1) DAR VS TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY,

G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014

Facts: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. are the registered
owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental devoted to the cultivation of
sugar cane. A portion of this land was awarded by DAR to beneficiaries of the CARP.
Trinidad opposed this move in the RTC and alleged that:

DAR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
valuation by Land Bank is not just compensation, the register of deeds cannot cancel their
title without a court order, and that Land Bank together with the LRA and Register of deeds
committed grave abuse of discretion when they cooperated to commit the act.

In its answer, DAR asserted that jurisdiction over all matters concerning agrarian reform
exclusively belongs to DAR and that the RTC’s jurisdiction in agrarian reform matters is
limited only to the determination of just compensation and prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA 6657.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

Held: No. Section 54 of RA 6657 leaves no room for doubt that decisions, orders,
awards or rulings of the DAR may be brought to the CA by certiorari and not with the RTC
through an ordinary action for cancellation of title. The findings of fact of the DAR shall be
final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.

It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the
complaint and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by
the Constitution and the law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of
the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their
act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
2) SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFONSO BAUTISTA VS LANDO,
718 SCRA 321

Facts:

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited a free-patent land located

in Davao Oriental covered by OCT. He subdivided the property and sold it to several
vendees, herein respondents. TCTs were issued in favor of the vendees. Years after the sale,
Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC Davao
Oriental. During the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner
Epifania G. Bautista. The respondents asserted that the total selling price of all the
properties is only P16,500, and the selling price or market value of a property is always
higher than its assessed value. BP 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over
civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the
assessed value is more than P20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the P20,000
jurisdictional ceiling.

The trial court found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the
subject property exceeds 20 thousand pesos.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. The instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
3) TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES VS TING GUM TRADING CORP,
G.R. No. 182153, April 07, 2014

FACTS:

Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan), a domestic corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines, obligated itself under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron
and steel to Tung Ho, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan, Republic
of China.

Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC International Court of Arbitration
(ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy
metal scrap iron and steel. The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho and ordered Ting Guan to pay
Tung Ho. Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue and for
prematurity, and subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper
venue. It also argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cebu where its principal
place of business was located.

The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss. Ting Guan moved to reconsider the order
and raised the RTC’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the
dismissal of the complaint. RTC denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily
submitted to the court’s jurisdiction when it raised other arguments apart from lack of
jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over Ting Guan.

HELD: Yes. It was Ting Guan who voluntarily appeared before the trial court.
However, the Court cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached,
given the established facts. To the Court mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the
trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons.
4) INOCENCIA TAGALOG VS MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ,
G.R. No. 201286, July 18, 2014

FACTS: Vda. De Gonzalez, as co-owners of Lot No. 1595-A, with an assessed value of
assessed value of P57,960 and a market value of P264,930, filed a complaint for Recovery
of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for TRO before the RTC of
Toledo City against Inocencia Tagalog.
Inocencia occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis
on the basis of a verbal contract. When Inocencia’s house of light material was damaged in
a typhoon, Inocencia discontinued paying rent and stopped inhabiting the house. They
then demanded that she remove the debris, and vacate the land as they will subdivide and
develop it for their own use. Inocencia however refused to vacate, instead she constructed
a two-storey house made of concrete. Despite the warning given by the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Inocencia proceeded with the construction.

Inocencia prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction as the case was
for ejectment and unlawful detainer not cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
RULING: NONE. The subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a
first level court or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a
second level court, the RTC’s decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It
then follows that the appeal brought before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or
resolutions promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.
5) UNIVERSITY OF STO. TOMAS FACULTY UNION VS UST,
G.R. No. 203957, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA 456

FACTS: The USTFU filed against UST a complaint for unfair labor practice before the
arbitration branch of the NLRC, after its demand from UST to remit its contribution to the
medical and hospitalization fund of UST’s faculty members, remained unheeded.

