013
2oo RONALDO P. LEDESMA, PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT (COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 613)
COMMENTS AND CASES p. 17 ( 1994), citing sec. 136 if the 1983 Foreign Service Code
201 See Sec. 3 (e), R.A. 8293. Under Sec. 13 (e) of the same Jaw, a "travel document", in lieu
of a passport, may be issued to a stateless person who is likewise a permanent resident, or

a refugee granted such status or asylum in the Philippines.
72
105.10. Lastly, the cases of Tecson vs. COMELEC

and Japzon vs. COMELEC, among others, show that a
presumption may be the basis of a claim for citizenship. In
Tecson vs. COMELEC, the late Fernando Poe, Jr.'s Filipino
citizenship was ultimately upheld based on the
presumption that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, who died
at San Carlos, Pangasinan, was a resident thereof even
before his death, and "in the absence of any other evidence
... would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902." The
COMELEC itself, in its Resolution (upheld by this
Honorable Court) denying the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Manuel B. Japzon in Japzon vs.
COMELEC, even summarized certain presumptions which
~ay be indulged in even if the issue involved is citizenship,
viz:
It must be noted that absent any showing of
irregularity that overturns the prevailing status of a citizen,
the presumption of regularity remains. Citizenship is an
important aspect of every individual's constitutionally
granted rights and privileges. This is essential in
determining whether one has the right to exercise pre-
determined political rights such as the right to vote or the
right to be elected to office and as such rights spring from
citizenship.
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus

presumed that every person is a citizen of the country in
which he resides; that citizenship once granted is
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and
that the burden rests upon who alleges a change in
citizenship and allegiance to establish the fact.202
106. Common sense tells us that Sen. Poe was born of

Filipinos and is therefore natural-born. Given this strong
probability, her statement in her COC for President that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines cannot automatically be
considered "false." The presumption that she is born of Filipino
parents is supported not only by international law principles,
but presumptions found in the Rules of Court, as well as
ordinary deductive reasoning applied to unrebutted
circumstantial evidence.
106.l. Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

states:

73
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The

following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
203
course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
The "ordinary course of nature" and the "ordinary habits of

life," taken together with the admitted facts in this case
which constitute circumstantial evidence unrebutted by
Private Respondent Tatad, lead to the conclusion that Sen.
Poe's biological parents were most likely Filipinos, and not
foreigners.
106.2. Sen. Poe is only 5 ft. 2 inches tali.204 She

has brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face.2os Her height
and facial features are consistent with physical traits
ordinarily associated with Filipinos.
106.3. Sen. Poe was found, as a new-born baby,

in Iloilo City which is located in the Philippines. Her
biological parents were therefore likely to have been
residents of Iloilo City. In 1968, as at any time, an
overwhelming majority of the population of Iloilo City were
Filipinos.
106.4. Sen. Poe was abandoned in a Roman

Catholic Church.206 A great majority of Filipinos are
Roman Catholics, and only a Roman Catholic would be
expected to entrust his/her new-born child to a church.
Even in 1968, the Philippines was the only predominantly
Roman Catholic country in Asia. In the ordinary course of
things, only Filipinos with Roman Catholic faith would
leave herein Petitioner in a church in Iloilo City.
106.5. Sen. Poe's abandonment as a new-born

child is also far more consistent with her biological parents
being Filipinos. New-born children are abandoned usually
because their parents are poor and cannot afford to take
care of them. On the other hand, foreigners impoverished
in their own country would not likely have the means to
travel and find themselves impoverished in the Philippines.

204 See Exhibit "4", p. 1
20s Id.
206 Id.
74
Therefore, abandoned children found in the Philippines are

more likely to have been born of poor Filipino parents, as
opposed to foreigners.
106.6. In the absence of evidence, the law does not

require the COMELEC to accept the improbable, the
unlikely and the absurd. As discussed, "unless overcome
by evidence," the "ordinary" must be presumed. In this
case, the "ordinary course of nature" and the "ordinary
habits of life" tell us that a new-born baby with brown eyes,
black hair and an oval-shaped face, found in a Parish
Church in Iloilo City hours after her birth, was born of
Filipinos. Occam's Razor teaches us that the simplest
answer is often correct.
106.7. On pages 31to32 of the 11December2015

Resolution, the COMELEC stated that "(t)o agree with (Sen.
Poe)'s claim that all foundlings are natural-born Filipino by
presumption of law can result to an absurd situation where
a foundling with white skin, green eyes, with hair half
blond and half purple - who was a foundling but later
adopted by Filipino citizens - is a natural-born Filipino and
may run for the elective position of and even sit as
President in the future." With due respect, the presumption
of natural-born citizenship would not be rendered absurd
in that hypothetical situation.
106.8. A natural-born Filipino does not have to

look like a typical Filipino. He or she may be of Caucasian,
Indian, African or other foreign descent, but still be a
natural-born Filipino citizen. The Constitution simply
provides that a person be born of parents who are citizens
of the Philippines. This means that a foundling's parents
may be naturalized Filipinos, but with Caucasian, Indian,
African or other foreign descent. It is also wrong to
presume that natural-born Filipinos must always be of the
Malay race, as there are many Filipinos who are mestizos,
Chinoys and others of mixed stock. Therefore, a foundling
may look like a foreigner, but still be a natural-born
Filipino. That said, this discourse is more academic than
decisive, because, as discussed, Sen. Poe looks entirely
Filipina. This obvious fact only strengthens the
presumption that she was born of Filipinos.
107. The above-mentioned circumstances of Sen. Poe's

discovery as an abandoned new-born baby in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo in 1968, and her physical features which
75
resemble a typical Filipina, must also be considered as

circumstantial evidence that she was indeed born of Filipino
parents. Circumstantial evidence, which may suffice for
conviction even in criminal proceedings requiring the highest
degree of proof, is certainly admissible in an administrative
proceeding requiring only substantial evidence to prove that Sen.
Poe is most likely born of Filipino parents, and did not "lie" when
she stated in her COC that, "to the best of [her] knowledge", she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
107 .1. Substantial evidence is defined as "that

amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. "207 Thus,
the COMELEC should have considered the uncontroverted
circumstances of Petitioner's birth, discovery as a new-born
infant, and physical features, as sufficient relevant
evidence adequately justifying a conclusion that she was
most likely born of Filipino parents. To repeat, a rule
requiring conclusive identification of blood ties to a Filipino
parent is neither supported by law (as the definition of
natural-born citizenship under the Constitution does not
even require actual proof of blood relationship) nor by
jurisprudence (as the cases of Board of Commissioners vs.
Dela Rosa and Tecson show, wherein a claim of citizenship
was upheld based on a presumption).
107. 2. Section 4 of Rule 133, on the sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction in a
criminal case, may be applied by analogy. Under said rule,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there are several
circumstances which lead to the inference that Sen. Poe is
likely born of Filipino parents, to wit: (1) she was found as
a new-born baby in Iloilo City in 1968; (2) Iloilo is, then as
now, predominantly populated by Filipino citizens; (3) there
is no international airport or seaport in Iloilo City in 1968,
and no evidence to show that it is considered a main port of
entry for aliens; (4) Sen. Poe was reportedly abandoned in a
Roman Catholic Church, which is the religion practiced by
a majority of the Filipino population in 1968, as in present
times; and (5) Sen. Poe's physical features are consistent
with those normally associated with Filipino citizens. These
"circumstances" are not disputed by Private Respondent
207 Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court
76
Tatad. The combination of these circumstances is sufficient

to produce a "moral certainty'' "or conviction in an
unprejudiced mind" that Sen. Poe is indeed born of Filipino
parents who abandoned her as a new-born infant in a
Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City in 1968.
107.3. It is grave abuse of discretion for the

COMELEC to rule that "the probability that [Sen. Poe]
might be born of a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove
her case" ,2oa and insist on nothing less than direct proof
from Petitioner that she was born of Filipino parents. To
repeat, the proceedings a quo were administrative in
nature, requiring only substantial evidence-the lowest
quantum of evidence in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings. Even criminal proceedings, which require
proof beyond reasonable doubt, do not require direct proof,
much less proof producing "absolute certainty'' of guilt. The
highest quantum of proof under the rules on evidence
require merely "moral certainty" that a person has more
likely than not committed the crime he is charged with. To
require Sen. Poe to prove with "absolute certainty" her
"blood tie" to a Filipino parent is to require her to meet a
quantum of evidence even greater than that required in
criminal proceedings. This is certainly unjust, arbitrary,
whimsical, and despotic.
108. All told, there was no legal basis for the COMELEC to
place the burden of proof on Sen. Poe to prove her natural-born
citizenship or to prove her bloodline to a Filipino parent. Tatad
ought to have proven that Sen. Poe was not telling the truth
when she claimed in her COC for President that she is a
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN." The COMELEC should
have demanded proof from the Tatad that Sen. Poe is not a
109. Was Private Respondent Tatad able to discharge his

burden? The answer is NO. The only way to prove that Sen. Poe
is not a natural-born Filipino is to prove that both of her parents
are foreigners. No such proof was presented. The only fact
established in the proceedings a quo is that Sen. Poe's parents
are unknown. But this fact cannot discharge Tatad's burden.
How can Tatad's failure to present evidence that Sen. Poe's
parents were foreigners discharge his burden to prove that Sen.
Poe is a foreigner or stateless and not a natural-born Filipino? A
burden of proof is not and cannot be discharged by the absence
of evidence; under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
20a 11 December 2015 Resolution, p. 25
77
can be discharged only by "evidence on the facts in issue

necessary to establish his claim . . . by the amount of evidence
required by law." To hold otherwise is to support the absurd
logic that the existence of a thing is proved by the very lack of
evidence that it exists.
!
110. Not knowing is different from not being. A person who
is not sure that she is a natural-born Filipino may in fact be a
natural-born Filipino. "Unknown" parents may in fact be
Filipino parents. Thus, Sen. Poe may in fact be a natural-born
Filipino. If it is entirely possible that Sen. Poe was telling the
truth when she stated in her COC that she is a "NATURAL BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN," then the COMELEC cannot conclude that
what she said was false. The mere fact that Sen. Poe's parents
are unknown does not render false her claim in her COC that
she is a "NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
110.1. Ignoring for the time being that

presumptions of law apply in favor of her natural-born
citizenship which have not been disproven, and that the
burden of proof is not hers but Private Respondent's, Sen.
Poe's statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino cannot be false, but at most only not proven. The
mere fact that a statement is not proven does not mean
that it is false.
111. In its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC

En Banc pointed out that this Honorable Court, in Reyes vs.
COMELEc,209 supposedly "noted that the doubts cast on
Petitioner Reyes's citizenship charged him with the burden to
overthrow and overcome such doubts." The COMELEC En Banc
then found that "(i)n view of the fact that (Sen. Poe) admits and
has been shown to be a foundling with no known blood
relationship, doubt is cast upon her status as natural-born
Filipino citizen." Thus, Sen. Poe "now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The COMELEC En Bane's reading and application of Reyes is
blatantly erroneous, misguided and misleading.
111.1. First, the COMELEC En Banc

misrepresented the use of the word "doubts" in the Reyes
case. A perusal of the decision would show that the
"doubts" which were cast on the candidate's citizenship in
Reyes were based on "substantial" evidence proving the
candidate's American citizenship. Burden of proof is
discharged by presenting prima facie evidence sufficient to
209 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013
78
shift the burden of evidence, not by simply casting doubt.

In Reyes, it was because the petitioner had presented
"substantial evidence" establishing the candidate's U.S.A.
citizenship, that the burden of evidence shifted to the
candidate to also present "substantial evidence" to prove
her natural-born Filipino citizenship. The pertinent excerpt
in Reyes is quoted below:
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered

evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of
an American passport which she continues to use until June
30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations.
The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly
failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225
by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American
citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any
elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the
original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In

moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing
that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside
from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
x x x
These circumstances, taken together, show that a

doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship. 210
111.2. Applying Reyes correctly to Sen. Poe's case,

Private Respondent Tatad initially had the burden of

79
"substantiating his allegation" that Sen. Poe is not a

natural-born Filipino by proving with "substantial
evidence" that she possesses foreign citizenship. In the
absence of such evidence, the burden of evidence would not
shift to Sen. Poe to prove her natural-born Philippine
citizenship.
111.3. Did Private Respondent present

"substantial evidence" that Sen. Poe, as a foundling, is a
foreigner from birth? "NO," he did not. Private Respondent
Tatad neither alleged nor proved, and the COMELEC never
found, that Sen. Poe is a foreigner from birth. The mere
fact that Sen. Poe's parents are "unknown" and the fact
that she is a foundling certainly do not mean she is a
foreigner. Therefore, following Reyes, the burden of
evidence never shifted to Sen. Poe to prove that she is a
112. At end of the day, the COMELEC acted with grave

abuse of discretion when it declared "false" Sen. Poe's assertion
in her COC for President regarding her citizenship, despite
Tatad's complete and utter failure to prove such falsity. In the
absence of proof, presumptions stand, and the presumption in
this case is that Sen. Poe was telling the truth in her COC when
she stated therein that she is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN."
B.3. The COMELEC acted

whimsically, capriciously,
contrary to common sense and
logic, and in contravention of
the letter and spirit of the
fundamental law, in concluding
that a foundling like Sen. Poe
is "excluded" from the
enumeration of Philippine
citizens under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935
Constitution.
113. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution

enumerates those who are considered Philippine citizens:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands

at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
80
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the

Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with

law.211
114. On page 45 of the 11December2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC concluded that a foundling is supposedly "not one of
the categories" or is excluded from the enumeration of Philippine
citizens above. This conclusion is whimsical and capricious
because it is illogical.
115. Sen. Poe concededly does not fall under sub-

paragraphs (1), (2) and (5). Therefore, she does not need to be
"excluded" from these three (3) categories. However, the mere
fact that she is a foundling does not, by any stretch of logic,
categorically "exclude" Sen. Poe from sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).
116. Philippine citizens under paragraphs (3) and (4) are

simply those whose parents are Filipinos. There is nothing in
the provision which requires that the identity of such parents be
proven with absolute certainty, or even that such identity be
proven as a fact.212
117. The biological parents of a foundling are simply

unknown and therefore they may in fact be Filipinos. Thus, as
discussed in paragraph 122 (and sub-paragraphs), Sen. Poe will
most probably fall under any of these two (2) types of Filipinos.
A foundling is NOT necessarily EXCLUDED from these two
categories of citizens. Simple logic and common sense (neither of
211Underscoring supplied
2 12This is true not only with respect to foundlings, but even with respect to legitimate
children, whose filiation (or biological tie) to their father is merely presumed by law. In
other words, a legitimate child may in fact be not biologically related to his or her Filipino
father, but the law will still consider him or her a Filipino citizen, because of the quasi-
conclusive presumption that he or she is born of the husband of his or her mother. There
are therefore situations wherein a person is presumed by law to be a Filipino citizen,
notwithstanding the absence of any actual "blood tie" to a Filipino parent, as in the case of
a child conceived or born within a valid marriage between a Filipino father and an alien
mother, but is actually the product of artificial insemination with a donor, or of adulterous
relations.
81
which the COMELEC wanted to use) are enough arrive at this

conclusion.
118. Considering that foundlings are not categorically
excluded from the letter of pars. (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, and there is ambiguity in the
application of this Article to foundlings, the issue becomes, in
essence, one of constitutional construction. Contrary to the
COMELEC's Resolution,213 a verba legis approach will not solve
the problem, as the "express terms" of the Constitution, when
"applied", will not lead to the conclusion that foundlings are not
Filipino citizens.
119. Since the issue is fundamentally one of construction,

it is proper to apply acceptable methods of constitutional
construction, among them, ascertainment of intent behind a
particular provision. In this regard, the deliberations of the
framers of the organic law must be consulted in order to discern
their intent with respect to the citizenship of foundlings.
119. l. In Nitafan vs. Commissioner,214 this

Honorable Court ruled:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers. 215
119.2. In In re Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile,216 the High

Court stated that "it is generally held that, in construing
constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in
213 11 December 2015 Resolution, p. 25

214 G .R. No. 7870, 23 July 1980
21s Underscoring supplied
2
16 G.R. No. L-35536, 17 September 1974, citing Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & T. Co. (1895)
157 U.S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759; See also Legal Tender cases (1884) 110 U.S. 421, 28 L. ed.
204, 70 A.L.R. 30). The Supreme Court also examined the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission/Convention in construing applicable provisions of the
Constitution in the following cases: Feliciano vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147402,
14 January 2004; Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Dolnain, G .R. Nos. 183591, etc., 14 October 2008;
Gamboa vs. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011.
82
the constitutional convention as throwing light on the

intent of the framers of the Constitution."
120. The COMELEC ought to have examined the

deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention (Exhibit
"37" in SPA 15-002 [DC]) in the hope of discovering why
foundlings were not categorically excluded from the enumeration
of citizens under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. If
the COMELEC had done so, it would have learned that there is a
perfectly good explanation for the silence in the text of the
Constitution and the explanation was not that foundlings should
considered stateless or non-Filipinos under Philippine law. On
the contrary, the Constitution was silent, only because
foundlings are already included in the concept of jus sanguinis
Filipinos.
121. The pertinent deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional

Convention, on what eventually became Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, show that the intent of the framers was not to
exclude foundlings from the term "citizens of the Philippines."
According to them, "(b)y international law the principle that
children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it was not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively." There was
certainly no intent to consider foundlings as "stateless" persons
or foreigners. Thus:
Soanish I Ene:lish Translation

SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda. For an amendment. I propose that
Propongo que despues del incise 2 after subsection 2, the following is
se inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos inserted: "The natural children of a
naturales de un padre extranjero y foreign father and a Filipino mother
de una madre filipina no reconocidos not recognized by the father.
por aquel.
xxx
xxx
El Presidente. La Mesa desea pedire [We] would like to request a

una aclaracion del proponente de la clarification from the proponent of
enmienda. Se refiere Su Senoria a the amendment. The gentleman
hijos naturales or a toda clase de refers to natural children or to any
hijos ilegitimos? kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols. A toda clase de hijos To all kinds of illegitimate children.

ilegitimos. Tambien se incluye a las It also includes natural children of
hijos naturales de padres unknown parentage, natural or
desconocidos, los hijos naturales or illegitimate children of unknown
ilegitimos, de padres desconocidos. parents.
Sr. Montinola. Para una aclaracion. For clarification. The gentleman said
Alli se dice "de adres "of unknown arents." Current
83
desconocidos." Los Codigos actuates codes consider them Filipino, that is,
consideran como filipino, es decir, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein
me refiero al codigo espanol quien all children of unknown parentage
considera como espanoles a todos born in Spanish territory are
los hijos de padres desconocidos considered Spaniards, because the
nacidos en territorio espanol, porque presumption is that a child of
la presuncion es que el hijo de unknown parentage is the son of a
padres desconocidos es hijo de un Spaniard. This may be applied in the
espanol, y de esa manera se podra Philippines in that a child of
aplicar en Filipinas de que un hijo unknown parentage born in the
desconocido aqui y nacido en Philippines is deemed to be Filipino,
Filipinas se considerara que es hijo and there is no need ...
filipino y no hay necesidad ...
Sr. Rafols. Hay necesidad, porque

I
estamos relatando las condiciones There is a need, because we are
de los que van a ser filipinos. relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola. Pero esa es la
interpretacion de la ley, ahora, de But that is the interpretation of the
manera que no hay necesidad de la law, therefore, there is no [more]
enmienda. need for the amendment.
Sr. Rafols. La enmienda debe leerse

de esta manera: "Los hijos naturales The amendment should read thus:
o ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign
de una madre filipina reconocidos father and a Filipino mother
por aquel o los hijos de padres recognized by one, or the children of
desconocidos. unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones. Para una enmienda con

el fin de significar los hijos nacidos I The amendment [should] mean
en Filipinas de padres desconocidos. children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols. Es que el hijo de una
filipina con un extranjero, aunque
este no reconozca al hijo, no es The son of a Filipina to a foreigner,
desconocido. although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
El Presidente. Acepta Su Senoria o j Does the gentleman accept the

no la enmienda? amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols. No acepto la enmienda, I do not accept the amendment

porque la enmienda excluiria a los because the amendment would
hijos de una filipina con un exclude the children of a Filipina
extranjero que este no reconoce. No with a foreigner who does not
son desconocidos y yo creo que esos recognize the child. Their parentage
hijos de madre filipina con is not unknown and I think those
extranjero y el padre no reconoce, children of overseas Filipino mother
deben ser tambien considerados and father [whom the latter] does
como filipinos. not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
El President. La cuestion en orden
es la enmienda a la enmienda del I The question in order is the
84
Delegado por Cebu, Sr. Briones. amendment to the amendment from

the Gentlemen from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Mr. Bulson. Mr. President, don't
you think it would be better to leave Mr. President, don't you think it
this matter in the hands of the would be better to leave this matter
Legislature? in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas. Senor Presidente, mi

opinion humilde es que estos son Mr. President, my humble opinion is
cases muy pequenos y contados, that these cases are few and far in
para que la constitucion necesite between, that the constitution need
referirse a ellos. Por !eyes [not] refer to them. By international
internacionales se reconoce el law the principle that children or
principio de que los hijos o las people born in a country of
personas nacidas en un pais de unknown parents are citizens in this
padres desconocidos son ciudadanos nation is recognized, and it is not
de esa nacion , y no es necesario necessary to include a provision on
incluir una disposicion taxativa the subject exhaustively.21s
sobre el particular. 211
122. Under which of the five (5) categories of Philippine

citizens enumerated in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution does a foundling belong? The exchanges between
the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional Convention quoted
above show that foundlings were intended to be ius sanguinis
Philippine citizens, that is - those born of "a father or mother
who is a citizen of the Philippines."
122.1. The citizenship of a "foundling" was

discussed specifically in the course of the debates of the
framers on jus sanguinis Philippine citizens who, at the
time, fell under paragraph (2) of the then proposed draft of
the Article on Citizenship, thus:219
(2) All persons born in the Philippines or in foreign

territory of a father or mother who is a citizen of the
Philippines;
The framers of the 1 935 Constitution did not discuss the

citizenship of a foundling in the context of the other types
of Filipinos under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, much less considered them in the context of
"naturalized" Filipinos ..
211 See Exhibit "37", pp. 186 to 187

21s Underscoring supplied.
219 See Exhibit "37", p. 135
85
122.2. Specifically, Delegate Rafols wanted to

include in the enumeration of Philippine citizens,
immediately after paragraph (2) quoted above, the following
sub-section:
The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino

mother not recognized by the father. 220
122. 3. Delegate Rafols explained that the phrase

"natural children" was meant to include "natural children
of unknown parentage."221 Delegate Montinola objected to
the amendment, citing Spanish Law which applies a
"presumption" that "a child of unknown parentage is the
son of a Spaniard." He then suggested that this apply to
the Philippines. In other words, Delegate Montinola
suggested that a foundling be presumed born of Filipinos.
As discussed, Delegate Roxas essentially agreed with
Delegate Montinola when the former expressed the view
that "(b)y international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation. "222 However, Delegate Roxas added that
since the cases of foundlings are "few and far in between",
and international law already recognizes a rule with respect
to their citizenship, there is no more need to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively. No one expressed
any disagreement, and this was the final statement on the
matter of "foundlings" before Delegate Rafols' amendment
was put to a vote.223 This explains why foundlings were not
mentioned in Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
122 .4. Paragraph (4), Section 1, Article IV of the

1935 Constitution considers as Philippine citizens "those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship."
Mr. Aruego's contemporary account of the debates on this
sub-paragraph confirms that the citizenship of foundlings
220 See Exhibit "37" hereof, p. 186 (English translation); Underscoring supplied
223 It must be noted that the membership of the 1934 Constitutional Convention was
dominated by lawyers. Seventy percent (70%), or one hundred forty two (142) out of two
hundred two (202) members of the Constitutional Convention, were lawyers, so that it is
not unreasonable to conclude that when Delegate Roxas expressed the opinion that an
express provision on children of unknown parentage in the Philippines is not necessary,
for "international law" already recognizes them as citizens of the Philippines anyway, they
understood this to be the case, as the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws was already existing at that time. This is also
supported by Delegate Aruego's contemporary account of the proceedings of the
Convention, as cited in par. 122.4 above. (For the composition of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, see, I JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 23-46
(1949).
86
was discussed in the context of jus sanguinis Philippine

citizens, thus:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols

presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention
believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them,
should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law were already
clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the
nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment. 224
122.5. In its 17 November 2015 final and

executory Decision, the SET ruled that "(i)t was never the
intention of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to exclude
foundlings from natural-born Philippine citizenship," and
"(t)here was a recognition that 'children or people born in a
country of unknown parents are citizens of this nation. "22s
122.6. Based on the foregoing, when the framers of

the 1935 Constitution declared that "by international law,"
a foundling is a "citizen of this nation," the type of
Philippine citizenship they had in mind was citizenship !2y
blood. Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
}us sanguinis Philippine citizens fall under paragraphs (3)
and (4) thereof. Accordingly, the intent of the framers was
to consider a foundling a Philippine citizen whose "father"
and/ or "mother" is a citizen of the Philippines."
123. The foregoing discussion illustrates why the

COMELEC acted whimsically and capriciously when it concluded
that a foundling is excluded from enumeration of citizens under
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
124. In People vs. Manantan,226 this Honorable Court

discussed an exception to the Latin maxim expression unius est
exclusion alterius, viz:
224 I JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 209 (1949)
22s Exhibit "43", p. 24
2 26 G.R. No. L-14129, 31 July 1962, citing Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App.
519)
87
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of

its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice
will follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius
227
est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked.
The exception applies here.
124.1. As discussed, it was precisely the intent of

the framers of the 1935 Constitution to include foundlings
in the definition of Filipino citizens (specifically, pars. (3)
and/or (1), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution),
even though they were not specifically mentioned in the
enumeration of "citizens of the Philippines." In other
words, "no reason exists" to exclude foundlings from that
enumeration.
124.2. Moreover, it would be the height of injustice

to deprive a foundling of Philippine citizenship, or to
punish her with statelessness, for a status and condition
that is not of her own doing. It is not her fault that she
was abandoned at birth. Worse, she can do little or nothing
to change her status as a foundling.
124.3. Based on the foregoing, in determining the

citizenship of a foundling under the 1935 Constitution, one
may not invoke the Latin maxim, "expresio unius est
exclusio alterius."
125. The intent to include foundlings in the classes of jus

sanguinis citizens under the 1935 Constitution was undisturbed
and repeatedly carried over in succeeding Philippine
Constitutions. Thus, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions also do
not contain any specific provision on the citizenship of
foundlings. The framers of later organic laws obviously also
shared the view that no express provision on foundlings needs to
be included in the text of the Constitutions, as they are
adequately protected under international law and considered
Filipino citizens.
126. The framers of the 1935 Constitution relied primarily

on international law in characterizing the citizenship of a
foundling, because international law is particularly authoritative
on the subject of citizenship. Indeed, the legal foundation of
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution on "Citizenship" is both

88
"municipal law and international law." Delegate Aruego of the

1934 Constitutional Convention expressed this view as
follows:22s
MR. ARUEGO. Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Convention:
If I take this stand this afternoon, it is because I realize and I know
that you realize with me the importance of this section of the
Constitution. In defining citizenship in the Constitution, we are at
the same time defining the persons to whom should be extended
the rights and duties of citizenship. Our definition of citizenship
in the Philippines involves both municipal law and international
law. It involves the obligations of Filipinos both under municipal
law and those obligations under international law.229
126.1. Thus, in proposing, defending and objecting

to, amendments to Article IV on "Citizenship," various
members of the 1934 Constitutional Convention repeatedly
cited rules and principles of international law to support
their respective arguments.230
126.2. These repeated reference and desire to

conform with international law is but logical, as Article 1 of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (" 1930 Hague
22s See Exhibit "37", at p. 139

