EN BANC As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with
Gloria's husband Col. Buenafe,4 she waited until their arrival at past 11:00
G.R. No. 131516 March 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RONNIE RULLEPA Y GUINTO, accused-appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to
wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing
her parity, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his
penis and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of the
undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will
and without her consent.1
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.2
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,3 her mother Gloria
Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the
prosecution established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her
house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told
her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa
bibig ko."
"Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes' house
boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things
to her, to which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May
what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-
appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an errand and informed her
husband about their daughter's plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May
who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him
whether what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted
doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three
days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant
several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning
to bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the
imputations against him, on account of which he was detained. Gloria's
sworn statement5 was then taken.6
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the
witness stand: "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa
bunganga," thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that
accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the
Biological Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
who examined Cyra May, came up with her report dated November 21,
1995,7containing the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject.
Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora presenting
in between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded
posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen.
External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index
finger.
 xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the
time of examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have
been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted
if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.8
The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single
at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having
anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed
that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for
Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused
to answer Gloria's queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he usually
accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria
would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing
of the complaint. Thus:
q According to them you caused the abrasions found in her
genital?
a That is not true, sir,
q If that is not true, what is the truth?
a As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the
family I was sent to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because
she had difficulty in urinating.
q Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a No, I do not know, sir.
q And how about the present complaint filed against you, the
complaint filed by the mother of the victim?
a I did not do it, sir.
q What is the truth, what can you say about this present
complaint filed against you?
a As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to
her that I was going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the
husband with a former marriage.9
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of
P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.10 (Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following
errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED
TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 IV a Yes, sir.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE q What did he do to you?
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.11 (Emphasis supplied.) a "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa
bunganga"
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following
portion of its decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually q How many times did he do that to you?
assaulted Cyra May:
a Twice, sir.
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra
Ma[y]'s complaint during the confrontation in the house. Indeed,
xxx xxx xxx
according to the mother, the admission was even
expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence that he had committed the
sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of q Do you remember when he did these things to you?
November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission
was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like this a Opo.
should be absolutely admissible and competent.
q When was that?
xxx xxx xxx
a When my mother was asleep, he put — he removed my panty
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during and inserted his penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
trial despite his freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission
became conclusive upon him.12 (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx

To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible
since they were made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra May's
parents "bullied and questioned him." He thus submits that it was error for
the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during the trial as an
admission of guilt.
q After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you
feel?
a "Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips)
Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako".

Accused-appellant's submission does not persuade. The trial court q Did you cry because of hurt?
considered his admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself
of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication of his
a Yes.
failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
q What part of your body hurt?
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in
the hands of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her a "Pepe ko po." When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt
accusations. Thus she testified on direct examination: pain in my organ, sir.13

q Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?

Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more q When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to
revolting details of her ordeal: you?

q So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did a "Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."
he do to you on November 17, 1995?
q And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do,
a "Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted his penis to my what did he do to you?
organ and to my mouth, sir.
a He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he
q When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into was already wearing any clothing?
your organ, into your mouth, and into your anus, would you describe
what — his penis? a Still had his clothing on, sir.

a It is a round object, sir. q So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya
Ronnie?
Court:
a Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
xxx xxx xxx
a Opo.
q So, that's the — and at the time, you did not cry and you did
q Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie? not shout for help?

a No, sir. a Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might
be roused from sleep.
q Which part of his body that titi located?
q How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
a Matagal po.
Court:
q After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other
Continue things did he do?

xxx xxx xxx a After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus,
sir.
q Why were you in that room?
q You did not complain and you did not shout?
a Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
 a I cried, sir.14
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was
not in the house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following
transcript of her testimony:
q Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father
leaves the house, he [was] usually accompanied by your kuya
Ronnie?
a Opo.
q Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when your father
left the house at that time, on November 17?
a He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you
because your kuya Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
15
a Yes, sir.
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when
her father Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995 with accused- court regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellant's commission of
rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable to
suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsel's above-
quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the
rape, Gloria having testified that she learned of it on November 20,
199516 while Cyra May said that immediately after the incident, she
awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it:17 This is
a minor matter that does not detract from Cyra May's categorical, material
testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing
the following portion of her testimony:
q "Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo," where did you
get that phrase?
a It was the word of my Mama, sir.18
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really
narrating the truth, that of hearing her mother utter "sinira niya ang buhay
mo."
Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of
which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is
preposterous. It is true that "the ordinary child is a `great weaver of
romances,"' and her "imagination may induce (her) to relate something she
has heard or read in a story as personal experience."19 But Cyra May's
account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV
fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a
tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo
the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public
trial."20
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that
there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could have been
caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless
appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness
sufficient to invest her with the competence to testify about her
experience. She might have been an impressionable child — as all
others of her age are — but her narration of KuyaRonnie's placing
his "titi" in her "pepe" was certainly one which could not be
considered as a common child's tale. Her responses during the
examination of counsel and of the Court established her
consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which
rendered inconceivable for her to describe a "bad" act of the
accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she
described the act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness
— manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain
responses to questions — further enhanced her claim to credit and
trustworthiness.21 (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before
the alleged incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating.
He surmises that she could have scratched herself which caused the
abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She
stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and
rubbing or scratching it is painful.22 The abrasions could not, therefore, have
been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application
of any form of trauma at the time of the examination" does not preclude
accused-appellant's conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in
statutory rape.23
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite
her testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does
not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellant's penis failed
to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more
resistant to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile.
No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation,
disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not
motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the
child's defilement.24 Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother
would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical hardship and
shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.25
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of
lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following
testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely "scrubbed" his penis
against her vagina:
q Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his
penis into your vagina?
a Yes, Sir.
q And when — he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a Yes, sir.26
Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly
beneath the labia majora,"27 proving that there was indeed penetration of the
vagina, not just a mere rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its
surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of
lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of
age.28 As shown in the previous discussion, the first element, carnal
knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is
true with respect to the second element.
The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element
of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,29 provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx.
Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance,
warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
 consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim:
xxx xxx xxx.
4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of
evidence of the victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided
30
case of People v. Pruna, established a set of guidelines in appreciating age
as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony,
if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family
either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or
the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it
is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the
age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the
therein accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua since:
. . . no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a
baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. . .
..
xxx xxx xxx.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court
does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing
therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was
presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her mother, Jacqueline,
testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the
commission of the crime).
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two
years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when
the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995,
or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon
further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted
the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty
that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes
 the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative
evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order
that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part
of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE's tender
age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not
necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when
PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA
cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty
cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the
testimony of LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding
PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof,
having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed
on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
(Italics in the original.)
Several cases31 suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the
appearance of the victim in determining her age. For example, the Court,
in People v. Tipay,32 qualified the ruling in People v. Javier,33 which required
the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victim's age, with the
following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate
of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a
victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite
manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial
years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may
seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance. In this
situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty
the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was
committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty
under the above-cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases34 holds that courts, without the
requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court,35 cannot take judicial notice of the victim's age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain "facta probanda," or
propositions in a party's case, as to which he will not be required to offer
evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the need of
evidence.36 Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose
way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually
known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of judicial
notice.37
The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age from his or her
appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based
upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous,
inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in
the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to
courts.38 As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing
judicial notice are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the
trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her
age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting
an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the
person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice,
the object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on
the contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible
as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court.
Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to
the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court.
"To be sure," one author writes, "this practice of inspection by the court of
objects, things or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in
ancient judicial procedure."39 The author proceeds to quote from another
authority:
 "Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all
countries than the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself,
whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The view of
the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where
mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an
infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of
seals, the examination of writings, to determine, whether they are
(`)blemished,(') the implements with which a crime was committed or
of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of
another, are few illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our
own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
past."40 (Emphasis supplied.)
A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of
being under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as
relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought
before it.41 Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately
an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of
old age and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted and
weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward
physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his
age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
cautious.42Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be
allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such
persons.43 The formal offer of the person as evidence is not necessary. The
examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent
to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is
properly refused.44
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an alien's age from his
appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,45 this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance
of the immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking
admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the
board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may
take into consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining
his age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor based upon such
appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal
case. Thus, in United States v. Agadas,46this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he
had never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a
cedula the following January. Thereupon the court asked this
defendant these questions: "You are a pretty big boy for seventeen."
Answer: "I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember when I
was born, but 17 years is my guess." Court: "If you are going to take
advantage of that excuse, you had better get some positive evidence
to that effect." Answer: "I do not remember, as I already stated on
what date and in what year I was born." The court, in determining the
question of the age of the defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
"The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he
thought that he was about 17 years of age, but judging by
his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has
shown that he has no positive information on the subject and
no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he
is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of article 9,
paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be
incumbent upon the defense to establish by satisfactory
evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused
person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance."
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984)
Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in the court below, that he
then was only 16 years of age. There was no other testimony in the
record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: "The
accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16
years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20." This court, in passing
upon the age of Estavillo, held:
"We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with
reference to the age of Estavillo from the latter's personal
appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we have
said, which even tends to establish the assertion that this
appellant understated his age. . . . It is true that the trial court
had an opportunity to note the personal appearance of
Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so
doing reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just
two years over 18. This appellant testified that he was only
16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be
imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude
 (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
appellants' ages were 16 and 14 respectively."
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was
17 years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging
from the personal appearance of Rosario, that "he is a youth 18 or
19 years old." Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we
must conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with
reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of
age at the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must be
resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to
six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one
day of presidio mayor. . . . .
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's
appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such
appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which
is again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony,
if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family
either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age
of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in
cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the
allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine
from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative's testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as
to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the
victim's mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact
age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim
should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty
and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of
the victim's age in the present case spells the difference between life
and death.47
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's certificate of live
birth or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother,
however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Cyra May's testimony goes:
q Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a Yes, sir.
q And you are 3 years old?
a Yes, sir.48
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and ½ years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.49
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and
the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have
had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age from her appearance. No
reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory
rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter.
Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily
be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and,
following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-
appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial
court is increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.50
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished
by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private
complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157177 February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution2 dated February 12, 2003, which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453,3 requiring Bank of Philippine
Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B.
Reyes (respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial court,
to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together
with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM
account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling
every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car
as its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero
Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new
accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having
homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to
sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her
exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88
and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip
for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said
bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of
the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was
filling up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to
where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable
balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only
and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her
signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces
of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing
the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
brought the same to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of
her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount
of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller
card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States
(Exhs. "T", "U"- "U-1") and returned to Manila on January 31, 1991
(Exhs. "V"-"V-1").
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her
statement of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM account
only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager
assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her
employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI with
the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of
said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and
when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip
stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion
thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and
when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was
validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will
be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank,
Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding
return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs. "B" and "C").
The same was received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October
7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit
down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be
submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff
filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine
Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund transfer in
the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the
express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. "3"
to "3-C"), however, it was the only amount she deposited and no
additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff
wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her
account was not sufficient and could not accommodate the same.
Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the amount to be withdrawn
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiff’s signature
superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy of the
deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00,
however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of
the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for
Jesusa Reyes had already left without signing the deposit slip. The
documents were subsequently machine validated for the amount
of P100,000.00 (Exhs. "2" and "4").
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the
transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in
the bank’s teller tape (Exhs."1" to "1-C").
 Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to
a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with flying colors
(Exhs. "5" to "5-C"), indicative of the fact that he was not lying when
he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when
plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7,
1990; defendant further alleged that they even went to the extent of
informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given credit
(Exh. "6") considering that no such transaction was really made on
December 7, 1990. 4
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision5 upholding the versions of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the
plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against defendant
Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per
annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.6
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited
only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy; that what should control
was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for there was no
chance by which respondent could write the amount of P200,000.00 without
petitioner's employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that it
was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's bankbook was
submitted to be updated after the lapse of several months when the alleged
error claimed by petitioner was corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil
Code provides that a deposit is constituted from the moment a person
receives a thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping it
and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged
to keep the thing safely and to return it when required to the depositor or to
his heirs and successors or to the person who may have been designated in
the contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated October
29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the
missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest
thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991,
the last day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-appellees'
counsel under the first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B),
or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when defendant-appellant
received said letter. Interest is demandable when the obligation
consist in the payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a
reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. The award
of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The absence of malice and bad faith, as in this
case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a
reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has
not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment
appealed from is in all other respects AFFIRMED. Without costs.7
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the
RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and
Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00
from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit
of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for
these two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking institution of
the stature of petitioner if their claims were not true; that the duplicate copy
of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with
the fact that it was not machine-validated and the original copy altered by the
bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount
"validated," is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee
Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and
categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration therein made;
that petitioner must account for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the
author of the loss; that banks are engaged in business imbued with public
interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing
with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them
received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the
amount of P100,000.00 representing an alleged additional deposit of
respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring
physical evidence in favor of testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable to respondents for the payment
of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is
contrary to law, in holding BPI liable for moral damages and
attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00
and P30,000.00, respectively. 8
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the
RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00
in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts.9 As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court
when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are
based on substantial evidence.10 Such rule however is not absolute, but is
subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.11 We hold that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3,
4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law.12 In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence,13 or that evidence which is of greater weight or
is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean
absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on
one side than on the other.14
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for
determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability
or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must
first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify
was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard
the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in
a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the
basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the 151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces of evidence on record.
***200000.0018
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented
by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully prove by BIG AMOUNT
preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit
of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account. 151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388

Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, ***200000.00
respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller
account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and
transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that 151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not
borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that ***200000.00
Capati prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the
claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund PB BALANCE ERROR
transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express Teller
account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal BAL. 229,257.64
slip. We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention
in the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings account
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
***200000.00
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip
without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for
respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business BIG AMOUNT
and taking ordinary care of her concerns,16 would make sure that she would
check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. 151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is very near
the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are ***200000.00
written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the amount
of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00. 151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount ***200000.00
of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account
was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence
and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended TOD
to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145
17
The teller's tape, Exhibit "1" unequivocally shows the following data:
***2000.00
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.0019
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.0020
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second
column shows the date of the transactions; the third column shows the bank
transaction code; the fourth column shows the teller's code; and the fifth
column shows the client's account number. The teller's tape reflected various
transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which
included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new
Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's
initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings
Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds
as shown in Exhibit "1-c."
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she
was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount
of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a
discrepancy;21 thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big
amount" means that the amount was so big for her to approve,22 so she
keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's
approval.23 The letter "J" appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to
show that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount
of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her
computer rejected the transaction, because the balance she keyed in based
on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the phrase
"balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced the balance
of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal of P200,000.00.25 Since
it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the
amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason "TOD,
overdraft,"26 which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more than
the balance, considering that there was a debited amount of P30,935.16
reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to
only P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of
respondent Jesusa's balance.28 Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to
the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage,
Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of
overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.29
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of
the figure "1" on the figure "2" and the change of the word "two" to "one" to
show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings account
was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the
alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00
by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but
since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27
seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's
original intention to withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and
not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred
as her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of
her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller
account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering
that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal, which records the teller's
daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing
that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer
of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate
copy of the deposit slip30 was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the
stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there
was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip
shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the
specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies
of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is
convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business.
She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip
for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip
for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express Teller
account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance
of P249,657.6431 as of November 19, 1990.32 Thus, at first glance, these
appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by
fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent
Jesusa, while the original copy33 of the deposit slip was left in her
cage.34 However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned
out that respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate
the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and
had already left the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was still inside the
teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the
latter told her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati superimposed the figures "1"
on "2" on the deposit slip36 to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for
respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the alteration.
Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, which bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was given to
respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her transaction, was not
machine-validated unlike the original copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by
Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's
policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction,37 nevertheless, we find
that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of
evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited
to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.38 We have, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.
Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical
evidence should prevail.39
with rape as described under the second paragraph of Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person." 1

In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals’ August 28, 2013
respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false story against a Decision3 affirming Ricalde’s conviction for rape through sexual assault and
banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we January 15, 2014 Resolution4 denying reconsideration.
cannot countenance.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of Ricalde of rape through sexual assault:
evidence.
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues raisedof Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
by petitioner. accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his
Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution dated February 12, damage and prejudice.
2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED. CONTRARY TO LAW.5

No costs. Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002.6 The
prosecution presented the victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the medico-legal as
SECOND DIVISION witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness.8

G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015 The facts as found by the lower courts follow.

RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at
vs. McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.11

DECISION After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it
was late.12 He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.13
LEONEN, J.:
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and
stomach and something inserted in his anus."14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled
Even men can become victims of rape.
his penis."15 When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s
room to tell her what happened.16 He also told his mother that Ricalde played
Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed with his sexual organ.17
against a 10-year-old boy. Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she
confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked
him to leave.19
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were
directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The police
referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination.21 Dr.
Roy Camarillo examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his
anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements
at the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against
Ricalde.25
Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the
2001 town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX’s mother is the
cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde.27 He and XXX became textmates, and
XXX invited him to his house.28 On January 30, 2002, XXX’s mother picked
him up to sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room
sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the alleged rape through
sexual assault.31
The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly,
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay
[XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.33
The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the
conviction with the modification of lowering the amounts of damages
awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-
appellant RICHARD RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in
the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages
likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos, both with
interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.35
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the
medico-legal testified that he found "no physical signs or external signs of
recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus,"37 or any trace of spermatozoa.38 He
contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the court’s] hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal
orifice.40 XXX was also able to immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push
and pull movement happened that would explain XXX’s alleged stomach
ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to
aggravate the charge against him.43
Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt
on his guilt.44 XXX claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but
in another instance, he testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his
penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was
also playing with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his salaysay that "the penis
reached only the periphery of his anal orifice."46
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that
petitioner was wearing pants with the zipper open.47 Petitioner submits that
performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a
challenge — the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair
entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider
every circumstance favoring the innocence of an accused.49
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should
have applied the "variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court
would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The petition then enumerated
circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between petitioner
and XXX.52 These include the fact that they were textmates and that
petitioner played with XXX’s penis.53
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that
XXX mistook as penetration.54 XXX could also have mistaken the
"overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his [anus]."55 Assuming
these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts of
lasciviousness.56
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt all elements of the crime charged.
The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to
human experience that XXX’s mother allowed her son to be left alone with a
stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger, and she could not have
foreseen such abuse since "rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual
abuse of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings deserves scant
consideration.60 The Comment quoted People v. Penilla61 in that "[a] medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape
inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
the accused of the crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the
sphincter’s flexibility and how an insertion into the anal orifice would not
necessarily cause injury.63
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual
assault based on XXX’s clear and categorical testimony.64 Petitioner’s
defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive testimony.65 Consequently,
petitioner’s contention that the incident only amounts to acts of
lasciviousness lacks merit.66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
We affirm petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against
persons68 and amended the Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on
rape through sexual assault:
Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed—
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person. (Emphasis supplied)
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as
"instrument or object rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or "homosexual
rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person’s genital or anal orifice."72
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
respect if not conclusive effect."73
The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony"74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.75 There was no showing
of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court of
Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court’s findings and affirmed
petitioner’s conviction.77
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s
testimony fails to convince.
78
In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the
testimonies of child victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity."79 XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason
to concoct lies against petitioner.80
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are
minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."81
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was
inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being
inserted into his anal orifice.
This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief82 that
"[a]lthough it is true that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not
rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the victim remained physically
intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing
that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-
appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus."83
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX’s testimony in
that he "felt something was inserted in [his] anus."84
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping
at your house, do you recall any unusual incident that happened to
you?
A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.
....
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus,
what did you do?
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was
even able to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he
was even playing with your private part, who is this person you are
referring to as "he"?
A: Richard, sir.85
In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what
was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that
rape through sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is
important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina.
To require "AAA" to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into
her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.87
Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent
trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The
absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility
of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive
testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert
testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s
credible lone testimony.88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in
the anal orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion considering
the flexibility of the sphincter:
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings
states [sic] that you did not find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain
to this court why you stated in your findings that you did not find any
congestion or abrasion?
A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent
trauma to the anus. It should be realized that the sphincter, that is the
particular portion of the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a
certain flexibility such that it can resist any objected [sic] inserted and that
area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any
injuries would be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir?89
Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing
People v. Sumingwa.90 Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the "variance doctrine":
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was
charged with qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts
of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 761091 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt
to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what
was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The
slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua94 discussed this
distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the
slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the
outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in
like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of
the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the
crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be
applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched
her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This
testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it
cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno.
Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis
supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all
existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this
interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the
slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of
rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree
of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."96
People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a
victim’s dignity, regardless of the manner of its commission:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are
relevant only insofar as these define the manners of commission of rape.
However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than
the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of
a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the
damage to the victim’s dignity is incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general
has been associated with negative psychological impacts such as trauma,
sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain,
impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience
of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed in a
relatively unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate
him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order." Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would
understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates
a message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious
than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading
acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person’s will and body.
In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or
less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result
was not raised in this case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be
accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to
impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the
mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower
court to the penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act":99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua
shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape
or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines
"lascivious conduct": [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
a person.100
In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his
fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor
victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of two counts of
rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual assault.103 This court modified
the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided
in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV
was ten (10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or
"The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes
the penalty therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:
....
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law,
Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein,
which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and
considering further that Armando’s act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private
part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault,
which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the
child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No.
8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses
committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610
is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or
those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A,
[the accused Chingh was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum."105
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is higher than the
imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a
higher penalty when the victi m is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was
established by his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the
defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information.107 The
higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v.
Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special
law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal
Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice Velasco suggests
that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic Act
No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act
on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by
other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and
ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly
provides that "children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . .
indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . .
other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion
and sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the
penalty to be imposed. The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a
child already coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child
abuse. The proposal of Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other
acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself that will characterize rape as This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where
child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not victims of rape are all women.1âwphi1However, as in this case, men can
yet present with one count of rape.
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the
purpose of the law. If we adopt his view, it would amount to our collective
official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape is not debilitating to a
child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into
a child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the
trust that will enable him or her to have full and diverse meaningful
interactions with other human beings. In my view, a single act of sexual
abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed
that this is conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the
law already punish that single act as child abuse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child
abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused
will be violated should we impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I
disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The
facts constitutive of the offense will suggest the crime punishable by law. The
principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in
the Information, the law which punishes the offense should already be clear
and the accused put on notice of the charges against him.
Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by
counsel. Clear from the records is the entry and active participation of his
lawyer up to and including this appeal.
On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00 in favor of
XXX as a victim of rape through sexual assault, consistent with
jurisprudence.108
This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields
the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to
victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion is
₱30,000."109
also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and this can involve
penile insertion.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387
dated August 28, 2013 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape
through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant
Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the
amount of ₱30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION
(SOLIDBANK), Petitioners,
vs.
DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES,1 AND
SPOUSE, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, "The Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O.
Morales and Spouse" promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order
dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27,
Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint3 for
recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading the spouse of
respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to bind their
conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust
corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of
respondents a loan in the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as
evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date.
Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
(respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty-five
monthly installments of ₱40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per
annum. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents
defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of the loan became
due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner
likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to
settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still
failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at
₱1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes "A," "B," and
"C," respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed
by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20
January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents’ loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the
Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants upon the
ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of
petitioner’s complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a
manifestation attaching thereto its answer to petitioner’s complaint which
states the following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein alleged, the
truth being those alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative
defense, defendant herein states that the promissory note in question is void
for want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration
involved as defendant herein did not receive any consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative
defense, defendant herein alleges that no demand has ever been sent to nor
received by herein defendant and if ever demands were made, denies any
liability as averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative
defense, defendant herein avers that the complaint states no cause of action
and has no basis either in fact or in law; …
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to
in accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the
defendants in this case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation
of the above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own
knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO4
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together
with his answer wherein he likewise renounced any liability on the
promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification
in paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been separated from his wife and the
system governing their property relations is that of complete separation of
property and not that of conjugal partnership of gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in
paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the matter therein averred, the correct of my own knowledge and information.
truth being those alleged in the Special And Affirmative Defenses
hereinbelow pleaded;
… Affiant5
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his
personal and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for
lack of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the
questioned promissory note, still, defendant herein cannot be bound
personally and individually to the said obligations as banking procedures
requires, it being a standard operating procedure of all known banking
institution, that to hold a borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as
well as personal capacity, the borrower must sign a Suretyship Agreement or
at least, a continuing guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s)
but which in this case is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain, as there is no conjugal
partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been separated
from his wife and their property relation is governed by the system of
complete separation of property, and more importantly, he has never signed
the said promissory note in his personal and individual capacity as such;
…
VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby depose and declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;
I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and
figures supplied by me to my retained counsel; have read each and every
allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to declare
respondents in default and admitted their respective answers.6
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole
witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection
Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the
loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to respondents’ failure to
pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to
send a demand letter to respondents; that as a result of this demand letter,
Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporation’s controller, wrote a
letter to petitioner requesting for some consideration because of the
unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business operation;
that Tolentino enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of
₱220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied
as partial payment to their company’s obligation to petitioner; that after
receipt of this partial payment, respondents’ obligation again became
stagnant prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand
letter which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also
identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate
original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as
Exhibit 7petitioner’s 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as
Exhibit 8 Tolentino’s letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked
as Exhibit 9 and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to
respondents marked as Exhibit 10
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence.
However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A" could no longer be found,
petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the
promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit "E."
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted
respondents’ motion that they be allowed to amend their respective answers
to conform with this new evidence.11
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and
motion for reconsideration12 of the trial court’s order admitting into evidence
petitioner’s Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E"
should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not
properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists
that Exhibit "E" was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he
had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioner’s exhibits,
one of which was Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A"
which were not contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not possibly be
considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly, respondent corporation
claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as
Lavarino admitted that Exhibit "E" was not the original of Exhibit "A" which
was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent corporation
based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider
order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E"13 which, other than insisting that the
due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established
as far as he was concerned, essentially raised the same arguments
contained in respondent corporation’s manifestation with motion for
reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents’ motions for
reconsideration.14 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this order
which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.15
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss
on the similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E,"
petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents’ alleged
indebtedness.16
On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion17 praying that the presiding judge,
Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself from this case
maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for reconsideration
of the trial court’s order of 06 December 1985 thereby depriving it the
opportunity of presenting proof that the original of Exhibit "A" was delivered
to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such haste on the part of the
presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and
fairness. This motion to inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August
1987.18
In an order dated 28 December 1987,19 the case before the trial court was
dismissed, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works,
Inc. and Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with costs
against the plaintiff.
The trial court’s finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
decision now before us. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987 dismissing
plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the
plaintiff-appellant.20
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer
1999 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the Court of (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally and
Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.21 specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory
note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that he
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from (MORALES) never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint
this Court imputing the following errors on the Court of Appeals: (Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover, what appears
in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they
I deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be
considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law
for specific denial.23
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE MATERIAL
ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK’S COMPLAINT, DESPITE We hold otherwise.
THE PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE
FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY
NOTE. SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. – When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
II corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT ‘E’, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply
THE PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
EXHIBIT ‘A’ (XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF refused.24
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF
SECONDARY EVIDENCE. In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,25 this
Court held that –
III
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he
allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these
FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING allegations in his "denial under oath," stating that the "promissory note sued
upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein
THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST
BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the
THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK.22 real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses…

