Kong, Marchini Sandro C.

SALMORIN V. ZALDIVAR
Facts:
On July 15, 1989, respondent Dr. Pedro Zaldivar, as legal possessor of Lot No. 7481-H situated in
Mapatag, Hamtic, Antique, entered into an agreement (Kasugtanan) with Salmorin designating
him as administrator of the lot with a monthly salary of P150. Salmorin allegedly did not comply
with the terms of the Kasugtanan when he failed to till the vacant areas. This compelled Zaldivar
to terminate his services and eject him from the lot. When Salmorin refused to vacate the property,
Zaldivar filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Tobias Fornier-Anini-y-Hamtic. Salmorin alleged the existence of a tenancy
relationship between him and Zaldivar. Thus, he claimed that the case was an agrarian matter over
which the MCTC had no jurisdiction.
The MCTC found that the case was in the nature of an agrarian dispute and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. Zaldivar appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique
which ruled in his favor. The RTC found that the consent of the landowner and sharing of the
harvest, which were requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship did not exist. Thus, it
ruled that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case.
Salmorin appealed the RTC decision to the CA but the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. He
now seeks a reversal of the RTC and CA decisions.

Issue:
Whether or not jurisdiction of cases of unlawful detainer should be filed with the MTCC?

Ruling:
Yes, MTC has jurisdiction over cases of unlawful detainer
On the other , Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
7691, provides that exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer is lodged with the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and MCTCs. Thus,
Zaldivars complaint concerned the unlawful detainer by Salmorin of the subject lot. This
matter is properly within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Neypes V. CA
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an
order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and,
on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1,
1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the
Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner seasonably filed their notice to appeal?

Ruling:
Yes, it was seasonably filed
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to
Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Jose Fernando V. De Belen

Facts:
This case emanated from a complaint for Recovery of Possession filed on 6 March 1998 by the
petitioners against Reynaldo De Belen, herein respondent, before the RTC, Branch 10 of Malolos,
Bulacan, involving a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-487
(997) registered in the name of the late Jose, married to Lucila Tinio and Apolonia Fernando, wife
of Felipe Galvez, consisting of 124,994 square meters, more or less, which is situated in Baliuag,
Bulacan.
In the said complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children of the late Jose and they are
in the process of partitioning their inheritance. However, they could not properly accomplish the
partition due to the presence of the respondent who intruded into a portion of their property and
conducted quarrying operations in its immediate vicinity for so many years, without their
knowledge and permission.
Petitioners, therefore, wrote a letter dated 8 April 1997 to the respondent which was unheeded;
thus, a barangay conciliation was resorted to. For failure of the respondent to appear, a Certification
was issued by the Barangay Lupon that led to the filing of the complaint before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan to assert and defend their right over the subject property and for the respondent
to vacate the premises and pay rental arrearages in the amount of P24,000.00, attorney’s fees of
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent Reynaldo De Belen filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 22
June 1998, setting forth the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of cause of action;
(3) ambiguity as to the portion of the lot De Belen occupies; and, (4) incomplete statement of
material facts, the complaint having failed to state the identity, location and area of the lot sought
to be recovered.
Finding lack of merit, the motion was denied in an Order dated 3 November 1998, with the trial
court ordering herein petitioners to amend the complaint by indicating the details desired by the
respondent in order for the latter to file a responsive pleading.
On 12 February 1999, the Amended Complaint with its attachment was filed to which the
respondent moved for a Bill of Particulars, specifically questioning the legal basis for the
complaint since the entire property appears to be co-owned by Jose and Antonia Fernando and it
was not particularized in the complaint as to what specific portion belongs to each of the
co-owners.
In addition, the respondent, in his Answer, claimed that even the Bill of Particulars did not clearly
show the exact identity, personal circumstances and relationship of the individual heirs of the
decedent, location, area and size of the subject property. Also, prescription, estoppel and laches
had set in as against the petitioners.
Trial on the merits ensued which eventually resulted in the 28 October 2005 Decision of the RTC
which is favorable to the petitioners.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on jurisdiction for
failure of the petitioners to state the assessed value of the subject property, absence of evidence
proving the lawful ownership of the petitioners and the grant of affirmative reliefs which were not
alleged or prayed for.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction for failure to allege in the complaint the assessed value of the subject property.
Ruling:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any
of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So
that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall
be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within

the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.


A reading of both the complaint and the amended complaint shows that petitioners failed to state
the assessed value of the disputed lot. This fact was highlighted by the Court of Appeals when it
ruled:
The allegations in the complaint and the relief sought by the party determine the nature of the
action if the title or designation is not clear. The complaint, in the case at bar, is bereft of any
allegation which discloses the assessed value of the property subject matter thereof. The court a
quo therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over instant action. The Amended Complaint does not
state a valid cause of action.
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Jurisprudence has it that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised. As held in the case of Solmayor v. Arroyo, it is not the
function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again. This is premised on the
presumed thorough appreciation of the facts by the lower courts. Such that, when the trial court
and the appellate court, as in this case, reached opposite conclusions, a review of the facts may be
done. There is a permissible scope of judicial review on the factual findings of the lower courts as
crystallized in Treñas v. People of the Philippines, where the Court cited contradictory findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court as one of the instances where the resolution of the petition
requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are
based.
So too are we reminded that procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper administration of
law and justice and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid sense, for they
are adopted to secure, not override, substantial justice.
We, accordingly, review the records of this case and note the facts and evidence ignored by the
appellate court. We observe that at the initial stage of this case when the respondent questioned
the jurisdiction of the RTC in a Motion to Dismiss, he solely assailed the vagueness of the
complaint for failure to allege the specific identity of the subject property and for being
prematurely filed. The trial court in its 3 November 1998 Order, settled the issue by declaring that
the allegations in the complaint make out for a case of recovery of ownership and that the
petitioners need not wait for the lapse of one year from the 8 April 1997 demand letter to maintain
the accion reinvidicatoria. The trial court went on to explain that the complaint clearly gives the
defendant, herein respondent, notice of their exclusive and absolute claim of ownership over the
entire property covered by the OCT No. RO-487 (997).
From the said Order, the respondent never raised any objection and did not even opt to elevate the
matter to a higher court via a certiorari case which is a remedy for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. If indeed respondent was not convinced of the trial court’s ruling, he could have
availed of such remedy which is an original and independent action that does not proceed from the
trial that would lead to the judgment on the merits. As aptly cited in the case of New Frontier Sugar
Corporation v. RTC, Branch 39, Iloilo City, when the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from
the judgment.
Further, the trial court went on to state that respondent has not proved his status as a purchaser in
good faith and for value taking cue from the facts and circumstances as well as the numerous
entries found at the dorsal sides of OCT No. RO-487 (997) which should have put any of the
buyers on guard.
After the entire proceedings fully participated in by the respondent, he cannot be allowed to
question the result as having been rendered without jurisdiction. This is the teaching in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, et al. as reiterated in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., where the Court ruled:
"While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel
has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief.
Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered."
Similarly, as this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively barred the respondent by estoppel from challenging the court’s
jurisdiction. The Court has consistently upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed
at any stage, a litigant who participated in the court proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting
his evidence cannot later on question the trial court’s jurisdiction when judgement unfavorable to
him is rendered.
Moreover, and of equal significance, the facts of this case demonstrate the inapplicability of RA
7691. The argument of respondent that the assessed value of the subject property places the case
outside the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is belied by respondent’s own Answer which
states that:


 "16. That the defendant’s ownership and possession over the parcel of land ought to be recovered

by the plaintiff is valid and legal as evidenced by the following:

(c) Deed of Absolute Sale by Florentino San Luis in favor of Reynaldo Santos de Belen dated
June 4, 1979 (Annex "3" hereof) and the corresponding receipt of the purchase price of P60,000.00
dated June 19, 1979 (Annex "4" hereof)." thereby showing that way back in 1979 or nineteen (19)
years before this case was instituted, the value of the property was already well covered by the
jurisdictional amount for cases within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Boston Equity V. CA
Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein
respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave
to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-
defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated
5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion
for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. This
motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement
of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen
days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********; (2) that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) ******

The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying
her motion. CA granted the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person?

Ruling:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons;
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.
Citing the case of Sarsaba:
“The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of
his death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit
of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. “

EDITHA PADLAN V. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN

Facts:
Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is covered by
TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion
regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed
the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the
property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan.
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots
to Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT
issued under the former’s name was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of Editha
Padlan.
Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons
was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered a
Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.
Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of
respondents’ own title.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the
complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case and the person of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
Ruling:
No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court
has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property
is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount
of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject
property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court that they will
present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a
copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should
be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is
only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

BANCO DO BRASIL V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services for damages the former incurred
when one of the latter’s ship ran aground causing losses to Urbino. Urbino impleaded Banco Do
Brasil (BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines nor does it have
any office here or any agent. BDB was impleaded simply because it has a claim over the sunken
ship. BDB however failed to appear multiple times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB
was adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for BDB being a nuisance
defendant.
BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no valid service of summons because
the summons was issued to the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the other summons which were
made through publication is not applicable to BDB as it alleged that the action against them is in
personam.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over Banco Do Brasil.

Ruling:
No. Banco Do Brasil is correct. Although the suit is originally in rem as it was BDB’s claim on
the sunken ship which was used as the basis for it being impleaded, the action nevertheless became
an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages in the said amount. As such, only a personal
service of summons would have vested the court jurisdiction over BDB. Where the action is in
personam, one brought against a person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. When the
defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not
physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person
and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Heirs of Reinoso vs CA
Facts:
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a passenger jeepney and a truck at around
7:00 oclock in the evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result,
a passenger of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The passenger jeepney was
owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck
was owned by Jose Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against
Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation (FGAC).
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and against Guballa.
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and reversed the RTC decision
and dismissed the complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine
laid down in Manchester v. CA.In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in,
petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was denied in a resolution
dated June 30, 1994. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to nonpayment of docket pay was proper.
Ruling:
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. In
Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court
decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the
plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket
fees required. Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court explained
that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required
by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin,
the Court stated:


 Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees,

we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those
fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second,
such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection
in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a
greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably,for it is far better to dispose of
a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had
already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees
was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate
level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling
came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to
the cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Jimmy and Patri
Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Mangubat (Mactan), it was stated that the intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full
opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the
recency of the changes introduced by the new rules. In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.

The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid and the correct
payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk
of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners claim would be
dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary
circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that
the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already
before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution.
In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court
will resolve the case on the merits.
2. While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions,
the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that
it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney was coming
from the opposite direction. When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post No.
J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney,
causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck
driver should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was
under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa, failed to rebut
the presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection or supervision of his employee. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and service record.
With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

JOSEFINA ESTOLAS and RICARDO SALVADOR V. RAYMUNDO ACENA

Facts:
On October 18, 1982, respondent was appointed Administrative Officer with permanent status at
the Rizal Technological College (RTC), by then President of the College Dr. Lydia Profeta.
On December 9, 1985, respondent was extended a promotion to be an Associate Professor, and
was then designated Acting Adiministrative Officer.
On January 9, 1986, respondent had to reject the promotion, given in a written letter to the
President of RTC, in view of the CSC’s Memorandum Circular No. 4 that requires Associate
Professors with a masteral degree. Said letter was approved by Dr. Profeta. The discrepancy of
salaries was also refunded by the petitioner.
On March 26, 1986, petitioner Estolas was designated OIC in place of Dr. Profeta and on April 8,
the same year, issued Memorandum Order No. 30 revoking the designation of respondent as
Acting Administrative Officer, to which co-petitioner Salvador allegedly filled in the position.
Respondent then filed a civil case of Injucture and Damages enjoining the petitioners herein, to
which Court of Appeals sided with respondent, that they be liable of P75,000.00 for moral damages
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
It is also noted that on March 23, 1987, Chairperson of the CSC, Celerina Gotladera, issued an
opinion in favor of respondent Acena holding that the latter is still the administrative officer as he
was appointed thereto under permanent status and as his appointment as Associate Professor had
been withdrawn.
Petitioners petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Estolas, in conspiracy with petitioner Salvador, issued the said
memorandum in bad faith.
Whether the inclusion of the award of moral and exemplary damages by the CA are proper.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2002 and
its Resolution dated 22 January 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that only
petitioner Josefina V. Estolas is ordered to pay respondent Raymundo Acena the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000) as moral damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as
exemplary damages. With costs.

Respondent Acena, grasping at straws, tried to establish during the direct examination of petitioner
Salvador that despite the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court for the petitioners to
refrain from enforcing Memorandum Order No. 30, petitioner Salvador continued to perform the
duties of Acting Administrative Officer through the signing of "payrolls, vouchers, requisitions."
It is axiomatic that "to support a judgment for damages, facts which justify the influence of a lack
or absence of bad faith must be alleged and proven." In the absence of contrary evidence, petitioner
Salvador cannot be faulted in accepting the designation of Acting Administrative Officer from his
superior and in exercising the duties and functions of the office.
Therefore, Salvador is not in bad faith due to lack of evidence. However, Estolas was ruled to have
had bad faith.
Despite the refusal of plaintiff to accept the position of Associate Professor, defendants ignored
the same but instead continued on removing Acena’s appointment as Associate Professor.
Moreover, there has been a request from two members of the Board of Trustees for a meeting of
the Board of Trustees to resolve the issues surrounding the controversy on Acena’s promotion.
However, herein defendants simply disregarded such request instead proceeded on implementing
the questioned Memorandum and continually placed Acena in the payroll as Associate Professor.
The defendant’s demonstration of bad faith remained even during the pendency of this case. After
a restraining order was issued by this Court, defendants persisted on enforcing Memo. Order No.
30. Defendants acted similarly when an injunction was issued by this Court. This contemptuous
attitude of the defendants cannot be viewed with favor.
Moreover, we find inexcusable and laden with bad faith the actuation of petitioner Estolas in
resubmitting to the CSC for its approval the appointment papers of respondent Acena as Associate
Professor despite the latter’s vehement rejection of said position and despite the pendency of the
case in the trial court. Worse still, petitioner Estolas conveniently did not inform the CSC of the
real picture of respondent Acena’s appointment.
Yet another clear badge of bad faith on petitioner Estolas’s part was to indicate respondent Acena
as Associate Professor in the payroll despite the trial court’s order of preliminary mandatory
injunction for petitioner Estolas to refrain from implementing Memorandum Order No. 30 as
respondent Acena was still Administrative Officer, occupying said position in a permanent
capacity.
The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, missed out one very crucial fact, i.e., damages
are not presumed; the first requisite for the recovery of moral damages is that there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant. There must
be proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, etc. The claimant must
satisfactorily prove the factual basis and causal connection thereof with the defendant’s acts. Thus,
the ultimate question that must be asked is: did respondent Acena suffer damages from petitioner
Estolas’s wrongful act of issuing Memorandum Order No. 30 and from her acts of bad faith as
discussed above?
On the witness stand, respondent Acena testified that as a direct result of petitioner Estolas’s
actuations, he felt insulted, embarrassed and humiliated. He suffered "serious anxiety, moral
shock, sleepness nights" and even had to resort to "minimum tanquilizer."
LICAROS V. LICAROS
Facts:
Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married on December 15,
1968. In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2)
children. On June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced Civil Case No. 91-1757, for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family
Code. As Margarita was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., the court
a quo ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order,
as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United
States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was
given sixty (60) days aafter publication to file a responsive pleading. Almost nine (9) years later,
the petition at bench was commenced when Margarita was informed that she no longer has the
right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been
judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991. On appeal,
Margarita asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However such claim was rejected by the CA because the case
involves the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem and where
service of summons may be served extraterritorially under Section 15 of Rule 14. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Abelardo.
Ruling:
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi
in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. Under Section 15 of
Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service. The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service
does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third
mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."
The Process Server’s Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons addressed to
Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of
Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Server’s certificate of service of
summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. Before proceeding to
declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its
Decision dated 8 November 1991 that "compliance with the jurisdictional requirements
hav(e) (sic) been duly established." Hence delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was
sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and
considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial
service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.

Nippon Express Corporation V. CIR

Facts:
Petitioner Nippon Express Corporation is a corporation duly organized and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is a value-added tax registered entity. On April 24, 2003,
Nippon filed an administrative claim for refund representing excess input tax attributable to its
effectively zero- rated sales in 2001. Pending review by the BIR, Nippon filed a petition for review
with the CTA First Division, requesting for the issuance of a tax credit certificate on April 25,
2003. CTA First Division granted and ordered CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in favour of
petitioner. CTA en banc affirmed. CIR filed a Motion for Recon and argued that CTA had no
jurisdiction over the petition for review because it was filed before the lapse of the 120-day period
accorded to the CIR to decide on its administrative claim for input VAT refund. According to CIR,
claim was premature.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has a jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review.
Rulings:
The Court finds the petition to be without merit. As regards the first issue, petitioner argues that
the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect as to prevent the tax
court from taking cognizance of the case.18 It merely renders the filing of the case premature and
makes it susceptible to dismissal for lack of cause of action, if invoked. Considering, however,
that the CIR failed to seasonably object to the filing of the case by petitioner with the CTA, it is
deemed to have waived any defect in the petition for review. In fact, petitioner points out that the
this issue was only raised for the first time in the respondent’s Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, dated December 3, 2010, which was filed after the promulgation of the
September 22, 2010 Amended Decision of the CTA En Banc. Finally, petitioner insists that it
cannot be faulted for relying on prevailing CTA jurisprudence requiring that both administrative
and judicial claims for refund be filed within two (2) years from the date of the filing of the return
and the payment of the tax due. Because this case was filed more than seven years prior to Aichi,
the doctrine espoused therein cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair petitioner’s
substantial rights and will deprive it of its right to refund.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of
the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the
expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with
the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis Supplied) A simple reading of the abovequoted provision
reveals that the taxpayer may appeal the denial or the inaction of the CIR only within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the decision denying the claim or the expiration of the 120-day period given
to the CIR to decide the claim. Because the law is categorical in its language, there is no need for
further interpretation by the courts and non- compliance with the provision cannot be justified.20
As eloquently stated in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court
and BF Homes, Inc.:21
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. When the law
is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs.
Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA-708 [1968]).
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its
true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in
more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous
if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to
exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s position, the 120+30-day period is indeed mandatory and
jurisdictional, as recently ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation.23 Thus, failure to observe the said period before filing a judicial claim with the CTA
would not only make such petition premature, but would also result in the non-acquisition by the
CTA of jurisdiction to hear the said case.
Because the 120+30 day period is jurisdictional, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the
said time frame may be broached at any stage, even on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time during the proceedings.
Jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent
or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them.24 Consequently, the fact
that the CIR failed to immediately express its objection to the premature filing of the petition for
review before the CTA is of no moment.