230 !!1., at pp. 178 to 180; Underscoring supplied. The excerpts below briefly illustrate this
point:
MR. CINCO. But suppose a child is born to a Filipino mother; the child has got a
father we cannot tell who he is, but it came out that the child appears to be very
white, it does not seem to be born of a Filipino father, what kind of citizenship has
the child?
MR. SANCHEZ. The general rule in international law will apply that (sic) child
follows the citizenship of his mother.
MR. CINCO. So that he is a Filipino citizen?
MR. SANCHEZ. I think so because that is the rule of international law.230
x x x
MR. PAREDES. Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: I have asked for
a chance to talk against all these five amendments, because I find them destructive
of the rules of International Law, converting the Filipino unnecessarily into a
treacherous and enabling every foreigner to be a Filipino just because he is
susceptible of naturalization.
x x x. With regard to No. 2., "All persons born in the Philippines or any foreign
country of a mother who is a citizen of the Philippines." I believe that is the point of
discussion, because as to the first point, if he is born of a Filipino father in or
outside the Philippines, he is a Filipino. We know that according to the rules of
International Law the nationality of a son follows the nationality of the father. x x
x.
x x x
The third reason is that in International Law, as I have stated, we have already
adopted this theory, and if we are going to alter the rules of International Law
which in the body of the article or chapter on principles we have declared to follow,
we will be contradicting the well-settled rules of International Law from time
immemorial, that the children will follow the nationality of the father.
(Underscoring supplied)
89
Convention"), which Private Respondent Tatad misquotes

as support in paragraph 5.26 of his Petition, in fact
provides that while it is for the State to "determine under
its own law who are its nationals,'' this will be recognized
only "in so far as it is consistent with international
conventions, international custom, and the principles of
law generally recognised with regard to nationality."
126.3. Indeed the principle that foundlings are

citizens of the country in which they are found, is an
ancient one predating even the earliest of the international
conventions cited in the following paragraphs. In the 1881
work of publicist2 3 1 Francis Wharton entitled "A Treatise on
the Conflicts of Law or Private International Law", he
already noted that "[t]he nationality of a foundling is that of
the place where he was born. "232
127. All told, since the text of Section 1, Article IV of the

fundamental law does not categorically exclude foundlings, and
the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution was to include
foundlings in the concept of )us sanguinis Filipinos, it was
indeed illogical, whimsical and capricious for the COMELEC to
conclude that foundlings are "excluded" from Philippine
citizenship.
B.4. The COMELEC disregarded the

basic international law
concepts of "transformation"
and "incorporation," and
ignored applicable settled
jurisprudence on the matter,
Philippines must first pass
domestic or municipal
legislation before a foundling
may enjoy the inherent and
fundamental right to a
nationality (which is
unquestionably afforded to all
231 A publicist is an expert in international Jaw. (Webster's Third new International

Dictionary, 1993 ed., p.1836)
2
32 Sec. 10, p.37. While at first blush, this principle appears to be }us soli in nature, it can
nevertheless be applied in countries which follow the }us sanguinis doctrine, based on the
common sensical presumption that a child found in a particular country is likely to have
been born of residents therein, such residents in all likelihood being citizens of said
country.
90
persons, without distinction,

under international law).
------------------------------------------
128. In complete and utter disregard of the intent of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution, the COMELEC ruled that there
is supposedly nothing in international law which justifies Sen.
Poe's claim that she is a natural-born Filipino. This ruling is
premised on the COMELEC's failure to grasp the consequences
of the doctrines of "transformation" and "incorporation."
129. The COMELEC found that although the Philippines

had ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR} (which both afford every child and
person from birth with a "right to acquire a nationality"), there is
supposedly nothing in these two treaties which provides that a
foundling is "ipso facto" granted with a nationality, and neither
do these conventions provide "how, when, and in what manner
will the child be accorded such nationality." The COMELEC
argued in the same fashion in ruling that Sen. Poe cannot rely
on the "right to a nationality" which is unquestionably granted to
all persons, without discrimination, under the U.N. Declaration
on Human Rights("UDHR").
130. The COMELEC's pronouncements fly in the face of the

basic principles of "transformation" and "incorporation," the
nature and character of fundamental rights afforded under
international conventions and instruments, and the basic
fundamental notion that the law must be construed in the best
interest of the child. Certainly, burdening a defenseless child
with proving the almost impossible-identifying the very persons
who abandoned him-is not in his best interest, It is cruel,
inhumane and merciless.
131. International law forms part of Philippine law either

through transformation or incorporation.233
131.1. A treaty ratified by the Philippines is

"transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts;"23 4 a treaty "forms part of the law of the
land. "2 3 s A State must perform its obligations under a
233 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Phil. vs. Duque III, G.R. No.
173034, 9 October 2007
23 4 Id., citing JOAQUIN 0. BERNAS, S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2002
ed., p. 57
235 See Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, referred to as the transformation
clause (as it 'transforms' treaties into municipal or domestic law), which states that "(n)o
91
treaty, in good faith, pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt

servanda. 23 6
Section 3, Article II of the 1 935 Constitution,

131. 2.
which embodies the incorporation method,23 7 states:
SECTION 3. The Philippines renounces war as

an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation. 2 38
132. The COMELEC did not dispute that the Philippines

ratified the UNCRC and the ICCPR. There is likewise no
question that the Philippines signed the UDHR and that it is
bound thereby (under the incorporation clause). It follows that
the UNCRC, ICCPR and the UDHR form part of Philippine law.
133. International laws (like the UNCRC, ICCPR and

UDHR) which become municipal law pursuant to the doctrines
of transformation or incorporation do not require further
implementing legislation in order to be binding and enforceable
in the Philippines.
134. Upon ratification, treaties may already be "applied to

domestic conflicts. "239
134.1. In at least four (4) decisions rendered by

this Honorable Court, the rights granted under the ICCPR
were applied and enforced directly, even without any
implementing legislation, to wit:
(a)ln Marcos vs. Manglapus,2 40 this Honorable Court

recognized the right to return to one's country,
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at

least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." See Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association vs. Dugue III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007; Puma Sportschuhfabriken
Rudolf Dassler. K.G. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75067, 26 February 1988;
dictum in Abbas vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965, 10 November 1989.
236 See La Chemise Lacoste. S.A. vs. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 63796-97, 21 May 1984; Taiiada
vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997; Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572,
138587, 138680 & 138698, 10 October 2000; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
104 768, 21 July 2003; Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the
Philippines ratified on 15 November 1972, states that "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. n
23 7 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs. Dugue III, G. R. No. 173034, 9 October
2007
238 The underscored phrase, otherwise known as the "incorporation" clause, was
substantially reproduced in Sections 3 and 2, respectively, of Article II of the 1973 and

1987 Constitutions.
239 G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007
240Q.R. No. 88211, 15September1989
92
although not found in the Philippine Bill of Rights.

The High Court applied the following rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR: "the 'right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence' [Art.
12(1)] and the right to 'be free to leave any country,
including his own.' [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be
restricted by such laws as 'are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others.'
[Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the 'right to enter
his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived."'
(b)In Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region vs. Hon. Olalia, Jr.241 and Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan2 4 2 the Supreme Court recognized
(independent of the Bill of Rights) the "right of every
person to life, liberty, and due process" as enshrined
in the ICCPR.
(c) In Razon vs. Tagitis,2 4 3 this Honorable Court cited the

following text of the ICCPR:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.24 4
The High Court also cited as "evidence of custom,"

statements of the "the UN Human Rights Committee,
under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights" concerning the interpretation of "Article 2
24t G.R. No. 153675, 19 April 2007
242 G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003
243 G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009
244 Emphasis in the original
93
(right to an effective domestic remedy)" of the ICCPR,

to the effect that:
... the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles

6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and
9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the
ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime
against humanity. 245
When Razon was decided, there was, as yet, no

domestic law prohibiting "enforced disappearances."
134.2. Accordingly, even in the absence of

domestic legislation on "the right to acquire a nationality"
granted under Article 24 of the ICCPR, a foundling can
already benefit directly from this right.
134.3. On page 28 of the 11 December 2015

Resolution, the COMELEC ruled that the Article 7 (1) of the
UNCRC cannot be implemented without municipal
legislation because Article 7 (2) states:
State Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights

in accordance with their national law and their obligations
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.2 46
This argument has no merit.
134.4. The above-quoted article does not state that

the Philippines must first enact a law before the rights
under the UNCRC may be enjoyed in the domestic sphere.
On the contrary, the section imposes upon the Philippines
the duty to "implement" the rights under UNCRC, which
presupposes that these rights already exist by virtue of the
treaty itself and, thus, may already be enforced or
implemented. "National law," as mentioned in the article,
obviously refers to existing national law which would limit
or guide the manner by which these existing rights under
the UNCRC would be implemented. National Law is not
limited to statutes; it includes the Philippine Constitution
and treaties, which, under the principle of transformation,
likewise form part of the law of the land. Hence, the phrase
"National law" does not signify that a new "national law"

94
must first be passed in the form of a statute so that the

Philippines may recognize or enforce the rights under the
UNCRC.
134.5. Secondly, Article 2.2, Part II, of the ICCPR is a

provision that is similar to Article 7, No. 2 of the UNCRC.24 7
Yet, in the four (4) Supreme Court decisions enumerated in
paragraph 134.1, the rights granted under the ICCPR were
applied and enforced directly, even without any
implementing legislation.
135. In Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 24 8 this Honorable

Court held that under the doctrine of incorporation, "no further
legislative action is needed" to make "generally accepted
principles of international law" "applicable in the domestic
sphere." Such principles are, by Constitutional declaration,
"part of the law of the Nation." It follows that the "right to a
nationality" granted under Article 15 of the UDHR does not need
any further implementing legislation in order to be enforceable in
the domestic sphere.
136. Based on the UNCRC (which recognizes the child's

right "to acquire a nationality" and to be protected from
statelessness), and the ICCPR (which provides the right to
"acquire a nationality" from birth), in conjunction with the
UDHR (which grant the "right to a nationality"), Sen. Poe had the
right not only to "acquire a nationality" but a "right to a
nationality" from birth, and that could only be the nationality of
a Filipino from birth, for the Philippines would not have the
power to recognize Sen. Poe as a citizen of any other country.
136.1. Notably, the right to be protected against

statelessness is a corollary of the right to nationality. To
afford a foundling the right to nationality is to protect her
against statelessness. Conversely, to leave a foundling
stateless is to violate her right to a nationality.
Accordingly, the right to be protected against statelessness
ought to be considered a "generally accepted principle of
international law'' as well.
136.2. In Sen. Poe's peculiar case as a foundling,

leaving her "stateless" would, indeed, violate the very terms
247 "Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant." (Underscoring supplied)
248 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000
95
of the UDHR, which is part and parcel of Philippine law.

The first paragraph of Article 2 of the UDHR states:
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set

forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
x x x249
136.3. Sen. Poe should not be left stateless or

deprived of her fundamental "right to a nationality," merely
because she has the "status" of a foundling.
137. The COMELEC truly acted whimsically when it failed

to comprehend the legal effect of the doctrines of
"transformation" and "incorporation," and insisted that
fundamental rights which are clearly and concededly protected
under international law, like the right to a nationality, still need
to be enacted and implemented through separate legislation,
before a person may invoke them. Indeed, why would Congress
need to enact a statute to "implement" international law, if upon
"transformation" or "incorporation," international law is already
deemed "part of the law of the land" and thus, at par with laws
passed by Congress? If every human rights convention still
needs to be legislated separately by the Philippines, what would
be the utility of ratification or incorporation?
B.5. The COMELEC disregarded

applicable international human
rights instruments ratified by
the Philippines which create
an affirmative obligation to
consider foundlings as natural-
born citizens of the country.
138. As discussed earlier, the COMELEC found that

the Philippines had ratified the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Therefore, there is no

96
dispute that these two conventions are binding on the

Philippines.
139. On 21 August 1990, the Philippines ratified the UN

Convention on the Rights of the Child. Under Article 7 of the
UNCRC, the Philippines undertook to protect the right of a new-
born to a nationality, and to ensure that every child is protected
against statelessness "from birth." The provision reads:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and

shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these

rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. 250
140. A similar Article is found in the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines
also ratified on 23 October 1986. Article 24 of the ICCPR
recognizes the right of every child "to acquire a nationality,"
thus:
Article 24. 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination

as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
original, property or birth, the right, to such measure of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 251
140.1. The UNCRC was adopted, among other

reasons, precisely because of the "need to extend particular
care to the child, "2s2 as provided in Articles 23 and 24 of
the ICCPR.

252 See preamble of the UNCRC
97
140.2. Article 2.1, Part II of the ICCPR states that

"(e)ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."
141. As mentioned, the ICCPR and the UNCRC create an

obligation on the part of the Philippines to ensure that, "from
birth," every child, "without discrimination," "acquires" a
"nationality." Conversely, the Philippines has a duty not to leave
any new-born stateless.
142. The only way the Philippines can perform its treaty
obligations under the UNCRC and the ICCPR in the case of a
foundling is to recognize him or her as its own citizen, that is-a
Philippine citizen. The Philippines has no authority to consider a
foundling a citizen of another county. In the words of the Hon.
Justice Carpio in his separate opinion in Maquiling vs.
COMELEC, "Philippine courts have no power to declare whether
a person possesses citizenship other than that of the
Philippines. "253
142.1. The Philippines has the obligation not

simply to recognize a foundling as its citizen, but to do so
from the time of the foundling's birth. To reiterate, under
the UNCRC, a child is guaranteed not only the right to
acquire a nationality, but the right to acquire such
nationality from birth, especially "where the child would
otherwise be stateless."
142.2. Domestic laws on naturalization2s 4 are not

sufficient to make the Philippines compliant with its treaty
obligations to ensure that a foundling be considered
Filipino from birth. Under Philippine law, an applicant for
naturalization2ss must be not less than eighteen (18) years
of age at the time she petitions for naturalization.
2sJ G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA 420
25 4Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and Republic Act No. 9139
255 Naturalization can either be judicial (governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended), or administrative (governed by Republic: Act No. 9139). Both laws clearly refer to
aliens and not to stateless persons. C.A. No. 473 prescribes, inter alia, a minimum age of
twenty one (21) years on the day of the hearing of the petition, and a minimum residency
in the Philippines of five (5) years, under special circumstances, and ten (10) years, in the
absence of special qualifications. On the other hand, R.A. 9139, which applies to "aliens
born and residing in the Philippines", requires that an applicant be at least eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of filing of the petition and be a resident of the Philippines since
birth.
98
Moreover, she must have "a known trade, business,

profession or lawful occupation to qualify for
naturalization. Thus, if the COMELEC's disregard of the
UDHR, UN CRC, and ICCPR is accepted, a foundling would
be left stateless from birth and for at least eighteen years
until she can qualify (by having a trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation) for naturalization, in
violation of the Philippines' obligations under the UNCRC
and the ICCPR. This is another reason why a foundling
must be recognized as citizen of the Philippines "from
birth."
143. Although neither the ICCPR llQ!: the UNCRC was in

force when Sen. Poe was born in 1968, each may apply
retroactively to the date of her birth in determining her
citizenship. The reasons are as follows:
144. First, the refusal to give retroactive application to the

ICCPR and the UNCRC will discriminate against foundlings born
before the Philippines' ratification256 of these treaties. This
would violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 257
144. 1. Differential treatment in law is justified only

when it is based on a reasonable classification. To be
reasonable, a classification: (a) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (b) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(d) must apply equally to all members of the same class.258
144.2. There is no valid and substantial

distinction between foundlings who were born before the
ICCPR and the UNCRC came into force, and foundlings
who were born after this date. For as long as the identities
of their birth parents are not established, they share the
srune status-that of a foundling. A law made applicable to
foundlings born after ratification should apply equally to
foundlings born before, as they are all members of the
srune class.
145. Second, the UNCRC and the ICCPR are "curative"

statutes which may apply retroactively.
256 The Philippines ratified the ICCPR and the UNCRC on 23 October 1986 and on 21
August 1990 respectively.
257 Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Underscoring supplied)
258 People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, 5 May 1939
99
145.1. To reiterate, as treaties which the

Philippines ratified, the UNCRC and the ICCPR form part of
the law of the land. These treaties are, therefore,
considered domestic statutes.
145.2. It is basic that "curative" laws apply

retroactively.2s9 Curative laws "are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. "260 A
law may be applied retroactively "when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIG HTS. "26 1
145.3. Insofar as the ICCPR and UNCRC supply

deficiencies in Philippine law on the rights of a new-born to
a nationality and to be protected against statelessness,
they are curative in nature. Thus, they apply
retrospectively to Sen. Poe's birth in 1968.
146. Third, under Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties, there is no prohibition against the
retroactive application of treaties (unless a different intention
appears). What is prohibited is the application of a treaty to a
fact or status which ceased to exist before the treaty entered into
force.
146.1. In the first place, neither the ICCPR nor the

UNCRC expressly or impliedly prohibits their retroactive
application. There is likewise no indication in these
treaties that their respective provisions should be applied
only prospectively.
146.2. Secondly, foundlings in the Philippines who

were born before the ICCPR and the UNCRC entered into
force did not cease to be such after the treaties entered into
force. They continue to be foundlings and foundlings
continue to be "born" until today. Therefore, these two
treaties bind the Philippines "in relation" to determining
Sen. Poe's rights at the time of her birth in 1968.
14 7. Fourth, considering that the Philippines was already a

signatory to the ICCPR as early as 19 December 1966 (or almost
2 years before Sen. Poe's birth), the Philippines was "obliged (as
of that date) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
259 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996; Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No.
114222, 6 April 1995; Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Serna, G.R. Nos. 82805 &
83225, 29 June 1989
260 Narzoles vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, 29 September 2000
261 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
100
and purpose" of the ICCPR.262 Article 18 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties states:
Article 18. OBLIGATION NOT TO DEFEAT THE OBJECT

AND PURPOSE OF A TREATY PRIOR TO ITS ENTRY INTO
FORCE
A State is obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat

the object and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments

constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear
not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b)It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,

pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided
that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 263
147.1. To deny Sen. Poe Philippine citizenship, or

to leave her stateless at the time of her birth in 1968, as
Petitioner argues, would have "defeated the object and
purpose" of the ICCPR, among which is to afford its
subjects (like Sen. Poe) a "right to a nationality."
148. Finally, a refusal (at present) to recognize Sen. Poe's

right to have "acquired a nationality" "from birth" and "to ensure
the implementation of this right" where she "would otherwise be
stateless," would be a violation of the obligations of the
Philippines under the UNCRC and the ICCPR.
B.6. The COMELEC ignored decades

of jurisprudence when it
restricted "generally accepted
principles of international law"
(in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution) to the concept of
"customary" international law,
excluding therefrom "general
principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" under Article
38 1 (c) of the ICJ Statute.
26 2See Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Bayan
Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011
101

COMELEC equated the phrase "Generally Accepted Principles of
International Law'' in the incorporation clause, with "customary
international law'' or "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law," as defined under Article 38.1
l]b) of the ICJ Statute. However, settled jurisprudence teaches us
that this is not the only way to understand the phrase
"Generally Accepted Principles of International Law."
150. A principle in a treaty (and not necessarily the entire

treaty which the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified) may
still be binding on the Philippines under Section 3, Article II of
the 1935 Constitution, which embodies the incorporation
clause, 2 6 4 thus:
SECTION 3. The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation.265
151. The Constitution itself does not define what is meant

by the phrase "generally accepted principles of international
law." It likewise does not appear that this Honorable Court has
laid down a consistent set of rules in evaluating precepts that
would qualify as "generally accepted principles of international
law." Jurisprudence applying this phrase employs varied levels
and types of analyses.
151.1. First, the phrase "generally accepted

principles of international law" may, indeed, refer to
"customary international law," as the phrase is understood
in Article 38 (1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, in which case two (2)
elements must concur:
(a) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on

the part of States; and
(b) A psychological element known as opinio JUns s1ve
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
151.2. However, the phrase may also be equated

with "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations," as defined under Article 38.1 (c) of the !CJ
Statute. This was the Supreme Court's ruling in
26 4Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October
2007
26 5 The underscored phrase, otherwise known as the "incorporation" clause, was
substantially reproduced in Sections 3 and 2, respectively, of Article II of the 1973 and

1987 Constitutions.
102
International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbin[j266

and in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Phil. vs. Duque III. 267 This principle is discussed in more
detail in paragraphs 168 to 174 hereof.
151.3. Finally, the Supreme Court may simply

declare a principle, a convention or a set of rules as
"generally accepted principles of international law," without
any detailed explanation, and without applying the
definitions and elements of "customary international law"
or "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations." 268 The UDHR is one such set of rules which the
266 G.R. No. 128845, 1 June 2000

267 G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007
268 These principles include, among others:
Pacta Sunt Servanda La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Hon. Fernandez, G.R. No.
L-63796-97, 2 May 1984; Sujanani vs. Hon. Ongpin,
G.R. No. L-65659, 21 May 1984; Tanada vs. Angara,
G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997; Secretary of Justice vs.
Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000; Bayan vs.
Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680 &
138698, 10 October 2000; See La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 27 January
2004; Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta
Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 193796, 2 July 2014
A State may not be sued Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014;
without its consent (State's Baer vs. Tizon, G.R. No. L-24294, 3 May 1974; Sanders
Immunity from Suit) vs. Hon. Verdiano, G.R. No. L-46930, 10 June 1988;
U.S.A. vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990); Shauf vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990;
Wylie vs. Rarang, G.R. No. 74135, 28 May 1992; U.S.A.
vs. Hon. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, 1 March 1993; Parreno
vs. Mcgranery, G.R. No. L-4263, 12 March 1953 (which
also cited Syquia vs. Lopez, et al., 84 Phil. 312, G.R. No.
L-1648; Marvel Building Corp. vs. Philippine War
Damage Commission, 85 Phil. 27, G.R. No. L-1822;
Marquez Lim vs. Nelson, et al., 87 Phil. 328, G.R. No. L-
2412.); The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949,
1 December 1994; Jusmag Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 108813, 15 December 1994; The Department of
Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. G.R. No. 169304, 13
March 2007 (Shaufv. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90314,
November 27, 1990, 191 SCRA 713 cited in United
States of America v. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, March 1,
1993, 219 SCRA 192.)
Vienna Convention on Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
Diplomatic Relations
adooted in 1961.
Diplomatic immunity Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration, G.R. Nos. 109095 - 109107, 23
February 1995; and Sombilon vs. Romulo, G.R. No.
175888, 11 February 2009
103
"(A) belligerent occupant Vda. De Villarual vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-
(like the Japanese in 1942- 10394, 13 December 1958
1945) may legitimately
billet or quarter its troops
in privately owned land
and buildings for the
duration of its military
operations, or as military
necessity should demand."
"(A) foreign army allowed Tubb vs. Griess, G.R. No. L-1325, 7 April 1947; and
to march through a Dizon vs. The Commanding General of the Philippine
friendly country or to be Ryukus Command, G.R. No. L-2110, 22 July 1948
stationed in it, by (citing Tubb vs. Griess)
permission of its
government or sovereign,
is exempt from the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of
the place."
"(A") state has the right to Illuh Asaali vs. Commission of Customs, G.R. No. L-
protect itself and its 24170, 28 February 1969
revenues, a right not
limited to its own territory
but extending to the high
seas."
"(J)udicial acts which are Etorma vs. Ravelo, G.R. No. L-718, 24 March 1947
not of political complexion
of de facto governments
established by the military
occupant in an enemy
territory" (a principle
based on the Regulations
of the Hague Convention),
are valid
"The Hague Convention, Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, 26 March 1949
the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents Liban vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011
of international (Geneva Convention only)
jurisprudence established
by the United Nations" and
the "rules and regulations"
of the Hague and Geneva
conventions
"(S)equestration of cash, I Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. L-554, 9
funds, and realizable April 1948
securities in occupied
territory (as) proscribed by
article 53 of the Hague
Regulations"
United Nations Convention I People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, 21April2014
on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (UN-
CEDA W) "and its allied
issuances" (In 1981, 180
countries, including the
Philippines, ratified this
Convention.)
104
Supreme Court has consistently declared, in its entirety, as

containing "generally accepted principles of international
law." (See Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Domingo vs. Scheer,
and Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
vs. Hon. Olalia, Jr.)
B. 7. The COMELEC ignored Sen.

Poe's evidence, in the form of
international conventions and
instruments, and sixty (60)
nationality statutes passed in
various countries in Asia, the
Americas and Europe. This
evidence establishes that: (a)
the presumption that a
foundling is a citizen of the
country in which she is found;
and (b) the presumption that a
foundling is born of citizens of
that country, have risen to the
level of "customary"
international law and may also
be considered "general
principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."
152. The COMELEC repeatedly insisted that Sen. Poe had

supposedly not proven that the 1930 Hague Convention and the
Convention on Statelessness had risen to the level of "customary
international law." The COMELEC ruled this way because it
The 1968 Vienna Agustin vs. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112, 2 February 1979
Convention on Road Signs
and Signals
"The Paris Convention and Sehwani, Inc. vs. In-N-Out Burger, Inc., G.R. No.
the WIPO Joint 171053, 15 October 2007
Recommendation"
There is no "duty on the BPI vs. De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc., G.R. No. L-
part of a bank to verify 24821, 16 October 1970
whether what has been
described in letters of
credits or drafts or
shipping documents
actually tallies with what
was loaded aboard ship"
105
simply refused to examine the voluminous evidence presented by

Sen. Poe in this particular issue.
153. In the first place, it must be clarified that in the

proceedings a quo, Sen. Poe did not argue that the 1930 Hague
Convention, in its entirety, or the Convention on Statelessness, as
a whole, should be considered "generally accepted principles of
international law." Sen. Poe focused on two specific principles or
presumptions in these two conventions, to wit:
153.1. The first sentence of the first paragraph of

Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention which provides
that a child of unknown parents, or a foundling, is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth,"
to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have

the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is
known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed

to have been born on the territory of the State in which it
was found '·269 --
and
153.2. Article 2 of the Convention on Statelessness

which states that foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the county in which she is found, thus:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State

shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within that territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State. 270
154.Sen. Poe's position in the proceedings a quo was that

these two presumptions are "generally accepted principles of
international law." Had the COMELEC examined Sen. Poe's
evidence, and applied settled law and jurisprudence on
international law, it would have realized that the two
presumptions may be considered either "customary international

106
law" under Article 38 (l)(b) of the ICJ Statute, or "general

principles of law recognized by civilized nations" under Article 38
(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute. As discussed, these two concepts under
the ICJ Statute may be considered the equivalent of the phrase
"generally accepted principles of international law."
i. Customary International law
155. As discussed, a principle may be considered

"customary international law" if two (2) elements concur: (a)
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and (b) a psychological element known as opinio juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Both elements
concur as regards: (a) the presumption that a foundling is a
citizen of the state in which she is found; and (b) the
presumption that a foundling is born of citizens of that state.
i. 1. "Widespread and consistent practice"
156. In Razon vs. Tagitis,2 1 1 this Honorable Court had to

resolve issues on the use and application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo in an enforced disappearance case. Since the concept
of an "enforced disappearance" was neither defined nor
penalized under Philippine law, the High Court sought guidance
from international law. The Court noted that under the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance," there is a "right not to be suqject to
enforced disappearance." However, the Court also pointed out
that the Philippines had neither signed nor ratified said
Convention. Still, this Honorable Court held that the ban on
enforced disappearances is binding on the Philippines as a
"generally accepted principle of international law."
157. In Razon, this Honorable Court considered the

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances, as part of the "generally accepted
principles of international law," even if it had been ratified by
only sixteen (16) States (excluding the Philippines), and even if it
had not yet entered into force, because the entry into force was
conditioned on its ratification by at least 20 States.212
Specifically, the High Court in Razon considered the ban on
enforced disappearances as a "generally accepted principle of
international law" and, thus, part of the law of the land, based
on the following "material sources of custom:"
211 G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009

212 See footnote No. 106, 606 SCRA 598 at 669
107
(a) An international treaty (i.e., the 1998 Rome Statute

establishing the International Criminal Court [ICC]);
(b) A regional treaty (i.e., Inter-American Convention on

Enforced Disappearance of Persons);
(c) The practice of international and regional organs (i.e.,

the declarations of the UN and the UN Human Rights
Committee, and the European Court of Human Rights
[in its application of the European Convention on
Human Rights]);
(d) Regional State Practice (i.e., legislation of Colombia,

Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, which
implement the Inter-American Convention on
Enforced Disappearance of Persons); and
(e) State Practice of the U.S.A. (i.e., the Third

Restatement of Laws and a decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals).
158. Applying the analysis in Razon, the presumption that

a foundling is a citizen of the State in which she is found, and
the presumption that a foundling is born of citizens of the
country in which she is found, were "generally accepted
principles of international law" at the time of Sen. Poe's birth in
1968, and therefore formed part of the law of the land at that
time. As discussed, this is essentially the position that the
framers of the 1935 Constitution took in their deliberations on
Article IV thereof.273
159. On the international plane, as of 1966 (or two years

before Sen. Poe's birth), no less than nine (9) international
instruments (which pursuant to Razon, may be considered
"material sources of custom") had already addressed the twin
issues of nationality and statelessness, to wit:
(a) the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions

Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (" 1930
Hague Convention");
(b) the 1930 Hague Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of

Statelessness;
(c) the 1930 Hague Special Protocol Concerning

Statelessness;
213 See pars. 121 to 122 hereof
108
(d) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(e) the 1957 United Nations Convention on the Status of

Married Women;
(f) the 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

the Child;
(g) the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction

of Statelessness;
(h) the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights; and
(i) the 1966 International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 274
159. 1. The 1930 Hague Convention is significant,

because it is the result of the first attempt to codify
international law principles on certain subjects, among
them, nationality laws. The 1930 Hague Convention is the
product of the First Conference for the Codification of
International Law, organized under the auspices of the
League of Nations and attended by delegates from forty
seven (4 7) governments (or over half of the existing states
in 1930)275 and by observers appointed by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic. This Conference for the
Codification of International Law, and the 1930 Hague
Convention it produced, is an important development in
international law, as it represented the first concrete action
by the League of Nations to "assist in the fixing and
codifying of international law" on various questions "the
regulation of which, by international agreement, would
seem desirable and realizable. "276
159.2. Considering its history, the 1930 Hague

Convention is considered confirmatory of certain general
principles of nationality law.277 Several of its provisions deal
21 4This list excludes regional and bilateral agreements
21s There were only seventy four (74) widely recognized sovereign states, including some
historical states, in 1930. The forty seven (47) delegates to the first League of Nations
Conference for the Codification of International Law represented some of the largest and
more established states existing in 1930.
276 United Nations Documents concerning the Development and Codification of
International Law, published as supplement to the American Journal of International Law,
Volume 41, No. 4, October, 1947. Available online at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/ documentation/english/ASIL 1947 study.pdf.
277
KAY HAILBRONNER, NATIONALITY IN PuBL!C INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW, IN
ACQUISITION AND Loss OF NATIONALITY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES - POLICIES AND TRENDS IN 15
109
with the acquisition of nationality of several groups who

traditionally face statelessness as a result of conflict of
laws: married women, children, foundlings, and adopted
persons. In 1968, when Sen. Poe was born, the 1930 Hague
Convention already had thirty-seven (37) State signatories
(or fifty percent [50o/o] of existing states in 1930) and fifteen
( 15) State parties. The 1930 Hague Convention now has
twenty-one (21) State parties. As discussed, Article 14
thereof states that "(a) child whose parents are both
unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth."
159.3. In 1947, the UN Human Rights

Commission urged consideration of nationality questions, a
proposal which received concrete expression in Article 15 of
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR")
(to which the Philippines is a signatory and which the
United Nations General Assembly adopted on 10 December
1948).27 8 Article 15(1) of the UDHR which the Supreme
Court has specifically declared to be binding on the
Philippines and part of the law of the land, states that all
people have a "right to a nationality."
159.4. In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly,

through Resolution No. 1386 (XIV) and by a vote of 70 to 0
(with 2 abstentions), proclaimed the "Declaration of the
Rights of the Child" ("UNDRC"). The third "whereas" clause
of the UNDRC states that "the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards
and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as
well as after birth." 27 9 In the UNDRC, the U.N. General
Assembly called upon the "national Governments" (among
others) "to recognize (the rights under the UNDRC) and
strive for their observance by legislative and other
measures progressively taken in accordance with (the
principles set forth therein)." Consistent with UDHR,
Principle 3 of the UNDRC states:
The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a

nationality. 280
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, Rainer Baubock, Eva Ersb0ll, Kees Groenendijk, Harald Waldrauch,
eds., Amsterdam University Press (2006)
27s See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Nationality and
Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual and External Arenas, 83 Yale L.J. 900, 965
(1974).
2so Underscoring supplied
110
159. 5. The Convention on Statelessness is the

culmination of more than a decade of international
negotiations, 2 8 1 and over thirty (30) years of international
covenants on the right to a nationality and the avoidance of
statelessness. The Convention on Statelessness provides
for rules on the acquisition of nationality by stateless
individuals. Under the Convention on Statelessness, States
must ensure access to nationality for a person who would
otherwise be stateless if the person is born in the State's
territory or born abroad to a national of the State. It also
protects individuals against the loss or deprivation of
nationality if he or she will become stateless as a result. By
setting out rules to limit the occurrence of statelessness.i
the Convention gives effect to Article 15 of the UDHR. It is
a matter of record that the UDHR (mentioned in the
aforequoted note of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees) was unanimously adopted by the members of the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948, including the Philippines.
To stress, the High Court has also repeatedly declared that
the UDHR embodies "generally accepted principles of
international law." Thus, even if the Philippines has not
yet signed or ratified the Convention on Statelessness, it is
still binding, being merely an implementation of the UDHR
signed by the Philippines in 1948. Hence, it cannot be
seriously disputed that the presumptions provided by the
Convention constitute generally accepted principles of
international law.
159.6. At the time of Sen. Poe's birth in 1968, the

United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Israel and the
Dominican Republic had already signed the Convention on
Statelessness. There are Sixty-Four (64) State parties to
the Convention on Statelessness.282 Unlike the international
convention which this Honorable Court applied in Razon
281 The Convention on Statelessness is the result of over a decade of international
negotiations on how to avoid the incidence of statelessness. In 1949, the Secretary
General, at the request of the Economic and Social Council, commissioned a study on
statelessness which called for the universal acceptance of the following two principles: (1)
nationality is to be conferred on every child at birth; (2) no person should lose his/her
nationality during his lifetime unless and until he has acquired a new one. In August
1950, the Economic and Social Council urged the International Law Commission ("ILC"),
the UN body tasked with definitively codifying international legal norms, to prepare at the
earliest possible time the necessary draft international convention or conventions for the
minimization of statelessness. The ILC responded by adopting the draft Conventions on the
Elimination and Reduction of Future Statelessness. This provided the impetus for the
convening of an international conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva in 1959, which
later reconvened in 1961. Significantly, since its inception in 1949, the ILC has included
"nationality, including statelessness" in its list of topics to be considered for codification.
Draft conventions by the ILC are often considered to be good evidence of the existence of
customary international law on certain subjects.
282 Data provided by the United Nations, available at
https: I /treaties. un.org/ doc/Treaties/2007 I 11 /29 /V-4.en.pdf.
111
(which had not entered into force, as it had only 16 state

parties), the Convention on Statelessness entered into force
in 1975. Although the Philippines remains neither a
signatory, nor a party to the Convention on Statelessness, it
is reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees to have already "initiated the process for
accession" to the Convention on Statelessness. 283 As
discussed, on the nationality of foundlings, Article 2 thereof
states that "(a) foundling found in the territory of a
Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within that
territory of parents possessing the nationality of that
State."284 Article 2 of the Convention on Statelessness
provides for a rebuttable presumption of descent from a
citizen (praesumption iuris sanguinis) in favor of a
foundling. This is consistent with the doctrine of jus
sanguinis under paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 1, Article
IV of the 1 935 Constitution.
159. 7. According to this Honorable Court in

Razon, the "material sources of custom" include "recitals in
treaties and other international instruments" and
"resolutions relating to legal questions in the U.N. General
Assembly," including statements of the UN Human Rights
Committee under the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. The "Introductory Note" to the Convention
on Statelessness written by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees establishes beyond doubt
the status of "generally accepted principles of international
law" accorded to the Convention. The U.N. Commission for
Refugees stated thus:
x x x . Together, these two treaties285 form the foundation

of the international legal framework to address
statelessness, a phenomenon which continues to adversely
affect the lives of millions of people around the world. The
1961 Convention is the leading international instrument that
sets rules for the conferral and non-withdrawal of
citizenship to prevent cases of statelessness from arising.
28 3See "Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report;" "Universal Periodic
Review: The Philippines" available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ee07aa22.pdf
See also the 21 June 2015 "With Due Respect" column in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
of former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban which reported the information from Mr.
Bernard Kerblat, country representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees that at a ministerial meeting on 7 December 2011, the Philippine panel pledged
to initiate accession to the Convention on Statelessness.
285 The other one being the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
112
By setting out rules to limit the occurrence of statelessness,

the Convention gives effect to article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which recognizes that
"everyone has the right to a nationality."286
159.8. Following the spirit of the UDHR and the

Convention on Statelessness, the ICCPR (which has one
hundred sixty-eight [168] State parties and to which the
Philippines is a signatory28 7 ) and the 1966 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination contain provisions recognizing the
fundamental right to a nationality of defined minority
groups. The ICCPR applies the right specifically to children,
thereby stressing that protection against statelessness
should start from birth. Article 24 of the ICCPR states that
"(e)very child has the right to acquire a nationality. "288
160. Similar to the adoption of international instruments

and conventions, State practice in the domestic sphere in foreign
jurisdictions is also widespread and consistent, insofar as States
presume that foundlings are citizens of the State in which they
are found or presume that they are born of citizens of that
State. 289
160. 1. In the proceedings a quo, Petitioner was

able to show evidence290 that at least sixty (60) countries,
spread throughout Asia, North and South America, and
Europe, have enacted statutes which prescribe that g
person found within its territory of unknown parentage
would be considered its citizen. At least forty two (42) of
these countries, or more than two-thirds (2/3) are jus
sanguinis countries which grant citizenship on the basis of
descent (either through paternal or maternal lines). These
countries include, per region:
a) Europe: Forty one (41) countries29 1 , with at least

thirty four (34) countries which apply jus sanguinis
principle (Albania, Austria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, enmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,

281 As of 1966
289 See Exhibits "38" and "39-series"
290 See Exhibits "38" and "39-series"
291 Russia was counted as part of the European region and not Asia.
113
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,

Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Serbia,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine);
b) North and South America: At least thirteen (13)

countries, with at least three (3) countries which
apply jus sanguinis (Belize, Costa Rica, Suriname);
c) East and Southeast Asia: At least six (6) countries,

five (5) of which apply jus sanguinis (Japan, China,
South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam).
160.2. Notably, all sixty (60) countries recognize

the presumption that a foundling is a citizen of the country
where he or she was found, despite only thirty three (33) of
them being parties to the Convention on Statelessness.
Twenty six (26) of these countries are non-signatories to the
Convention on Statelessness, while one country (France) is
a signatory but has not yet ratified said treaty. This
strongly suggests that states, irrespective of being a party
to the Convention on Statelessness, recognize as obligatory
the principle that a foundling is presumed to be a citizen of
the country where he or she was found.
161. On the regional level, there are several regional

conventions on human rights which uniformly affirm the right of
persons, particularly children, to a nationality, and the right of
every person not to be arbitrarily deprived of such nationality,
viz:
(a) The European Convention on Nationality292, signed

and/ or ratified by twenty nine (29)293 out of forty
seven (4 7) members states of the Council of Europe;
(b) The Arab Charter on Human Rights,29 4 signed and/ or
ratified by seventeen (17)295 out of twenty two (22)
members of the League of Arab States;
292 Article 4 - Principles
The rules on nationality of each State Party shall be based on the following
principles:
1. everyone has the right to a nationality;
2. statelessness shall be avoided;
3. no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality;
4. neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a State
Party and an alien, nor the change of nationality by one of the spouses during
marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse.
293 Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Macedonia, Ukraine have ratified the Convention.
The countries which signed the Convention, but have not yet ratified, are: Croatia, France,
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Russia,
294 Article 29
114
(c) ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 296 adopted

unanimously by the ten (10) member states of the
ASEAN, including the Philippines;
{d) American Convention on Human Rights,29 7 ratified by
twenty five (25)298 out of thirty five (35) member states
of the Organization of American States ("OAS"); and
(e) 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 299
161.1. The European Convention on Nationality, in

particular guarantees the right of a foundling to acquire a
nationality ex lege when he would otherwise be stateless.
Although only twenty seven (27) countries are signatories,
forty-one (41) member states3oo of the Council of Europe,
with thirty four (34) of them following the jus sanguinis
doctrine, already provide for automatic acquisition of
citizenship by foundlings found within their respective
territories. The wording of the European Convention on
Nationality is in turn drawn from the Convention on
Statelessness. 301
1. Everyone has the right to nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily or unlawfully

deprived of his nationality.
2. States parties shall take such measures as they deem appropriate, in
accordance with their domestic laws on nationality, to allow a child to acquire the
mother's nationality, having due regard, in all cases, to the best interests of the
child.
3. Non one shall be denied the right to acquire another nationality, having due
regard for the domestic legal procedures in his country.
295 Algeria {2006), Bahrain (2006), Egypt {signed 2004, not yet ratified), Iraq (2012), Jordan
(2004), Kuwait (2006), Lebanon (2011), Libya (2006), Morocco (signed 2004, not yet
ratified), Palestine (2007), Qatar (2009), Saudi Arabia (2009), Sudan (signed 2005, not yet
ratified), Syria (2007), Tunisia (signed 2004, not yet ratified), the United Arab Emirates
(2008), and Yemen (2008).
296 Article 18. Every person has the right to a nationality as prescribed by Jaw. No person
shall be arbitrarily deprived of such nationality nor denied the right to change that
nationality.
291 Article 20. Right to Nationality
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he
was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.
29a Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. However, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela denounced the convention on 26
May 1998 and 10 September 2012 respectively.
299 Article 24
1. Everyone shall have the right to citizenship.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his citizenship or of the right to change it.
300 These countries are Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Non.vay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom.
301 Id.
115
162. Clearly, there is a uniform practice of recognizing the

right to nationality of foundlings, spread over different
geographic areas, and observed even among jus sanguinis
countries, supporting a finding that it is a "generally accepted
principle of international law" that foundlings are presumed
born of parents who are citizens of the country in which they are
found.

COMELEC ruled that the 1961 UN Convention of the Reduction
of Statelessness (the "Convention on Statelessness") could not be
considered customary international law because "only a little
less than one third (1/3) of the general membership of United
Nations" had ratified the convention. According to the
COMELEC, this is "a far cry from the ideal majority." This
stance is contrary to jurisprudence.
163.1. In Mijares vs. Ranada,302 this Honorable

Court held that the principle of "recognition of foreign
judgments" had risen to the level of "customary"
international law. At the time the case was decided (12
April 2005), only four (4) States (Cyprus, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Kuwait) had "either ratified or acceded to"303
the "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,"
prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference. The Supreme
Court also noted that the "members of the European
Common Market (had) acceded to the Judgments
Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to
participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition
such as reciprocity and revision au fond." In 1978, there
were only nine (9) members of the European Common
Market (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United
Kingdom).30 Finally, the High Court cited U.S.A. laws and
4
jurisprudence providing for the recognition of foreign

judgments. In sum, this Honorable Court had alluded to
the "practice" of only fourteen (14) States. Yet, it still held
that "there is a widespread practice among states accepting
in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement,
albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees."
302 G.R. No. 139325, 12 April 2005

303 See footnote No. 55 of said case
30 4 Greece joined in 1981 and Portugal and Spain joined in 1986.
116
163.2. In Razon,3os this Honorable Court held that

the "ban against enforced disappeances" constitutes an
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law." In terms of specific State practice, the
High Court cited the fact that the "Organization of
American States (OAS) General Assembly (had) adopted the
Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of
Persons in June 1994." In 1994 (and up to today), only
thirty-five (35) countries in the Americas, including the
U.S.A., were part of the OAS. The Court noted that five (5)
of these States, i.e., "Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru
and Venezuela ha( d) enacted separate laws in accordance
with the Inter-American Convention and ha(d) defined
activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.
Moreover, as of 2009 (the year Razon was decided), the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance" only sixteen (16) States had
ratified the Convention (Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba,
Ecuador, France, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain and Uruguay.)
163.3. Based on the foregoing, a principle need not

be practiced by a "majority" of States in order that such
practice may be considered as "wide-spread."
164. Applying Mijares and Razon, the more accurate

interpretation is that State practice must be "spread" across
various areas and regions of the world. The presumption that
foundlings are citizens of the State in which they are found and
the presumption that foundlings are born of citizens of that
State, has been practiced, not only through the signature,
ratification or accession by States of relevant International
Instruments and Conventions as discussed in paragraphs 159
and 161 (and sub-paragraphs) above, but also through
legislation by numerous States "spread" across several
continents, including Asia, the Americas and Europe, as
discussed in paragraphs 160 (and sub-paragraphs) above.
165. In sum, the COMELEC acted capriciously when it

failed to cite any legal basis, and again, ignored settled
jurisprudence, in concluding that "wide-spread and consistent"
State Practice (as an element of "customary international law") is
equivalent to the practice of a "majority" of States.
305
G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, cited with approval in Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No.
184467, 19 June 2012
117
i.2. Opinio Juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or

necessity).
166. Implicit in this element is a belief that the practice in

question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it." As discussed, the State practice alluded to in the
case of the presumption that foundlings are citizens of the State
in which they are found and the presumption that foundlings
are born of citizens of that State, refers to legislation. This
indicates that the adoption and application of these
presumptions arises from a belief on the part of the States
involved that they are under a legal obligation to follow these
presumptions. Moreover, the legislation is also related to, and in
line with, a State's ratification of the pertinent International
Convention involved.
167. Opinio Juris being a subjective element, it is important

to take into consideration the particular state's interpretation of
whether a practice alleged as international custom is considered
by it to be obligatory. In Nicaragua vs. United States of
America,306 which was cited in Mijares vs. Ranada, the
International Court of Justice placed particular emphasis on the
practice of the U.S.A. (a party to the case) in determining the
existence of the element of opinio Juris. This is significant
because the Philippines itself, even in the absence of domestic
legislation, has performed acts which indicate that it
acknowledges the binding effect of the presumption that a
foundling a citizen of the country in which she is found or born
of citizens of that country.
167.1. As discussed, based on the deliberations of

the 1934 Constitutional Convention, foundlings were
always meant to be included in the concept of Philippine
citizens, even though they were not specifically mentioned
in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. The basis
for that intent is precisely the presumption under
international law that a foundling is a citizen of the country
in which she is found. Again, this principle was already
concretely expressed in the 1930 Hague Convention (which
codified existing principles of nationality law), and the
members of the Constitutional Convention, who are
predominantly lawyers, are presumed knowledgeable of
this existing principle.
306 Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186

118
167.2. Another concrete manifestation that the

Philippines has long recognized the generally accepted
principle of international law that foundlings are citizens of
the country in which they are found is DOJ Opinion No.
189, series of 1951. In this opinion, the Secretary of Justice
recognized that foundlings are citizens of the country in
which they are found in the context of an application for a
passport for that foundling.
167.3. Another instance showing the recognition of

the said generally accepted principle of international law is
the fact that the DFA specifically allows passports to be
issued to foundlings. This means that the DFA recognizes
foundlings as Philippine citizens, as passports can be
issued only to citizens of this country. If the State, acting
through the DFA, did not find that according foundlings
citizenship is a "conduct of a civilized nation" (as discussed
below), then the Philippines would not be issuing passports
to them.
ii. "General Principles of Law Recognized by

Civilized Nations"
168. Even if the presumptions favoring a foundling's

citizenship cannot be deemed "customary international law,"
they could still be considered "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." Indeed, as earlier stated, the
term "generally accepted principles of international law'' has
been associated with "the generally accepted principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." It is not required that they are
accepted by all nations or by the majority of nations. It is
enough that they are accepted by "civilized nations."
169. In fact, this Honorable Court's focus of inquiry is not

the number of states who accept the legal principle but whether
such a principle can be "established by a process of reasoning,
based on the common identity of all legal systems."307 For
example, the principle against non-discrimination is a generally
accepted principle of international law because it can be
deduced by the test of reasonableness from basic principles of
equity fairness and justice which are valid throughout all kinds
of human societies. In International School Alliance of Educators,
vs. Quisumbing (G.R. No. 128845, 1 June 2000) the Supreme
Court held:
307Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October
2007
119
International law, which springs from general principles of

law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the
general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.308
170. Hence, any discriminatory act sanctioned by the state

against a foundling would violate a generally accepted principle
of international law. Denying to foundlings the rules on burden
of proof, and presumptions of innocence and regularity which
are ordinarily accorded to all persons, including even persons
accused of crimes or charged with civil claims, would be
discriminatory against foundlings, and would violate their rights
under both municipal and international law.
171. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the

Phil. vs. Duque Ill, 309 this Honorable Court also described
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as
follows:
The concept of generally accepted principles of law has also

been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain general

principles of law as a primary source of international law
because they have the character of jus rationale and are
valid through all kinds of human societies. (Judge Tanaka
in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa
Case, 1966 I.CJ. 296). O'Connell holds that certain
principles are part of international law because they are
basic to legal systems generally and hence part of
the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are
established by a process of reasoning based on the common
identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or
disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine

309 G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007
120
whether the municipal law principle provides a just and

acceptable solution. xx x3IO
172. The principle that a foundling should be deemed, at

least presumptively, a citizen of the State in which she is found
or born of citizens of that State, is founded on equity, fairness
and justice. As discussed, it would be the height of injustice to
penalize a foundling with statelessness (and all the limitations
that being stateless entails) for a status and condition that is not
of her own doing. It is not her fault that she was abandoned at
birth. Worse, she can do little or nothing to change her status as
a foundling. Therefore, it is but fair and just that a State initially
embrace a foundling as its own citizen, pending proof that she
would otherwise not qualify for citizenship. Leaving a foundling
out in the cold, so to speak, and depriving him or her of parens
patriae, is anything but civilized.
173. Given the widespread and uniform enactment and

application of the presumption of citizenship of foundlings in
various "civilized nations" across continents (See Exhibits "39-
series" in SPA 15-002 [DC]), it is reasonable to conclude that
these rules have become "basic to legal systems" and "valid
through all kinds of human societies," or at least, among
"civilized nations."
174. In sum, the presumption that a foundling is a citizen

of the country in which she is found and the presumption that a
foundling is born of citizens of that country may also be
considered "General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations" as defined in Article 38.1 (c) of the ICJ Statute and,
therefore, "generally accepted principles of international law''
which form part of the law of the land under the incorporation
clause.
175. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC did not

adopt an analysis as extensive as the one detailed above because
the COMELEC baselessly jumped to the conclusion that there
was supposedly nothing to support Sen. Poe's position that the
presumptions supporting her natural-born Philippine citizenship
had risen to the level of customary international law. Such
blatant disregard for the evidence on record, not to mention,
basic ignorance of settled jurisprudence on international law,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
310 Emphasis in the original

121
B.8. The COMELEC ignored the

Constitutional and settled
jurisprudential definition of a
"natural born Philippine
citizen" when it concluded
that, although a foundling is
considered a Filipino citizen
under international law, she
cannot be considered a
"natural born" Filipino.
-------------------------------------------
176. The COMELEC conceded that under international
law, a foundling is a Philippine citizen (See page 32 of the 11
December 2015 Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed in its 23 December 2015 Resolution). However, the
COMELEC also ruled that a foundling is not natural-born.
177. The CO MELEC acted illogically incongruously, and

therefore with grave abuse of discretion, when it ruled that Sen.
Poe is Filipino under international law, but at the same time
denied that she is natural-born.
178. It is well-settled, not only in the Constitution, but in

applicable jurisprudence, that there are two approaches to
determining whether a person who is admittedly a Filipino, is
also "natural-born."
178.1. The first approach is by applying the

definition in Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
which states that natural-born citizens of the Philippines
are "those who are citizens of the. Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."
178.2. The second approach is by showing that the

foundling is not a naturalized Filipino because, if she is not
naturalized, she is perforce, natural-born,3 1 1 pursuant to
Bengson III vs. HRET,312 thus:
The present Constitution, however, now considers

those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
311 JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 68 ( 1975)

312 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
122
IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship

in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: ( 1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. 313
178.3. As explained below, a foundling

.
IS a
natural-born Filipino under both approaches.
179. Under treaty and conventional international law and

"generally accepted principles of international law," a foundling
is a Filipino from birth. In fact, the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of the Child (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1959) and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
(ratified by the Philippines in 1990) both expressly state that a
child's right to a nationality must be recognized "from birth."
There is also nothing under international law which requires a
foundling to "perform an act to acquire or perfect" her
citizenship. Having satisfied the two (2) elements of the
Constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino under Section
2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC ought to
have concluded that Sen. Poe is natural-born.
179.1. The second sentence of Section 2, Article IV

(in relation to Section 1[3), Article IV) of the 1987
Constitution also considers as "natural-born" Filipinos,
those "born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who "elect Philippine citizenship."
179.2. Assuming for the sake of argument that

Sen. Poe should be considered born of a Filipino mother
only (and not of a Filipino father), Sen. Poe was deemed to
have "elected" Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age
of majority" (under par. (4), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution) when she decided to live a Filipino life and,
thereafter, secured: (a) her Voter's Identification Card31 4 in
1986 (which is the year she turned 18); (b) her first
Philippine Passport two years later, or in 1988;315 and (c)

314 See Exhibit "3"
31s See Exhibit "4"
123
her second Philippine Passport, five years later, or 1n

1993.316
179.3. In Co vs. HRET,317 this Honorable Court

reiterated that the "election" of citizenship may be "both a
formal and an informal process." The High Court cited In
Re: Florencio Mallare,31s which held that "the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship." According to Co, Mallare applies to those "who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship." Indeed,
Sen. Poe could not have been expected to formally "elect"
Philippine citizenship because, when she reached the age of
majority in 1986, she did not know the identity of her
biological father. (Today, she still does not know who he is).
Thus, she had no way of finding out whether her biological
father was, indeed, a foreigner and that, therefore, she had
to formally elect Philippine citizenship by the time she was
18. Informal "election" of Philippine citizenship would,
therefore, apply to her (assuming arguendo that she falls
only under par. (4), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, in relation to Section 1(3) and Section 2,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution).
180. Sen. Poe is also a natural-born Filipino, because she

cannot be considered a Filipino "naturalized in accordance with
law," under paragraph (5), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. 31 9 Notably, the COMELEC did not rule that a
foundling is a naturalized Filipino. On the basis of the
COMELEC's ruling, it would follow that Sen. Poe must be
considered a natural-born Filipino. That said, there is no legal
basis to consider a "foundling" as a "naturalized" Filipino.
180.1. The phrase "in accordance with law'' in par.