The petition is meritorious. Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,26 the Court
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary actionable document, viz.:
to petitioner’s stance, respondents were able to generally and specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note,
thus:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not
sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the
statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by
fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due
execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the
genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the
instrument upon a ground not affecting either.27
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioner’s
complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect,
respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation
to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the
"best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of
the proof is to establish the terms of the writing – meaning the alleged
promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money allegedly
loaned to the defendants (respondents herein)."28
The "best evidence rule" is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The "best evidence rule," according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in
the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was
quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the usages of trade
and that "the best proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only
required."29 Over the years, the phrase was used to describe rules which
were already existing such as the rule that the terms of a document must be
proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence
about the document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the
rule excluding assertions made out of court and not subject to the rigors of
cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the group
of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred
to that of others.30
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, "the only
actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring
the production of the original writing"31 the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a
substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to
give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.
In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of
written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by
presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is
justified.32
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is
the justification for the "best evidence rule," we declare that this rule finds no
application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed
the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude
that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of
said note is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their
responsive pleadings, respondents’ principal defense rests on the alleged
lack of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales
also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These
contentions clearly do not question the "precise wording"33 of the promissory
note which should have paved the way for the application of the "best
evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain
the decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure is not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions
one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the
possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion to
inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have
sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit "A" was in the possession
of respondents which would have called into application one of the
exceptions to the "best evidence rule."
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically
the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no
need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question.
Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the
promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless
of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note.34
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due
execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff
need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant.35 In
the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.,36 this Court
held that –
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took
into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof,
without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In
the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the
authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the authenticity and due execution of these documents must, in
that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff
from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The
court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without
the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties.37
Anent petitioner’s allegation that the presiding judge of the court a
quo should have inhibited himself from this case, we resolve this issue
against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought
against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show that he or she is,
indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough. Bias and
prejudice are serious charges which cannot be presumed particularly if
weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor
and the rich.38There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from
an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.39
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge
Diaz was guilty of bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding
that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states
the rule on the effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. It reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action. Caution, however,
must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this
ground as under the rules, if the movant’s plea for the dismissal on demurrer
to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he
loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendant’s motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on
appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the
movant loses his right to present evidence.40 The reviewing court cannot
remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment
on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.41
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are
obligated to petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos, this being the
amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound
themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the loan; and a penalty
charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents
likewise agreed to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount
due, but in no case less than ₱200.00, plus costs of suit with both these
amounts bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs against
respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
25 November 1999 as well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28 December
1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to
pay One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum,
penalty charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the amount due as
attorney’s fees together with a 1% interest per month until fully paid. The
sum of ₱220,020.00 which was the value of the postdated check given
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted from the
amount due from respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on
September 16, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank, Philippine National Bank, Dipolog
Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make,
draw, issue and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his
obligation to the latter, PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30,
1991 in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, which check, however, when
presented for payment with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored
and refused payment for the reason that it was drawn against
insufficient funds, and despite repeated demands made by the
private complainant on the accused, the latter, failed to make good
the check’s value, to the damage and prejudice of RICKY OLVIS in
the aforestated amount.

G.R. No. 152881 August 17, 2004 CONTRARY TO LAW.3

ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
vs. guilty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to
adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. On motion
of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence. The prosecution
presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct
DECISION examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued to
him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967 dated September 30,
1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the
latter’s account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in payment of
the petitioner’s obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on
October 1, 1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Engr. Bayani testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner
1
Magdayao of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20549 pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise.
affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, Branch 8, Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P.
convicting the petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22. Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner
again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the
The Antecedents dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one
for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity
on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the check
to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and
failed to pay the P600,000.00.
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the
check, but because of the latter’s absence and that of his counsel, the direct
examination on the witness could not be terminated. The prosecution moved
that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date, and that
the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be
identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court granted the
motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the
meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967
as Exhibit "A," and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit "A-1."
After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his
counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial. They again
failed to appear when the case was called for continuation of trial on
November 21, 1995. The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of
PNB Check No. 399967, which the court admitted. The trial court, thereafter,
issued an Order declaring the case submitted for decision.4 The petitioner
filed a motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the trial court denied
on January 26, 1996.
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him
to Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that:
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox copy of the
PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and further stressing that the same
was paid, the prosecutor insisted, against the vigorous objection of
accused, in filing the case in Court. Plenty of water passed under the
bridge since then;5
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it dispensed
with the presentation of the original of the dishonored check because the
same had been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out that the
petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the photocopy of the
dishonored check.
In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the
subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution’s
failure to produce the original thereof. On July 8, 1996, the trial court issued
an Order denying the petitioner’s motion. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration thereon was, likewise, denied by the trial court.
On January 29, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused established beyond
reasonable doubt, the herein accused, Engr. Bayani Magdayao is
convicted of the crime charged against him for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang22, as principal by direct participation, and
pursuant to Section 1 thereof sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to
pay the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the private
complainant the sum of P600,000.00 corresponding to his obligation
due to the private offended party.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner assigned the following
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
THE CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE
FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:
A. MACHINE OR PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF PNB CHECK
NO. 399967 DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1991;
B. WORD "DAIF" AT THE BACK OF THE PHOTOSTATIC
COPY OF SAID CHECK;
C. UNCORROBORATED ORAL TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
WITHOUT HIM BEING POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE
COMPLAINANT OR OTHER WITNESS.
III
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE
DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL INDEMNITY
TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS.7
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the trial court. The appellate court also denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
In his petition at bar, the petitioner merely reiterates the errors he ascribed to
the RTC in his appeal before the CA, and prays that the decisions of the trial
and appellate courts be set aside.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the first three assignments of error, the petitioner avers that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged because of the following: (a) the photocopy of PNB Check No.
399967, adduced in evidence by the prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence
under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no
probative weight; b) the prosecution failed to present the BPI-Family Bank
teller to testify on the presentment of PNB Check No. 399967 and the
dishonor thereof; and (c) the prosecution failed to prove that it was he who
drew and delivered the dishonored check to the private complainant, and
that he was properly notified of the dishonor of the said check. The petitioner
also asserts that there was no legal basis for the award of the amount
of P6,000.00 as civil indemnity.
We rule against the petitioner.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 for which the petitioner was charged, reads:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.— Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
(1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court.
To warrant the petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged, the prosecution
was burdened to prove the following essential elements thereof:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.8
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment.9 As to
the second element, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit with the bank to cover the
check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the drawer; hence,
it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law creates a prima
facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit, coincidental with the
attendance of the two other elements. As such, Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.— The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full
 by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the
contents thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee,
the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such
dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the
adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would
expose and defeat.10 As long as the original evidence can be had, the court
should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such
as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such
photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of
probative weight.11
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary
evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility
of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or
control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse
party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the
same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control.— If
the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce
the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case
of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the
party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure
the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document.12 The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of
the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party
or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.13
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to
the petitioner upon the latter’s offer to pay the amount of the check by
drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other
for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to
Olvis:
Q Sometime in the month of May 1991, do you remember that
(sic) you have any transaction with the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was the transaction about?
A It was about our joint venture in Ipil.
Q What did the accused in this case issue to you?
A He issued me a check worth six hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000.00).
Q If the photostatic copy of the check [would] be presented to
you, would you be able to identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I am showing to you a photostatic copy of PNB Dipolog
Branch Check # 399967 with a maturity date on September 30, 1991
in the amount of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00), is this
the check issued to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Here is a signature at the bottom corner of this check, whose
signature is this?
A Bayani Magdayao[‘s]. We pray, Your Honor, that the photostatic copy of the check
be marked as Exhibit "A." The reason why it was
Q In other words, this check was issued for a valuable dishonored, found at the back of this check, indicated as
consideration in connection with the project you have in Ipil? "DAIF" meaning to say: "Drawn Against Insufficient Fund" be
marked as Exhibit "A-1."
A Yes, Sir.
…
Q What did you do with the check?
Q After being informed that the check was dishonored by the
drawee bank, what did you do?
A I deposited this in BPI-Family Bank, but it was drawn against
insufficient fund.
A I went to Magdayao’s house and asked for payment but he
Q When did you deposit the check? refused to pay.

