Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
JUNE 26
Definition of Terms
1. Administrative Law- is the branch of public law
which fixes the organization of government. It
determines the competence of administrative
authorities who execute the law and indicates to
the individual the remedies available in case of
violation of his rights.
- It also refers to the system of legal principles in
settlement of conflicting claims involving
administrative and executive officers in their
dealings with individuals.
- The purpose is the protection of private rights of
individuals.
What concepts are important in the study of
administrative law?
- The doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
- Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
- The Doctine/Power of Control as distinguished
from Power of ______
- Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
- Exceptions of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
- Due process provision in the administrative
proceedings.
It also deals with powers and procedures of
administrative authorities, importantly, the relief
against abuses committed by administrative
authorities. The power of judicial review of
administrative decisions.
So administrative law deals with all portions of
administrative law involving administrative and
executive officers. The objective here is the
protection of private rights, therefore the subject
matter is the nature and the mode of exercise of
the administrative power and the system of the
need against administrative action.
The function of administrative law is to make the
government machinery work in an efficient and
orderly manner.
The government have only a few functions to
deal with. But because of the complexities of the
activities of individuals and entities, the
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government found itself unable to deal with
these complexities. And thus the need to create
administrative authorities dealing on specific
matters w/in their competence. And so the
legislature and courts felt that they were not
competent to deal with these intricacies and so
the need therefore for congress to create
administrative bodies.
How then do we distinguish administrative
authorities from the court? Take note that the
court has only one function, that is,
adjudication—the adjudication of legal rights, but
not so in the case of administrative authorities. It
has multiple functions. The exercise of quasi-
legislative function and quasi-judicial function of
administrative bodies.
The administrative authorities are empowered
under their laws not only to promulgate rules.
Principally, the purpose of administrative
authority is regulatory, although in the process it
may have the authority to adjudicate
controversies. But take note, in the latter _____,
it is incident to the principal function, still
regulatory.
So the test here whether, the administrative body
is judicial or administrative is whether the body is
tasked to regulate even if it is empowered to hear
but the latter is only incident to its principal
function to _____ out the provisions of the law.
Therefore, its authority is administrative.
Whereas, if that tribunal has only one kind of
power that is to adjudicate legal rights, to decide
legal controversies, then that tribunal is the
court.
This has been asked in the bar, what are the
types of administrative authorities? The
government may set up to create bodies to offer
some privilege, grant or gratuity, for example, the
Philippine Veteran’s Affairs Office, the GSIS, SSS.
Or the government may establish an entity to
carry out certain business function of
governmental activity, for example, Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Or the government may make
a body tasked to regulate business affected in
public interest, let’s say the Department of
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Energy. Certainly, there must be administrative
authorities to regulate these activities affected
with public interest. Or an agency may be created
by government through legislature in order to
adjust individual controversies. Basically, because
of enshrined constitutional social policy, for
example, the NLRC, DOLE. Or the government
may create an agency that will perform some
kind of business activity, for example the Phil.
Postal Corporation. Or an entity may be
established to consider the government as a
private entity, for example in the case of the
Commission on Audit, the authority under the
constitution to audit the transactions of
government entities.
Very important! The distinction between the
term Republic of the Philippines aka the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as
distinguished from the term National
Government. So the GRP is defined under Sec. 2
of the Revised Administrative Code (EO 292)
refers to the corporate governmental entity to
which the functions of the government are
exercised throughout the Phils. including the
various arms of its political authority is made
effective, rather we’re talking of the various local
government units, such as the Autonomous
Region, the province, city, municipality and
barangay; Whereas, the National Government
refers to the entire machinery of the central
government composed of the executive,
legislative and judicial departments. And this
concept ought to be distinguished from the LGUs,
which are part of the term GRP. LGU is not part of
National Government.
Old case. Is the Central Bank part of the term
National Government? This arose because of the
unilateral rescission made by the Central Bank in
the matter of construction agreement, although
verbal, it had with the Ablaza Construction. And
here the Central Bank contend that it is part of
the term National Government under the old
administrative code. Sec 607 of that code
declared that whenever there is a disbursement
of public fund by the National Government, there
must be a certificate of availability. But there was
none in this case. The SC ruled that the CB is a
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
government instrumentality that has been
(rated?) as an autonomous entity, it has its own
charter of ____ (??? 265 as amended). And the
purpose of this Institution is to administer the
monetary and banking system of the Philippines.
In the case of Bacani vs NACOCO. The issue of
w/n the coconut corporation is within the term
GRP. COA contended that there should be no
payment because NACOCO is embraced in GRP
and under the Rules of Court, it is exempt from
payment of such fees. The SC ruled that this
government corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from the GRP.
In the Bar, this has been asked twice: Are GOCCs
embraced in the term GRP? Yes. If they are
performing political or governmental function.
No. if they’re not. So clearly GOCCs may perform
governmental and corporate functions or
proprietary functions. The latter capacity, these
GOCCs performing proprietary functions are not
embraced with the term GRP.
What other important terms? Instrumentality of
the Government as defined in the Revised Admin
Code. It refers to the agency of the National
Government that has not been integrated within
the department framework, but vested, it is given
special functions as provided by law. And this
instrumentality enjoys operational autonomy
under its charter.
You have here the case of MIAA of the status of
the MIAA. The SC ruled that MIAA is not a GOCC
but rather an instrumentality of the National
Government vested with not only governmental
functions but with corporate powers. So it is
vested with a corporate function in order for it to
perform efficiently governmental functions. The
fact that the law vests in the instrumentality
corporate functions, it does not mean that this
corporation is already an instrumentality, unless
this corporation has been organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation. So it remains an
instrumentality exercising both corporate and
governmental powers. So an instrumentality may
also be a GOCC, but not all GOCCs are
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intrumentalities as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code.
The case of Rp vs. Rambuyong, pertainting to the
definition under Sec. 2 of EO 292. The term
instrumentality includes GOCCs. What about the
status of the National Power Corporation? It has
dual status, it is also an instrumentality of
government. The problem here was that
Rambuyong and the Vice Mayor of Sibugan,
Zamboanga, appeared as counsel in a case filed
against the NPC. Under the LGC, it declares that
no member of the Sangguniang Bayan fo the LGU
shall appear as counsel in a case against the
instrumentality, agency of a government unit.
The SC ruled that Rambuyong cannot appear as
counsel un this case for damages against NPC
because NPC is an instrumentality of government
and therefore within the ambit of the provision
under Sec. 90 of LGC.
In an earlier case, Maceda vs Macaraig, the SC
declared that NPC is a government
instrumentality that is tasked to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of
power, in order to improve the quality of life. This
is on the basis of Art. 2 Sec. 9 of the Constitution.
In the case of Iron and Steel Authority vs CA, in
the status of ISA. ISA was created under PD 272
for a term of 5 years. Subsequently, after the
lapse of 5 years, it was extended under EO 555
for another 10 year period. And so during the
corporate life of ISA, it instituted an imminent
domain proceeding over the Ma. Cristina plant in
Iligan. And so while the case was pending, the
corporate term of ISA expired. And so the issue
w/n the expiration of term also mean the
extinction of the suit it filed during its corporate
term. The SC ruled, looking into the status of the
ISA that the GRP should substitute in the place of
ISA because the ISA is a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the GRP. Therefore, upon
the expiration of its authority, all the powers of
the ISA ought to revert back and should be
assumed by the principal, the GRP, unless there is
a specific provision in the law providing for such
disposition.
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Very important! The Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction. Under this concept, the court cannot
and will not determine controversies involving an
issue w/in the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal. More so, where the issue reminds the
exercise of sound administrative question and
this calls for the expertise and special knowledge
of the administrative tribunal. And so the court
refer to the authority of the administrative
tribunal on the basis of this Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.
There are two reasons for this Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction. First, the person here is
allowed the administrative agency to decide the
issue correctly and the Second is the need to
prevent resorting to two courts, in the process
declogging the court’s dockets.
Precisely issues were generally resolved under
the provisions of the Civil Code and were taken
cognizance by the courts. But not anymore.
Because on the basis of the law, the
administrative tribunal may take cognizance of
the issue requiring its expertise. So ascertainment
of factual matters which used to be within the
competence of the court are now within the
admin tribunal. And in fact, again on the basis of
the provision of law, the administrative tribunal
may even award damages.
A good illustration of this application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the case of Sagip
Kalikasan vs Paderanga. The authorities were able
to confiscate in the alleged illegal _____ of timber
products and these products were turned over to
CENRO. But what happened here was there was a
private individual who claimed ownership over
the timber products and filed a suit for replevin
before the court presided by Judge Paderanga. In
here, the judge was even dismissed by the SC for
gross ignorance of the law because he took
cognizance of the case knowing that this was
already been handled by the competent
authority, DENR. Under the law, DENR is
responsible in matters of enforcement of forestry
laws (PD 705 as amended). The forest products
that were confiscated were in custodial egis and
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therefore cannot be the subject of replevin suit
before the court against DENR.
The law provides that the enforcement of
forestry laws as wells as rules and regulations,
the protection, conservation and management of
forest lands are within the exclusive authority of
the DENR.
The exclusive authority being exercised by the
Bureau of Immigration over deportation cases.
Applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. So
whenever the issue in the deportation of an alien,
it is within the competence of the BI and in the
process, whenever there is a claim of citizenship
of this alleged alien, it will not divest the BI of its
authority to take cognizance of this case and in
the process it will also look into the issue of
citizenship. As a rule, judicial is enjoined. The
court will have to defer to the authority of the BI.
This rule is subject to exceptions. What is the
exception to the primary authority of the BI over
deportation cases where there is judicial
intervention?
1. Where the court itself believes that there is
substantial evidence in support of the claim by
the deportee of his citizenship; or
2. Whenever the evidence submitted by the
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship.
In these cases the BI must defer in favor of the
authority of the court.
What is the nature of a citizenship proceeding? It
is sui generis. Therefore, the concept of the res
judicata will not apply. Whenever the issue of
citizenship is raised time and again, the concept
of res judicata will not apply.
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is applicable
only whenever there is a concurrence of
jurisdiction between the court and the
administrative tribunal. What the law provides,
the court should defer to respect the authority
given to the administrative agency under such a
law. But where what is involved is the
concurrence of jurisdiction between two or more
disciplining authorities, the doctrine of primary
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
jurisdiction does not apply. So this principle will
apply whenever there is a concurrent jurisdiction
between the court and the admin tribunal.
Because of what is provided by law the admin
tribunal must be given the power to decide the
controversy. But where there is concurrence of
the authority of disciplining authorities. For
example, the CSC and OMB, these are both
disciplining authorities, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply. So what applies is the
exclusionary rule. The tribunal that takes
cognizance first of the complaint is an exclusion
of the other equally competent admin authority.
Another application of this doctrine, the case of
the Commission of the Settlement of Land
Problems (under DOJ)(EO 561). The competence
of the COSLAP who resolve public land disputes.
So it is limited to those public lands or those
covered by specific agreements with the
government, license obtained from the
government, such as pasture lease agreements,
timber concessions or reservation grants. In the
case of Machado vs Gatdula, there was such a
complaint by Gatdula against Machado
pertaining to the need of complainant to a right
of way over the property owned by Machado. But
this was a private property and certainly the
COSLAP does not have and could not have
jurisdiction over such property classified as
private. Not even in such in this case, the parties
participated in the proceedings even if there was
this writ of execution issued by the COSLAP, the
COSLAP never acquired jurisdiction. And so its
authority may be questioned at any time. The
proceedings are in fact null and void. SO the lack
of jurisdiction could not be cured by the
participation of the parties. SO COSLAP’s
authority is limited to those involving public
lands, covered by specific agreements granted by
the government. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
does not apply in this case because what is at
issue is the right to pay the private individual.
In a case of UST vs Sanchez. The issue is w/n the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. What
happened here was that Sanchez filed a suit for
damages against UST before the court because
UST refused to give Sanchez the transcript of
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records despite repeated demands. UST said this
should be claimed within the competence of the
Commission on Higher Education. And in fact
Sanchez filed an administrative complaint against
UST before the CHED. Sabi ng UST, the fact that
Sanchez instituted this complaint before the
CHED is an indication that they recognize that this
should be a matter brought before the CHED not
before the court.
Take note, another concept. The Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction applies only in the exercise
by the administrative authority of its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory power. It has no
application in the exercise of a quasi-legislative,
rule making power of the administrative
authority.
Now the law of the CHED, RA 77, the Higher
Education Act of 1994, does not confer to the
CHED quasi-judicial power. In other words, if this
suit is one for damages, and the law itself, RA 77,
does not vest to CHED a power to adjudicate. The
SC ruled it is within the competence of the courts.
In fact the CHED, not only does not have such
power of quasi-judicial, it does not have the
power also to award damages.
What is the law of HLURB? Applying the Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, PD 957 as amended by PD
1344. Very important, Section 1. Section 1
provides for the cases over which the HLURB has
the exclusive jurisdiction. What are these cases?
(1) Unsound real estate business practices. So if
the complaint involves the unsound real estate
business practice of the owner of a subdivision,
this is within the competence of HLURB. (2)
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (3) Cases involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyer of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. Whenever there is
failure on the part of the developer to comply
with its statutory and contractual obligations, let
say providing for the basic needs of the housing
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
units in the subdivision, it is clearly within the
competence of HLURB.
In the case of CT Torres vs Hibionada, asked in
the bar, whenever the issue is specific
performance with damages for delivery of title.
There was failure on the part of the developer to
deliver the Certificate of Title accompanied by a
demand for damages. The SC ruled that under
the law HLURB is empowered to award damages.
On the matter of a complaint for reimbursement
of expenses incurred by homeowners to repair
defective housing units as so constructed by the
developer, again this falls under the second
situation, within the ambit of the jurisdiction of
the HLURB.
In the case of Chua vs Ang, take note, the
authority of the HLURB applies only the matter of
imposition of administrative fines, but not
payment of penalties under Section 39 PD 1344
because there is criminal violation on the
provisions of PD 1344, of course you have to file
the case before the courts. It is the courts that
impose these penalties, not the HLURB. SO
HLURB must interpret and apply contracts. This
used to be within the competence of the court,
not anymore, because of PD 957 as amended by
PD 1344.
Where the complaint refers to the need to
declare void a mortgage. The voidance of a
mortgage of a lot done for a violation of PD 957
as amended by PD 1344 and the nullification of a
foreclosure sale, this used to be the function of
the court, but not anymore. These are already
within the authority of the HLURB.
The mere claim of relationship between the
subdivision owner or developer and the lot buyer
or condominium unit buyer does not
automatically confer jurisdiction to the HLURB. It
should be any of the three cases mentioned
under Section 1.
In the case of Cadimas vs Carrion, there was this
contract to sell executed between seller Tagimas
and buyer Carrion but later on the buyer dispose
of such unit. There was a transfer of the
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townhouse to a third party which is a violation of
his contract to sell. The SC ruled that it is not the
HLURB that has authority to take cognizance of
the issue but rather the court. This issue is not
any of those three cases mention under Section 1
of PD 1344.
In Arranza vs BF Homes, the problem here was
that the developer BF Homes was already placed
under receivership. In fact the SEC appointed a
board of receivers to manage the affairs of BF
Homes. But nonetheless the aggrieved
homeowners filed this suit before the HLURB. The
court ruled that even if the developer was
already placed under receivership by the SEC,
there was no violation of this order of the SEC
preventing payment to creditors. And in fact the
HLURB under the law still has the competence to
take cognizance of the case because the principal
action is not monetary in nature. So there is no
violation of the SEC order prohibiting payment to
creditors. Although in the process of adjudication
of the HLURB, it may incidentally award monetary
claim, but that is not the principal action. If ever
there is such monetary award, such matter would
be referred to the board of receivers.
Receivership as the objective of ascertaining the
rights of the parties, it does not mean the
extinction of the corporation itself. So here, the
homeowners filed suit because of the failure of
BF Homes to comply with the statutory
obligations on the matter of providing open
spaces, etc. The SC ruled, even if the corporation
is under receivership the HLURB still has to take
cognizance of the case.
In the case of Marina Properties Corp. vs CA, the
issue, whether there is forum shopping resorted
to by HL Carlos. What happened here was that
there was an agreement between HL Carlos for it
to construct the houses and condominiums of the
Marina Properties Corp. There were actually two
contracts. The first one is a construction contract
and the other the contract to purchase, because
here the contractor also purchased a unit from
Marina. So there was failure of Marina Property
to comply with its obligations under its contract
to purchase. So a suit was instituted by the
contractor before the HLURB and another suit
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
was filed by the contractor against the developer
pertaining to the unpaid sum of money in
connection with its accomplishment with the
construction project. It was claimed by petitioner
that it was forum shopping because the
contractor resorted to the filing of suit before
two courts. Is there forum shopping here? No,
because we are talking here of two separate
actions. The first one, the suit before the HLURB
pertained to failure on the part of the developer
to comply with statutory obligations, etc.. and the
second one pertained to sum of money suit and it
should be filed before the courts. So there is no
forum shopping.
Previously under PD 902-A, the SEC had the
authority and jurisdiction over intra-corporate or
partnership cases, not the courts, but not
anymore. A new law, RA 8799, the Securities
Regulation Code, it now within the competence
of the courts.
Whenever there is a claim of violation, criminal in
nature, of the provisions of the Securities
Regulation Code, this is a specialized dispute that
should first be looked into by the SEC under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. So whenever
there is violation, criminal in nature, of the
provisions of SRC, you cannot immediately file
the case before the prosecutor’s office. Applying
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because this
is a specialized issue/dispute within the
competence of the SEC. SEC must have the power
to look first into the alleged violation. Whenever
it makes a finding of probable cause then it only
when this matter shall be referred to the DOJ for
the conduct of preliminary investigation. But
nonetheless, whenever the SEC conducts the
investigation, it already interrupts the
prescriptive period.
What happens if there is non-compliance with
this requirement? There was no adoption of this
doctrine of primary jurisdiction because the
complaint immediately was filed before the
president’s office or prosecutor’s office. The
prosecutor’s office has the competence to
dismiss the case.
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Applying again the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, Toll Regulatory Board, PD 1112 as
amended. What therefore is the remedy of an
express way user, whenever he finds the toll rate
adjustments are oppressive and exorbitant? The
remedy under the TRB law is to file a petition for
review of this adjusted toll rates with the TRB,
because this involves a question of fact within the
competence of the TRB. TRB has the expertise,
applying the formula in other factors as so
provided by law. This calls for the determination
of factual matters thus the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies. Under the same law, the
decision of TRB is appealable within 10 days to
the office of the president. Again this is
consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Within the
administrative realm, there must be exhaustion.
Under the same law, in relation to PD 8094, the
TRB is invested with the power to grant to any
qualified entity or person the authority to
construct, to maintain, operate a toll facility. Thus
in the process issue the corresponding toll
operating permit, also known as toll operating
certificate. If the law confers such power to the
administrative agency like TRB to grant such
franchise or _____, there is no need to secure
from legislature to secure a special franchise
because the law already provides the mechanism.
The law itself confers the power to the
administrative agency to grant such privilege or
franchise or award such contract by explicit,
express provision of law. TRB is empowered to
grant administrative privilege for the operation of
toll facility and impose, alter the terms and
conditions in the appropriate contract.
Same case, Francisco vs TRB, the Court made a
distinction between the fixing of initial toll rate
and the fixing of the subsequent periodic interim
toll rates. What is the distinction? (1) Quasi-
legislative, rule-making power, no need of a
public hearing. But the subsequent fixing of
interim/periodic toll rates, whenever there are
adjustments of the toll rates subsequent to the
initial fixing, this would require the conduct of a
public hearing. Even in the matter of fixing of
initial toll rates, the general rule here is there is
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
no need of such hearing, there is no violation of
this due process requirement because the law
itself confers such power. But where there is a
challenge, there is a question on the initial toll
rate made, it only in such situation that public
hearings are required. So there is a challenge as
to the fixing of toll rate, the general rule there is
no need as provided under the law. Of course in
the latter case, whenever subsequent to the
initial rates, there have been adjustments, so
there are petitions filed for the amendment or
increase in the toll rates, there should be conduct
of public hearing because in the latter case this
calls for the exercise of a quasi-judicial function.
Quasi-judicial power, what does it mean? It
simply means the power to decide, to adjudicate.
Take note, NOT ALL administrative authorities are
empowered, that possess a quasi-judicial
function. There must be an express conferment,
an empowerment on the basis of its law given to
the administrative tribunal. Even if there is such
grant of this adjudicatory power on the basis of
law, this is simply incidental. This is simply an aid
to the principal power of any administrative
agency, which is regulatory, in order to carry out
the provisions of its charter that is regulatory.
And in the process in the express conferment,
empowerment by law it may decide
controversies, it may adjudicate.
So what is the nature of this quasi-judicial power
of the administrative agency? This calls for the
exercise of discretion, the action or discretion of
the administrative authority in investigating facts.
How do you investigate facts? First gather your
evidence and from such evidence gathered, you
determine the facts. This would be the basis of
your decision. So the exercise of discretion of
judicial nature. This calls for the taking and
evaluating of evidence and determination of facts
based on such evidence gathered and presented.
An order or decision is issued. Such order or
decision must be supported by the facts.
If there is no authority given by law to the
administrative body to apply the law, although it
be conferred the power to gather evidence, does
it mean that this administrative body possess of a
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quasi-judicial power? It only means that that
agency, given the power to gather evidence, to
determine facts is conducting a fact finding
investigation which is different from adjudicatory
power.
The case of PCGG vs Judge Pena. The law of
PCGG, Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. To
investigate alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcos’ and his cronies. What happened here
was that, in its early years of existence, the PCGG
had the authority to issue freeze orders. This
freeze order was issued by PCGG over two
apparel companies. These apparel companies
went to the court to enjoin, to prevent the PCGG
from carrying out its task. Question: May the
court restrain the PCGG from exercising its
authority, in this case, from issuing this freeze
order. The SC ruled, the PCGG is a co-equal body
of the trial court and and exercises quasi-judicial
power. The court cannot restrain the PCGG.
In the matter of the power of the administrative
tribunal either to grant, deny or suspend or
revoke a license or permit, that is an exercise of a
quasi-judicial power. So in the case of Philippine
Overseas Employment Authority, the authority of
this agency either to grant, deny, suspend or
revoke a license of any private placement agency,
this is a quasi-judicial power. When we talk of
quasi-judicial power you should equate this to
observance of due process requirement. Always
compliance with the due process requirement
although the law itself may allow the agency to
issue provisional authority. Because provisional is
temporary, it is still subject to a full blown
determination in a hearing where all the parties
are the given the opportunity to present their
evidence. Here the POEA, in the exercise of such
quasi-judicial power has such competence to
suspend, cancel any license of the private agency
on any grounds whenever there is a violation of
the terms or provisions of its permit or license.
Case of Sanado vs CA.
In the same manner as the NTC has such
competence to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity for the operation,
installation of communication of facilities and
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
services. Therefore in the process determine the
area of operation that the applicant may have
such competence for the operation of this
telecommunication services. The NTC is under
what department? DOTC. Even the DOTC can
usurp this power of the NTC to issue a certificate
of public convenience and applying the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. And it can even, by
provision of law, initiate the conduct of
investigation just like the POEA, it is empowered
by the DOLE to initiate, whenever there is a
report of an alleged violation by placement
agencies pertaining to the rights of overseas
Filipino workers. The POEA has authority on its
own to initiate and conduct an investigation,
quasi-judicial power.
In the case of Eastern Telecom vs International
Communication Corp. What happened here was
that the NTC granted the provisional authority to
the ICC to operate of an area that is already
within the authority of the Eastern Telecom as
granted to it by its permit. The SC ruled that there
was not abuse of authority committed here by
the NTC by issuing a permit covering the area
already within the coverage of Easter Telecom’s
permit because this is consistent with the policy
of healthy competition. Taking into account the
technical and financial capabilities of the ICC.
There was no grave abuse committed by the NTC.
The conduct of investigation by the prosecutors
under the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial function.
Why do you say it is not a quasi-judicial function?
Because it will not, whatever the resolution
issued by the prosecutor will not resolve the
finality, which is in the competence of the court.
The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency whenever it
releases the finding of the prosecutor regarding
the existence of probable cause. Because the
prosecutor simply makes a determination that
there is, the crime has been probably committed.
It is within the competence of the court to
determine the finality of the case.
Any other agency you can think of where the
question is not a quasi-judicial power, whenever
you can say the NBI conduct an investigation,
would you say that is an exercise of quasi-judicial
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power? NBI? Pagmagimbestiga ang NBI, would
you say that it is already performing a quasi-
judicial power? NO. because it simply
recommends. It will not put to rest the issue.
When filing, san ifafile yan? the prosecutor’s
office or office of the ombudsman. The resolution
or recommendation of the NBI does not
terminate the proceeding. It is not a quasi-judicial
function.
In the case of UP Board of Reagents vs CA, what
happened here there was this Indian national
took her post graduate studies in anthropology in
the UP. Later on, she was issued a Doctorate
Degree by the UP. It was later found out that her
thesis was plagiarized. The issue here is w/n there
was violation of the rights of this Indian national,
then the doctorate degree given earlier was
withdrawn from her by the UP board of reagents.
The SC ruled that as an act in the pursuit of
academic excellence and the need to defend its
integrity, the UP board of Reagents has such
power to withdraw such degree conferred
whenever it was found to be issued because
there was fraud, or there were errors committed,
but of course subject to the requirement of due
process. The UP board cannot simply withdraw
the degree without giving the person opportunity
to answer.
One other issue raised here, there was no formal
hearing conducted that is why violation. The SC
ruled, whenever there is such a case involving the
student, the due process requirement is already
complied with whenever opportunities are given
to file pleading, etc. No need for the conduct of
formal hearing. So the UP board is empowered to
determine who should be its students and who
should be given this privilege to be considered its
graduates. It follows that this institution of higher
learning has the power to withdraw this degree
whenever the grant was founded on fraud or
error.
In the case of Carino vs CHR, there were public
school teachers of the Ramon Magsaysay
Highschool who were on strike sometime in 1990.
They were required by the Sec. of Education to
report to classes, they refused. So administrative
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cases were filed against them by the Sec. And
some of them were suspended and some were
dismissed for service. One of the public school
teachers did was file a case against Carino before
the CHR. What is the CHR under the Constitution?
The CHR has the authority to investigate all kinds
of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. Its authority is limited. It does not
have the power to adjudicate. Its authority is
simply to make a determination of the facts. So
fact finding investigation, which is not
adjudication. The SC ruled that the CHR has no
business interfering with the conduct of
investigation because the Constitution does not
confer CHR adjudicatory power.
What is the objective in creating the Philippine
Truth Commission? The PTC is a fact finding body.
It does not have the power to adjudicate. No
quasi-judicial power is given to the commission. It
is not even a creation of legislature, simply to the
issuance of President which came into being. So
quasi-judicial power involves power to hear,
determine questions of facts. Not only in matters,
but also the authority to apply and decide in
accordance with the standards provided by law.
In the absence of such authority, it is not an
adjudicatory tribunal.
Forum shopping. We mentioned this a while ago.
When do you say there is forum shopping? There
is forum shopping whenever a party against
whom another decision has been rendered, seeks
a favorable decision or opinion in another forum.
In other words, the first one speaks of the
concept of res judicata, there has been
adjudication of this same issue that has already
been resolved in another forum. Or where the
party files, the same cause of action before two
or more forums, litis pendentia. There is a
pending suit filed before another tribunal and
here the party feels that he may not get a
favorable decision, files a case involving the same
cause of action before the court.
The rule on forum shopping also applies to quasi-
judicial proceedings. What is the test for us to
conclude that there is a violation against forum
shopping? Where the elements of litis pendentia
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are present, there is an ongoing investigation or
pending proceeding involving the same cause. Or
where final judgment in a case will amount to res
judicata in another. So the law as a rule, so many
laws of agencies, there is a requirement of filing a
certificate of non-forum shopping.
This requirement is not jurisdictional but it is a
mandatory requirement. Failure to comply with
this mandatory requirement may justify the
dismissal of a suit, of course at the discretion of
the investigation officer. Whenever there is a
complaint filed verified under oath, attached to
such verified complaint is a certificate of non-
forum shopping that there is not similar case filed
before any other tribunal.
Is the certification signed by the counsel of the
parties sufficient? No. The certification signed by
the lawyer representing the plaintiffs is defective,
unless there is special authority or power of
attorney given. As a rule, the parties themselves
must sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
What is the exception to this rule? The case of HL
Construction, the exception here is where it is
impractical for all of them to sign. One of them
may sign on behalf of the others, provided that
they share the same cause, they have common
interest and the file the case collectively.
In the case of Ombudsman vs Valera, the issue is
w/n there was a violation of this rule against
forum shopping. Here, deputy commissioner
Valera was the subject of an administrative
investigation by the Ombudsman and in fact
during the pendency of the investigation he was
preventively suspended. The one who
preventively suspended Valera was the Special
Prosecutor. So he filed a motion for
reconsideration of his preventive suspension
order, only for him to file a petition before the
appellate court, certiorari. The SC ruled that
there was no violation. Why? Because contested
in the court was the authority of the Special
Prosecutor’s to issue the preventive suspension
and there was really basis because under the law
the Special Prosecutor does not have the power
to issue preventive suspension, only the
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman. Even if the
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Special Prosecutor is of the same rank as the
Deputy Ombudsman, he does not have the same
rights/powers. The law does not confer this
power to the Special Prosecutor. So there is no
violation of this rule against forum shopping.
In the case of Montemayor vs Bundalian, there
are theses two cases filed against the Regional
Director of Public Works, Montemayor. First was
the criminal case before the Ombudsman,
another case before the Special Anti-Graft
Commission. It happened that the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal case and on that basis
Montemayor agreed that the administrative case
ought to be dismissed. Is he correct? We are
talking here of two different causes of action. The
first one is criminal and the other one is
administrative. So no violation of this rule against
forum shopping.
In Cabarrus vs Bernas, Atty. Bernas filed a civil
suit for damages against Cabarrus in connection
with alleged perjury committed by the latter. At
the same time, Atty. Bernas filed a criminal
complaint before the NBI. The question now is
w/n forum shopping is applicable in this case.
This rule is not applicable to agencies not
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Take
note, what it the nature of the case filed by Atty.
Bernas before the NBI? We look into the criminal
liability of Cabarrus for alleged perjury committed
and the NBI is not performing a quasi-judicial
power. It conducts investigation based on the
complaint it received coming from Atty. Bernas.
And in fact it was the filing of the civil case
independently with the criminal case.
In the case of Velasquez vs Hernandez, there was
this case before the CSC and another case before
the office of the Ombudsman. two different
causes of action. No violation.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent
authority before two or more disciplining bodies,
the tribunal that take cognizance of the
complaint acquires authority to the exclusion of
other equal competent tribunals. In the case of
Ombudsman vs Rodriguez where the complaints
were first filed with the OMB means that the
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authority and jurisdiction is already conferred
with the OMB and this same admin case can no
longer be filed before the Sangguniang Bayan.
Under the LGC Sec. 60-69 the Sanggunian has
also concurrent authority in cases filed against
the elective official. If the case was filed before
the Sanggunian then hindi na dapat makialam
ang OMB.
02 JULY
Earlier, we discussed the exercise of a quasi-
judicial power by administrative authorities.
What is this quasi-legislative authority of
administrative tribunals? It is the power of
administrative bodies to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to carry out or implement
the provisions of law that they are mandated
to…that they are tasked by the legislature to
implement.
So this is, actually, the charge of this quasi-
legislative power is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and, in fact, an exception to
the rule of non-delegation of legislative power. So
the rule here is for the legislature not to delegate.
But because of the multifarious
functions/activities now being performed by
individuals and entities, the need therefore for
legislature to authorize the discharge of certain
governmental functions and this is delegated to
administrative authorities and, thus, these
administrative authorities are given such power
to promulgate rules and regulations.
So, what are the requirements for the validity of
such rules promulgated by administrative
authorities? (1)The rules and regulations must be
germane to the purpose or objects of the
law;(2)Must conform to the requirements of such
law and must carry out the purposes; and of
course one other important requirement is (3)
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the need for publication of such rules and
regulations.
Take note that not all rules and regulations ought
to be published either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation. Essentially,
only those rules and regulations that are
intended to apply to the public, so where it binds
the public at large, therefore there’s a need for
the publication of such rules issued by the
administrative authority.
Nonetheless, whatever rules and regulations of
these administrative authorities to carry out the
mandate given to them are merely
interpretations or constructions of the law.
Moreso, if these rules are in excess of the
authority given to the administrative bodies, they
do not have a binding effect upon the courts. It’s
simply an interpretation of such law and,
therefore, ultimately it is still the court that
makes a decision on the validity of such rules.
The fact that the administrative authority has not
yet issued the implementing rules does not mean
that the law itself is no longer valid. So, mere
absence of the promulgation cannot effectively
______________ the provisions of the law where
there can a reasonable construction made by
administrative authorities.
Now, what about a promulgation on the basis of
law giving the power to the chief executive to
suspend the operation of the law upon the
happening of an act, the ascertainment of which
is left to the chief executive, is this a valid law?
YES, in this case, the president is simply
implementing what is provided under the law
and, thus, the president has such power to
promulgate rules in order to carry out the
mandate as provided in such statute.
There are three (3)categories of rules that may
be promulgated by administrative tribunals.
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1. Those intended to supply the details of
legislation;
2. Those intended to make a construction or
interpretation of the particular statement that
the administrative authority is duty-bound to
enforce.
From time to time, government tribunals,
especially those performing front line operations
issue rules and regulations in interpretation of
the provisions of law. Eg. BIR, CSC
3. Those intended to determine some fact or state
of things upon which the enforcement of a law
shall depend.
We mentioned earlier the president may himself
be authorized from the basis of such law, the
ascertainment of such act is dependent upon the
rules as promulgated by the administrative
authority. Or let’s say the grant of the legislature
of emergency powers to the president, but for
this law to be valid, giving such emergency
powers to the president, there must be sufficient
standards.
In the case of PhilBank vs. CIR, there was this
circular issued by the BIR changing the
prescriptive period for claims of excessive
corporate income tax payments. Now, under the
law, the prescriptive period provided therein was
only two (2) years, but under this Memorandum
Circular 7-885 this period was extended to ten
(10) years. So clearly, the rule is not in conformity
with what the law provides. It is, in fact, already
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an amendment of the law itself. And so, there
can be no vested rights arising from the wrong
construction or interpretation of such law by
administrative authorities, in this case the
Commissioner of the BIR. And this cannot a shield
to be used by the taxpayer against such action
that may be instituted by the government against
the taxpayer.
Now, in the case of Ople vs. Torres, in the matter
of the issuance by the Office of the President of
Administrative Order No. 308 which provides for
the adoption of the National Computerized
Identification Reference System—is this
constitutional? Take note that this rule involved
contending state policies, for example: the right
of the state to gather information against the
right of individuals to privacy. So clearly, this
cannot be done simply through the issuance of
AO by the Office of the President, this involves a
subject matter that should be embodied in a law
as passed by congress. So the establishment of
this identification reference system requires
delicate adjustments of contending state policies.
In the case of ________ vs. COA, in the matter of
the issuance by the DBM of this local budget
circular setting the maximum amount as
additional honorarium or allowance that may be
given by the local government unit to officials of
national agencies. Now, take note, the basis for
the issuance by the DBM of this LBC is Sec. 458 of
the LGC, but the LGC simply provides that the
LGU may grant such allowance whenever its
finances allowed. Nowhere in the provision of the
LGC does it provide a maximum limit, the
maximum amount that may be paid by the LGU
to the national government official with office in
the locality in the LGU. So clearly, the LBC issued
by the DBM is contrary to the law itself. What did
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we say earlier? The rules and regulations must
always be in conformity with the law. It cannot go
beyond what it provided in the law, otherwise, it
will already be usurping a power belonging to
legislature.
In the case Lopangco vs. CA, a resolution was
passed by the PRC prohibiting the attendance by
the reviewees of accountancy review classes. You
can just imagine if you will be prohibited from
attending review classes, of course this would be
a violation of the established right to liberty, and
on the part of the schools, the academic freedom
of these institutions. So clearly, take note, one
other requirement we mentioned earlier, that
whatever promulgation made by the
administrative authority must be reasonable,
must not be arbitrary or capricious.
In the case of Confederacion vs. Quisumbing,
there was an order issued by then Minister
Quisumbing phasing out Spanish subjects.In place
of Spanish, the inclusion of Arabic on an optional
basis. And so, the association of Spanish
professors all over the country questioned this
order. The SC sustained the validity of this order.
This is a reasonable issuance, and it is intended to
apply to all similarly situated, all Spanish teachers
all over the country.
In the case of _____________ vs. Abad Santos,
the Board of Examiners of Nursing issued a
regulation providing for periodic inspection of
nursing schools and preventing the graduates of
these nursing schools which are not able to
conform to the minimum standards set by the
Board of Examiners. Of course, this is a
reasonable regulation, a valid exercise of police
power.
There was a time that then BIR Commissioner
__________ issued this regulation Memorandum
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Circular 37-93 reclassifying these fourteen
brands, Hope, Champion, and more. They were
classified as local, but on the basis of this
memorandum circular, they were classified as
foreign brands based on the World Tobacco
Listing. And so, by reason of this issuance, there
was an imposition, and assessment of 55% ad
valorem tax, and the validity of this circular was
questioned before the court. Clearly, in the guise
of an exercise of a quasi-legislative power, it is
actually a quasi-judicial power. It is made
applicable only to one tobacco company, the
Fortune Tobacco Company. Clearly, the
requirements of the law have not been met in the
issuance of this memorandum circular, moreso,
the requirement of notice and hearing, and of
course, the need to have this published, none of
which were complied with. Clearly, the
memorandum circular is arbitrary, is capricious, is
not in conformity with the law.
Subsequently, another case involving the
issuance by the commissioner of the BIR, this
circular gives authority to the commissioner of
the BIR to make updates of the classification of
cigarette brands every two (2) years. Of course,
there is no such authority given under the law for
the commissioner to make such reclassification.
This must be embodied in the law. So nowhere in
the NIRC is there authority given to the BIR
commissioner to update the classification of
cigarette brands periodically.
In the case of Romulo vs. HDMF, put in issue here
are two (2) amendments issued by the Board of
Trustees of the HDMF, amendments to the IRR of
the HDMF. The first one, the 1995 amendments,
declared that for the employer to be exempt
from the Pag-ibig Fund coverage, the employer
must have both provident retirement and
housing benefits. Now, is this 1995 amendment
valid? The law itself, RA 7742 does not require
the existence of both provident retirement and
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housing benefits. It only provides, it declares that
for purposes of exempting the employer, there
must be a showing that either he has provident
retirement or housing benefits, not both benefits.
So clearly, in promulgating these 1995
amendments, the BOT of HDMF amended the law
itself.
Subsequently, the BOT issued the 1996
amendments, abolishing these provident
retirement and housing benefits. And clearly,
they do not have such authority because in doing
so, the BOT already repealed the law itself. The
law provides for the existence of either benefits,
and here the 1996 amendments passed by the
BOT abolished. So clearly repealing the law.
Now, in the matter of the creation of the AFP
Anti-Graft Board, now take note that the powers
of this Board must always be in accord with what
is provided under the law. What is the law of the
PCGG? Executive Orders Nos. 1 – 14 and 14A in
the matter of the conduct of an investigation
involving unexplained wealth cases of the
Marcoses, their cronies, or their associates. We
have here a situation where the AFP Anti-Graft
Board created by the Commissioner Chair of the
PCGG, that time Salonga, conducted an
investigation on the alleged unexplained wealth
of one Col. Pecson, and here there was no
allegation that this retired military officer was a
crony or associate of the Marcoses. And clearly,
the issuance of this rule creating this anti-graft
board with the power to investigate military
officers whether in the active service or those
retired, or whether they are cronies or not, is not
consistent with the law of the PCGG.
Now, before discussing this ________________
vs. COA, there is in fact a law, the Teves
Retirement Act, RA 4968 which prohibits the
creation, or establishment of any insurance or
retirement scheme or package or plan other than
that already provided by the GSIS for govt officers
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
and employees. The reason for this law is to
prevent the iniquitous and undue proliferation of
such retirement plans for gov’t officers and
employees. So this law bars the creation any
similar insurance or retirement plan. And there
was such plan issued by the BOT of the SSS. Now,
earlier we mentioned the important rule that this
power to promulgate rules by the administrative
agency, being a delegated task given to it by the
legislature, cannot be used to defeat the
authority given to it by congress or the
constitution itself by, for example, enlarging its
powers or issuing rules that go beyond the scope
of the power of the administrative authority. So
here, clearly, the SSS, in promulgating this
resolution, and this resolution provides
supplementary retirement or pension plan for the
retiring SSS employee is a violation of this Teves
retirement law. So this resolution is null and void.
Another situation here, similar to the case of
Conde vs. COA, the BOT of GSIS also issued a
promulgation establishing the retirement
financial plan for GSIS officers and employees. Of
course, we know that the officers and employees
of GSIS are already enjoying higher salaries
compared to their counterparts in ordinary
offices of gov’t, and this in fact was an
observation of the SC in the case of GSIS vs. COA.
Although, the GSIS law, 8291, confers the power,
the authority, to the GSIS through the Board to
create a financial scheme, but nonetheless, this
power is limited only to those officers and
employees availing, in the course of
reorganization, of an early retirement plan
because they are not qualified under existing
retirement plan of the GSIS. So you know, the
gov’t officer has the option to retire upon
reaching the age of 60, or mandatory retirement
at the age of 65 under the GSIS Act. Now, here,
what the BOT of GSIS did was to create such
financial scheme clearly in violation of this Teves
Retirement Law because it provides for some
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financial package apart from those existing under
the GSIS Act. So here, the retirement financial
plan, as adopted by the GSIS BOT is null and void.
It is, in fact, a form of reward for the GSIS
employees’ lengthy service and loyalty, which is
already taken cared of under the GSIS Act. So
clearly, a violation of this Teves Retirement Act.
Now, earlier, we mentioned that even in the
absence of rules and regulations the law is still
effective, so long as there can be a reasonable
construction made of such a law. So, in the case
of SEC vs. Inter_______ Corporation, the SC ruled
that even in the absence of the rules to
implement the Revised Securities Act, the Act
was approved way back in 1982 but it was only
after 14 years, in 1996, that the full disclosure
rules were promulgated by the SEC, even in the
absence of such IRR, it does not invalidate nor
make ineffective the Revised Securities Act. So
long as there are reasonable and sufficient
standards embodied in the law itself, and
reasonable interpretation may be given.
This is case ought to be distinguished from the
earlier case we mentioned, the case of PNU vs.
Rector?? General. What happened here was then
Pres. GMA issued Executive Order. 420 directing
all government agencies to adopt a unified
multipurpose ID system in order to reduce cost
brought about by the existence of multiple ID
systems/requirements of various government
offices; and of course, to bring about greater
convenience on the part of the public dealing
with government offices. The question now is
whether or not the EO issued by GMA is a
usurpation of legislative power. Is this EO valid.
Now, the SC ruled the validity of this EO. Why?
This can be done in two (2) ways in order to
achieve this unified ID system. The objective here
is to reduce cost, bring about efficiency and
greater convenience in transacting with gov’t
agencies. The first mode is for these heads of
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gov’t agencies to enter into a MOA. And this can
be done if, on its own, the government
corporation, on the basis of law or its charter, is
allowed to formulate or establish an ID format,
and there are so many government offices vested
with such authority under their laws. With more
reason that these heads of gov’t entities may
enter into a memorandum in order to adopt a
uniform ID format to make their systems uniform.
And this is purely administrative, not requiring
the enactment of a law by legislature. The second
mode of having this unified multipurpose ID
system is on the basis of the power of control
under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the President. Meaning,
the Pres has control over all departments,
bureaus, and offices, and so clearly, the President
can issue this EO on the basis of her power of
control directing that these gov’t agencies ought
to adopt a uniform ID format. Again, this is
merely administrative, through the issuance of an
EO by the president. This does not require
legislative function.
Again take note that this applies to offices under
the office of the President because the president,
being the chief executive, has control and
supervision over all departments, bureaus, and
offices in the executive branch.
In the case of Review Center…You know, there
was this leakage in the nursing exam and the
then President ordered that the examinees
retake the examination, and another act was
made to replace the members of the Board of
Nursing, and she further issued EO 566. This EO
authorized the CHED to supervise the operation
of all review centers. And so, the issue not is
WON this EO is valid. Of course, the EO is not
valid. The issuance of this EO is a usurpation of a
power belonging to legislature. Why? Because
the law of the CHED, RA 7722 gives authority to
the CHED only over institutions of higher learning
and degree granting programs and all secondary
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educational institutions. Take note that review
centers are not under the category of secondary
educational institutions. A review center is not an
institution of higher learning. And clearly, the EO
expands the coverage of authority of CHED. Not a
valid promulgation.
Now, there’s also this important concept known
as Fiscal Autonomy. Take note, not all gov’t
offices enjoy fiscal autonomy. What offices are
vested with fiscal autonomy? Under the
Constitution you have the SC, the members of
constitutional commissions, and the office of the
Ombudsman. These are the only offices under
the constitution conferred with fiscal autonomy.
What about the CHR? It is also created under the
constitution because of the obligation of the
Philippines under the international law.
What is this fiscal autonomy all about? This
means the freedom of these institutions vested
with fiscal autonomy from outside limitations and
control except those provided by _________
(36:40) laws. It is the power, the authority to levy,
assess, and collect fees. You know, the CSC from
time to time, even the courts, collect fees. Any
document you require from CSC, you have to pay
the necessary fees. The authority likewise to fix
the compensation rates. And this is not enjoyed
by other gov’t offices—theauthority to fix the
compensation rates provided that such
compensation rates does not exceed the highest
rates authorized by the Salary Standardization
Law. It also refers to the power to allocate and
disburse such funds as may be provided by law.
So, the alignment of funds, and there’s no
violation of law because this is a power belonging
to these offices. The authority likewise to
formulate and implement their organizational
structure and compensation of the personnel.
But again, there’s an existing limitation on this
authority as provided under the Unified Position
Classification Plan of the DBM.
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In the case of the CHR, you know these offices,
the SC, COA, CSC, and the COMELEC, and the
Office of the Ombudsman have this group known
as CFAG, the _____________ (39:28) Fiscal
Autonomy Group. The CHR applied as a member
and it was admitted, so the CHR is also a member
of the CFAG. So, the SC ruled that the matter of
enjoying this fiscal autonomy is a grant given
under the Constitution, it is not a grant obtained
by membership. But nonetheless, the CHR, being
a member of the CFAG, enjoys, in a limited sense,
that is the right to have its appropriations
automatically and regularly released.
So, this offices enjoying fiscal autonomy,
although they are authorized to formulate and
implement their administrative structure, and
even determine the compensation of their staff,
nonetheless, this power is not absolute. This
must be exercised within the parameters, the
criteria, under the unified position classification
and compensation system as administered by the
DBM on the basis of RA 6758, the Salary
Standardization Law. Remember there’s such a
restructuring plan, that plan ought to be
submitted for review by the DBM.
In the case of the CHR Employees Assoc. vs. CHR,
what happened here was that the management
of the CHR made a reorganization, and in so
doing it created the finance management office
and the public affairs office, and this creation,
upgrading of positions, was opposed by the
employees assoc. on the ground, among others,
that this will diminish the benefits due to the CHR
employees. And so the SC ruled that while the
members of the CFAG have the power to
formulate and implement organizational
structures and even determine the compensation
of their personnel, nonetheless, this power is not
absolute, it must be done in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the parameters imposed
under the unified position classification and
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 Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013