UST sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
contended that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of
the provisions of the CBA and the conflict between the herein parties must be resolved as
grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether LA has jurisdiction over the cases involving the interpretation of
CBA

RULING: No. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the

present case, USTFU alleged that UST committed unfair labor practice in its blatant
violation of the economic provisions of the CBA. UST, meanwhile, has consistently
questioned USTFU’s act of bringing the case before the LA, and of not submitting the
present case to voluntary arbitration.

Controversy between the parties involved an issue “arising from the interpretation or
implementation” of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter. Therefore, it
was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present case. The case should
have been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
6) ARIGO VS SWIFT,
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance
for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January
13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call
in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been
no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of

the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as
to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

HELD: YES, Petitioners have legal standing.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for
more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.
7) MONSATO VS LIM,
G.R. No. 178911, 735 SCRA 252, September 17, 2014

Facts:

In a letter dated February 18, 2004, Pag-IBIG requested the intervention of Executive Judge
Monsanto, RTC Catbalogan, Samar, on the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted by
Sheriff De Guzman. According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously acceded to its request to
move the date of the auction sale to January 20, 2004; however, to its surprise, the sale
proceeded as originally scheduled on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the
winning bid of Lim was grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that the
outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto, was more than the bid
amount.

Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering that Eduardo is his relative;
instead he re-assigned the same to Judge Usman of Branch 28. After hearing, wherein
Pascual Monsanto appeared in behalf and as assignee of Eduardo, Judge Usman noted, in an
Order dated May 3, 2004, that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed which
presents a judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of partake of administrative
matter.

Issue: Whether RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

The SC dismissed the petition because the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter. As noted by Judge Usman, there was no proper initiatory pleading that
was filed before the trial court. Moreover there were no docket fees paid. Filing the
appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 5, Rule 1 specifically provides that a
civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. Moreover, every
ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court mandates that upon the filing of the pleading or other application
which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. It
is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
8) GARCIA VS FERRO CHEMICALS, INC.,
G.R. No. 172505, October 01, 2014

Facts: Ferro Chemicals, Inc., filed against Antonio Garcia a criminal complaint of
Estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the RPC in the Regional Trial Court, for allegedly
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares of stocks he is selling were sold at
public auction under the PH Investment System Organization.

RTC acquitted Antonio Garcia for insufficiency of evidence. Both Motion for
Reconsideration in the RTC and Notice of Appeal in the CA were denied.

Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case

Ruling: No. RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases, the
imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has
jurisdiction over the case. The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article
318 of the RPC, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of 1
month and 1 day to 6 months.

When the information was filed on Sept. 3, 1990, the law in force was BP Blg. 129 before it
was amended by RA 7691. Under sec. 32 of BP Blg. 129, the MTC had jurisdiction over the
case. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

This lack of jurisdiction reslted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the
judgment rendere. Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an
issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached the Supreme Court, it was
ruled that, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.
9) PEDRO VS ROMASA DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014 743 SCRA 52

FACTS:

This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner
Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro). The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan
Development Corporation (RDC) before the RTC of Antipolo City.

Respondent RDC alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and possessor of land.
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The officer’s return reads in
part: AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of
Post Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address.

Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication. RTC
granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published in People’s Balita.
Respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in
default for failure to file their answers. The RTC granted the motion.

ISSUES: Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro

RULING: No. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The return shows no detail of the sheriff’s
efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only
because the post office messenger stated that there was no “Aurora N. De Pedro” in the
service address.

The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve
summons upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by
publication is availed.

Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service.
10) ANGELES VS CA, 35 SCRA 82

Facts:

A complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance and
damages was filed by Sps. Coronel against Angeles and several others in the RTC. After trial,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

Petitioner Angeles and her co-defendants filed their Notice of Appeal, while the Coronels
filed a motion for execution of the judgment pending appeal. Both appealed to the CA. The
trial court directed that the entire record of Civil Case be transmitted to the CA for
appropriate action.

Petitioner was evicted from the subject property as a result of the enforcement of the Writ
of Execution Pending Appeal.