A Sometime in October. Q When you say Magdayao, are you referring to the accused in
this case, Bayani Magdayao?
Q October, what year?
A Yes, Sir.
A In 1991, Sir.
Q It appears that this is merely a photostatic copy of the check,
where is the original of the check?
Q Within a reasonable period from the maturity date of the
check, you caused it to be deposited?
A Magdayao replaced the original check worth six hundred
thousand pesos (P600,000.00), and he gave me another check
A Yes, Sir. worth four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) and two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Q And this check was dishonored by the depository bank, that
the account to which it was drawn does not have sufficient fund, is Q At the time the accused in this case replaced this check worth
that indicated in this check? six hundred thousand (P600,000.00), was the case already pending
before the City Fiscal’s Office or before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir, it is pending.
Q Where is that indication of dishonor for lack of sufficient fund?
Q Until now the amount of six hundred thousand pesos
A Here, Sir. (P600,000.00) has not been paid to you?

INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the check. A Yes, Sir.14

ATTY. CO: In his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, the petitioner
admitted that he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the
private complainant15 and that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored
check.16 The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production
of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the
prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy
thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus
Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special
Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the
prosecution’s violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however,
never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the
same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a
bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence
in his defense, which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified
postponements as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the
employee of the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of
the dishonored check17 to testify that the same was dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. The petitioner had already been
informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when Olvis
returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as shown by the testimony
of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks, one
for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored
check.
Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to
overcome that of the prosecution’s.
The petitioner’s contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of
the subject check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to
identify the petitioner after his direct examination, but the latter and his
counsel inexplicably failed to appear. The direct examination of Olvis had to
be continued to enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the
drawer of the check. This is shown by the transcript of the stenographic
notes taken during the trial, viz:
ATTY. CO:
Considering that the accused is not present, Your Honor, I would like
to manifest that the private offended party be given the opportunity
to identify the accused for purposes of this case.18
The trial court issued an Order on June 7, 1995, directing the petitioner,
under pain of contempt, to appear before it to enable Olvis to identify him:
After the declaration of the first and only witness for the prosecution,
the private prosecutor prayed to set the case for continuation of the
trial, and ordering the defendant to appear to allow the prosecution
to establish his identity.
Set the case for continuation of the trial on June 13, 1995, ordering
the accused to appear personally for purposes of his identification in
court under pain of contempt if he fails to comply unjustifiably with
this order. The defense shall be allowed to cross examine the
witness for the prosecution if desired, otherwise, his right of cross-
examination shall be considered waived completely.
SO ORDERED.19
The petitioner defied the Order of the court and failed to appear as directed,
and as gleaned from the records –
(14) June 7, 1995 – The accused and counsel did not appear;
hence, the prosecution was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte.
The private complainant was presented to testify in the direct-
examination, reserving the right of cross-examination on the part of
the accused, and setting the case for the purpose on June 13, 1995.
(15) June 13, 1995 – The accused did not appear, but the defense
counsel requested for a resetting of the cross-examination to be
conducted. The request was granted over the objection of the
prosecution, and set the continuation of the trial to August 31, 1995.
(16) August 31, 1995 – As in previous occasions, the accused did
not appear and defense counsel requested for another resetting, and
despite the vigorous opposition by the prosecution, the trial was
postponed to October 3, 1995, with the understanding that if the
accused will not appear, it would be taken to mean that he waived
his right to cross-examination and to present evidence in his
defense.
(17) October 3, 1995 – Atty. Narciso Barbaso appeared as a new
counsel for the accused but requested that he be allowed to read
first the transcript of the direct testimony of the plaintiff’s witness to
be cross-examined. The request was granted, and the trial was reset
to November 21, 1995.
 (18) November 21, 1995 – The accused and his counsel both did not The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, objects to the
appear. The prosecution formally offered Exh. "A" in evidence, and petitioner’s plea on the ground that when the latter drew and issued the
upon its admission, the prosecution rested its case, and prayed that dishonored check to the private complainant, he knew that the residue of his
as stated in the previous order of the court dated August 31, 1995, funds in the drawee bank was insufficient to pay the amount thereof.
the case shall be considered submitted for judgment, which request
was granted. Considering the facts and circumstances attendant in this case, we find the
petitioner’s plea to be barren of merit. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
(19) December 7, 1995 – The defense filed a motion for provides:
reconsideration of the order dated November 21, 1995. The court
required the defense to file a supplemental motion stating the nature It is, therefore, understood that:
of its evidence to be presented if allowed to enable the court to
determine the merit of the motion for reconsideration, but despite the 1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as
lapsed (sic) of the period set by the court, the accused did not
an alternative penalty for violations of BP 22;
comply; hence, the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and set
the case for promulgation of the judgment on February 19, 1996.
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
(20) Then came the Omnibus Supplemental Motion, etc., by the case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
accused dated February 8, 1996, and by reason thereof, the
serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
promulgation of the judgment set on February 19, 1996, was held in imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
abeyance. violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
(21) The defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for
the accused dated February 27, 1996, and which was granted by the
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay
order of the court dated March 1, 1996. the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code on subsidiary imprisonment.22
[(22)] May 28, 1996 – A Special Manifestation dated May 21, 1996 in
support of the Omnibus Supplemental Motion filed thru another The records show that despite the numerous opportunities given to him by
lawyer appearing as a new counsel for the accused, now under
the trial court, the petitioner refused to adduce any evidence in his behalf.
consideration.20 Moreover, the Court of Appeals found the petitioner’s appeal to be devoid of
merit. Considering the factual milieu in this case, there is every reason for
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the trial court did not award P6,000.00 as the Court to reject the plea for a penalty of fine and maintain the penalty of
civil indemnity in favor of Olvis; it ordered the petitioner to pay imprisonment the trial court imposed on the petitioner.
him P600,000.00, the amount of the subject check. Having failed to pay the
amount of the check, the petitioner is liable therefor and should be ordered to IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE
pay the same to the private complainant in this case.21 COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner faulted the trial court for
imposing a penalty of imprisonment instead of a penalty of fine, and cites SC
SO ORDERED.
Circular No. 12-2000 to bolster his contention. He suggests that since he is
merely a first offender, he should be sentenced to pay a fine double the
amount of the check.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146424 November 18, 2005
ALBINO JOSEF, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES* and AGUSTIN ALARILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of a decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR no. 23234,2 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan convicting Albino Josef of 26 counts
of violation of BP 22, also known as the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law.3
By way of a preliminary clarification, this is a petition for review of the CA’s
decision affirming Albino Josef’s conviction for 26 counts of violation of BP
22. It is therefore a criminal case and the People of the Philippines should be
impleaded as a respondent in line with Section 2, Rule 125 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4Nonetheless, petitioner, in filing this petition,
incorrectly entitled it Albino Josef v. Agustin Alarilla. In accord with Section 6,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,5 we have allowed petitioner Josef to
subsequently implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in this
case.
Now, the facts.
From June to August, 1991, petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and
seller of shoes, purchased materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a
seller of leather products from Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which the former
issued a total of 26 postdated checks against his account with the
Associated Bank and Far East Bank & Trust Company (Marikina Branches).
When private respondent presented these checks for encashment, they were
dishonored because the accounts against which they were drawn were
closed. Private respondent informed petitioner of the dishonor and
demanded payment of their value. After some negotiations, petitioner drew
and delivered a new set of postdated checks in replacement of the
dishonored ones. Private respondent, in turn, returned to petitioner the
originals of the dishonored postdated checks but retained photocopies
thereof. When private respondent deposited the replacement checks in his
account with the Westmont Bank, these were also dishonored by the drawee
bank. As a result, the private respondent filed criminal complaints against
petitioner for violation of BP 22 with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor filed 26
Informations against petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan for violation of BP
22, entitled People v. Josef, Criminal Case Nos. 2113-M-93 to 2138-M-93,
for the original 26 postdated checks.6
The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts and imposed the penalty of
six months for each conviction. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed
decision, affirmed the trial court.
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored checks. However, he
claims the following defenses: 1) he has already paid private respondent the