5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution must be
construed in relation to the verb "naturalized" which has a
well-settled meaning in Philippine law.
(a) In Republic vs. Karbasi,320 Go vs. Republic,3 21 and So

vs. Republic, 322 the Supreme Court defined
"naturalization" as the legal act of adopting an alien
316 See Exhibit "4-A"

311 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, 30 July 1991
31s 59 SCRA 45 (1974)
319 Id., at pp. 98 to 104 (Underscoring supplied)
320 G.R. No. 210412, 29 July 2015
321 G.R. No. 202809, 2 July 2013
322 G.R. No. 170603, 29 January 2007
124
and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born

citizen. Under the present laws, the process of
naturalization can be judicial or administrative.
(b) In Republic vs. Batugas,323 the Supreme Court held

that "(u)nder existing laws, an alien may acquire
Philippine citizenship ... "
(c) In Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. the Commissioner of

Immigration, 324 the Supreme Court adopted the
following discussion by counsel on paragraph (5),
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution: "Citizens
by naturalization, under this provision, include not
only those who are naturalized in accordance with
legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but
also those who acquire citizenship by 'derivative
naturalization' or by operation of law, as for example,
the 'naturalization' of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an
alien woman to a citizen."
(d) Mr. Aruego defined a "naturalized" citizen as one

"who, at the moment of birth, is an alien but who, by
an intervening act, is made a citizen. "325
180.2. In sum, the subject of "naturalization" is

always an alien who becomes, through an intervening act,
a Filipino citizen.
180.3. The "intervening act/ s" vary depending on

the law governing his naturalization and this is how the
phrase "in accordance with law" should be construed.
(a) Under R.A. No. 9139, otherwise known as the

"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000," and
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
"Revised Naturalization Law," the alien (who must not
be less than 18 years old) must file a
petition/application with the Special Committee on
Naturalization (under R.A. No. 9139) or with the court
(under C.A. No. 473). If the petition is granted, a
"decree" or "certificate" of naturalization" is issued
and the alien must take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Under Section 15 of C.A.
323 G.R. No. 183110, 7 October 2013

324 G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971
325 JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 67 (1975).
125
no. 473, an alien woman married to a Filipino, who

might herself be naturalized, will be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines.
(c) Aside from the usual process that the passing of a law
entails and the lobbying that precedes such
enactment, naturalization of an alien by direct act of
Congress usually requires the taking of an oath of
allegiance and its registration with the Bureau of
Immigration. 326
180.4. is noteworthy that when the 1935

It
Constitution was adopted, the only law in force which
granted "naturalization," was Act No. 2927 or the
"Naturalization Law." Like the naturalization statutes
which succeeded it, this law also applied only to
foreigners32 7 and provided for the filing of the necessary
petition with the Court of First Instance. Based on
available resources, in 1935, there had been no grant of
citizenship by direct act of Congress to specific individuals.
It follows that when the members of the 1934
Constitutional Convention used the phrase "naturalized in
accordance with law,'' they specifically had the
"Naturalization Law" in mind and not any municipal law or
act of Congress, much less international law.
180.5. On the other hand, when the members of

the 1934 Constitutional Convention discussed the
citizenship of foundlings, they did not say (or otherwise
express their intention) that a foundling could be
considered as a Filipino "naturalized in accordance with
law." The sub-paragraph on Filipinos "naturalized in
accordance with law" was passed without even mentioning
"foundlings."328 On the contrary, as discussed, when the
framers declared that "by international law," a foundling is
a "citizen of this nation," they had a ;us sanguinis
Philippine citizen in mind. A foundling would fall under
either paragraph (3) or (4), Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, but certainly not paragraph (5) thereof.
326 See footnote 321 of Sen. Poe's Memorandum on SPA 15·002 (DC)
3 27SEC. 1. Who ma.11 become Philippine citizens. - Philippine citizenship may be acquired
by: (a) Natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said
country if residing therein.
328 See Exhibit "37", p. 203
126
181. In sum, the person subject of "naturalization" is, !2y

definition, an alien who, through the performance of an act (i.e.,
the filing of the appropriate petition/ application/ request, by
marriage, and/or the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines), becomes a Filipino. Sen. Poe was
definitely not an alien at birth, and never had to undergo any
naturalization process.
182. "Naturalization" is clearly not what takes place when a

foundling is recognized as a Filipino from birth under applicable
international law. As explained, a foundling is a Filipino (not an
alien) from birth who does not have to do anything to perfect her
Filipino citizenship. A foundling, therefore, falls squarely within
the definition of a natural-born Filipino, and totally outside the
definition of a "naturalized" Filipino.
183. Since Sen. Poe is not a Filipino "naturalized in

accordance with law," she must perforce be considered "natural-
born."
184. Had the COMELEC bothered to apply the settled

definitions of "natural-born" Philippine citizenship, it would have
found that Sen. Poe is, indeed, a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Therefore, it was not "false" for Sen. Poe to state in her COC for
President that she is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
185. It bears stressing that international law does not

violate the principle of jus sanguinis under the Constitution.
185.1. First, as discussed, even under the 1935

Constitution, international law which is either
"transformed" (under the treaty clause) or "incorporated"
(under the incorporation clause) forms part of the law of
the land.
185.2. Second, Article IV on Citizenship in the

1935 Constitution was based significantly on international
law principles. In fact, the presumption of the citizenship
of a foundling under international law is the basis for the
intent of the framers to include foundlings in the concept of
jus sanguinis Philippine citizens. To repeat, they were
deliberating what eventually became paragraphs (3) and (4)
of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution (children of
Filipino fathers and mothers) when they discussed the
citizenship of foundlings.
127
185.3. Third, under international law (specifically,

the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and
applicable State legislation), a foundling is presumed born
of citizens of the Philippines. This is consistent with the
principle of jus sanguinis, as enshrined in paragraphs (3)
and (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
which considers as Filipinos those whose fathers or
mothers are "citizens of the Philippines." The situation
would, of course, be different if the presumption of natural-
born citizenship were applied despite an admitted or proven
fact that the foundling was born to foreigners. Such
application of international law would, indeed, contravene
the Constitution. But that is not the case here, because it
was neither alleged nor proved that Sen. Poe's biological
parents are aliens.
185.4. Fourth, presumptions are generally founded

upon basic principles of justice, laws of nature, the
experienced course of human conduct and affairs or the
connection usually found to exist between specific
agencies. 329 Presumptions arise from motives of public
policy and for the sake of greater certainty. They owe their
existence to necessity and are based on general experience.
The necessity which brings them into existence is the fact
that in their absence many meritorious causes would fail
through inability to produce affirmative evidence of
essential facts, concerning the existence of which the
general experience of men leaves but slight doubt.330
Since presumptions take the place of facts in the absence
of evidence, 331 there is no valid basis to distinguish between
persons who can establish their bloodline by proof and
those who can do so by presumption.
185.5. Fifth, the natural-born citizenship of a

person may be established using presumptions. This is
precisely what the Supreme Court did in Tecson vs.
COMELEC. 332 In Tecson, the Court found that Sen. Poe's
father, the late Fernando Poe, Jr., is a natural-born
Filipino, based ultimately on a presumption that his
grandfather had resided in the Philippines in 1899, and
therefore benefitted from the mass Filipinization that took
place in 1902, thus:
329 Padilla, Evidence, Vol. 2, 1994 ed. P.62, citing 20 Am. Jur Sec. 158, p.162
330 Id. citing 31 CJS, Sec.114, pp. 723-724
331 See Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
332 G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004
128
In ascertaining, in G .R. No. 161824, whether grave

abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC,
it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in tum,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in
the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
(
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year

1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could
have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 193 5 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FP J has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. 333
185.6. Sixth, Sen. Poe is more likely to have been

born to Filipino parents, than aliens. The possibility that
she was actually born to foreigners is very slim. Therefore,
there is essentially no risk that a foundling (who is, in
reality, a foreigner) would enjoy presumptive natural-born
Filipino status.
185. 7. Seventh, a ruling on citizenship is never

final. If someone is later able to specify two foreigners and
is able to conclusively show them to be Sen. Poe's parents,
then that would be sufficient to overcome the presumption
of her natural-born citizenship.
185.8. Eighth, under the 1935 Constitution,

natural-born Filipino citizenship is not always based on
blood relationship. Thus, according to Aruego, a member
of the 1934 Constitutional Convention and noted authority
on the 1935 Constitution, the "understanding by the
National Assembly under the original 1935 Philippine
Constitution that for the purpose of election to the
bicameral Congress which was instituted with the 1939-

129
1940 amendments requiring the fact of being natural-born

for election thereto, the term natural-born citizen meant
anybody who was not so by naturalization. "334 In other
words, even some of those who were not Philippine citizens
by blood, i.e., those citizens "at the time of the adoption" of
the 1935 Constitution" or those "born in the Philippine
Islands of foreign parents who, before adoption of the
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands," were still considered "natural-born."
185. 9. Finally, by defining natural-born citizens as

those who are citizens "from birth," as opposed to ".Qy
birth," the intent of the Constitution was not to limit
natural-born citizens to those who are related, by blood, to
Filipino parents. Moreover, there is nothing in the
Constitutional definition of natural-born Filipino
citizenship33S which confines such status "solely and
exclusively" to actual proof of blood relationship to a
Filipino father or mother.336 The definition of natural-born
citizenship does not say "those born of a Filipino father or
mother proven as a fact", or even "those born of a Filipino
father or mother", but rather, "those who do not have to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Filipino
citizenship."337 Clearly, the definition of natural-born
citizenship is broad enough to contemplate citizenship ex
lege or by operation of law, apart from naturalization,
which always involves a positive act on the part of an alien
who wishes to acquire Philippine citizenship.
186. It is a basic principle of statutory construction

that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. Ut magis
valeat quam pereat. Thus, in Francisco vs. House of
Representatives, 338 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 4 4 this Honorable Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction

that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
334 JOSEM. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 68 ( 1975).

335 Sec. 2, art. IV of the 1987 Constitution.
336 Indeed, considering that the filiation of children is sometimes also a presumption
created by law (e.g., children conceived or born during the marriage of their parents are
presumed to be the child of the husband, and their legitimate filiation cannot be impugned
but by the husband himself or his heirs and only on limited grounds during a limited
period}, the Constitution cannot provide for such definition. In other words, tying natural-
born Filipino status to actual proof of the existence of a blood tie between a child and a
Filipino parent would be tantamount to requiring each Filipino citizen to prove, through
scientific evidence such as DNA, that they are beyond the shadow of doubt the biological
child of a parent who is Filipino.
337 Underscoring supplied.
338 G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003
130
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if

practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)339
187. Thus, it was gross error for the COMELEC to consider

Article IV of the 1 935 Constitution in isolation and give it an
interpretation that is patently antagonistic to other provisions of
the same Constitution, such as Section 3, Article II (on the
applicability of generally accepted principles of international law)
of the same Constitution. This error is exacerbated by the fact
that another interpretation that harmonizes the different parts of
the Constitution is actually applicable, yet ignored, by the
COMELEC.
188. The COMELEC's wholesale rejection of the numerous

legal bases supporting the proposition that a foundling found in
the Philippines is presumed born of Filipino citizens, and, since
he or she did not have to perform an act to acquire or perfect
such citizenship, is deemed a natural-born Filipino, if upheld by
this Honorable Court, is tantamount to the disenfranchisement
and statelessness by judicial fiat (by the COMELEC which is not
even a judicial body) of thousands of foundlings who have
heretofore enjoyed the benefits of citizenship, and were actually
recognized by the State as Filipino citizens. This is a matter of
transcendental importance that goes beyond herein Petitioner's
candidacy, or indeed, the political aspirations of any person.
189. To uphold the COMELEC's inexplicable disregard of

elementary principles pertaining to presumptions of law, burden
of proof, the applicability of treaties and generally accepted
principles of international law, and blind adherence to a
supposed "requirement" of Filipino parentage proven as a fact
under the Constitution, is to negate the very citizenship-the
right to enjoy rights-being enjoyed by thousands of foundlings
heretofore considered by the state as Filipino citizens. This is not
only in blatant disregard of the Philippines' obligations under the
339 Boldface in the original

131
UDHR, the UNCRC, and the ICCPR, among others, but it is also
an interpretation that runs counter to the very spirit animating
our Constitution.
189 .1. The foremost principle animating the

Constitution is the sovereign people's desire to build a "just
and humane society''. 3 4 0 While "independence",
"democracy", and "rule of law'' are treasured ideals of the
sovereign, it is trumped by the primordial principle of
justice· and primacy of human rights. Indeed, full respect
for human rights is guaranteed in Section 11, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution. The fact that it is expressly
mentioned in the declaration of state principles and state
policies, before the article on citizenship, underscores its
importance in construing other provisions of the
Constitution, to the end that the entire document may be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the stated
objectives of the sovereign.
190. Based on the foregoing, there is nothing

unconstitutional about presuming that Sen. Poe was born of
Filipinos or that she is a natural-born Filipino, even though she
cannot, as yet, prove that she is related by blood to citizens of
the Philippines. The following pronouncement in Co vs. HRET is
highly instructive on the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship:
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest

wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever
cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of

citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation,
have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its
richness. 341
B.9. The COMELEC acted beyond

its jurisdiction, and in
violation of the DOJ's primary
jurisdiction, when it effectively
revoked the B.I.'s 18 July 2006
Order which: (a) found Sen. Poe
to be presumptively a former
natural-born Filipino; and (b)
approved her petition for
reacquisition of natural-born
340 Preamble, 1987 Constitution
132
Filipino citizenship. Insofar as

the COMELEC held that Sen.
Poe was not qualified for the
B.I. 's Order, the same is a
prohibited collateral attack on
Sen Poe's natural-born Filipino
citizenship.
191. On page 17 of its 11 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC ruled that it is not bound by the 18 July 2006 Order
issued by the Bureau of Immigration ("B.I.") which: (a) found
Sen. Poe presumptively a former natural-born Filipino; and (b)
approved her petition for reacquisition of natural-born Filipino
citizenship.
192. However, Sen. Poe's did not argue per se that the
COMELEC was bound by the B.l.'s 18 July 2006 order. Sen. Poe
simply stressed (repeatedly) in the proceedings a quo, that the
DOJ has the "primary jurisdiction" to decide whether said order
was legally issued, which necessarily includes the initial inquiry
as to whether Sen. Poe was a "former natural-born Filipino"
qualified for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225.
193. In Quintas, Jr. vs. National Stud Farm,342 the Supreme

Court held:
It is true that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort

goes no further than to determine whether it is the court or the
agency that should make the initial decision. Parker, in his text,
would put the matter thus: "The fact that a governmental authority
is empowered to deal with a given type of matter gives rise to a
presumption that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. If
the law delegates A to make decisions this means that in dubio B
is not so delegated." Davis clarifies the point in this wise: "The
precise function of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide
a court in determining whether the court should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after, an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court." The important thing is
that the dispute be determined according to the judgment, in the
language of an American Supreme Court decision, "of a tribunal
appointed by law and informed by experience." x x x. When,
therefore, as was likewise adverted to by the Solicitor General, the
342 G.R. No. L-37052, 29 November 1973

133
judicial forum was sought by plaintiff, there was in effect an

unwarranted disregard of the concept of primary jurisdiction.. 34 3
193.1. Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico,

Jr. 344 is also apropos:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been

to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence. As early as 1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.
932, 941 ), held that under the sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction' .. the courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to
the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered. '345
194. The DOJ has the primary jurisdiction or the power to

"make the initial decision" to rule on whether reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino citizenship evidenced by the 18 July 2006
Order, was valid. Under Section 18 of B.I. Memorandum
Circular No. AFF. 05-002, the 18 July 2006 Order can be
revoked only by the DOJ, thus:
However, the Order of Approval issued under these Rules

may be revoked by the Department of Justice upon a substantive
finding of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on the part of
the applicant and after an administrative hearing initiated by an
aggrieved party or by the Bureau of Immigration. 346
195. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, until the

DOJ has been given the chance (in the appropriate
administrative proceeding) to decide the issue, the COMELEC
should have "refrained" from deciding whether Sen. Poe could
validly avail herself of the benefits of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., whether
she was, indeed, a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines
344 G.R. No. L-47051, 29 July 1988; see Ros vs. DAR, G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005;
Saavedra vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 80879, 21 March 1988; Brett
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 74222 & 77098, 27 November 1990.
346 Undercoring supplied
134
qualified under the terms of that statute. In the meantime, the

18 July 2006 Order which: (a) found that Sen. Poe was born to
Filipino parents and presumptively a former natural-born
Filipino; and (b) approved her petition for reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino citizenship, cannot be impugned in this
case. It must be presumed valid and regular.
196. A corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is

the prohibition against collateral attacks against citizenship
(which the COMELEC did not discuss in its assailed
Resolutions). It is well-settled that "[i]n our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity. "3 47 Before the 18 July 2006 Order
can be assailed, the jurisdiction of the appropriate
administrative agency (i.e., the DOJ) must first be properly
invoked. As a final note, the COMELEC is not a court of general
jurisdiction which can pass upon the validity of an
administrative proceeding that has long ago been terminated,
and the decision in which has long ago attained finality. The
COMELEC is of limited jurisdiction and it would have been
becoming modesty on its part to respect the determination of the
agency specifically tasked with the implementation of Rep. Act
No. 9225.
B.10. The COMELEC

unceremoniously usurped the
power of this Honorable Court,
and took it upon itself to
create new legal doctrine and
to reverse settled judicial
precedent (i.e., Bengzon vs.
HRET and related
jurisprudence), when it ruled
that Sen. Poe did not reacquire
her "original nationality," or
her natural-born Filipino
citizenship, when she was
repatriated under R.A. No.
9225.
-------------------------------------------
197. The COMELEC's First Division ruled on page 33 of the
11 December 2015 Resolution that after Sen. Poe lost her
Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. G .R. Nos. 19214 7 & 192149,
3 47
23 August 2011; Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. G.R. Nos. 92191-92,
30 July 1991, citing Queto vs. Catolico. G.R. Nos. L-25204 & L-25219, 23 January 1970
135
natural-born Philippine citizenship on 18 October 2001, "her

repatriation (under R.A. No. 9225) (did) not result in her
reacquisition of her natural-born status." I
Moreover, the
COMELEC ruled that since the applicant under R.A. No. 9225
must "perform" an "act" (i.e., the repatriation itself), the
citizenship that she would acquire under the terms of the statute
cannot be "natural-born" citizenship, but only plain "Philippine
citizenship." The COMELEC En Banc did not reverse this ruling,
and therefore upheld it, when it issued its 23 December 2015
Resolution.
198. The COMELEC's opinion on R.A. No. 9225 is not only

contrary to prevailing law and jurisprudence, it seeks to create
new legal doctrine, a power which only this Honorable Court
possesses, and to retroactively apply it to Sen. Poe. Only the
extraordinary writ of certiorari can correct such flagrant
usurpation of power. As explained below, when Sen. Poe took
her oath of allegiance under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 on 7 July
2006, she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship.
199. If the
COMELEC opinion is adopted, then this
Honorable Court has, over the last 14 years, effectively and
repeatedly created unconstitutional jurisprudence on the subject
of repatriation and the effects of R.A. No. 9225.
199 .1. In Parreno vs. Commission on Audit, 34 8 this

Honorable Court categorically stated that "(i)f petitioner
reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he
will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."3 49 The
rationale for the Parreno ruling is that the procedure under
R.A. No. 9225 for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship is a
form of repatriation. Thus, this Honorable Court in Parreno
cited the landmark case of Bengson III vs. HRET, 350 which
explained the consequences of repatriation as follows:
(R)repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality. 351 This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. 352
348 G.R. No. 162224, 7 June 2007

350 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
351 Bold face in the original
136
199.2. Parreno also cited Tabasa vs. Court of

Appeals,353 where the High Court had said that "(t)he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship." In Sob~jana-Condon vs.
COMELEC, 354 the oath required under R.A. No. 9225 was
described as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, su~ject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5 ... " Similarly, in
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, 355 this Honorable Court repeatedly
characterized R.A. No. 9225 as a procedure for
"repatriation." In sum, the High Court has been fairly
consistent in characterizing the procedure under R.A. No.
9225 as one for "repatriation." Even Private Respondent
Valdez, in paragraph 47 of the Valdez Petition, referred to
Sen. Poe as a "repatriated citizen."
199.3. On pages 34 to 35 of the 11 December 2015

Resolution, the COMELEC pointed out that Bengson vs.
HRET did not involve R.A. No. 9225 and the public official
therein, Representative Teodoro C. Cruz, rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the U.S.A. and subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
This minor dissimilarity between Bengzon and Sen. Poe's
case is immaterial because the Supreme Court made no
distinction whatsoever among repatriation statutes when it
categorically held that "repatriation results in the recovery
of the original nationality." The Supreme Court did not
say that this principle applies only to repatriation under
R.A. No. 2630, or to service in the American armed forces.
In fact, in Bengson, the Supreme Court made reference to
all of the other laws then in force "where repatriation may
be had by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
and economic necessity." In other words, the High Court's
ruling that "repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality" is a general principle applicable to all
repatriation statutes, including R.A. No. 9225 which would
subsequently be passed. This is consistent with
jurisprudence that followed after Bengson, as discussed in
paragraphs 199.1 and 199.2.
353 G.R. No. 125793, 29 August 2006

354 G.R. No. 198742, 10 August 2012
355 G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013
137
199.4. Moreover, the COMELEC did not even

explain why repatriation under RA 2630 would result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship, but not
repatriation under R.A. 9225. Like Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225, Section 1 of R.A. No. 2630 did not expressly state
that the type of Philippine citizenship which would be
reacquired thereunder is "natural-born" Philippine
citizenship. Section 1 of R.A. No. 2630, which was also
quoted in full on page 35 of the 11 December 2015
Resolution, is reproduced below:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine

citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States Citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. 356
199.5. Despite the silence of R.A. No. 2630 on the

~ of Philippine citizenship that would be reacquired
thereunder, the Supreme Court in Bengzon still held that
the applicant would reacquire "natural-born" citizenship if
"natural-born" citizenship was what he lost in the first
place, as that would be his "original" nationality and
repatriation results in the restoration of whatever was a
person's "original nationality."
199.6. Since "natural-born" citizenship may be

restored through repatriation, even if the repatriation
statute does not expressly state that "natural-born"
citizenship is what is reacquired thereunder, then R.A. No.
9225 (which also does not expressly refer to the
reacquisition of "natural-born" citizenship) may validly
restore one's natural-born status.
200. The COMELEC likewise ruled that the phrase "from

birth" "implies that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth
and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." This
opinion is again contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

138
200.1. In Bengson3s1 (a case which dealt

specifically with defining the concept of natural-born
citizens, and where there was a temporary loss thereof),
this Honorable Court clarified that the phrase "from birth"
in the Constitutional definition of "natural-born" citizens of
the Philippines, simply means "at the time of birth." The
High Court in Bengzon said: "A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof."
200.2. In other words, as long as the person is a

citizen "at the time" of her birth without having to perform
any act to become a citizen, she is natural-born. The
material point in time is the moment of birth; the period of
time after that moment is not relevant to determining
natural-born citizenship.
200.3. The need for a "continuous" and

"uninterrupted" period during which a prospective
candidate becomes acquainted with the locality in which
she seeks to run, is addressed by the residence
requirement for elective office, not the citizenship
qualification. Thus, the Constitution prescribes a specific
(10-year) period preceding the election for the residence
qualification, but does not prescribe any similar period for
the citizenship qualification. Also, the "residence"
requirement seeks to prevent the possibility that a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter" would serve in public office.3sa Therefore, a specific
period of "continuous" and "uninterrupted" residence is
required for most elective offices. On the other hand, "the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our country or
a unit of territory thereof."359 The citizenship qualification
is concerned with "allegiance" per se, and not the period or
length of allegiance (which is taken care of by the residence
requirement). In repatriation statutes like R.A. No. 92,25,
emphasis is thus laid on the oath of allegiance itself,
without imposing any residence requirement.
3s1 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001

358 Romualdez- Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 119976, 18 September 1995, citing
Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941); Torayno vs. COMELEC, 392 Phil. 343 (2000), cited in
Sabili vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012
359 G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
139
201. The COMELEC insists that "repatriation" is an act to

"acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. Of course, this is contrary
to jurisprudence already discussed, such as Bengson. That said,
unlike naturalization statutes, the oath that must be taken
under R.A. No. 9225 (as well as other repatriation laws like R.A.
No. 2630) is not a means for a person to originally "acquire" or
"perfect" her Philippine citizenship (as these words are
understood in the definition of natural-born citizens of the
Philippines). The oath under R.A. No. 9225 also does not
"perfect" citizenship "at the time of birth." R.A. No. 9225, like
other repatriation statutes, results in the reacquisition of
natural-born Philippine citizenship previously lost, but already
originally acquired and perfected.
202. Under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,

Congress was given the sole power to determine how "Philippine
citizenship" (without distinguishing between "natural-born" and
"naturalized" Philippine citizenship) "may be lost or reacquired."
The fact that the Constitution allows Congress to legislate
the manner of reacquisition of "natural-born" citizenship,
implies that one's "natural-born" status may be lost and
then restored by law; it need not be "continuous or
uninterrupted," as the COMELEC opined. And again the
COMELEC must be mindful of its proper place: it is not for the
COMLEC to say how natural-born citizenship is reacquired or
what exactly is reacquired; it is for Congress to determine. Note
that Section 5, Rep. Act. No. 9225 allows the repatriated citizen
to vie for any elective office. It did not limit the position to local
offices, and is broad enough to include national positions such
as the Congress and the Presidency. The COMELEC's
interpretation that repatriation results in naturalized citizenship
will constitute unauthorized legislation.
203. Consistent with jurisprudence and the Constitution, a

logical and reasonable construction of R.A. No. 9225 dictates
that a person who "re-acquires" Philippine citizenship under said
law necessarily re-acquires natural-born Filipino citizenship (not
"naturalized" citizenship, as Petitioner claims}. The reason is
plain: one can only re-acquire what was lost in the first place.
R.A. No. 9225 applies only to former "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines as defined by Philippine Law and jurisprudence."360
Thus, a former natural-born citizen can only "re-acquire"
natural-born citizenship, because that is the only citizenship
that she could conceivably have lost. "Re-acquisition"
J6o Section 1 of BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002, otherwise known as the
"Revised rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004."
140
presupposes the existence of a prior status, not the creation of a

new one. This is why it is absurd on the one hand, to accept
R.A. No. 9225 as a statute which allows for reacquisition of
citizenship by natural-born citizens, but, on the other hand,
deny that "natural-born" citizenship is what is reacquired by
citizens who avail themselves of the benefits of that statute. If
an applicant under R.A. No. 9225 becomes a "naturalized"
Filipino or some other type of Philippine citizen, then she did not
reacquire what she lost, because what she lost was "natural-
born" citizenship. It bears stressing that the declared policy of
R.A. No. 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
citizenship under the conditions of this Act." 3 61 It would be
against this basic state policy for one who was once natural-
born, to, all of sudden, become an ordinary "non-natural" born
Filipino.
204. Finally, as discussed earlier, in Bengson,362 this

Honorable Court declared that there are only two (2) types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: (a) the natural-born
citizen; and (b) the naturalized citizen. The High Court noted
that there is no separate category for those who lose their
citizenship and then reacquire it. The High Court explained that
since the petitioner was not required to undergo naturalization
proceedings to reacquire his citizenship, he is necessarily
natural-born. The Court said:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens

under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (I) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law
to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member
of the House of Representatives.363
361 Section 2, R.A. No. 9225

362 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
363 Underscoring and emphasis supplied
141
Since Sen. Poe was never "naturalized" as a Filipino, she must

perforce be a "natural-born" Filipino.
205. A last note, the only entity which can overturn a

Supreme Court-decreed precedent is this Honorable Court. The
COMELEC has no such power. And even assuming arguendo the
COMELEC may establish new doctrine overturning established
precedent (Bengson III v. HRE1), it cannot be retroactively
applied. In the recent case of Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 364 this Honorable Court overturned
the so-called condonation doctrine but reminded that "(I)t
should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of
the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for
the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole
authority to interpret what the Constitution means and all persons
are bound to follow its interpretation." This Honorable Court
further said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as
'good law' prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected." Basic due process
therefore precludes the COMELEC's new interpretation from
prejudicing petitioner.
206. Considering that Sen. Poe's representation in her

COC on her citizenship is based not only on logic and common
sense, but more importantly on prevailing law and jurisprudence
on the effects of repatriation and R.A. No. 9225 (which the
COMELEC apparently wants to either ignore or overturn), it was
grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to rule that her
representation in her COC for President is "false."
B.11. The COMELEC ignored

evidence of Sen. Poe's honesty
and good faith when it ruled
that she supposedly intended
to mislead or deceive the
Philippine electorate, when
she stated in her COC for
President that she is a
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN."
-------------------------------------------
364 GR No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015, italics supplied

142

COMELEC ruled that Sen. Poe "deliberately attempted to deceive
and mislead the electorate with respect to her citizenship." This
ruling cannot hold water, because it contrary to the facts and
common sense.
208. Sen. Poe has always believed, in good faith, that she is
a natural-born Filipino. Therefore, even if she was wrong (and
she was not), Sen. Poe did not "deliberately" mislead anyone
when she stated in her COC for President that she is a
209. The COMELEC En Banc clearly ignored the hornbook

doctrine that an error as to a difficult question of law may form
the basis of good faith. This was the pronouncement of this
Honorable Court as early as the 1939 case of Kasilag v.
Rodriguez, 365 where the Court, quoting Manresa, held:
We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases
of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition
appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has
already been passed upon by competent authority, and even
established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and
the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon
to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, ~
clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to
which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing
is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal
principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error

of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the
capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
compliance with certain fonnalities and appreciation of certain
acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of
doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil
Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101and102.)
209.1. As far as Sen. Poe is concerned, she is a

natural-born Filipino citizen, a legal position which was
upheld by the Senate Electoral Tribunal-the sole judge of
her qualifications, including her natural-born citizenship,
365 G.R. No. 46623, 7 December 1939

143
as a sitting Senator of the Republic. Moreover, Kasilag is

authority to the effect that even if this position later turns
out to be an "an error of law" based on the "interpretation
of doubtful doctrines", still, such "error" is not incompatible
with good faith.
210. In the final analysis, there is ample evidence on record

to show that Sen. Poe had always believed, in good faith, that
she is a natural-born Filipino. Therefore, even if she was wrong
(and she was not), Sen. Poe did not "deliberately" mislead
anyone when she stated in her COC for President that she is a
210 .1. From her personal knowledge of the

material circumstances of her discovery, coupled with her
physical appearance, Sen. Poe has reasonable grounds to
form a well-founded belief that she was in all likelihood
born of Filipino parents who live in Jaro, Iloilo, who later
abandoned her in a Roman Catholic Cathedral mere hours
after she was born. 366 As discussed, Sen. Poe is only 5 ft. 2
inches tall, with brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face-all
physical features ordinarily associated with Filipinos. She
was found, as a new-born baby, in Iloilo City, where in
1968, as at any time, an overwhelming majority of the
population were Filipinos. It is not reasonable for Sen.
Poe-or indeed, for anybody-to assume that in 1968, a
pregnant foreigner (together with her foreigner husband or
partner), who just so happened to have predominantly
Filipino-like physical features, left her motherland in order
to give birth in the Philippines, in an island very far from
where the international airport and main port of entry are
located, all to abandon such baby in a Roman Catholic
Church, presumably because of poverty.
210.2. The reported circumstances of Sen. Poe's

birth are consistent with her good faith belief that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. To repeat, the mere fact that
Sen. Poe is a foundling, without more, is not sufficient for a
finding that she thereby had the intention of deceiving or
misleading the electorate into thinking that she is a
natural-born citizen.
210.3. As discussed in paragraph 105 hereof (and

sub-paragraphs), the Government of the Regublic of the
Philipgines has, through the B.I. (which granted Sen. Poe's
366 See pars. 4.20 to 4.21, et seq., Sen. Poe's Memorandum with Fonnal Offer of Evidence
144
petition for reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under

R.A. No. 9225 and issued an Identification Certificate in her
favour), the Office of the President (which appointed Sen.
Poe MTRCB Chairperson) and the COMELEC (which
accepted her COC for Senator), consistently recognized,
and therefore repeatedly led Sen. Poe to believe, that she is
a natural-born Filipino. These official government acts
certainly did not alert her to the prospect of being legally
"stateless," as Tatad claims.
210.4. When Sen. Poe prepared her Verified

Answer in SET Case No. 001-15367 (which she filed on 1
September 2015 or more than a month before she filed her
COC for President), she was provided with sound legal
bases (in a pleading prepared by her legal counsel) for the
proposition that she is a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter,
on 17 November 2015, the SET agreed with Sen. Poe and
declared her to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
The SET Decision was affirmed in a Resolution dated 3
December 2015 and it became final and executory on the
same date.
211. These facts negate any intent on Sen. Poe's part to

mislead or deceive the Philippine electorate. They show that,
when Sen. Poe accomplished her COC for President, she had
good faith and legal basis for her representation therein that she
is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
212. Moreover, contrary to the COMELEC's ruling on page

46 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution that a foundling is
supposedly "clearly" not a natural-born Filipino, the issues
surrounding Sen. Poe's citizenship qualification have been the
subject of intense debate and discussion, not only among
members of the legal profession, but the public at large. Indeed,
respected legal figures, such as Former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban,368 prominent election lawyer Atty. Romulo
Macalintal,369 U.P. College of Law Professor and Director of the
Law Center Institute for Human Rights Elizabeth
Pangalangan,37o Ateneo School of Government Dean Antonio La
Vina,371 and Justice Mario Guarifia 111372 have each expressed
367 See Annex "7" of Annex "U" hereof.