The CA ruled that the petition should have been filed with the court a quo. It bears
stressing that the power to determine whether x x x the acts alleged by petitioner
constitute indirect contempt rests exclusively in the court against which the contumacious
act was committed.

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case

Ruling: NO, the CA is correct in dismissing such case. The respondent public
officers acted faithfully in carrying out the trial court’s directives. If petitioner doubted
these directives then she should have questioned them by filing the corresponding appeal
or petition in order to set them aside.

If respondent public officers should be punished for their perceived defiance or failure to
abide by the trial court’s directives and processes, then the contempt charge should have
been initiated in the court a quo, and not in the CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 respectively
state that “proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed” and “where the charge for indirect contempt
has been committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court.”
11) PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE VS BPI,
G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014

FACTS:

Bonier, then the President of petitioner Corporation (Pinausukan), executed 4 real estate
mortgages involving the petitioner’s land situated in Pasay City in favor of BPI. When the
unpaid obligation secured by the mortgages had ballooned to P15M, the Bank commenced
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages in RTC, Pasay City.

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the
mortgages, Pinausukan, represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman, brought against the Bank
and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC averring
that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the
mortgages without consent.

However, the subsequent hearing dates of action for the annulment were reset several
times. Accordingly, RTC dismissed the for failure to prosecute, while the order of dismissal
attained finality, and the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the
property of Pinausukan

Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the
order of dismissing the action for the annulment. CA dismissed the petition for annulment,
citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged
extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction in annulling its own judgment

RULING: No. Only the Court of Appeals may annul the decision on RTC here. In 1981,
the Legislature enacted BP Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several
innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of
a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of
litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and
expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA.

The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation
continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI
as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an
action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To
implement this change, “the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.”
12) COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS SILICON PHIL. INC.,
G.R. No. 184360 & 184361, February 19, 2014

FACTS: This is a consolidated petition before this Court.

In G.R. No. 184360, petitioner Silicon discussed two important issues: (1) whether the CTA
En Banc erred in denying its claim for refund of input VAT derived from domestic
purchases of goods and services attributable to its zero-rated sales on the ground of failure
to imprint the words “TIN-VAT” and “ZERO-RATED” on its export sales invoices; and (2)
whether the CTA En Banc erred in denying Silicon’s claim for refund on the ground that
Silicon failed to prove its input VAT derived from its importation of capital goods and
equipment and in not considering the recommendation and findings of the Court-
commissioned Independent Certified Public Accountant that Silicon has substantially
supported its export sales, importation of capital goods/equipment and its input VAT on
local purchases.

In G.R. Nos. 184384 & 184361, Silicon and the CIR assail the Decision and the Resolution
of the CTA En Banc which ordered the CIR to refund, or issue a tax credit certificate to
Silicon for the amount of P2,139,431.00 representing its unutilized excess input VAT on
domestic purchases of goods and services and importation of goods/capital equipment
attributable to its zero-rated sales.

ISSUE: whether the petitions for review filed by Silicon before the CTA were filed
within the prescribed period provided under the Tax Code in order to determine whether
the CTA validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitions filed by Silicon.

RULING: Yes. A tax credit or refund, like tax exemption, is strictly construed against
the taxpayer. For failure of Silicon to comply with the provisions of Section 112(C) of the
NIRC, its judicial claims for tax refund or credit should have been dismissed by the CTA for
lack of jurisdiction.

Silicon’s judicial claims were filed late and way beyond the prescriptive period. Silicon filed
its Quarterly VAT Return for the 1st quarter of 1999 on April 22, 1999 and subsequently
filed on August 6, 1999 a claim for tax credit or refund of its input VAT taxes for the same
period. From August 6, 1999, the CIR had until December 4, 1999, the last day of the 120-
day period, to decide Silicon’s claim for tax refund. But since the CIR did not act on Silicon’s
claim on or before the said date, Silicon had until January 3, 2000, the last day of the 30-day
period to file its judicial claim. However, Silicon failed to file an appeal within 30 days from
the lapse of the 120-day period, and it only filed its petition for review with the CTA on
March 30, 2001 which was 451 days late.
Similarly, Silicon’s claim for tax refund for the second quarter of 2000 should have been
dismissed for having been filed out of time. Silicon again failed to comply with the 120+30
day period provided under Section 112(C) since it filed its judicial claim only on June 28,
2002 or 536 days late.
12. CIR vs. Silicon Philippines Inc

G.R. No. 184360 & 184361, February 19, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue empowered to perform

the duties of said office including, among others, the power to decide, approve and grant
refunds or tax credits of erroneously or excessively paid taxes.