amount of the checks in cash; 2) the trial court was incorrect to accept as
evidence photocopies of the original checks and 3) he acted in good faith.
He likewise adopts the dissenting opinion of CA Justice Martin Villarama,
Jr.,7 which states that the penalty of imprisonment was incorrectly imposed
on petitioner in the light of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.8
The petition is without merit.
The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.9
All three elements are present here.
Petitioner categorically admits the fact of issuance of the checks and their
dishonor,10 the first and third elements. He has likewise failed to rebut the
statutory presumption11 of knowledge of insufficient funds, the second
element, which attaches if the check is presented and dishonored within 90
days from its issuance.12 While petitioner alleges to have paid private
respondent the amount of the checks, he failed to specify if he had done so
within five banking days from receiving notice of the checks’ dishonor and to
present any evidence of such payment. In addition, his unsubstantiated claim
of cash payment contradicts his earlier defense that he had replaced the
checks.
Moving onto the procedural aspects of the case, petitioner claims that, under
the Best Evidence Rule, the trial court should not have admitted in evidence
the photocopies of the checks until after he had been given reasonable
notice to produce the originals. The Court of Appeals, in disposing of this
contention, said:13
However, in the light of the factual milieu in the present recourse, (we) find
and so declare that the Court a quo did not commit any reversible error in
admitting in evidence the photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of
the originals thereof in the possession of the [Petitioner]. It bears stressing
that the raison d’etre of the proscription against the admission of secondary
evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original thereof is to prevent the
commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession of the
best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced secondary evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the
originals of the checks and even marked the same in evidence as Exhibits
"1" to "21", except five (5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as
missing and the Prosecution even adopted the original checks as its
evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the
subject checks were in his possession. The [Petitioner] never alleged that
the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by
the Prosecution were not faithful copies of the originals of the
checks. In point of fact, when he testified in the Court a quo, he was shown,
by his counsel, the photostatic copies of the subject checks… and admitted
that the originals of said checks were in his possession on his claim that he
had paid the Private Complainant the amount of ₱600,000.00 in cash and
the balance in the form of checks which he drew and issued to the Private
Complainant by way of replacement of the aforesaid other checks:
xxx xxx xxx
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic
copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the
Prosecution were the faithful reproductions of the originals of the
checks in his possession. Hence, the Prosecution may mark and offer
in evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the checks
admitted in evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful reproduction of the
original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from
invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting that the originals were in
his possession and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured
whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution’s evidence. The fact that
these originals were all stamped "account closed" merely confirmed the
allegations of the respondent that the checks were dishonored by reason of
the account being closed. Because they were entirely consistent with its
main theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these originals as its own
evidence. In addition, by petitioner’s own admission, five of the original
checks were lost, thus rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as
exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.14
Regarding petitioner’s allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a
claim is immaterial, the offense in question being malum prohibitum.15 The
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check and therefore,
whether or not malice and intent attended such issuance is unimportant.16
In invoking of A.C. No. 12-2000, petitioner adopts the interpretation of
Justice Villarama to the effect that the circular mandates judges to impose
fines rather than imprisonment on violators of BP 22. In affirming the
sentence imposed by the trial court, the majority pointed out that it is only
under certain conditions that trial court judges may impose fines rather than
imprisonment. The Circular provides, in part:
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court
(Second Division) per Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence
imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment
and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the
check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this
appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a
prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the
penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely,
that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to
the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an
amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate
penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme
Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and
sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine
allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., ₱200,000, and concluded that "such would best
serve the ends of criminal justice."
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Considerable confusion arose as a result of this circular. Like Justice
Villarama, many came to believe that the policy enunciated in this circular
was to altogether remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violation
of BP 22. The circular created so much confusion, in fact, that less than
three months later, we had to issue yet another circular, Administrative
17
Circular No. 13-2001, for the specific purpose of clarifying exactly what the
implications of A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In order to put all doubts to rest, the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
second circular provides:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith
or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to
say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the
Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a
hindrance (emphasis ours).
Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within
the sound discretion of the judge trying the case, based on his assessment
of the offender and the facts. Justice Villarama premised his dissent on the
absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000 between which offenders
deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a fine and which deserve
imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13-2001 states, the application of the circular is
selective and it is entirely up to the trial court judge to make that distinction,
given the circumstances obtaining. This brings us to the factual issue of
petitioner’s worthiness of the lighter penalty. On this, we see no reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23234 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005
vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death by the
RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311,
for rape committed against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest among the six
children of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz.3 She was six years and nine months
old when the rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas St.,
Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase, PasayCity, taking care of her younger
siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was out. On the
guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to the victim's house and asked
her to lie down on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed
her clothes and his own clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed and
laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Alpha Jane shouted
in pain which startled the appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and left.4
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what
had happened. She immediately reported the incident to the barangay
officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital
for medical examination. She also sought assistance from the police at the
521st Air Police Squadron who, after gathering information from the victim,
arrested the appellant at his house.5 Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the following day,6 and on August 10,
2001, to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further medical
examinations, which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations,
respectively, on the victim's genitalia.8
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before the
RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City, Metro ,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, GENARO CAYABYAB Y FERNANDEZ, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by means of force and intimidation have
carnal knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six (6)
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that on August
7, 2001, he was plying his normal route inside the Villamor Airbase as a
tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.10 After returning the tricycle to its
owner Roberto Gabo at the corner of 14th and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase,
he reached home at around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating
dinner.11 At around 9:30 p.m., he woke up to urinate at the back of their
house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled him.12 At the
headquarters, he was forced to admit the rape13 while the victim's father
asked for money in exchange for his release, which he refused.14
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent with the medical findings
of the doctors from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH.
Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated defense of denial and
alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor
victim. Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority and
imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven
the guilt of the accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond reasonable
doubt for rape as defined and penalized under Article 335, paragraph 3 and
4 as the victim herein is only six (6) years old and hereby sentence accused
Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay civil indemnity in the
amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of Php 50,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.15
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However,
pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo16 modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as direct
appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, this
case was transferred to the Court of Appeals,17 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED intoto,
and accordingly certifies the case and elevate the entire records to the
Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.18
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
There is no doubt that appellant raped Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001 inside Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?
their house at Villamor Airbase, PasayCity. This credibility given by the trial
court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence19 which appellate A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the
direct and cross-examination by counsel. Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?