compensation system as implemented by the if there is such revenue shortfall. The only
DBM. And so, here, the SC ruled that the creation exception to this rule where there can be no
of these offices by the CHR, in the absence of the release is where the total revenue collections of
imprimatur by the DBM, is not valid. It is not even the gov’t are so insufficient that they are not able
authorized under the General Appropriations to cover the entire appropriations for these
Law. entities vested with fiscal autonomy. This has
never happened, this is improbable. So even if
The CHR here filed a MFR, and so the SC made
there is revenue shortfall on the part of the gov’t,
the clarification that considering that the CHR has
nonetheless, because the Constitution itself
been made a member of the CFAG, it is therefore
confers fiscal autonomy to these institutions,
given a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, and
these offices ought to be released their regular
that is in the matter of having its annual
appropriations by the DBM.
appropriations regularly and automatically
released. But not the fiscal autonomy in its broad In the matter of the creation by the SC of
sense that is given to constitutional offices, the positions pertaining to the Philippine Judicial
Ombudsman, and the SC. Academy (PHILJA), a resolution was passed by the
SC creating the positions of Chief Judicial Staff
In the case of CSC vs. DBM, what happened here
Officer with SG 25, and Supervising Judicial Staff
was in the 2002 General Appropriations Act, the
Officer with SG 23 in the PHILJA. And so the SC
CSC was appropriated the amount of P285M for
submitted to the authority of the DBM, because
the central office of CSC. Of this amount, there
this matter of formulating and implementing its
remained a balance of P5.8M which was not
organizational structure and even the salary must
released to the CSC by the DBM on the ground
conform with the requirements of the unified
that the CSC failed to submit its report. And DBM
position classification system, and this plan was
had the policy, “No report, no release.” Another
submitted to the DBM. Now, the DBM
reason cited by the DBM in refusing to release
downgraded the created positions. The position
the balance was that there was revenue shortfall,
of Chief JSO was downgraded from SG 25 to SG
there was shortfall in the collections of the gov’t.
24, while the Supervising JSO was downgraded
The SC ruled that these are not valid reasons for
from SG 23 to SG 22. The SC ruled that the DBM
the DBM not to release the balance because the
does not have the power to downgrade these
CSC enjoys fiscal autonomy, and fiscal autonomy
positions created by the SC. Why? Because this is
means automatic and regular release of the
within the power of the SC under fiscal
appropriations as provided under the General
autonomy. The authority of the DBM simply
Appropriations Act. In other words, even if there
refers to the need to call the attention of the SC
is no compliance with this DBM requirement, this
whenever such a resolution does not comply with
does not apply to the members of the CFAG.
the requirements of budgetary laws and rules,
What about the other excuse made by the DBM
and on that basis, the SC, at its discretion, may
that there was insufficient revenue collection?
amend or modify the resolution, as dictated
The SC ruled that this contention was not even
depending upon the needs of the questioned
true, but granting that there is such revenue
offices. And so, the SC ruled that there was
shortfall, nonetheless, those agencies enjoying
encroachment by the DBM of the fiscal autonomy
fiscal autonomy should be given priority in the
power of the SC.
matter of the release of their appropriations even