Respondent Silicon Philippines, Inc., on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged primarily in the
business of designing, developing, manufacturing, and exporting advance and large-scale
integrated circuits components (ICs).

On 6 May 1999, respondent filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter- Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF) an application for Tax Credit/Refund
of VAT paid for the second quarter of 1998 in the aggregate amount of P29,559,050.44,
representing its alleged unutilized input tax.

Thereafter, since no final action has been taken by petitioner on respondent’s

administrative claim for refund, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) on 30 June 2000 docketed as CTA Case No. 6129.

ISSUE:

Whether the CTA acquired jurisdiction over respondent’s instant claim taking into
consideration the timeliness of the filing of its judicial claim as provided under Section 112
of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.

HELD:
The mandatory rule is that a judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the Commissioner’s decision denying the administrative claim or
from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action from the Commissioner.
Otherwise, said judicial claim shall be considered as filed out of time.

The Court is mindful that when respondent filed its administrative claim on 6 May 1999,
and its corresponding judicial claim on 30 June 2000, the NIRC of 1997, as amended, was
already in effect. Clearly therefore, the strict observance in applying the provisions of
Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997 is proper. Hence, failure of respondent to observe the 30-
day period under said Section through its belated filing of the Petition for Review before
the CTA warrants a dismissal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

All told, the CTA has no jurisdiction over respondent's judicial appeal considering that its
Petition for Review was filed beyond the mandatory 30-day period pursuant to Section
112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended. Consequently, respondent's instant claim for
refund must be denied.
13) VILLAGRACIA VS FIFTH (5TH) SHARI'AH DISTRICT COURT,
G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

FACTS: Vivencio filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging
that the decision rendered by the Sharia District Court is void for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. He asserts that he is a Christian which means that the Sharia District
Court does not have any jurisdiction to rule on the matter.

ISSUE: Whether the Sharia District Court have jurisdiction over cases were one of
the parties is non-Muslim.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 143 of the Muslim Code would reveal
that Sharia courts has jurisdiction over real actions when the parties are both Muslims. The
fact that the Sharia courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts in cases of
actions involving real property means that jurisdiction may only be exercised by the said
courts when the action involves parties who are both Muslims. In cases where one of the
parties is a non-muslim, the Shariah Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over it. It would
immediately divest the Shariah court jurisdiction over the subject matter.
14) TUMPAG VS TUMPAG,
G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014

FACTS: Esperanza Tumpag (petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of possession

with damages against Samuel Tumpag (respondent) before the RTC, Negros Occidental.
The RTC proceeded with trial and ordered the respondent to return possession of the
subject portion of the property to the petitioner and to pay the petitioner damages.

In his appeal to the CA, among the grounds the respondent raised was the issue of the
RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the case. The CA dismissed, without prejudice, the complaint
for recovery of possession and damages that the petitioner filed before the RTC because the
complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the disputed property in the case.

ISSUE: Whether the court may look into other documents/evidence aside from the
facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case

RULING: Yes, in instances when a rigid application of the general rule may result in
defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party’s substantial right. While generally,
the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a
suit is within its jurisdiction, this rule was relaxed in several cases decided by the court.

In Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Garcia, the Court allowed the RTC to consider, in addition
to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

In Guaranteed Homes, Inc. vs. Heirs of Valdez, et al., the Court held that the factual
allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and
inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts.

