Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 76 November 1983 933

Human factors and air operations in the

South Atlantic Campaign: discussion paper'

J A Baird MB MFOM
P K L Coles MB MRCGP
A N Nicholson OBE DSC MFOM
Royal Air Force Strike Command, High Wycombe
and Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine, Farnborough

The operation during 1982 to regain sovereignty of the Falkland Islands involved air
operations from an early stage, and it was anticipated that they would be difficult because of
the distance of over 7000 miles from the United Kingdom to the Falklands, and the absence
of forward airfields. Apart from aircraft which could operate from ships, the only other
option was to use Ascension Island, which is almost exactly midway between the United
Kingdom and the Falklands. Flights to Ascension were accomplished very easily, but the
support of the task force from Ascension required return flights of up to 6800 miles. This
posed problems for the aircrew, in particular disturbances of sleep inevitable in maintaining
a continuous long-range air operation.
From the earliest phase the medical staffs at the Headquarters of Royal Air Force Strike
Command and at the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine were involved with
advice on human factors for the aircrew and ground personnel. This included considerations
of the crew task in flight, duration and frequency of flights, unusual patterns of work and
rest, and rest facilities. The operation posed two problems: flights of very long duration and
intensive rates of work.
Previous studies carried out during the early 1970s on reinforcing the Far East from the
United Kingdom (Figure 1) had involved several exercises with transport aircraft (Atkinson
et al. 1970), and these suggested that, with some augmentation of the crew, the duration of
individual flights could be extended to 30 hours - possibly involving loss of sleep over two
consecutive nights. However, there was less information available on how frequently such
flights could be operated over several weeks, though previous studies on aircrew in both civil
and military transport operations provided some idea of workloads which would preserve an
acceptable sleep pattern (Nicholson 1972), and this guideline was used initially (Figure 2).
However, it was evident at an early stage that the duty hours indicated by the guideline as
being compatible with an acceptable sleep pattern would be far exceeded, particularly in
maritime reconnaissance and in some transport roles, and that the operational requirement
was most demanding. During the operation, flying rates were extended in many roles far
beyond previous experience (Figure 3). This would have led to considerable sleep difficulties,
and so from the early stages of the campaign hypnotics were used - particularly as the rest
periods occurred at various times of the day and night, and because several weeks of
disturbed sleep were envisaged.
The use of hypnotics in such a critical situation required a drug which was effective at any
time of the day or night without a residual effect on awakening after 6 -hours, and the facility
to use the drug repeatedly at intervals of around 24 hours without the possibility of
accumulation. This, in turn, required a hypnotic which was rapidly absorbed, and in which
the plasma concentration fell below that of the minimum effective concentration for
impaired performance before awakening.
'Paper read at symposium held by the United Services Section at the Royal College of Surgeons, 17-18 February
1983. Accepted 28 July 1983

01414768/83/(110933-05/$01.00/0 (D 1983 The Royal Society of Medicine

934 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 76 November 1983
ak. IStond

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Figure 1. Route structure for a double-crew, continuous flying operation carried out
during the late 1960s. Two crews slept aboard the aircraft (VCIO) and provided a
capability independent of positioned crews. This operation from the United Kingdom via
Alaska, Wake Island, Singapore and Persian Gulf was completed in less than 48 hours

Previous research at the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine (Clarke &
Nicholson 1978, Nicholson & Stone 1976, 1979a,b,c, Nicholson 1981) had shown that the
1,4-benzodiazepine, temazepam, a metabolite of diazepam which has no long-acting
metabolite and which is rapid!y eliminated, was a useful hypnotic for aircrew, and because
of this experience - albeit in a less demanding situation - it was made available. Laboratory
studies had raised the possibility that it may not maintain sleep under difficult circumstances
(Nicholson & Stone 1979a, Nicholson et al. 1980), but, in the event, it proved quite
adequate.
Temazepam (Normison; Wyeth) was used widely. The majority of aircrew took 20 mg to
get to sleep at various times of the day, and experienced good sleep without side or residual
effects. They were advised to take the hypnotic at least 8 hours before flights and, whenever
possible, were given an initial test dose to assess any untoward effect; none, however, was
encountered. In many cases there was no time available to give the test dose, but such was
the usefulness of the drug that crews found that they could fly 6 hours after taking
temazepam without any ill effect. A brief account of the work of the crews - in particular
those involved in maritime reconnaissance and long-haul transportation - will make this clear.
The maximum flying rate in peacetime for the Hercules transport crews is 120 hours per
month, though this has seldom been achieved. During the South Atlantic Campaign it
reached 150 hours per month, and this could involve six long-range flights with durations of
up to 28 hours if a landing in the Falklands was not possible. Such flights usually extended
over two nights. Most were achieved with augmented crews, which involved an extra pilot
and navigator. Other crews were flying up to 19 hours in a single flight, and over a 3-month
period some accumulated 360 flying hours. The very long flights were only possible with air-
to-air refuelling: this was a new task, because the aircraft had never been used in this way
before.
 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 76 November 1983 935
Flying hours
ian-
]Du Transports
(Hercules) p
Flying hours
140 150h-24days
I120 - Transport s IVC 10)
Maritime and
reconnaissince Air to Air refuelling
I100 - (Nimrods), (0IVictors)
901 lOOh -14 doys/ lOOh-28 do