368 Exhibit "36"
369 Exhibit "36-B"
370 Exhibit "36-C"
311 Exhibits "36-D", "36-E" and "36-F"
372 In a column published on 10 December 2015 at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Justice
Guarifla joined a roster of prominent legal personalities who maintain that, under
applicable provisions of the Constitution, state obligations of the Philippines under
international law, and generally accepted principles of international law, a foundling has
145
their opinion that Sen. Poe is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines. Surely, if these legal personalities say that Sen. Poe
is a natural-born Filipino, her assertion in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen cannot be said to be baseless, much
less intentionally deceptive. If legal experts disagree, then the
suggestion that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born Filipiono is far
from "clear." Even those who claim that Sen. Poe is not
"natural-born" cannot agree on whether she is "stateless" or
simply a "naturalized" Filipino. In fact, Private Respondent
Valdez proposed that Sen. Poe be placed under a third category
of "repatriated" citizens. Notably, only two (2) out of the four (4)
private respondents (i.e., Tatad and Elamparo) sought to cancel
Sen. Poe's COC on the ground that a foundling cannot legally be
considered a natural-born Filipino. Despite the opportunity to
do so, Private Respondents Contreras and Valdez chose not to
raise this as an issue in their respective petitions.
213. Finally, the Second Division of the COMELEC (in SPA

15-001 [DC], which is subject of a separate Petition to be filed
with this Honorable Court) initially ruled that "the evidence is
not conclusive that Sen. Poe deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact from the electorate when she declared
in her subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen."
Although Commissioners Arthur D. Lim and Sheriff M. Abas
(members of the Second Division) abandoned this position when
the COMELEC En Banc issued its 23 December 2015 Resolution
(in SPA -15-001 [DC]), Commissioner Al A. Parreno (Chairman of
the Second Division) maintained (as shown by his hand-written
note next to his signature on the last page of the 23 December
2015 Resolution) that "there is no material misrepresentation as
to citizenship." In his separate concurring and dissenting
opinion, the Chairman of COMELEC, the Hon. Andres D.
Bautista, also agreed that Sen. Poe simply had no intent to
deceive the Philippine electorate when she stated in her 2015
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino. Since Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim abstained from COMELEC En Banc
ruling in SPA 15-001 (DC), there were only four Commissioners
(namely: Commissioners Arthur Lim, Sheriff Abas, Ma. Rowena
Guanzon and Lito Guia) out of the seven who categorically
found that Sen. Poe intended to mislead when she claimed in her
2015 COC that she is a natural-born Filipino. This was also the
voting on the issue of "false material representation" on the
citizenship issue in the 23 December 2015 Resolution issued by
the COMELEC En Banc in the proceedings a quo. The fact that
the right to be deemed natural-born, a presumption which may be applied without

violating the principles of natural-born citizenship under the Constitution. A copy of
Justice Guarifia's article is attached hereto as Annex "V".
146
the COMELEC En Banc was essentially divi.ded on this issue

further bolsters Sen. Poe's position that she actually acted
honestly in accomplishing her 2015 COC.
214. The foregoing facts and circumstances, taken together

and viewed fairly and objectively and without whim and caprice,
wholly negate any intent on Sen. Poe's part to mislead or deceive
the Philippine electorate. They show that, when Sen. Poe
accomplished her COC for President, she had good faith and
legal basis for her representation therein that she is a "NATURAL
BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
215. Therefore, assuming arguendo that the

representations in Sen. Poe's COC are "false" (and they are not),
they would, at most, be tantamount to honest mistakes on
difficult questions of law, but certainly not statements which
were meant to "deceive" or "mislead" the electorate. Accordingly,
the COMELEC should not have cancelled Sen. Poe's COC on the
ground that she had deliberately misrepresented therein that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. There was simply no
evidence, much less substantial evidence, to support that factual
conclusion. A conclusion unsupported by proof is an arbitrary
conclusion, and therefore reversible by certiorari.
C. THE COMELEC ACTED

WHIMSICALLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY,
IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN RULING THAT SEN.
POE MADE A FALSE MATERIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HER COC
FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT HER
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY
BEFORE MAY 09, 2016" WOULD BE
"10" YEARS AND "11" MONTHS.
C.1. The COMELEC had the positive

duty to consider and weigh
Sen. Poe's evidence showing
that she had reestablished her
domicile of choice in the
Philippines as early as 24 May
2005. The COMELEC's refusal
147
to perform this positive duty,

and its gross and inexcusable
misappreciation of Sen. Poe's
evidence, are unquestionably
acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, which
warrant setting aside the
COMELEC's finding of fact on
the issue of Sen. Poe's
residence ..
216. The settled definition of "residence" in election law is

that it is "synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."3 73
In Romualdez, 314 this Honorable Court held:
In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile

to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes
the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently. 375
In other words, "domicile" is simply a function of "presence" and

"intention." It is ultimately a question of fact. Therefore, when
an issue of residence is brought before the COMELEC, its
positive duty, which it cannot evade, is to carefully evaluate and
weigh the evidence. The same formulation applies to the
determination of whether one has established a new domicile of
choice.
217. It is well-settled that in order to acquire a new

domicile of choice, three (3) requisites must concur:376
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
373 Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, 24 November 1941 (citing Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil.
645); Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009; Jalosjos vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012 (citing Limbona v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391, 401)
374 G.R. Nos. 119976, 18 September 1995, citing Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941)
31s Underscoring supplied
376 Mitra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Japzon v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Papandayan. Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 430 Phil. 754 (2002)
148
(b) an intention to remain there (animus manendz);

and
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus

non revertendz)
The COMELEC itself cited these three (3) elements on page 39 of

the 11 December 2015 Resolution and on page 20 of the 23
December 2015 Resolution
217 .1. Even in Japzon37 7 (which the COMELEC

cited in its assailed Resolution and which is the primary
legal basis for this Honorable Court's recent ruling in
Caballero3 7B), the High Court stressed the significance of
the elements of intention and physical presence in
determining domicile of choice. In Japzon, this Honorable
Court stated that "(t)he length of his residence . . . shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice .... "379 Japzon3so also relied on Papandayan, Jr. vs.
COMELE0 81 which provided a "summation of the different
principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the
residence qualification for elective local officials." This
summary again emphasized that residence is essentially a
factual issue of "physical presence" and "intention."
217 .2. After summarizing the core principles

related to the residence qualification, this Honorable Court
in Japzon3B2 stressed that this matter is ultimately a
question of fact, which requires a careful examination of
the evidence presented by the parties, thus:
Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan,

Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the residency qualification requirement.
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he

complied with the one·year residency requirement for
running for public office is a question of fact. Its
determination requires the Court to review, examine and
377 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009

378 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2012
380 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
38t G.R. No. 147909, 16 April 2002
382 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
149
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence

presented by the parties before the COMELEC.383
218. Sen. Poe's documentary and testimonial evidence

proving her residence in the Philippines since 24 May 2005 are
summarized below:
Exh. Exh. Formally offered by Sen. Poe

No. No. Description (among other purposes) to prove
384 385 that:
"1" "5" U.S.A. Passport Sen. Poe returned permanently to the
No. 017037793 Philippines on 24 May 2005, and
which the U.S.A.- from that point onwards would
Washington always return to the Philippines after
Passport Agency every trip to a foreign country
issued to Sen. Poe
on 18 December
200 1, consisting
of 13 pages
"2- "6- E-mail exchanges 1. Sen. Poe's family decided to

serie serie on various dates return and permanently reside in
s" s" from March 18, the Philippines soon after the
2005 to September death of Sen. Poe's father, i.e.,
29, 2006 between sometime in the first quarter of
Sen. Poe and/ or 2005;
her husband and 2. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe
representatives of: and her family already had the
(1) Victory Van definite intention to abandon
Corporation, and their U.S.A. residence and return
(2) National to the Philippines for good;
Veterinary 3. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe
Quarantine had begun the process of
Service of the relocating and re-establishing her
Bureau of Animal residence in the Philippines;
Industry of the 14. This process continued from
Philippines, March 2005 to early 2006;
consisting of 23 I 5. As early as February 2006, but no
pages later than April of the same year,
Sen. Poe and her family had all
their valuable movable properties,
including household goods,
furniture, toys and vehicles,
packed and stored for relocation
to the Philippines; and
6. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be
a resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months
"3" "7" Official Transcript I 1. Sen. Poe enrolled her school-aged

38 4In relation to the Contreras and Valdez Petitions
385 In relation to the Tatad Petition
150
of Records for children in Philippine schools

Brian Daniel Poe before June 2005;
Llamanzares, 2. Sen. Poe's school-aged children
issued by The transferred to and began
Beacon School, attending Philippine schools
consisting of 1 starting June 2005;
a e 3. Sen. Poe's children had been
"3-A" I "7-A" I Certification dated continuously attending Philippine
April 15, 2015 schools since June 2005;
issued by the 4. Sen. Poe intended to reside, and
Registrar of La had been actually residing,
Salle Green Hills, permanently in the Philippines
Ms. Sandra since May 2005; and
Bernadette F. 5. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be
Firmalino, a resident of the Philippines for
consisting of 1 ten (10) years and eleven (11)
page months
"3-B" I "7-B" I Elementary Pupil's
Permanent Record
for Hanna
Mackenzie P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 2 pages
"3-C" I "7-C" I Secondary
Student's
Permanent Record
for Hanna
Mackenzie P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 2 oages
"3-D" "7-D" Certificate of Same as Exhibit "3" /"7", and further,
Attendance dated to prove that Sen. Poe enrolled her
April 8, 2015 youngest child, Anika, in Philippine
issued by the schools as soon as she was of
Directress of the schooling age, and that she had been
Learning continuously attending school in the
Connection, Ms. Philippines
Julie Pascual
Penaloza,
consisting of 1
page
"3-E" I "7-E" I Certification dated
April 14, 2015
issued by
Directress of The
Greenmeadows
Learning Center,
Ms. Anna
Villaluna-Reves,
151
consisting of 1
page
"3-F" I "7-F" I Elementary Pupil's
Permanent Record
for Jesusa Anika
Carolina P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 1 page
"4" "8" Identification Card 1. Shortly after Sen. Poe returned to
issued by the the Philippines permanently in
Bureau of Internal May 2005, she secured for herself
Revenue ("B.l.R.") a T.I.N. (239-290-513-000) from
to Sen. Poe on the B.l.R.;
July 22, 2005, 2. In the first quarter of 2005 and
consisting of 1 no later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
page had abandoned her residence in
the U.S.A., and, from then on, she
intended to reside permanently in
the Philippines; and
months
"5" "11" Condominium 1. In the first quarter of 2005 and
Certificate of Title no later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
("CCT") No. had abandoned her residence in
11985-R covering the U.S.A., and, from then on, she
Unit 7F of One intended to reside, as she did
Wilson Place, actually and physically reside,
which the Registry permanently in the Philippines;
of Deeds for San 2. In the second half of 2005, Sen.
Juan City issued Poe and her husband acquired a
on February 20, residential condominium with
2006, consisting parking slot in San Juan City,
of 4 pages which they used as a family
"6" "12" CCT No. 11986-R residence until the completion of
covering the their intended permanent family
parking slot for home at Corinthian Hills, Quezon
Unit 7F of One City; and
Wilson Place, 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be
which the Registry a resident of the Philippines for
of Deeds for San ten (10) years and eleven (11)
Juan City issued months
on February 20,
2006, consisting
of 2 pages
"7" I "13" I Declaration of
Real Property No.
96-39721 covering
Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place,
issued bv the
152
Office of the City

Assessor of San
Juan City on April
25, 2006,
consisting of 1
page
"8" I "14" I Declaration of
Real Property No.
96-39722 covering
the parking slot
for Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place,
issued by the
Office of the City
Assessor of San
Juan City on April
25, 2006
consisting of 1
oae:e
"9" I "15" I Receipt No. To prove that:
82171 72 issued 1. In February 2006, Sen. Poe briefly
by the Salvation travelled to the U.S.A. for the sole
Army on February purpose of supervising the
23, 2006, packing and/or disposal of some
consisting of 1 of the family's remaining
a e household belongings;
"9-A" I I
"15- Receipt No. 2. Sen. Poe had definitely
A" 8220421 issued abandoned her residence in the
by the Salvation U.S.A. and did not intend to
Army on February return there anymore;
23, 2006, 3. Since May 2005, Sen. Poe
consisting of 1 intended to reside, and actually
page resided permanently in the
Philippines; and
ten {10) years and eleven {11)
months
"10" I "16" I E-mail from the 1. Sen. Poe and her family definitely
U.S.A. Postal abandoned their former residence
Service, sent on in the U.S.A. and did not intend
March 28, 2006 to to return there anymore;
Sen. Poe's 2. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
husband, had abandoned her residence in
confirming the the U.S.A., and, from then on, she
latter's intended to reside permanently in
submission of a the Philippines; and
request for change 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be
of address to the a resident of the Philippines for
U.S.A. Postal ten {10) years and eleven {11)
Service, consisting months
of 1 page
"11" I "17" I Final Statement 1. On April 27, 2006, Sen. Poe and
issued by First her husband sold their family
American Title home in the U.S.A.:
153
Insurance 2. Sen. Poe and her family definitely

Company which abandoned their former residence
indicates as in the U.S.A. and did not intend
Settlement Date: to return there anymore;
"04-27/2006," 3. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
consisting of 2 had abandoned her residence in
pages the U.S.A., and, from then on, she
intended to reside permanently in
the Philippines; and
ten ( 10) years and eleven (11)
months
"12" "18" Transfer 1. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
Certificate of Title had abandoned her residence in
No. 290260 the U.S.A., and, from then on, she
covering a 509- intended to reside permanently in
square meter lot the Philippines;
at No. 106, Rodeo 2. In early 2006, shortly after selling
Drive, Corinthian their house in the U.S.A., Sen.
Hills, Baran gay Poe and her husband acquired a
Ugong Norte, vacant lot in Quezon City, where
Quezon City, they built their new home; and
issued by the 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be
Registry of Deeds a resident of the Philippines for
for Quezon City on ten ( 10) years and eleven (11)
June 1, 2006, months.
consisting of 4
pages
"23" "30- The Questionnaire 1. As stated on page 1 of the
A" - Information for Questionnaire, even before she
Determining ran for an elective office, and long
Possible Loss of before the question of her
U.S. Citizenship residence in the Philippines
(issued by the became an issue, Sen. Poe
U.S. Department considered herself a resident of
of State - Bureau the Philippines since "05 2005"
of Consular or May 2005;
Affairs), which 2. As stated on page 4 of the
Sen. Poe Questionnaire, Sen. Poe
accomplished on maintained her ties in the
12 July 2011, Philippines, re-established her
consisting of 5 residence in the Philippines since
pages May 2005, and exercised her civil
and political rights as a Filipino
citizen;
3. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
had abandoned her residence in
the U.S.A., and, from then on,
she intended to reside
permanently in the Philippines;
and
4. By 9 May 2016, Sen. Poe will be
a resident of the Philiooines for
154

months
"26" "41" I Affidavit of Jesusa 1. Shortly after the death of Sen.
Sonora Poe dated Poe's father, i.e., in early 2005,
8 November 2015 Sen. Poe and her family decided
consisting of 3 to move back and come home to
pages the Philippines for good to be
with Sen. Poe's mother;
2. Sen. Poe arrived in the
Philippines in May 2005 and her
children also arrived at or
around that time;
3. Sen. Poe enrolled Brian and
Hanna in schools in the
Philippines for the school year
2005-2006;
4. Upon their return to the
Philippines in 2005, Sen. Poe
and her children initially lived
with Sen. Poe's mother at her
residence in San Juan City until
they could find their own place to
stay;
5. Sen. Poe's mother reassigned
their long-time family driver to
work as Sen. Poe's driver since
2005 precisely because Sen. Poe
would and her children would
henceforth be based in the
Philippines;
6. In the first quarter of 2005 and
no later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
and
months
"27" "42" I Affidavit of 1. Shortly after the death of Sen.
Teodoro Misael Poe's father, i.e., in the first
Daniel V. quarter of 2005, Sen. Poe and
Llamanzares her husband decided to return to
dated 8 November and permanently reside in the
2015 consisting of Philippines;
3 pages 2. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe
and her husband started making
arrangements to transfer her
familv's oersonal belongings and
155
household goods from the U.S.A.

to the Philippines;
3. In the first quarter of 2005 and
no later than May 2005, Sen. Poe
ten ( 10) years and eleven (11)
months;
5. The documents marked as
Exhibits "2-series" /"6-series"
are authentic print-outs
accurately reflecting digitally
stored electronic data messages
or electronic documents
pertaining to the conversations
between Sen. Poe and/or her
husband and representatives of
(a) Victory Van International; and
(b) National Veterinary
Quarantine Service of the Bureau
of Animal Industry of the
Philippines; and
6. The document marked as Exhibit
"10" /"16" is an authentic print-
out accurately reflecting digitally
stored electronic data message or
electronic document from the
United States Postal Service.
Additionally, Exhibit "27" /"42" is
being offered to:
Authenticate Exhibit "2-
series" /"6-series" and Exhibit
"16" in accordance with Rules 5
and 9 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC386,
promulgated by the Supreme
Court on 17 Julv 2001.
218.1. As held in Sabili vs. COMELEC387 and

Mitra vs. COMELEC, 388 the various pieces of evidence
showing that Sen. Poe established her domicile of choice in
the Philippines starting on 24 May 2005, must be viewed
"collectively" and not "separately" or in isolation.
386 The Rules on Electronic Evidence

387 G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, citing Enojas. Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347
Phil. 510 (1997)
388 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010
156
219. Treating the issue of Sen. Poe's residence as a

question of fact, it is evident that when she returned to the
Philippines on 24 May 2005, she satisfied the three (3)
requisites for reestablishing her domicile of choice in the
country. If the COMELEC had carefully examined and weighed
Sen. Poe's evidence, it would have arrived at the inevitable
conclusion that Sen. Poe's animus manendi (in the Philippines)
and animus non reverlendi (to the U.S.A.) concurred with her
physical presence in the country on 24 May 2005.
219. 1. Sen. Poe returned to the Philippines on 24

May 2005,389 and, except for brief trips abroad,390 has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since that period.
Notably, in 2011 or two (2) years prior to her ever running
for an elective office, Sen. Poe already stated in a sworn
document that she "became a resident of the Philippines
once again since 2005" ,391 specifically from "05 2005" (May
2005) to "present". 392
219.2. Sen. Poe's animus manendi, or intent to

stay permanently in the Philippines, is evidenced by,
among others:
a) Sen. Poe's travel records, which show that whenever

absent for a trip abroad, she would consistently
return to the Philippines;393
b) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe,39 4 attesting to, inter
alia, the fact that after their arrival in the Philippines
in early 2005, Sen. Poe and her children first lived
with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan
City, which even necessitated a modification of the
living arrangements at her house to accommodate
Sen. Poe's family;395
389 See Exhibit "J" (Sen. Poe's travel records) and Exhibit "5", p.10 (Sen. Poe's U.S.A.
Passport), showing arrival in the Philippines on 24 May 2005
390 Sen. Poe's trips abroad during the contested period from May 2005 to July 2006 are:
1) Hong Kong - Philippine departure: September 11, 2005, Philippine arrival:
September 14, 2005, lasting only four (4) days;
2) USA - Philippine departure: December 16, 2005, Philippine arrival: January 7,
2006, lasting only twenty two (22) days;
3) USA - Philippine departure: February 14, 2006, Philippine arrival: March 11, 2006,
lasting only twenty five (25) days;
4) Thailand - Philippine departure: July 2, 2006, Philippine arrival: July 5, 2006,
lasting only four (4) days. (See Exhibits "I" for the Petitioner and "S" for Sen. Poe)
391 See Exhibit "30-A", p. 4, in response to item no. 7 appearing on the same page.
392 Id. p. l
393 Supra note 390, infra note 411
394 Exhibit "41" for Sen. Poe.
395 See Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012 [citing Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03, July 30,
1991, 199 SCRA 692, 715, citing Delos Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893, 899 (1935)], where
the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "a candidate is not required to have a
157
c) School records of Sen. Poe's children,396 which show

that they had been attending Philippine schools
continuously since June 2005;
d) Sen. Poe's TIN I.D.,397 which shows that shortly after
her return in May 2005, she considered herself a
taxable resident and submitted herself to the
Philipp ines' tax jurisdiction;
e) Condominium Certificates of Title for Unit 7F and a
parking slot at One Wilson Place, 398 purchased in
early 2005, and its corresponding Declarations of Real
Property399 for real property tax purposes, which
clearly establish intent to reside permanently in the
Philippines;4oo
f) Sen. Poe's reacquisition of her natural-born Filipino
citizenship, 401 and applications for derivative
citizenship for her minor children;402
g) Sen. Poe's registration as a voter on August 31,
2006; 403
h) Sen. Poe's renunciation of her U.S.A. citizenship on
October 20 ' 2010·404
,
i) Sen. Poe's acceptance of her appointment as MTRCB
Chairperson on October 21, 2010 ;405
j) Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible
Loss of U.S. Citizenship,406 wherein Sen. Poe, long
before the commencement of any controversy with
respect to her residence, indicated that she considered
herself a resident of the Philippines starting in May
2005.
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is

sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a
friend or relative." - --
396 Exhibits "7" to "7-F" for Sen. Poe.
397 Exhibit "8" for the Sen. Poe.
398 Exhibits "11" and "12" for Sen. Poe.
399 Exhibits "13" and "14" for Sen. Poe.
4
oo The candidate's purchase of real property in a locality is a strong evidence of his intent
to reside or live therein. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012, citing
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-
03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 715), the candidate's purchase of a residential lot and a
fish pond in the locality were considered evidence of his establishment of domicile there.
In Mitra vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938, October 19. 2010), the following were considered
as proof of establishment of residence: (a) "the purchase of a lot for (the candidate's)
permanent home;" and (b) the construction of a house on the said lot." In Gallego vs. Vera
(73 Phil. 453 ( 194 lJ), the fact that the candidate had "bought a piece of land" in Abuyog
was deemed evidence of his animus manendi therein.
4 0 1 Exhibits "19" (Sen. Poe's Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines), "20"
(Sen. Poe's Petition filed with the Bureau of Immigration ["B.I."J), and "22" (Order of B.I.
granting Sen. Poe's Petition).
402 Exhibits "21", "21-A", and "21-B".
403 Exhibit "24".
404 Exhibit "27".
405 Exhibit "29".
406 Exhibit "30-A".
158
219.3. On the other hand, Sen. Poe's animus non-

revertendi, or definite intent to abandon her U.S.A. domicile
as early as first quarter of 2005, is evidenced by, among
others:
a) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, 407 attesting to, among

others, the reasons which prompted Sen. Poe to leave
the United States and return permanently to the
Philippines;
b) Affidavit of Sen. Poe's husband, Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares,408 corroborating Mrs. Poe's statement
and explaining how he and Sen. Poe had been actively
attending to the logistics of their permanent relocation
to the Philippines since March 2005;
c) Sen. Poe and her husband's documented
conversations with property movers regarding the
relocation of their household goods, furniture, and
cars, then in Virginia, US.A., to the Philippines, which
show that they intended to leave the United States for
good as early as March 2005;409
d) Relocation of their household goods, furniture, cars,
and other personal property then in Virginia, US.A., to
the Philippines, which were packed and collected for
storage and transport to the Philippines on February
and April 2006;
e) Sen. Poe's husband's act of informing the United
States Postal Service of their abandonment of their
former U.S.A. address on March 2006;
f) Sen. Poe and her husband's act of selling their family
home in the U.S.A. on April 27, 2006;
g) Sen. Poe's husband's resignation from his work in the
U.S.A. in April 2006 and return to the Philippines on
May 4, 2006;
h) Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible
Loss of U.S. Citizenship,410 wherein Sen. Poe, long
before the commencement of any controversy with
401 Exhibit "40".
408 Exhibit "42".
409 See Exhibits "6-series" and "42" for the Sen. Poe. These e-mail conversations (Exhibit
"6-series"), authenticated by Sen. Poe's husband (Exhibit "42") show, among others, that
as early as March 18. 2005, Sen. Poe was already in touch with property movers asking for
an estimate of the total cost of relocating their household goods from Virginia, U.S.A., to
Manila, Philippines (see e-mail dated March 18, 2005). Sen. Poe and her husband
eventually obtained the services of Victory Van International, which packed, collected, and
stored their household goods and other moveable properties for transport to the
Philippines in two (2) batches: one in February 2006 (supervised by Sen. Poe, who was
then in the United States), and another in April 2006 (supervised by Sen. Poe's husband,
who was still at the United States at that time) shortly before Sen. Poe's husband returned
to the Philippines in May 2006. (See e-mails dated February 8, 2006, February 10, 2006,
and April 7, 2006).
410 Exhibit "30-A", p.1
159
respect to her residence in the Philippines, indicated

that she considered herself no longer a resident of the
United States since May 2005 until present.
219.4. If the COMELEC considered these pieces of

evidence, it would have found that Sen. Poe's statement
that she will be a resident of the Philippines for 10 years
and 11 months by May 2016 is not false. The COMELEC
would have correctly appreciated the fact that Sen. Poe had
been a resident of the Philippines starting May 2005.411
This is why her children had been continuously attending
Philippine schools since June 2005; this is why she and
her husband purchased a condominium unit in San Juan
in late 2005; this is why they purchased a vacant lot to
build a family home in Quezon City in early 2006; this is
why they had their household belongings in the U.S.A.
packed and collected for storage and eventual transport to
the Philippines no later than April 2006;412 this is why they
sold their house in the U.S.A. in April 2006,413 the same
month that Sen. Poe's husband resigned from work and
eventually returned to the Philippines to join his family.
411 Sen. Poe's travel records (Exhibit "J" for the private respondent Tatad) and U.S.A.
Passport (Exhibit "S" for Sen. Poe) show that Sen. Poe was physically present in the
Philippines continuously from May 24, 2005 to December 16, 2005, except for a brief four
(4) day travel to Hong Kong from September 11 to 14, 2005, after which she returned to
the Philippines. On December 16, 2005, Sen. Poe briefly travelled to the U.S.A. to attend to
her family's ongoing relocation, staying there for only twenty two (221 days. She returned to
the Philippines on January 7, 2006. Sen. Poe's last lengthy stay in the U.S.A. was from
February 14, 2006 to March 11, 2006, or twenty five (251 days (less than one month!. to
supervise the packing and collection of her family's household goods, and wrap-up her
family's affairs in the United States. (See Exhibits "6-series" [e-mail correspondence with
Victory Van International! and "15" to "15·A" [receipts for donated goods from the
Salvation Army], which show Sen. Poe's activities during this period.) Sen. Poe did not
leave the country again until July 2, 2006, for a brief four (4) day visit to Thailand, after
which she returned to the Philippines on July 5, 2006. On November 1, 2006, Sen. Poe
again went overseas for a brief four (4) day visit to Singapore, after which she returned to
the Philippines on November 4, 2006. These uncontroverted pieces of evidence clearly
show that Sen. Poe had been continuously staying in the Philippines since May 2005, only
leaving for brief periods of overseas business, but always returning to the Philippines.
4 12 See Exhibit "6-seriea" for the Sen. Poe, which show that as early as March 2005, Sen.
Poe and her husband had been in touch with property movers and obtaining estimates
regarding the total cost of relocating their household goods, furniture, and other movable
properties to the Philippines. The spouses eventually obtained the services of Victory Van
International, which scheduled the collection and storage (for eventual transport to the
Philippines) of the Llamanzares family's household goods in two (2) batches: the first in
February 2006 (see e-mail dated February 10 and 15, 2006), and the second in April 2006
(see e-mail dated April 7 and 27, 2006). This timeline is consistent with the fact that Sen.
Poe's house in the U.S.A. was sold on April 27, 2006. These pieces of evidence indubitably
show that Sen. Poe and her family abandoned their U.S.A. domicile and could no longer
have been living in the United States during this period. This logical conclusion is
consistent with the fact that Sen. Poe and her children returned to the country with the
intention to reside here permanently starting May 2005.
4 13 Exhibit "17" in Tatad case; Exhibit "11" in Contreras and Valdez cases
160
220. In Varlas vs. COMELEC, 4 14 the High Court ruled that

ignoring evidence constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Indeed,
when the question brought before a tribunal is one of fact (which
the issue on residence undoubtedly is), there is really nothing
more whimsical, capricious and arbitrary than disregarding
evidence. Such utter disregard of evidence constitutes grave
abuse of discretion because it amounts to an evasion of a
positive duty enjoined by law, that is, the duty of the COMELEC
to treat the issue of residence as a question of fact and to
carefully weigh the evidence presented by the parties.
221. It is noteworthy that this Honorable Court has ruled

that several candidates established their respective domiciles of
choice in their respective localities based on significantly less
evidence than that presented by Sen. Poe in the proceedings a
quo.
221.1. In Perez vs. COMELEC, 4 15 this Honorable