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Example of an MCQ: Which of the following
violates the judiciary’s fiscal autonomy?
A. An item in the 2011 GA Law allowing P13.5B to
the judiciary, which is the same amount allotted
last year but less than 15% than the proposal of
the SC.
Is this valid? Is this within the concept of fiscal
autonomy? No. But it’s valid because the
constitution, as well as existing laws, provide that
the budget of government offices cannot be
reduced. Even if there is no appropriations act
passed by congress, the remedy here would be to
adopt the same budget of the preceding year, but
it cannot go below the preceding appropriations.
Clearly, A is valid but it is not within the concept
of fiscal autonomy.
B. A letter of the BM Secretary to the chief of the
budget office of the SC requesting for data on the
judiciary discretionary funds from 2005 up to the
present.
C. The president’s veto of an item in 2011 GA Law
allotting P900M as supplemental fund for retired
members of the judiciary.
Does the president have such power to veto this
item? Yes, of course.
D. A COA circular requiring all gov’t offices to submit
post-procurement report at the end of each fiscal
year.
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Now, which of this is a violation of the judiciary’s
fiscal autonomy? Which concept falls within the
concept of fiscal autonomy?
B is a violation of the judiciary’s fiscal autonomy.
The demand of DBM to the SC requesting for data
on the judiciary discretionary funds…Of course
it’s part of the prerogatives of the constitutional
office, moreso the SC, this falls under the ambit
of the judiciary’s fiscal autonomy. And no other
branch of gov’t can intervene in such discretion in
the matter of disposition of its discretionary
funds.
Now, the power to issue subpoena, take note, is
not inherent in administrative agencies. For the
administrative agency to have the authority to
issue subpoena, there must be a law conferring
such power. Administrative agencies do not have
inherent power to require the attendance of
witnesses but they may be authorized by law to
issue subpoena ducestecum or subpoena ad
testificandum. Is there such a law? Yes, the
Revised Administrative Code, EO 292, under this
law, administrative bodies are now given the
power to require the attendance of witnesses or
the production of records or documents. And the
authority here to take testimony or receive
evidence includes the power to administer oaths,
to summon witnesses, and issue subpoenas. And
in case of refusal to comply with such subpoena
issued by the administrative tribunal, there is
disobedience, this may be the basis for the
contempt of such officer refusing to comply with
the subpoena.
Now, is there a difference here between
administrative subpoena and judicial subpoena?
Administrative subpoena is different from judicial
subpoena because in the latter case, such a
subpoena is intended to prove a charge pending
in court, whereas in administrative subpoena, the
issuance of this subpoena has for the purpose of
gathering and obtaining evidence, and on the
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basis of this evidence gathered, this may be the
basis for the filing of the charge. So that is the
objective of the administrative subpoena, to
gather evidence which may be used as basis for
the filing of the charge, whereas in the case of
judicial subpoena, this is for the purpose of
proving the charge.
The subpoena may be enforced if the
investigation or the inquiry to be conducted is
within the competence of the agency of the basis
of the conferment to it of such power under the
law, and that the demand of the administrative
tribunal is not too indefinite. In other words, the
subpoena itself must indicate specifics, what
documents are required. And the information is
reasonably relevant or related to the subject of
inquiry.
In the same manner that, just like the power to
issue subpoena, the power to punish contempt is
not inherent in administrative authorities. There
must be law clearly defining and granting to
administrative authorities this power to punish
contempt. And the law itself must make a
determination of the penalty for the
administrative agency to punish such act as
contempt.
What about a situation where the law does not
provide for such authority to punish such
contempt but there is refusal to submit to the
demands of the issuing officer, there is disregard
of the subpoena issued by the competent
authority. In the absence of such law giving the
power to punish contempt, the remedy available
to the administrative tribunal or officer issuing
such subpoena is to invoke the aid of the courts
to punish such act as contempt.
Now, EO 292 provides that the agency, in case of
disobedience, may invoke the aid of the RTC to
punish refusal, or there is disobedience to its
demand. That is in situations where there is no
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
such provision of law giving power to punish
contempt. One such example of a law giving to
the administrative office the power to punish
contempt is under the Ombudsman Act, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman has the power to punish
contempt. There is in fact a decided case on this.
So, the power to punish contempt is limited to
make effective this power to elicit testimony or
gather evidence, and this cannot be exercised in
furtherance of administrative quasi-legislative
functions. So this is limitation derives from the
nature of this power, it is not inherent. It is
inherent in courts but not in administrative
tribunals.
In the case of Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, there were
provincial prosecutors who refused to comply
with the directives of the Office of the
Ombudsman and after due proceedings, they
were sanction. And the prosecutors question the
authority of the ombudsman to punish them for
contempt. The SC sustained the power of the
Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. So the
argument made here by prosecutors that they
cannot be held liable for contempt because their
refusal, their alleged disregard of the orders of
the Ombudsman arose out of an administrative
rather than judicial proceeding. The SC held that
this is without merit because the law itself
conferred such power to the Ombudsman.
Necessarily, in order for administrative
authorities to be able to effectively carry out
their mandate, they must be given the
competence to interpret, to make a construction
of the laws that they are duty-bound to
implement. We have mentioned this, one of the
categories of the promulgations that may be
made by administrative bodies, the authority to
interpret or the issuance of rules. But these
interpretations are not binding upon the courts
but they carry persuasive effect. They have the
force and effect of law and therefore they must
4 Manresa

be respected. The courts will respect the
determination made by the administrative
authority, consistent with the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, because the law confers to them
such expertise or competence within the fields
bestowed to them under the law. So, the general
policy therefore is to uphold the decision, the
resolution, the order of the administrative
tribunal because of the principle of separation of
powers and because of the expertise and
eligibility of these administrative tribunals as
conferred to them by law. In the passage of time,
administrative tribunals become experts in their
particular fields. But nonetheless, whatever
interpretation made by the administrative officer
may be abrogated by the successor. The
successor is not duty-bound to uphold the
interpretation of the predecessor should the
successor make a determination that there
should be a different interpretation of what the
law should be.
Now, in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, the SC
provided for the requirements for the validity of
administrative rules. We have mentioned this
earlier, they must always be in conformity, must
be issued under authority of law, the rule making
power is on the basis of law, must be within the
scope or purview of the law, must be reasonable,
must not be capricious, and last important
requirement, the need for publication.
The Civil Code Art. 2 provides that laws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. So Art. 2
has been amended by EO ____. So not only the
O.G. but also in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Now, not all rules need to be published, only
those issuances which are of general application
intended to be binding upon the public. The
rationale here is that the people cannot be made
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
liable under provisions of laws or the rules
promulgated by administrative authorities of
which they were never notified through this
publication requirement. This is simply part of
this due process principle.
In the case of SEC vs PICOP, in the matter of the
application filed by PICOP for extension of its
corporate existence. One issue raised here is:
which rule or circular of the SEC ought to apply in
the matter of the application filed by PICOP for
extension of its corporate existence. Should it be
the 1986 circular or the 1990 circular issued by
the SEC? The 1986 circular imposed ceilings on
the filing fees to be paid by the applicants,
whereas under the 1990 circular, it removes the
filing fee ceilings. And so, if this 1986 circular was
to be applied, the filing fee payable by PICOP was
only P1,000.00 But under the 1990 circular,
because of the removal of the filing fee ceiling,
the fee would reach P12M. The SC ruled that at
the time of the filing of this application by PICOP,
the 1990 circular was never published. So, in
other words, because of the lack of publication,
the 1990 circular never became effective. Even
this 1990 circular was submitted to the UP Law
Center only in 2004. Now, the requirement of the
law is that there should be publication either in
the O.G. or in a newspaper of general circulation.
So here, the SC ruled that the rule applicable to
the PICOP was the 1986 circular and not the 1990
circular because at the time of the filing of the
application, the 1990 circular was never
submitted for publication.
In the case of GSIS vs. COA, there was this EO 79
issued, providing for the compulsory membership
in the GSIS of qualified Reserved Armed Forces of
the Philippines officers, like retired Gen.
Asuncion, and he died in a helicopter crash, and
here the heirs of Gen. Asuncion claimed the
death benefits. One argument raised here is that
there should be no payment of said death
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benefits because this EO has not yet been
implemented by the GSIS Board, the BOT did not
yet issued the resolution to implement the EO. Is
this contention valid? Take note that applying
Art.2 of the Civil Code, if this EO was published on
December 22, 1986, when did the EO take effect?
After 15 days following the completion of the
publication, or on January 6, 1987. Here, it was
not correct that the EO was not yet effective
because of the non-issuance of a resolution by
the BOT of GSIS because the law itself provides
for the validity of the EO following the
completion of its publication.
In the case of Phil. Int’l Trading vs. COA, here
again the DBM issued a circular disallowing the
payment of allowances and other emoluments to
public officers and employees. Now, take note
that it is intended for general application, in the
absence of such publication this DBM circular is
not effective. It is of no force and effect. One
other issue raised here was that there was
reissuance, and the submission by the DBM of
this circular cured the defect. The SC ruled that
this requirement for the publication of this rule is
a prior condition, a condition precedent for the
effectivity of the law or the rules.
Now, the requirement of the law is that the rules
must be published either in the O.G. or a
newspaper of general circulation. Now, take note
of an added requirement under the Revised
Administrative Code where the circular or rule
issued by the administrative tribunal imposes
administrative sanctions. Because where the
circular issued by the administrative body as
authorized to it under the law imposes
administrative sanctions, the RAC provides that
there must be filing and registration of this rule
with the UP Law Center under Sec. 3, 4, and 7 of
EO 292. So here, in the case of Philsa Int’l
Placement, the circular issued by the POEA was
not filed with the National Administrative
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Register with the UP Law Center and therefore in
cannot be used as a basis for the imposition of
administrative sanctions. So it is ineffective by
reason of non-observance of this requirement
under the RAC. It does not matter that this
circular is addressed to a specific group, the
private employment agencies. It does not excuse
compliance with the registration requirement
with the UP Law Center through the National
Administrative Register.
Take note, earlier, prior to this
_________________, (74:05), we had this joint
circular Ombudsman-DOJ 95-01, and the question
raised here by Honasan in the case of Honasan vs.
DOJ Panel, Honasan question the authority of the
DOJ Panel, he being a high ranking official , and
therefore it should be the Ombudsman that
ought to take cognizance of the cases for coup
detat filed against him. And another reason here
is that there was non-observance of an important
requirement, no publication of the Joint Circular
95-01. The SC ruled that the DOJ Panel had the
authority to proceed with the investigation
because it is a case of concurrent jurisdiction
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ. Now, as
to this issue of publication, considering that this
circular is intended to apply only to the
prosecutors of the DOJ and the Ombudsman in
the matter of the conduct of preliminary
investigation, there is no need for publication.
The circular is not intended to regulate the
conduct of outside persons or the public in
general. The circular does not even provide for
penalties in case of violation. It does not
prescribe the performance of an act. It merely
prescribes the procedure to be followed by the
prosecutors of the Ombudsman and the DOJ in
handling the cases filed against public officers.
Because under this Joint Circular, if a case of
concurrent jurisdiction, even if the case against
the public officer is filed with the DOJ, the DOJ
has authority even in the absence of the approval
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by the Office of the Ombudsman. But
nonetheless, under this Joint Circular, whenever
the case against the public officer is office
related, moreso if he is high ranking, there must
be approval by the Ombudsman. But this was
already repealed by the Ombudsman-DOJ MOA
dated March 29, 2012. Now, under this MOA,
there is no need anymore to secure the authority
of the Ombudsman for the DOJ prosecutor to file
the case against the public officer before the
court or even the dismissal of such case, again
because of the concurrent jurisdiction before the
DOJ and the Ombudsman. The only situation
where there is this imprimatur in the handling of
this case by the DOJ, the need to secure the
approval of the Ombudsman is in cases involving
high ranking government officials committing the
offense in relation to his office because in such
situation, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction. Meaning, primary jurisdiction, the
ombudsman can take over at any stage because
the authority to prosecute cases against high
ranking officers before the Sandiganbayan is
vested under the law with the Office of the
Ombudsman through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. But for regular cases, RTC/MTC, even
if a case is filed against a public officer before a
DOJ prosecutor, there is no need for the
prosecutor to get the approval of the
Ombudsman. Even if he files or dismisses the
case, he can already decide on the matter.
So what need to published? Of course, those of
general application. It follows that, those rules
which are merely internal to govern the internal
affairs of the agency or to provide for rules to be
observed by the personnel of the office, relating
only to the personnel of the gov’t agency and not
the public, then there’s no need for publication.
Letters of instructions issued by superior officers
or rules to be adopted or followed by
subordinates, these do not require publication
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
either in the O.G. or newspaper of general
circulation.
In the case of Republic vs. Express
Telecommunication, one issue raised here is
which rules the MTC ought to apply in the matter
of the application of BAYANTEL to be granted
provisional authority, should be the 1978 MTC
rules or the 1993 MTC rules. The 1993 rules were
never published at the time of the application of
BAYANTEL either in the O.G. or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Although, the MTC did file the
rules with the UP Law Center, is this is operative
act? No, the operative act is publication.
Therefore, since the 1993 MTC Revised Rules
were not published, although filed with the UP
Law center, but that is not the operative act, it
means therefore that the application of the
Bayantel shall be governed under the 1978 MTC
rules.
The requirement for the submission of this rule to
the National Administrative Register is merely a
bulletin of qualified rules that were furnished
upon by important main offices of the gov’t, the
judiciary, the courts, and such other offices of the
gov’t.
In the case of SEC vs. GMA Network, in the
matter of the authority of the SEC to collect filing
fees under RA 3531. And so, here, the SEC issued
Circular No. 1 imposing a filing fee of 1/10 of 1%
of the authorized capital. So here, the GMA filing
an application for the extension of its corporate
existence. Now, one issue raised here is there a
need for the publication the SEC Circular? Yes, of
course, it is intended to bind the public and
therefore in the absence of such publication, the
SEC circular cannot be made effective.
JULY 3
Lets go to the requirements of administrative due
process as laid down in the case of Ang Tibay. (1)
There must be and impartial tribunal. (2) Due
4 Manresa

notice and hearing or the opportunity to be
heard. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard. (3) the procedure of the
admin tribunal must be consistent with the
essentials/requirements of fair trial and fair
dealing. (5) the proceedings should be conducted
by the admin tribunal in such manner for the
court to determine whether the applicable rules
of law or procedure were in fact observed.
In the case of Fabella vs CA, there were
administrative cases filed against public school
teachers. The cases were filed before the CSC.
The proceedings were undertaken. This case was
______ Department of Education. What law
ought to apply the admin cases against Public
School Teachers? Under the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers (RA 4670), the
Department of Education through the
investigating committee created under Sec. 9 of
this law, has the original jurisdiction. Indeed
there was such proceeding undertaken by the
investigating committee of the DepEd. But Sec 9
provides for the membership of this committee
tasked to investigate the cases. So the chair of
this committee is the school division
superintendent, and the members include, the
division supervisor and a representative coming
from the teacher’s organization. The committee
that _____ the cases did not include the
representation coming from the teacher’s
organization. So the SC ruled here that there was
a tribunal that did not comply with the
requirements of Sec 9 of RA4670. It cannot be
said that the conduct of proceedings was
undertaken by an impartial tribunal. Because
what gives flesh to this requirement of an
impartial tribunal is the inclusion in this
investigating committee of the representative of
the teacher’s organization. There was none in this
case.
In Emin vs De Leon you have here an Non-formal
education supervisor Emin of the Dept. of
Education, who was charged before the CSC in
connection with his acts of receiving fees in
return for the issuance of certificates, false
certificates of eligibility. When CSC came out with
its decision, it was adverse to Emin. He was
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
dismissed from service. A finding that he
committed the offense of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. It was only for the first time that he
raised the issue of the competence of the CSC
that under the Magna Carta law Sec 9. it should
have been investigated by the investigating
committee. The SC ruled, applying the principle
of Estoppel by Laches, he may not anymore
question the authority of the CSC. There was
sufficient opportunity in fact he participated in all
stages of the proceedings. It cannot be said that
he was denied due process by the CSC.
In the case of Alcala vs Villar, here the school
principal Villar was charged before the office of
the OMB for dishonestly. Proceedings were
undertaken and he participated fully in these
proceedings before the OMB in Visayas. In fact he
cross-examined the witnesses of the
complainant. Subsequently when a resolution
was issued by the OMB dismissing him from
service, he raised for the first time the issue of
jurisdiction that it should have been the DepEd
through the investigation committee. The SC
ruled that it was estoppeled by laches. There was
no denial of due process. In fact this public school
principal fully participated in all the stages of the
proceedings.
What happens if complainants file the admin case
and subsequently have a change of mind and
would like the transfer the admin complaint to
some other tribunal equally competent? What
happened in this case was the DepEd first took
cognizance of the complaint and subsequently
the complainants later on wanted to withdraw
the complaint in favor their filing of the ______
admin case before the office of the OMB. The
DepEd was willing, so the OMB likewise
acquiesced in such transfer. The issue here w/n
the transfer of this case was during that the
DepEd through the investigating committee
already acquired authority and in fact
commenced proceedings by virtue of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. The original
authority belongs to the schools superintendent
as the chair in the investigating committee. The
SC ruled that jurisdiction is conferred by law that
it cannot be simply transferred to another on the
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say so of the parties. Jurisdiction is not lost upon
the instance of the parties. And once it is
acquired the tribunal continues to have authority
and it should continue with the proceedings until
the case is terminated despite the acquiescence
of such transfer by the Office of the OMB and
DepEd.
On the case of OMB vs Medrano, you have here
the OIC principal who was charged in connection
with alleged acts of sexually harassing his school
teacher. So a complaint was filed against him.
Take note that the matter of jurisdiction is
concurrent, it is not exclusive. Here the law itself,
the OMB Act 6770 recognizes the existence of
some proper disciplinary authorities these
wordings of law Sec 23 and OMB may refer the
complaint to the proper disciplinary authority for
the institution of the appropriate administrative
proceeding against the public official or
employee. The wording of the law is that the
OMB has such discretion because this is not a
case for exclusive authority on the part of the
DepEd. So the proceedings were undertaken in
the Office of the OMB and after due proceedings,
the OMB rendered a decision dismissing OIC
Principal Medrano and for the first time he raised
in his motion for reconsideration that under the
Magna Carta law. It should have been the
investigating committee. The SC ruled although
the OMB should have desisted because of this
Magna Carta and in fact the OMB recognizes the
competence, it is not a case of exclusivity but one
of concurrence that there should be respect for
the authority of the DepEd, but nonetheless,
proceedings were already undertaken. In fact the
principal fully participated in the proceedings
before the Office of the OMB, he is now barred
from assailing the jurisdiction of the OMB
through the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Incidentally this issue was raised
before the CA. The CA ruled against the OMB
declaring that the DepEd, under the Magna Carta
law, has the exclusive jurisdiction. But when this
matter was elevated by the SC. The SC ruled it is
not a case of exclusive authority on the part of
the DepEd but rather it is a case of concurrent
jurisdiction between the office of the OMB and
the DepEd. But the OMB on the basis of Sec 23 of
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
its charter has the option, it may choose to refer
this admin complaint to the other agency on the
basis of law concurring that power to the latter
but this was not done and in fact proceedings
were already conducted by the Office of the
OMB.
In the case of OMB vs Delijero, again sexual
harassment. Principal Delijero was teaching
mathematics, courted his pupil, a 12 year old girl,
1st year highschool. Some place in Leyte. He
wrote letters to this pupil. He gave Php 200
allowance and so the admin case was filed
against him before the OMB. Again the OMB took
cognizance of the case and after the proceedings
he was dismissed from service. He appealed to
CA. The CA sustained him, declaring that the
DepEd has the exclusive authority under the
Magna Carta law. The SC ruled the OMB has
concurrent jurisdiction together with the DepEd
despite the Magna Carta. It cannot be said there
was no violation of due process by reason of the
active participation on the part of Delijero in the
proceedings before the Office of the OMB.
Although it would have been more prudent for
the OMB to have referred this matter to the
DepEd but nonetheless this was not done. But it
does not meant that the OMB is deprived of its
authority.
A Davao City case of OMB vs Masing, The SC
made the clarification about the nature of this
Magna Carta. It does not mean exclusive
jurisdiction granted by law to the DepEd. Neither
does this law prescribe an exclusive procedure in
the conduct of investigation of admin cases filed
against public school teachers. And more than
that the _____ was enacted way before so here
the jurisdiction cannot be restricted by the
Magna Carta law. The SC ruled that this Sec 9 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
referring to the creation of the investigating
committee simply provides for a specific
procedure. It does not mean the exclusive
jurisdiction or an exclusive procedure, rather a
specific procedure that must be observed to be
followed by the investigating committee in the
handling of administrative investigation of the
case filed against a public school teacher.
4 Manresa