701 80 _

60-

Workload compatible with

acceptoble sleep pattern 40 - Workload compatible with
in long range air operations acceptable sleep pattern

20 -

0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 D0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Days on task Days on task

Figure 2. Workload in terms of flying hours believed to Figure 3. Workload in terms of flying hours reached by
be compatible with an acceptable sleep pattern some aircrew during the campaign

The problems associated with air-to-air refuelling from jet Victor tankers to turbo-prop
Hercules were considerable and, because of speed differentials, a 'toboggan' descent for both
aircraft was required during the refuelling procedure, resulting in a 10000 ft loss of altitude.
This had to be carried out twice on the southbound leg of a round trip, so that if the aircraft
could not land in the Falklands it would be able to return to Ascension - 3500 miles away
(Figure 4). Air-to-air refuelling was a major requirement in the campaign, and the Victor
aircraft proved indispensable. The aircraft operated on a daily basis out of Ascension. Up to
14 aircraft were required to position one aircraft in the total exclusion zone. The flights were
of variable duration (2-14 hours), and involved flying hours up to 100 per month (Figure 5).
Nimrod crews were involved in intensive maritime reconnaissance, and some crews
reached up to 100 flying hours in 2 weeks (Figure 5). Flights varied from 6 to about 20
hours, and the crews were augmented with one extra pilot and engineer. The aircraft spent
many hours in transit and required air-to-air refuelling, which had previously not been
attempted with this aircraft.
VCI0 aircraft operated from UK to Ascension and were used throughout the campaign.
The crews were not unduly stretched and did not require hypnotics, although their normal
peacetime flying rates increased from about 20 to about 100 hours per month. The crews
were on schedules similar to normal route flying, although flights were more frequent.
VC1Os were also used in the aeromedical evacuation role, and 11 flights from Montevideo
conveyed 565 casualties to the United Kingdom.
Harriers (GR3) were rapidly equipped with refuelling probes, and the pilots were
familiarized with aircraft carrier operations. The aircraft were flown to Ascension with in-
flight refuelling. This was a 9-hour flight accomplished without any major difficulty.
Previous experience in the human factors of long-range, air-to-air refuelling had been
gathered during such operations with Lightning and Phantom crews in the early 1970s (Mills
& Nicholson 1974) (Figure 6).
Some Harriers were transferred to carrier operations and took over the offensive support
role, leaving the Royal Navy to revert to air defence and fleet protection. Initially they
operated from HMS Hermes, but after the landings 2 aircraft used San Carlos as a forward
936 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 76 November 1983

Figure 4. Route structure for Hercules
(transport) aircraft. These aircraft operated
between the United Kingdom, Ascension and
Falkland Islands. Some operations south from
Ascension involved return flights to the
Falklands without landing (duration up to 28
hours) and with air-to-air refuelling
"
Falklands
Figure 5. Flight pattern of Nimrod (maritime
reconnaissance) and Victor (air-to-air
refuelling) aircraft involved flights from
Ascension Island into the South Atlantic

base. They operated during the day only, with the pilots normally flying twice a day and
able to get adequate rest at night. During the campaign they flew over 150 support and low-
level reconnaissance missions, losing 3 aircraft to enemy action. No pilots were killed, but
one was taken prisoner.
Helicopters were in short supply and this was accentuated by the loss of 3 Chinooks on SS

Figure 6. Route structure for an air-to-air refuelling operation during the

early 1970s of fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom to the Far East via
Bahrain. The aircraft (Lightnings) completed the operation in two parts, and
were refuelled by tanker aircraft (Victors) from the United Kingdom, Malta,
Cyprus, Middle East, Indian Ocean and Singapore
 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 76 November 1983 937

Atlantic Conveyor. The remaining Chinook flew intensively on the Falklands during the
phase from the San Carlos landings to the recapture of Port Stanley, lifting most of the
heavy equipment and about 80 troops at a time. Other helicopters involved in the campaign
were Sea Kings, both in Ascension and latterly on the Falklands. All helicopter crews flew
up to 10 hours per day, with a maximum of 120 hours per month compared with a
peacetime maximum of 75 hours per month.
During the South Atlantic Campaign advice on human factors - particularly in relation to
the problem of disturbed sleep - played an important part in maintaining air operations.
Hypnotics were used extensively, and they ensured that adequate sleep was provided under
difficult circumstances over many weeks.
References
Atkinson D W, Borland R G & Nicholson A N (1970) Aerospace Medicine 41, 1121-1126
Clarke C H & Nicholson A N (1978) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 6, 325-331
Mills N H & Nicholson A N (1974) In: Simulation and Study of High Workload Operations. Ed. A N Nicholson.
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, Neuilly-sur-Seine
Nicholson A N (1972) Aerospace Medicine 43, 138-141
Nicholson A N (1981) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 11, 61-69S
Nicholson A N & Stone B M (1976) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 3, 543-550
Nicholson A N & Stone B M (1979a) In: Chronopharmacology. Ed. A Reinberg & F Halberg. Pergamon Press,
Oxford; pp 159-169
Nicholson A N & Stone B M (1979b) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 7, 463-468
Nicholson A N & Stone B M (1979c) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 8, 39-42S
Nicholson A N, Stone B M & Pascoe P A (1980) British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 10, 459-463