On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and positively A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.
identified appellant as her assailant, thus:
Q. After that what else happened?
Fiscal Barrera:
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you?
Q. Did you follow him?
A. I was inside our house.
A. No, sir, I did not follow.
Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City?
Q. And so what else happened?
A. Yes, sir.
A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my shorts and
Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that date and panty.
time?
Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what happened?
A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng spray gun for
painting. A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.

Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. while your Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?
mother bought gas and your father was walking with his spray gun used for
painting? A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.

A. My brothers and sisters. Fiscal Barrera:

Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of any unusual What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to your private
incident that happened to you? part?

A. Yes, sir. A. I shouted, sir.

Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you? Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and you shouted,
what happened?
A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me. EXAMINATION

Q. Then what happened? Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type of Hymen:
Anullar
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
...
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
IMPRESSIONS
A. I run away.
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to your mother?
(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)
A. Yes, sir.
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5
Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and removed oclock and laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous (TSN, November 20,
your shorts and panty and thereafter inserted his penis inside your vagina on 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior injury to the
August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you see him? victim's hymen which might have been caused by the insertion of a blunt
object such as an erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim
A. Yes, sir. that she had been raped (TSN, November 20, 2001, pp. 6-7).21

Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you be able to The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.
identify him?
Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years old', is a
dastardly and repulsive crime which merit no less than the penalty of death
A. Yes, sir.
pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying
circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in
Q. Is he inside the courtroom? the information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death
cannot be imposed.
Interpreter:
In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of conflicting
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Genaro pronouncements concerning the appreciation of minority, either as an
Cayabyab.20 element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a number
of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the Court ruled that
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the age of the victim was not duly proved.23 On the other hand, there were
the victim's father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast and consistent that it was also several cases where we ruled that the age of the rape victim was
appellant who raped her. The victim's testimony was supported by the sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the
medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts from the PNP Crime birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age.24 Thus, in order to
Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit: remove any confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
ANO-GENITAL circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. clearly admitted by the accused.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth the baptismal certificate of the victim was presented to prove her age. The
of the victim would suffice to prove age. trial court based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped
on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact that the defense did not contest her
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been age and questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age. It
lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and was however noted that the Medico-Legal Report never mentioned her age
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or and only the testimony of her mother was presented to establish Lizette's
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such age. The Court found that there was uncertainty as to the victim's exact age,
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth certificate,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
circumstances: evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of 'below seven (7) years
old is appreciated.
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old; Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that
Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was raped, based not only
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be on the testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but also on the
proved is that she is less than 12 years old; strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note
that the defense did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on
the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of birth.
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a mere
photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of
testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for said photocopy
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.
admitted by the accused.78
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.25
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar following cases:
authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and
school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the
family may be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the
victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the
local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation
of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand
the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and
no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.27
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the
photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed to
raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary
evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and
the other party is bound thereby.28
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was
only six-years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when the rape
incident happened on August 7, 2001.
Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence that if the crime is
qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty
by applicable amendatory laws, the accused should be ordered to pay the
complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages is distinct from exemplary
damages, hence must be awarded separately. The award of moral damages
is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other
than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim
has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.29 However,
the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in accord with
prevailing jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary damages, we held
in People v. Catubig31 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages. Conformably, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, as affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding appellant Genaro
Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and imposing the penalty of DEATH33 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170604 September 2, 2013
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document
are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a
cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not
apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other
than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment
rendered on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of Maximo S Alvarez
and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila dismissing the respondents’ action
for quieting of title.2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita
Prodon,3 the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late
spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered
owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in
possession of the property during their lifetime; that upon their parents’
deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as heirs, paying
the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not locate the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on
file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy
contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant
Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been
maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed
that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN
FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF
₱120,000.00, THE HEREIN REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING FOR
HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR THE
SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTH (sic) FROM
EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET FORTH IN (DOC. NO.
321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A. RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF
MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase;
that the deed had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly
annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six
months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property;
and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its
non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the
files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,6 finding untenable the
plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not
exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as
evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon
proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being
without bad faith. It found that the defendant had established the execution
and existence of the deed, to wit:
In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of the disputed
deed of sale with right to repurchase accomplished by the late Maximo
Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has been adequately
established by reliable and trustworthy evidences (sic). Defendant Prodon
swore that on September 9, 1975 she purchased the land covered by TCT
No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and
Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7); that the deed of sale with right
to repurchase was drawn and prepared by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid.,
p. 9); and that on September 10, 1975, she registered the document in the
Register of Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon dated September 10, 1975 (Exhibit
2), and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit
4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following entries, to wit:
"No. 321; Nature of Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase;
Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date and
Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to wit: ‘Number
of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour and Minute: 3:42
p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with Right to Repurchase; Executed by:
Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita Prodon; Date of Document: 9-9-75;
Contract value: 120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-a). Under these premises the Court
entertains no doubt about the execution and existence of the controverted
deed of sale with right to repurchase.7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
could not have executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase because of
illness and poor eyesight from cataract. It held that there was no proof that On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the
the illness had rendered him bedridden and immobile; and that his poor
eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to
produce it before the court. It believed Jose Camilon’s testimony that he had
handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he could not
anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had
meanwhile suffered from a heart ailment and had been recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE
EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE
WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE
DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE
DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS
BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT
WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE PLAINTIFFS’
CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS ALLEGED
EXECUTION.8
RTC, and ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) v. Del
Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is instructive in resolving this
issue. The said case held:
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other
than the original document itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence
of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original is lost or
destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no
bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or
other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary."
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a
document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the] document
must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites ha[ve]
been established by Margarita Prodon. This Court, however, after going
through the records of the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds that the
following circumstances put doubt on the very existence of the alleged deed
of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized
between August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975 (Exhibit "K"). It was also
established by said Exhibit "L" that Maximo Alvarez suffered from paralysis
of half of his body and blindness due to cataract. It should further be noted
that barely 6 days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was again
hospitalized for the last time because he died on October of 1975 without
having left the hospital. This lends credence to plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion
that their father, Maximo Alvarez, was not physically able to personally
execute the deed of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s
testimony that Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his residence on
September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that again they met on
September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed of sale (Exhibits "A" and "1").
The Court also notes that from the sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was
finally filed, defendant-appellee never tried to recover possession of the
property nor had she shown that she ever paid Real Property Tax thereon.
Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of Title had not been transferred in the
name of the alleged present owner. These actions put to doubt the validity of
the claim of ownership because their actions are contrary to that expected of
legitimate owners of property.
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, the fact of its
loss had not been duly established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps. Aguilar (218
SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after proof of the execution of
the Deed it must also be established that the said document had been lost or original deed of sale and to establish its loss.
destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next
be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of
the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may
be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using
copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing
itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be
regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable
(i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the
document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five
original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. This[,] petitioners failed to do. Records
show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original
copies." (218 SCRA at 607-608)
In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed that a copy was given
to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not recover said copy. A perusal of
the testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted
sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had
exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he said was with Atty.
Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed that Atty. Lacanilao was
already too sick to even try looking for the copy he had. But even assuming
this is to be so, Jose Camilion did not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one
in his office to help him find said copy. In fine, this Court believes that the
trial court erred in admitting the secondary evidence because Margarita
Prodon failed to prove the loss or destruction of the deed.
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been
admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby
REVERSED and a new one entered ordering the cancellation of Entry No.
3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to remove the
cloud over plaintiff-appellants’ title.
SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002) filed
an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for Reconsideration of
the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA erred: (a) in finding that the
pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had not been
complied with; (b) in concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with right to
repurchase; and (c) in blaming them for not recovering the property, for not
paying the realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the title in their
names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing the
substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for
reconsideration for its lack of merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the
Court through petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely: (a)
whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had
been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with right to
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was already barred
by laches.12
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a
harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in order to carry out our
essential responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on the
admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the CA and
the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their
misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for
quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in order to turn the
case to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule
excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents
thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror
to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact
contents of a writing are brought before the court,14 considering that (a) the
precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more
than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard
of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or
typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from
memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in
the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.15 The rule
further acts as an insurance against fraud.16Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose
and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting
from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a
larger set of writings.18
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading
inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are
in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts,
such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference
to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.19 In such a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for xxxx
the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring in her answer
is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, that "sometime [o]n September 9, 1975, deceased Maximo S. Alvarez
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an lawfully entered into a Contract of Sale with Right to Repurchase, object of
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street, Tondo, Manila, in favor of
the complainant and other claimants to place things in their proper place and defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC defined the issue to be tried as
to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb "[w]hether or not the alleged document mentioned in the said entry is
the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right existing, valid or unenforceable,"23 and did not include the terms of the deed
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can of sale with right to repurchase among the issues.
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use,
and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined, for none
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant of them thereafter ventured to present evidence to establish the terms of the
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
deed of sale with right to repurchase. In the course of the trial, however, a
the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to question was propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or executed the
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule.
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20
The RTC then sustained the objection.24 At that point began the diversion of
the focus in the case. The RTC should have outrightly overruled the
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, objection because the fact sought to be established by the requested
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may testimony was the execution of the deed, not its terms.25 Despite the fact that
not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground the terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the
alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the
based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with,
of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be
of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary excluded. In the end, the RTC found in its judgment that Prodon had
evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule complied with the requisites for the introduction of secondary evidence, and
will come into play. gave full credence to the testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the non-
production of the original. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake
It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded
deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the differently, in that it held that Prodon had not established the existence,
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was execution, and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites for the
whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have
complaint that: been admitted, but like the RTC the CA did not state what excluded
secondary evidence it was referring to.
xxxx
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the
9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and deliberately done by terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA
the defendant Margarita Prodon created cloud and [is] prejudicial to the title did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution,
of the property subject matter of this case, since while it is apparently valid or and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had
effective, but in truth and in fact it is invalid, ineffective or unenforceable been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed
inasmuch that the instrument purporting to be a Deed of Sale with right of and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed
repurchase mentioned in the said entry does not exist. 21 as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due Q
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of
evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness?
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even
without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
A

2.
Yes, sir.

Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of
Q
the deed of sale with right to repurchase
A
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to
establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the Q
deed.26 This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the
foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.27 Her inability to Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased plaintiff
produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife?
existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary
under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required When they went to our house, sir.
to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to
which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition When was this specifically?
for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to
show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the
Sometime the first week of September or about September 5, 1975, sir.
presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified
that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that
he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao Q
had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without
showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in meeting you
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was on that date?
inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from
Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that A
direction.
They were selling a piece of land, sir.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the
existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. xxxx
had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on
September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and the
second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to Q
repurchase, viz:
At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave ATTY. REAL
approached you to sell their piece of land located at Endaya, Tondo, Manila,
what document, if any, did they show you? Q

A What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?

The title of the land, sir. A

xxxx She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.

Q Q

You said that on the first week of September or September 5, 1975 spouses After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?
Maximo and Valentina approached you at the time, what did you tell the
spouses, if any? A

A I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.

I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a buyer,
Q
sir.
Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita Prodon?
xxxx
A
Q
Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can now sell the
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later and that piece of land, sir.
you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if any?
Q
A
What did you tell Valentina Clave?
I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
A
Q
Q
A
We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.
What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
And did the meeting occur?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
WITNESS
 A • Congestive heart failure
• CFC III29
Yes, sir.
June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)
ATTY. REAL • Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis)30

August 23-September 3, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

Q • Congestive heart failure, mild
• Atrial fibrillation
What happened at the meeting? • Cardiac functional capacity III-B31

A September 15-October 2, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the spouses,
wanted to sell the land, sir.
Q • Upper GI bleeding probably secondary
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
A
That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she was
going to buy the lot, sir.28
The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving the
due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase for three
reasons.1âwphi1
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the time that
the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been supposedly executed on
September 9, 1975. The records manifested that he had been admitted to
the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and
had then been diagnosed with the serious ailments or conditions, as follows:
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• Pneumonia
• Urinary tract infection
• Cerebrovascular accident, old
to stress ulcers32
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable
for him to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where
Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only to negotiate and
consummate the sale of the property. This high improbability was fully
confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested that his father had been
seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in 1975.33 The medical
records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975, or three days prior to his
final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered
from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough
productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious"
but "weak" and "bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular
rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity
had suffered 90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975
could not command belief.

Period of confinement
March 31 – May 19, 1975
Diagnosis
• Prostatitis, chronic
• Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Atrial fibrillation
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved
at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the
registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of its authenticity or
its due execution by the registered owner of the property, which was
precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that registration,
being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is
inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the
dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the
instrument.35 It is relevant to mention that the law on land registration does
not require that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of
registration is only to give notice.36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon
could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
notarized by him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the
property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised her right to
take over the property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in
1976 of the repurchase period stipulated under the deed, including
transferring the TCT in her name and paying the real property taxes due on
the properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity of her claim against the
respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18,
2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo
Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO
ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO,
ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue
whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these
instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the
parties in order to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not
its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical
errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the October 7, 2003
Decision,2 as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998,
is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.4
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the
following dispositive portion:
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
 1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI
[of] the Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly
TCT No. 43258);
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in
the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively,
as they are disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;
3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its
rightful beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under
reasonable terms and conditions;
4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and
Salun-at; and ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per
hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus such accrued
and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for
with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed to assist the
parties execute their leasehold contracts and;
5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be
observed until otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate
body.
SO ORDERED.5
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 ‘W.,
agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located 1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while
the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the
Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap
6
property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi) (who is the
husband7 of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property
is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz
(Dela Cruz).8
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the
loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January
14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following
description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m.
more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 ‘E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 ‘E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 ‘W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 ‘W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road;
on the southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the northwest by
Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete.
Bearings true. Declination 0131 ‘E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-
176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in
accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O.
Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March 1913. Note: All
corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159
of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the
Lantap property and contained the following description:
thence N. 61 deg. 40’E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20’E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40’E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20’W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
containing an area of 2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast,
southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the northwest by
Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31’E., points
 referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority
of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6,
1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite
K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.10
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag
Townsite, K-27," without any reference to either Barangay Lantap or
Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots
from RBBI. The Deed of Sale11 described the property sold as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and
unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and
described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000
hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public
Land; and on the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia
and Santos Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 ‘B. Points referred to
are marked on plan H-176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in
fee simple in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention
the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property.
There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the
Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who
continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised
acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent
Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other
respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property
-- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any
landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a
decade later, on July 1, 1994.12
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 2013 and 2114 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,15executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of
the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an
agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-
62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).16
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of
₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez17 and Dela Cruz18 on
September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of
agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.19 The CLOAs were registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of
the respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor
of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint20 before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by
petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary
land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based
on respondents’ theory that the Murong property, occupied by the
petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back,
as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that
their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong
property.
Petitioners filed their Answer21 and insisted that they bought the Murong
property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have
always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the
owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest
belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and
exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also
argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was
actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and
possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of
the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a
grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the
disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules
and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision23
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the
Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on
respondents’ Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property,
the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong
property. On the other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No.
T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled
that petitioners’ CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the
particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the
Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical
error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not
the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were
disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the
cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold
contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers of
the Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of
leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision24
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD
Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to
petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the
respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were
remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the
corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular
performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by
the respondents’ admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the
Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents’ allegation that they bought back the Murong property
from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with
substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBI’s claim that
respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property.
Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into
an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the
actual tenant of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the
CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by operation of law qualified
beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles
were awarded in conformity with the CARP program implementation; and
finally, the Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the
subject landholding must be completely and finally laid to rest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the
assailed decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered,
declaring:
1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona
fide tenant-tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are
the qualified beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396
issued in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and
Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096
(TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;
3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold
contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap
property, [the latter] being the subject matter of the ‘buy back’
arrangement entered into between [respondents] and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed
resolved.
SO ORDERED.25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in
ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were
awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers
indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in
determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents’ Deed of Sale
expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what
was sold to them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners’
VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836;
thus it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property.
Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the
Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of
qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule
embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the
best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which
was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject
is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is
the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the
property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the
Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject
thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere
typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in
the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same
particularly describes the properties’ metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which were separately denied.28
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this Court.29 RBBI raised the issue that
the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean
hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the
two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from
any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyone’s expense.
RBBI’s petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said
Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition
for review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of
sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.30
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.31 Entry of
judgment was made in that case on December 15, 2004.32
On July 27, 2005,33 petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the
Court’s determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBI’s Petition for Review
on Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject of the contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties’ respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual
issues which are beyond the province of Rule 45.34
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the
appellate court’s rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as
inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the
admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Court’s authority
to review.35
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to
review the same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only
questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are "(1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record."36
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the
general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the
case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be
discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing
bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under
Rule 45.
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBI’s appeal
Respondents maintain that the Court’s earlier dismissal of RBBI’s petition
for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no
reversible error in the appellate court’s decision in favor of the respondents.37
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBI’s earlier petition in G.R.
No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors
in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in
the appellate court’s decision but simply placed the responsibility for the
confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the
identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with
clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the
appellate court’s Decision. It is the appellant’s responsibility to point out the
perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises
equitable considerations such as the "clean hands" doctrine without a clear-
cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be
no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction
and the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not
always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it
could simply be the result of the appellant’s inadequate discussion,
ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
RBBI’s failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not
prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBI’s appeal, especially
because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately
and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his
right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already
appealed ahead of him,38 or just because the other party’s separate appeal
had already been dismissed.39
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment
against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior
to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of
CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two
properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam)
is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.40 Thus, when the
vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons
(petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment which may
be rendered against the vendor.41
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the
Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the
property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale
stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the title for
the Murong property – then the property repurchased by the respondents
was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs
between petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 – the title for the
Lantap property – then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap
property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence
rule to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of
the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately
expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol
Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the
dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule.
The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and
no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is
admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the
chance of undetected tampering with the document.42
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence
Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It
is admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to TCT
No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further
described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the
Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No.
T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property
(covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and
the petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong" was a typographical
error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to "Barangay
Murong" reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836
was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts,
arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the
true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the
documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the
actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.43
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a
party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid
agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied
in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the
contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The
appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and
refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the
case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs
executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule
is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest."
The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in
question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.44
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence
Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs
described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap
property), but they also describe the subject property as being located in
"Barangay Murong." Even the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls under the
exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096"
(Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the
Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine
the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is
the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the
soul of a contract,45 not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies,
or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements. for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.

In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code Aside from respondents’ neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the
involving the interpretation of contracts: Murong property, there is one other circumstance that convinces us that
what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall property, without turning over the supposed landowner’s share to RBBI. This
control. strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not
RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly
spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the
latter shall prevail over the former. the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations as
supposed tenants of RBBI’s land? The factual circumstances of the case
simply do not support the theory propounded by the respondents.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were
documents is likewise enlightening: already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying
rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the
language he is to interpret.1âwphi1 petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase price of
₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the
intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, did not reveal
were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the
seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners’ favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer
Third issue to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession
of the Murong property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until
respondents started the controversy in 1997.
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and
petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and
the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no
the respondents was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After
contrary evidence of the parties’ actuations to indicate that they intended the
the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise
sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT
acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that
to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken
they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the
belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not
Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the
farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality
possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular
barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are
bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed
technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.

The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners’ argument that their VLTs

were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by
asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their
contract.46 A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises
when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not
to abide by the true agreement of the parties.47 It seems fairly obvious that
petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto
(RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and
application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong
property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when
strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that the issue
became relevant for the first time.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836,
while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and
CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-
62096. In consequence, the CA’s ruling against RBBI should not be
executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein.
Although the CA’s decision had already become final and executory as
against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No. 163320, our
ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the
execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The

assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981
are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the
DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February
26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers
the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners
cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds
of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles
of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against
respondents.

SO ORDERED.