Court upheld the COMELEC's ruling that private
respondent therein had "changed his residence from
Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July
1990 on the basis of the following (five [SJ pieces/types of
evidence):" (a) "the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the
owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St.,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived
in 1990;" (b) "the contract of lease between private
respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996;" (c)
"the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between
private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit;" (d) "the
certificate of live birth of private respondents second
daughter;" and (5) "various letters addressed to private
respondent and his family."
221.2. In Japzon vs. COMELEC, this Honorable

Court held that Mr. Ty had established a new domicile of
choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines based on only four (4) pieces of
evidence, namely: (a) his application for a Philippine
passport "indicating in his application that his residence in
the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur,Eastem Samar;" (b)
community tax certificates for the years 2006 and 2007
"stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
414 G.R. No. 189078, 30 March 2010

415 G.R. No. 133944, 28 October 1999
161
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar," and

showing that "Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local
tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar;" and (c) Ty's registration as a voter on 17
July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
221.3. It is notable that Ty did not even present

independent evidence that he had abandoned his domicile
in the U.S.A. (i.e., proof of animus non-revertendz).
Nevertheless, this Honorable Court sided with him. Why
should the outcome be different in Sen. Poe's case when,
on top of her proof on animus manendi, she proved her
animus non-revertendi separately and through distinct
pieces of evidence, such as her and her husband's
resignation from work, the donation of some of the family's
household belongings, collection and transport of the
family's household belongings, and the sale of the family
home in the U.S.A.?
221. 4. Similarly, in Jalover vs. Osmena and

COMELEC, 4 16 this Honorable Court affirmed the
COMELEC's finding that "Osmefta had sufficiently
established by substantial evidence his residence in Toledo
City, Cebu." The COMELEC relied on only six (6) acts: (a)
"Osmefta applied for the transfer of his voter's registration
record to Toledo City;" (b) "Osmefta likewise purchased a
parcel of land in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995;" (c) he
"commenced the construction of an improvement, which
would eventually serve as his residence since 2004;" (d)
"Osmefta even acquired another parcel of land in Das,
Toledo City in December 2011; (e) he "transferred his
headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as early as
2011; and (f) "Osmefta has always maintained profound
political and socio-civic linkages in Toledo City."
222. Despite Sen. Poe's overwhelming and unrefuted

evidence, the COMELEC still insisted that she failed to comply
with the 10-year residence requirement for Presidential
candidates. In arriving at that decision, the COMELEC focused
on only three (3) isolated factors. Two (2) of these facts
supposedly show that Sen. Poe had not reestablished her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005, to
wit: (a) her husband "remained a resident of the US in May
2005, where he kept and retained his employment;" and (b) Sen.
416 G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014

162
Poe's travels to the U.S.A. using her U.S.A. passport from May
2005 to July 2006. (See page 39 of the 11 December 2015
Resolution). The COMELEC also cited Sen. Poe's apparent
statement in her COC for Senator that she had resided in the
Philippines for only "6,, years and "6,, months on 13 May 2013.
According to the COMELEC, this was proof that Sen. Poe had
resided in the Philippines since November 2006 and, therefore,
for only 9 years and 6 months by 9 May 2016.
223. With due respect, the three (3) aforementioned factors

do not constitute "substantial evidence,,, and thus, cannot
negate Sen. Poe's other evidence (discussed in pars. 218 to 219)
clearly and overwhelmingly showing that the "fact" of her
residence is that she had reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as 24 May 2005.
a. The COMELEC acted illogically,

arbitrarily and in disregard of
the evidence when it found that
Sen. Poe had not abandoned her
domicile in the U.S.A. simply
because her husband (whose
domicile is not even in issue)
stayed in the U.S.A. after 24
May 2005 up to 4 May 2006,
and that he remained "a citizen
of the US." The evidence on
record undoubtedly shows that
Sen. Poe's husband stayed in
the U.S.A. primarily to sell and
dispose of the family home
there, and that he returned to
the Philippines 7 days after the
sale (on 27 April 2006 ).
Moreover, the citizenship of
one's spouse cannot possibly
negate one's own residence in
the Philippines.
--------------------------------------------
224. The issue before the COMELEC concerns Sen. Poe's
domicile as of 24 May 2005, not that of her husband. It also
does not concern the citizenship of Sen. Poe's husband (who
actually holds dual citizenship from birth), which has no bearing
on Sen. Poe's establishment of residence in the Philippines.
There is no question that Sen. Poe returned to the Philippines on
24 May 2005 (See Sen. Poe's cancelled U.S.A. Passport, Exhibit
163
"1" in SPA 15-007 and 139; Exhibit "5" in SPA 15-002). Sen.
Poe (together with her children) initially lived with her mother at
23 Lincoln St., Greehhills West, San Juan City. Paragraph 9 of
the Affidavit of Sen. Poe's mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe,
corroborates this fact (See Exhibit "26" in SPA 15-007 and 139;
Exhibit "41" in SPA 15-002). In paragraph 10 of her Affidavit,
Ms. Poe even recounted how "the living arrangements at 23
Lincoln had to be modified to accommodate (Sen. Poe) and (Ms.
Poe's) grandchildren," and that "one of the spaces in the house
had to be converted into a bedroom for one of the children."
225. Sen. Poe's evidence explains exactly why her husband

stayed in the U.S.A. after May 2005, and it was not because Sen.
Poe or her husband had not abandoned their domicile in the
U.S.A. In her Verified Answers, Sen. Poe consistently explained
that her husband "stayed in the U.S.A." for the sole and specific
purpose of "finishing pending projects, and to arrange for the
sale of the family home there." 4 11 Paragraph 9 of the Affidavit of
Sen. Poe's mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, again corroborates this
fact (See Exhibit "26" in SPA 15-007 and 15-139; Exhibit "41" in
SPA 15-002). The purpose of Sen. Poe's husband in staying in
the U.S.A. was entirely consistent with the couple's intention to
move back to Philippines and to abandon their domicile in the
U.S.A.
226. If the COMELEC had examined the foregoing

evidence, it would have realized that the stay of Sen. Poe's
husband in the U.S.A. from 24 May 2005 to 4 May 2006 does
not evince Sen. Poe's or her husband's intent not to abandon
their domicile in the U.S.A. On the contrary, it is consistent
with her claim that she had abandoned her residence in the
U.S.A. (precisely, she and her husband sold their home in the
U.S.A., which is an act that flies in the face of the COMELEC's
finding that she wanted to remain domiciled in the U.S.A.).
Moreover, none of the Private Respondents presented evidence to
refute the declared purpose of Sen. Poe's husband in staying in
the U.S.A. from May 2005 to May 2006. In De Guzman v.
Commission on Elections,418 this Honorable Court held that an
administrative body commits grave abuse of discretion when it
"grossly misappreciate(s) evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion."
226.1. Assuming arguendo that the
commencement of Sen. Poe's domicile in the Philippines
Answer to Tatad Petition, par. 120; Answer to Contreras Petition, par. 1.12; Answer to
4 17
Valdez Petition, par. 1.12

164
should reckoned only from the return of her husband to

the Philippines on 4 May 2006, then Sen. Poe would still
possess at least 10 years of residence in the Philippines "up
to the day before" the 9 May 2016 elections. The 11-month
discrepancy would not be "material" because that period
would not make Sen. Poe any more qualified for the
Presidency.
b. The COMELEC ignored settled

jurisprudence and disregarded
the evidence when it found that
Sen. Poe's travels to the U.S.A.
between 24 May 2005 and 7
July 2006 constitute proof that
she had not abandoned her
domicile in the U.S.A.
227. In the first place, Sen. Poe did not "travel frequently"
to the U.S.A. between May 2005 and July 2006. Her cancelled
U.S.A. Passport shows that she travelled to the U.S.A. only twice
during this period and each trip did not last more than a month
(See Sen. Poe's cancelled U.S.A. Passport, Exhibit "1" in SPA 15-
007 and 139; Exhibit "5" in SPA 15-002). As explained in
paragraph 55.3.3., the five (5) trips which Sen. Poe referred to in
her Motion for Reconsideration (between 2006 to 2011) actually
happened on on 14 February 2006, on 20 April 2009, on 19
October 2009, on 27 December 2009 and on 27 March 2010. It
bears stressing that after 20 October 2010, Sen. Poe no longer
used her U.S.A. Passport. This fact is evident from a simple
examination of the entries in her cancelled U.S.A. Passport as
well as the travel logs which Private Respondent Tatad himself
submitted. Those same travel logs reveal that Sen. Poe travelled
only twice in 2011, and she used her Philippine passport on
both occasions. Those two 2011 trips were not even to the U.S.A.
but to Hong Kong and to Thailand. Therefore, it was erroneous
for the COMELEC En Banc to conclude, or to imply that Sen. Poe
had asserted, that she travelled to the U.S.A. in 2011 "using her
U.S.A. Passport." The evidence in the proceeding a quo simply
does not support that conclusion. And even then, travelling to
the U.S.A. at an average of less than once a year (and for short
durations at that) cannot, by any standard, be described as
"frequent" travels to the U.S.A.
228. Also, in her Verified Answers, Sen. Poe explained why

she had to travel to the U.S.A. in February 2006, and it had,
again, nothing to do with supposedly maintaining her domicile
165
in the U.S.A. Sen. Poe's trip to the U.S.A. in February 2006 was
"for the purpose of supervising the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings. "4 19 In fact, during this
trip, Sen. Poe even donated some of the family's household
belongings to the Salvation Army (See Exhibits "9" and "9-A" in
SPA 15-007 and 139; Exhibits "15" and "15-A" in SPA 15-002).
Surely, a trip which involved the disposal of the family's personal
properties in the U.S.A. cannot be considered evidence of Sen.
Poe's supposed intent not to abandon (or to maintain) her
residence in the U.S.A.
229. Again, as held, in De Guzman v. Commission on
Elections, 4 20 there is grave abuse of discretion when the
COMELEC "grossly misappreciate(s) evidence of such nature as
to compel a contrary conclusion." Also, in Jalover vs. Osmena
and COMELEC, 421 this Honorable Court held that "when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but
has the constitutional duty to intervene." The only logical and
"reasonable" conclusion that one can derive from Sen. Poe's trip
to the U.S.A. in February 2006, is that she wanted to abandon
her home in the U.S.A. (not maintain it).
230 . That said, regardless of the purpose of Sen. Poe's two
short trips to the U.S.A. between May 2005 and July 2006, these
trips cannot by themselves negate her compliance with the 10-
year residence requirement for Presidential candidates.
Japzon422 is again instructive:
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in

the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a
little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon
maintains that Tys trips abroad during said period, i.e., to
Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to
the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that
Ty had no intention to permanently reside in
Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en bane, as well
as this Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that
Ty did come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur,
4 19 Answer to Tatad Petition, par. 1.26; Answer to Contreras Petition, par. 1.16; and
Answer to Valdez Petition, par. 1.16
422 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009

166
Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further

manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and

never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the
contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration
as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence.- The Court also notes, that even with
his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in
Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14
May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place
is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it
does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. 4 23
Dela Pena vs. Osmena and COMELEC424 is of the same import:

The petitioners, in the present case, largely rely on
statements that Osmefia was "hardly seen" in Toledo City, Cebu to
support their claim of error of jurisdiction. These affidavits,
however, deserve little consideration and loudly speak of their
inherent weakness as evidence.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-
four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the
residency requirement. 425 In Fernandez v. House Electoral
Tribunal, we ruled that the "fact that a few barangay health
workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever
they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no
moment, especially considering that there were witnesses
(including petitioner's neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in
turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a
resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. x
x x It may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds
petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment
or business."
Under the circumstances, the evidence submitted by the
petitioners do not conclusively prove that Osmefia did not in fact
reside in Toledo City for at least the year before election day;
most especially since the sworn statements of some Toledo City
residents attesting that they never saw Osmefia in Toledo City

424 G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014
42s Citing Fernandez v. HRET, G. R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 733
167
were controverted by similar sworn statements by other Toledo

City residents who claimed that Osmefia resided in Toledo
City.426
231. The Constitution does not require Sen. Poe to be in

the Philippines 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; neither does the
fundamental law expect her never to leave the country at all.
Therefore, the COMELEC could not have relied on the fact that
Sen. Poe travelled to the U.S.A. twice (without anything more) to
support its intended conclusion that she had not abandoned her
domicile in the U.S.A. On the contrary, to borrow the words of
the Supreme Court, "the fact that (Sen. Poe) did come back to
the (Philippines), after (her) trips (abroad), is a further
manifestation of h( er) animus manendi and animus non
revertendi."
c. The COMELEC disregarded the

settled principle enunciated in
Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, reiterated in Perez
vs. COMELEC, that a candidate's
statement in her certificate of
candidacy is not decisive of the
issue of resif;lence. The fact of
residence always prevails over a
candidate's statement about his
or her residence.
--------------------------------------------
232. On pages 43 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution, the
COMELEC pointed out that Sen. Poe cannot comply with the 10-
year residence requirement under Section 2, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution because she was a resident of the Philippines
starting only "in November 2006." Therefore, in the COMELEC's
view, by 9 May 2016, Sen. Poe will be resident of the Philippines
for only 9 years and 6 months. The COMELEC's sole basis for
this conclusion is Item No. 7 of Sen. Poe's COC as Senator,
wherein she indicated that her "period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013" is "6" years and "6" months.
The COMELEC clearly ignored this Honorable Court's landmark
ruling in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC. 4 27
233. In Romualdez, 428 this Honorable Court categorically

held that "(i)t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a

427 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
428 Id.
168
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in

determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement." In the same
case, the Supreme Court ruled that an "honest mistake" in a
certificate of candidacy "should not ... be allowed to negate the
fact of residence . . . if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper." Romualdez
applies squarely to Sen. Poe's case because:
(a) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez (who stated that her

period of residence in the locality was 7 months,
instead of "since childhood"), Sen. Poe stated a period
of residence in her COC for Senator ("6" years and "6"
months) which is. shorter than the period she should
have stated therein ("7" years and" 11" months);
(b) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez, Sen. Poe's error in

her COC for Senator was the result of an honest
mistake rooted in the confusing entries and questions
in the certificate of candidacy itself; and
(c) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez, Sen. Poe was honest

and open about her mistake, and she corrected it the
first chance she had, and with every succeeding
opportunity thereafter.
234. Sen. Poe committed an honest mistake when she

stated in her COC for Senator that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" is "6" years and "6" months.
234.1. Only a two-year period of residence in the

Philippines is required to qualify as a member of the Senate
of the Republic of the Philippines. Sen. Poe sincerely had
no doubt that she had satisfied this residence requirement.
She even accomplished her COC for Senator without the
assistance of a lawyer. Indeed, even Chairman Andres
Bautista of the COMELEC, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion promulgated on 23 December 2015,
noted that the "residency requirement for Senator is two (2)
years. Hence, when [Sen. Poe] stated in her 2013 COC that
she was a resident ... for (6 years and 6 months], it would
seem that she did so without really considering the legal or
constitutional requirement as contemplated by law. After
all, she had already fully complied with the two-year
residence requirement." (Because of this, Chairman
Bautista ruled that the supposed "admission" in the 2013
COC was not knowingly made.)
169
234.2. It is no wonder that Sen. Poe did not know

that the use of the phrase "Period of Residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013" in her COC for Senator,
actually referred to the period immediately preceding 13
May 2013, or to her period of residence on the day right
before the 13 May 2013 elections. Sen. Poe therefore
interpreted this phrase to mean her period of residence in
the Philippines as of the submission of COCs in October
2012 (which is technically also a period "before May 13,
2013").
234.3. In terms of abandoning her domicile in the

U.S.A. and permanently relocating to the Philippines,
nothing significant happened in "November 2006."
Moreover, Private Respondents were not able to present any
evidence which would show that Sen. Poe returned to the
Philippines with the intention to reside here permanently
only in November 2006. Thus, there would have been no
logical reason for Sen. Poe to reckon the start of her
residence in the Philippines from this month. This bolsters
the fact that Sen. Poe's representation in her COC for
Senator regarding her period of residence was based on her
honest misunderstanding of what was asked of her in Itern
No. 7 of her COC for Senator, and that she indeed counted
backward from October 2012 (instead of from 13 May
2013).
234.4. The COMELEC apparently realized that the

phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before (the
date of the election)" (which appears in Sen. Poe's COC for
Senator) might cause some confusion or misunderstanding
among prospective candidates in the 9 May 2016 elections.
Thus, Item No. 7 of the latest COC forms which the
COMELEC prepared for the 9 May 2016 elections
(including Sen. Poe's COC for President) was significantly
amended and revised. It now states:
PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:429
The COMELEC's recent insertion of the phrase "UP TO THE

DAY" in the entry above is significant because it bolsters
Sen. Poe's claim that she was misled by the earlier version
of that question in her COC for Senator.
429 Underscoring supplied.

170
234.5. If a question is, in the COMELEC's eyes,

confusing, shouldn't the COMELEC expect that a candidate
would give a wrong answer to that question, and that the
candidate who gave such wrong answer did not lie but was
simply confused? If a question is concededly imprecise,
shouldn't the COMELEC excuse a candidate's honest
imprecise answer to the imprecise question?
234.6. On page 48 of the 11 December 2015

Resolution, the COMELEC pointed out that counting 6
years and 6 months backward from October 2012, would
more or less bring us to "April 2006" which does not match
Sen. Poe's claim that she started residing in the Philippines
on 24 May 2005. The COMELEC ignored that Sen. Poe had
already addressed this matter in paragraph 4 .156. 4 of her
Memorandum in the Tatad Petition and in paragraph 4.27.4
of her Memorandum in the Valdez Petition, to wit:
When Respondent accomplished her COC for

Senator, she reckoned her residency in the Philippines from
March-April 2006, which is when (to her recollection at the
time she signed this COC) she and her family had
substantially wound up their affairs in the U.S.A. in
connection with their relocation to the Philippines.
Specifically, March 2006 was when Respondent arrived in
the Philippines after her last lengthy stay in the U.S.A., and
April 2006 was when Respondent and her husband finally
sold their house in the U.S.A. The month of April 2006 is
also when Respondent's husband resigned from his job in
the U.S.A. The period between March-April 2006 to
September 2012 is around six (6) years and six (6) months.
Therefore, this is the period Respondent indicated (albeit,
mistakenly) in her COC for Senator as her "Period of
Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."
234. 7. This erroneous understanding of the

commencement of her residence in the Philippines, together
with the confusing question in Item No. 7 of her COC for
Senator, explains why Sen. Poe mistakenly indicated in
that COC that her "Period of Residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013" would be "6" years and "6" months.
234.8. Sen. Poe was later advised (only this year)

by legal counsel that the concept of "residence," for
purposes of election law, takes into account the period
when she was physically present in the Philippines starting
from 24 May 2005, (after having already abandoned her
residence in the U.S.A., coupled with the intent to reside in
171
the Philippines) and not just the period after her U.S.A.
residence was sold and when her family was already
complete in the country, after her husband's return. Sen.
Poe's period of residence in her COC for Senator should,
therefore, have been counted from 24 May 2005, and
extended all the way "up to the day before" the 13 May
2013 elections. Sen. Poe realized only this year that she
should have stated "7" years and "11" months (instead of
1
"6" years and "6" months) as her period of residence in her

COC for Senator.
235. What if a candidate's statement on her residence in a

previous certificate of candidacy was not the result of an "honest
mistake," would that statement be considered "decisive" or
"binding" with respect to her future COCs? Would the candidate
in that scenario be "estopped," as the COMELEC held, from
claiming a different period of residence in a subsequent COC?
Perez vs. COMELEC430 tells us that both questions must be
answered in the negative.
236. In Perez, the Supreme Court reiterated the

undisturbed principle previously enunciated in Romualdez that
an erroneous statement in a COC is not decisive of the issue of
residence. However, the High Court did not make any
determination, and therefore did not ·consider as material,
whether the candidate had committed "honest mistakes" in his
previous COCs (and even in his prior affidavits), when he had
stated therein that he was a resident of a locality other than the
locality in which he sought to run for office. The High Court
stressed that residence is an issue of fact, thus:
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private

respondent's certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in
the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections his voter's affidavit which he
used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his
voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, in all of which it is
stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel,
Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of
Cagayan.
x x x
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private
respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao,
the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the
following: ( 1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner
of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the
430 G.R. No. 133944, 28 October 1999

172
contract oflease between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas

T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St.,
Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June
30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998,
between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the
certificate of live birth of private respondents second daughter;
and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his
family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one ( 1) year immediately
preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that
private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of
Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the
merit of this factual finding.
Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was
a resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the
following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (I) his
certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988,
1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voters registration records, the
latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that
private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of
1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
x x x
Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of
candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992,
and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of
Gattaran. Under the law, what is required for the election of
governor is residency in the province, not in any district or
municipality, one year before the election.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a

certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his

certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that
he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one ( 1) year
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7)
173
years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of
Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was
governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao,
which is the capital of the province of Cagayan. 431
237. Applying Perez, in relation to Romualdez, whether the

erroneous statement on residence in an earlier COC was made
intentionally or mistakenly, the fact of residence will always
control. This is but logical, for while a candidate is required to
state in his or her COC certain information pertaining to his or
her eligibility for office, the law itself does not discount the
possibility of error or mistake, as it only requires the candidate
to certify under oath that such information in his or her COC are
"true to the best of his knowledge." 4 32 Certainly, a candidate's
"knowledge" could turn out to be wrong, without bad faith on the
part of such candidate.
238. Does the "fact" of Sen. Poe's residence show,

consistent with what is apparently stated in her COC for
Senator, that the earliest she started residing in the Philippines
was on November 2006? The answer is "NO." This explains why
neither the COMELEC nor any of the Private Respondents could
(or bothered to) identify any fact or piece of evidence which
would explain why Sen. Poe's residence should be reckoned from
November 2006. On the contrary, the "fact" of Sen. Poe's
residence, as discussed in detail in pars. 218 to 219 above, is
that she reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines
as early as 24 May 2005.
239. Since Sen. Poe's COC for Senator does not coincide
with the fact of her residence, this document should have been
disregarded by the COMELEC, and not declared to be "binding''
or decisive on the issue of Sen. Poe's compliance with the 10-
year residence requirement. The COMELEC should disregard
what is stated in a COC when it does not jive with the rest of the
evidence. Conversely, it should not throw away or, worse, ignore
the rest of the evidence when these do not jive with what is
stated in the COC.
240. Notably, the COMELEC characterized Sen. Poe's

statement on residence in her COC for Senator as an
"admission" However, an "extra-judicial" admission or a party's
"out of court" statement may only be given in evidence against a
party, and nothing more, viz:

432 Sec. 74, Omnibus Election Code
174
Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or

omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. 4 33
240. 1. In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 434 this

Honorable Court emphasized that there is "no doubt" that
"admissions against interest may be refuted by the
declarant." Even a "judicial admission" under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, or one made "during the
proceedings in the same case," may be contradicted if the
party proves that either the admission was made through
"palpable mistake" or that no admission was made.
Similarly, a confession of guilt in a criminal case is not
sufficient, by itself, to convict the accused, unless the
confession is supported by other evidence; specifically,
evidence of corpus delicti.
241. In sum, although Sen. Poe's statement in her COC for

Senator may be "given in evidence against her," in accordance
with Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, that so-called
"admission" may nevertheless be overcome by evidence to the
contrary. This principle is also wholly consistent and in
harmony with the landmark ruling in Romualdez (reiterated in
Perez) that a statement in a candidate's COC is not "decisive" of
the issue of residence. As discussed in in pars. 218 to 219
above, Sen. Poe's evidence showed that she had reestablished
her domicile of choice in the Philippines since 24 May 2005, and
not "in November 2006." The COMELEC's refusal to consider as
"decisive" the "fact" of Sen. Poe's residence in the Philippines is a
blatant disregard of jurisprudence, especially Romualdez and the
concept of "admissions" under Section 26, Rule 130.
C.2. The COMELEC disregarded the

basic principle that residence
is an issue of fact, and cited
inapplicable jurisprudence,
commencement of Sen. Poe's
domicile in the Philippines
should start, at the earliest,
when she reacquired her
natural-born Philippine

434 478 Phil. 544 (2004)
175
citizenship under R.A. No.