In the present case, the Court finds reason not to strictly apply the above-mentioned
general rule, and to consider the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property
attached to the complaint in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the
Esperanza’s case. A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the
question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy litigation on this point
unnecessary.
15) ZACARIAS VS ANACAY,
G.R. No. 203254, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508

FACTS:

Petitioner Zacarias filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Victoria Anacay and
members of her household. Respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite. Petitioner claimed that she is the owner of the parcel of land illegally occupied by
respondents. Despite repeated demands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the
subject premises. Petitioner’s lawyer then wrote a demand for respondents to vacate the
premises but the same remained unheeded.

MCTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state the essential elements of an action for
unlawful detainer. On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer is the
proper remedy because she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises.

ISSUES: Whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer

RULING: No. Complaint does not make a case for unlawful detainer

What determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. Petitioner’s
complaint failed to substantiate their claim for unlawful detainer. When petitioner
discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007, the possession could not have been legal
from the start since it was without her knowledge or consent and was not based on any
contract.
16) LANUZA VS BF CORPORATION,
737 SCRA 275

Facts:

Controversy arose from agreements by the two corporations where BF Corp

undertook to construct Shangri-La mall and a multilevel parking structure along EDSA,
1989 and 1991 respectively. Shangri-La had been consistent in paying but after a while, it
defaulted.

BF Corp filed a complaint against Shangri-La and its board of directors members. BF Corp
alleged that Shangri-La misrepresented it had funds to pay and that it was simply a matter
of delayed processing of BF’s progress billing statements.

Construction eventually was completed but despite demands, Shangri-La refused to pay the
balance. BF also alleged that Shangri-La’s directors were in bad faith so they should be held
jointly and severally liable with Shangri-La.

The two corporations failed to agree to what law would apply but the trial court ordered
that it should be RA 876. Both corporations then wanted to clarify the term “parties” and
whether Shangri-La’s directors should be included in the arbitration proceedings. The trial
court then opined that the directors were interested parties and thus should be served with
a demand for arbitration.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be made parties to the arbitration proceedings

pursuant to the arbitration clause provided in the contract between BF Corp and Shangri-
La.

RULING: Yes. Petitioners may be compelled to submit to the arbitration proceedings

in accordance with Shangri-La and BF Corporation's agreement, in order to determine if
the distinction between Shangri-La's personality and their personalities should be
disregarded.

When corporate veil is pierced, the corporation and persons who are normally treated as
distinct from the corporation are treated as one person, such that when the corporation is
adjudged liable, these persons, too, become liable as if they were the corporation.

When there are allegations of bad faith or malice against corporate directors or
representatives, it becomes the duty of courts or tribunals to determine if these persons
and the corporation should be treated as one. Hence, when the directors, as in this case, are
impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice or bad faith on their part in
directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that the
directors and the corporation are not acting as separate entities.
17) ZUMIGA-SANTOS VS SANTOS-GRAN,
G.R. No. 197380 October 8, 2014 738 SCRA 33

Facts: On January 9, 2006, petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (petitioner), through her

authorized representative, Nympha Sales, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and
revocation of title against respondents Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of
Marikina City before the RTC. The said complaint was later amended on March 10, 2006
(Amended Complaint).

In her Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the
registered owner of three (3) parcels of land (b) she was forced by her husband to take
care of his husband’s child Gran and subsequently devised a way for Gran (respondent) to
receive Property in question without the consent of Petitioner using “void and voidable
documents” (stated in the complaint).

Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending, inter alia, (a) the Amended Complaint failed to
state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were not
properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint

should be sustained.

Held: Yes. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct
grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the
allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the
action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of
the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while
dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have
been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff.
18) PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORP. VS LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP., G.R. No. 161589, November 24, 2014

Facts: Penta Pacific leased its properties to Ley Construction. Both parties then entered
into a contract to sell. Ley Construction failed to pay its amortizations prompting Penta
Pacific to file an action for ejectment.

Issue: Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or accion
reivindicatoria.