The due process requirement in admin
proceeding includes the (1) right to an actual or
constructive notice about the institution of the
proceeding, the case filed against him. (2) there
must be real opportunity to be heard. So service,
either through mail or personal service and the
opportunity to be heard for him to file his
pleadings personally or with assistance of a
lawyer and to present evidence. And one other
important requirement, (3) that the tribunal must
be impartial. Must be competent. Must be
authorized under the law. (4) the basis of its
finding must be substantial evidence. It is
evidence that such fact and circumstances
sufficient to justify a conclusion.
In the case of Garcia vs Molina, the SC made the
pronouncement, a violation of any of the
requirements of due process is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Lets say, the tribunal is not
empowered or there was absence of the
compliance with the procedural and substantive
due process or the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence, etc. Any violation pertaining
to this requirements means the proceedings are
null and void. And anytime the decision may be
questioned. So in the case of Molina, involving
lawyers of the GSIS, who were charged by then
president of GSIS, Garcia in connection with the
illegal acts of these lawyers in ________ of the
GSIS in concerted activities sometime in 2002.
Garcia issued a formal charge. The basic issue
here is the was there observance of the basic
requirement of due process in the handling of the
administrative case, in the institution of a formal
charge against Molina? Take note, undisputedly,
under the GSIS law (RA 8291), the president
general manager has the competence as the
disciplining authority to initiate the case. But
nonetheless, this power of the General Manager
of the GSIS under the GSIS law to discipline its
own personnel must be in accordance with the
Civil Service law, rules and regulation. In other
words, there must still be observance of the
uniform rules of admin cases in the civil service to
be followed in the handling of these cases
involving GSIS personnel. So what does the rule
provide in this matter? That there must be a
preliminary investigation. During this preliminary
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investigation, the parties will be given the
opportunity to present their evidence. It is just
like a show cause order by <….???>. So period:
within 2 hours, is given under the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations for this officer to
submit his counter affidavit or answer under
oath. A prima facie determination must be made
by the disciplining authority. If there is such
prima facie case, a formal charge follows. What
happened in this case was that, a day after the
concerted activities led by these lawyers, Molina
and Velasco, a formal charge was immediately
issued by the GSIS general manager. And so
clearly, there was a shortcut of the procedure.
There was no preliminary investigation
conducted. The SC ruled that there was violation
of due process. That when this formal charge was
issued by Garcia, directing Molina to answer
within three days, they were placed under
preventive suspension.
The lawyer went to the CSC to question the
issuance of the preventive suspension. They also
questioned the lack of observance of the
requirements as provided under the Civil Service
Uniform Rules. The SC granted the lawyers back
salaries. You know… subsequently in our
discussion in Public Officers that in preventive
suspension there can be no back salaries. An
exception in this case where there was a violation
of the requirements of due process of the
proceedings undertaken by the disciplining
authority of the GSIS where totally null and void.
This has been asked in the bar. The
administrative tribunal performs multiple offices.
It acts as investigator and in this capacity it
gathers evidence. After the evidence is gathered,
it proceeds with the preparation of the
complaint. It becomes the complainant. It files
the complaint in the same agency and so it also
becomes the prosecutor as well as the judge. Is
there violation of due process here? There is
none. So long as the administrative body is
brought with such power. It is within the
competence of the tribunal. And the decision
rendered is still based on substantial evidence. So
given this, there must be compliance with the
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requirements of procedural and substantive due
process.
In the case of Cruz vs CSC, Palitum, the municipal
treasurer, took the alleged sum on behalf of her
friend Cruz from the CSC. Later on this anomaly
was discovered. On its own, the CSC conducted
an investigation and that with evidence, there
was such evidence as a basis for its filing. It
became the complainant, the CSC became the
complainant so the case was judged before the
same office. Is there violation of due process?
The SC said, there was none. So long as the
decision rendered is based on substantial
evidence.
In the case of Garcia as discussed a while ago.
One other issue here is the competence of the
GSIS to act as complainant, prosecutor and judge
was disallowed. There was violation of the
procedural requirements as provided in the
Uniform Rules of the CSC.
In the case of Zambales Mining, it is important
that whenever there is a decision, the defeated
party has the remedy of appealing to higher
authority. The reviewing official must not be the
same officer whose decision is under review.
Otherwise, it would be a violation of due process.
So in the case of Zambales, you have here
Director Juson, in his capacity as the Director of
Mines, issuing a decision adverse to the
applicants, denial of the application for operation
of mineral claims. When this appeal was taken,
Juzon got promoted. He became the Secretary.
He is the same officer now reviewing his own
decision. Certainly a violation of due process. He
should have inhibited himself and allowed it to be
handled by the next lower rank official.
There is a distinction here between the authority
of the Commission under Section 12 and its
authority under Section 47 of the Revised
Administrative Code of EO 292. PD (67?) Section
37.. Take note, under Sec. 12 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the CSC has the power, in
its own initiative, to institute, to conduct
investigation, to institute motu propio and
directly administrative cases for dishonesty and
falsification. The reason is to protect the integrity
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of the CS system by removing from the Civil
Service list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualification. There are so many cases of
fraudulent appointments on the basis of falsified
submission of false credentials, etc. And the basis
of the commission is Sec. 12. Whereas in Section
47 of the law refers to the ordinary disciplinary
action, the need to discipline a bona fide member
of the CS system. The grounds provided under
Sec. 46 in relation to 47. So here the case of CSC
vs Albao, this respondent Albao, who got an
appointment as executive assistant in the Office
of the V-President, he declared in his personal
data sheet that he passed the electrical
engineering exam with a grade of 76%, but in fact
he failed said exam. So he was dismissed from
service after the proceedings on the basis of Sec.
12, the authority of the commission to directly
and motu propio conduct the case involving the
act of the public officer in falsifying documents.
In the case of Singson vs NLRC, here the labor
arbiter Aquino, rendered a decision, and his
decision was subject of an appeal before the
NLRC. Then the LA got promoted and became a
commissioner and he was one of the
commissioners reviewing his own decision
rendered in his capacity as LA and participated.
The fatal defect is not here, the fact that
subsequently, upon the filing of MR, he inhibited
himself. And the order denying the MR by the
aggrieved party, was done by the two other
commissioners without his participation, this
does not cure the fatal defect. There was
violation of due process.
In the case of Tejano vs Desierto, in the matter of
an investigation and later on the filing of graft
charges against Tejano, that time VP of PNB, in
connection with the 2.2 million fraud. In the first
investigation, Desierto already had participated in
his capacity as Special Prosecutor. When he
became the OMB, he again participated in the
conduct of investigation. In fact denied the
determination of the reinvestigating officer for
the dismissal of the case against PNB VP. The SC
ruled that there was commission of grave abuse
of authority by Desierto. This defect was not
cured by the fact that upon filing for
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reinvestigation this was resolved by his successor,
Simeon Marcelo, nonetheless the proceedings
were already in violation of the requirements of
due process.
In the case of Rp. vs Express Telecom, an order
was issued by the NTC reviving the _________,
the order was done without notice with the other
party, the oppositor Express Telecom. Is there
denial of due process? The SC ruled, there was
none. Why? Because all the parties, including the
oppositor, will have the full opportunity present
their sides during the full blown hearing.
As part of the requirement of due process, it is
important that the respondent should only be
convicted of an offense with which he was duly
notified. The administrative proceedings are not
exempt from the fundamental requirements of
procedural principles, right to due process. IN the
case of CSC vs Lucas, Lucas was an employee of
the Department of Agriculture. He had been in
the service for more than 20 years. He committed
the mistake of touching the thigh a female
<convoy?>. This woman filed this admin case
before the Department of Agriculture Secretary
against Lucas. The secretary created this
committee on personnel to conduct
investigation. Subsequently after due
proceedings, Lucas was found liable for simple
misconduct. The penalty imposed against him
was suspension of 1 month and 1 day. The
woman filed an appeal before the CSC. On appeal
the CSC reversed, set aside, the decision of the
DA secretary and imposed the penalty of
dismissal for grave misconduct. The SC ruled
violation of due process, because the respondent
should be due informed of the charge of grave
misconduct, in fact he was only notified of simple
misconduct. He cannot be convicted of an
offense with which he was not duly charged.
The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard or to seek a
reconsideration of an adverse finding or decision.
There is a difference, a distinction between
procedural due process and substantive due
process. What is the distinction? Procedural due
process refers to the method or manner in which
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the law is being enforced by the admin tribunal,
the hearing officer. Whereas substantive due
process refers to the law itself whether it is fair.
The application of this law should fair, reasonable
and just.
As applied to the requirement in tenurial
protection given under the constitution to public
officers and employees, is due process means in
its procedural sense requires that the dismissal of
the public officer or any sanction for that matter
ought to be effected after due notice and
hearing. Notice, part of the requirement of
procedural due process. Whereas, substantive
due process requires that the dismissal must be
for any of the grounds provided under the law. It
must be for legal cause. Art 9-B Sec. 2 par 3. No
public officer or employee shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.
The last part refers to the requirement of
substantive due process. It must be for legal
cause provided by law.
In the case of Lacson vs PAGC, petitioners were
officers of Philippine Estate Authority. They were
investigated for violations on the basis of the
findings of the PAGC (Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission). After the investigation conducted
by the PAGC, it submitted its report and the
recommendation for the dismissal of the
petitioners, the employees, officers of the
Philippine Estate Authority. This matter was
submitted to the PEA management for
implementation. One issue raise here is what
should be the remedy available to the
petitioners? The other one, w/n there is violation
of the requirements of substantive due process.
Was their dismissal for a valid cause? The SC
ruled, yes. It was for a question investigated, a
ground provided by law. What is the remedy here
available to the aggrieved parties? What
happened here was that Lacson, et al filed a
petition before the CA, petition for certiorari. Is
this the proper remedy? The proper remedy
should have been to seek an appeal before the
next administrative body. In this case, under the
law, the CSC. Of course, it follows that there
should be filing of a motion for reconsideration
and is denied. The decision here is rendered by
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the Office of the President(PAGC). The next step
would be an appeal before the CSC under rule
what? Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. If still
aggrieved, if the CSC does not rule in favor of the
aggrieved party, what is the next remedy? The
remedy would be under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. From the CSC to the CA, then to the SC.
Here there was failure on the part the petitioners
Lacson from taking the appeal to the CSC, thus
period to file said appeal expired. When this
matter was elevated, the SC could no longer act
on the issue because the decision already
became final and executory because of their
failure to comply with the requirement in the
matter of the appeal to be taken. In here there
was no violation of due process because the
petitioners fully participated in the proceedings
before the PAGC. They in fact submitted their
memoranda as their evidence.
In the case of Ruivivar vs OMB, an LTO employee.
What happened here was that she complained.
While the decision was issued by the OMB in the
admin case filed against her, she raised the issue
that during the formal investigation there was in
fact denial of due process because she was not
given copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of
the other party. What happened was the OMB, in
an order, directed her to submit whatever
pleadings she deems to submit. She was
furnished copies of those affidavits of witnesses.
Question: Is there denial of due process? No.
Because she was given such opportunity to file a
motion for reconsideration and she was furnished
copies upon such filing, upon her filing of her MR.
She was furnished copies of those documents
and was directed to submit whatever pleading
she may desire. But she refused to do so. And so
the SC ruled, there was no denial of due process.
In the case of Gaoiran vs Alcala, there is here the
term formal charge, the complaint as mentioned
under the law (Revised Administrative Code). This
refers to the verified complaint. It has no
reference to an unverified complaint. In fact a
formal investigation can only be undertaken on
the basis of an affidavit under oath. What
happened here was that Castillejo filed this
unverified complaint against Gaoiran before the
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
CHED. The SC said this is not the complaint
contemplated under the law to commence formal
investigation but it may be the basis for the
conduct of a fact finding investigation. In fact
there was such inquiry, fact finding conducted by
the legal office of the CHED. The formal charge of
the legal office of the CHED is the complaint
contemplated under the law, not the complaint
that was filed by Castillejo because in the first
place it was never verified under oath. So the
filing of the unverified complaint may merit the
conduct of a fact finding inquiry.
In the case of MWSS vs Vasquez, the SC ruled
that the due process requirement, the need to be
heard, is made legal not solely through verified
presentation. It is not required in all admin
proceedings. Meaning, if the law itself confers
such prerogative to the hearing officer or the
tribunal to decide the case simply on the basis of
submissions, there is no violation of due process.
So one may be heard not solely by verbal
presentation but also through submission of
position papers, counter affidavits and other
documents in admin proceedings. The technical
rules and procedures of evidence as seen in
judicial proceedings are not strictly applied in
administrative adjudication.
You still recall the case of the Indian? The case of
this woman who submitted a plagiarized thesis
and one of the issues she raised was there was
violation of due process because there was no
formal hearing conducted just like what is being
done in the courts. The SC ruled, in admin
proceedings against students, the requirement of
due process is already observed if the respondent
is accorded the opportunity to file her evidence
to file whatever pleadings she deems necessary.
So the process here does not require the
proceedings that is seen in judicial proceedings.
In the case of National Power Corporation vs
NLRC, on the basis of law PD 478, the Office of
the Solicitor General is the representative of the
Government, any of its instrumentalities and
agencies and it may also be the legal counsel of a
GOCC if there is authority given to the OSG by the
President or Head of the GOCC. In this case of
NPC, it was represented by the Office of the
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Solicitor General. Here is an adverse decision
rendered by the Labor Authorities binding upon
the OSG where the notice was given to the
special agent of the OSG. The SC ruled that the
service of summons, or order, or any decision
adverse to the client should be made in the OSG.
This is part of the requirement, this is an
indispensable ingredient of due process. Where
the decision of the rendered by the LA was given
not to the OSG but to the Special Attorney on
behalf of the OSG. The reglementary period to
file appeal never commenced to run. It
commences to run only from the time of the
receipt of the decision by the OSG.
In the case of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. vs NLRC, there
was an adverse decision against petitioner in a
labor case and the decision was given to the
counsel of record of petitioner. But here, in
reality the lawyer was no longer the counsel
handling the case. So Lincoln Gerard was the
losing party in the labor case, but the counsel
never notified the client Lincoln Gerard about of
the adverse decision until the period to file
appeal had prescribed. The SC ruled, where the
party appears by counsel in proceedings either
before the court or in admin bodies, notices to be
given must be served not to the client but to the
counsel. The notice to the counsel is already
notice to the Lincoln Gerard because on record
there was no formal withdrawal of his
appearance as a lawyer for Lincoln Gerard. On
record it appears that the lawyer was still the
lawyer of Lincoln Gerard. So whatever fault
committed is already binding on this petitioner.
In the case of Philippine Ports Authority vs
Sargasso Construction, if the principal, the Gov’t
Office, in this case the PPA, is represented by
several lawyers on record, notice is given to any
of them is notice to all. Thus the period for the
filing already commenced to run, despite the fact
the other counsels on record have not received
the copy of the decision. For example in this case
of PPA it was also represented by its own in
house counsel apart from the OSG, etc. Notice to
any participants is also notice to all of them.
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
In Alba vs Nitorreda, a Davao City case, the
respondent in this case, the Assistant ______ of
the DepEd was charged __________________
committed against the students. When a decision
was rendered after the observance of due
process, he was given the penalty of suspension
of 1 month. He claims that there was violation of
his right to appeal, the decision imposing the
penalty of suspension under the law is already
final and executory, I need to appeal from such
decision. The SC ruled that appeal is not a matter
of right, it is not even part of due process. Here
the aggrieved party is already given all the
chances during the formal investigation, the
formal trial of its case. So long as this
requirement has been complied with, there is no
violation of due process where he is not given his
right to appeal where the law itself provides for
the finality of this decision, in those cases where
the penalty imposed by the administrative agency
is reprimand, suspension not to exceed thirty
days, 1 month. In all other cases, subject to an
appeal.
The issue in the case of Ampong vs CSC is w/n the
respondent in the admin case is ought as a
matter of right to be assisted by a lawyer. The
assistance of a lawyer is not an absolute
requirement in admin proceedings. There is even
no duty imposed by law for the admin tribunal to
provide counsel to the parties, more so to the
respondent in such admin case. It is one that may
be invoked by the respondent. The respondent
has such option whether to engage or not the
services of a lawyer. And so in this case where the
aggrieved party Ampong willingly submitted to
the jurisdiction of the tribunal and in fact she
acknowledged her fault, she cannot complain
later on that there was violation of due process
because she was not assisted by a lawyer. So it is
really up to the respondent whether she would
engage the services of a lawyer because the
tribunal, the admin authority is not duty bound to
provide the parties the counsel.
So a party of an admin investigation may or may
not be assisted by a lawyer. This rule applies
regardless of the gravity, the nature of the
charges, even of the respondent is facing so many
4 Manresa

