simon vs chr

FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion
to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this
case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner
also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs.
Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section
18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms
of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess.
The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or
by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No.
90-1580.

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari
stores and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the
same in all parts of the world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political
rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social
services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only
be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.

CARIÑO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an
order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at
the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to
sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service
of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the
Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
“striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply
to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human
rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

"Investigate," commonly understood means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, and obtain
information. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation.
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
of the CSC.

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights

Facts:

Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA
Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 th PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants. The same
parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought by
Fil oil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing
the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist from doing
work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion was dismissed. EPZA filed
the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and
injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR
abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and
desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation
(Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue:

WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to
compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.

Ruling:

In Carino vs CHR, it was held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to
the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision
directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law
and never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution
refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper
courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue
the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary
remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party
thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is granted.
Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013,
Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to
3pm. However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to
wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for
being late. In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer
(TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the
OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said
infraction. Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO,
Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his
appeal. In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his
English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers
concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused
to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was
dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and
were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated
by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students
with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all
that instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO. Later, the
TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written
appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.

The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA. Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine
(9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses
presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted
Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of
chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the
minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed
the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center. Cudia appealed to the
HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the
PMA. Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It
was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was
referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB). Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education,
and privacy of communication. Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But
on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia. PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that
the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

HELD:

I. Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his
supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed
against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further,
such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed

The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual
controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that
judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and
political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests
are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be
deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus,
when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired
upon by the courts.

(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a
cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)

II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution.
Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He
was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written
report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the
formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance
to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC
voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive
of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies. Academic freedom of the
PMA Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor
Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. Such argument is not
valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets.
Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may
be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets. Further, as stated
earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution. The essential freedoms of
academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;

a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;

c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;

d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then
it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code. But
Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?

The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a
gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA,
he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have
known all of these.
Quisumbing vs. rosales

DECISION

Before this Court is the petition for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Commissioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing (petitioner) to annul and set aside the Show Cause
Order dated September 18, 2013 issued by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), through its
Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Chairperson Rosales).

In their affidavits, Eugenio, Buizon, Fernandez and Ayuste accused the petitioner of: (1) seriously
maltreating and inflicting upon them mental abuse through her unreasonable behavior and demands on how
they should work in or out of the office; (2) taking a cut from some of her employees’ salaries to form an
office fund under her sole control; (3) repeatedly misplacing and taking no action on official documents
requiring her action; (4) forging another commissioner’s signature; (5) hiring employees who do not come
to work; and (6) contracting consultancy work for another government agency.

On the bases of these affidavits, the CHR issued on the same day Resolution CHR (IV) No. A2013-148 ( CHR
Resolution), through Chairperson Rosales, a Show Cause Order (dated September 18, 2013), requesting the
petitioner to submit within five (5) days from receipt, a written explanation as to why she should not be held
liable for any administrative disciplinary actions, and to transmit the written explanation together with her
supporting documents to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Show Cause Order specified allegations of the
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of certain acts of malfeasance or misfeasance constituting
misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service, all in violation of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. The Show Cause Order was served at the petitioner’s office on September
19, 2013.

The petitioner further maintains that the Show Cause Order is insufficient to enable her to respond to the
allegations made because it does not specifically state: (1) the “acts of malfeasance or misfeasance by way
of misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service” that she
allegedly committed; and (2) the “civil service laws and rules, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees” that she allegedly violated. Thus, the petitioner claims that
she was denied due process of law.

The petitioner lastly alleged that the respondents gravely abused their discretion when they referred the
affidavits of her former employees to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and the Office of the
Ombudsman. She claims that since the CHR, as a body, was not empowered by law to act on disciplinary
complaints against its own members, the respondents have no authority to issue the Show Cause Order.

The Office of the Solicitor General’s Comment

The OSG also asserts that the petitioner failed to show that the respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Show Cause Order. The OSG emphasizes that aside from petitioner’s bare
allegations of malice and bad faith, she did not offer any convincing evidence proving that the respondents
exercised their power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility.

The OSG lastly submits that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to her
before instituting the present petition. Since the petitioner had an ample administrative remedy under the
law to protect her right, it was premature for her to commence the present petition before the Court.
 The Issue

The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writs
ofcertiorari and prohibition.

We dismiss the petition.

We stress, at the outset, that the subsequent referral of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate prosecutorial action rendered the issues raised in the present petition moot and academic
insofar as the CHR is concerned.

Records disclose that the CHR, through Chairperson Rosales and Commissioners Dela Cruz and Mamauag,
issued an Order stating that it could no longer act on the petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss since the case had
been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, no practical relief can be granted to the petitioner
by resolving the present petition since the proceedings before the CHR – the initiation of an investigation
through the issuance of the assailed Show Cause Order – had been terminated.

The petition likewise fails for plain lack of merit. The OSG correctly argued that the respondents, in their
official capacities as Chairperson and Members of the CHR, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but simply undertook
to initiate the investigation of the allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry was not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties were heard and penalties were imposed. It was at most,
an exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of
4
adjudication. The power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman
is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less
5
than the Constitution. Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in its actions.

The petition also fails with respect to the petitioner’s claim of denial of due process. There can be no denial
6
of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his case. In the present case, the
petitioner was given ample opportunity to air her side on the allegations against her after being sufficiently
apprised of the allegations against her; she was afforded the chance to submit her written explanation.
Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to avail of that right, and chose to directly seek the intervention of this
Court. These circumstances, by themselves, point the prematurity of the petition.

Jurisprudence tells us that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the chance to explain
one’s side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given
the opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is taken, the demands of due process are sufficiently
7
met.

In sum, we find that the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be dismissed for mootness and for lack
of merit.