Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POZNA STUDIES
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES
VOLUME 96
EDITORS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
EPISTEMOLOGY
AND THE SOCIAL
Edited by
ISSN 0303-8157
ISBN: 978-90-420-2421-2
©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008
Printed in The Netherlands
CONTENTS
Epistemology on the one hand, and “the social” on the other hand, have
been considered alien to one another for rather a long while. Not only
when epistemology was understood as theory of knowledge in general
(something that is still normal in the English-speaking world) but also
when epistemology was understood in the more restricted sense of
philosophy of science (as is more customary today in other linguistic
areas). Indeed, epistemology understood as general theory of knowledge
seems to be specifically concerned with those cognitive operations that
are performed by an individual knowing subject and are supposed to be
essentially the same for every knowing subject, operations that, for this
reason, are often considered as performances of “the mind” in a rather
abstract sense. Society as such is incapable of knowing and, at most, can
act as a set of external conditionings that, rather than help, could disturb
the mind in the correct performance of its tasks. This situation does not
change when epistemology is considered as a synonymous of philosophy
of science, because in this case it is understood as the investigation of the
conditions under which science constitutes a form of knowledge (and
indeed the most advanced form of knowledge). Implicit in this view is
the tenet that epistemology does not have a descriptive role, but rather
also a normative one, in the sense that scientific knowledge is valid
knowledge par excellence, and epistemology is precisely entrusted with
the task of clarifying the conditions under which this valid knowledge in
science actually obtains. Therefore, any intromission of “the social” is
seen again as a disturbing factor of which epistemology should rather
teach us how to get rid.
A second reason for this distance was represented by the fact that, if
one considers epistemology as philosophy of science, it is implicit that it
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 7-16. Amsterdam/New York, NY:
Rodopi, 2008.
8 E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, A.Gómez
how certain factors coming from the social and cultural environment
operate within the rational choice.
In the paper by Brigitte Falkenburg, “The Invisible Hand: What Do
We Know?”, Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible hand” is
investigated in detail. Smith’s analogue was the mechanics of the solar
system but precisely this analogue makes the analogy fail. Indeed the
correct analogue belongs to thermodynamics and statistics because in the
simplest macro-economic model the business cycle has the same formal
structure as the heat flow between two heat reservoirs, and a business
cycle of growing efficiency works like a refrigerator: it pumps money
from the poor to the rich. More complicated models do not give a more
friendly image. Due to technological push, an economic system behaves
like a thermodynamic system far from equilibrium, showing chaotic
behaviours and developing into unpredictable states.
In the paper by Peter Kemp, “The Cosmopolitan Vision,” the
opposition is taken into consideration that the sociologist Ulrich Beck has
recently maintained between the national and the cosmopolite point of
view. The awareness of this opposition is important for a correct
understanding of many issues in present international political
framework, but the question is posed whether this same opposition
should also affect the epistemology of the social sciences, in the sense of
asking whether our knowledge of social realities be possible at every
level without choosing a political point of view.
The contributions published in this volume correspond to revised
versions of papers presented at a meeting of the International Academy
of Philosophy of Science on the theme Epistemology and the Social that
took place in Tenerife on September 22-25, 2005. The meeting was
organized in collaboration with the Faculty of Philosophy of the
University of La Laguna at Tenerife and with the sponsorship of the
Institute of Philosophy of the Spanish Superior Board of Scientific
Researches, the Urrutia Elejalde Foundation, the Spanish Society of
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. It was also supported by
the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, and the Regional
Government of the Canary Islands. To all these institutions and their
officers we present the most sincere expressions of thanks for the
realization of the meeting and the publication of this volume.
16 E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, A.Gómez
Evandro Agazzi
President of the International Academy of Philosophy of Science
Javier Echeverría
Full Professor of Philosophy of Science
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Amparo Gómez
Full Professor of Philosophy of Science
University of La Laguna
PART 1
GENERAL PERSPECTIVES
Evandro Agazzi
ABSTRACT. A sociological study of science is not very recent and has never
been seen as particularly problematic since science, and especially modern
science, constitutes an impressive and extremely ramified “social system” of
activities, institutions, relations and interferences with other social systems. Less
favourable, however, has been the consideration of a more recent trend in the
philosophy of science known as the “sociological” philosophy of science, whose
most debatable point consists in directly challenging the traditional epistemology
of science and, in particular, in stripping scientific knowledge of its most
appreciated characteristics of objectivity and rigour. A vicious circle seems to lie
at the root of this sociological epistemology because, on the one hand, criticism
of the traditional concept of scientific knowledge is developed by relying upon
sociology, but this, on the other hand is reasonable only if sociology is credited
with the status of a reliable instrument, that is, because it has been recognized as
a science through an epistemological debate. In this paper it is shown that not all
circles are vicious: in particular, feedback loops, positive and negative, are
normally considered in cybernetic models of various processes. Negative
feedback loops are fundamental in self-regulating processes and have already
occurred from time to time in readjusting the concept of science itself.
Therefore, a sociological epistemology of science can contribute to a more
careful analysis of the real meaning and purport of the cognitive aspect of
science, provided that it is not pushed to the self-defeating extreme of
challenging the legitimacy of considering objectivity and rigour as the
characteristic features of scientific knowledge.
According to what we could call the “classical” view, the fact of knowing
was considered to consist in an “opening” of reality to the mind as well
as an (intentional) “identification” of the mind with reality. In other
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 19-31. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
20 Evandro Agazzi
words, the fact that being must reveal itself as it is, was taken for
granted, and at the same time the fact that our thinking activity
necessarily thinks being. This attitude, that today we might be ready to
qualify as “naïve realism,” was actually rooted in a deeper consideration,
that is, in the absolutization of the concept of being, that was simply
conceived as the opposite of non-being. Therefore, if our thinking were
not thinking of being, it should be thinking of non-being, that is, thinking
of nothing, and in such a way no thinking at all. This was, in short, the
position of Parmenides, but he could obviously not overlook something
that seemed to play at the same time the role of an indispensable tool and
of a possible obstacle for knowledge, namely sense perception. Indeed
sense perception seems to put us in direct immediate contact with reality,
seems to be the situation in which the word “opens” itself to us in the
most spontaneous way, without demanding from us any effort, but
despite this, we are aware of certain situations in which we are easily
deceived by the so-called “sense illusions.” Yet this is not the most
important shortcoming of sense perception, the most significant one is
that it seems to make manifest something that cannot be real, that is,
multiplicity of beings and, especially, change. The sensory experience of
change seems to testify that there was a time when something existing did
not exist and also will not exist at some future time; in other words, this
experience seems to testify that being can become non-being, or that non-
being can produce being, all things that the simple nature of being
necessarily excludes. As is well known, this was the reason why
Parmenides and his school disqualified sense knowledge as fallacious
opinion (doxa) leaving the attaining of truth (aletheia) as a privilege of
the intellect (logos). Things changed a little with Plato, and much more
with Aristotle (as a consequence of having clarified that the concept of
being does not have a univocal meaning), but even within the doctrine of
the Stagirite (in which a proper role is attributed to sense perception),
genuine knowledge (episteme) was considered possible only thanks to the
work of intellect, and this because of two reasons. The one is that
genuine knowledge not only presupposes truth, but in addition requires a
justification of this truth through suitable arguments that are elaborated
by intellect. The other is that truth itself (according to its most
appropriate conception) is a property of judgments and these are again a
product of intellect. As a consequence of this historical development we
find the famous medieval definition of truth as adaequatio intellectus et
rei, that has become the core of the Western conception of truth (though
different criteria for truth have been proposed in the history of Western
philosophy).
Epistemology and the Social: A Feedback Loop 21
the mind thinks). It has become clear in the sequel, on the contrary, that
the contents of thought, that is, what has been already accepted in our
thought, influences our way of thinking, especially when these contents
have been interiorized in an unconscious way. In short, human
knowledge never begins from zero, and successive elements of
knowledge are “framed” within the already acquired knowledge and tend
to consolidate it. We could express this by saying that thought is simply
the whole of our thoughts, that our mind is the whole of our knowledge.
This statement does not coincide with a return to the Cartesian and
Baconian caveats against the risks of becoming prisoners of preconceived
prejudices, since it appears that such prejudices are not something we
must get rid of, but something that is a precondition of our knowing the
world.
This awareness has been stimulated also by the studies of psychology
already starting in the second half of the nineteenth century and
continuing with the most recent trends of cognitive psychology, but has
also been enriched by the developments of sociology and, in particular,
of sociology of knowledge.
The thesis of the social dependence of science has become more and
more prevalent, at least quantitatively, as a result of the combination of
two cultural factors which, though of very different provenance, were
(accidentally, one might say) at play in the same time frame. The first of
these is represented by the so called “non-orthodox” tradition of Marxist
thought, which developed largely in western European countries in the
1960s (particularly, though not exclusively, in the Frankfurt School, and
in the writings of authors such as Goldmann and Althusser in France),
and was using its arguments – concerning the total dependence of
scientific knowledge and practice on the social relations of production in
the capitalist societies – as weapons in the polemic over the neutrality of
science in the 1970s. In the meanwhile the Anglo-American world began
to develop a sociological conception of science, which it has articulated
up to the present.
This conception was born with Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962). This work engendered a lively debate since
it opposed both the epistemological tradition of logical empiricism and
Popperian thought. Kuhn always maintained the professional image of
24 Evandro Agazzi
points (that have been examined with particular insistence, for example,
by Mario Bunge). We are not interested here, however, in a critical
examination of this sociological conception of science, but want rather to
present a few more general methodological considerations regarding the
very fact of using sociology as a tool for elaborating an epistemological
doctrine, and in particular a doctrine regarding the epistemology of
science.
These considerations can be briefly sketched as follows. Sociology of
knowledge is a science, intends to be a science and, in particular, one of
the specializations of the social sciences; moreover its results and claims
are considered reliable simply because they satisfy the conditions of
scientificity. And this is what actually happened: during several decades
between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century a wide epistemological debate took place in order to vindicate
the specific scientific status of the social sciences. This debate eventually
led to a very large recognition of the scientific status of sociology such
that this discipline, having been admitted among the contributors to our
genuine knowledge, can be legitimately used whenever people want to
avail themselves of some contents of human knowledge (for instance, in
investigating economic phenomena, legal institutions, artistic production,
history of ideas and so on). Should we stop this use of sociology when
we come to science? Should we become diffident before a sociology of
science? Of course not, because, after all, science is also in some respects
a “social product” and, despite some legitimate criticisms that have been
levelled against the sociological conception of science, none could deny
that it is a positive thing in itself to introduce historical and social
consciousness into the understanding of science, and that it is also useful
to submit the scientific enterprise to sociological study: the information
gained thereby is always interesting and illuminating. It is something
completely different, however, to claim to reduce scientific knowledge to
nothing but a social product. Herein lies the mistake of a good portion of
sociological epistemology, a mistake that derives precisely from having
promoted sociology to the role of a judge of what is science, beyond the
study of how science is concretely practiced in societies. This is
tantamount to having endowed sociology with an epistemological role
while it has received from epistemology its right to pronounce statements
with a cognitive value. In other words, are we confronted with a vicious
circle, consisting in the fact that we need a recognized science in order to
speak of a socially conditioned status of science in general? Would we
not put sociology in the place traditionally occupied by logic and
methodology of science, attributing to sociology the privilege of a super-
26 Evandro Agazzi
The situation is not precisely this: it is rather like that of a feedback loop.
A process which starts under certain conditions can be led to modify
these conditions as a consequence of the results of the process itself
(selfregulation). In our case, a process of epistemological reflection
initiated under the “condition” of accepting a certain modern concept of
science (practically derived from an idealization of the “exact” natural
sciences, in spite of being considered “general”) continued with a
relaxation of certain too rigid requirements included in that idealization,
and permitted to include also the social sciences in the domain of
science. This step, in turn, made reasonable the acceptance of the results
of sociology even when they are applied to knowledge and to scientific
knowledge in particular, a fact that produced a reconsideration and
readjustment of the “general” concept of science such that social
conditionings of science should be taken into serious consideration.
This way of reasoning is not circular, but actually common to any
form of “reflecting thinking.” So, for example, one cannot start an
inquiry on the functioning of mind without crediting mind with the
capability of offering us a reliable tool for this inquiry. Even in the case
of Kant, he affirmed that his investigation on the a priori conditions of
any possible knowledge represented the most solid science, despite the
fact that the conclusions of his transcendental investigation were that
science is only possible when we apply intellectual categories to sensory
intuitions (and this does not occur in the transcendental investigation).
Similarly, it was by respecting certain fundamental methodological
requirements of classical physics that scientists have been led to results
obliging them to repudiate several principles of that physics. To be more
precise, circularity is a weakness, a methodological mistake, when it
consists in taking A as a justification of B, and then B itself as a
justification of A (very clearly when this justification has the form of a
logical deduction). But there are many cases in which this does not
happen, even when we use deductive tools: for instance, when we use a
hypothesis H to deductively predict an event E, we can say, on the one
hand, that this prediction was justified by H but, on the other hand, if E
does actually occur we say that E justifies H (while the not occurring of
E refutes H), and this is correct because the meaning of “justification” is
Epistemology and the Social: A Feedback Loop 27
obviously different in the two cases (in the first direction it means a link
of logical consequence, in the second direction it means a link of
empirical confirmation). This shows that not every “circle” is a vicious
circle and, paradoxically, a non-vicious circle is that in which, by
developing the consequences of A, we end up with the negation of A
(which, in a way is a kind of “coming back” to A). The paradoxical
impression consists in the fact that we seem to consider a contradiction
an example of non-vicious circle, but things are actually a little different:
this circle is not vicious not only because it does not take A as
justification of non-A, and then non-A as a justification of A, but
especially because it is not a contradiction, but a process for discovering
a contradiction and, in such a way, for eliminating an error. This
procedure is present in the proofs by reductio ad absurdum quite
common in mathematics, and is implied in the dynamics of scientific
theories according to the standard view, when the developments of a
theory can lead to certain results that are logically incompatible with
some hypotheses of the same theory and can induce scientists to modify
or abandon it. Another significant example that has some similarity with
the reductio ad absurdum is what the ancient philosophers called
elenchos (and is often translated as “refutation” in modern terminology).
This type of argument is different from “demonstration,” strictly
understood as a deduction from given premises, since it serves to provide
a justification of the first premises or principles themselves, and
essentially consists in showing that the person who denies the principle
must actually use it in his act of negation. The most famous application
of this kind of argument is made by Aristotle in defending the principle
of non-contradiction: the denier must use this principle if he simply
wants to say something determined, and therefore he implicitly admits it
(see the fourth book of Metaphysics).
which steps, under what conditions and according to what criteria it can
be believed to obtain, and this in particular regarding the different objects
that we would like to know. These two aspects are, of course, only
analytically distinct but are concretely interdependent. After a possible
analysis of some different meanings of the notions of knowledge and
knowing present in common language, one should focus on the
traditionally most relevant one (the one that is taken into consideration
by the “theory of knowledge”) which is often qualified as “propositional
knowledge,” that is, a knowledge expressed in declarative propositions.
This knowledge can be characterized in this way: “knowing is to have
present reality as it is” and “knowledge is the mental or linguistic
expression of this presence,” that is, “knowledge is the representation of
how things really are.” Whatever epistemology must not only presuppose
this concept of knowledge (otherwise it would be not theory of
knowledge, but theory of something else) but also presuppose that
knowledge as such is possible in general. Indeed, if we want to know how
our knowledge functions and obtains, we must concede that we can know
at least this. Therefore we find here the scheme of the elenchos: the
person who maintains that we can not know anything is defeating herself
since she presupposes at least that she knows this fact. By the way, this
was not the sense of the Socratic declaration that he knew that he did not
know, since this was only the admission of his ignorance about many
things, but not a general declaration of the impossibility of knowing
(indeed he has tried to show in what a possible sound knowledge can
consist).
body, and also to estimate within what limits we could be satisfied with
the imperfect realization of such properties according to our actual needs
in the different situations. In the case of science, the importance of
sociology of science consists mainly in making clear what conditions
have to be satisfied in order a scientific discourse to be at the same time
socially situated and intrinsically valid.
University of Genoa
Department of Philosophy
Via Balbi, 4
16126 Genova GE
Italy
e-mail: agazzi@nous.unige.it
Hervé Barreau
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 33-47. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
34 Hervé Barreau
necessarily circular, but the circularity loses its closed context, rejecting
all discussion, when it is studied within the hermeneutic context of its
era, where the theoretical choices can be discussed and justified
rationally.
The hermeneutic context requires epistemology, understood as the
philosophy of science, to fulfil two requirements; firstly it must look at
scientific discoveries within the context of their era, examining the
problems they encountered and tried to resolve; secondly it must see the
full epistemological impact of the problems themselves, as they were
seen by those who formulated them, particularly if the latter did not
confine themselves to a narrow sector of empirical reality to which
science is applicable, but aimed much wider, for example at an entire
discipline such as physics, chemistry, biology or history. Concentrating
on the first type of problem epistemology studies the historical factors
which weigh ceaselessly on the evolution of the sciences; addressing the
second, it examines the transcendental factors which for a long time
determined the frameworks within which the construction of the science
in question operated.
We intend to show that for some forty years epistemology has been
more concerned with the first factors that with the second, to such an
extent that there is crisis in the way in which we consider the value of
scientific knowledge today.
Th.S. Kuhn has a special place among the science historians who
renewed the attention paid to the historical factors which renewed the
face of science in the twentieth century. In advancing the notion of
“paradigm,” which in some sort prescribes how science must be
conducted if it is to be effective in the new fields it discovers, Kuhn
certainly rid the history of science of the cumulative vision on which
positivism rested, according to which discoveries accumulate and new
discoveries do not appreciably change the sense and scope of those
preceding them.
Unfortunately Kuhn was not content to demonstrate the extent of the
scientific revolutions which mark the history of science from age to age
according to the great disciplines. He also wanted to show that these
revolutions are so profound that they completely transform the object of
scientific activity and leave only a kind of homonym between the old
concepts and the new, to such an extent that theories arising from the old
Historical and Transcendental Factors in the Construction of the Sciences 35
4. Conclusion
REFERENCES
Kuhn, Th.S. ([1977] 1990). La tension essentielle, tradition et changement dans les
sciences. Paris: Gallimard. Translation of The Essential Tension, Selected Studies in
Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Th.S. (1983). La structure des révolutions scientifiques. French translation by
Laure Meyer (from the 1970 edition). Paris: Flammarion.
Latour, B. ([1987] 1995). La Science en action : Introduction à la sociologie des sciences.
Paris: Gallimard. Revised version of Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and
Engineers through Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Juan Urrutia Elejalde
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 49-70. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
50 Juan Urrutia Elejalde
feature that one would expect to loom high in E(SK), I just assume
perfect foresight all the time, a simple case of rational expectations and a
clever way of not letting in the very rich play of expectation-forming.
Without leaving the realm of E(SK) proper, I can ask myself some
meta-questions on the pros and cons of this Solow model vs. the usual
game theory approach based on the notion of Nash equilibrium 1 or the
issue relating to the humanity or non-humanity of scientific research
strategy. These latter types of issues are not quite the same as those
encompassing E(SK) and they could be classified under the S(E(SK))
meta-heading.
For many years I have been interested in what I have called E(SK) or
S(E(SK)) and more specifically in the transformation of puzzles (or
enigmas) into problems and puzzles as a kind of conundrum that I find
both bothering and challenging. A problem only challenges me. The
challenge posed by a problem is indeed the challenge of solving that
problem. The challenge I feel when facing a puzzle is to convert it into a
well-defined problem. Although solving problems is a delicate and
decisive task, in this paper I will be considering it as automatic, taking
problems and solutions as equivalent.
My old interest in puzzles and problems was driven by policy matters
such as, for instance, how to organise scientific institutions to produce
science. More recently, I have come into contact with the Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge, S(SK), and with the death of the subject or the
bracketing out of both the subject and the world. These are rather esoteric
issues for an economist but, in any case, they shifted my attention from
the production of scientific output to the process of forming scientific
beliefs. In this process, input and output are not clear cut notions. One
way of understanding them is to think of pairs like Heidegger’s things
and objects, or Latour’s matters of fact and matters of concern. My
recent interest in these notions and in processes relating them in a
circular flow has a dual origin. In the first place, I want to explore how I
can apply economic reasoning to their understanding, and to what avail.
Here, for instance, I will try to capture the importance of visual
representation in science through the examination of a particular
economic example. But, secondly, I also want to use my economic tools
1
Using a macroeconomic model as a tool to understand issues related to the functioning of
science is a kind of “tour de force” although not a “boutade.” Not using game theory is
almost heretic but it has the novelty of not underwriting rationality of the human agent
even when talking about a scientist. However this departure from conventional modelling
allows us to cover under the same model both the modern and post-modern conceptions of
science as an “ongoing concern.” I return to this point in 3.2.
Puzzles and Problems 51
I begin by introducing the Solow model in its own terms and with a
notation which I will not bother to modify when referring to its
interpretation and/or applications. I begin with the supply side. Let Q
stand for output, the same kind of stuff as capital (K). This stuff is
produced by this capital K together with labour L. I will take the
production function to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale
from the very beginning. That is:
Q K 3 L1-3 F ( K , L)
where:
FK K FL L
3 and (1 - 3 )
F ( K , L) F ( K , L)
2
The reader may wonder why I devote several pages to reproduce with some mathematical
detail the Solow model when this model is well known and could have been recalled
graphically with greater ease. There are two reasons for proceeding the way I do. In the
first place I want to introduce in the model a public sector for reasons which will become
obvious in the sequel. Secondly, mathematics (even without explicit proof) are necessary
because I want to argue that visual representation in science can be deceitful and the
thrust of my argument is precisely that some mathematically established results are hidden
to the eye.
Puzzles and Problems 53
Fig. 2a
and it gives the social valuation of capital in terms of labour. Note than
along any isoquants the MRS diminishes southwest.
Constant returns to scale enable us to rewrite everything in per capita
terms:
Q
q f (k ) k3; f ' ! 0, f ' ' 0, where k K L
L
3 -1
FK f ' (k ) 3k
FL f (k ) - kf ' (k ) (1 - 3 ) k 3
f (k ) - kf ' (k ) (1 - 3 ) k 3
MRS
f ' (k ) 3 k 3 -1
54 Juan Urrutia Elejalde
and all these notions can be represented in figure 2.b, where the
production per capita and the MRS for a particular k, denoted by k0, are
shown.3
f (k)
q0
(W/r)0 0 k0 k
Fig. 2.b
I can now turn to the demand side of the model, specifying the
consumption function. Let consumption C be given by:
C Q - sQ (1 - s ) Q
where s can be a function of other variables and not necessarily a
constant. In per capita terms we can define c = C/L and write:
c (1 - s ) f (k ) (1 - s )k 3
in the case of the Cobb-Douglas.
3
This is a good place to explain why I have contended that the Solow model could be
thought as abstracting from individual rationality. It is not because the individual in the
model, be it the consumer-worker or the producer, is just an aggregate the rationality of
which is problematic. Even if this is indeed the case, the model presumes the
maximisation both of utility and of profit. But it does explain the evolution of the MRS
(i.e., the evolution of relative price (w/r)) which is necessary for the goods and labour
markets to be in short run equilibrium at any given time. Under these conditions I can, at
any rate, consider the model as representing a blind machine and concentrate my attention
on how this machine works in the long run under alternative interpretations. This is what I
will be doing in the next two sections.
Puzzles and Problems 55
Fig. 2.c
4
Before I turn to applications, I want to make clear at this point why I cannot squarely
face two topics which are supposed to be central to S(SK). I cannot elucidate
constructivism in the model as I have presented it because, to do so, I would have had to
introduce expectation-forming and not to make do with perfect foresight: there are no self-
fulfilling prophecies with this latter notion of expectations. Neither can I properly speak
of relativism because according to Theorem 1 there is only one equilibrium. Had I
complicated the model making n dependent on k, I would have generated multiplicity and
then it would have been possible to understand that different communities (of scientists,
for instance) would reach completely different scientific levels of development.
58 Juan Urrutia Elejalde
opportunity to look at this matter in the field and with the aid of
Economics. Go back to figure 2.a in which a map of isoquants was
depicted together with two rays from the origin each of which
represented a particular k and united points of identical MRS. In figure
3.a, I offer two panels.
Fig. 3.a
In the first direction, we observe a feature on the right hand side panel
which is not present on the left. Look at L, the number of scientists.
Along the false trajectory the difference between the number of existing
scientists and the number corresponding to the optimal k seems to
decline. But the opposite is true as shown on the right hand side panel.
The same applies to scientific resources. The number of scientists that
each year has to be introduced into the system in order to obtain a
“better” equilibrium in the production of science increases. So does the
amount of resources applied to science. The second direction in which
visual representation is dangerous in this particular case is velocity of
adjustment. In this respect, the Solow trajectory is deceitful because it
gives the wrong impression that adjustment is quick. However, the period
of adjustment, as we will see presently, is not a simple issue and can
certainly not be ascertained graphically. In this sense, the impression
given by the true trajectory is also deceitful. This example is sufficient
for us not to be as iconophilic as Latour, in his 1998 paper, claims we
should be.
Let us now turn to S(E(SK)). Here, I have three comments to make.
The first is related to Zamora’s critique of Latour/Woolgar (1979).
Zamora objects to their conception of the production of science as
credibility o resources o credibility
in an endless way which disregards any epistemic issue and looks similar
to a Marxist model of how an economy functions. According to Zamora,
the way to understand scientific production in an economically sensible
way is to embed it in a typical neoclassical model of the workings of the
economic system as in the following diagram:
commodities
consumption
money Factors Labour money
goods
of
production Intermediate
intermediate
goods
goods
Fig. 3.b.
5
This section is an example of modern thinking. In fact Economics in general uses
modern thinking and this is also the same when talking about (SK). This modern thinking
is easily characterised as making a clear distinction between “I” and “the world,” between
the “subject” and the “object” of enquiry, between “origin” and “destiny.”
Puzzles and Problems 61
x
k 0
we have that S f ( k ) = S k = nk , i.e.,
nk
S
k
Therefore, in the long-run equilibrium, we can write per capita
consumption as a function of S :
ª nk º 3
C (S ) «1 - k 3 » k k 3 - nk
¬ ¼
In order to maximise c, we have to implement a savings ratio, S, which
corresponds to a k such that
f ' (k ) 3k 3 -1 n
wt D wt D
1.b 0 and !0 for d0 ! k
wa0 wt 0
Proof. See Urrutia (1984).
Let us consider the usual case of underdeveloped countries. In these
countries, k 0 is very small and below k. We can then say that the relevant
period of adjustment is larger for those underdeveloped countries which
have initially a greater size of the public sector and/or a lower tax rate.
Note that Theorem 3 is just a mathematical implication of the model and
therefore cannot be directly related to any conventional knowledge about
the influence of the public sector on development, but it could easily be
empirically tested. However, we will make use of it to discuss matters
related to the production of science and to the scientific belief-forming
process which will be raised by different interpretations of the Solow
model.
Having introduced these two topics, I can now prove that the public
sector can implement the golden rule of accumulation. Let us use optimal
intervention to designate any pair (a0 , t 0 ) which, given S and , produces
S = S 0 = . Given the definition of S, we obtain this locus as given by
Puzzles and Problems 63
S (1 - t 0 ) - 3
a0
S (1 - t 0 )3 - 3
Given and S , the optimal size of the public sector is a0 < 1, satisfying
the above condition for 0 < t 0 < 1, which can always be obtained
provided S d 3 , as seems to be the general case. Now, the public sector
deficit can be written as follows:
a
D t F (k , L) (1 - t ) a FK K - S (1 - t )(1 - a3 ) F ( K , L)
1- a
and it is obvious that for t = 1, there is a superavit. By continuity it can
easily be shown that there is always a certain t that generates a superavit
together with the corresponding a. As an example,
aS (1 - a3 )
0t 1 generates a superavit of (1 - t ) aFk K .
aS (1 - a3 ) (1 - a )
6
This section 4 is an example of how Economics, which, as I have said in the previous
note, is in general modern, can, however, become a way of thinking which can be labelled
post-modern. This post-modern thinking brackets away the “I” and “the world” and
concentrates on the mediations between the “subject” and the “object,” between “origin”
and “destiny.” It is when abstracting from modern notions that the exploration of (SK)
becomes less conventional and more exciting, even if one is subject to the usual critique
of post-modernism as an “imposture intellectuelle” (see Sokal and Bricmont 1997). What
is unconventional about this post-modern research strategy applied to (SK) is that one is
led to shift from a correspondence theory of truth to a coherence theory of truth as is the
case with the rhetoric approach. And what makes it exciting is that it can be shown that
there are circumstances under which rhetoric is a better strategy for uncovering truths in
the correspondence sense. See Urrutia (2003).
Puzzles and Problems 65
contemplation of the object that falls to the floor when I cut my toenails,
completely deformed by psoriasis. I feel this object is absurd, but only
until I discover that my psoriatically fattened toenails show how they,
like a dolomite rock, can be divided into finer layers of corneous matter.
Then what stood as a disgusting object turns into the intelligible
implementation of an uncoordinated body process full of meaning and a
clear source of understanding about my own being. Immersed in this
mesmerising thought, I discovered the distinction made by Heidegger
between objects and things. According to Latour (2004), Heidegger
understands that an object, a jar for instance, is something against which
we unconsciously bump. A thing, however, like a car for instance, is
closer to a coordinated decision of several judges closing a cause (chose,
cosa) or a cooperative solution to a problem posed to a political assembly
(thing). As I have just said, my psoriatic toenails are more things than
objects. But this personal and existential experience becomes an
interesting research enigma if, following Latour, we associate
Heidegger’s objects (like the Roquentin root) to matters of fact (or
simply facts: incontrovertible proven facts) and Heidegger’s things, like
cars (or my psoriatic toenails), to matters of concern (or ways of caring
about certain enigmas or puzzles). Whoever elaborates a theory is
someone who cares about ideas and helps to transform them into facts.
These facts, as time goes by, detach themselves from their origin and
become the unproblematic objects we come up against or which are used
as weapons in intellectual wars. To deconstruct this fact or this object
might mean to recover its “awe” and remember that it was once subject to
the caring effort of many people. In sum, science and thinking in general
is a return ticket to travel between objects and things, between facts and
theories, between matters of fact and matters of concern. Is this travel
everlasting? Can we think about it? Can we say something about it?
These are the questions I want to explore next.
This digression leads me to the ad hoc translation I want to make of
the Solow model. What I have said in my digression can be presented in a
better way. Let G stand for a function transforming objects into things.
Let M represent the transformation of things into matters of concern and
let E transform these matters of concern into matters of fact which are
nothing but objects. However, part of these objects can be transformed
through E-1 back into matters of concern or enigmas. Consider the
following artistic example. The function G transforms sounds into music:
g (sounds) defined on all possible sounds. This new music g can be, for
instance, dodecaphonism. Then M “transforms” this new music into a
new required instrument: m (music) defined on the range of all kinds of
66 Juan Urrutia Elejalde
music. And E finally transforms the new instrument m into a new form of
concerto: e (instruments) defined over the set of all instruments. Part of
this new form of concerto e might be transformed into a new required
instrument. Now, these three functions can be composed into a single
function F, going from sounds to concertos and another function S going
from concertos to instruments and new sounds. Then the translation of
this process of science which S(SK) wants to explore (bracketing out the
subject and the world) can be represented by the previously presented
Solow model. Let L stand for enigmas or puzzles which flow at a constant
rate n. Let K stand for the problems (which can be taken to be
transformed into solutions on a one by one basis) and let F(K, L) be the
problems produced by the enigma and the solutions already obtained. Let
S(a, t) stand for the ratio of these solutions which are not consumed at a
given time and feed back to the production of more problems and
therefore solutions. In this interpretation, t might represent the number of
problems or solutions that are necessarily not consumed if we want to
maintain a constant stock of problems usable for the functioning of the
(scientific) process. In a way, the saving function and (a, t) are the
mediators between the (bracketed away) subject and the world. I will
assume that there are many attainable (a, t) pairs, something that cannot
be proved in the context of this translation. And, given this assumption, I
will take S(a 0 , t 0 ) as the golden rule of accumulation of solved problems
that can be used to obtain knowledge, or more facts.