9225.
------------------------------------------
COMELEC ruled that the evidence discussed in pars. 218 to 219
above supposedly "cannot be given weight" because Sen. Poe
was "still an American citizen" from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006.
Although this statement implies that only a Filipino may
establish domicile in the Philippines (which is of course
incorrect), it appears that what the COMELEC really meant was
that Sen. Poe could establish her residence in the Philippines
from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 only if she had a "permanent
resident visa." And since Sen. Poe did not possess such visa,
she could reside in the Philippines only "temporarily." Because
Sen. Poe could supposedly establish her domicile only after 7
July 2006, the COMELEC ruled that she started residing in the
country only on 31 August 2006 (which is when she was
registered as a voter). This ruling was affirmed in the COMELEC
En Bane's 23 December 2015 Resolution, and is purportedly
based on three decisions of this Honorable Court, i.e., Coquilla
vs. COMELEC, 43 s Japzon vs. COMELEQ436 and Caballero vs.
COMELEC. 43 7 The COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it misapplied these three decisions in deciding
when to count the commencement of Sen. Poe's residence in the
Philippines.
243. The facts in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero have two

(2) things in common: (a) the candidates presented negligible or
no evidence of reestablishment of domicile of choice in the
Philippines before they were repatriated; and/ or (b) the evidence
(other than the candidates' previous COCs) showed that they
had not reestablished residence in the Philippines before they
were repatriated.
243. 1. In Coquilla, the only pieces of evidence

showing that he might have had the intent to reside in the
Philippines were: (a) his Community Tax Certificate; and (b)
his verbal declarations that he intended to run for office.
The candidate's balikbayan stamps in his U.S. passport, by
themselves, showed that the candidate's intention was only
to vacation temporarily in the Philippines.
435 G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607
436 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
437 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015
176
243.2. In Japzon, there was absolutely no evidence

of the candidate's residence before he reacquired his
natural-born citizenship. In fact, all of his evidence
pertained to events after repatriation.
243.3. Finally, in Caballero, the candidate clearly

failed to prove that he had reestablished his domicile of
choice in Uyugan, Batanes, at least one year before the May
13, 2013 elections. On the contrary, he admitted that his
place of work was abroad, his visits to the_Philippines were
"vacations" from work, and he had only 9 months "actual
stav" in Uyugan, Batanes.
244. In other words, in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero, this

Honorable Court was left with no choice but to reckon the start
of the candidate's domicile, at the earliest, on the day he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, because there was simply
insufficient proof that the candidates in question had resided in
the Philippines before repatriation. Accordingly, in these three
decisions the Supreme Court did not lay down (and could not
have laid down) an absolute rule that residence may start only
from the date of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or when
the candidate secures a permanent resident visa. There was
also no pronouncement in these three cases that evidence of
residence before reacquisition (or before securing a permanent
resident visa) must be ignored or set aside. The High Court had
no opportunity to tackle this specific issue because (as
discussed) there was no proof of residence before repatriation or
while the candidate did not possess a permanent resident visa.
244.1. Indeed, even Commissioner Louie Guia, in

his Separate Opinion, reconsidered his previous position
and held that, based on a proper appreciation of Coquilla,
Japzon, Caballero, and Caasi vs. COMELEC, and the
undisputed evidence on record, Sen. Poe "effectively
transferred her domicile from the US to the Philippines as
of May 2005", as "[r]e-acquisition of former citizenship is
not a condition for one to be deemed to have re-established
his or her domicile in the country." 4 38 After taking a second
look at Sen. Poe's unrebutted evidence, Comm. Guia
correctly concluded that while "[t]he circumstance of ...
being solely a US citizen before July 2006 should of course
be considered in evaluating [Sen. Poe's] intent to stay in the
Philippines and abandon her US domicile permanently",
"[e]vidence abound" to show that the intention to change
438 Comm. Guia, Separate Opinion in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) dated 23 December 2015, p. 5.
177
their domicile from the US to the Philippines "have already

been present as of May 2005." "Entertaining the probability
of [Sen. Poe] still intending to maintain US as her domicile
[simply] because she was still a US citizen at that time,
despite proof to the contrary, can be considered as
employing a 'subjective non-legal standard' which the
Supreme Court rejected in the case of [Mitra vs.
COMELEC]. " 4 39
245. The facts which Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero share

in common are the very same facts which distinguish these
decisions from Sen. Poe's case. As explained in detail in
paragraphs 218 to 219, unlike these three cases, Sen. Poe was
able to present overwhelming and unrefuted evidence that she
had reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines before
her repatriation on 7 July 2006, or as early as 24 May 2005.
Unlike these three cases, not a single piece of evidence in the
proceedings a quo (other than Sen. Poe's non-binding COC for
Senator) proved that Sen. Poe had resided elsewhere before 7
July 2006 or that she had failed to reestablish her domicile of
choice in the Philippines before this date. The stark contrast
between the factual milieu in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero on
the one hand, and Sen. Poe's case, on the other, is illustrated in
the table below:
Coquilla Japzon Caballero Sen. Poe's case (SPA 15-

001 [DC]) (See Argument
A.5.)
Evidence of the The None None 1. Entry in U.S.A.

candidate's candidate's Passport showing that
establishment Balikbayan Sen. Poe returned to
of domicile in visas, his the Philippines on 24
the Philippines community May 2005 (See
before tax Exhibit "5");
repatriation certificate
and his 2. E-mail exchanges
declarations between Sen. Poe
that he and/or her husband
intends to and representatives
run for office of: (1) Victory Van
Corporation, and (2)
National Veterinary
Quarantine Service of
the Bureau of Animal
Industry of the
Philippines, showing
that, as early as
March 2005, the
family started
planning their move
back to the
Philiooines (Exhibits
439 Id., at p. 7
178
"6-series");
3. School records of Sen.
Poe's two older
children showing that
they were enrolled in
Philippines schools
for the Academic Year
2005 to 2006
(Exhibits "7-series");
4. Identification Card
bearing Sen. Poe's
TIN which the BIR
issued on 22 July
2005 (Exhibit "8");
5. Condominium
Certificates of Title
Nos. 11985-R and
11986-R showing that
Sen. Poe and her
husband had
acquired a
condominium unit
(and parking slot) in
San Juan City no
later than 20
February 2006
(Exhibits "11" and
"12");
6. Declarations of Real
Property Nos. 96-
39721 and 96-39722
covering the same
condominium unit
(and parking slot) in
San Juan City
showing that these
real properties were
declared for tax
purposes in Sen.
Poe's and her
husband's name on
25 April 2006
(Exhibits "13" and
"14");
7. Receipts issued by
the Salvation Army
both dated 23
February 2006
showing that Sen. Poe
had donated a
number of her
household goods in
the U.S.A. (Exhibits
"15" and "15-A");
8. E-mail from the

U.S.A. Postal Service,
sent on 28 March
2006 to Sen. Poe's
husband, confirming
the latter's
submission of a
reauest for chan11:e of
179
address to the U.S.A.

Postal Service
(Exhibit "16");
9. Final Statement
issued by First
American Title
Insurance Company
which indicates as
Settlement Date: "04-
27/2006," which
shows that Sen. Poe
and her husband sold
their family home in
the U.S.A. on 27 April
2006 (Exhibit "17");
10. Tran sfer Certificate
of Title No. 290260
covering a 509-
square meter lot at
No. 106, Rodeo
Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Baran gay
Ugong Norte, Quezon
City, issued by the
Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City on l
June 2006 (Exhibit
"18");
11. The Questionnaire -
Information for
Determining Possible
Loss of U.S.
Citizenship (issued
by the U.S.
Department of State
- Bureau of Consular
Affairs), which Sen.
Poe accomplished on
12 July 2011
(Exhibit "30-A")
12. Affidavit Affidavit of
Jesusa Sonora Poe
dated 8 November
2015 (Exhibit "41");
13. Affidavit of Teodoro
Misael Daniel v.
Llamanzares dated 8
November 2015
(Exhibit "42");
14. Sen. Poe's verified
statements in her
Answer and other
pleadings
Coquilla Japzon Caballero Sen. Poe's case (SPA 15-
001 [DC]) (See Argument
A.5.)
Evidence cited Balikbayan Candidate Candidate None

or offered to visas which, ~dmittedl:y admitt~d
prove that the ID:'. started that his
candidate had themselves, residine: in olace of
180
not established showed that the work was

residence in the the Philippines abroad, his
Philippines candidate only after visits to the
before intended to repatriation. Philippines
repatriation stay only were
(other than the temporarily "vacations"
candidate's in the from work.
non-binding Philippines and he had
COC) only 9
months
"actual
stay" in
Uyugan,
Batanes.
246. Obviously, in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero, the

evidence of establishment of domicile in the Philippines before
repatriation was nothing compared to Sen. Poe's evidence in the
proceedings a quo. So, why should Sen. Poe's residence be
decided in the same way that the issue was decided in Coquilla,
Japzon and Caballero? Why should these three cases be
controlling in Sen. Poe's case? Only similar cases should be
decided similarly, and, as clearly demonstrated above, Coquilla,
Japzon and Caballero are anything but "similar" to Sen. Poe's
~·
247. It bears stressing that Coquilla nowhere stated an

absolute rule that a foreigner's residence in the Philippines may
commence only upon repatriation. As a matter of fact, as the
COMELEC itself pointed out, Coquilla is authority for the
proposition that a foreigner can establish residence in the
Philippines "as a visitor" allowed by immigration laws to stay as
such. Therefore, contrary to the COMELEC En Bane's 23
December 2015 Resolution, Sen. Poe's "alien citizenship" did not
"remain a legal impediment which prevented her from
establishing her domicile in the Philippines." In other words,
what Coquilla prohibits, for purposes of determining compliance
with statutory or constitutional residence requirement for
elective offices, is not residence in the Philippines while being an
alien, but residence obtained through unlawful entry in the
Philippines. Sen. Poe's cancelled U.S.A. Passport shows that
her presence in the Philippines from 24 May 2005 onwards was
always legal. Therefore, under the terms of Coquilla, Sen. Poe
could reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before her repatriation on 7 July 2006.
247.1. Indeed, to qualify a balikbayan as a mere

visitor, as if he or she is not inclined nor permitted to stay
even without a resident visa, is inconsistent with the law
itself. To start, the term balikbayan is defined by law to
181
include "a former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as

this term is defined hereunder, who had been naturalized
in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines."44 0 Under the law, the visa free entry period of
one year afforded by a balikbayan stamp is of a length
indicative of something more than just transient stay. The
law also envisions a balikbayan program instituted by the
Department of Tourism which "shall include a kabuhayan
shopping privilege allowing tax-exempt purchase of
livelihood tools and providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their
return to the country."441
24 7. 2. That "balikbayans" can avail themselves of

livelihood programs designed to make them "become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their
return to the country'', and are allowed to bring in personal
effects, vehicles, motorcycles and household goods, show
that the law does not treat them as transients with no
intent to stay. The obvious intent of the law is to help
balikbayans reestablish residence here.
248. Not only did the COMELEC apply inapplicable

jurisprudence, it also failed to apply applicable jurisprudence.
Jalosjos vs. COMELEC4 4 2 is the case which the COMELEC should
have applied in deciding the length of Sen. Poe's residence in the
Philippines. In Jalosjos, the Supreme Court started counting the
candidate's residence in the Philippines even before he
reacquired his natural-born Filipino citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 (and without mentioning the need for a "permanent
resident visa," as the High Court did in Coquilla). This is
because the candidate was able to prove that he started living
with his brother prior to his repatriation, thus:
Section 2, RA No. 6768 as amended by RA No. 9174

4 40
Section 1, RA No. 6768 as amended by RA No. 9174. The law also provides for training
44 1
programs thus:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the OWWA, in

coordination with the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), livelihood corporation and
other concerned government agencies, shall provide the necessary entrepreneurial
training and livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance to a balikbayan,
including his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of the kabuhayan
program in accordance with the existing rules on the government's reintegration
program.
In the case of non-OFW balikbayan, the Department of Tourism shall make the
necessary arrangements with the TLRC and other training institutions for possible
livelihood training.
442 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012
182
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's

compliance with residency requirement since the question of
residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time.
x x x
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos'
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for
granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City
to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it
is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have
a domicile or residence somewhere. 443
248.1. Jalosjos teaches us that evidence of

reestablishment of domicile of choice before repatriation or
in the absence of a permanent resident visa cannot be
ignored (as the COMELEC did in its assailed Resolutions).
This ruling makes perfect sense in light of the basic and
fundamental principle that residence is an issue of fact, as
discussed extensively in pars. 217 to 219 above.
248.2. Even if Sen. Poe had not yet been

repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 and even if she did not

183
possess a permanent resident visa444 , the COMELEC

should have at least examined, weighed and given
probative value to Sen. Poe's overwhelming and unrefuted
evidence showing that she resided in the Philippines as
early as 24 May 2005 (See pars. 218 to 219 above). After
all, Sen. Poe's evidence is much more substantial than the
evidence presented by Jalosjos. For the same reasons, it
was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to peg the
start Sen. Poe's domicile on 31 August 2006 (which is when
Sen. Poe was registered as voter, and which is supposedly
the date Sen. Poe established her domicile in the
Philippines after her repatriation on 7 July 2006).
248.3. Still, the COMELEC En Banc found Jalosjos

supposedly does not apply because this case "does not
explicitly and directly declare that an alien or a foreign
visitor may establish her domicile in the Philippines even
prior to her repatriation."
248.3.1. This observation is beside the point

because this Honorable Court in Jalosjos clearly
counted the candidate's residence BEFORE he was
repatriated and nowhere mentioned that he already
possessed any permanent resident visa at the time.
248.3.2. Viewed differently, if the COMELEC En

Banc is correct, and residence in the Philippines may
commence, at the earliest, only upon repatriation or
while a person is in possession of a permanent
resident visa, why did the High Court in Jalosjos start
counting the candidate's residence even before
repatriation and despite the absence of any proof that
the candidate possessed a permanent resident visa?
Obviously, the supposed "rule" which the COMELEC
stated in its assailed Resolutions is not really the rule
under the present state of the law.
248.3.3. And even if we concede for the sake of

argument that Jalosjos does not apply to Sen. Poe's
case, it follows that there has been no decision by this
Honorable Court which squarely addresses the issue
of whether evidence of reestablishment of residence in
the Philippines before repatriation and before a
candidate secured a permanent resident visa, may be
444 It must be emphasized that Sen. Poe did not have to secure a permanent resident visa
at that time, for her residence in the country was at any rate lawful and allowed under the
balikbayan program.
184
ignored or set aside (as the COMELEC did). As

discussed earlier, Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero did
not address this specific issue. In turn, it would follow
that this Honorable Court must simply apply the
settled elements for determining whether a candidate
has reestablished domicile of choice in the
Philippines, i.e., physical presence, animus manendi
and animus non-revertendi. As explained extensively
in Argument B.1., all of these elements concurred in
the case of Sen. Poe on 24 May 2005.
249. The COMELEC also insists that "getting a permanent

resident visa" is supposedly the only way to "waive" one's "non-
resident status." This is a misreading of Coquilla and other
applicable jurisprudence.
249. 1. As shown in the excerpt of Coquilla quoted
on page 40 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution, this
Honorable Court did not say that the procurement of an
"immigrant visa" and an "immigrant Certificate of
Residence" are the only ways for a foreigner "waive" her
non-resident status. Therefore, the COMELEC En Bane's
ruling to the contrary lacks legal basis.
249.2. In fact, jurisprudence shows that there are

other acts, especially permanent relocation to the
Philippines, which would indubitably show an alien's a
"waiver" or "forfeiture" of her non-resident status.
249.3. In Caasi vs. Court of Appeals (which was

cited in Coquilla and in U_qdoracion vs. COMELEC'r45 ), this
Honorable Court held that the waiver of one's non-resident
status (in that case, the possession of a green card) "should
be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country,'' which are shown by "clear" and "indubitable"
evidence. A candidate's unequivocal acts may be indicative
of her waiver of her non-resident status. This is consistent
with jurisprudence holding that residence is ultimately a
question of presence and intention.
249.4. In Jalosjos,446 the candidate returned to the

Philippines to live with his brother even before he
reacquired his natural born Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225. This Honorable Court held that his act of
445 G.R. No. 179851, 18 April 2008

446 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012
185
residing (as an Australian) with his brother was among the

acts by which he "forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia."
249.5. In the same vein, in Gayo vs. Verceles, 447

the High Court considered the act of "relocating" to the
Philippines "for good," as a "waiver" of ones "permanent
residency status" in a foreign country, and the
commencement of one's legal residence, thus:
Applying case law to the present case, it can be said
that the respondent effectively abandoned her residency in
the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a
permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the
respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even
before the holding of the May 2001 elections. The records
show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way
back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S.
residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover,
when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in
1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A.
on periodic visits to her children who were residing there.
Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and
served as such for the duration of her term. We find such
acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to
stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she
has once again made the Philippines her permanent
residence. 44 s
249.6. In Sen. Poe's case, on 24 May 2005, she

clearly and undoubtedly waived and forfeited her status as
a non-resident alien when she relocated to the Philippines
"for good." Therefore, even under the terms of Coquilla,
starting on 24 May 2005, Sen. Poe could reestablish her
domicile in the Philippines.
2 50. As discussed in pars. 21 7 to 219 above, it is well-

settled that there are only three (3) requisites for establishing a
new domicile of choice, to wit:449
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
447G.R. No. 150477, 28 February 2005

449 Mitra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Japzon v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Papandayan. Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 430 Phil. 754 (2002)
186
(b) an intention to remain there (animus manendz); and
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non

revertendz)
250.1. Upholding the COMELEC 's ruling would be

tantamount to adding a fourth requisite, i.e., the
possession of: (a) "permanent resident visa;" and/ or (b)
Philippine citizenship, throughout the period of
establishment of domicile of choice in the Philippines.
250.2. If the COMELEC is correct, then despite

established jurisprudence on the subject, "residence" would
no longer be an issue solely of "physical presence" and
"intention," but of alien documentation and/ or Filipino
citizenship as well.
251. The ruling of the COMELEC that the possession or

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship is a condition sine qua non
for establishing domicile in the Philippines, runs contrary to the
basic principle that residence is independent of, or not
dependent on, citizenship.
251.1. In Cordora vs. COMELEQ450 and Frivaldo vs.

COMELEC, 4 5 1 this Honorable Court ruled that residence is
"separate," "distinct" and not dependent upon citizenship.
251.2. Similarly, in Japzon, 4 52 this Honorable

Court held that R.A. No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence, thus:
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225

governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights
and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of
said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the
matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes
no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
450 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009

451 G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
452 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
187
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship

independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
x x x
As has already been previously discussed by this
Court herein, Ty's reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his
domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming
his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of
his birth. 453
251.3. If R.A. No. 9225 is supposed to have "no

effect" on residence, then one's repatriation thereunder
should not (in all instances) be the starting point of one's
residence in the Philippines.
251.4. It bears stressing that the Constitution

simply requires that a Presidential candidate be a natural-
born Filipino. There is no added condition in the
fundamental law that she be a natural-born Filipino for ten
years immediately preceding the election.
252. To reiterate, in Japzon, 4 5 4 this Honorable Court

stressed that the issue of whether a candidate complied with the
residence requirement is ultimately a question of fact, requiring
a careful examination of the evidence presented by the parties.
As held in Sabili vs. COMELEC4ss and Mitra vs. COMELEC, 4 s6 the
pieces of evidence showing the establishment of domicile of
choice must be viewed "collectively" and not "separately" or in
isolation. Thus, as discussed at the outset, in Romualdez, 457 the
High Court stressed that even the statement of a candidate in
454 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
4 55G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, citing Enojas. Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347
Phil. 510 (1997)
456 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010
457 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
188
her COC regarding her period of residence is not "decisive,"

because the "residency requirement" is ultimately a question of
fact. A single statement "should not ... be allowed to negate the
fact of residence . . . if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper."
252.1. Applied to Sen. Poe's case, one cannot

ignore the numerous pieces of evidence showing that she
reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
early as 24 May 2005, simply because she did not possess
an: (a) "permanent resident visa" or (b) Philippine
citizenship, at the time.
252.2. The absence of a single document (like an

"permanent resident visa," or an Oath of Allegiance under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225) should not be viewed in
"isolation," or considered (in itself) "decisive" of the issue of
residence, especially in the face of voluminous unrefuted
evidence proving Sen. Poe's reestablishment of her domicile
in the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005. A contrary
ruling would violate the basic principle that compliance
with the "residency requirement" is ultimately a question of
fact.
253. When the COMELEC placed undue stress and

emphasis on the stay of Sen. Poe's husband in the U.S.A. from
24 May 2005 to 4 May 2006, his U.S.A. citizenship, and her two
trips to the U.S.A. between 24 May 2005 and 7 July 2006, Sen.
Poe's COC for Senator and the date of her repatriation, the
COMELEC "used wrong and irrelevant considerations" and
"clearly g(ave) too much weight to one factor" in deciding the
issue of Sen. Poe's residence. In Varias vs. COMELEC, 4 58 this
Honorable Court ruled that these acts amount to grave abuse of
discretion. As discussed, the "relevant considerations" in
reckoning the commencement of Sen. Poe's residence are the
overwhelming and unrefuted evidence discussed in pars. 218 to
219 above, which collectively show that Sen. Poe had
reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines starting
on 24 May 2005.
C.3. In ruling that a person's

domicile of choice may
commence only upon
repatriation and/or the
possession of a permanent
458 G.R. No. 189078, 11 February 2010
189
resident visa, the COMELEC

applied a "very legalistic,
academic and technical
approach to the residence
requirement" which "does not
satisfy" and is completely
divorced from the "simple,
practical and common-sense
rationale for the residence
requirement."
254. In Torayno vs. COMELEC, 4 5 9 the Supreme Court

warned against applying a "very legalistic, academic and
technical approach to the residence requirement" which "does
not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for
the residence requirement." As correctly stated on page 37 of the
11 December 2015 Resolution, the rationale for the "residency"
requirement is "to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar
with the needs, difficulties and aspirations, potentials for growth
and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies."
255. The COMELEC's ruling that Sen. Poe's residence
should be reckoned, at the earliest, from the moment she
secures a permanent resident visa and/ or reacquires her
natural-born Philippine citizenship is also a "very legalistic,
academic and technical approach to the residence requirement"
which is totally oblivious to the rationale behind the residence
requirement.
255.1. Familiarity with a locality is a function of

physical presence and time, not alien documentation or
citizenship.
255.2. Thus, one who has spent at least 10 years

in the country, without securing a "permanent resident
visa" or before reacquiring her natural-born citizenship, is
not necessarily less acquainted with the problems that
beset the Filipino people, than one who secured
"permanent resident visa" or reacquired her natural-born
citizenship before the start of her 10-year period of
residence in the country, but leaves the country for long
periods of time.
255.3. Therefore, reckoning a candidate's period of

domicile in the Philippines only from the moment she
459 G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000

190
secures a "permanent resident visa" or reacquires her

natural-born citizenship, "does not satisfy th(e) simple,
practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement."
256. As discussed, Sen. Poe reestablished her domicile in

the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005. Thus, by 9 May 2016,
Sen. Poe would be far from a "stranger or newcomer" to the
country. On the contrary, by 9 May 2016, she would have been
well "acquainted with the needs" of her countrymen and women
for at least 10 years and 11 months.
257. Considering that Sen. Poe's statement in her COC for

President regarding her period of residence in the Philippines
satisfies the "simple, practical and common sense" rationale for
the residence requirement, the same cannot be considered false.
In the absence of a "false" representation in Sen. Poe's COC for
President, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the same.
C.4. The COMELEC ignored

evidence of Sen. Poe's honesty
and good faith when it ruled
that she had concealed her
supposed "ineligibility" for the
Presidency, and that she
supposedly intended to
mislead or deceive the
Philippine electorate, when she
stated in her COC for President
that her "PERIOD OF
RESIDENCE UP TO THE DAY
BEFORE MAY 09, 2016" would
be "10" years and "11"
months.

COMELEC held that Sen. Poe supposedly "hid" her ineligibility
and misled the electorate. In the first place, Sen. Poe does not
lack the residence qualification for the Presidency, as discussed
extensively above. Second, she never "hid" from the public the
fact that she mistakenly indicated in her COC for Senator her
period of residence to be "6 years and 6 months", in order to
"mislead" them into thinking that she is compliant with the
residence requirement prescribed in the Constitution. As shown
191
by her evidence submitted to the COMELEC in her Verified

Motion for Reconsideration, Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the
ten-year residence requirement on the basis of her COC for
Senator was already known by the public as early as June 2015,
and she, reacting to this issue the first opportunity that she had,
already publicly acknowledged and went on record that she
committed an honest mistake in accomplishing her COC for the
Senator with respect to her correct period of residence in the
Philippines. Under these circumstances, the intention to deceive
the public (or to conceal anything from them) is clearly negated
by Sen. Poe's public explanations made long before she ever
announced her candidacy for President and filed her now
assailed COC in October 2015.
259. To Sen. Poe's knowledge, the statement in her COC for

Senator that she had been a resident of the Philippines for "6
years and 6 months" "before" May 2013 was first reported in the
media on 2 June 2015, when it was raised by Navotas City
Representative and then United Nationalist Alliance ("UNA")
Secretary General Tobias "Toby'' M. Tiangco during a press
conference held at the House of Representatives. 460 During this
press conference, Representative Tiangco, using the same theory
propounded by those seeking to obstruct Sen. Poe's run for the
Presidency, raised doubts regarding her compliance with the
residence requirement for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency
(i.e., that following her COC for Senator, Sen. Poe will be a
resident of the Philippines for only 9 years and 6 months by May
2016). 4 6 1 The press conference called by Rep. Tiangco was held
late in the afternoon. Sen. Poe could simply have kept her
silence and said nothing in response to Rep. Tiangco's
allegations. Instead, the very next day, she chose to publicly
admit the truth-that she had committed an honest mistake in
her COC for Senator, 4 62 explaining that her period of residence
460 A video clip of this press conference was uploaded on video-sharing site Youtube by
SunStar Philippines on 2 June 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OrlG5ns2yE.
A compact disk containing a copy of this video clip is attached as Annex "2" of Sen. Poe's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "U" hereof), and re-attached as Annex "W"
hereof.
461 Several media outfits, reporting on the press conference held by Rep. Tiangco, ran
front-page stories regarding Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residency
requirement on the basis of her COC for Senator. A sampling of these articles which
indubitably show that the public was aware of this issue as early as June 2, 2015, are
attached as Annex "3-series" of Annex "U".
462 Again, Sen. Poe's statements during this ambush interview, i.e., that she mistakenly
reckoned her period of residency in her 2013 COC only from April 2006 (when she and her
husband sold their house in the U.S.A.) despite living in the country with her children
since early 2005.. were reported by several media outfits via print and broadcast media.
Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residency requirement, and Sen. Poe's
assertion that she was able to comply with the same-were on the news for several days. A
sampling of these news reports are attached as Annex "4-series" of Annex "U" hereof. A
compact disc containing video clips of news reports broadcasted during this relevant
192
indicated therein was only "6 years, 6 months" because at the

time she executed said document, she "thought to err on the
side of prudence" by counting her residence in the Philippines
only from April 2006, when she and her husband sold their
family home in the U.S.A., until October 2012, when she filed
her COC for Senator.
259. 1. The pieces of evidence that Sen. Poe

mentioned during her June 2015 interview-Le., her actual
physical presence in the Philippines since May 2005; her
children's attendance in Philippine schools since June
2005; her family's purchase of a condominium unit for use
as a temporary residence while they are looking for a new
family home-were all presented in evidence by Sen. Poe in
the proceedings a quo.
259.2. This issue (i.e., her correct period of

residence in the Philippines) was hurled at Sen. Poe at least
four (4) months before she filed her now assailed COC for
President. Sen. Poe, while not being a candidate then, was
already made to answer-and indeed answered-this
"issue" and explained to the public the circumstances
behind the mistaken entry in her COC for Senator.
260. Consistent with her public admission that she

committed an honest mistake in accomplishing her COC for
Senator, Sen. Poe, as early as September 1, 2015, in her Verified
Answer filed before the SET in SET Case No. 001-15 (a petition
for quo warranto filed by Rizalito David), already made it of
record that as of 13 May 2013, she had been residing in the
Philippines "for more than six (6) years and six (6) months"
already, thus:
2.6.1. The truth is that, as of 13 May 2013, [Sen. Poe] had

been residing in the Philippines for more than six (6) years and six
(6) months. [Her] statement in her COC that she had been
residing in the Philippines "for a period of six (6) years and six (6)
months before the May 13, 2013 elections'' was therefore
technically wrong. However, this mistake was an excusable error
arising from complex legal principles that a layman is not
expected to fully know, much less understand. It was an honest
mistake made in good faith. In fact, [Sen. Poe] was not assisted
by counsel when she accomplished her COC.
period was also attached as Annex "5" of Annex "U" hereof, and re-attached hereto as
Annex "X".
193
2.6.2. Petitioner's good faith is made more manifest by the

fact that she had nothing to gain by indicating a period shorter
than her actual residency in the Philippines. On the contrary, it
would have been to her advantage to indicate a longer period.
The fact that she did not so indicate, clearly shows that she
honestly misunderstood what was being asked of her in her COC,
and that she did not intend to mislead or deceive anyone.
2.6.3. This is not the first time a candidate committed an

honest mistake in stating her period of residency in her COC. The
Supreme Court was faced with precisely this problem in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC. However, instead of making
the candidate pay for her mistake by disqualifying her, the
Supreme Court stressed that the "residency requirement" is
ultimately a question of fact. The statement in the COC is not
"decisive." (underscoring in the original)
260.1. The SET Answer was the first opportunity

that Sen. Poe had to go on record in any formal proceeding
to explain the erroneous entry in her COC for Senator.
Prior to this, her residence in the Philippines was never
assailed in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
proceeding.
260.2. Sen. Poe also could not have withdrawn her

COC for Senator nor corrected the same earlier, as she
learned of her honest mistake in her COC for Senator only
early this year (2015), or around 2 years after she had
already been elected and proclaimed Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines in May 2013. Her first chance
to correct her mistake in the records of the COMELEC was
when she filed her COC for President on 15 October 2015.
260.3. Sen. Poe's Verified Answer in SET Case No.

