ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE
Raytheon Int’l vs. Rouze
FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of
America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered
into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate
the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent
secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI
for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.,
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as
BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special
Sales Representative Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of
the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included
a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if
the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case
is filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired
by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil
action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation
will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop,
that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,
may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-
BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered
as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.
Miciano vs. Brimo
FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said
scheme of partition; (2) the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and
the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws
are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated."
ISSUE: (1) WON it was sufficient to no longer present to the court the existence of
Turkish Laws
(2) WON the conditional legacy found in the will is valid and binding
RULING: 1. NO. FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION.—In the absence of
evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. It has not been proved in these
proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so
that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity
to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on
the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator
Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
2. NO. SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO
LAW; NULLITY OF.—If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he
respect the testator's order that his property be distributed in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his
nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil
Code, said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall
be considered unwritten, thus making the institution unconditional.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings
has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the Civil Code provides the following:
"Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide."
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national laws.
Aznar vs. Garcia
FACTS: Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California
where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only
heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should
be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the
deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under
California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: No. Because this will entail an Renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning of “national law” in
Article 16, Civil Code; Conflict of law rules in California to be applied in case
at bar.—The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly
apply to any general American Law, because there is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the
state. It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the
decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California prescribes two
sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a
conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason
demands that the California con-flict of law rules should be applied in this
jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in determining aliens’ domicile in
the Philippines.—An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to
California, resided there for nine years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very
rarely re-turned to California and only for short visits, and who appears to have
never owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be considered to
have his domicile in the Philip-pines.
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of the domicile in
determining matters with foreign element involved.—The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound to ap-ply its own law as
directed in the conflict of law rule of dece-dents state; Application of the
renvoi doctrine.—The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code,
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California, as such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth
between the two states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must
apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed
in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially
because the internal law of California provides no legitime for natural children,
while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recog-nizing them).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine law to be applied in case
at bar.—As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child of the latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law,
pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California.
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in
effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which
applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians
domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the
law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights under
Philippine law only.
Mata vs. Agravante
FACTS: Respondents Eddie E. Santillan, Patricio A. Armodia, Alejandro A.
Almaden and Hermenegildo G. Saldo were former security guards of the Bessang
Pass Security Agency, owned by herein petitioner Clarissa Mata. On October 27,
1993, the respondents, assisted by their counsel, Atty. Alexander Agravante, filed
a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cebu City for
non-payment of salaries/wages and other benefits. On January 6, 1994, petitioner
instituted an action for damages against the respondents averring that respondents
filed unfounded, baseless complaints before the NLRC for alleged violation of the
labor laws and with the PNP for cancellation of its license to operate. She further
alleged that by furnishing the government offices copies of these complaints,
especially the Department of Public Works and Highways which was its biggest
client, the agency’s reputation was besmirched, resulting in the loss of
contracts/projects and income in the amount of at least P5,000,000.00. Petitioner
then declared that respondents deliberate and concerted campaign of hate and
vilification against the Bessang Pass Security Agency violated the provisions of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, prayed that the respondents be
held jointly and severally liable to pay her the sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, attorneys fees in the amount of P200,000.00 and other reliefs. Trial
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the trial courts decision. It dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence,
this petiton.
ISSUE: WON respondents have violated Art. 19, 20, 21 of the NCC as claimed by
petitioner
RULING: NO. Abuse of Rights; It has been held that Article 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is
not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.—It has been held
that Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The
object of this article is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following elements:
(1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure. The common element
under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be intentional, and
attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting
in damages under Articles 20 and 21, or other applicable provision of law, depends
on the circumstances of each case. In the case before us, as correctly pointed out
by the CA, the circumstances do not warrant an award of damages. Thus, the
award of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages is quite preposterous. We agree with
the appellate court that in the action of the respondents, there was no malicious
intent to injure petitioner’s good name and reputation. The respondents merely
wanted to call the attention of responsible government agencies in order to secure
appropriate action upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for
their grievances. So, we reiterate the basic postulate that in the absence of proof
that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents, no damages can
be awarded.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes
FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of
Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in
celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During the party and when
respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and
embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself
a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out
of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and
discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and
exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet
table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the
party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed
and made a big scene.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive
conduct.
The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court,
that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to
injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr.
Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel
Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant
petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be
solidarily liable with her.

RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There
was no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to
expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story was
unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having
abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.