grave charges, and regardless of the capacity of
the respondent to represent himself. There is no
duty imposed on the tribunal to furnish the
person investigated with services of a lawyer.
So in the case of Lumiqued vs Exevea, here the
Regional Director of the Department of
Agriculture, he was charged with so many
offenses. So due proceedings were conducted
and he was not represented by a lawyer. Then
there was this committee in the Department of
Justice that investigated the cases upon
instructions of the President, and after the due
proceedings a decision was rendered, dismissing
him from the service. He complained for the first
time on appeal that he was not represented by a
lawyer. The SC ruled, that the respondent has the
option whether to engage in the services of a
lawyer or not. The right to a lawyer is not
imperative because the admin investigation has
the objective of determining whether the facts
would merit disciplinary measure against the
public officer. The objective here is of course in
relation to the purpose of the CS system, the
need to maintain the integrity, dignity of the
Gov’t Service.
What about in criminal cases? Custodial
investigation, right to counsel. May this be
waived? Cannot be waived unless the waiver be
done in writing and in the presence of the
accused. Does not apply to admin cases.
In the case of Maquilan vs Maquilan, the
negligence of the counsel is binding on the client.
The exception to this rule is where the negligence
of the lawyer is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that this would tantamount to deprivation of his
day in court. There is actually absence of fair trial.
In the case of Perez vs Abiera, the issue here is
what happens if during the pendency of the
admin case against the public officer, he later on
is separated from the bureaucracy either by
resignation, abandonment or retirement. Is this a
basis for the extinction, the termination of the
proceedings? The rule here is, the jurisdiction is
acquired at the time of the filing of the case
before the admin authority is not lost simply
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
because of the separation in office of the
respondent public officer during the pendency of
the admin case. (So subsequent to the filing, new
developments, such as for example the public
officer respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy. Yun ginagawa nila yan. Dismiss ang
charges. Why? what happens when you file a
certificate of candidacy? You are deemed
resigned.) What is the effect of this separation? It
will not deprive the authority of its jurisdiction,
which was acquired upon such filing. The admin
tribunal continues to retain jurisdiction and the
power to continue with the proceedings and to
make a pronouncement that you’re innocent of
the charge or to declare him guilty.
The rule here is that death of respondent in the
admin case does not prevent the finding of admin
liability. This is consistent with the early ruling
mentioned, the admin tribunal acquires
jurisdiction upon the filing, upon its taking
cognizance of the complaint and whatever
developments that are subsequent to the finding
will not have any effect on the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
What happens if subsequent to the filing during
the pendency of the case, the respondent dies? It
does not preclude a finding of admin liability. But
there are three exceptions to this rule:
(1) the respondent has not been heard and the
continuation of the proceedings would deny him
of his right to due process. Let us say, pagkatapos
ng filing ng reklamo before the admin tribunal.
And before the filing of his answer even before
the issuance of an order requiring him to file an
answer, namatay. So here the first exception
would apply. When respondent has not been
heard and the continuation of the proceedings
would deny him of the right to due process.
(2) Where exceptional circumstances exist in the
case leading to equitable and humanitarian
considerations. This has been applied so many
times because of so many public officers, because
of the filing of cases against them, subsequently
namatay, na hear attack, I recall years back, I
won’t mention a name. There was this
department director of a department in the
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executive branch here in Region 11 Davao city. 2
to 3 weeks before he died he already made a
_____ because of the filing of the charges against
him. There was a case filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Sabi ko tapos na eh. Wala na
magawa. So one of the exceptions where the
tribunal be considered for humanitarian reasons,
we have applied liberality for humanitarian
reasons, instead of imposing the penalty or the
forfeiture of benefits. Allow the heirs to recover
the benefits from the deceased public officer.
(3) when the kind of penalty imposed or
imposable would render the proceedings useless.
The Cardinal Primary Right in Admin Proceedings
as laid down in the Ang Tibay case:
(1) The right to a hearing;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support
itself;
(4) The decision must be based on substantial
evidence;
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented. So the decision must be based on
evidence at least on record. The decision cannot
be made on the basis of evidence that was not
given to the respondent. Let us say, the basis of
the decision against the respondent is the
inspection report, but the respondent never
knew about the existence of this inspection
report. This is clearly a violation of his primary
rights. So the proceeding is null and void;
(6) The tribunal must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy. Should not simply accept the views
of the subordinate, there must be an
independent ascertainment of the facts and law
of the case;
(7) The decision rendered should be that the parties
are able to know the various issues and the
reasons. So the need therefore for statement of
facts and of the law as a basis for the issuance of
the decision.
In the case of DOH Secretary vs Camposano,
there was this investigation conducted by the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Corruption. After the proceedings, there was this
information. But take note any Anti-Graft
Commission under the Office of the President
does not have the power itself to discipline. What
it is doing is on the basis of the authority given to
it by the president, the creation of the president,
is to make an investigation and submit its
recommendation whether to impose the
necessary sanction against the public officer.
Here the Secretary of the DOH, upon submission
to her of the resolution she said even copied in
toto in another ______ kahit na mali mali. Here
there was a violation of the according to the SC of
the Cardinal Requirement mentioned earlier that
the judge must act on her own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of
the subordinate conducting the investigation.
Here in the decision issued by the DOH Secretary
relying on the recommendation, it did not
contain factual findings and legal assessment. The
SC ruled, there was violation of the cardinal
requirements of due process. There should be an
independent ascertainment by the disciplining
authority of the facts and the applicable law
pertaining to the case.
In the case of Malinaw vs Reyes, the SC ruled that
a decision that is prepared by a member, the one
who has been assigned to prepare the resolution
for the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, should have
been submitted to the SP and for the members of
the SP to deliberate on the issues and to make a
decision. So if the decision is prepared and signed
by only one member, the one who prepared the
decision, it is not the decision of SP. It does not
comply with the requirements of the law, more
so the provision of the Local Government Code,
particularly Sec. 66, there must be statement of
facts and the law of the case that must be
approved by at least majority of the members of
the SP.
We have emphasized that there should be notice
and hearing as an important part of due process.
But there are instances in the conduct of admin
adjudication where notice and hearing need not
be observed:
(1) The summary abatement of a nuisance per se. Of
course we know the nature of a nuisance per se.
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Is there somebody here who is a nuisance per se?
Summarily ejected. For example, the illegal
structures under the bridge all along the
riverbanks. Is this nuisance per so? Or a
basketball court sa middle of the street. The
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, but not
where the thing is classified as a nuisance per
accidens because the requirement of notice and
hearing should be observed;
(2) Cancellation of the passport by the DFA;
(3) Summary proceedings of distraint and levy of
property of delinquent taxpayer as provided by
law;
(4) Preventive suspension. Why? Because of the
nature of preventive suspension. What is the
nature of preventive suspension? Is this a
penalty? No. It is not yet penalty. There is no
need for this requirement of notice and hearing
because the parties will still be given the
opportunity to hear their side in an adversarial
proceedings;
(5) The grant of provisional authority for increase
rates or to engage in a particular line of business.
For example, toll regulatory board, increase rates
as provided by law even there are so many
agencies the government empowered to already
authorize provisional increase of rate. But by its
nature it is still subject to a hearing to determine
the final rate to be set. The TRB resolution
number 2099, authorizing the provisional toll rate
adjustment at the Manila Metro Skyway was
signed by the TRB executive director and four
directors none of whom personally attended the
hearing. Is there violation of due process? You
have here the TRB issuing a resolution. This
resolution was signed by the directors and
executive directors but not them. They attended
the public hearings. The task of conducting the
hearing or gathering evidence may be delegated
to subordinates by the superiors. For example
this case of the executive director and directors,
there is no violation, there is nothing irregular in
the issuance of this TRB resolution.
The right against Self-Incrimination. It is available
in all kinds of proceedings, but nonetheless it
applies only to natural persons. The right against
self-incrimination is not applicable to a juridical
entity. What is the reason for this? Simply
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
because the law may require the compliance of
requirements. For example the need for regular
submission of financial reports. The need to
insure that there is compliance with the
requirements of law. So public policy.
In the case of Naco vs CSC. You have here an
employee of the Philippine Export(expo?) Zone
Authority. She was charged with dishonestly and
grave misconduct because of her acts of illegally
collecting fees. In the proceedings against her,
she was requested to submit samples of her
signature. She voluntarily submitted such
samples. May she later on claim that this violates
the right against self-incrimination? This right
against self-incrimination is not self-executory, it
is not automatically operational. It must be
invoked, it must be claimed within an appropriate
time. Otherwise, there is a waiver of this right
against self-incrimination. So the fact that, in this
case of Naco, she voluntarily submitted samples
of her signature, it means that she waived such
right against self-incrimination.
An important doctrine, the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Admin Remedies. This has been
asked a number of times. Before the aggrieved
party may be allowed to seek judicial relief from
the courts he, by law, must exhaust all means of
administrative relief available to him. For
example, a good illustration of the application of
this doctrine is the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. This is consistent with the
doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.
There are three reasons for this doctrine:
(1) The need to allow the admin tribunal to correct
whatever error it may have committed in the
process of adjudication.
(2) On the basis of separation of powers because
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
tribunal is clothe with the expertise on the
determination a field within its expertise.
(3) The need to declog the court dockets.
A direct action in the court without complying
with the requirement of exhaustion of admin
remedies is premature. If the law provides that
the party should file a motion for reconsideration
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but this was not complied with. The aggrieved
party files the writ before the court, what
happens? The case may be dismissed by the court
because it is still premature. The other party may
file a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action.
It has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
court. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.
One important principle. This doctrine of
exhaustion of admin remedies applies only in the
performance by the admin officer or tribunal of a
quasi-judicial power. It has no application in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative or rule-making
power by admin tribunal.
So in the case of Homeowner’s Association vs
Defensor, what is being put in issue is the validity
of the implementing rules and regulations issued
by the National Government Center
Administration Committee on the basis of its law,
RA 9207. Clearly, this is not the discharge of a
quasi-judicial power. The relief is already before
the court because the admin tribunal cannot
decide with finality of this issue of the validity of
this implementing rules and regulations. The
court has such final say on this matter. So there is
no need to comply with the requirement of
exhaustion of admin remedies.
Under the rules of the NLRC, rules of procedure,
before the aggrieved party may file this special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 the sole
ground of grave abuse, there must first be
observance of this requirement, consistent with
the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies,
the filing of a motion for reconsideration in
accordance with the NLRC rules of procedure
before Rule 65 petition may be invoked by the
aggrieved party.
In Task Force Sagip Kalikasan vs Judge Pederanga,
where this guy (Edma?) filed a suit in court,
action for replevin with damages to recover this
confiscated products timber which was already
under the custody of the CENRO. Clearly, what
should have been applied here is the doctrine of
exhaustion of admin remedies. The remedy here
is not before the court through this complaint for
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replevin and damages. The law itself provides
that the action of the Bureau Forest
Development, now known as the Land
Management Bureau, is subject to review,
consistent with this doctrine of exhaustion, to the
higher admin authority, in this case the Secretary
of the DENR. Many departments of government
are under them offices, bureaus, agencies right?
Applying this doctrine, whatever decision that the
director lets say, director of bureau or agency
attached to this department may be subject of
authority to the secretary of this department
consistent on the doctrine of exhaustion of admin
remedies.
Is there a need for exhausting further from the
DENR Secretary to the Office of the President?
May an appeal be still taken from the
Department Secretary to the Office of the
President? You know, all departments are under
the Office of the President in the executive
branch. If it is already the decision of the
Department Secretary, may there still be appeal
to the Office of the President? IT DEPENDS upon
the provision of law. If there is such requirement,
go the Office of the President. But if there is
none, what applies is the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency.
Under the PD 705, this law is being implemented
by the DENR. All the actions, decisions of the
Land Management Bureau Director are subject to
review by the Secretary of the DENR. The
procedures embodied here are simply consistent
with the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Admin
Remedies. The decision of the DENR Secretary
are appealable to the president. So there is such
provision, because in the absence of this
provision there is no need to go to the office of
the president. The courts may not and will not
review the decision of the department secretary
unless there is commission of grave abuse or
arbitrariness. And if there is such grave abuse or
arbitrariness committed, the remedy under Rule
65 Special Civil Action for Certiorari or
prohibition.
JULY 9
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So in our last meeting, we discussed the concept
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Pursuant to this doctrine, whenever the party has
administrative remedies available to him as
provided by law, he must not only _______ (4:18)
such remedies, but he must ______ (4:22) until
the conclusion of the proceedings, until there is
determination made by the administrative
tribunal. And of course, the reasons for this
would be the need of the superior administrative
authority to correct whatever error, abuse, or
mistake that may have been committed by the
subordinate administrative officer, and of course
the need to reduce court dockets, because the
law itself has conferred the authority to the
administrative tribunal to decide on such a
matter within its expertise, its competence.
There is a distinction between the Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction and the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative remedies. First off,
the similarities between this two doctrines is that
both dealing with the proper relationships
between the administrative authorities and the
courts. The distinction between this two
principles is that this Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies is applicable where the
issue, the question is legally cognizable in the first
instance by the administrative authority.
Whereas, the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is
applicable where the issue is within the
concurrent authority of the courts and the
administrative tribunal, but because the issue
requires the determination of technical or factual
matters certainly not within the competence of
the courts but rather the administrative
authority, the court will have to suspend
proceedings, will have to defer to the authority of
the administrative tribunal, in line with what is
provided under the law.
What is the proper remedy or the process that
ought to be observed whenever there is an
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increase in the water rates by local water
districts? The law requires that before such an
increase in water rates be done, there should be
public hearing conducted by the local water
district. And so, such determination made in the
course of public hearing, nonetheless, must still
be submitted for review and approval by the local
water utilities administration. And this is in line
simply with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It follows therefore that
the rate that was adjudged in the course of the
public hearing must be the same rate as
submitted for review and approval of the local
water utilities administration. Now, after the
review made by the local water utilities
administration of this increase in water rates, and
they are still questioned by the water
concessionaire, such rate may be the subject of
appeal, and again consistent with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to the
national water resources board. And the law itself
provide for further administrative step from the
decision of the National Water Resources Board,
the same may still be appealed to the Office of
the President, again in line with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. But take
note, this mechanism is resorted to by the
aggrieved party whenever there is a provision of
law providing for the taking of such
administrative ________ (9:03) to higher
administrative tribunal.
Now in the case of Delta Ventures Resources vs.
_____________, there was this labor case filed
against Green Mountain Farm and Roberto
Ongpin, and after the requisite due proceedings,
the labor authorities rendered a decision for
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against
the labor case respondent. But subsequently,
there was this writ of execution madeon
properties owned by Roberto Ongpin, and here
the petitioner Delta Ventures filed a third party
claim, not before the NLRC but before the court
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for recovery of possession and injunction,
claiming that such property subject of the writ is
owned by Petitioner. Now, the court ruled that,
clearly, the proper remedy is not before the court
for the recovery of possession and injunction
because this claim is simply an incident to the
action before the labor authorities. This is simply
an incident of the labor case and therefore, it
should be the NLRC that ought to take
cognizance, and not the court, of this third party
claim. So here, the court ruled that the RTC
cannot enjoin the NLRC. So again, consistent with
this principle, the remedy available should be to
exhaust administrative remedies.
In Ombudsman vs. Valera, take note again, in line
with the administrative hierarchy, whenever a
decision is rendered by a lower administrative
authority, the same may still be subject of an
appeal to or review made by the superior
authority. And so, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is simply a unit of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, and in
fact, the former acts under the control and
supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. So
clearly, the determination made by the OSP is still
subject to the power of review by the
Ombudsman herself. Of course, in this case, the
issue involved here is _________ (12:12) and
there is no need for exhaustion, why? The special
prosecutor issued an order for the preventive
suspension of Deputy Commissioner Valera.
What is being raised here is the authority of the
special prosecutor in issuing this preventive
suspension order because the law provides that it
should be the Ombudsman or the Deputy. Even if
the Special Prosecutor has the ____________
(12:42) as the Deputy Ombudsman but,
nonetheless, it does not mean that he possess
the same duties and responsibilities.
Now, in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the head of the
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department clearly has the power of control and
supervision over the heads of bureaus and offices
under such department. And this in fact, is
recognized in the Revised Administrative Court.
So in line with that thinking, the review made by
the DOJ Secretary is just consistent with the
power of control exercised by the secretary over
the subordinate officials under the department.
Of course, we know that the power of control
includes the power of supervision, and as
consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, whatever resolution or
decision of the prosecutor may still be the subject
of an appeal to the higher administrative
authority, in this case, the DOJ Secretary. And
thus, the Secretary has the power either to
affirm, modify, or reverse the ruling of the
provincial, city, or state prosecutor. Simply, this is
in order for the higher administrative authority to
make necessary corrections whenever any such
mistake, negligence, or abuse that may be made
by the lower administrative authorities in the
course of the administrative process.
Now, in the case Regional State Prosecutor Orillo
vs. Ravi(???), again you have to, you know, the
nature of the powers and function being
performed by the RSP. You know that the RSP is
part of the hierarchy in the DOJ and he exercises
administrative supervision over all city and
provincial prosecutors. But take note, this
authority exercised by the RSP does not extend to
the conduct of preliminary investigation. In fact,
the RSP, the nature of the functions of the RSP is
simply administrative, he’s not empowered to
conduct PI. And so, what happened here was that
there was a resolution issued by inquest
prosecutor, as approved by the city prosecutor,
but nonetheless, the Petitioner here, Orillo, took
cognizance of the case and directed his asst. RSP
to conduct a preliminary investigation, and in so
doing, he was no longer performing the power of
supervision. That is the power properly tasked to
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the RSP. But in this case, in conducting the PI, he
in fact took over a function belonging to the
inquest prosecutor and the city prosecutor who
approves the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor. And in the process, he also deprived
the party to file a motion for reconsideration of
such resolution issued by the city prosecutor, and
if still denied, the party still has the remedy to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. But here, by
reason of the conduct of the PI made by the RSP,
clearly, he was already usurping a power. He was
exercising power beyond what is given to him
under the law.
In the case of DAR vs. ________ Coconut
Plantation, Inc., this issue refers to the matter of
the implementation of the CARP Law by the DAR.
Here, what happened was that the PARO(???)
subjected the parcels of land owned by the
coconut plantation under the CARP. But instead
of filing a motion for reconsideration and later on
appealing to higher authority, in this case, the
Secretary of DAR, what PCPI did was to file a
petition for certiorari before the CA, asserting
that there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by the PARO. Now, the SC ruled here
that there was non-compliance by PCPI of what is
prescribed even under the rules of procedure of
the DARAB. Because the rules provide for the
application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. First off, MR, and if still
denied, file the appeal before the next superior
authority. In this case, the appeal should have
been taken before the Secretary of the DAR.
Under the law, the DAR Secretary has the
exclusive authority to determine the qualification
and eligibility of tenants and beneficiaries. In fact,
in this case, the PCPI never questioned, never put
in issue the qualification and eligibility of the
beneficiaries, and it just filed this petition for
certiorari before the CA which is a violation of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. And the law itself provides that the
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matter of the propriety of subjecting a land under
the CARP is still within the exclusive authority of
DAR and not before the court.
In Corsiga(???) vs. Defensor, there was this
regional manager of the NIA, Corsiga, who issued
an order reassigning Senior Engineer
Isoc(???)(21:05) to a workplace different from
that stated in his appointment. If we were to
apply the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, what should have been
done in this ? First off, the aggrieved party Sr.
Engr.Isoc ought to have filed an MR. And if still
aggrieved, if the MR is denied, what is the next
step? An appeal to be taken to the next superior
authority, in this case the head of the NIA, in this
case, Corsiga. But what the aggrieved party did
was to file in court a petition for prohibition and
injunction. Clearly, this is not the proper remedy.
Now, take note, if you still recall the provision in
the Constitution, the CSC has the exclusive power
and authority over all personnel matter,
personnel action, including reassignment. Any
movement of personnel is within the exclusive
competence of the CSC. And so, following what is
provided in the Constitution, and this is
consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, from the decision of the
NIA, the aggrieved party may still appeal the
same to the CSC because the issue involved
personnel reassignment.
In the case of Republic vs. Extelcom, again here,
the Extelcom violated the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies when it filed the
petition for certiorari directly before the CA
without complying with what is required under
the rules of procedure of the NTC. The rules of
the NTC provide that the aggrieved party must
first file his within a period of 15 days from
receipt of decision. And so, considering, let’s say
if the aggrieved party fails to do so and the 15-
day period to file the appeal or the MR, it means
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that the decision becomes final and executory.
And in this case, by reason of the lapse of this
period, the NTC order already become
immediately executor. Now, take note, the filing
of the MR may still be allowed as provided by
law, even if the law itself provides for the
immediate execution of the order subject of the
appeal. It does not mean that the remedy is
already not available to the aggrieved party. So
here, what is clearly provided is the filing of the
MR from the decision of the NTC. Here, Extelcom
violated this principle by not exhausting his
administrative remedies.
Now, in the case of SEC vs. _______(26:18), take
note, under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for review may be taken from the
decision of the administrative authority to the CA
within 15 days from the date of the denial of the
MR. Now, take note again, under the Rules of
Court, it allows only the filing of only one, the
first and only motion for reconsideration. In this
case, the SEC, when it received the denial of its
MR, persisted by filing a second MR. Of course,
this is already a prohibited pleading. And so what
is the effect of the filing of a prohibited pleading?
The filing of the second MR does not produce any
legal effect. And so, if this is so, if the aggrieved
party still fails to make the necessary appeal
within the timeframe provided under the rules by
filing the second motion for reconsideration,
certainly, the decision may have already become
final and executor and so the court may no longer
act on this matter. So here in this case, the SEC
did not exhaust the proper remedies as provided
under existing laws, rather, it filed a second MR
before the Office of the President, and the filing
of the second motion before the Office of the
President which had already denied the first
motion, did not stop the running of the
reglemantary period to file the petition for
review before the CA. What should have been
done by the aggrieved party, in this case, the
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SEC? Upon receipt of the denial of its MR, the
Rules of Court grants the aggrieved party a period
of 25 days to file the petition. This was not
complied in this case.
In Laguna ________ vs. ________ (29:20),
consistent with Art. 128 of the Labor Code, the
authorized representative of the Secretary of
Labor, has, after due proceedings, the authority
to order a monetary award in the exercise of the
department secretary’s visitorial and
enforcement powers, and so, by delegation of
law, this authority is also exercised by the
regional director of the DOLE. What should have
been done? The aggrieved party should have filed
the appeal before the next superior
administrative authority, in this case, the
Secretary of Labor. Now, what the petitioner did
in this case, upon receipt of the order of the
DOLE Regional Director denying the motion it
filed to quash the writ of execution, because here
the regional director issued an order granting
monetary award adverse to Petitioner. What
Petitioner did was to file a motion to quash the
writ of execution issued by the regional director,
and upon denial, the Petitioner filed before the
CA, of course this is not a proper remedy, a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review. What should have been done was for
petitioner to appeal to the Secretary of Labor
consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
I have emphasized repeatedly that this doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies must be
applied whenever there is a provision of law
providing for such administrative mechanism
before there may be recourse to the courts. One
such example is under Sec. 408 of the LGC. Sec.
408 provides that the parties in a dispute must
submit the issue, their conflict, to the
LuponngTagapamayapa for amicable settlement
or mediation. Now, question, supposing the
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complainant, one of the parties in the dispute,
files an action before the court without
complying with Sec. 408, what is the effect? The
effect is that the court has basis to dismiss the
complaint that was directly filed before the court
without complying with what is required under
the LGC. So here, a motion to dismiss on the
ground of prematurity, on the ground of lack of
cause of action. But nonetheless, again, I have
emphasized that the party must invoke at the
earliest time, generally before the filing of the
answer, availing of this doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies because the failure to
comply with this doctrine does not mean that the
court no longer has jurisdiction. In fact, this does
not involve the jurisdiction of the court, it simply
means that the action is premature by reason of
failure to comply with what is required under the
law. So if the party does not invoke this timely,
the court may even look into the merits of the
case despite the non-compliance with the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
In the case of Alexandra Condominium
Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, here the Laguna Lake issued an order
after complying with this principle of due process
imposing a penalty of more than a million upon
Alexandra because of its polluted waste water
discharge causing pollution to the Laguna Lake.
Again, if we are to apply the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, file first
an MR before the tribunal issuing the questioned
order, so LLDA. But this was not done, and so, if
not done, what should have been the next proper
administrative step? To go to the higher
administrative authority, which in this case would
be the DENR because under EO 149, the LLDA has
been placed under the DENR through the
Pollution Adjudication Board in the Office of the
Secretary of the DENR. So here there was failure
to comply with this requirement when the
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Petitioner immediately filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA under Rule 65. Of course, this
is not a proper remedy. In fact, here the matter
does not involve a legal issue but rather a factual
issue, and so this must be threshed out before
the administrative agency and not before the
court. Now, take note also, under Rule 65 on the
filing of this action, petition for certiorari, of
course we know the ground, the sole ground is
grave abuse. Now, this cannot be invoked
without taking the administrative step as
provided by law such as the filing a MR. In fact,
this petition is available when there is no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. What is the plain, speedy,
adequate remedy under the course of law? That
is the filing of the MR, and this was not complied
with by the Petitioner.
Now, on another issue upon the offer of
Petitioner to pay a reduced amount, condoned
amount. It offered to pay about a million, now it
depends. The question now is which body has the
power to compromise claims? Applying the
government auditing code, PD 1445, the
authority to compromise claims if the amount is
P100K and below, belongs to the COA, if the
amount of compromise is more than such, under
the RAC, the authority is vested with congress. So
in this case, congress has such power to
compromise claims.
In the Province of Siquijor vs. COA, what
happened here was the Province, on the basis of
the resolution passed by the sanggunian, granted
a Christmas Bonus of P20k to each employee of
the province. And so the COA disallowed the
payment of this bonus. It was argued by the
Province that this grant was in fact approved by
the President. And so, nonetheless, when there
was this disallowance made by the COA Region
VII, and this was affirmed by the COA legal office,
and so, what should have been the proper
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remedy in case of the denial of this motion filed
by the Province? Consistent with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and under
the government auditing code, the remedy
should have been an appeal before the COA
Central, the office of the Chair of the COA, but
this was not done. In fact, under the COA rules of
procedure, clearly, it so provided that the appeal
should be taken before the COA through the
Chairman. Until such time that the disallowance,
because of the failure to make the appeal within
the timeframe, the disallowance became final
and executory. And so, clearly, the remedy of
certiorari may no longer be invoked when the
timeframe has already lapsed. As I mentioned a
while ago, the remedy of certiorari may be
availed only when there is no appeal or when
there is no plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. So, if the law itself and
even the rules of procedure of the agency
provides for the filing of MR, then that is the
speedy adequate remedy provided under the
law.
The SC further ruled in this case that the matter
of determining whether indeed the marginal note
made by the president is approval of the grant is
a factual matter and therefore should have been
determined by the COA and not before the court.
Take note, whatever decision, under the law and
even under rules of procedure of the COA, what
is the remedy of the aggrieved party? If the COA
Central still denies the appeal, what is the
remedy? It is before what court? IT IS BEFORE
THE SC, not before the CA.
Now, PD 242, and old law, 1973 law, is a general
law providing for the administrative adjudication
or settlement by the DOJ of matters,
controversies, disputes, involving agencies of
government, instrumentalities, agencies, GOCCs,
so long as the disputants belong to the
government, under this law, the matter may be
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submitted if let’s say the disputants are in the
same branch, let’s say, office of the President, the
matter may be submitted to the office of the Sol.
Gen.;if the disputants are GOCCs, the matter may
be submitted to the Gov’t Corporate Counsel; in
all other cases, the matter has to be submitted to
the DOJ for resolution. This is the general law, so
broad.
Now there is this special law, PD 464 pertaining
to the matter of assessment, appraisal, and
collection of real property tax by LGUs. Now, in
the case of the Province of Misamis vs.
NAPOCOR, here the province of Misamisfiled an
action before the court of the basis of PD 464 for
the collection of realty taxes from the NPC. NPC
failed to pay the realty taxes to the LGU. Now, in
this case, the NPC raises the issue of
administrative settlement on the basis of PD 242.
According to NPC, there should be application of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in relation to doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, so the need for the DOJ can solve this
issue because the disputants are both gov’t
entities, the LGU and the NPC, a GOCC. So the SC
ruled, between the general law and a special law,
this special law providing authority to the LGU for
the assessment, appraisal, and collection of realty
taxes, this should prevail over PD 242 and so the
court has the authority to take cognizance over
the matter because of the failure on the part of
NPC to pay the realty taxes.
Now, there’s a distinction between the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
due process principle. This has been asked in the
bar. Take note that these two principles are
related. The distinction here is that this principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on the view point of the ruling tribunal. So if this
is decision rendered by the ruling tribunal,
applying doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, opportunity should be given for the
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higher authority to amend the decision. Whereas
from the view point of the litigant, the adverse
party against whom the decision is rendered, so
due process has to be considered. So due process
is considered from the view point of the party
against whom the decision is rendered. So clearly,
in both doctrines there is this opportunity given
to them. What is the opportunity? Under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, opportunity is given to the higher
administrative authority to make a ruling in order
to correct whatever error that may have been
made by the lower administrative subordinate.
Whereas, in the administrative adjudication
opportunity is also given to the aggrieved party
against whom the decision is rendered by making
necessary remedies provided by law, an
opportunity for the party to be heard, part of the
requirement of due process.
We have mentioned that the rule is there should
be filing of a motion for reconsideration
consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and what are the
exceptions to this rule? In what cases may there
be no prior motion for reconsideration?
1. If the order of the administrative authority is a
clear nullity, null and void. For example, the
tribunal issuing the order or decision never,
under the law, never had the power or
jurisdiction. Of course, we know if what is being
raised is the jurisdiction, if in the first place the
tribunal never acquired jurisdiction, all
proceedings are null and void, at any time the
decision can be questioned. So there is no need
to exhaust, what is there to exhaust? The
immediate recourse is before the court.
2. Where there is an urgent necessity for the
determination of the issue, then any _______
may cause irreparable damage or injury to the
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parties, it may be the gov’t or any of the parties.
There is the clear prejudice by reason of, let us
say, undue delay. Let us say, in a petition to oust
the possessor of the office, what is the proper
remedy for one who claims that he is lawfully
entitled to the possession, what is the remedy?
Quo warranto, this should be filed within what
timeframe? Within one year. So to wait further
will cause will only cause grave irreparable
damage. So there is no need to wait further, go to
court.Or when there is a deprivation of the due
process clause, and the need for urgent remedy,
or as we said, where the issue is purely legal. If
purely legal, of course the administrative
authority does not have the competence to rule
on such issue; or where what is involved is public
interest.
You know, the rules in administrative law are not
so rigid. The court time and against has applied
liberality in the implementation of administrative
rules and regulations. What are the exceptions to
this doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies? Let’s discuss not the cases applying
the exceptions to this doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
In the case of Dimaisip vs. Bakal (???), if your
recall you study of public officers, there was this
head of PAO, Bakal, she was the chief of the PAO
during the time of Pres. Ramos, but during the
time of Estrada, she was replaced and transferred
to PAO Region 10, so from Chief, she became a
subordinate, a regional director of PAO Region
10. So the issue is whether there is a need to
exhaust administrative remedies. What’s the
issue? Whether the transfer of Bakal, she was
replaced by Dimaisip who was not even CESO, to
Region 10, which was made without the consent
of Bakal is constructive dismissal in violation of
her security of tenure guaranteed under the
Constitution. Clearly, this is a legal issue that
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ought to be looked into by the court, there is no
need to exhaust administrative remedies.
In the case of Rimao vs. Tajer(???), the Petitioner
was promoted by then ARMM Gov. Missuari,
from Education Supervisor to director, but
unfortunately was disapproved by the CSC, and
later on an order was issued by Missuari
reinstating her to her former position of
supervisor. During period that Petitioner was
director, her old position was occupied by
Respondent as supervisor. Of course, the concept
of de facto applies in this case. The issue here is
whether the memorandum issued by Missuari
reinstating Petitioner in spite of the fact that she
was already on AWOL. Clearly, this already
exceeds the authority given to the governor. So
clearly there is here grave abuse of discretion, an
act done in excess of jurisdiction which is also a
legal issue, and so there is no need exhaust
administrative remedies. There is no need for the
aggrieved party to wait further for the resolution
of this matter by the Office of the Governor
because the governor is the same person who
issued conflicting resolutions. In fact, the order of
reinstatement issued was done based on an
outmoded civil service resolution. So according to
the SC, there is no need, the matter ought to be
heard before the court and not before the local
government of ARMM, Office of the Governor.
In the case of Lastimoso vs. Asayo (???), what is
being raised here is whether or not the chief of
the PNP has the authority to take cognizance of
the administrative complaint filed by a private
citizen against Sr. Insp. Asayo, because what
happened here was that the PNP Chief took
cognizance of the case. Now, again, this is a
matter within the competence of the court and
not within the authority of the PNP. In fact, under
RA 6975 as amended by RA 8551, the law of the
PNP, there is in such a law created the PLEB,
People’s Law Enforcement Board. The authority
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of the PLEB is to take cognizance of citizens’
complaints filed by citizens against police officers.
So what’s being raised here by Asayo, is that this
matter should have been taken cognizance by
PLEB rather than the chief.
In the case of Quisumbing vs. Lumbang (??), there
was this District Supervisor of DepEd Esther Yap.
And you have this issuance made by the Minister
of DepEd, at that time Quisumbing,
transferring/reassigning Esther Yap from Mlang
to ______________, and so instead of exhausting
administrative remedies, the aggrieved party Yap
went to court. Is there a violation of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies? One
exception to this doctrine is that if the issuance
emanated from the superior, in this case the
head of the department, Quisumbing. And so, if
the issuance is from the dept. secretary, there is
no other higher authority, of course except the
office of the Pres., but applying the alter ego
principle, the act of the dept. secretary is the act
of the Pres., so there is no need to take the
matter to the office of the Pres., unless there is a
provision of law providing for such administrative
mechanism, in this case there is none. And so,
since the issuance emanated from the dept.
secretary herself, therefore, it was just proper for
the aggrieved party to file the case before the
court where the respondent is the dept. secretary
whose acts as alter ego, bear the approval of the
Pres.
In the Case of Benamira vs. Garucho (???),
Benamira was not even appointed but
designated, not by the president who is the
appointing power, but by the head of the tourism
dept. And so Benamira got designated as the GM
of the PTA. And Benamira complained violation of
his security of tenure. Where the doctrine of
qualified political agency applies, of course this is
also another exception. Under the doctrine of
QPA, the alter ego principle, whenever the action
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was done by the superior authority, the dept.
secretary, of course this means that that act of
the dept. secretary is the act of the Pres. And so,
applying, as an exception to this doctrine, the
remedy here is before the court.
In the case of Castro vs. Gloria, this complainant
Gutang filed an administrative case against
Castro, a public school teacher for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, because Castro had an illicit
affair with the wife of Gutang. And so, when a
decision was rendered after complying with the
requirements of due process, Castro was
dismissed. Take note, he had been in service for
so long a time and this was the first violation he
committed, and dismissal kaagad. What is being
raised by Castro is the propriety in imposing the
penalty of dismissal considering that this is first
administrative case. So it is a question of law, and
as the SC ruled, there is no need for the aggrieved
party, Castro, to exhaust administrative
remedies, he can already seek relief before the
court in order to make a determination. He is not
even questioning the conviction rendered in the
administrative case, he is only questioning what
is the proper penalty that ought to be imposed
against him?
In the case of Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology, here the student,
Regino, was not able to take the final
examination because of her refusal to buy the
tickets sold to her by her teachers and so
hindisiyanaka-graduate. So here, the student filed
a damage suit against the school, and here the
college argued that what ought to apply is the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Is this doctrine applicable? No, because
the suit is for damages and the CHED does not
have the authority to award damages. It is in fact
a matter resolvable under the provisions of the
Civil Code. In fact, she is not questioning the
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policies of the school, the nature of her action is
simply one of damages.
This has been asked twice in the bar, the case of
Sabello vs. DECS(???), you know this guy Sabello
was then a public school principal, he was
charged and he was convicted by the court, and
so one of the accessory penalties in conviction is
dismissal from service, and he was in fact
removed from service by reason of his conviction.
And later on, he was granted absolute pardon,
and he was reinstated by reason of this absolute
pardon but not to his original higher position but
a lower position of school teacher. And without
exhausting administrative remedies, he went to
court arguing that poverty denied him the
services of a lawyer. I have said earlier, the rules
of administrative law are not strictly applied,
from time to time liberality is applied by the
court. And so here the SC applied liberality, taking
into account that the petition filed before the
court was by a non-lawyer who claims that
poverty denied him the services of a lawyer, he
could not pay a lawyer, and so he has to rely on
his own in seeking legal review, and so the SC set
aside the requirement of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and
decided to look into the merits of the position
filed Sabello.
In the case of Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, this involves
the issuance by the President of UP Diliman of an
order reassigning Sta. Maria from the College of
Arts Education of UP to the Office of the
President. Now, take note, the appointment
given to Sta. Maria was as Dean of the College
Arts for a term of 5 years, but even before the
expiration of this 5-year term, the president
issued this reassignment order, so he was
reassigned to the Office of the President with the
rank of Dean, and so he claimed that this is
constructive dismissal in violation of his security
of tenure. And so SC ruled that there is nothing
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left to be done except for court action. This raises
a legal issue, and so there is no need to exhaust
administrative remedies.
What other exceptions are there to the rule?
When there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking. For example, if the administrative
officer or tribunal declares that it should have
been court action, upon the filing of the petition
in court, he cannot declare that it should have
been raised before the administrative tribunal, he
is already in estoppel. Or when there is
unreasonable delay of official action such that it
will cause irreparable damage or injury to the
complainant. Non-action despite compliance,
there is undue delay, so this may be a basis for
the filing the suit. Or as I mentioned a while ago,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy except for court action. Now, take note,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies only to public lands. Because if
it’s a public land, where should the exhaustion be
made? Before the DENR. If it involves private
property, it means that it is already under the
Torrens system, and it is only the court that can
revoke such title. So, if the property in question is
private, the authority belongs to the court and
not the administrative tribunal. Or, one
exception, the amount is so small to make the
application of the rule to so impractical. There is
nothing left to be done except court action.
Very important doctrine in administrative law is
the doctrine of qualified political agency, the alter
ego doctrine. In the absence of provision either in
the law or the Constitution, the official acts of the
dept. secretary are deemed the acts of the
president unless the president himself
disapproves the acts of the subordinate dept.
secretary. So, unless the Constitution or the law
requires personal action by the Pres., you know
under our existing system of gov’t, all the
functions in these various depts. are performed
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by the dept. heads and not by the pres. himself,
otherwise, mauubosnayungbuhokniPNoy. So, this
QPA simply is a recognition of one executive, the
president, and all branches, offices, departments
in the executive branch are mere adjuncts of the
executive depts., and the heads of those offices,
bureaus, and departments are mere agents of the
chief executive. So they are mere agents who
implement the policies that may have been
adopted by the Pres. They are the alter ego of the
President.
Now, is it correct to say that the executive
secretary is of the same level as the dept.
secretary in the executive hierarchy? That is not a
correct statement because the executive
secretary is higher than the department
secretary, he acts by authority of the President,
that is known as the “little president”. So the
executive secretary has the authority either to
affirm, modify, set aside, nullify the decision of
the director, even if the decision of the director
has been affirmed by the dept. secretary. Again,
that is simply consisted with the doctrine of QPA,
he acts by authority of the President.
Now, one other important principle you need to
know, you should remember that this doctrine
does not apply to offices outside the Office of the
President. So meaning, this does not have any
application whatsoever to Constitutional
Commissions or the Office of the Ombudsman.
Why? Because this commissions created under
the constitution are supposed to be non-political,
independent of the office of the president. That is
the case of Perez vs. Sandiganbayan. So the
doctrine of QPA does not apply to the office of
the Ombudsman.
In the case of the Province of CamarinesNorte vs.
Province of Quezon, you know there was this
boundary dispute between the Province of
CamNor and Quezon. And so because of this
conflict, there was an order issued for the
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conduct of a survey, and because of this order,
there was a special order issued by the Secretary
of DENR authorizing the creation of this technical
team from the DENR with the objective of
conducting the survey in order to delineate the
boundaries of these two provinces. And so here
the governor of Quezon claimed that the conduct
of the survey is null and void because this was
not authorized by the President. The SC ruled
that the fact the special order creating the survey
team came from the secretary of DENR, it means
that such act is the act of the President, applying
the doctrine of QPA.
Now, there are laws providing that the dept.
secretaries, by reason of their position, are ex-
officio members of governing boards of GOCCs.
By provision of law, the head of the department
is made ex-officio member, by reason of his
office. And so, in those cases where the dept.
secretaries are made ex-officio members of
GOCCs and other instrumentalities where there is
a board of trustees, it means that personal
judgment must be made by the department
secretary. And so, this duty, this authority to vote
and approve resolutions of the board must not be
conferred to the subordinate. Rather, this is one
that involves the exercise of utmost sound
discretion. It can only be exercised by the dept.
secretary. He cannot delegate such task to his
agent. You know, there have been so many times
in the past, I was once a corporate secretary in a
GOCC, and many of the members of the board
are department secretaries, but because of the
distance of Mindanao, they designate their
representatives. And so many resolutions passed
by the board were made with the participation of
these representatives, and at that time wala pa
itong decision naito, mali-
malipalayungginagawanamin.
Anywasy, so here the SC ruled that, you know
there was this resolution passed by the NP Board
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declaring that effective January 2003, all the NPC
employees were terminated from their positions,
but the matter was raised before the SC. Of the 9
board members in the passage of this resolution,
upon determination, only 3 were declared valid.
Why? Because the thee were declared valid
because the 3 came from the department
secretaries, all others were merely
representatives, so null and void yung resolution.
So the task of voting on the resolution cannot be
delegated to the representative, this is a function
that is exclusive to the department secretary be
reason of his office, it involves an act of utmost
discretion.
In the case of DENR Secretary vs. DENR
employees, you know there this conduct of
plebiscite determining which provinces should
belong to the ARMM. And so, after that, an order
was issued by the Secretary transferring the
regional office of DENR from Cotabato City to
Koronadal. And so because of this issuance, the
families of the employees were affected, so they
complained that the issuance was illegal because
it did not have the imprimatur of the president.
The SC ruled that the order of the DENR Secretary
is also the act of the President under the doctrine
of QPA, that’s one. Another reason here is that
the President under Sec. 17, Art. 7, has the power
of control over all departments, bureaus, and
offices within the executive branch. And you
know, the multifarious acts of the executive
branch are performed through this departments,
and certainly the department heads are within
their competence, within their power to issue
such an order in implementation of the policies of
the president. This power may be delegated to
the members of his cabinet under the doctrine of
QPA. And another reason here, take note that
under the Constitution, not only the power of
control, and this power of control includes the
power of supervision in the need for the faithful
observance of laws by the subordinates. So the
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principle of this Presidential power of control as
provided in Art. 7, Sec. 17. I’ve already mentioned
this a number of times, the authority of the
president over the executive branch of
government including all executive officials and
subordinates, and this power of control refers to
the authority of the president to modify, set aside
what the subordinate had done. So the question,
may the president nullify the action of the
subordinate and perform the act himself? Yes,
because this is consistent with the power of
control. He can also issue an order that the act be
undone or the act be re-done. This is again within
the concept of power of control. May he issue the
rules? Yes, because this is consistent with the
doctrine of control, presidential control. But as
distinguished from the power of supervision, the
president does not have the power to issued
rules. This applies only, the issuance of rules
applies only whenever he performs consistent
with his power of control. But under the power of
supervision, and this applies to LGUs under Art.
10, Sec. 4, and the ARMM under Art. 10, Sec. 16,
it is one of supervision. In the latter case, power
of supervision does not include to issue himself
the rules. The authority of the president in so far
as his power of supervision simply means the
power to ensure that these rules faithfully carried
out in accordance with law, but he cannot order
the formulation of new rules to suit the manner
of the doing of the act. So the power to
substitute the judgment of the former with that
of the latter.
In the case of Tondo(??) Medical Center
Employees Association vs. CA, in the matter of
the reorganization effected in the DOH in the
time of Pres. Estrada under EO 102, and it is
claimed that this is a usurpation of legislative
power. Even without specific legislative fiat, the
President issued this EO calling for or giving
authorityto reorganization the DOH. Is this
proper? There is no usurpation of a power
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
belonging to legislature because there is already
an existing law conferring to the president a
blanket authority to undertake changes in any
office or department of the executive branch.
Take note, the authority belongs to the president
whenever what is involved is a department, or
office, or bureau under the executive branch of
gov’t. So clearly, under the Revised Admin Law,
there is a continuing authority granted to the
President to effect reorganization whenever the
need arises. So whenever to reorganize the
structure of existing offices in the executive
branch, can he do this? Yes, because that is
within the powers given to him under the RAC.
Again, this rule applies only to offices in the
executive branch.
Again, the same principle applies in the case of
Manda vs. Mipa (??), the president has the
authority to effect reorganization of offices,
agencies, instrumentalities in the executive dept.
And the basis here is the Constitution, the grant
of power of control under Art. 7, Sec. 17, and by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
under the RAC to effect reorganization of
executive offices under EO 292. So that’s the
basis in any reorganization effected by the
President without securing specific authority
from the executive.
JULY 10
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
the President as Chief of the Executive branch has
the power to alter, modify, or affirm whatever
decisions may be rendered or acted upon by the
subordinates in their respective departments.
In the case of Chavez v NHA, even without the
required authorization of the secretary of the
DENR, the President issued an Executive Order
motu proprio for the development of the housing
project known as the Smoky Mountain Dagat-
Dagatan Housing Project with the directive for
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the implementation of the undertaking. In fact, restructuring of the Office of the President so as
this project happened during the time of to justify this power of control. Rather, the
President Aquino and this program was extended authority here is on the basis of the obligation,
even way beyond the term of office of then the duty imposed under the Constitution in the
President Corazon Aquino, so during the time of same provision, Article 7, Section 17 that there
President Ramos. The issue here is WON there is should be faithful compliance of the laws and this
still a need to secure the authorization needed is carried out by the President. And so the need
for the implementation of this project more so to ensure that there is faithful adherence, and in
that there is here the need to claim public land case of violation, it follows that the President has
and thus the authorization of the DENR should be the authority and duty in fact to file the necessary
obtained. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled cases against the erring public officials.
that this authority the President can exercise,
There is here a distinction between the power of
being the Chief Executive of the executive branch
control and the power to create a public office.
and in fact the president ordered the creation of
In the case of power of control, this refers to the
this project through the implementing committee
authority of the President to adopt, to alter,
and included in this committee was the DENR.
modify or nullify the action taken by the
The DENR was made part of the implementing
department secretary, the president’s agent. In
committee, so this already complies with the
the case of this power to create a public office,
requirement needed that there should be
take note, the basis is the conferment to the
authorization of the DENR. The other reason here
President by law. There must be a law granting
is that the ultimate authority over disposable and
such power, delegated authority to create. There
alienable public land is vested NOT in the
must be a law and in fact, there is such a law, the
secretary of the DENR but rather with the Office
Revised Administrative Code, EO 292, conferring
of the President. Otherwise, if the requirement is
the power to the President but only to reorganize
that there should be prior authorization of the
the existing bureaucracy in the Executive branch
DENR secretary, this would negate the power of
of the government. But more than that, the duty
the President over the department secretaries.
likewise imposed under the Constitution to the
So this would in fact be a derogation of the
President to ensure that there is faithful
authority of the power of the President as Chief
compliance or observance of the laws.
Executive of the executive branch of government.
The question is, whether or not the President has
In the case of Meralco v Philippine Truth
the authority to reorganize the Executive branch
Commission, one of the issues raised in this case
of government. Take note, the rule here is that
is the basis for the creation of the Philippine
the power to create includes the power to
Truth Commission. The basis here is not the
destroy. This principle is made applicable to
power of control, under Art. 7 Sec 17 because this
offices that have been created on the basis of
provision, power of control, applies already to
legislative fiat. Congress itself provides for the
those existing departments, offices, bureaus in
creation of these public offices, and so it follows
the executive branch and clearly, this Philippine
therefore that, proceeding from this power to
Truth Commission, is not yet part of the structure
create, Congress likewise has the power to
of the executive branch of government when the
destroy. There may be amendatory law or there
Executive Order 1 was issued. So, the Philippine
Truth Commission is not born out of the
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may be a delegated conferment given by
Congress to the Chief Executive.
What are the bases for the authority of the
President to reorganize the Executive
department? We mentioned that there must be
legislative imprimatur. This principle is not
applicable to an office created under the
Constitution as Congress does not have the
power to abolish an office created under the
Constitution. This authority of Congress is limited
to those offices Congress itself created on the
basis of legislative enactment. The authority
likewise of the President under the power of
control is to ensure that there is faithful
observance of the law and so the need for the
President to review the actions of the
subordinate officers.
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning Manggagawa,
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau.
This bureau was created during the time of
Corazon Aquino. Subsequently, during the time of
President Estrada, he issued an Office Order
3149(?) effecting the deactivation of the EIIB and
so the employees who were affected by such
issuance questioned this order on the ground
that this usurps the power belonging to the
Legislature. The SC ruled that the authority of the
President is recognized, in fact, there may be a
law passed by Congress, giving to the President
the power to carry out organizational measures
but this authority applies to departments, offices
in the Executive branch of government. Is there
such authority? Yes, under the Revised
Administrative Code, EO 292, conferring to the
President the power in order to achieve,
simplicity, economy and efficiency to reorganize
the administrative structure of the office of the
President. And so, consistent with this authority
given by Congress on the basis of law, the Revise
Administrative Code, the President has the power
to transfer the functions of agencies and
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departments, to the office of the President. Take
not that the EIIB is a Bureau under the
Department of Finance and the Department of
Finance of the structure of the Office of the
President. Thus, it is within the authority of the
President to effect the changes in the Executive
branch of government.
In the earlier case Domingo v Zamora, here this
was during the time of President Estrada; he
issued EO 321 which provides for the transfer of
the sports programs and activities from the
Department of Education to the Philippines
Sports Commission. The affected employees
questioned the issuance and the SC upheld the
authority of the President and in fact, the
rationale for this continuing authority granted to
the President under existing law, EO 292, is that
the Office of the President is the command post,
it is the nerve center and therefore, the President
has the prerogative to shape or reshape, being
the commander of the administration, this
bureaucracy within his control. The objective
here is efficiency and effectivity of those
departments and offices in the Executive branch
of government.
So, continuing authority given by Congress on the
basis of EO 292, the RAC to effect this
reorganization of the Office of the President. But
this is subject to the caveat, (important in our
study of Public Officers), that one mode of the
termination of the public office is abolition, but
the condition here is that it must be done BONA
FIDE, in good faith.
We have mentioned and discussed the power of
the President of control. On the other hand,
there is also the President’s power of general
supervision. As earlier said, power of control
applies to the departments, bureaus offices in the
executive branch, whereas the power of
supervision applies to the LGUs under Art. 10,
Sec. 4 and Art 10, Sec 16 and insofar as the
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ARMM is concerned, we have Art. 10, Sec 18 of
the Constitution. This simply means that the
authority of the President to make sure that
there is faithful compliance and execution by the
local government units acting through their local
chief executives, of the law of the land.
This power of general supervision exercised by
the President over LGUs is not inconsistent with
the power of the President to order the conduct
of investigation or whatever. The laws of the land
are not faithfully observed by the local chief
executives. It therefore follows that the President
has the power or authority, whenever these laws
are breached, there is no faithful adherence by
the local chief executive, for the President to
conduct investigation, even the filing of
disciplinary cases against erring local chief
executives.
There is here a distinction between disciplining
authority and investigating authority. Disciplining
authority is vested with the President as the Chief
Executive who has the power of control as well as
the power of supervision over the LGUs. This task
of conducting the investigation in order to obtain
the ends of this administrative, disciplinary action
may be conferred or delegated to subordinate
officers. Thus, this task may be assigned to the
alter ego and this alter ego becomes the
investigating authority. Assuming (?) this task is
being performed by the DILG Secretary or the
Secretary may create an investigating committee.
Some other body may be tasked by the President
other than the DILG secretary, for example, the
President may task the secretary of the
Department of Justice. In those cases, the
investigating official becomes the investigating
authority. And so there is no incompatibility here
because the authority to disciple is vested with
the President. There is NO delegation of the
power to disciple but simply the power to
investigate. In fact, the authority here of the
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investigating tribunal or committee is conducting
the investigation as so directed by the President
and submitting the report with recommendation.
And so, ultimately it is still with the President to
impose the necessary final action. Whatever
action that must be made still belongs to the
President as the disciplining authority.
Specifically, the power of supervision is one of
mere oversight over local government units as
declared by the Supreme Court in Bituonon v
Fernandez. This simply refers to the authority of
the President to check whether the officials of
the LGU or LGUs, perform their obligations as
prescribed by law and if the rules are being
followed. But the President himself CANNOT by
himself lay down the rules for the doing of the
act. And if these rules or laws are not observed,
what the President, as the superior, may do is to
order that the work be done or undone, in order
to conform to the prescribed rules or what was
provided by law. But the superior, in this case the
Chief Executive, cannot himself prescribe his own
manner for the performance of the act.
Otherwise, if this were so, it would already be
power of control and no longer power of
supervision.
The power of general supervision exercised by
the President extends to the Liga ng mga
Barangay. Of course we know that the Liga ng
mga Barangay is recognized in the Local
Government Code. What is this Liga ng mga
Barangay? This is simply an aggroupment of
barangays which are represented by their
barangay captains. And in fact, the
representatives of this Liga sit in an ex officio
capacity at the higher aspect, the administrative
aspect, municipal, city and provincial Sanggunians
and so in this manner, the Liga ng mga Barangay
now becomes the medium, to which the
barangay is able to participate in the enactment
of ordinances and the formulation of policies
4 Manresa

beneficial to the barangay. Of course, before the
Present Vice Mayor of Davao became the Vice
Mayor, he used to be sitting in the Sangguian, ex
officio as the head of the Liga.
Again we emphasize that the authority of the
President is one of supervision insofar as the Liga
ng mga Barangay is concerned. So in the case in
David v Paredes, where the judge here Victoria
Paredes, issued the order designating the DILG as
the interim caretaker to manage the affairs of the
Liga and because of this order of the court, the
DILG issued orders nullifying the results of the
Liga election in Caloocan and in fact promulgated
rules and regulations for the holding
synchronized elections and more than that, the
DILG appointed Rayos as president of the Liga ng
mga Barangay in the local city and this guy was
not the duly elected. The one chosen by the Liga
ng mga Barangay in Caloocan was David. Clearly,
in so issuing these acts, performing these powers,
the DILG already usurped a power. It already
went beyond the authority which is only one of
1. If there is misappreciation of facts by the
supervision. Here, the DILG was already
performing powers of control. The DILG deprived
the National Liga Board of its authority of its
authority over the Liga. So clearly a grave abuse
of discretion was committed here by the DILG
and as to the part of the judge in issuing this
order.
What is the rule in the review of administrative
decisions?
We know that before there may be a judicial
review of the administrative decisions, what we
have to follow is the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Before there may be
resort to court, you have to exhaust your
administrative remedies within the
administrative realm.
2. What about more than factual findings? The issue
Let us say there is compliance and in the proper
case as so provided by law, the decision of the
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administrative tribunal is elevated before the
court. What is the general rule? The general rule
is that the findings of fact of administrative
authorities are not only given respect but even
FINALITY. Meaning, this factual findings of
administrative authorities are not subject to
judicial review insofar as the findings of facts of
administrative authorities are concerned,
premised on the condition that the decision
rendered by the administrative tribunal is
supported by SUBSTANTIAL evidence and another
requirement is that such decision or proceeding
was done within the ambit of authority of the
administrative tribunal or body.
There is an exception of the many exceptions to
this rule. In what cases, even the factual findings
of administrative authorities may be subject to
judicial review? Because the rule here is the
factual findings of administrative authorities
ought not to be given only respect but finality.
What are the exceptions?
administrative authority or if the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. There is here
a disparity since the decision is not supported by
evidence on record or where the findings are
vitiated because of the existence of fraud,
collusion or imposition or there is an irregular
proceeding done by the administrative authority
in violation of procedural due process; or there
are serious, grave errors committed by the
administrative authority, grave abuse of
discretion or there is clear arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the hearing officer
or tribunal.
The rule here is that factual findings must be
respected and accorded finality.
now involves not only factual but even a legal
issue. MIXED factual finding of facts and of law.
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Thus the 2nd exception: the doctrine of
assimilation of facts.
In the case of Bautista v Araneta, where the
petitioner argues that the certification issued by
the agrarian authorities to the effect that he is a
tenant of Araneta is a factual issue because a
certification has been issued. And in the basis of
this declaration, this finding, the MARO, the
DARAB likewise affirmed this certification. The
Supreme Court here said that the issue of
tenancy is NOT purely a factual relationship.
What is the factual relationship here? The factual
relationship is the fact of this guy tilling the land.
But more than that, the Supreme Court said that
there is a need also to establish a legal
relationship. Whether indeed consent has been
obtained or whether the consent of the lawful
owner has been given. So more than being a
factual relationship, tenancy is also a legal
relationship. What does this mean? This means
that this mixed finding of fact and law is subject
to judicial review.
In the case of Republic v Imperial, the Supreme
Court ruled that the classification of whether the
land is public or not is made by the Director of
the Land Management Bureau under the DENR.
The fact is that this Director of LMB declares that
the land is public land. Of course this is within the
competence and technical expertise of the
executive official, in this case the LMB Director,
and so this is a factual finding and is thus
conclusive upon the court and the latter cannot
interfere with such declaration made by the
administrative officer exercising his authority
under the law within the powers given to him
under the law. The classification of public land is
the duty, the function of the LMB Director and his
decision when affirmed by the Secretary of the
DENR as to this question of fact, is conclusive and
not subject to judicial review. The exception
would apply if there is arbitrariness,
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capriciousness, there is an irregular proceeding, a
violation of the requirements of due process, etc.
In this situation, the general rule would not apply.
The issue of whether to file the case in court or
not involves determination of the evidence, the
required evidence to sustain the filing of the case,
that is probable cause. This determination is
made by the prosecutor whether of the DOJ or
the Office of Ombudsman whether there is
sufficient basis, there is probable cause that a
crime has been committed and this crime was
committed by this public officer. The
determination of evidence to assess whether a
prima facie graft case exists is a question of fact.
It involves the exercise of discretion. And
whenever what is being performed by the
administrative or quasi-judicial officer is an
exercise of discretion, mandamus will not lie.
Mandamus may not be filed in order to compel
the official, in this case, the prosecutor, to
perform a discretionary function. But if the power
being performed by this public officer is
ministerial, mandamus will lie in order to compel
the officer to perform not a discretionary act but
rather a ministerial function. The matter of
determining whether there is probable cause so
to warrant the filing of the criminal case before
the court involves the exercise of discretion and
so, the aggrieved parties cannot compel the filing
of the case where the prosecutor himself
declares that there is no evidence. So it is one of
discretion. We know that the exception would
apply if clearly there is arbitrariness, clear
capriciousness in the exercise of this power by
the public officer.
We mentioned the general rule that factual
findings are not only accorded respect but
finality. One exception, the 3rd exception, is
where there are conflicting factual findings at
various levels of the investigation by the
different tribunals. Here is the case of Fabian v
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Agustin. In here, Agustin was charged by Teresita
Fabian, a contractor. They used to be
sweethearts, the petitioner is the paramour of
Agustin and because of such relationship, the
petitioner contractor was able to have lucrative
contracts in the public works but their
relationship turned sour and the petitioner, the
woman, filed administrative cases against Agustin
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the public service, immorality,
etc. and after due proceedings, the hearing
officer rendered a decision finding Agustin guilty
and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Of course, this has to be approved by the
head which is Desierto and he modified the
penalty, that it was not grave misconduct, so
instead of dismissal from service, he imposed the
penalty of 1 year suspension. Desierto was
subsequently asked to inhibit himself and this
was assigned to a deputy Ombudsman Guerrero
and the latter subsequently dismissed the case.
When the matter was raised before the Court of
Appeals, it adopted the earlier decision of
Desierto of 1 year suspension. But later, it issued
a modified decision dismissing the case against
Agustin. So at various stages there are conflicting
factual findings and so this is an exception to the
rule when this matter was elevated to the SC. The
SC looked into the factual milieu of the case
because of the conflicting versions.
In the case of Matuguina Wood Products v CA,
the issue is whether or not Matuguina Wood
Products, a party in this natural resources case is
the alter ego of Milagros Matuguina. It is one of
fact and this matter should be threshed out not
in court. This involves a factual issue and this
should be resolved in the natural resources case.
Again, the rule here is that the court would not
interfere with such competence, with the
authority given by law to the administrative
tribunal to determine factual and technical
issues. And in fact, the court will support the
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
decision of the administrative tribunal, it will not
interfere with the latter’s exercise of power.
In what cases may there be a review by the
courts of administrative decisions?
1. To determine the constitutionality of a law or
order or
2. To determine the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal or
3. Or in order to determine a question of law or
4. When there’s a need to determine a question of
fact in order to determine a higher issue which
may be jurisdictional or constitutional. So in
order to determine a constitutional or
jurisdictional issue or
5. The commission by the admin tribunal by abuse
of authority amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or
6. There has been error of law committed by the
administrative hearing officer.
Take note that under the Constitution, Article 8,
Section 5, this justifies judicial review on all the
errors or decisions of administrative bodies
involving questions of law. These are subject to
judicial review. And this is based on what rule?
Rule 43, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 43 on
quasi-judicial agencies to be reviewed by the CA.
Under Rule 45, petition for review on certiorari is
from the CA to the SC, not on factual findings but
on legal issues.
The principle that only questions of law shall be
raised in appeal in a petition for review on
certiorari under rule 45 has exceptions. The rule
under Rule 45 that only questions of law may be
reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari
from the CA to the SC.
What are the exceptions?
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1. Where the findings of the tribunal are grounded
on mere speculations, conjectures and there is no
basis at all;
2. There is contradiction between the evidence on
record and the findings of the administrative
tribunal;
3. Or the inference made by the administrative
authority is manifestly mistaken, GAD has been
committed;
4. Misappreciation of facts; or
5. As mentioned earlier in Fabian v Agustin, the
findings of fact are conflicting; or
6. In Section 66 of the LGC, the decision must be,
valid and legal, there must be a statement of the
facts and the law. Kung walang ganun, not even
citation of specific evidence which would be the
basis of the decision. Of course this would call for
a a judicial review;
SECTION 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (a)
The investigation of the case shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from the start thereof.
Within thirty (30) days after the end of the
investigation, the Office of the President or the
Sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in
writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the reasons for such decision. Copies of said
decision shall immediately be furnished the
respondent and all interested parties.
In the case of Bernaldo v Ombudsman, Barrita
Bernaldo was charged in the Office of the
Ombudsman for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and after due proceedings,
the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman finding
that she was guilty of this offense was suspension
for 9 months. This decision was affirmed by the
CA. The SC decided otherwise on the ground that
clearly contrary to this disposition, there is no
evidence on record to sustain such a finding. In
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
fact the SC ruled that the decision of the
Ombudsman was based on conjectures. The SC
nullified the decision rendered by the
Ombudsman where the factual findings are
premised on supposed evidence or not supported
by evidence on record. The requirement is
substantial evidence and if this requirement is
not met, this will be a basis for the court to set
aside the decision.
The basic rule we should all know that under Rule
65, factual or evidentiary matters are not basis in
a Petition for Certiorari because the basis is grave
abuse of discretion; or the act done by the
administrative tribunal or officer was without or
is in excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Alexandra Condominium
Corporation, the emission of waste matter
pollution into the Laguna Lake and this resulted
in the imposition of penalties and what the
Alexandra Condominium Corporation did was to
file a petition under Rule 65.
Was this the proper remedy? No, because there
must be taking of this petition before the court,
this can only be done if there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy available. Is there such
a remedy here? Yes, there is. It may file an MR,
an appeal before the proper Department
Secretary or before the Department. The law
created this PAB (Pollution Adjudication Board)
which is under the DENR. So the LLDA has been
placed under the DENR. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is not immediately to file a
petition, Original Action for Certiorari under Rule
65 but rather exhaust first administrative
remedies. So, dun muna sa Secretary ng DENR in
his capacity as head of the PAB. Here, the petition
of the ACC cannot be given merit because there is
no showing of grave abuse committed by LLDA
and more than that, there is a remedy available
to the aggrieved party and this was not invoked
or availed of by Alexandra Condominium
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Corporation. So the filing of the petition under
Rule 65 will not prosper.
The doctrine of assimilation of facts which
involves mixed questions of facts and law and
these are subject to judicial review. This doctrine
states that when the finding of fact is intimately
involved and dependent upon the more
important matter, a question of law, in order for
the court to resolve the higher issue which is one
of law, it may look into the evidence, the factual
setting of the case. The more important matter
here which is one of law assimilates the facts
under the doctrine of assimilation of facts.
Although the general rule here is, as we have
emphasized, factual findings must not only be
respected but given finality by the courts. The
court will not interfere. BUT if this fact is
intimately related with the question of law, there
is a need to determine this question, how to
resolve this question of law, you have to go into
the merits of the case, the factual setting of the
case, so applying this doctrine, the court is
authorized to review factual matters under this
doctrine in order to determine the more
important issue which is one of law.
In the case of Lacson v PEA (Philippine Estates
Authority), (not the Lacson we know) the
petitioners were officials from the Philippine
Estates Authority, deputy managers etc. but they
were not appointed by the President but
nonetheless, they were career officers. Upon
order of the President, they were the subject of
investigation because of the alleged commission
of graft and corruption and after the proceedings
conducted by the PAGC (Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission), the PAGC submitted its report and
recommendation to the President. The
recommendation was the dismissal of the
respondents now petitioners. This became the
decision of the PEA management by reason of the
fact that this decision was approved by the
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
President. What is the remedy therefore of the
aggrieved parties? What the petitioners did here
was to file in court this Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Is this the proper remedy?
Of course, what they did first was to file a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied. And
because of this denial of the Office of the
President, they went straight to the Supreme
Court. Is this proper? The decision of the
President may be appealed to what office? To the
Civil Service Commission under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court (since this involved the movement,
i.e. dismissal of career officers). This was not
done. Rather, the petitioners, immediately filed
their petition under Rule 65 clearly violating
these available remedies given to them under the
law such that when they went to the Supreme
Court, the matter, the decision already became
final and executory and thus the Court no longer
has the competence to review the decision by
reason of the lapse of the period for the
petitioners in this case to take the necessary
remedy. The applicable remedy was supposed to
be before the CSC but this was not done.
So you have to verify: if the decision is rendered
by the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no
need to go to the CSC. From the Ombudsman, go
to the CA under Rule 43. But if the decision is
rendered by OTHER offices, for example, any
Department in the Executive branch or even if
the Office of the President has rendered such a
decision, what is the remedy? The remedy under
Rule 43 is from the Department Secretary or from
the Office of the President to the CSC. Is there
any other remedy from the CSC? YES. To the
Court. From the CSC to the Court of Appeals. And
from the CA to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Here, clearly, this remedy was not availed of by
the aggrieved parties, the petitioners. So, from
the decision of the CSC it can be elevated to the
CA under Rule 43 Petition for Review and from
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the CSC, it can be further appealed to the SC
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45.
You should know these. The differences between
a Rule 45 Petition and a Rule 65 Petition
whenever the administrative tribunal has
rendered a decision, of course, Rule 43 and Rule
45 this has to be distinguished from Rule 65.
Rule 65 is an original action whereas Rule 45 is
not an original action. Rule 65 is a Petition
dwelling on jurisdictional errors, whether there
has been commission of GAD whereas a Rule 45
Petition is not an original action, it is a mode of
appeal, centering on the review of the judgment
or order or decision or award rendered by the
tribunal involving, as a general rule, a question of
law, unless it involves mixed question of fact and
law (assimilation doctrine) or there is error
committed.
MCQ
In judicial review of administrative decisions:
A. Courts can examine the sufficiency of evidence
and are authorized to receive additional evidence
not submitted earlier. Tama or mali? Parang di
kayo sure sa inyong answer. True or false? FALSE!
Very good! (HAHA) Parang tayong nasa kinder. :P
C. Letter C muna. (Kay B man ang answer.)
Factual Findings are accorded not only respect
but finality binding on the court so long as
supported by preponderance of evidence. Is this
statement true? FALSE. Why? Substantial
evidence. Simple lang.
D. Errors on decisions of administrative bodies
may be questioned in a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. False. Why? Errors yan. So, under
Rule? 45, yes! Susmaryosep.
B. The correct answer is B: Trial de novo is not
contemplated.
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Take note, there’s this distinction: review of
administrative decision to a higher administrative
authority v review of administrative decision to a
judicial body. In the first instance, pwede yan trial
de novo. Meaning, pag–iakyat mo yan sa
administrative agency pwede mag-conduct ng
panibagong trial, new evidence may be
submitted. Pag-dating sa korte, wala nang ganun.
No trial de novo because the review conducted
by the court is limited to evidence earlier
submitted earlier before the administrative
tribunal. There is already opportunity granted so
pag-dating sa korte, di na factual, but purely
question of law or under Rule 65 pag may grave
abuse na.
The rule here is administrative authorities do not
have the inherent power to grant criminal and
civil immunities to persons. The exception, first,
there must be conferment of this power to grant
immunity or the administrative tribunal (you
know this power is inherent in courts, but not in
administrative tribunals), unless there is authority
or express provision of law conferring the power
to the administrative tribunal to grant immunity
from criminal and civil suits. Example of such
body: the PCGG (Presidential Commission on
Good Government) under AO 1 up to 14-A. 14-A
because this law grants immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who testifies in any
conduct of investigation made by the PCGG in the
matter of the alleged ill-gotten acquisitions by
the Marcoses, cronies or associates.
The law, AO 14-A clearly mentions the power of
the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution. This has been asked (in the bar).
What about the authority of the PCGG to grant
immunity from civil prosecution? Yes, although
there is no such express provision under the AOs,
under the law of PCGG, what applies is the
general law, the Civil Code under Article 2028
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referring to the amicable settlement in civil cases
which rule is also applicable to cases of the PCGG.
Another law, RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act
particularly Section 17 which confers authority to
the Ombudsman to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to any person who is essential to the
successful prosecution of the case the
Ombudsman may file against any public officer.
Of course there are conditions which you ought
to know before the grant of this immunity.
What is the three-fold responsibility of public
officers? Very easy. Civil, criminal and
administrative. These remedies exist
independently of the other. One is not dependent
upon the other. Whenever there is a conclusion
reached in one remedy, it will not be res judicata
on the other. A public official may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for any
violation of duty or the wrongful act or omission
of such public officer. These remedies may be
invoked separately, simultaneously, alternately or
successively. Meaning, the general rule is,
administrative cases are independent from
criminal cases.
Is there an exception? Yes, if the law itself
prescribes that there should be prior
administrative determination before a criminal
action may be resorted to. But the general rule,
in the absence of such provision of rule, the GR
here is that administrative cases are independent
from criminal cases and vice-versa.
Exceptions where the law itself declares the need
for prior final administrative determination: In
prosecution of unfair labor practice under the
Labor Code. No criminal prosecution for ULP can
be filed without first making a determination in
the administrative proceeding. There must be a
final judgment in a previous administrative
proceeding. But in the absence of such law,
paminsan-minsan lang yan, hiwalay talaga yan.
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
In the case of Chua v Ang, where the petitioner
filed a criminal case against the developer of a
real estate because of violation of PD 957 as
amended by PD 1344, what is this law all about?
Yung the competence of the HLURB, unsound
real estate business practices, failure of the
contractor to provide for the basic necessities.
There was failure here on the part of the
developer to construct and deliver to the
petitioner the condominium unit. So, there was
this supposed violation criminal in nature and the
petitioner filed the case before the prosecutor’s
office. But what the prosecutor’s office did was to
dismiss the criminal on the ground that there
should be prior determination, there should be a
finding of administrative liability before the
criminal case may be allowed.
Is this correct? No. because the law, PD 957 as
amended by PD 1344 never mentions any mode
of this nature that there should be prior
administrative determination. And so clearly, the
city prosecutor was wrong. There is no law
requiring that there should be prior
administrative determination for the criminal suit
to prosper. Where the law is silent on this matter,
what should be adopted? The fundamental rule
that is that the administrative case is
independent form the criminal action.
This was already asked in the bar: Hierarchy of
quantum of evidence. Of course the highest is
criminal case: proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Followed by clear and convincing
evidence; next in line is preponderance of
evidence and lastly, the lowest: substantial
evidence in administrative cases.
In the case of Gatchalian Talents Pool v
Mendoza, wag sana kayon gumaya kay Atty.
Mendoza. Atty. Mendoza, a lawyer defrauded
this Gatchalian Talents Pool. GTP was the losing
party in a POEA case but there was lack of full
disclosure of Atty. Mendoza declaring that there
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 Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013

is still an appeal to be taken from the decision administrative case? In fact here, he was
rendered by the POEA. And so for this purpose, dismissed by the Ombudsman he went to the
Atty. Mendoza asked the amount of $2,555.00 as Court and alleged that because of the dismissal of
the supposed bond for the filing of the petition. the criminal case, the administrative case should
But actually the decision already became final likewise be dismissed. Of course the
and so he pocketed the amount. And so the client requirements are different in those cases. In the
filed a disbarment case against Mendoza which is criminal case, it simply means that there is
administrative in nature as well as a criminal case absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt but it
for estafa. But unfortunately, the trial court does not mean that there is no more evidence to
dismissed the criminal case for estafa filed pin down the respondent.
against Mendoza. And because of the dismissal,
In criminal cases, you have prescription of
Mendoza argued that the administrative case
offenses. The RPC provides for that. Is there such
should also be dismissed because of the dismissal
a similar concept in administrative law? In
of the case.
administrative law, administrative cases do not
Is this contention correct? Of course not. A prescribe.
criminal prosecution will not constitute a
The case of Guiang (?) v Sunga, Guiang a woman
prejudicial question even if the same facts are
government employee in the court of appeals
attendant in the administrative proceedings.
was administratively charged because she had an
Regardless of the results in either case, it will not
illicit affair with a co-employee of the court of
have any bearing on the other because of the
appeals. She argued that she should not anymore
different requirements of evidence, the quantum
be sanctioned because this was a thing of the
of evidence is different in administrative cases
past. Tapos na yan. Matagal na, years back. But
and different likewise in criminal cases. It simply
nonetheless, the courts here took cognizance of
means that if the criminal case is dismissed, the
this case stating that administrative offenses did
requirement proof of guilt beyond reasonable
not prescribe. The stigma of this immorality still
doubt has not been established. Whereas we
attaches. Here the SC instead of imposing a more
have the lower kind of evidence in administrative
serious penalty simply imposed the fine of 10T
cases, the required evidence is simply substantial
against her. Administrative offenses do not
evidence.
prescribe.
In the case of Ocampo v Ombudsman, Ocampo,
In the case of Dr. Melendres, Executive Director
an employee of the National Irrigation Authority
of the Lung Centre v Pasig, it is possible, take
who received the amount of $9,600.00 as training
note, that the criminal cases are filed in another
fee but he did not remit this amount to the
administrative tribunal whereas the
agency so he malversed this amount so
administrative charges are in a different tribunal.
administrative cases as well as criminal cases for
For example, in this case, the administrative
falsification and estafa were filed against him
charges against Dr. Melendres were filed before
before the regular courts and administrative
the PAGC under the Office of the president
cases before the Ombudsman for dishonesty,
whereas the criminal cases were filed before the
grave misconduct. And again the criminal case
Office of the Ombudsman. Here, the SC ruled that
was dismissed by the court. Does this mean that
the dismissal of these criminal cases either by the
the Ombudsman has to dismiss the
Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman will not result
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 Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013

in the dismissal of the administrative case in the committee were charged. Take note here, the
absolution or acquittal of the petitioner from the alleged act constituting the administrative
administrative charges filed against him before offense or even the criminal case happened in
the PAGC. He was sanctioned by the PAGC. 1992 and it was only in 1996 that this complaint,
anonymous at that, was filed before the
There may be a provision of law giving the power
Ombudsman against De Sahagun. What is the
to the administrative tribunal not to investigate
effect of such filing of an anonymous complaint?
anymore the administrative offense but take note
It only commences the fact finding investigation.
in the light of what we mentioned earlier that
It is not yet the formal investigation. It was only
administrative offenses do not prescribe, such
in September of 2000 that the fact finding
provision as provided by law simply refers to the
investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman issued
discretion exercised by the administrative
this report and information for the filing of formal
authority whether or not to still proceed with
charges against De Sahagun et al. That was more
the investigation, to pursue the administrative
than 7 years after the commission and it was only
charge. So a matter of discretion.
after a few years that the administrative
Under Sec 20 of the Ombudsman Act, the proceeding was promulgated and the decision
Ombudsman may no longer conduct the rendered against De Sahagun adverse to them.
necessary investigation of an act complained of if Clearly here there was a long lapse of time from
the complaint was filed after or more than the the appealing of the act complained of to the
year from the occurrence of the act complained investigation not yet even formal to the
of. It does not mean that under this provision, the disposition of the administrative case. Here, there
ombudsman is duty bound NOT to investigate is NO prescription.
anymore. It is an exercise of sound judgment,
What is the reason of the non-application of the
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman
prescription concept? Because the object of
whether to conduct the investigation. It may do
administrative proceedings is not the punishment
so even after the lapse of so many years. More
of the public official but rather the need to
than 1 year. That is at the option of the
preserve the integrity of the public service, the
Ombudsman. This provision is not mandatory but
improvement of public service and the need to
rather directory, an exercise of discretion on the
preserve the public face and confidence in the
part of the Ombudsman, whether to still proceed
bureaucracy. Unlike in criminal cases, because
with the investigation. It has nothing to do with
the liability there is directly applied on the public
prescription of offenses.
officer like imprisonment and the accessory
A good illustration of what we have mentioned a penalties.
while ago is the case of Ombudsman v De
What is the effect on an administrative case upon
Sahagun. Sahagun in his capacity as the chair of
the happening of an event subsequent to the
the Bids and Awards Committee of the
filing of the administrative charge against the
Intramuros Administration, a government entity.
public officer? Let us say, after such filing,
This has relation to the giving of a award without
namatay yung respondent or he was able to
public bidding of a video event. Etong public
retire. So does it mean that the case should
bidding, required sa Procurement Act. But this
already be dismissed by reason of the fact that he
was not complied with. So, this guy with the
is no longer in government service? No. The rule
other members of the bids and awards
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez 4 Manresa

here is the death or retirement of the public
officer from service does not prevent the finding
of administrative liability and the imposition of
the proper penalty because he is answerable to
all such offense.
We have mentioned so many times, jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint is acquired at
the time of the filing, upon taking cognizance by
the administrative complaint, upon filing of the
complaint and this is not lost because of
subsequent events such as the death or
retirement during the pendency of the
administrative case. Here, the administrative
tribunal continues to retain jurisdiction in order
to pronounce the respondent either guilty if
there is evidence or the need to vindicate his
name to acquit him in the administrative case.
In the case of Ombudsman v Deputy Director
(Andutan) (?) the one stop shop of the
Department of Finance. What happened here
was that before the filing of the charges against
Andutan et al, they were officers of a Bureau
under the Department of Finance. A
memorandum was issued by Executive Secretary
Zamora for them to enter their resignation. They
were not career officers. They complied. It was
only when they were no longer in service that
they were charged criminally and
administratively. This pertains to alleged illegal
transfer of tax credit certificates, tax scam cases.
The prevailing doctrine is that the administrative
authority or jurisdiction can no longer be
exercised by the administrative tribunal, in this
case, the Ombudsman, if the public officer is
already separated from the service prior to the
filing of the charge. Take note, PRIOR to the filing
of the case. The general rule, dapat mauna yung
separation mo. If so, as a rule, you can no longer
be administratively charged. The rule would be
different if kinasuhan ka and subsequently you
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separate yourself from the public service. That is
a different scenario.
Here, in the case of Andutan, what happened
here was that the respondents Andutan et al
were no longer connected with the government
service at the time the administrative and
criminal cases were filed. Of course, the criminal
case will subsist and may prosper. What about
the administrative cases? Depende. If at the time
of the filing you are no longer with the
government service, the administrative case will
no longer prosper. But that is the general rule.
There is also an exception to that rule. On the
other hand if the separation from the service
came after the filing of course the rule here is the
administrative tribunal continues to acquire
jurisdiction and has to decide the case.
Exception: Bacano (?) v Nasap. Etong si Ester
Bacano was the cashier of the Provincial
Treasurer’s Office in the province of Benguet and
she was involved in this shortage upon audit. She
was found to have a shortage in here
accountabilities of more than 1.4 million and she
was ordered to explain why not formal charge
should be filed against her. But 4 days PRIOR to
the issuance of said notice for her to explain, she
filed her certificate of candidacy! What is the
effect of the filing a certificate of candidacy under
Section 66 of the OEC? Automatically resigned ka
na. Sabi nya, Yehey! Wala na ako from service!
The exception here is if it was done in bad faith;
if the separation was made in bad faith. Clearly in
this case, there was bad faith because she
anticipated the filing of formal charges against
her. That was a precursor that the filing of this
requirement, explained why she should not be
formally charged, that is the procedure in the civil
service law, the need for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation in order to determine a
prima facie case before a formal charge may be
issued. So she anticipated this. So the exception is
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when the public offer resigned in BAD FAITH or
the resignation was done in anticipation of the
filing of charges against her. This case is the
exception to the rule.
Now, in so many cases especially those coming
from the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) magfafile sila ng kaso, then
subsequently they issue an affidavit of desistance
or the withdrawal of the complaint. What does
this mean? Does this have any effect on the
charge?
The withdrawal of the complaint or the
desistance by the party complainant will NOT
automatically result in the dismissal of the
administrative case because the rule here is if you
file an administrative case, the State has a higher
stake in this charge. You are merely an informant,
a witness because the objective here is to
preserve the integrity of the public service. This
rule applies if there is sufficient evidence to
justify or to support the charge. But of course,
the rule would be different if it is only through
the testimony of the complainant that the case
may prosper and therefore the tribunal will no
longer have an option except to dismiss. But the
general rule is even if you execute an affidavit of
desistance, it does not mean that the case you
filed will already be dismissed. The reason here is
that the tribunal has an interest apart from the
complainant. This tribunal represents the State,
perhaps through the COA or the Office of the
Ombudsman, to determine the truth and to
determine the proper imposition of sanctions
against the employee including the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of benefits, retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification. This is
important. Even if the public officer is no longer
in service, the tribunal may impose perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
What is the rule on anonymous complaints?
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It will not justify the outright dismissal of this
complaint where the allegations of this
anonymous complaint can be verified and
established by competent evidence. Of course we
have mentioned so many times that it triggers
the fact finding investigation if there is such
evidence, if there are sufficient leads.
What is the doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation?
This applies only to ELECTIVE officials. It simply
means that the elective official can no longer be
subject to disciplinary action for prior misconduct
or any act or offense committed during a prior
term. Why? Because the two terms are NOT a
continuation. The succeeding term is not a
continuation of the prior term of office. It is a
separate term. If you commit or violate a law and
you are answerable administratively, the State no
longer has the power to sanction you
administratively by reason of the lapse of the
term of office as provided under the law. The
reason here is if this guy is again re-elected gaya
ng nangyayari sa bayan natin, the bad guys
always get re-elected, and so this simply means
that the doctrine of forgiveness also known as
the Aguinaldo doctrine, the doctrine of
condonation, applies. And kasalanan ng tao eh.
Pinatawad na xa nga taong bayan by electing him
to public office. In the other hand, if he does not
get re-elected, penalty na yan. He has been
sanctioned by the people by not electing him to
public office. Take note, this is NOT applicable to
appointive officers but rather to elective officials
seeking re-election.
In Garcia v Mojica, the case here of Garcia of
Cebu. A few days before the election is that the
Mayor of Cebu entered into a contract negotiated
without public bidding in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices act, and of course, an
act or omission of a public officer gives rise to
administrative and criminal liabilities. And so,
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charges were filed, administrative and criminal.
Sabi ng Supreme Court, only the criminal case will
prosper or will be looked into but not the
administrative case because of expiration of the
term. 4 days before the end of the term of Mayor
Garcia, entered illegally into these negotiated
agreements and his term expired thereafter.
In the case of Ombusdman v Maricar Torres, this
Maricar Torres was the executive assistant of her
father. Her father was a councilor in Malabon
City. And so during her tenure as such assistant of
her father councilor, she was charged allegedly
for falsifying her daily time records before the
Office of the Ombudsman. She claimed that since
she ran for elective office as councilor, and she
won, and so applying this doctrine, she should no
longer be administratively charged nor
sanctioned. Is this contention proper? NO.
Because she was an appointive officer, NOT an
elective officer so the doctrine cannot benefit the
appointive officer seeking elective office. But
nonetheless, the Ombudsman still dismissed the
administrative case because of the failure to
produce the daily time records by the
complainant.
Same principle was applied in the case of
Salumbides (?) v Ombudsman, the condonation
by the electorate of the prior administrative
infractions. Violations committed by the re-
elected official cannot be extended to re-
appointed con-terminus employees. Whenever
the term of office of an elective official ends,
together with the expiration of his term, the
other appointive employees who were appointed
on the basis of confidence, are also terminated.
Co-terminus yan. So they have no more business
in office. Pag ma-tapos na yung termino ng
superior nyang elective official, the other co-
terminus elective officers likewise have to end
their term. And so because of such fact, they
claim that they should no longer be sanctioned.
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Of course this principle is NOT applicable to
appointive officers more so these co-terminus
appointive officials. There is here no violation of
the condonation doctrine.
Moreover, is this a violation of the equal
protection of the law? Kasi if ganun sa elective
official, dapat din ganun ang principle sa
appointive officials. Right to equal protection?
The situation is totally different because in the
case of elective officials, they have the mandate
of the people electing them. There is no
disenfranchisement of the electorate in the case
of appointive co-terminus employees. They
cannot claim that they have the mandate of the
electorate unlike the elective officials. Otherwise,
if the rule would be different, lahat na lang, wala
nang makasuhan.
JULY 16
The civil service law as well as the revised
administrative code it provides that appeals shall
be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision. In the earlier ruling of the court in
Paredes vs CSC, the SC ruled that the aggrieved
party who has the right to appeal the decision is
the government officer. The issue here is whether
or not an appeal may still be taken from a
decision extenuating the respondent more so on
appeal. Take note that section 39 should be read
in relation to section 37. Section 37 of PD 87
provides that the Commission shall have
appellate authority over all administrative and
disciplinary cases. So the remedy of the aggrieved
party is from the decision of the department and
to the civil service commission and from the
decision the civil service commission to the court
of appeals. So under section 37 the civil service
commission decides on appeal on disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty
suspending the officer for more than 30 days or a
fine in amount not exceeding 30 day salary or
4 Manresa