Ruling: The SC ruled that a defendant’s claim of possession de jure or his averment of
ownership does not render the ejectment suit either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. The suit remains accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can
proceed independently of any claim of ownership. Even when the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
19) CRISOLOGO VS JGWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORP.,
G.R. No. 196894, March 03, 2014

FACTS: The RTC of Davao City rendered its decision in favor of one Sy Sen Ben, the
plaintiff in a collection case, against defendants Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. The
defendants then were directed to transfer the subject properties in favour of Sy Sen Ben.
However, the latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn,
sold the same to JEWM. TCT’s were eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which
still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in connection with
the other pending cases filed against So Keng Koc.

A year after, Sps. Crisologo prevailed in a collection case filed before the RTC, Davao City.
The same Defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the spouses. After the issuance of writ
of execution, the Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling the auction of the properties.

To protect its interest, the JEWM filed a separate action before the RTC for cancellation of
lien. The counsel then of Sps. Crisologo questioned the authority of the court to restrain the
execution proceedings. JEWM opposed on the ground that Sps. Crisologo were not parties
in the case. No motion to intervene was filed by the spouses believing it hat it was
unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does named in the complaint of
JEWM.

ISSUE: Whether Sps. Crisologo are considered indispensible parties in the case for
cancellation of title

RULING: Yes. SC ruled that in an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated
at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those
whose liens appear as annotations. The cancellation of the memorandum cannot be
ordered without giving notice to the parties who caused such annotation on the certificate
of title itself.

Here, the undisputed fact is that petitioner spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated
at the back of the certificate of title. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand
to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the
pertinent TCTs. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as
defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The effect of Spouses Crisologo’s non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude

the judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.
20) Republic vs Namboku Peak Inc.
G.R. No.169745; and G.R. No.170091

Facts: These are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decisions of CA.

The first - The Secretary of Labor filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Namboku contended
that the Secretary is a mere nominal party who has no legal standing to participate or
prosecute the case. Further, the Secretary should have refrained from filing the said MR
and should have maintained the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

The second - The Phil-Japan seeks to challenge the unconstitutionality of a DO and the
decision of the Med-Arbiter which granted the petition of PJWU-SUPER seeking to
determine the exclusive bargaining representative in Phil-Japan and ordered the conduct of
certification election.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor is a real party-in-interest vested with

personality to file the present petitions

Ruling: No. The court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions is bereft

of any right or personality to question the decision of an appellate court reversing its
decision.

The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in-interest vested with personality to file the
present petitions. Gleaning from Rule 3 Sec 2, the real parties-in-interest in these cases
would have been PALCEA-SUPER and PJWU-SUPER, respectively. It would have been their
duty to appear and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor for they are the ones who
were interested that the same be sustained. As to the Secretary of Labor, she was
impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one
of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction but that
does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the
decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling.
21) MAGALLANES VS PALMER-ASIA, INC.,
G.R. No. 205179, July 18, 2014

FACTS: Andrews International Product, Inc. (Andrews) is a domestic

corporation that manufactures and sells fire extinguishers. Sometime in 1995, Andrews
and another corporation, Palmer Asia, Inc. (Palmer), entered into an agreement whereby
all the business of Andrews was going to be handled by Palmer. Hence, Palmer Asia was
born.

Palmer filed a petition for review of the Decision of the RTC in the Criminal Cases for B.P.
22 before the CA, where Andrews International Products, Inc. was the original private
complainant. The alleged bounced checks issued by a certain Magallanes were issued
payable in the name of Andrews. The narration of facts in the several Informations for
violation of B.P. 22 filed against Magallanes solely mentioned the name of Andrews
International Products, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether real party in this case is Andrews, not Palmer.

RULING: Yes, it is Andrews, not Palmer, which is the real party in this case.

Under our procedural rules, “a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause
of action.” In this case, the corporation that initiated the complaint for B.P. 22 is different
from the corporation that filed the memorandum at the RTC and the petition for review
before the CA. The RTC Decision absolving petitioner from civil liability has attained
finality, since no appeal was interposed by a real party-in-interest.
22) ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014

FACTS: On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC

Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011, cancelling the certificate of registration of
the ABC Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the 2010 national elections. The
disqualification of the ABC Party-List resulted in the re-computation of the party-list
allocations in the House of Representatives, in which the COMELEC followed the formula
outlined in the case of BANAT vs COMELEC.