001-15 is a later document made under oath. It is a public
record, made widely accessible when it was uploaded in full
in the online news website Rappler. 4 63 Thus, apart from the
news reports in June 2015,464 her explanation, this time
under oath, regarding her "honest mistake" in her 2013
COC was already communicated to the public 4 6s as early as
463 See "FULL TEXT: Grace Poe's response to disqualification case before the SETn,
published on September 1, 2015, available at
http://www.rappler.com/nation/ politics/ elections/2016 / 104418-full-text-grace-poe-
response-disqualification-case. (date of last access: December 2, 2015) A computer print-
out of this news article is attached as Annex "8" of Annex "U" hereof.
46 4 See Annex "4-seriesn of Annex "Un.
465 See Annexes "3-series", "4-series", and "Sn of Annex "U". See also news article written
by Camille Elemia for online news site Rappler, published on September 4, 2015, reporting
on the "honest mistake" committed by Sen. Poe in her 2013 COC, available at
http: //www.rappler.com/nation/politics/ elections/2016/ 104 731-grace-poe-citizenship-
194
September 2015, or before Sen. Poe filed her COC now in

question.
261. The foregoing clearly shows that, in indicating her

period of residence in the Philippines in Item No. 7 of her COC
for President to be "10 years, 11 months", she could not have
intended to mislead or misinform the public as to the actual
period of her residence in the Philippines. To the contrary, Sen.
Poe indicated such period in order to correct a previous error
committed in her COC for Senator, which error she already
publicly recognized long before filing her now assailed COC for
President.
262. Sen. Poe's June 2015 interview and September 2015

Verified Answer in SET Case No. 001-15 are consistent with
other statements she made in other documents and news
reports about her return to the Philippines. Sen. Poe could not
have been lying when she claimed that she was physically
present in the Philippines since early 2005. Her evidence on
record backs her story. It is also consistent with news reports-
all published long before the onset of this controversy-that she
had returned to the Philippines in 2005. 466 As importantly,
Private Respondents were not able to produce any evidence at all
that would contradict Sen. Poe's explanations as to her actual
period of residence in the Philippines.
263. Also, Sen. Poe's return to the country since December

2004 or in early 2005 was even reported in several news articles
all published long before the onset of the present controversy.467
Under the circumstances, it simply cannot be said that, in
indicating her answer to Item No. 7 of her COC to be "10 years
11 months", Sen. Poe deliberately intended to create the
impression on the part of the unsuspecting electorate that she is
compliant with the residence requirement by hiding her
supposed illegibility.
264. Since a Petition to Deny Course to or Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is
concerned not with the qualification of a candidate per se, but
residency-timeline-arguments. A computer print-out of this news article is attached as

Annex "9" of Annex "U" hereof.
466 Sen. Poe's claim that she returned to the Philippines in early 2005, shortly after her
father's death in December 2004, is consistent with reported circumstances of her
permanent return to the Philippines published long before the onset of any controversy
regarding her residence in the Philippines. Computer print-outs of these news articles
stating that Sen. Poe was known to have returned to the Philippines in 2005, and not in
July 2006 as the Petitioner posits, or in November 2006 as the Second Division
erroneously concluded, are attached as Annex "IO-series" of Annex "U" hereof.
467 Annex "10-series" of Annex "U" hereof.
195
whether a candidate committed any deliberate misrepresentation 4 I
in relation to those qualifications, 46s the Petitioner in such action

is duty-bound to establish bad faith on the part of the candidate
as an indispensable element. Good faith is an available defense;
thus, an allegedly ineligible candidate (and Sen. Poe is not
ineligible) who made an erroneous declaration in an honest belief
that he possesses such qualification cannot come under the
provision.
264.1. In the first place, the issue on Sen. Poe's

residence, is at least debatable, as even the COMELEC
cannot seem to determine exactly when Sen. Poe's
residence in the Philippines should be reckoned-i.e.,
whether it should be 24 May 2005 (as Sen. Poe has
shown), March-April 2006 (which Sen. Poe explained is the
basis of her erroneous declaration in her 2013 COC), 7 July
2006 (as Contreras and Valdez claim}, August 2006 (the
date Sen. Poe was registered as a voter, which the
COMELEC found to be the earliest she established domicile
in the Philippines after her repatriation on 7 July 2006),
November 2006 (as the COMELEC infers), or 20 October
2010 (as Tatad and Valdez claims).
264.2. Sen. Poe cited in support of her position the

ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Romualdez-
Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, i.e., that the statement
of a candidate in her COC regarding the period of her
residence is not "decisive" and cannot estop the candidate
from proving her actual period of residence as a "question
of fact"; Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 4 69 that a
candidate may reestablish her residence before reacquiring
her citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225; and even
Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections,410 where it was ruled
that a foreigner can reestablish residence in the Philippines
"as a visitor" allowed by immigration laws to stay as such.
Sen. Poe also cited the ruling in Cordora vs. Commission on
Elections4 71 and Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections412 that
residence is "separate", "distinct" and not dependent upon
citizenship; and the ruling in Japzon vs. Commission on
Elections, 473 reiterated in Caballero vs. Commission on
46 8 See Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008.
469 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012
410 G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002
4 11 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009
412 G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
473 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
196
Elections, 4 74that R.A. 9225 treats citizenship

independently of residence.
264.3. In other words, there were ample legal

bases for Sen. Poe to state in her COC for President a
period of residence that was reckoned from a date prior to
April 2006 (November 2006 as COMELEC erroneously
concludes), and prior to her reacquisition of citizenship
under R.A. 9225. That the COMELEC does not agree with
Sen. Poe's position based on these legal authorities only
highlights that the reckoning of her period of residence is ~
matter of legal dispute; and given that this Honorable Court
has not itself definitively ruled on it, that legal dispute (on a
difficult legal issue) is itself a basis for good faith negating
any supposed intention to deceive on the part of Sen. Poe.
265. Sen. Poe's good faith in indicating her period of

residence to be "10 years, 11 months" is bolstered by the opinion
of respected legal figures, such as Former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban (who in one column expressed his opinion that Sen.
Poe complied with the constitutional residence requirement for
President), election law expert Atty. Romulo Macalintal, Atty.
Oscar Franklin Tan, and even Senate President Franklin Drilon,
among others, who, citing settled jurisprudence on residence,
are also of the opinion that a statement in a COC is not binding
and would not prevent Sen. Poe from proving her compliance
with the ten-year residence requirement. At the very least, these
published opinions are evidence of Sen. Poe's good faith in
reckoning her period of residence from May 2005, which is when
she returned to the Philippines with a definite intention to reside
here permanently. Surely, if these legal personalities say that
Sen. Poe is not bound by an honest mistake in her COC for
Senator, and can prove through evidence a longer period of
residence in the Philippines, Sen. Poe's assertion in her COC for
President that by May 9, 2016, she will be a resident of the
Philippines for "1 O" years and "11" months," especially in light of
uncontroverted evidence she presented, cannot be said to be
baseless, much less intentionally deceptive.
474 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015

197
D. THE COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT

JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED
THE PETITIONS A QUO, DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF ANY FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN
SEN. POE'S COC FOR PRESIDENT.
D.1. In the absence of a false

material representation in Sen.
Poe's COC for President, the
petitions a quo should have
been dismissed outright for
being a premature petition for
quo warranto which is within
the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the PET.
266. As discussed, the COMELEC lacked legal basis to

"deny due course to or cancel" Sen. Poe's COC for President. Yet,
it cancelled Sen. Poe's COC just the same, thereby sanctioning a
premature attack on her citizenship and residence qualifications
for the Presidency. By cancelling Sen. Poe's COC for President
(despite that absence of any "false material representation"
therein), and before the conduct of the May 9, 2016 elections,
the COMELEC effectively passed upon her eligibility for the
Presidency. This act constitutes grave abuse of discretion
because there is no proceeding to specifically declare the
"ineligibility" of a candidate before the election. Fermin vs.
COMELEC4 75is instructive in this regard.
266.1. In Fermin, the petitioner seeking the

disqualification of the candidate cited an earlier version of
Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules which stated
that "(a)ny candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law x x x may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate." The petitioner in Fermin
also quoted COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 which stated
that a candidate could be "disqualified" under Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules, among other grounds, "(f)or not being
a citizen of the Philippines" or "(f)or lack of residence."
266.2. This Honorable Court ruled that the

petitioner could not rely on (the earlier version of) Section 1
475 G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008

198
of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules and on COMELEC

Resolution No. 7800, because "they cannot supersede the
dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition
for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under
Section 78 of the OEC." The High Court cited the separate
opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez which
noted that the COMELEC could not, through the simple
passage of a rule of procedure, create a cause of action or
remedy to declare the "ineligibility" of a "candidate" which
does not exist in law, to wit:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding

for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule
25, §I the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who

does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of

candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule.. making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. 476 It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence
and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of

grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration
of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already
stated, are based on grounds specified in §12 and §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as
a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to
476 Bold-face font in the original

199
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or

during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office. 477
267. In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "the

purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office." A petition which seeks to
declare "ineligibility" or "lack of qualifications" should therefore
be filed against an "incumbent," by way of a petition for gyg_
warranto. In the case of the President, such a quo warranto
proceeding must be filed with the PET "within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner," pursuant to Rule 16 of A.M. No. 10-
4-29-SC, otherwise known as "The 2010 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," which states:
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A verified for quo

warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice -
President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines may filed by any registered voter who
has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner.478
268. In the absence of a "false material representation" in

her COC for President, the petitions a quo were reduced to
nothing but assaults on Sen. Poe's eligibility for the Presidency.
The petitions a quo were in essence petitions for quo warranto.
Since the petitions a quo are fundamentally for quo warranto,
they are obviously premature, because no elections have been
held yet and Sen. Poe has not been elected or "proclaimed"
"winner." Moreover, in the event that Sen. Poe is elected and
proclaimed President, Private Respondents would have to file
petitions with the PET (which is the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the "qualifications of the President"). 47 9
269. All told, in ruling on the petitions a quo, despite the

absence of any "false material representation" in Sen. Poe's COC
for President, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
477 Bold-face font in the original

479 Rule 13, A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC; Section 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
200
D.2. In the absence of a false

material representation in Sen.
Poe's COC for President, the
cancellation thereof effectively
deprives the Filipino people of
their sovereign prerogative to
decide a purely political
question, that is-who will be
the 16th President of the
Republic of the Philippines?
------------------------------------------
270. A political question is defined as a question "which
under the Constitution (is) to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity." 4 80 The choice of elective public officials is
granted exclusively to the Filipino people through the right of
suffrage. 4 81 Under the Constitution, the President of the
Republic of the Philippines "shall be elected by a direct vote of
the People." 4 82 Therefore, the issue of who should (as opposed to
who may) be elected President is a political question which is
clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
271. As discussed, the petitions a quo lack causes of action

under Section 78 of the OEC. They were likewise premature
petitions for quo warranto which can be filed only with the PET,
and only if Sen. Poe is proclaimed President. Moreover, the DOJ,
and not the COMELEC, had primary jurisdiction to rule on the
legality of Sen. Poe's reacquisition of natural-born Philippine
citizenship. Nevertheless, by cancelling Sen. Poe's COC for
President, the COMELEC effectively declared that Sen. Poe
should not even be given a chance to secure the mandate of the
Filipino people.
272. If the assailed Resolutions are not annulled or set

aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the COMELEC
will be allowed to deprive the Filipino people of their sovereign
right to decide the most critical question in a democracy-ls Sen.
Poe the popular choice of the Philippine electorate? Should she
serve as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines?
This is obviously not a justiciable question, but a purely political
one, which is solely within the province of the Filipino people to
decide (and not the COMELEC). In the words of former Chief
Justice Reynato Puno in Tecson:483
4 soJavellana vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. L-36142, etc., 31 March 1973
481 Article V, 1987 Constiution
482 Section 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
483 G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004
201
Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for

President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no
less dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the
citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made
more difficult by the interplay of national and international law.
Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this
Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who
will be the next President. For on political questions, this
Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the
Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court
the right to elect in behalf of the people. 484
VII.
EXTREMELY URGENT APPLICATION FOR AN
EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER,
AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUCTION
273. Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and the whole

or part of such relief is to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing
and implementing its assailed Resolutions. The gross and patent
errors, constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, if not outright absence of jurisdiction, are
obvious.
274. There is extreme urgency for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order, status quo ante order, or writ of
preliminary injunction in this case. In fact, not granting
immediate injunctive relief will render this Petition moot and
academic, and unjustly deprive over fifty (50) million Filipino
voters a valid choice for the highest office of the land. This
violates not only Petitioner's right to run for public office, but
constitutes perhaps the gravest wrong to the sovereign people-a
violation of their basic and illimitable power as sovereign.
275. Under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a

decision of the COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. "4 ss This is the same period given by
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
However, the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure (as amended
484 Underscoring and emphasis supplied

485 See also Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code: "Decision in the Commission. -
The Commission shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from
the date of their submission for decision. The decision of the Commission shall become
final thirty days after receipt of judgment."
202
by its Resolution No. 8523), particularly Section 8, Rule 23,

states in pertinent part that:
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in

case of a Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed
within the reglementary period, or in cases of rulings of the
Commission en bane, no restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court within five days from the receipt of the decision or
resolution.
276. While it is obvious that the COMELEC should not be

allowed to adopt a rule inconsistent with the Constitution or the
law, 4 86 the fact remains that the COMELEC may under its own
Rules declare the assailed Resolution final and executory. The
effect of such precipitate circumstance will be catastrophic.
277. The 2016 elections will be automated and governed by

Rep. Act No. 8436, as amended. The ballots to be used thereat
are required by law to carry the names of all official candidates.
Section 15 thereof states that the ballots must contain the
positions to be filled and that "(U)nder each position to be filled,
the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by
surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The
maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as
preferred by the female candidate. xx x"
278. In other words, because the name of candidate must

be on the ballot, the voter cannot vote for any person not on the
ballot. Conversely, a candidate whose name is not on the ballot
because his candidacy is initially invalidated, though
subsequently declared legal by the Supreme Court, cannot hope
to garner as single vote because his or her name is not printed
on the ballot, as what happened in Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC4B7.
279. The printing of the ballot is imminent and will

commence soon. In a document apparently coming from the
COMELEC entitled "2016 National and Local Elections
Automation Project OVM-VCM Terms of Reference" dated 14
486 See for example, Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
782: "A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments
that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the
appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing
of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due
course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC."
487 G.R. No. 190529, 22 March 2011, 646 SCRA 63
203
October 2014 4 88, particularly the "2016 National and Local

Elections Implementation Calendar" 4 89 attached thereto, printing
of ballots will start on "Mon 1 / 10 / 16" and will finish on "Mon
4/25/ 16". However, in some news media reports, the COMELEC
has been quoted as saying it will commence on 15 January
2015 4 90. And in some news reports, no definite day is given, only
that it will be in January 2016. 4 91 The COMELEC's Chairman
has been quoted confirming that printing of ballots will be
sometime in January 2016. 492 Regardless of when the actual
date is, printing of ballots will start very soon making the need
for a temporary restraining order urgent.
280. Injunctive relief may be granted if a party, court,

agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably
in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. That is the case here. Unless a TRO or status quo
ante order is issued and petitioner's name allowed to remain on
the ballot, a final judgment in her favor will be empty and
ineffectual because her name will not be on the ballot and the
electorate will not be allowed to vote for her. On the other hand,
if this petition is ultimately denied after her name is allowed to
remain on the ballots, then any votes cast for her will, by
express command of Section 9, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules
as amended, simply be treated as stray votes and not counted.
281. At this time, it should be pointed out that Petitioner

has been consistently ranked among the top, if not the top,
488 Available at
http: I lwww.comelec.gov .ph I uploadslAboutCOMELEC I BidsandAwards I ProcurementProje
ctslBAC012014AESOMRIBAC012014AESOMRITB TermsOfReference.pdf
489 The entire document is 67 pages. Only the first page, and pp. 61 to 67 where the
Implementation Calendar is found, are attached hereto as Annex "Y".

4 90 See "Two crucial dates for the candidates in the coming elections", available at
http:Ilwww.tempo.com.phl2015112109 ltwo-crucial-dates-for-the-candidates-in-the-
coming-electionsl ("The second important Comelec date is January 15, 2016. The Comelec
will start printing the official ballots on this date.); also "Cha-cha referendum proposed:'
found at http: //www.mb.com.phlcha-cha-referendum-proposedl ("The Comelec has
disclosed that it will start printing the ballots on January 15, 2016.")
491 See "Comelec concludes substitution of candidates for 2016 polls", available at
http: 11 cnnphilippines.com I news 12015112110 I Comelec-concludes-deadline-su bstitu tion-

candidates-2016-elections.html ("According to the Comelec, setting a deadline for
substitution is imperative for ballot printing which will commence on January next year.
There are 1,953 versions of the ballot specific to each legislative district in the country.").
See also "Poe on disqualification case: Roxas, Binay behind Comelec ruling", available at
http: 11cebudailynews.inquirer.net/76687 I poe-on-disqualification-case-roxas-binay-
behind-comelec-ruling ("Comelec is set to finalize the list of candidates by Dec. 15 and is
expected to begin printing ballots in January.")
492 See "Comelec en bane tackles Grace, Diogong cases today", available at
http: I lwww.mb.com.phlcomelec-en-banc-tackles-grace-digong-cases-todayl ("We are also
studying that. Remember, the printing of the ballots will happen sometime in January,"
said Bautista.)
204
choice for President in pre-election in surveys. Her leads over the

perceived second and third placers in several surveys were
substantial. Even with the recent entry of a new candidate
(Mayor Rodrigo Duterte), Petitioner remains a major contender.
Petitioner's candidacy thus should not be precipitately mooted
and the millions of Filipino voters disenfranchised by a non-
issuance of a TRO or status quo ante order.
282. It must also be pointed out that the Public

Respondent Commission, in an aggravated display of its
capriciousness which characterized its entire handling of the
cases against Petitioner, issued the assailed 23 December 2015
Resolution two (2) days before Christmas, at a time when it was
already widely announced that courts-including this Honorable
Court-would be closed and would not be able to grant
immediate relief. Under its own Rules (the validity of which
Petitioner does not concede), the Commission knows that
Petitioner would only have five days, or until 28 December 2015,
within which to secure an injunctive relief, otherwise it may
consider its own Resolution final and strike out Petitioner's name
in the list of candidates. If it was minded at all to act with
fairness towards Petitioner and respect towards this Honorable
Court, nothing prevented the respondent Commission from
releasing such Resolution on the following working day
(December 28), knowing full well that Petitioner would not be
able to secure any kind of relief during four (4) out of five (5)
limited days it prescribes under its Rules. Indeed, Petitioner
could think of no reason behind the COMELEC En Bane's
decision to issue its assailed Resolution on December 23, but to
ensure that Petitioner's time would run out before she could
obtain from this Honorable Court an injunctive remedy. It need
not be belabored that even the respondent Commission would be
closed, and the all-important task of ballot-printing would not be
accomplished anyway, from December 23 to December 27.
283. Petitioner is willing to post a bond in such amount as

this Honorable Court may fix, conditioned upon payment to
Private Respondents of all damages she may suffer, if it is finally
adjudged that petitioner was not entitled to injunctive relief in
the first place.
205
RELIEFS
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Immediately upon filing hereof, and before this

Petition can be heard on notice, a temporary restraining
order/ status quo ante order (followed by a writ of preliminary
injunction, if required by the Honorable Court) issue:
(a) restraining the Public Respondent COMELEC from:
(i) in any manner treating as final and/ or

executory, its Resolution dated 11 December
2015, rendered through its First Division, and
its Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission En Banc, in the consolidated cases
of SPA No. 15-002 (DC), entitled Francisco S.
Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No.
15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and
(ii) excluding the Petitioner from the list of official

candidates for President in the 9 May 2016
national elections and from the official ballots to
be printed and used in the same elections;
(b) Alternatively, directing the COMELEC to include

Petitioner in the official list of candidates and the
official ballots for the 2016 national and local
elections if the COMELEC has already ordered her
exclusion therefrom; and
2. Judgment be ultimately rendered granting the instant

Petition, and nullifying the aforementioned 11 December 2015
and 23 December 2015 Resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No.
15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC).
Other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances

are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for City of Manila, 24 December 2015.

206
POBLADOR BAUTISTA & REYES

Counsel for Petitioner
Senator Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares
5th Floor, SEDCCO I Building
120 Rada corner Legaspi Streets
Legaspi Village, Makati City
Tel No. 893-7623/Fax No. 893-7622
E-Mail: central@pbrlaw.com.ph
A~·-'·
By:
/.ffe.-
ALEXANBtR J. POBLADOR
PTR No. 4777501/Jan. 27, 2015/Makati City
Lifetime IBP No. 00066/Makati City
OR No. 345214/March 1, 1993
Roll of Attorneys No. 29440
MCLE Compliance No. V-0009389 /__ J 2,2015
A. TAMAYO
~/Jan. 17,
2015/Makati City
'fetime IBP No. 01293/Quezon City
R No. 449518/December 29, 1997
MCLE CompliancyN\:r.\IV-0015221/April 2, 2013
V.L ....oa.~T,BPHER-e. MENDOZA
RN . 7 18/Jan. 27, 2015/Makati City

IBP o. 979194/Jan. 08, 2015/Makati City
E Compliance No. IV-0017855/ April 22, 2013
ET . ........ .ell.......
R No. 4896418/May 2015/ ati City

IBP No. 1007077 /April 14, Zambales
Roll of Attorneys No. 64 795
Newly Admitted, M.C.L.E. Governing Board Order
I.S. 2008, July 4, 2008
... Verification and Certification follows

VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I, MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE

LLAMANZARES, of legal age, Filipino, and with address care
of Poblador Bautista & Reyes Law Offices, 5th Floor, SEDCCO I
Building, 120 Rada corner Legaspi Streets, Legaspi Village,
Makati City, under oath, hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled case.
2. I caused the preparation of, and have read, the

foregoing Petition for Certiorari, and confirm that the factual
allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and/ or based on authentic records.
3. I hereby certify that, except for the Petition entitled

"Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, petitioner, vs.
Commission on Elections and Estrella C. Elamparo,
respondents," which is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which I also intend
to file with this Honorable Court, I have not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in
the above-captioned case, in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or any other court, tribunal or agency. Should it
come to my knowledge that another similar action or
proceeding initiated by or against me has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any
other court, tribunal or agency, I here by undertake to report
said fact to this Honorable Court within five (5) days from
knowledge thereof.
4. On 17 August 2015, Mr. Rizalito Y. David filed with

the Commission on Elections Law Department an Affidavit-
Complaint accusing me of having committed an election
offense under Section 262, in relation to Section 7 4 of the
Omnibus Election Code. On 8 December 2015, Mr. David also
filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 221538 and entitled "Rizalito Y. David,
petitioner, vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Mary Grace Poe
Llamnazares, respondents." The criminal complaint pending
before the COMELEC Law Department, and G.R. No. 221538
before this Honorable Court, also involve the issue of my
natural-born Filipino citizenship.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 24th day of December 2015 at Quezon City, Philippines.
MA C~~ONORA Affiant
POE LLAMANZARES
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of

December 2015 at Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to me her
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861, valid until 17 March 2019,
as competent evidence of her identity.
Doc. No. 0.(3 ;
Page No. ~ ;
Book No. I ;
Series of 2015. CO~MANO
M No. ~g,,qg ;8)2jis-
lbf No . C[Y//-(;~ ~ 1 U/ /~
~ ll Nf) . 4036=1
l"\Uf ~ ~ .'}[
- DOil ~gg / 1(-u,f0
11 ~ Nb . 141- 2q4_g42, {)!;~
,,
209
COPY FURNISHED:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Public Respondent
Palacio Del Go bernador
Gen. Luna St., lntramuros
Manila
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street
ATTY. MANUELITO R. LUNA

Counsel for Private Respondent Francisco Tatad
Room 412, FEMI Building, Annex
A. Soriano, Jr. Avenue, lntramuros, Manila
MR. ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS

Private Respondent
Unit F. Shorea Homes, Jose Street
Lopez Village, San Antonio
Los Banos, Laguna
ATTY. AMADO D. VALDEZ

Private Respondent
Valdez Law Offices
Counsel for Private Respondent Amado D. Valdez
6A Vernida-1, 120 Amorsolo Street
EXPLANATION
Copies of the fore going Petition for Certiorari were by

registered mail instead of the preferred mode of personal service
due to distance, time and manpower constraints. Pursuant to
Section 6 of A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC (Efficient Use of Paper Rule),
copies of the Annexes to this Petition, except Annexes "V" and
"W", were no longer served on the respondents, all of these being
part of the records of the case that are already in their
possession. A copy of the Petition with a full set of Annexes was
additionally served to the Office of the Solicitor General.

700 Petition Bautista Reyes

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,, __ ' ,,.,_ '...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD

-versus- · . No. ""' "" . n '"' o UV

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Extremely Urgent Application

Petitioner Senator MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-

This is a matter of extreme urgency. Through arbitrary,

Sen. Poe, a candidate for the Presidency in the 9 May 2016

just days later, or on 23 December 2015), Sen. Poe's Certificate

Applying Section 8 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of

V. Guanzon pointed out to the media last 22 December 2015, in

Once we are finished promulgating the decision, the rules

To Sen. Poe's knowledge, none of the other members of the

Sen. Poe received the COMELEC En Bane's 23 Decem~r~··~:

Banc decided to release its Resolution on 23 December 2015, it

Suffice it to state that it is not easy to secure injunctive

To make matters worse, the COMELEC En Banc actually

Under these circumstances, Sen. Poe humbly prays for the

Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that

application of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence, will be

Sen. Poe will demonstrate briefly below how the COMELEC

The COMELEC categorically held that Private Respondent

If the Tatad Petition is taken out of the picture, this

Assuming arguendo that there is reason to disregard the

conventional international law and "generally accepted

The COMELEC, applying the the Latin maxim "expresio

The COMELEC ruled that since Sen. Poe is a foundling

It is settled that the burden in an action under Section 78

;;i.C,complished his or her COC. Just as a person enjoy~,~.a ~~t

therefore stands to lose if neither party presents evidence, ~s)i;

The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, ins

. f'§ec. 3 (~), Rule 131, Rules of Court

representation, with the intent to deceive (which are mandatory

Sen. Poe is an incumbent Senator who enjoys a mandate

Sen. Poe submits that the issue of whether a foundling is a

The COMELEC also ruled that Sen. Poe could not be

abuse of discretion because it was rendered in defiance of

Assuming arguendo that Sen. Poe's representation about

On the issue of Sen. Poe's residence in the Philippines, all

However, the same three Private Respondents could not_

three options: (a) 20 October 2010, or the date of Sen. Poe's

In the midst of these multiple, varied and highly technical

As discussed extensively in this Petition and in the

1; ·For this and other reasons, this Petition must be gra!l.fe<i;~::

· ~~be.;.·~ssailed Resolutions of the COMELEC reversed anq~~:~~!f

1. Petitioner ("Petitioner" or "Sen. Poe") is a Filipino, of

2. Public Respondent Commission on Elections

3. Private Respondent Francisco S. Tatad ("Private

3.1 Private Respondent Antonio P. Contreras

3.2 Private Respondent Amado D. Valdez ("Private

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

4. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in

dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, in the

4'\ 1. Certified true copies of the 11 December 2015

5. On 11 December 2015, Petitioner, through her

s As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523

7. On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed her Certificate of

8. Under date of 19 Octa ber 2015, herein Private

PhilippJne law, made a sworn renunciation of her U :s.~:;A.*

cannot be treated as a petition to deny due course to or to cancel

10. Under date of 17 October 2015, herein Private

11. Summons in SPA No. 15-002 (DC) was served on

· ~~be.;.·~ssailed Resolutions of the COMELEC reversed anq:!f

Philippines together with her daughter, Hanna. 47 Petitioner~~