their penalty is demotion or dismissal of such
employee from the public service.
Take note. In all other cases, meaning if the
decision imposes the penalty of suspension of 30
days or less or even the imposition of a fine
equivalent to a salary of 1 month or less the law
provides that such a decision is already final and
executor. But in all these cases where appeal is
allowed, it should be lodged before the civil
service commission. In the case of civil service
commission vs. dacoycoy where the CSC in the
administrative case against school administrator
dacoycoy imposed, after due proceedings, the
penalty of dismissal from the service or violation
of the ______ rule against dacoycoy. Here, the
aggrieved party went to the court of appeals,
where it reversed the judgment rendered by the
CSC. The SC ruled that the aggrieved party here is
certainly the CSC because under the Constitution,
it has the mandate to uphold the integrity of the
CS system. The aggrieved party here cannot be
the respondent because precisely on appeal, he
was exonerated by the Court of Appeals. Because
of this ruling, the SC abandoned its earlier rulings
that the CS Law as well as the Revised
Administrative Code does not _____ review on
the decisions exonerating public officials from
administrative charges.
The decision of the CSC may still be the subject of
appeal under Rule 43, Petition for review. In the
case of OMB vs City Treasurer Samaniego, the
Court of Appeals on the motion of the OMB to
intervene in a case. Theres an earlier
administrative case decided against a chief executives? Of course in the news lately is…
government officer CT Samaniego. The SC ruled
that the OMB is the aggrieved party it has clear
legal interest to intervene in the petition for
review on certiorari brought out before the court
under Rule 43.
If you recall, we have discussed the concept of res
judicata. This may apply in cases where there is
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
already an existence of litis pendentia or by
reason of the fact that a decision has already
been rendered in one forum and that the same
cause is now being raised before another forum
in order to obtain a different ruling. The rule, of
course, is that the decision of the administrative
agency upon the finality of such decision has a
binding effect of a final judgment within the
ambit of the res judicata principle.
So what are the exceptions to this rule, this res
judicata may not apply? Of course when there
are: (1) supervening events making it imperative
to modify a final judgment to harmonize it with
prevailing circumstances. For example the
decision is not __________ with the evidence on
record. (2) the application of this principle would
mean sacrificing justice to technicality or (3) the
parties themselves waived this principle or do not
timely raise this as a matter of defense and (4) in
the case of citizenship where this issue is raised
by the party.
Lets discuss some of the more important
administrative organizations of government.
The Philippine National Police. The basis for the
creation of the PNP is article 16 section 6 of the
constitution. “the state shall establish and
maintain one police force, national in scope and
civilian in character to be administered and
controlled by the national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units
in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
So what is, therefore, the authority of the local
our own mayor in light of what happened here in
claveria. Is it within the authority of the local
chief executive? Yes. Because under the law RA
8551, the local chief executive exercises
operational control and supervision of units and
elements of the PNP. So what does this mean the
authority of the local chief executive is one of
4 Manresa

operational control and supervision? It is the
power of the local chief executive to employ and
deploy the elements of police, in police functions
such as crime prevention, traffic control and
police investigation.
In what instances may there be no control by the
local chief executive? 30 days prior and 30 days
after the election. So that is the exception to the
rule. The rule here is the authority of this local
chief executive is one of operational control and
supervision. The power of the mayor to deploy
the police resources.
So what are the authority of the NAPOLCOM? It is
one of administrative control and supervision
which is different from operational control and
supervision. In the bar, the question asked was
about the function given to the armed forces of
the Philippines to act as the protector of the
people. Now is this mandate equally applicable to
the PNP? Take note under this law RA 8551, the
________ under which the PNP has been
attached is only given a supporting role. The main
role in matters pertaining to the suppression of
insurgency belongs to the armed forces of the
Philippines. The authority of the PNP is
information gathering and police investigation
but nonetheless the exception here is on the
basis of the order of the chief executive, the
president of the Philippines calling on the PNP to
play a supporting role to AFP in combat
operations in matters pertaining to insurgency.
In the law, RA 8551, it provides for the creation of
the People’s Law Enforcement Board. It has the
power to take cognizance of citizen’s complaints.
Here, the authority of the PLEB in administrative
cases against members of the PNP after due
proceedings. The board has the power to dismiss
or suspend the members of the PNP. This
authority is concurrent with the authority of the
PNP chief and the regional directors of the PNP.
So it’s a case of concurrent jurisdiction over
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
administrative cases involving the members of
the PNP.
Take note of this creation this national appellate
board and regional appellate board which are
both appellate machineries belonging to the
NAPOLCOM. So it is erroneous to make appeal
from the NAP or the RAB to the NAPOLCOM
because the NAP and the RAB are the appellate
machineries of the NAPOLCOM itself. So what
should be the remedy from a decision rendered
by PLEB? Under the law, the decision of the PLEB
the basis of which is the citizen’s complaint, shall
be appealable to the RAB, whereas the decision
the chief of the PNP is appealable to the NAB and
from such board an appeal may be taken to the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government and not the NAPOLCOM.
Because these courts are part of the integral
machineries of the NAPOLCOM. From the
decision of the Secretary of the DILG, where
should it be taken? Of course applying again the
principle of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the appeal may be
further taken to the CSC, in accordance with the
provisions of the CS Law and Revised
Administrative Code.
Let me mention that prior to the 87 Constitution,
you know that then integrated national police
were not subject to the civil courts. Other words
there was fusion of the AFP and the Integrated
National Police or Municipal Constabulary such
that offenses, crimes committed by the officers of
the then Integrated National Police were not
brought before the Civil Courts but rather on the
basis of the provisions of CA 408 the court
marshal law. Court marshal is not part of our
judicial system, it is part of the executive branch
of government. And so because of the 87
Constitution there is delineation now. The
members of the PNP are civilian and therefore
whenever they are involved in cases in violation
4 Manresa

of the revised penal code or special penal laws,
they shall be brought not before the courts
marshal but before the regular courts. So courts
marshal are not judicial courts but are
instrumentalities of the executive branch
government.
What about the authority to appoint the local
chief of police? In our case, Dela Rosa. Who has
the power to appoint the police chief, city or
provincial police chief? The authority of course is
vested under the law the local chief executive but
nonetheless such authority is limited in a sense
that he must rely on the list submitted to him by
the regional police director. The regional police
director has the authority to name the 5 eligibles
for the position of city police chief. In the case of
the appointment to the regional police chief, the
regional police director has to submit 3 names
and these shall be from the pool of eligible
officers also screened by the senior officers of the
_________ and selection board in camp crame.
So the authority here is to select one or among
the list.
In the case of Dayap vs RTC, the mayor of Cebu
filed a case in court to compel the inclusion of
Inspector Andres Sarmiento for him to appoint as
police chief. The SC ruled that the authority of
the mayor is limited. He has to select from among
the names submitted to him by the regional
police director. So the regional police director
cannot be compelled to include a name because
that involves the exercise of discretion on the
part of the police director.
What is the law applicable to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines? You have RA 7055. An act
strengthening civilian supremacy over military by
returning to civil courts the jurisdiction over
certain offenses involving not only AFP members,
but also CAFGU. What is the CAFGU? Citizen
Armed Force Geographical Unit. Yes. Anybody is a
CAFGU here? So the AFP as well as the members
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
of the CAFGU are subject to this law. The need to
return _______ … the authority to try certain
offenses involving the members of the AFP. What
is the rule? There is in fact a delegation of the
authority here between the court marshal under
CA 408 pertaining to office-connected (service-
connected siguro) offenses committed by the
members of the armed forces as well as offenses
committed under the RPC and special penal laws.
So the General Rule here is that these officers,
AFP and other individuals subject to military law
committing crimes penalized under the RPC,
special criminal laws or even local ordinances are
to be tried by the proper civil court.
What is the exception to this rule? The exception
here if there is determination before arraignment
by the court that the offense committed by the
AFP member is service-connected. When do we
say that the offense is service-connected? When
it is any of the offenses mentioned in the articles
of war (CA 408). So where the civil court makes a
determination before arraignment of the accused
member of the AFP that the offense is service-
connected, then the offender should be filed to
the court marshal.
Exception to the exception. Again before
arraignment, the president, in the interest of
justice, directs that such a crime be tried by the
proper civil court.
What are these service-connected offenses?
These are defined and enumerated in the Articles
of War CA 408. Violations of this Articles are
triable by the court marshal. So there is here a
distinction, delineation of jurisdiction between
the military court and the civil court over cases
involving military officers or personnel. The
reason for this delineation is the need to achieve
the highest form of discipline in order to insure
the highest degree of military efficiency.
4 Manresa

So in the case of Gonzales vs Abaya, where the
petitioners were charged with coup de etat. Now
there was in fact an order issued by the RTC, that
handled the cases filed against petitioners, to the
effect that the charges filed against them in
court, the court marshal are not service
connected and therefore they are absorbed(?) in
the crime of coup de etat and therefore these
offenses should be tried by the RTC. The SC ruled
that such an order is null and void. Here the
petitioners were charged in connection with the
act committed, coup de etat, under the RPC and
this in fact is a violation of article 96 of the
Articles of War. The violation of their solemn oath
to defend the constitution and the duly
constituted authorities. That’s putting the
suspect to the military institution which clearly is
service connected.
Is it possible for the military officer to be tried
before both the court marshal and the civil court?
Yes, if it is being charged before the civil court for
violation of any of the crimes under the revised
penal code such as coup de etat and such an
offense is also service-connected, a violation of
the articles of war. Take note that the court
marshal has to its objective the dismissal of the
military officer from the service.
The OSG, the creation of this agency, this office of
government is under PD 478 as well as Book 4 of
the Revised Administrative Code EO 292.
The mandate given under the law to the SG is
that he acts as the lawyer of the government
authorities or agencies including government
owned and controlled corporations with or
without a charter and officials. So here he
represents the public officer in all proceedings
whether civil, criminal or administrative. Such
proceedings ought to arise from the discharge of
official functions by the public officer. So the rule
here is any action taken or initiated in the name
the republic of the Philippines or any of its
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Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
instrumentalities or agencies should be done by
the SG otherwise there is basis for the summary
dismissal of such petition filed without the
participation of intervention of the SG. So
remember the petition is filed in the name of the
Republic or any of its intrumentalities, it should
be initiated, should be filed with the office of the
SG.
What are the exceptions to this rule? Of course
we mentioned earlier that the OSG is the lawyer
of government offices and it is possible that there
may be conflict involving 2 or more government
offices. One government office takes a position
contrary to the position taken by the other. So
the SG has to take a side. Such position taken in
favor of one government office may be adverse
to another. So that is one exception. (1) when the
government office is adversely affected by the
adverse position taken by the OSG. If you recall
the case of Orbos vs CSC, in the matter of the
organization effected by petitioner Orbos in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communication during the
time of Corazon Aquino. Here there was an order
issued by the CSC for the appointment of these
employees who invested the appointments
issued by Orbos. The OSG took the side of the
DOTC and the position is certainly adverse to the
CSC. So if the government office still believes in
the merits of its case that its position is not the
same position taken by the OSG it has to
represent itself through its in-house lawyers.
Second exception on the basis of the provision of
law, (2) where the authority is given under the
law for the SG to deputize legal counsels to
government offices to represent him in the cases
involving their respective offices. Under Section
35 of Book 4 of the Revised Administrative Code.
I mentioned a while ago that the SG may
represent a public officer in these proceedings,
some proceedings arise from the officers acts in
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his official capacity. What is the exception? (1) if
the public officer is being charged criminally.
Certainly the SG cannot represent the public
officer because the state can never be author of a
wrongful act. (2) the SG cannot represent the
public officer in civil cases for damages arising
from the commission of felonies. Because any
judgment rendered against the public officer, say
monetary board, is adjudged against the
respondent public officer, it is the sole liability of
the public officer and not the government or any
of its agencies. So here in this cases, the SG
cannot represent the public officer.
In Dir. Pascual vs Judge Beltran, a suit was filed, a
civil suit for damages was filed by employee
Raymundo against her boss, the Regional Director
of the Telecommunication office, TELECOM. She
made mention in the suit the fact that Pascual is
the TELECOM director, is in itself sufficient basis
to transform the case as one filed against the
public officer in his official capacity. Clearly there
is no basis here for the OSG to represent Dir.
Pascual in this suit for damages filed by
Raymundo before the Regional Trial Court. So it
does not transform the action into one filed
against a public officer in his official capacity.
In Urbano vs Chavez, in the matter of the
institution of a graft charge against SG Chavez. At
the time of Corazon Aquino, Chavez was
represented by OSG. The SC ruled that in no case
may the OSG represent the public officer charged
with the commission of graft before any tribunal
or court. In the same manner in the case of CO vs
Chavez where a civil suit for damages was filed
because of alleged defamation committed by
Chavez in an interview with the Business World
and made insinuations against the petitioner CO.
The SC ruled that the OSG cannot represent
Chavez in this case against him.
I mentioned a while ago that many petitions filed
in behalf of the Rp of the Phils. there should be
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intervention by OSG. We have here the case of
Republic vs Desierto as an exception to this rule.
What happened here was that the PCGG had filed
cases against Coguangco et al before the office of
the OMB and subsequently the OMB dismissed
the cases filed by the PCGG. PCGG was not
satisfied, they felt that there was arbitrariness
committed by the OMB dismissing the case filed
against Coguangco. PCGG filed a petition under
Rule 65 for certiorari. In such petition on behalf
of the Republic should have been lodged by the
office of the OSG, but nonetheless here the SC
adopted liberality because according the SC
whatever defect in the filing of this petition
without the intervention of the SG was cured
when in the Consolidated Reply the OSG signed
as co-counsel for the Republic of the Philippines.
So there was ratification of whatever defect that
occurred in the filing of the petition.
Under the Constitution, the OMB has the
authority to act promptly on complaint filed in
any manner against any public officer when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, improper or
unjust. So broad. So the OMB is given the
authority to act as protector of the people so it
must take cognizance of any complaint filed from
any Citizen against any action or inaction of the
public officer.
In Tatad vs Sandiganbayan, in the matter of
alleged undue delay in the disposition _____ then
followed by the predecessor of the OMB when
the case was filed for failure on the part of Tatad
to comply with the requirements under the law
_____ (ambot). Here the SC ruled that gross
violation of Tatad’s right to due process and the
right to speedy disposition of cases. The cases
were before the Sandiganbayan were ordered
dismissed by the SC.
Same case in Angchangco vs OMB, you here the
deputy sheriff, despite several follow-ups, took 6
years for the OMB to decide. Then the case was
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finally decided before the Sandiganbayan. The SC
ordered the dismissal because there was
violation by OMB of the right to speedy
disposition of cases.
If you recall one important principle that there is
no prescription of administrative offenses and so
here the case of OMB vs Jurado, where there was
the filing of administrative charges against an
employee of customs for an act committed in
1992 but it was only year after that a formal
complaint was initiated by the fact finding
bureau. Between 1992 and 1997, there was a
conduct of fact finding investigation. It was only
in 1997 that he was formally charged and
ordered to submit his answer. It was only in 1999
that a decision adversely was rendered imposing
the penalty of 6 month suspension. Was there
violation of due process? The SC ruled, No. No
violation of due process because in the interim
from the time of the occurrence in 1992 up to the
time of the supposed filing of the admin case
against him in 1997, he was not yet subjected
into formal investigation. What happened was
that the OMB was still conducting a fact finding
investigation.
The process of fact finding investigation, the
public officer is not yet considered a respondent.
He is merely a subject of investigation.
The authority over all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by any
public officer during his tenure of office is clear in
the case of Uy vs OMB. Because in the early ruling
of the SC this case was that the authority of the
OMB was only to investigate administrative cases
before sandiganbayan. The authority as provided
under the Constitution is disciplinary is quite
absolute. And so it is empowered to conduct
investigation and prosecute all kinds of criminal
cases involving public officers and employees not
only those within the authority of the
sandiganbayan but also those within the
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
competence of the regular courts, whether MTC
or RTC, whether office related or non office
related. But there are rules pertaining to the
handling of cases by the DOJ and the OMB.
Is there a conflict here between the powers,
authorities vested under the law to the DOJ and
the OMB? No. Because they both have
concurrent jurisdiction. This power of the OMB is
shared with the DOJ. Recall the case of Sanchez
vs Demetrio. The mayor was the charged with
______ in the bidding. The municipal mayor
claim that I am the municipal mayor and the OMB
should be investigating me, not DOJ. The SC ruled
that this case is of concurrent jurisdiction. More
so, you don’t have to be a public officer to
commit these crimes.
In the case of Honasan vs DOJ Panel, again
Honasan at the time was charge with coup de
etat under the RPC and was investigated by
special panel created by the DOJ Secretary. He
claimed that he is a high ranking officer with
salary grade 31 and therefore it should be the
OMB not the DOJ. _______ . Under the law, it
should be the OMB that takes primary authority
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The
DOJ could not be prevented from conducting the
preliminary investigation even if the case falls
under the exclusive authority of the
Sandiganbayan. The authority of the OMB is
primary. Meaning, the OMB in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, may take over the
investigation at any stage.
In the case of Orcullo vs Gervacio, Davao City
case. Councilor Nenita Orcullo was charged by a
certain _______ for unpaid wages. According to
Morales, the complainant, this constitutes a
violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices act
because of the failure to pay the salaries. The SC
ruled, a money claim against a public officer is
within the authority of the court and not the
OMB. If the money claim is against the
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government, therefore it should be submitted for
the city council. Why is there such a need to such
submission to the city council? In order for the
city council to make appropriation for such a
claim.
You have here the memorandum of agreement
between the OMB and the DOJ dated March 29,
2012 modifying or amending the earlier circular
regarding these offices. Take note again,
concurrent jurisdiction but nonetheless what is
important here is the control of the OMB is only
over criminal cases committed by high ranking
officers even those in conspiracy with high
ranking officers and these cases are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. Office related offenses
committed by these officials. So the OMB
exercises primary jurisdiction.
What about other cases? The law recognizes the
concurrent jurisdiction over these cases between
these two offices. Let’s say a criminal case is filed
before the DOJ prosecutor against a public
officer, because it is a case of concurrent
jurisdiction, the DOJ can already proceed and
decide the case without even the approval of the
OMB. In the same manner that if the case of filed
before the OMB, it has the option of whether in
referring or allowing the DOJ to conduct the
preliminary investigation. Or if the OMB itself
may conduct the investigation and proceed to
determine whether the case ought to be filed to
the court or not. Even in those cases where it is
the OMB that conducted the preliminary
investigation, it is still referred to the DOJ for
prosecution of the case. And whatever, that once
there is referral of this case to be filed before the
court through the DOJ prosecutor, therefore that
case so filed shall now be under the full control of
the DOJ, even without the participation of the
office of the OMB. Know that the OMB will only
insist of taking cognizance of cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. So Primary Jurisdiction yan.
Gil Garcia II Daryl Ritchie Valdez
Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013
Under the MOA, the OMB will have
“primary jurisdiction in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and inquest
proceedings over complaints for crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”
Under Sec. 4 of RA 8249, among the cases
over which the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction are the following: “I) Violations of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); II)RA
1379 (Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Wealth);
III)Crimes by public officers or employees
embraced in Ch. II, Sec. 2 Title VII, Bk. II of the
Revised Penal code (Crimes committed by Public
Officers) namely : Direct Bribery, Indirect Bribery,
Qualified Bribery, Corruption of Public Officials;
IV) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed in
relation to their office by the public officials and
employees mentioned above” and cases involving
government officials and employees with Salary
Grade 27 or higher for a)Violation of RA 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards)
b)Violation of RA 7080 (The Plunder Law)
c)Violation of RA 7659 (The Heinous Crime Law)
d) RA 9160 (Violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering Law when committed by a public
officer) e) PD 46 (Prohibition Against Gift-Giving)
and f)PD 749(law granting immunity to bribe-
givers who voluntarily gives information).
It said that when complaints involving the
above-mentioned cases were filed before the
DOJ, the same shall immediately be endorsed to
the OMB.
The two officials also agreed that the OMB
and the DOJ shall have concurrent jurisdiction
over cases involving public officials falling outside
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, “the office where such complaint is
filed for preliminary investigation shall acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint to the exclusion of
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 Administrative Law Transcribed Lectures 2013

the other”. (sa net ni gikan. Dili klaro ang gina answer to the criminal charge. Take note a
ingon ni sir) criminal case filed against him before the OMB.
Here the SC ruled that when a criminal case
We mentioned a while ago the mandate applies
against the judge arises from the discharge of his
to all public officers and employees. What are the
official duties as such judge, the OMB ought to
excretions? Who are not subject to the authority,
refer to the authority, must respect the authority
take note the administrative authority of the
of the SC because the SC was made prior to the
OMB? Under Article 11 Sec. 2 of the Constitution
determination whether the judge had acted
pertaining to (1) impeachable officials. Who are
within the scope of his administrative duties.
the impeachable officials? (a) The president, (b)
vice president, (c) members of the SC, (d) TO BE CONTINUED… kulang pa ni gamay mga 40
members of the constitutional commissions, (e) or 35 mins.
and the Ombudsman. So these are the
impeachable officials.

In Re: Raul Gonzales, there was such a complaint

filed before the office of the _______ (naputol.
Dunno why. sori) Impeachable Officials have to
be impeached before a case may be filed against
them.

(2) Members of congress. Why? Because the

constitution itself provides under Article 6
Section 16 the house of congress shall have the
power to discipline its members by a vote, the
concurrence of 2/3s of all members to suspend
for good such a member. Or where the
respondent is a (3) member of the Judiciary, an
employee of the judiciary from the highest to the
lowest rank. So many cases here. Maceda vs
Vasquez, Caoibes vs Alumbres, these parties here
were both judges, nagsuntukan silang dalawa
over a piece of wood. So the aggrieved party who
got a black eye filed this administrative case
against the other party to the OMB. The
Ombudsman was directed by the SC, “you have
no authority to take cognizance of this case”.

In Maceda vs Vasquez, judge maceda signed a

certificate of service declaring that he had no
pending cases. But in he still had pending cases.
And so a criminal case for falsification was filed
against him before the OMB. He went to the SC
when he was ordered by this OMB to submit his
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