The petitioner Association of Flood Victims and its representative Jaime Hernandez filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus before the court assailing Resolution No. 12-0859.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Association of Flood Victims is a real party-in-interest in

this case

RULING: No. Petitioners failed to allege personal or substantial interest in the

questioned governmental act. The Supreme Court ruled that under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties to a civil action, which must be prosecuted and defended by a real party-in-
interest. A real party-in-interest is the person who stands benefitted or injured to the
outcome of the case or is entitled to the avails of the suit. Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court the facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of the party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of
an organized association of persons that is made as a party must be averred.
23) GERMINO VS CALDERON,
G.R. No. 201781 December 10, 2014 744 SCRA 564

FACTS: A building was erected beside the house of Joel and Annie Geronimo for
purposes of wider area for their growing family. Subsequently, the building turned out to
be a church of SACC. The church was used for different religious activities including daily
worship services, baptisms, summer school, choir rehearsals, band practices, playing of
different musical instruments and use of a loud sound system which would last until late in
the evening. The noise allegedly affected respondents’ health and caused inconvenience to
respondents because they were forced to leave their house if they want peace and
tranquillity. Due to the added noise and tension, Estela’s nose bled. That is why the case
was filed before HLURB.

HLURB ordered for the non-use of the building for religious purposes and as a
location of a church through temporary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether HLURB has jurisdiction over the issue

HELD: Yes. The law covers questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums.
The intention was aimed at providing for an agency (HLURB) to which parties aggrieved in
the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights relating to real
estate may seek relief. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being
imbued with public interest and welfare, any issue relating to such should be brought to
the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter.
24) CITY OF LAPU-LAPU VS PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
742 SCRA 524

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the City of Lapu-
lapu and the Province of Bataan Separately filed against the PEZA. In GR No. 184203, Lapu-
Lapu City assails the CA’s decision and resolution dismissing the City’s appeal for being the
wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the RTC’s (B-111) decision finding PEZA exempt
from payment of real property taxes. In GR No. 187583, Bataan assails the CA’s decision
and resolution granting the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The CA ruled that the RTC (B-
115) gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxex to the
Province of Bataan.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City had jurisdiction to hear,
try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief

RULING: No. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and
decide the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu.

The City was objecting to the venue of the action, not to the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay. In essence, the City was contending that the PEZA’s petition is a real
action as it affects title to or possession of real property, and, therefore, the PEZA should
have filed the petition with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City where the real
properties are located.

Whatever objections the City has against the venue of the PEZA’s action for declaratory
relief are already deemed waived. Objections to venue must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity. The City did not file a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the venue was improperly laid. Neither did the City raise this objection in its answer.

xxx

(The venue of an action depends on whether the action is a real or personal action. Should
the action affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, it is a real action.
The action should be filed in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. If the action is a personal action, the
action shall be filed with the proper court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.)
25) FERNANDEZ VS VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014, 733 SCRA 548

FACTS: Sisters Lourdes and Cecilia filed a petition to recover possession of a

land against respondent Norma Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her behalf
including her family (respondents). However, only Lourdes was the signatory in the
verification and certification against forum shopping. Norma questioned the propriety of
the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction despite that only Lourdes signed in
the verification and certification against form shopping

RULING: The Court then ruled that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who
share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the
petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the
court from proceeding with the action.
26) FUJI TELEVISION NATIONAL, INC., VS ESPIRITU,
G.R. No. 204944-45, December 03, 2014, 744 SCRA 31

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Corazon was
authorized by Fuji to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping because
of the secretary’s certificate to delegate the authority to sign the necessary pleadings,
including the verification and certification against forum shopping. However, the authority
given in the secretary’s certificate is only for the petition for certiorari before the CA, and
there was no attachment of any board resolution authorizing Corazon or any other person
to file a petition for review on certiorari with this court.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for review should be dismissed as Corazon E. Acerden,
the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition, had
no authority to sign the verification and certification on behalf of Fuji