Let us look at this interpretation carefully. F(K, L) is the number of
things or problems (= solutions) that have emerged from L puzzles and K
problems which have been reintroduced into the scientific process. Of
F(K, L), a certain percentage amounting to C is “consumed.”
Consumption here is the number of things produced which become
objects. As such objects or facts they are scientific beliefs not useful for
further advancing the scientific process. They are like branches of the
evolution of the system which cannot be expected to grow new shoots. S,
on the other hand, is the number of things produced which continue to
have research potential and are refuelled into the process of forming
scientific beliefs. How the split between C and S occurs depends on a and
t. This latter tax detracts a portion of F(K, L) that goes immediately back
to the process, a kind of forced saving of matters of fact which are then
spared from becoming just absurd objects. The remaining (1 - t) F(K, L)
can be consumed or fed back into the process. We can understand a as the
% of things which are public in the Latour sense (see Latour and Weibel).
Those public things are brought to the attention of the public and help to
determine, in part, the amount of things or problems (= solutions) which,
Puzzles and Problems 67
disgust. Therefore it seems natural to ask whether any society will ever
make the effort to jump from an initial “state of affairs” corresponding to
k 0 to the optimal state of affairs k . The answer will depend once again
on the rate of discount of the future, or impatience, and on the relevant
period of adjustment. Go back to the content of Theorem 3 and apply this
interpretation. First take a society which is now (with S 0 ) at an
equilibrium k0 , which is greater than k, the k that gives the same number
of (non-productive) facts or truths if S0 were the case. Then making many
things or problems public reduces the relevant period of adjustment as it
would decrease the number of things which are found to be fuelled back
into the problem. Now take a society where k0 < k. In this case, the
reduction of the relevant period of adjustment occurs when the stock of
things made public is small and forced saving increases. This gives some
content to the Latour and Weibel (2005) idea of “making things public.”
According to this interpretation, no policy recommendation is
possible. However, we can try to apply the last result to the
understanding of Latour’s (2004) rhetoric crisis. At the beginning (k 0 < k)
it might be appropriate, in order to reduce the relevant period of
adjustment, to have a small stock of matters of concern. But as k
increases and if k > k, then increasing the stock of matters of concern
available to the process of forming scientific beliefs will be appropriate
in order to reduce the relevant period of adjustment. Latour claims that
critique has not been understood because it has been taken as an attempt
to reduce the number of accepted facts when the case was rather that
what critique was trying to do was to increase the number of matters of
concern in such a way as to increase the “state of affairs.” What I am
surmising is that according to my E(S(SK)), we might not take Latour’s
words at their face value. After all, Latour is human and accepting his all
too human explanations might not be the right research strategy. As a
matter of structure, my result can be more convincing in the sense that
what he asserts to be the case is just the result of the passage of time. Or,
alternatively, to see everything in problem form is only a good research
strategy in societies where k > k, that is in societies which we could
describe as scientifically progressive. Or, alternatively still, his
repentance might not be just rhetoric. He should have wanted to create
problems out of facts (i.e. to increase a) until the society had reached a
point beyond k. Along these lines, his faked crisis can be understood as
the opportunistic broadening of empiricism to matters of concern when it
really helps.
Puzzles and Problems 69
Let us now summarise the answers I have given to the issues posed in the
introduction and then add some additional and brief comments.
As for Modelling, that is S(E(SK)), my main message is that a chance
should be given to Solow-like models when exploring E(SK). I have
shown that the Solow model proper is independent of human agency, has
rich and precise policy implications and captures some features of S(SK).
As for Policy I have been able to contribute to E(SK) the following
relatively new three results. First, the optimal path of scientific
production can be reached through an attainable public intervention.
Second, whether this public intervention ought to be implemented
depends in part on the relevant period of adjustment, a rather
unconventional notion. Third, the analysis of this relevant period of
adjustment and of its changes brought about by a or by t, may help to
understand the development of science. Finally and in relation to
Epistemology I have been able to produce two results on what I have
called E(S(SK)). Concerning visual representation I have shown that it
can be very misleading and in relation to epistemology proper I have
suggested that the proliferation I have uncovered (which certainly
broadens empiricism) forces a reconsideration of the desideratum of
science.
The final comments that I feel obliged to add are of a different nature.
They recognise, as I did in note 4, that this “macroeconomic” way of
looking at science in an evolving social system has not been able to say
anything of interest concerning the constructivism and relativism of
science. Is it then completely devoid of epistemic value? Well, I have
already isolated some epistemic issues; but something else can be added.
On the one hand, I have shown that iconophilia does not add to the
epistemic value whatever its importance as “condensed mediations”
between “I” (the mind) and “the world.” On the other hand, it should be
clear that not all epistemic misconceptions carry errors. For instance, the
false Solow trajectory of adjustment would have never inoculated any
error in the calculations of the period of adjustment.
70 Juan Urrutia Elejalde
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Longer Required for Research Purposes: A Debate between Bruno Latour and Steve
Fuller. History of the Human Sciences 16 (2), 77-99.
Burmeister E., and A.R. Dobell (1970). Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth. New
York: McMillan.
Latour, B. (1998). How to Be Iconophilic in Art, Science and Religion. In: C.A. Jones and
P.L. Galison (eds.), Picturing Science, Producing Art, pp. 418-440. New York:
Routledge.
Latour, B. (2004). Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters
of Concern. Critical Enquiry 30 (2), 225-248.
Latour, B. and P. Weibel (2005). Making Things Public. Atmospheres of Democracy.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Latour, B. and S. Woolgar (1979). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts.
2nd edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sokal, A. and J. Bricmont (1997). Impostures Intellectuelles. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Solow, R.M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 70 (1), 65-94.
Urrutia, J. (1982). Curiosidades y paradojas en un modelo elemental de teoría neoclásica
del crecimiento. Boletín de Estudios Económicos 37 (116), 367-384.
Urrutia, J. (1984). La influencia del sector público y de la distribución en la velocidad de
ajuste a trayectorias óptimas de crecimiento. Boletín de Estudios Económicos 39
(121), 201-209.
Urrutia, J. (2003). La potencia semántica de la retórica (un planteamiento de óptimo
subsidiario y racionalidad limitada). In: G. Marqués and A. Avila (eds), Objetividad,
Realismo y Retórica. Nuevas perspectivas en metodología de la economía, pp. 63-86.
Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Zamora, J. (2005). Ciencia pública – ciencia privada. Reflexiones sobre la producción del
saber científico. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 71-81. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
72 Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla
So, imagine the following situation: 1) you are a scientists and you
have to decide whether entering a “race” for the solution of an unsolved
scientific problem or not; 2) you are a “recognition-seeking,” that is, your
fundamental goal is having your own solution to the problem explicitly
accepted by your colleagues; and 3) the other participants in the “race”
have exactly the same kind of motivation as you. Besides this, imagine
you have red or heard something about contemporary philosophy of
science, and so you know that no scientific hypothesis can be
conclusively confirmed (I actually think that most researchers are aware
of this possibility without knowing anything about philosophical
epistemology). So, to the purported solutions presented by your
competitors, you could always respond that they are not still “supported
enough” by the facts; this entails that you will never be forced to accept a
solution advanced by a colleague. Your problem is that all your rivals
have also the same option regarding the solutions presented by everybody
else! Obviously, the conclusion is that the game of research is absolutely
pointless for you, because you know a priori that you will never have a
chance of “winning” the game, that there is nothing you can do in order
to force your competitors to recognise that your solution is the right one.
Expressed in game theoretical terms, the equilibrium (or at least one of
the possible equilibria) of the “persuasion game” is that each researcher
would adopt the strategy of never accepting publicly a solution proposed
by another researcher.
The history and sociology of science show us that this situation
happens very frequently: no agreement is reached in many research
processes. But my argument is that, if scientists are “recognition-
seekers,” and if they have always open the possibility of rejecting a
rival’s solution for not being “confirmed enough,” then we could never
observe a general agreement about a scientific fact, theory or law.
Actually we could never observe anything like scientific research,
because it would be a game that nobody would like to play. Hence, if
science does exist, and if agreements about facts, laws or theories do
exist, then it is necessary to conclude that the game of scientific research
is organised in such a way that scientists do not have permanently open
the possibility of rejecting the solutions presented by their rivals. There
must be some circumstances where the acceptance of a proposed solution
becomes compulsory. Or, stated differently, we can conclude that:
1) every game of scientific research must be subjected to some rules, and
2) researchers must know that their colleagues usually comply with these
norms. If these conditions are not met, recognition-seeking researchers
will simply have no interest at all in playing the “persuasion game.”
Normativity and Self-Interest in Scientific Research 75
one described in the past section, and it can be shown that, under some
reasonable assumptions, the adopted methodological norms will usually
be sensibly sound from the epistemic point of view. Let us consider these
“rationalist” aspects.
Firstly, what kinds of norms can be expected to arise in a negotiation
among “recognition-seeking” researchers. It seems that three types of
them are needed, at least:
(1) Inferential norms: these tell that, if a researcher has accepted
certain propositions, and if another proposition stands in certain
specified relation with the former ones, then that researcher will be
forced to accept also the later proposition. For example, norms of
this type will establish when is a hypothesis “well supported
enough” to make its acceptance compulsory. These rules are useful
for a “recognition-seeking” researcher because they indicate what
statements you have to persuade your colleagues about, before
attaining the public acceptance of your hypothesis.
(2) Observational norms: in order to prevent the strategic denial to
accept any statement that can “trigger” the undesired acceptance of
a rival’s theory through the rules of the first type, it is necessary
that the commitment about some kinds of propositions is
compulsory for reasons different from the previous acceptance of
other statements. Typically, observations and experiments (or
specific parts of them) are the natural locus of this type of norms,
though probably nor the only one.
(3) Distributional norms: these norms govern the allocation of the
power to control the resources needed for making research and
communicating their results. Obviously, this power is interesting
for scientists not only for the ability they confer to increase the
probability of getting their theories accepted, but also because
many other “private benefits” accrue to them together with that
power (I admit that these rules are less appropriately called
“methodological”).
Secondly, it is perhaps more important to notice some properties that
any “reasonable” system of rules must have. These properties are
grounded on the very nature of the negotiation process through which the
rules are established:
(1) Norms are usually chosen “under the veil of ignorance” (to use a
Rawlsian expression). It is certainly possible that accepting a norm
may be interesting for you on a particular occasion because that
norm “supports” the theory you are proposing; but committing to a
Normativity and Self-Interest in Scientific Research 77
you are much better at Latin than the rest, but in this case it is just this
differential ability what will make your competitors abstain from
accepting a norm so clearly benefiting you. In any case, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to ground your decision about which norm to accept on
an estimation of your probability of success. What other criteria will you
employ, then? It seems to be a benevolent assumption that, ceteris
paribus, researchers will prefer methodological norms which are
consistent with the maximisation of the epistemic value of the theories
which happen to win in the game of persuasion. After all, why would
they have chosen a scientific career as a means of getting public
recognition, instead of other kinds of activities, as pop music, sports, or
politics, if they did not worry at all about the attainment of
“knowledge”?
A last important point in connection with this is that, although the
contractarian approach to scientific norms leaves some space to the
influence of epistemic factors in the choice of the rules (and hence in the
justification of scientific knowledge), we can not interpret this result as a
return of the classical view of epistemologists as deciding a priori how
the pursuit of knowledge has to be. Because it is essential to recall that,
even if epistemic values enter into the negotiation of scientific norms,
this values are those of the researchers who are taking part in it, not
those of the philosopher or the “science student” who are observing the
process from outside. This is again something that our approach shares
with that of many scientific naturalists, though I want to point towards an
aspect more specific of the contractarian view: the assumption that an
explicit or implicit agreement between the members of a scientific
discipline is the only legitimate way of “aggregating” the epistemic
preferences of all these individual scientists. Nevertheless, it is true that
other agents outside the research field or even outside science may have
an interest in negotiating the norms according to which the game of
research is played, and the study of this interaction can also be an
interesting point of contact between the approach defended here and
other approaches in the field of social epistemology.
The past two sections have been devoted to show why recognition-
seeking researchers are interested in establishing a set of methodological
norms and what are the fundamental types and properties of these norms.
But it is legitimate to ask still a further question, which is whether a
Normativity and Self-Interest in Scientific Research 79
to you what facts or theories are accepted by your colleagues. So, the
only question relevant for you is whether your colleagues obey the rules
or not: if they do it, you will be rewarded for doing “good research”
(“good” according to the accepted norms), and you will get nothing
otherwise; if they do not obey the rules, you will get nothing no matter
what you do, because they are not going to accept your own theory
however much effort you might put in defending it. So, the game of
persuasion has two possible equilibria in general: either no one obeys the
rules of the game (and this means that no research is done, save perhaps
by isolated people), or everybody does (though, in this case, further
problems arise when deciding which norms to institute). Under the
contractarian vision of scientific method I am defending here, the first of
these two equilibria would represent something like the “state of nature,”
or, to express it in popular Kuhnian terms, perhaps the state of scientific
disciplines in their “pre-paradigmatic period.” The emergence of a
“paradigm,” as well as its subsequent changes, can then be seen as the
outcomes of collective negotiations on a “methodological contract.”
Unfortunately, the argument of the preceding paragraph does not
entirely solve the problem stated in this section, for it only works
properly with inferential and observational norms, i.e., the rules
governing what propositions have to be accepted. Distributional norms,
instead, open the possibility of enjoying other types of benefits (income,
travels, power, relief from boring activities, and so on), and people who
have control over this kind of resources will surely be tempted to use
them to their own advantage. It seems that, “under the veil of ignorance,”
scientists will prefer that an institutional mechanism is established that
guarantees that a closer relation exists between the level of recognition
one has reached and the resources and advantages that one can enjoy.
Anyway, the design of such a self-enforcing, self-policing mechanism (if
actual institutions are not satisfactory) is a difficult problem which offers
a promising avenue of research for students of the economics of science.
If we desired something like a “moral” from this section, we could
affirm that the norms for accepting facts, theories and laws prevailing in
a scientific discipline are very probably “right,” in the sense that
everybody trying to enter into the discipline to make a “critical
examination” of the knowledge produced by its members would conclude
that those norms are acceptable, given all the available the information.
On the contrary, the actual norms of distribution of resources within
science will probably be more subject to criticism, in the sense that the
interests of many people outside science may be strongly affected by the
establishing (and enforcing) of some system of norms instead of another.
Normativity and Self-Interest in Scientific Research 81
5. Conclusion
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 85-112. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
86 Wenceslao J. González
In recent decades there has been a philosophical shift from the idea of
science as wertfrei or value-free 1 to the acceptance of the scientific
undertakings as “value laden.” This feature is generally assumed
nowadays: any science (formal or empirical) carries out values. This trait
1
“An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do – but rather what he can do
– and under certain circumstances – what he wishes to do” (Weber [1904] 1951, p. 151;
1949, p. 54).
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 87
2
Formal sciences, such as mathematics, can be seen from this viewpoint, cf. Gonzalez
(1991).
3
This is the case not only among different versions of scientific realism but also in the
approach of pragmatic idealism, cf. Rescher (1997, pp. 172-196) and (1999a, pp. 73-96).
4
On objectivity in Weber’s wertfrei, cf. Agazzi (1999, especially pp. 181-183).
5
The latter is understood in the sense and reference present in Simon (1996). Economics
is also a science of the artificial, cf. Gonzalez (forthcoming).
6
De facto, there is an increasing interest in “Economics of science” in recent times, cf.
Wible (1998).
88 Wenceslao J. González
But the values can go beyond that point: they also have repercussion on
the processes as well as on results of scientific activities.
Axiology of research should deal with the different kinds of values
(cognitive, social, economic, etc.) that have influence on the scientific
activity. Thus, the whole set of values in science (“internal” and
“external,” cognitive and social, epistemic and practical, . . . ) are studied
by axiology of research. This is a domain of philosophy of science, and it
has been intensively developed in the last two decades. Moreover,
axiology of research is a philosophical domain that accompanies the main
areas of this field: semantics of science, logic of science, epistemology,
methodology of science, ontology of science, and ethics of science.
Among the relevant values for doing science are economic values.
They influence a variety of aspects – aims, processes, and results – of
scientific activity. Generally, economic values in science are in one way
or another related to a cost-benefit evaluation: effectiveness, efficiency,
profitability, utility, productivity, prosperity, etc. They are related to
science as a human activity, because scientific activity seeks aims or
goals which are singled out or picked out according to values (among
them, economic ones). But economic values also affect scientific means
and outcomes of scientific undertakings.
Since 1984, when the book Science and Values was published, the
new value-laden attitude was seen as a standard among philosophers of
science, and the old value-free tendency was no longer assumed among
specialists. However, the subtitle of the book was very clear: “The aims
of science and their role in scientific debate” (Laudan 1984), because the
focus was on aims rather than on processes or results. Thus, even though
the concern of Larry Laudan was with cognitive values as well as
methodological norms and rules, his particular interest was “the role of
cognitive values in the shaping of scientific rationality” (Laudan 1984,
p. xii). At the same time, he recognized that “the question of precisely
how one distinguishes cognitive values or aims from noncognitive ones is
quite complex” (Laudan 1984, p. xi). Moreover, his view places
“cognitive values” in the realm of “aims,” insofar as he states that “an
attribute will count as a cognitive value or aim if that attribute represents
a property of theories which deem to be constitutive of “good science””
(Laudan 1984, p. xii).
Laudan’s explicit interest has been in cognitive values. In his book
Science and Values he also recognized the existence of ethical values in
science,7 but it is difficult to find in his text statements directly related to
7
“Ethical values are always present in scientific decision making and, very occassionally,
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 89
the interconnection between cognitive goals of science and the rest of our
goals as human beings. These aspects are highlighted by Rescher (cf.
Gonzalez 1999a, pp. 21-22). For him, one of the key values of science as
a human cognitive project is “its selflimitation based in a need to
recognize that there are limits to the extent to which this project can be
realized.” 10
Assuming that science is limited, their values are also bounded. Some
of the limits are in the epistemological and ontological areas. This
recognition is based on the acknowledgement that the composition itself
of reality (natural or social) can be a limit for our cognitive control
through science. In addition, Rescher conceives scientific goals (mainly,
cognitive ones) as related to the rest of our goals (social, cultural,
economic, etc.). Thus, besides the teleological character of science, this
viewpoint insists on science as a human undertaking in a contextual
setting rather than in a purely cognitive project or an isolated doing. In
other words, science belongs to a human network.
Holism of values follows from the interconnection between scientific
goals and other human goals: they can be seen as a “system.” Moreover,
Rescher thinks that the distinction between internal and external values
of science is a “distinction” but not a separation (Gonzalez 1999a, p. 22).
i) The structure of human needs and goals is larger than mere human
cognition alone. The aim of controlling reality is only one valid human
aim among others. There are many other valid human needs and
desiderata. ii) Even though knowledge is not an all sufficient be-all and
end-all, it is itself a human need-a situational requisite of ourselves as the
sort of creatures that we are. iii) The internal values of science
(consistency, generality, comfortability, etc.) are what they are because
this is necessary to achieve effectively the applicative aims of science
(effective prediction and control), and these aims of science are what
they are because they inhere in the large situational requirements of us
humans as homo sapiens.
Hence, Rescher proposes a holism that binds the sphere of values
together, and he sees them as a matter of the effective servicing of human
needs. De facto, he offers a practical framework for the role of values in
science. Within it there is a clear space for economic values, which he
conceives have a role in science as human project and, consequently,
they are values that are related to human needs. Thus, the analysis here of
economic values and scientific progress will consider his approach more
10
Rescher, personal communication, 27 August 1998.
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 91
closely than the conception of Laudan, where the cognitive values are
shaping scientific rationality (Laudan 1994, p. xii).
progress. Economic values can be considered in this regard, but they are
not commonly placed in a key role.
It seems noticeable to me that Laudan and Rescher, two philosophers
who focus particularly on scientific progress and the role of values in it,
coincide in emphasizing the diversity of aims or goals of science and, at
the same time, they insist on the preference for the cognitive factor above
of other scientific components (social, cultural, political, etc.). However,
there are also philosophic-methodological differences between these two
thinkers, because they differ on boundaries of the values in science, as
well as in the problem of how to articulate the whole set of scientific
values. In addition, the explicit connection between economic values and
scientific progress appears in the latter rather than in the former.
Rescher’s approach on scientific progress is frequently based on the
language of cost and benefit, because – for him – cost-effectiveness is a
salient aspect of rationality, where the benefits of knowledge can be
theoretical (or purely cognitive) or practical (or applied). On the one
hand, among the internal benefits of sciences is the increasing capacity
that a science has to provide explanation and prediction, which also
contribute explicitly to the human worldview as well as the solution of
many practical problems of everyday life. On the other hand, there are
growing external costs, mainly in the natural sciences and in the sciences
of the artificial, which are due to the enlarging complexity of the
phenomena studied as well as the greater difficulty in learning and
mastery.11 These internal and external aspects of economic values related
to scientific progress require a closer analysis, which is developed in the
following sections.
11
“The historical situation has been one of a constant progress of science as a cognitive
discipline notwithstanding its exponential growth as a productive enterprise (as measured
in terms of resources, money, manpower, publications, etc.)” (Rescher 1998, p. 85).
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 93
However, the distinction between internal and external shows that the
economic values are of Rescher’s interest insofar as they are related with
science itself (i.e., the internal perspective), rather than science as
connected to the rest of the human experience (i.e., the domain of
external perspective): his analysis of economic values is made in
connection to methodology of science, a dominion that – using some
insights of Charles S. Peirce – he calls “economy of research.”12
Moreover, his book Scientific Progress – a central book of his
methodological contribution – is conceived as a philosophical essay on
the economics of research in natural science (Rescher 1978).
In other words, Rescher’s main purpose is to clarify values – in
general, and economic values, in particular – mostly in the context of
scientific processes, whereas Laudan clearly focuses the attention on the
area of aims (mainly, in cognitive values). But a general framework of
values should make explicit – in my judgment – the values of the realm
of outcomes or results, in addition to those values of aims and processes.
Moreover, there is a relevant place for the role of economic values within
this triple realm (aims, processes, and results).
1) Economic values can evaluate the outcomes or results of scientific
activities (as intellectual achievements and as products of society),
mainly in the case of applied science (pharmacology, economics, library
science, etc.), where the connection with economic markets (including
the stock market) is clearer than in the case of basic science. In effect,
this economic repercussion of the scientific outcomes is more relevant in
design sciences (i.e., sciences of the artificial), due to their relation to
technology. 2) Economic values of results or outcomes, which obviously
have been obtained after the aims and processes, can be used to compare
the validity of what has been achieved and what was expected. This
comparative factor may be a starting point for changes in science,
according to the self-corrective nature of science. Thus, the cost-benefit
analysis can appear in the evaluation of the three scientific realms as
human activity: aims, processes, and results or outcomes.
Additionally, besides the triple realm of values in science, I consider
that economic values can be seen in the internal perspective of science,
and then they affect scientific knowledge and method; and they can also
be considered from the external point of view, where two directions
appear: on the one hand, values which have influence on science as social
activity connected to other human activities of social character; and, on
12
Cf. Rescher (1989, p. ix) and (1996, p. 3). The idea comes from some reflections made
around 1896 and published in Peirce (1931, vol. 1, sect. 1.122).
96 Wenceslao J. González
13
The analysis follows here Gonzalez (2001, pp. 17-20).
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 97
14
On the relations between economic values and technology, cf. Gonzalez (1999b).
98 Wenceslao J. González
15
This conception can be seen in his books Cognitive Economy: The Economic Dimension
of the Theory of Knowledge and Priceless Knowledge?
100 Wenceslao J. González
16
This instrumental character of human reason is also present in the field where Simon
has worked more on goals: political science. In this area, he describes and analyzes some
problems (conflicting goals, salient goals, focus of attention, group identifications, . . . )
and several goals (search of power, pursuit of private interest, . . . ), but he does not offer
an examination of the validity or not of those goals. Moreover, he seems to exclude any
chance for an evaluative rationality of ends: “rationality can only go to work after final
goals are specified; it does not determine them” (Simon 1995, p. 60).
102 Wenceslao J. González
17
These reflections are based on Gonzalez (2001, pp. 30-33).
18
The insistence on the relevance of economic values of social character is wholly
compatible with dismissing a “finalization thesis,” that can lead to determine from an
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 103
extrinsic base the scientific process itself. Cf. Niiniluoto (1984), pp. 226-243; and
Gonzalez (1990), pp. 100-104.
104 Wenceslao J. González
19
On the role of economic rationality in connection to science and technology, cf.
Gonzalez (1998a), pp. 95-115, especially pp. 97-107.
20
“It is important to distinguish applied science from the applications of science. The
former is a part of knowledge production, the latter is concerned with the use of scientific
knowledge and methods for the solving of practical problems of action (e.g., in
engineering or business), where a scientist may play the role of a consult” (Niiniluoto
1993, p. 9).
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 105
21
“The impressive scope of recent advances in science has tended to obscure the fact that
this progress has been achieved at an increasingly high cost in manpower, talent, and
resources devoted to scientific work. The sheer volume of progress has masked the
circumstance that the actual rate of return in terms of high-quality results per unit
investment has been decreasing over time” (Rescher 1978, p. 120).
22
Cf. González (2005), pp. 8-13. The relations between science, technology and society –
including the topic of “technoscience” – have been analyzed in a large amount of
publications, among them are those listed in Gonzalez (2005, pp. 37-49).
23
This feature also appears explicitly in the subtitles of two books: “A Philosophical
Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science,” in the case of Scientific
Progress, and “Natural Science in Economic Perspective,” in the volume Priceless
Knowledge?
106 Wenceslao J. González
24
Cf. Blaug (1980), p. 248. As it is well-known, the Nobel Prize winner in 1992, Gary S.
Becker, studies social realities, such as family or prisons from a purely economic angle,
cf. Becker (1976 and 1981).
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 107
25
The internal and external economic values of technology are analyzed in Gonzalez
(1999b, pp. 69-96, especially pp. 72-95).
26
“Inferences from sample to population, from part to whole (from the jaws to the entire
alligator), from style to authorship, from clue to culprit, from symptom to disease, and the
like, are all also modes of inductive reasoning. The characteristic and crucial thing about
inductive reasoning is its overreaching the evidence in hand to move to conclusions lying
beyond the informative reach of relatively insufficient data” (Rescher 1989, p. 83).
108 Wenceslao J. González
27
For Laudan, “epistemic values” (truth, falsity, . . . ) can be distinguishd from “cognitive
values” (cope, generality, coherence, consilience, explanatory, . . . ), cf. Laudan (2004,
p. 20).
28
Rescher, personal communication, 27 August 1998.
29
Cf. Laudan (1984), pp. xi-xii, n. 2. When he proposes a reticular model of scientific
rationality, he points out: “Doubtless a wide range of cognitive goals or values can satisfy
the demands laid down here” (Laudan 1984, p. 63).
30
Cf. Rescher (1999a), section 3.6, pp. 93-96. On the use of economic rationality as
intermediation between scientific rationality and technological rationality, cf. Gonzalez
(1998a), pp. 95-115.
Economic Values in the Configuration of Science 109
31
On the relations between applied science and technology, cf. Gonzalez (2005),
pp. 11-12 and 24-26.
110 Wenceslao J. González
University of A Coruña
Faculty of Humanities
Dr. Vazquez Cabrera street, w/n
15402-Ferrol
Spain
e-mail: wencglez@udc.es
REFERENCES
ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes some issues derived from the social turn in
the philosophy of science. The point of departure is the transformation of science
into technoscience. If technoscience is conceived of as a system of human
actions, then it requires the consideration of both epistemological and
methodological parameters and the analysis of ethical, political, economic, and
social aspects. This involves the necessity of assessing these parameters as a
whole, by using a broad notion of value, namely, a pragmatic notion of value.
Accordingly, value will henceforth be a “pattern-guideline of solving problems.”
It leads to considering the philosophy of science as an axiology of technoscience.
The following issues are developed: i) science as a value-laden enterprise;
ii) value assessment as a task in the philosophy of science, which means
justifying some special methodologies of assessment; iii) the proposal of specific
criteria for establishing social policies of science and technology.
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 113-125. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
114 Ramón Queraltó
without any real separation from science, since they are concretely
intertwined and, so to speak, consubstantial [. . .]. This in particular
justifies the use of the term technoscience for designating this new
reality” (Agazzi 2001, p. 127).
In turn, the conception of technoscience necessarily involves the
consideration of social factors in order to correctly understand the
structure and the nature of contemporary sciences. A preliminary
conclusion to be drawn from this is that it is possible to assert that the
impact of technoscience may imply an enlargement of the traditional
boundaries of the philosophy of science.
Within the philosophy of science, the received view considered
essential the methodological, logical, and epistemological traits of
scientific knowledge, but other factors such as ethical, political or
economic concerns were not particularly focused upon. At present,
however, these social factors possess a specific relevance. Because of
this they have been added to those traditional parameters in order to
obtain a correct view of scientific activity.
In this respect, two main reasons have to be pointed out. On the one
hand, the massive impact of technoscientific outputs on human life and
on nature; on the other hand, the proper quality of technoscience itself.
We devote our analysis to this last issue.
The relevance of social factors derives especially from the specific
meaning of technoscience. As a primary trait, technoscience is conceived
of as a system of human actions based on the results of scientific
knowledge and directed toward the transformation of reality with the goal
of achieving benefits for humankind. This is a standard conception of
technoscience (Mitcham 1994; Echeverría 2003). So the aim of techno-
science is to transform reality in order to obtain practical profits.
Consequently, technoscience emphasizes the relevance of the pragmatic
aspect of scientific knowledge. From this initial description originate
both types of factors above mentioned: first, the necessity of scientific
knowledge as such, which involves especially methodological and
epistemological issues; and, at the same time, it also implies social
factors, given that technoscience is considered a system of human actions
that are envisaged as attaining a set of presumable profits to man.
Thus, technoscience is both a knowing enterprise (its scientific
aspect) and also a pragmatic enterprise including concrete engagements
directed to modify nature, reality, and man. This last element implies
necessarily that technoscience becomes a value-laden enterprise too, as
far as it is characterised as a system of human actions.
The Philosophical Impact of Technoscience or the Development of a . . . 115
University of Sevilla
Research Unit on Science, Technology, and Society
Facultad de Filosofía
Camilo José Cela S/N, 41018 Sevilla
Spain
e-mail: queralto@us.es
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PART 3
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 129-142. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
130 Alberto Cordero
1
See, for example, McMullin (1983), Brown (1989), and Cordero (1992, 2004a, 2004b,
and 2005).
Epistemology and “the Social” in Contemporary Natural Science 131
2
My presentation here follows Okruhlik (1994).
132 Alberto Cordero
3
In point of fairness, a major – and more credible – worry in Keller (1983) concerns the
illusiveness of pretending that science has absolutely no cultural background.
4
Cases in point are allegedly available in speculative fields, particularly in certain areas
of psychology and the social sciences (Gilligan 1982).
Epistemology and “the Social” in Contemporary Natural Science 135
the moment and look first into the related matter of interdisciplinary
success.
Although I have addressed only a specific case study regarding
socially driven calls for epistemological reforms of type (3), the approach
I have followed seems to have similar implications for other
interventions originating from the broader social sphere (on behalf of
such presently disregarded ways of “looking at things” as ethnic
cosmologies, minority science, epistemological anarchism, and so on).
There is no denying that bringing multiple points of view into
research projects can be epistemologically beneficial sometimes. Clear
favorable instances suggest some significant epistemological traits at
work, or so I will argue. Here my choice of success story is the
development of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (SR). The studies
and research for this theory, conducted mostly during Einstein’s years as
doctoral student at the Swiss Federal Polytechnic in Zurich, brought
together insights and ways of thinking from a variegated array of
disciplinary perspectives. The scientific success of this case, I will
suggest, attests not to the benefits of any general “pluralism,” but to
Einstein’s having been able to critically discern relevant epistemic local
connections between the perspectives he brought to bear on his studies.
sense), this is not enough to let the general argument for pluralism get
through.
We are thus left with a question: Why something like the pluralist
strategy worked so well in Einstein’s and other major scientific cases?
Arguably, in Einstein’s work one prominent reason has to do with
something already hinted at: the perspectives that converged were
brought in because of explicitly recognized relevance to Einstein’s
scientific goals at the time. The multiple concerns and disciplines he
pulled together were fairly autonomous from each other, yet their
respective domains overlapped in ways that invited specific questions on
and/or answers to the issues he was addressing. Consider the following
sample of connections readily discernible regarding the technological and
cultural influences at play in the episode. Let us begin with the
“pragmatic” approach at Einstein’s school, the Zurich Polytechnic, where
the teaching of theoretical science emphasized application to situations of
practical interest through detailed modelling. This was not pragmatism of
an instrumentalist or anti-realist sort the way these terms are understood
in philosophy. Its focus was on distinguishing within specific theoretical
narratives what did and did not have clear experimental consequences,
and directing trust accordingly. This emphasis is apparent in much of the
of work done at the Polytechnic in theoretical physics and chemistry
during Einstein’s time there, including his thesis research on molecular
diffusion, in which predictive power is explicitly valued as an
epistemically desirable feature. But, of course, attributing predictive
power to a narrative does not make it true. In principle a successful
account can be false. How to interpret this possibility has been a matter
of philosophical debate since the early days of modern science. It is still
with us.
At the Polytechnic, faculty tended to sneer at the mere logical
possibility that massively successful theories might turn out to be
completely wrong. For example, the ultimate, “true” nature of heat may
forever escape us, but nevertheless at the Polytechnic the kinetic theory
of matter was recognized as leading very convincingly to a mechanical
conception in which heat is but mechanical motion. Importantly, this
“Polytechnic mentality” was not without precedent in modern natural
philosophy. It had clear precursors in earlier science, most famously
Newton’s work. Forceful intimations are apparent in, for example, his
fourth rule of reasoning:
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true,
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such
Epistemology and “the Social” in Contemporary Natural Science 139
time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more
accurate, or liable to exceptions. (Newton 1934, p. 400; my emphasis)
The above rule gestures toward what would become a non-trivial defense
of ampliative inference against global (philosophical) skeptical readings
of theoretical accounts. Nevertheless, as questions first about Newton’s
Absolute Space and later on about the ether had revealed, the ampliative
force licensed by Newton could be overgenerous.
Newton’s Rule needed a purgative supplement. One move, available
to Einstein at the time of his exertions, was Hertz’s reaction to theoretical
sub-plots found to be dubiously connected with specific predictions –
conspicuously the ether story. Such plots Hertz regarded as optional
interpretation. Hertz, who had experimentally demonstrated the existence
of electromagnetic waves and expressed strong doubts about the physical
significance of the received distinction between electricity and
magnetism, thought Maxwell’s theory should be completely freed of
assumptions about the ether. The young Einstein developed a great
admiration for the way Hertz had centered Maxwell’s theory in a few
basic equations. A similarly sobering, yet still non-skeptical approach to
physical theories was further encouraged in Einstein by the Patent Office
at Bern, where everybody was “officially” aware of the excessive fertility
of the imagination.
And so, I suggest, Einstein’s revamped “scientific way” of under-
standing the scope and limits of credible theoretical representation was
eminently contemporary yet also continuous with earlier responses to
skepticism within fundamental physics. It was a way centered on an
appreciation of the epistemic value of predictive power in the search for
the underlying constituents of nature.
At least equally important was Einstein’s interest in epistemology and
philosophy in general. The young Einstein studied the modern period
well, from Descartes to Kant, and his epistemic interest in physics was
ostensibly helped throughout the first decade of the century by his
detailed exposure to the major current philosophical debates about
science. Einstein’s insight into the ease with which people end up
believing too much was especially helped by the works of J.S. Mill, Karl
Pearson, Richard Avenarius, and Ernest Mach, thinkers whose
philosophical reflections impinged directly on the received notions of
absolute time and the ether.
Einstein’s attitude towards the ether in electromagnetism proceeded
largely in step with his intellectual immersion in the variegated
perspectives just mentioned, from his initial unease about the ether
concept to his realization that, once the intuitive notion of the ether had
140 Alberto Cordero
been demoted, that posit had become an onerous fiction, a medium whose
movement was kept in the narrative even though it seemed impossible to
empirically ascribe any measurable effect to it. His thought on how to
conceive of time and space in physics developed in a similar way.
Lorentz and Poincaré would remain forever committed to distinguishing
between “real” and “apparent” times, even after it became clear that the
distinction could not be grounded it in any empirically discernible matter
of fact. Unlike Poincaré, Einstein started by defining the position of a
point with respect to a system of rigid rods, supplemented by his new
definition of simultaneity.
Einstein’s emphasis on the epistemic value of predictive power,
already strong in 1905, grew stronger still in the following decade. With
SR reasonably well articulated as a theory, we find Einstein repeatedly
insisting that the only theoretical narratives of interest are those that lead
to results accessible in principle to experience. The important task for the
1910s, he urged, was to make the most accurate experiments possible in
order to test the foundations of the theory. Further speculation and
conjecture alone would not take anyone far, he remarked time and again.
5. Concluding Remarks
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Jesús Mosterín
ABSTRACT. The history of genetics offers abundant material for the study of
the influence of social factors in the development of science. Several of these
factors are listed and briefly touched upon. Especial attention is paid to the
interference of political power in the business of science, exemplified and
analyzed in the tragic case of the Lysenko affair, which lead to the death of the
best geneticists of Russia and the destruction of a whole and fruitful scientific
community.
1. Genetics
The epistemic development of genetics in the last hundred years has been
frequently hampered or boosted by the interference of social factors and
polemics. Therefore, the history of genetics offers a wealth of case-
studies and a touchstone on which to test hypothesis about the relations
between epistemology and society. Let’s recall some of the milestones of
this history and some of the issues involved.
One of the main social factors affecting the dynamics of scientific
development is the role of diffusion and communication in science.
Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) discovered his famous laws of genetics and
the “hereditary factors” (now called the genes) in the course of a heroic
series of experiments with peas. His seminal paper, “Versuche über
Pflanzen-Hybriden” (1865), included the results of the experiments and
the formulation of his laws. It was published in an obscure Czech journal,
Verhandlungen des naturforschenden Vereines von Brünn. For 35 years,
no one read his paper, not even Charles Darwin, who had received a
reprint of the paper that remained unopened in his library. So, Mendel’s
work which had no influence at all in the development of genetics until it
was rediscovered in 1900, long after his death.
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 143-155. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
144 Jesús Mosterín
2. Mutations
The laws of Mendel, the germinal line of Weismann and the whole
formal and mathematical character of classical genetics emphasized the
permanent, immutable aspect of hereditary transmission. As already
pointed at, this led some people to think that there was an incompatibility
between genetics and the Darwinian theory of evolution, which rather
stresses change in the characteristics of organisms. Only through change
can variability be produced, so that there are different alternatives for
natural selection to choose from. The solution to the conundrum was
found in the discovery of mutations. Genes are generally transmitted in
an immutable manner as perfect copies, but sometimes there are
exceptions, accidental changes, errors of copy or mutations.
Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), who had rediscovered Mendel’s laws,
based on his own botanical observations, completed Mendel’s theory
with the introduction of mutations. De Vries inferred their existence, but
had no idea of how they were implemented in the material world. It
would be up to Hermann Muller to prove that mutations are real by
producing them in the laboratory. So in the middle of the 20th century it
was already known that genes reside in the chromosomes, that they are
made of DNA and that sometimes they change by mutation.
Hermann J. Muller (1890-1967) studied genetics with Thomas
H. Morgan and taught at the University of Texas and at Columbia
University. In 1926 he presented the first genetic theory of the origin of
life: The first living organism had been a randomly formed gene with the
properties of being autocatalytic (replication), heterocatalytic (metabo-
lism), mutable (subject to evolution) and autotrophic. From 1925 on, he
taught genetics and evolution, and did research mainly on mutations.
Between 1918 and 1926, he formulated the chief principles of
spontaneous gene mutation as now recognized: most mutations are
146 Jesús Mosterín
and death to the best geneticists of the Soviet Union and caused the
complete collapse of the science of biology in that country, in marked
contrast with the continuous flourishing of physics and mathematics
under the communist regime. The Lysenko affair is the best known and
most dramatic case of extreme interference of politics in science. As the
geneticist Michael Lerner pointed out,
the story of Soviet genetics in the period 1937-1964 is, perhaps, the most
bizarre chapter in the history of modern science. In a society devoted to
the betterment of the lot of peasants and workers, an illiterate and
fanatical charlatan was allowed absolute dictatorship and control over
both research in biology and practical agriculture. This event not only
stifled the development of science, but also had a far-reaching and
destructive influence on the national economy of the Soviet Union. To the
outside world, it was completely incomprehensible that a country capable
of developing a nuclear potential rivalling that of the United States, and
of establishing itself in the forefront of space exploration, could have
entrusted its fundamental resources to exploitation by an obvious quack.
(Medvedev 1969, p. V)
The 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent 1918-1920 civil
war completely disrupted agriculture. By 1921, food shortages were
acute. The forced collectivization of agriculture by Stalin in the early
1930s dealt food production in Russia a further and severe blow.
Collectivization attempts had been very violent, involving the deportation
and eventual deaths in camps of hundreds of thousands of peasants, and
were followed by a famine which killed millions. Many peasants opposed
the collective farms and some even went to the length of destroying their
grain in order to keep it away from the Soviet government. This dismal
state of Soviet agriculture was the consequence of the agricultural
policies of Stalin, but they were taboo and could not be openly criticized.
Only technical points could be discussed, but few agricultural technicians
were willing to work towards the success of the troubled collective
farms.
The factors stimulating germination and early flowering in a wide
variety of crop species had attracted considerable research interest in
Russia and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The main technical problem for Soviet agriculture was to increase yield,
both by learning how to manipulate environmental conditions and by
developing genetic strains that could flower early and thus produce two
crops in a season. One of the key debates in this connection was between
proponents of day length (photoperiodism) and exposure to cold
temperature (vernalization) as the major factors stimulating early
148 Jesús Mosterín
that turned the tide. Lysenko’s theories and policies were finally given
official sanction at a 1948 meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural
Science. By this time many of his opponents had been silenced through
arrests or imprisonment. Even the foreign communist parties, like the
French communist Party, were mobilized in a vicious attack on the
“bourgeois” science of genetics and in defense of Lysenko’s hoax.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, Lysenko retained his position, enjoying a
relative degree of trust from Nikita Khrushchev. However, mainstream
scientists were now given the ability to criticize Lysenko for the first
time since the late 1920s. In 1962 three of the most prominent Soviet
physicists, Yakov Zel’dovich, Vitaly Ginzburg, and Pyotr Kapitsa, set
out the case against Lysenko, his false science and his policy of political
extermination of scientific opponents. In 1964, physicist Andrei
Sakharov spoke out against Lysenko in the General Assembly of the
Academy of Sciences:
He is responsible for the shameful backwardness of Soviet biology and of
genetics in particular, for the dissemination of pseudo-scientific views,
for adventurism, for the degradation of learning, and for the defamation,
firing, arrest, even death, of many genuine scientists. (Sakharov 1990,
p. 324)
The Soviet press was soon filled with anti-Lysenkoite articles and
appeals for the restoration of scientific methods to all fields of biology
and agricultural science. Lysenko was removed from his post as director
of the Institute of Genetics at the Academy of Sciences. After the
dismissal of Khrushchev in 1964, the president of the Academy of
Sciences declared that Lysenko’s immunity to criticism had officially
ended, and an expert commission was sent to Lysenko’s experimental
farm. A few months later, the devastating critique of the commission was
made public. That was the end of the Lysenko affair.
How do you explain the replication of the genes? In 1953, James Watson
and Francis Crick discovered the mechanism and described the double-
helix structure of DNA. How do genes get expressed, how do you get
from genes in the chromosomes to proteins in the rest of the body? In
1961, François Jacob, Jacques Monod and Sidney Brenner introduced the
notion of messenger RNA for explaining the regulation of gene
expression. How do you explain the translation of the DNA or RNA
message into actual proteins? You need a code, the genetic code. In 1966,
Social Factors in the Development of Genetics and the Lysenko Affair 153
Marshall Nirenberg and Gobind Khorana cracked the genetic code. With
that, the revolution of molecular genetics, started in 1953, was basically
completed.
Resistance to the acceptance of new ideas by the scientific community
was previously exemplified in the cases of Mendel and of the
identification of DNA as the genetic material by Avery, MacLeod, and
McCarty. Even the much celebrated idea of the double helix, put forward
in 1953 by Crick and Watson, had to wait several years for its general
acceptance. After a few years the recognition came and a whole stream of
Nobel Prizes were awarded to the discovers: in 1959 to Severo Ochoa
and Arthur Kornberg for producing nucleic acids by artificial means, in
1962 to Watson and Crick, in 1965 to Jacob and Monod. By 2003, the
double-helix structure of DNA, discovered by Crick and Watson, had
become an icon of science and its 50th anniversary was celebrated in the
whole world with unprecedented fanfare.
A social factor that often hampers the progress of science is the
negative reaction of the uninformed public towards new possibilities and
the exaggerated social perception of risks involved in research. The 1974
moratorium on recombinant DNA experiments was a response to this
social fear. The fear was later seen to be unfounded and the recombinant
experiments were resumed. The more recent polemics about genetic
engineering and transgenic crops are other cases in point.
In 1985, a technological breakthrough took place: the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) was discovered (or invented) by Kary Mullis. The
next year the first automatic instrument for sequencing DNA was
presented. This made possible to conceive the ambitious plan of
sequencing the whole human genome. In this case, as in many others, a
technological advance in instrumentation opened the door to important
research in new fields.
Living beings are the only things in the Universe that carry inside
themselves a description of what they are, as often emphasized by Sidney
Brenner. That description is written in the genetic code of DNA and
constitutes the genome. Each species has its own genome. And we are
understandably interested in our human genome. In 1990, the Human
Genome Project was launched, under the leadership of John Watson.
The role of competition in science was highlighted by the ferocious
competition between the Public Consortium and Craig Venter (and the
company Celera) in the sequencing of the human genome. Thanks to this
competition, the whole project was completed in a shorter time and at a
lower cost than originally foreseen, a rather rare event in the economics
of science.
154 Jesús Mosterín
REFERENCES
Davies, K. (2001). Cracking the Genome. New York: The Free Press.
Fisher, R. (1948). What Sort of Man Is Lysenko? Listener 40, 874-875.
Gee, H. (2004). Jacob’s Ladder: A History of the Genome. New York: W.W. Norton.
Graham, L. (1993). Science in Russia and the Soviet Union. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Graham, L. (1998). What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the
Russian Experience? Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Joravsky, D. (1970). The Lysenko Affair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lecourt, D. (1977). Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press.
Lysenko, T.D. (1948). Soviet Biology: Report to the Lenin Academy of Agricultural
Sciences. http://www.marxists.org/archive/Lysenko/works/1940s/report.htm.
Medvedev, Z. (1969). The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Roll-Hansen, N. (2005). The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science. Buffalo: Humanity
Books.
Sakharov A.D. (1990). Memoirs. London: Hutchinson.
Soyfer, V. (1994). Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Sturtevant, A. (1965). A History of Genetics. New York: Harper & Row. Reprinted by
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press in 2001.
Sulston, J. and G. Ferry (2002). The Common Thread: A Story of Science, Politics, Ethics,
and the Human Genome. New York: Bantan Press.
Vavilov, N. (1992). Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants. Translated by Doris
Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Valentín A. Bazhanov
1. Introduction
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 157-169. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
158 Valentín A. Bazhanov
ideology until the late 1980s and in virtue of its having been implanted
by the force of totalitarian power?
According to the old tradition, Marxism was thought to consist of
three parts: philosophy, political economy, and so-called scientific
communism (the sort of political science based upon the number of
Marxist dogmas).
The interpretation of Marxism and its components during its hundred
and fifty years of history and various geographic sites was different.
Sometimes the adepts of Marxism debated over the problem (and even
smashed each other heads) of what to consider as authentic Marxism.
Authentic comprehension of Marxism was declared by dozens of its
followers: for example by George V. Plekhanov and Vladimir I. Lenin in
Russia, G. Lukacs, A. Gramsci, A. Camus, M. Foucalt, J.P. Sartre,
H. Marcuse, M. Merleau-Ponty, et al., in Central and West Europe.
In the early 1920s in Soviet literature the dominant position was that
any ideology is a “transformed” ideology, a false self-consciousness and
its highest form, philosophy, in its rational content was already totally
dissolved in science. Moreover, some Marxists claimed that the term
‘philosophy of Marxism’ is non-logical and even “harmful,” and we need
only pure science itself (Minin 1922b, pp. 194-195), that science was
opposed to philosophy as well as to religion (Minin 1922a, p. 122). This
standpoint was quite popular until the late 1920s because “Marxism
revealed the laws of social development and cast philosophy out from the
sphere of social knowledge. At the present moment philosophy has
finally lost its value” (Nastol’nyi entsyclopedicheskii slovar 1929,
p. 607).
Some well-known Soviet Marxists (V.N. Sarab’yanov, I.I. Skvortsov-
Stepanov, A.K. Timiryazev, L.I. Akselrod, A. Varjas) assumed that
philosophy is nothing but a mere summary of conclusions drawn from
science. The laws of the transformation and conservation of energy were
considered to be universal and all conceivable material processes could
be reduced to these laws. Dialectical understanding of nature coincides
with the mechanical understanding, and all processes converge to
“energy transformations which are in the scope of physics and chemistry”
(Stepanov 1924, p. 85).
Some Marxists treated the notions of “dialectical” and “historical”
materialism as identical (as did, e.g., Friedrich Engels), while the other
the concept of “historical” materialism was used to denote Marxist
sociology (by Nikolai I. Bukharin, for example).
Despite the lack of unity and the various readings of Marxism, its
followers were confident that Marxist methodology opens radically novel
Social Milieu and Evolution of Logic, Epistemology, and the History of . . . 159
Social realism was represented by Hegel and Karl Marx. It judged that
the development of a society and its parts (man, social groups, etc.) was
determined by the whole – the Absolute Idea (Hegel) or class struggle
(Marx). The practical result of the dialectal evolution of class-in-itself (or
class-as-such) to class-for-itself was disdain for human life and dignity,
in violence toward the person. The tragedy of the individual was seen to
be justified by the bright future of the whole of mankind. Social
utopianism may be seen to have been fed by the conceptual undertakings
of social realism.
Social nominalism, represented, for example, by liberalism and its
forerunners (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David
Hume, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls) judges that every
person has rights. The freedom of the individual takes priority over the
state. The state itself emerges as a result of a social contract (e.g.,
Rousseau’s Du contract sociale): it provides for citizens’ existence more
comfortably and safely than would otherwise be possible.
Applicability of the principle of practice to society presupposes the
standpoint of social realism. It meant the absolute priority of economic
factors upon the spiritual components of society; moreover, it meant the
later determination of these components by economic processes, the
direct dependence of superstructure on the base (a sort of “economism”).
After K. Marx died in the early 1890s his closest friend, F. Engels, did
his best to soften this position. He noted that the base only ultimately
economically determines intellectual ingredients, and that superstructure
and social consciousness develop autonomously. Nevertheless, the
conviction that dominated among the Soviet neophytes of Marxist
doctrine was the style of primitive economism. Certainly it led to the
manner in which the angle of examination of science and its history was
selected.
even purges. Nazi Germany pursued and eliminated Jews; after the World
War II anti-Semitism was transmitted to the USSR, and only the death of
Joseph Stalin saved Soviet Jews from the large-scale purges.
A notable by-product of the phenomenon of ideologized science
phenomenon was the goal of identifying blight-ridden authorities in all
fields of research and, hence, the struggle with cosmopolitism (see
Daniels 1985, pp. 303-306). Proponents of Soviet Marxism adopted the
principle of “ideological correspondence”: when the bourgeoisie in the
early stages of capitalist development played a progressive role it
produced progressive science (e.g., the classical mechanics of Newton,
the associationist psychology of Hume); but once capitalism begun to
disintegrate, the bourgeoisie were to be treated as a reactionary class, and
the science of this latter period becomes corroded by reactionary ideas
and conceptions. Thus, theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, or of
Freudian psychoanalysis, are reflections of imperialist crisis and in
reality pseudosciences.
4. Logic
Since the autumn of 1917 and the October coup d’état, and to the late
1940s, the philosophical traditions in the USSR were destroyed. The
monolithic State ideology did not admit any standpoints which differed
from the official one. Elementary logic was taught in Russia’s schools
before 1917, but the first steps toward the reconstruction of Secondary
(school) education debarred logic from the school and University
curricula. For the Marxist ideology was based upon dialectical, mainly
Hegelian, ideas, so that formal logic was treated as a metaphysical
heritage, alien to the revolutionary proletariat. A campaign against
formal logic was launched in the leading Communist Party ideological
journal. The laws of formal logic were considered to be contradictory to
dialectics, and the study of formal logic was ossified and stagnant,
showing through materialistic dialectics the invalidity of the position of
formal logic. The Law of Contradiction ignores the fact that all sorts of
evolution presupposes contradiction; the Law of Excluded Middle is just
inane. (For the dialectician, A = A is just a momentary static fragment of
the law of dialectical logic A A, the latter indicating a dialectical
development in which one state passes into another, just as formal logic
is considered to be nothing more than a static fragment of the dynamic
and progressive dialectical logic.) The accusation of ignoring Marxist
dialectics become the most pervasive in the ideological discussions in
Social Milieu and Evolution of Logic, Epistemology, and the History of . . . 163
5. Epistemology
6. History of Science
Formal logic was for a long period of time, from about 1920 until late the
1940s, almost banned in the USSR. Gnoseology at last became
independent within Marxist philosophy and took the shape as a theory of
reflection (Lenin 1908). As really paradoxical may be described the
situation around the history of science in the USSR and former Soviet
bloc countries.
Social realism, typical for Marxist philosophy, presupposed a very
definite conception of scientific development. After K. Marx who, as we
164 Valentín A. Bazhanov
well know, strictly adhering to the spirit of social realism, declared that
“man is the summation of all social relationships,” and that the economic
base determines intellectual superstructure, social existence, i.e., social
consciousness. Science in fact was dissolved in social and economic
realities. The sources of the growth of science were placed beyond
science itself; they were placed in economics or (at lesser degree) in
culture. Not accidentally, F. Engels even in regard to such theoretical
fields as philosophy, judged that philosophers are pushed foreword not
only by the force of pure thinking, as they imagined, but mainly by the
powerful evolution of economy and natural sciences.
Faith in the determinacy of science as a whole, and especially
discoveries by economic conditions, was precisely the salient thesis of
Soviet historians of science in the 1920s. Precisely this conviction was
embodied in the concrete conception of history of science in the USSR,
called externalism. According to externalism, science has grown due to
socio-economic reasons, the demands from the society (often Western
tradition of externalism points to a certain conception of consciousness;
in our work this notion has nothing to do with consciousness).
The concrete date of the new conception of science is firmly fixed in
the annals of history.
On June 30-July 4 of 1931 the Second International Congress of the
History of Science took place in London. The Soviet delegation included
rather well-known scholars and public figures. It was headed by the high-
ranking communist official Nikolai I. Bukharin, who by a single vote was
just elected to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (from the list
approved by the Central Committee of Communist Party). N. Bukharin
was appointed as Director of the Institute of History of Science and
Technique. At various stages of his life he held the most prestige
positions in Communist Party and State hierarchy. The delegation also
included actual members of the Academy of Sciences, biologist Nikolai
I. Vavilov, physicists Alexander F. Ioffe and Vladimir F. Mitkevich,
Professor Boris M. Hessen (physicist and philosopher), Boris
M. Zavadovsky (physiologist), Ernest Kol’man (mathematician and
philosopher), Mikhail M. Rubinstein (economist).
B.M. Hessen presented at the Congress the paper “The Social and
Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia” in which he put forward the idea
that the birth of classical mechanics was entirely determined by the
evolution of capitalist, by the demands of new social class, the
bourgeoisie, who needed much more productive results of labor than that
which had been available in the feudal era. B. Hessen began his paper
with a quotation from A.N. Whitehead, who had noticed that I. Newton
Social Milieu and Evolution of Logic, Epistemology, and the History of . . . 165
was born in the same year that G. Galileo had died, and wondered what
path mankind might have taken had not these two great thinkers been
God’s gifts to the human race (Whitehead 1969, p. 46). Hessen pursued
the idea that concrete persons (Galileo, Newton, et al.) are not so
important, since social and economic conditions pushed mankind toward
new inventions or discoveries. “Newton,” Hessen claimed, “was the
typical representative of the rising bourgeoisie, and in his philosophy he
embodies the characteristic features of his class [. . .]”(Hessen 1933,
p. 38). Until Hessen’s paper Newton was treated as a genius, and his
creativity as indebted to his outstanding talent, which was given him by
God.
Hessen persistently stressed that the bourgeoisie needed science for
the development of industry, and this science should “investigate
material bodies and forms of forces we can find in Nature”; “being for a
particular time the most progressive class, the bourgeoisie demanded the
most progressive science” (Hessen 1933, pp. 23-24). Moreover Hessen
indicated “the complete coincidence of the physical content of this era,
arising from the economic requirements with the content of Principia”
(Hessen 1933, p. 31). The development of industrial capitalism put in
front of technology the problem of designing effective machines. The
steam engine was created, and in its turn thermodynamics flourished. All
these events had a powerful impact upon the productive forces and,
hence, upon science.
Hessen’s ideas attracted the attention of the Congress participants. As
a matter of fact the novel direction of research, even novel paradigm in
the field of history and philosophy of science was proposed. The paper
was published in English (and Russian) and reprinted several times.
Analogous thoughts, typical for Marxists (practice is base for the theory)
were announced by N. Bukharin in his paper “Theory and Practice from
the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism.” N. Bukharin’s attitude toward
science was really shivery. He was confident that due to Soviet scientists
the USSR would become “the greatest hotbed of world science,” that “in
the USSR science plays a noble role: it promotes the liberation of
mankind from the shame of our epoch” (he meant capitalism – V.B.), and
that “science is transformed into the friend and close ally of working
class” (Bukharin 1928, pp. 6, 15, 16).
Hessen’s ideas formed the basis of externalism which displayed a
brilliant performance in the West. Let us just to mention the works of
J.D. Bernal, J.G. Crowther, R. Merton, J. Needham, E. Zilsel, et al.
An irony of history resulted from the fact that, in the USSR, where
Marxism played the role of the State ideology and naturally presupposed
166 Valentín A. Bazhanov
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Dr. Irving Anellis for his valuable comments on
first draft of this paper and suggestions. This work was partially
supported by RFH grant (N 07-03-00054a).
Social Milieu and Evolution of Logic, Epistemology, and the History of . . . 169
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Sonin, A.S. (1994). Phizicheskii idealism. Istoria odnoi ideologicheskoi kampanii
(Physical Idealism. The History of One Ideological Campaign). Moscow: Fiz-mat.
Literature.
Stepanov, I.I. (1925). Moi oshibki, vskrytye i ispravlennye Ya. Stenom (My Mistakes,
Revealed and Corrected by Ya. Sten). Bolshevik 14, 83-89.
PART 4
1. Introduction
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 173-189. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
174 Juan Fco. Álvarez and Javier Echeverría
every other one; as they are all epistemic gods, none of them are
necessary. They upgrade to some kind of Popperian third world where
they can achieve objective knowledge. However, we always need a
concrete agent: objectivity is not a view from nowhere, it is a view from
somewhere – Amartya Sen (1993). We cannot eliminate the particular
agent; we always need it at least as a parametric reference. Other
approaches try to put a grammar, an inner language, several absolute
capabilities or innate abilities into human beings, and that is why we
cannot understand the bargaining process itself. We are rational but less
than gods.
As we have mentioned, theories about social interaction usually
assume a very debatable notion of rationality. This notion comes from
economic studies, but nowadays many discussions show that it is a very
weak notion. An important part of social studies accepts this standard
notion as a datum. However, a simple review of the benefits and
drawbacks of economic theory could show the way out of this enclosure.
It is necessary to open our minds in order to build a pragmatic orientation
that will not be reduced to some kind of sophisticated semantics. Perhaps
it would be a good idea to look at the conceptions of rationality from
other sides.
There are some similarities between these problems and those that
have appeared in economic welfare theory with the economic notion of
utility. Trying to reduce any economic variable to a single utility
generates some very important difficulties for understanding economic
processes. Once we have superseded the code view of language, we
would reject notions such as truthfulness or relevance as the main
purpose of language.
The communicative process is usually shown as a mechanism with a
single and one-dimensional output (related to some kind of utility or
cooperative disposition such as some kind of happiness in economic
studies). Even the relevance principle (or the two relevance principles) is
heir to these one-dimensional economic notions.
In order to rebuild the dialogic interaction process, we must not only
make its communicative component explicit but also include spaces
where interlocutors can express their individuality: spaces that could be
considered to be other dimensions with their own values that the
participants try to satisfy to various degrees. So it is very important to
include dimensions related to power, emotions, and affections; to sum it
up, an n-dimensional set of values. This set becomes a group of criteria
that we try to satisfy in our social interactions, and if we draw this kind
Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences 177
In our opinion, the participants in interactions now and then use some
kind of ignorance-based decision mechanism. As Peter M. Todd says:
“When choosing between two objects (according to some criterion), if
one is recognized and the other is not, then select the former” (Todd
2001, p 56). This kind of mechanism is embodied in the recognition
heuristic (Gigerenzer). The point is that usually our basic intuitions tell
us that having more information is an advantage for the decision maker
(Rubinstein 1998, p. 52), but this is only so if our belief system has some
special structure. In fact, as Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) have
investigated, adding more knowledge to the recognition heuristic in use –
by increasing the proportion of recognized objects in an environment-
can even decrease decision accuracy. This mechanism is named the less-
is-more effect by Todd. To be precise: “Knowing more is not usually
thought to decrease decision-making performance, but when using simple
heuristic that rely on little knowledge, this is exactly [. . .] what can be
found experimentally” (Todd 2001, p. 57). “Simple strategies that use
few cues can work well in real decision environments, and fast and frugal
heuristic that exploit this feature can satisfy the true bounds – temporal,
rather than cognitive – of our ecological rationality” (Todd 2001, p. 68).
1
Valuative expressions may or may not be declarations – value judgments. An expression
of approbation or rejection can express a valuation. In the social sciences, many
valuations are expressed with evaluation matrices, that is, using numerical tables in which
various evaluational criteria are weighed and added. This kind of axiological expression is
the most interesting for BAR.
Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences 179
2
And, in general, for all living beings that have valuative capabilities. We defend a
naturalized axiology, which works not only for human beings, but also to analyze
valuation processes occurring in the animal world. In this contribution, we will focus
solely on the area of the social sciences.
180 Juan Fco. Álvarez and Javier Echeverría
intentions, and goals. The values operate not only as informative filters,
but also as deliberative and proactive filters.3 Note that these two
valuations are previous to the selection of the means that will be used to
try to achieve the proposed goals.
Let us give an example. A scientist first designs a research project, in
which he includes the human resources, instruments, and financial means
required to carry it out. All these components of the projects will be
valuated by anonymous peers or committees. However, the scientist has
previously selected the objectives to be achieved and has demonstrated
that they would be epistemically or technologically valuable. The choice
of the possible courses of action occurs before the choice of means.
(3)Thirdly, given a positive value V for a subject S in circumstances c,
we can always assume that an upper boundary MS,c of the degree of
satisfaction possible for this value will exist. These boundaries are
generated by the subject herself and by external constraints of different
sorts. They are not magnitudes that can be precisely determined, but
rather upper boundaries of possible satisfaction of the values, which vary
according to the circumstances and the cognitive or emotional state of
subject S.4
We have already set forth the first two objections to the inherited
conception of rational choice (incomplete information, limited
calculational capability) elsewhere (Alvarez 1992, pp. 73-93; 1999,
pp. 345-357). In this contribution, we will place greater emphasis on the
third objection, which characterizes bounded axiological rationality
(BAR) and develops Simon’s ideas, synthesizing them with those of
Boudon and other authors.5 We will give some examples to illustrate this.
(i) The economic growth of a country is a positive value, but if it
turns out to be excessive, as a result of complex systemic interactions,
the risk of inflation appears. Experts in political economy tend to set
boundaries for growth, although they give acceptable margins of
variation according to the national and international situations. Many
3
This is particularly important in institutional evaluations in which several subjects
holding different evaluational criteria participate. In these cases, the evaluations of others
intervene as constrictions and limitations on the subject’s evaluations. This is the most
frequent case in social science. Álvarez (1995, pp. 137-148).
4
Obviously, a subject with diminished or altered cognitive or valuative abilities, whether
due to dullness, distraction, a state of euphoria, or any other reason, does not evaluate
opportunities or risks the same way as he would in a state of watchfulness, maximum
attention, and cognitive normalcy.
5
Evandro Agazzi has always insisted that human actions are guided by values. See
E. Agazzi (1996). As we have already said, Amartya Kumar Sen’s work (above all in the
methodological aspects) is a fundamental reference.
Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences 181
6
Stating that behaviors that systematically tend to maximize a single value or the utility
function, independent of the circumstances and the consequences derived from these
behaviors, are irrational is excessive, although sometimes we may harbor serious doubts
as to whether or not they are intelligent behaviors. The BAR proposal distinguishes
degrees of rationality according to the plurality of values and the limitation functions
taken in to account. This will become clearer when we distinguish among different models
of rationality, some of which are more rational than others from the BAR point of view.
Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences 183
7
Going back to the example of scientific actions, at a given moment the purely epistemic
aspects may have greater weight (in the laboratory, for example), while at others technical
values (instrument design and construction, use of apparatuses), economic values
(obtaining funding), or social values (presenting results, dissemination and circulation of
knowledge) may have more weight. The same thing happens in many other human actions.
184 Juan Fco. Álvarez and Javier Echeverría
individual, but collective. The M4 model requires plural agents with the
capacity to integrate different individual agents, each of which takes on
and promotes the different types of values that we have described.
These four models can be represented by the different formal
structures of the value systems that they apply. One would be totally
monistic, another partially monistic, the third partially pluralistic, and the
fourth totally pluralistic. (However, there is never a closed totality of
values, if only because new values may possibly emerge. This aspect is
fundamental when we make decisions today for future generations,
whose values are clearly uncertain at present.) Between one structure and
another, there are several intermediate models, with greater or lesser
subordinations and hierarchies. Strict monists believe in the existence of
a supreme (prioritary, preponderant) good or evil and even personalize it
(God, Fatherland, King, Company, Party, Nature . . . ). This is the object
of their identification, love, devotion, reverence, esteem, etc., or,
reciprocally, of their rejection, hatred, repudiation, or disdain. Pluralists,
on the other hand, try to modulate and combine the different kinds of
good and evil. By modulate we mean that they weigh them adequately
and in a balanced fashion, according to each situation and moment. They
may subordinate some kinds of good to others depending on the context
of action, but never a priori.
The four models represent as many forms of rationality and generate
very different patterns of action. From an axiological perspective, the
first model is the least rational and the fourth the most rational.
Obviously, we have given a very schematic description of the models, to
the end of making it clear that different degrees of rationality exist.
4. In Conclusion
From the point of view of bounded rationality, there are several models
of practical rationality, one of which is synthesized in the theory of
maximizing rational choice. However, by introducing values as a factor
in the analysis of actions, their objectives, and their results, it is possible
to establish differences among these models according to their greater or
lesser degree of axiological rationality. In particular, the models that
assume the existence of maximum and minimum boundaries of
satisfaction of positive (and negative) values entail a greater complexity
and development of axiological rationality. One particularly interesting
case is the case in which a minimum upper boundary and a maximum
lower boundary are adopted, as happens with warrant models in stock
Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences 187
REFERENCES
1. Introduction
1
This work has been facilitated by the Research Project HUM2006-10521. Translated
from Spanish by Marie MacMahon.
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 191-205. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
192 Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
2
Procedural rationality takes into account the individual’s frame of mind, his
conceptualization of his predicament, and his aptitude for evaluating the information and
options available to him. Simon (1976, pp.129-148).
Rational Choice Theory and Economic Laws 193
Since the middle of the last century, various authors (Allais 1953;
Ellsberg 1961; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Machina 1982; Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Linchensten 1982; among others) have shown that empiric
choices breach the axioms of Utility Theory and Expected Utility Theory.
The axioms around which deviation has emerged are the following:
cancellation, dominance, invariance and transitivity. Starting in the early
seventies, Tversky and Kahneman examined the invariance and
dominance axioms. Several of their empirical experiments demonstrate
the vulnerability of these axioms when choices are made under
conditions of risk. This means the principle of maximization of expected
utility is breached, and involves, thus, a refutation of Expected Utility
Theory. In the light of the experiments, Kahemann and Tversky propose
a purely descriptive theory, their Prospect Theory. This Theory explains
the results of their experiments and permits a new Rational Choice
Theory under conditions of risk. The notions of framing effects and
heuristics are crucial in their theory.3
3
For the proposal of these authors to see: Kahnemann and Tversky (1979, 1984, 2000,
2002) and Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974, 1981, 1988, 1990).
194 Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
4
The value function is: a) defined on gains and losses, b) concave in domain of gains and
convex in the domain of losses, and c) much steeper for losses that for gains (loss
aversion). Kahneman and Tversky (2000, p. 3).
Rational Choice Theory and Economic Laws 195
The Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky has had a great impact
on psychological studies of rational choice; it has also influenced the
work of authors interested in the social aspects of rational choice, for
instance, Kuklinski and Quirk (2000), Bazerman, Gibbons, Thompson,
and Valley (1998) and, especially so, in the previously mentioned
proposal of Halpern (1998).
Halpern (1998) presents important insights concerning the
dependence of rational choice on the social and cultural context. First of
all, Halpern actually tries to sever Rational Choice Theory from an
exclusive grounding in neoclassical economics in an effort to dig up
Rational Choice Theory from the prevailing economic roots of choosing.
And she offers, instead, a proposal that allows rational choice to be fully
inclusive, applicable, that is, in all choosing, economic or otherwise. She
recognizes, together with Simon, Kahneman, Tversky, and other authors,
that our choices are limited by cognitive biases, and admits the notion of
bounded rationality. But she does not consider these the only biases that
must be faced. For Halpern social and cultural biases must be weighed in
as well. These latter biases would explain many of the deviation cases in
empirical choices. In other words, rational choices have an important
social and cultural dimension that needs to be considered by Rational
Choice Theory.
Halpern’s viewpoint relies on two facts: a) we all share ways of
evaluating options (that may not be objectively optimal) and b) we use
196 Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
5
Kuklinski and Quirk (2000, pp. 153-182) use the Kahneman and Tversky’s notion of
heuristics in the field of political elections. Other authors, such as Bazerman, Gibbons,
Thompson, and Valley (1998, pp. 78-98) have developed proposals in the field of the
social heuristics that offer an account of the social aspects implied in the personalization
of alternatives by members of society. Halpern (1998) and Coleman (1990, 1994)
underline the notion of shared understanding. People give sense to their behavior in light
of their common understanding and shared knowledge of culture.
6
As Ross and Anderson (1982, p. 131) have pointed out, the individuals have a shareed
understanding of social actions.
Rational Choice Theory and Economic Laws 197
4. Shared Values
7
Chong (2000, p. 48) affirms “every society prescribes certain goals and certain approved
cultural issues to attain them.” According to Coleman (1990, p. 242) the rationality also
has to do with the functioning of norms and states “some theoreticians of rational choice
armed with maximisation of the function of the utility as a principle of action consider the
concept of the norm totally unnecessary,” but this ignoring an important process in the
functioning of social systems included the one linked to economics.
198 Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
One key factor serving to explain shared evaluation is the claim that
norms sustain the common values individuals share. The shared values
become a part of the perception, interpretation judgment and evaluation
of the actors and therefore of their choices.8 Shared values, together with
the social heuristics, are implicated in choice deviations from normative
rational choice theory.
However, it is not enough to affirm that shared values do exist. It is
also necessary to explain how common values become shared values. In
order to address this question, we pay special attention to the notion of
mental model. The cognitive sciences state that individuals construct
models of the environment in which they live, choose and act, and of the
problems they face. These mental models are internal representations that
individuals create in order to analyse and evaluate the situations and
problems they face, as occurs in the problem choice case. In fact, the
mental models are internal representations created by individuals and
“the institutions are external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create
to structure and order the environment” (Denzau and North 2000, p. 24).
The mental models that construct different individuals of the same
culture and society (with common institutions, organizations and
therefore, norms and rules) are convergent and, in relevant aspects, are
shared models. Denzau and North (Ibid.) coincide on this idea, when they
affirm: “Individuals with common cultural backgrounds and experiences
will share reasonably convergent models, ideologies, and institutions
[. . .].” But at the same time institutions and ideologies “are the shared
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that
provide both an interpretation the environment and a prescription as how
that environment should be structured” (Ibid.). Thus we can state, that
social and cultural factors, like ideologies and institutions, make possible
shared mental models.
Mental models “provide a prescription as how environment should be
structured” because norms and values form part of our internal
representations. And if a shared mental model is available, the concepts
and values embodied in the structure of mental models that several
people have are more similar and therefore shared. There is a very close
relationship among society, culture, institutions, norms and shared
values. Common society, culture and institutions imply shared values
(amongst other things) which are part of mental representations or
models that individuals have.
8
According to Agazzi (1996) actions are guided by values.
Rational Choice Theory and Economic Laws 199
The shared mental models are possible thanks to the social and
cultural experience, interaction and learning of individuals. Society and
culture presuppose a common background that is transmitted through
learning, experience, and the same interaction and communication that
social life implies. Part of this background includes norms and
consequently, values. Individuals construct their mental models
incorporating materials already social and culturally existent. For that
reason such models can converge and be shared.
Learning from others makes an significant number of similarities
feasible among members of each society and culture.9 In fact, a common
cultural heritage reduces divergence in the mental models that people
have in a given society, because it supposes the transference of common
values, ideas, concepts, etc. from one generation to the other. Not
everyone needs to start at level zero.10 Cultural heritage, social interaction
and communication, more shared learning and experience, explain the
existence of shared values (and beliefs, conceptions, etc. ) that make up
part of the mental models of individuals with the same cultural and social
background.11
It is quite important to point out that the common values that are
transmitted in such a way will become shared values as they are accepted
by the individuals. The acceptance is based on the uniformity of
cognitive beliefs (for those who accept them) about the adequacy,
correctness, convenience, and opportuneness of values that are culturally
and socially transmitted. The values shared by individuals are expressed
in the analysis, the evaluations, the preferences and furthermore, in the
rational choices that take place.
Therefore, individuals do not choose in a vacuum, that emptiness
presumed in the market notion of neoclassical economics transferred to
Rational Choice Theory. Instead, individuals make their choices in a
social and cultural environment. One of the forms in which this occurs is
9
As Jones (2001, p. 114) explains, the Solomon’s experiment and much addional research
show human susceptibility to social influence and learn from others. The rational choice
always imply a interactive and social context. According to Zey (1998, p. 82) motivations
are learned in the course of social action.
10
Henrich et al. (2001, p. 244) affirm: “Cultural trasmission mechanisms are cognitive
information processor that allow individuals to acquire information in some fashion from
others individuals, often via observation, imitation and interaction.”
11
In the existence of shared values we find another relevant factor: the linkage of the
individual to social groups such as amongst others: the familiar or the professional ones.
Groups, play an important role in the convergence of values, beliefs, opinions, and
preferences. According to Chong (2004, p. 67) “Group members develop common
evaluations, identifications, and norms [. . .].”
200 Amparo Gómez Rodríguez
through shared social and cultural values, in the sense we have just
described. This fact has important consequences over the rational
choices, including the economic and scientific choices. As Zey (1998,
pp. 69-70) points out, markets are made up of relationships, networks of
organizations linked together through economic transactions, family
relationships, friendships, and social and management circles.
Consequently, standard Rational Choice Theory cannot explain
adequately the operation of markets nor can it deal satisfactorily with a
large portion of economic rational choices.
Even scientists do not choose in a social vacuum as presumed by
economic rationality. Within the scientific field the neoinstitutionalistic
vision highlights the social aspects implicated in scientific practice and
consequently in the choices of the scientists. The neoinstitutionalists
consider not just the scientists (their actions and choices) as basic units in
their analysis of science, but also include the institutions, the
communities, the norms, the rules, and the values. Scientists choose
under stronger social links than the individualistic and traditional models
of rationality allow. They choose rationally in an institutionalized,
organized, regulated, and normative environment, besides interactively
and strategically.
Their rational choices are understood in terms of bounded and
strategic rationality, in which the values that come from social norms and
cognitive rules play an important role. Individual scientists have
interests, beliefs, preferences, and values, all of which is mediated by the
institutional and normative matrix of science. All values, including
cognitive values, are social. According to Shi (2002) cognitive values
(such as simplicity, precision, etc.) are a type of social value linked to
institutional norms and rules of science.
The norms and rules are essential elements of the scientific
institutions. They not only determine the scientists’ frame of
opportunities in their strategical interactions, but they also provide a
substratum of values and prescriptions shared by scientists belonging to a
scientific community. Shared values explain the presence of common
interpretations and evaluations of the choice problems that scientists
face. The shared values make it possible for individual scientists to
evaluate problems in a similar manner, to have common objectives, and
linked strategies in order to achieve those objectives. This implies
coordination and cooperation, and one of the functions of norms is,
precisely, to make both feasible.
Finally, values are not the non-rational bedrock of explanation.
Values are part of the reasons from which choice is made. Individuals are
Rational Choice Theory and Economic Laws 201
able to give reasons about values and can deliberate rationally about
them.
6. Concluding Remarks
University of La Laguna
Faculty of Philosophy
Campus de Guajara, s/n
38206 La Laguna
Spain
e-mail: agomez@ull.es
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Brigitte Falkenburg
ABSTRACT. Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible hand” and its analogue
in classical physics are investigated in detail. Smith’s analogue was the
mechanics of the solar system. What makes the analogy fail are not the
idealisations in the caricature-like model of the rational economic man. The
main problem rather is that the metaphor does not employ the correct analogue,
which belongs to thermodynamics and statistics. In the simplest macro-economic
model, the business cycle has the same formal structure as the heat flow between
two heat reservoirs and a business cycle of growing efficiency works like a
refrigerator: it pumps money from the poor to the rich. More complicated models
do not give a friendlier image. Due to technological push, an economic system
behaves like a thermodynamic system far from the equilibrium, showing chaotic
behaviour and developing into unpredictable states .
1
Translated from German by Vanessa Cirkel.
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 207-224. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
208 Brigitte Falkenburg
2
Mestmäcker (1978, p. 160) shows this under the nice title “Die sichtbare Hand des
Rechts” (“The Visible Hand of Law”); Mestmäcker (1978, p. 164): “Die Vereinbarkeit des
egoistischen Handelns mit dem öffentlichen Interesse wird nicht dadurch gesichert, daß
der einzelne vorgibt, im öffentlichen Interesse zu handeln, sondern dadurch, daß er sein
Eigeninteresse in den Grenzen des Rechts verfolgt.”
210 Brigitte Falkenburg
3
Here, Smith attributes to the protagonists particular selfish motives which in the age of
globalisation do no longer work like this. Today, the flight of capital in the form of
foreign accounts and shares is possible due to missing international laws.
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 211
phenomena, for example the well-known facts about fire, water, and
bodies:
Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter
substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the
invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those
matters. (Smith 1795, p. 49)
From a modern point of view all natural phenomena are in contrast
dynamically related by immaterial links respectively forces, what Smith
calls an invisible chain. Modern physics (that Newton had still called
natural philosophy) is concerned with recognising the principles of order
and coherence in nature, which link all individual, seemingly chaotic
natural things:
Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature. Nature,
after the largest experience that common observation can acquire, seems
to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent with all that
go before them [ . . . ] Philosophy, by representing the invisible chain
which binds together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce
order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances [. . .]. (Smith
1795, pp. 45-46)
Smith is full of admiration for Newton’s system of general gravitation
which makes this invisible chain between the natural phenomena visible
with so far unknown perfection (Smith 1795, pp. 104-105). The
expression invisible chain is something like a secularised (or rather
naturalised) version of the metaphor of the invisible hand. The emphasis
is now only on the physical effect, but no more on divine action. Yet the
religious background is still present, when Smith marks off modern
understanding of nature from ancient natural philosophy. There, in the
polytheistic framework the action of one unique invisible hand is not
assumed in order to explain regular, consistent natural phenomena.
Against that background the metaphor of the invisible chain (which
links all natural phenomena) does not express anything fundamentally
different from the metaphor of the invisible hand (which presides over
economy). Both metaphors are typical of the rationalist thinking of the
17th and 18th century. Rationalism established close connections
between the laws of nature and the actions of God within the world.
Smith regards the organising principles of socio-economic systems and
the laws of physics as analogous. And this means that he sees powers and
laws at work in nature as well as in human society. From his point of
view, in both cases these organising powers are responsible for the
organisation of the individuals’ behaviour to a stable system, or rather:
212 Brigitte Falkenburg
purposeful actor, whose actions only aim at maximising his benefit.4 For
the sake of generality this is abstracted from all other motives, including
the aestheticism and orderliness according to Smith. Of course this is an
ideal-typical model in Max Weber’s sense, resting upon idealisation. It
still has to be examined how far it can be applied to human behaviour. In
the ideal case, if the conditions of being adequate and applicable are
fulfilled, the model of the rational economic man will correspond to the
actual economic action of men, at least statistically or in the average.
Only under such general, ideal conditions the behaviour of the
rational economic man becomes thus calculable. What is calculated, i.e.,
given the form of a mathematical model, is his producer and consumer
behaviour: the number of products he may produce and sell or is willing
to buy; the money that he may invest; the prices he fixes his goods at or
he is ready to accept; and finally, the monetary benefits or economic
profits he thus is trying to maximise. With this method one may model
markets with the help of operational research. The solving of
mathematical extremum problems is particularly of interest. The producer
and consumer behaviour is defined under the assumption that everyone
may maximise his or her benefits; as a solution results in an equilibrium
state. In this model supply and demand regulate each other like according
to a law of nature. The consumers’ demand determines the supply on the
part of the producers and vice versa: an equilibrium of the market is
reached. Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand is up to the day willingly
used for pointing out the law-like development of a market towards an
equilibrium state. Nevertheless, it is all too often forgotten that Smith
himself thought only of market mechanisms set under legal conditions.
Actually, here applies a socio-economic law that has an exact formal
analogue in physics. So one is absolutely entitled to speak of market
mechanisms, as far as the model of the rational economic man is justified
by social reality. In this ideal case markets behave exactly like many-
particle states which obey classical statistical mechanics or the kinetic
theory of gases. A free market can be compared to a many-particle state,
with unbound particles; or: to an ideal gas with freely moving molecules.
The individual decisions of producers and consumer corresponds to the
inertial motions of the molecules.
A good that is produced and consumed on the market, has a (relative)
value for producers; for consumers it has an average utility; and this
matches the price they are ready to pay. In contrast to modern economics
Adam Smith still had a theory of the “absolute” value or labour value that
4
The model traces back to Bentham and Mill; cf. Hottinger (1999).
214 Brigitte Falkenburg
5
The optimisation problem consists in maximising the Lagrange function of a system
under a side condition whose components are independent of each other except for the
side condition. In the kinetic gas theory the temperature functions as a Lagrange
parameter, in the theory of the market the (natural) price. In the case of the ideal gas, the
side condition is that the total energy of all molecules is conserved. The analogous
conserved quantity at the market may be considered to be the altogether available money
supply, as far as one abstracts from flight of capital, stock exchange stock, inflation etc.
So the analogy has to be taken with caution. It is spelled out in Mimkes (1999) in many
details; to what extent it holds, however, is not discussed there. For several competing
markets, the economic correlate of the temperature is the mean income of a society, i.e.,
the standard of living. See also Mimkes (2000).
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 215
Unfortunately this is not the whole truth. The question of whether and
how the market mechanism works in each particular case has to be solved
out considering the particular market conditions prevailing at that
moment. Here the conditions of adequacy concerning economic theory
formation come into play. Which idealised assumptions have been made
and to what extent are they justified in the specific case? Or: under which
non-negligible boundary conditions do supply and demand balance?
According to Adam Smith, the legal order under which the market
mechanism works has to be taken into account. Absolutely deregulated
markets with uncontrolled growth strictly speaking do not exist according
to the author of the metaphor of the invisible hand.6 Besides: what kind
of equilibrium state is expected to be reached by such uncontrolled
growth?
3. Society Atomised
6
Cf. my above remarks and Mestmäcker (1978, p. 164).
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 217
7
This conception can be seen in Friedman (1996).
8
In economics one tried to take this into account by theories of bounded rationality; cf.
Simon (1992).
218 Brigitte Falkenburg
9
In principle, known deviations from the behaviour of the rational economic man, just
like the legal frame of the markets, can be taken into account by maximising the utility
function under side conditions.
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 219
10
Mimkes (2000, section 4), Mimkes (1999, pp. 43). Both distributions do well agree with
the German data (from the years before the reunification) which shows Mimkes. In the
statistical model, a uniform distribution only results from the capital when nobody has
anything.
11
Mimkes (1999, pp. 78); Mimkes (2000, section 4). The quasi-thermodynamic model
forecasts four possible mode of actions of the market mechanism: A. Colonialism: The
profit is distributed in the richer society whose standard of living grows at the expense of
the poorer society; the efficiency of the economic cycle increases. B. Booming economy:
If the economy profit flows back to the poorer society, the living standards tend towards
being equal; the efficiency of the economic cycle decreases. C. Fair deal: The trading
partners share the profit, doing justice to each other; the economic cycle proceeds with
constant efficiency and the standard of living grows in both societies. D. Two class world:
The colonialist market mechanism works in the domestic market; an originally
homogeneous society splits up into the poor and the rich.
220 Brigitte Falkenburg
12
Schumpeter (1939). For recent considerations of the economic theory of technological
push cf., e.g., Hall (1994).
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 221
4. What Do We Know?
However: The analogy between physics and economics does not argue
for a doctrine of bare economic liberalism – rather on the contrary. The
analogy holds for the ideal model of an atomised society without any
social bonds or legal restrictions. In this model individuals act absolutely
free, in the sense of freedom being not much more than mere
arbitrariness. Their individual decisions are determined through arbitrary
needs and are not justified by social norm nor ruled by legal order. The
fulfilment of their needs is only limited by economic necessities. Their
individual behaviour is uncorrelated. Individual decisions are subject to
statistical laws and show only coincidental deviations from the mean
value.
But at the same time one has to be aware of the following fact.
Unfortunately, human needs are not of that kind that socio-economic
equilibrium is reached automatically, if all individuals pursue their own
benefits. Rather our consumer behaviour takes on a life of its own due to
the plasticity of human nature. In atomised society our needs tend
towards unlimited growth. Those who are on top of the income- and
property-scale may follow these tendencies undisturbed; those who are at
the bottom of the scale have to restrict themselves. Yet, not only the
simple thermodynamic analogy, but also the experience of the last
decades, teaches us that in a globalised world the gap between the rich
and the poor diverges increasingly in many places.13
Economists dislike being confronted with such embarrassing truths.
Though macro-economics is also based on cyclic models which are
modelled according to examples from physics. However, the original idea
of an economic cycle is not based on the aforementioned analogies to
19th and 20th century physics.14 It still derives from the ideas of
Renaissance to understand nature as an organic whole.15 The cyclic
models of modern macro-economics therefore link an early modern,
organic idea with the mechanical analogies from classical physics. The
13
For an opposite opinion cf. Norberg (2003). The book primarily cites India and Asia.
Norberg’s main thesis is that the globalisation is not due to poverty and mismanagement
but to the hindrance to the global free market economy by over-regulation and
bureaucratisation. His remarkable plea for liberalism demonstrates the limitations of the
thermodynamic analogy discussed here.
14
The first economic work which takes the analogy to thermodynamics into account is
Georgescu-Roegen (1971); it treats the embedding of the circular flow of the economy
into the ecosystem. Daly (1996) discusses this revolutionary work and its to this day far
too low reception in standard economics. Mirowski (1988; 1989) presents a related
philosophical account.
15
Cf. the discussion of baroque mercantilism, as represented in the work of Johann
Joachim Becher, in Falkenburg (2004).
The Invisible Hand: What Do We Know? 223
University of Dortmund
Institut für Philosophie (FB 14)
Emil-Figge-Straße 50
44227 Dortmund, Germany
e-mail: falkenburg@fb14.uni-dortmund.de
16
Becher (1689) carried this idea from natural philosophy into economics, even though he
already emphasised the ambiguities of technology between progress and failure in Becher
(1686). Cf. Falkenburg (2004).
224 Brigitte Falkenburg
REFERENCES
Becher, J.J. (1686). Närrische Weißheit Und Weise Narrheit. Frankfurt: Zubrodt.
Becher, J.J. (1688). Politischer Discurs. Frankfurt: Zunner.
Daly, H.E. (1996). Beyond Growth. The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston,
MA: Beacon Press.
Eucken, W. (1950). Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. Berlin: Springer.
Falkenburg, B. (2004). Wem dient die Technik? In: J.J. Becher-Stiftung Speyer (ed.),
Johann Joachim Becher Preis 2002: Die Technik – Dienerin der gesellschaftlichen
Entwicklung?, pp. 5-172. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Friedman, D. (1996). Hidden Order: The Economics of Everyday Life. New York:
HarperBusiness U.S.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Hall, P. (1994). Innovation, Economics, and Evolution. Theoretical Perspectives on
Changing Technology in Economic Systems. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Hottinger, O. (1999). Die Grundlagen der ökonomischen Nutzentheorie und deshomo
oeconomicus: die Beiträge von J. Bentham und J.St. Mill. In: M. Faber (ed.),
Horizonte ökonomischen Denkens. DIALEKTIK 1999/3, pp. 63-82. Hamburg: Meiner.
Mestmäcker, E.-J. (1978). Die sichtbare Hand des Rechts. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Mimkes, J. (1999). Script zu Politik und Thermodynamik. http://fb6www.un-
paderborn.de/ag/ag-mim/publikationen.htm
Mimkes, J. (2000). Society as a Many Particle System. Journal of Thermal Analysis and
Calorimetry 60 (3), 1055-1069.
Mirowski, P. (1988). Against Mechanism. Totawa: Rowman and Littlefield.
Mirowski, P. (1989). More Heat Than Light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, M. (1997). The Character of “Rational Economic Man.” In: B. Falkenburg and
S. Hauser (eds.), Modelldenken in den Wissenschaften. DIALEKTIK 1997/1,
pp. 77-94. Hamburg: Meiner.
Norberg, J. (2003). Das kapitalistische Manifest. Warum allein die globalisierte
Marktwirtschaft den Wohlstand der Menschheit sichert. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1939). Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical
Analysis of the Capitalist Process, 2 vols. New York and London: Porcupine Press.
Simon, H.A. (1992). Economics, Bounded Rationality, and the Cognitive Revolution.
Aldershot: Elgar.
Smith, A. ([1761] 1976). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The Glasgow Edition of the
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, A. ([1776] 1980). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. II.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, A. ([1795] 1980). Essays on Philosophical Subjects. The Glasgow Edition of the
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Soros, G. (1998). The Crisis of Global Capitalism. Open Society Endangered. New York:
Public Affairs.
Peter Kemp
1. The Question
Today two sociologists, Ulrich Beck (Munich) and David Held (London),
are becoming fervent advocates of a cosmopolitanism opposed to
nationalism, liberalism, Marxism, etc. They support their conviction by
analyzing the social life conditions in the 21st century. We are led to ask
the question: have they dismissed the scientific ideal of “axiological
neutrality” (Max Weber), or the ambition of “treating social facts as
things” (Emile Durkheim)? Moreover, if this is true, can we still be sure
that their works are scientific? Through these questions, I try to single
out the issue of sociological epistemology as it presents itself nowadays:
what is a sociological knowledge in our days? Can we achieve and
communicate a social and political knowledge today in spite of taking up
In: E. Agazzi, J. Echeverría, and A. Gómez (eds.), Epistemology and the Social (Pozna Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 96), pp. 225-231. Amsterdam/New York,
NY: Rodopi, 2008.
226 Peter Kemp
2. Émile Durkheim
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) insisted on the fact that sociology has its
own object of research, that is, the collective consciousness that, even
though it does not exist without the individual consciousnesses,
constitutes a sui generis reality with specific characteristics that cannot
be reduced to psychological features. The behaviour of a group cannot be
explained by assembling the individual acts of the single persons, but it
follows its own rules. Society, Durkheim says in the book Moral
Education (1902-1903), “is a psychic being that has its own way of
thinking, of feeling nd of acting, different from that which is proper of
the individuals that compose it” (Durkheim 1963, p. 56). This is the
reality he tries to treat like things, in the search of testable information
that assure it scientific objectivity.
Nevertheless Durkheim also pays attention to a specialization and a
division of the social tasks that entail a growing individualism that is a
threat for the collective consciousness, and consequently people forget
the main condition of their social life. Therefore, the individual believes
that he can act alone or almost alone, and sets himself against the society
of which he is a member, by declaring that he is unique. According to
Durkheim, from this phenomenon derive society’s anomies, immorality,
and the psychic illnesses that can lead people to suicide, a topic to which
he has devoted a whole book.
The task of a sociologist, according to Durkheim’s ideal, is not only
to make a diagnosis of the social body, but also to prescribe the cure, that
is nothing but its moral education. It is necessary to remind the young
generation the importance of discipline, that is, the adaptation to the
collective consciousness upon which are founded the citizen’s duties.
What has survived him, is not the preacher and moralist Durkheim,
but his idea that a society consists of sociological facts that can be
subjected to a rigorously scientific and objective analysis. They are as
objective as the natural facts of the natural sciences.
The Cosmopolitan Vision 227
3. Max Weber
4. Ulrich Beck
normative political theory with the view of preventing not only political
science, but also political action from becoming blind.
However, at variance with the national vision that is unable to see that
the Nation-State idea and its imaginary notion of sovereignty do not
match anymore the political and social reality, the cosmopolitan vision is
realist and hopes to guide action in a sceptical and self-critical spirit.
Nowadays, the cosmopolite is neither optimist nor pessimist, but he
nurtures the ambition to be an incentive for understanding the present
world and make possible a politics in the service of humankind. So he
wants to show in what measure the State has become as relative as the
cosmopolitan State considered as dependent on the transnational political
structures and by recognizing that “world politics has become world
internal politics” (Beck 2003, p. 453).
5. Final Comments
In the book Democracy and the Global Order, published by David Held
in 1995 a remarkable analysis is made of the transformation of the State
from the role of a sovereign actor to that of an actor among many others
such as the NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), the cultural and
scientific associations, and the international courts. This book also shows
that the definition of the State by its power over a territory does not hold
in an absolute way any more, since a State cannot exist today without
establishing relationships with other States, and also with other agencies,
with what happens in other territories, and with whatever has impact on
politics without reference to any territory. Furthermore, throughout his
work he advocates a democracy which goes beyond the borders of all the
States.
Held is one of the authors that have inspired Ulrich Beck and, as in
Beck’s case; his ambition is to lead a political movement in keeping with
a cosmopolitan view.
Considering this sociologic work, the question for me is to know
whether the non-neutrality, not only theoretical but also practical, is
precisely what allows these scholars to understand things, more and
better than a sociologist, who insists in doing an analysis without
assessment and without a political aim. Is it not the partisan episteme that
wants to be at the same time empirical (looking for all the social facts
that constitute the current society life) and normative (by imagining the
best politics)? Is it not this vision that really understands the object of its
investigation?
The Cosmopolitan Vision 231
REFERENCES