RULING: No. A review of the board resolution quoted in the secretary’s certificate
shows that Fuji shall “file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals” and
“participate in any other subsequent proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom,
including but not limited to the filing of appeals in the appropriate venue,” and that Shuji
Yano and Jin Eto are authorized to represent Fuji “in any other proceeding that may
necessarily arise therefrom. Shuji Yano and Jin Eto were also authorized to “act in the
Corporation’s name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform
any and all of the following: . . . 5. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition
of the action.”

Considering that the subsequent proceeding that may arise from the petition for certiorari
with the CA is the filing of a petition for review with this court, Fuji substantially complied
with the procedural requirement.
27) KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., VS ROBREDO,
G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014, 730 SCRA 322

FACTS: The cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs)
sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. Accordingly, section 28 (a) and
(b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order under certain
circumstances.

Petitioners directly filed in the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition and mandamus to
enjoin the public respondents from evicting the individual petitioners as well as the
petitioner-associations’ members from their dwellings in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and
Quezon without any court order, and to compel the respondents to afford them judicial
process prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts

RULING: Yes. The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they
directly filed the petition before the Court.

The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the
Court with their petition for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioners appear to have
forgotten that the SC is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of
courts should serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for Rule 65
petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before the SC, the petitioners have
unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to matters within our
exclusive jurisdiction.
28) CANDELARIA VS RTC, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO
G.R. No.173861, July 14, 2014, 730 SCRA 1

FACTS: On October 12, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence of the petitioner. Petitioners’ alleged illegal arrest should have
been raised before accused entered his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashal of the information before the arraignment, he is estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. Notwithstanding this reference, the RTC based its decision from the
affidavit that the search and seizure was incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the
accused who were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence obtained during such search
and seizure is admissible in evidence.

From the RTC, petitioners made a direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether this petition for Certiorari should prosper

RULING: No. This is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for
certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders of the RTC should be filed with the Court of
Appeals and not directly with the Supreme Court

A Petition for Certiorari will prosper if the following rules will be observed:

1) the applicant must allege with certainty that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, or when any of those are present,
allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that will
excuse him for not having availed himself of such remedy;

2) he must also show that the party against whom it is being sought acted in grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction; and

3) the hierarchy of courts must be respected.

However, it cannot be resorted to when then the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the petitioners for any perceived error in its interpretation of the
law and its assessment of evidence would only be considered an error of judgment and not
of jurisdiction. Hence, such is correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
29. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs
Ley Construction and Development Corporation
743 SCRA 618

Facts: The obligation of the respondents covered by the Letter of Credit in

the amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and unpaid, notwithstanding
repeated demands for payment. Plaintiff, therefore, instituted the instant complaint for
recovery of P23,259,124.14.

In support of its cause of action against defendant, plaintiff presented the testimony of Mr.
Fenelito Cabrera, Head of the Foreign Department of plaintiff’s Head Office.

The trial court found that Cabrera was incompetent to testify on the documents presented
by the Bank during the trial. Cabrera was with the Bank’s Dasmariñas Branch and not with
the Head Office during the period the transaction covered by the documents took place.

The trial court concluded in its decision that the Bank failed to establish its cause of action
and to make a sufficient or preponderant case.

Issue: Whether Metrobank is able to establish its cause of action

Held: No. The bank is not able to establish a cause of action.

The Bank’s petition contravenes the elementary rule of appellate procedure that an appeal
to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 “shall raise only questions
of law.” The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by
preponderant evidence is essentially a question of fact.

Second, the nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint.
A party’s cause of action is not what the party says it is, nor is it what the designation of the
complaint states, but what the allegations in the body define and describe.
30) VERGARA VS OTODOY
GR NO. 192320, APRIL 4, 2016

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: