YU vs SANTIAGO, January 24, 1989

 The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July
1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the
Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID,
respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral
argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its
10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the
pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November 1988.
4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for

reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order
dated 28 November 1988.
 Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6
Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is a
summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.
 In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13
December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988
was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
 The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently
sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting
petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for
restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13
December 1988, 10 the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
 Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17
valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese
consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July
1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980.
 To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge,
and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
 This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally
shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not
only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with
the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but
he has failed.
 While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as
this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
 Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for
clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately
executory.
 SO ORDERED.
AZNAR vs OSMEÑA, May 25, 1990

 Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private
respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
 The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
 On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.
 On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
 On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively.
 The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
 Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing
but to suspend the proclamation.
 At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form
No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B");
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21,
1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration
Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
 Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.;
that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25,
1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
 On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
 Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for
not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen.
 Hence, the present petition.
 The petition is not meritorious.
 The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and
that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988.
Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
 The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that
private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
 However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis
for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
 Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from
running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.
 In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by
any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
 In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of
registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an
American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of
Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
 Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or
not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
  By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
 The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L.
Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
 In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A.
 Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the
Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo
who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
 Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he
was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
 The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
 In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving
as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered
the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
 In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as
a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the
loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
 In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the
fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is
enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents
a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a
student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean
that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is
no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
 Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while
it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of
dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the
aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law.
Said law has not yet been enacted.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is
hereby AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.

VILANDO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, August 23, 2011

 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24,
2010 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for
quo warranto and declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified
as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its
Resolution2 dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.
 In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.
 On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the
basis of Comelec Resolution No. 80623 issued on May 18, 2007.
 On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
 The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors:
Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R.
Nos. 179240-41).6 These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by
Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which
resolved the disqualification cases against her.
  On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint
Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek
relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
 On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as
they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that
Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They
alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a
mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.
Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
 For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not
be assailed through a collateral attack.
 On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as
Member of the House of Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:
 By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that respondent
is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the First District,
Negros Oriental. This being so, their petitions must fail.
 WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and declares that
respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District, Negros Oriental.
 As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sent to the
President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, the Commission on
Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Chairman, Commission on Elections,
for his information and appropriate action.
 SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs MANAYAO, July 28, 1947

 Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime
of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been apprehended, only
Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances
of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the
crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each
of the persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that
decision to this Court.
 On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan,
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing
the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this
plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered
the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or
seventy, the residents thus assembled included men, women and children — mostly women
 The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women — the prosecution star
witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently, the
Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103,
t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing,
among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta,
Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10,
13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
 Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he bayoneted to
death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13,
31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative,
but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of
guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).
 Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino if he had
been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed to kill
them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of the matter
(pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be
wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them
 The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses — Clarita Paulino,
Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence
of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant
— such a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly states (p.
3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of the testimony
of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and saw them
testify, had the following to say:
 The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple barrio girls,
only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any
desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in their testimony and
did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could not have been
mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they know him so well that they referred to
him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the
narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were
forced eye-witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the
massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were
not consummated in a fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain
a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.
 Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and convincing
that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred
residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one made on August 28,
1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A;
pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
 In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the
Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was
therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of
the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese
Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of
Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is
absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, providing:
 . . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
 xxx xxx xxx
 (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
 (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
 xxx xxx xxx
 (6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
 There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he
was admitted into the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the
Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched
deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely
aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese constitution
and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National
Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission — although the war ended
before this could be done — they surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or
laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a
proposition which seems self-evident.
 Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or
air service" of Japan.
 Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in the
Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
 Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles
governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said
constitution ordains:
 "SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.).
 This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a period of
stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his
loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under
the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him even when
his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission
in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or
Air Corps.
 It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of
committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of
record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
 beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment.
 But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the
character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an
illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for
instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country.
(Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
 696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall take up arms
against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe
this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)
 As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is improper to
separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed
men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the
same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a
band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the
aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
 As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant acted
in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because
he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the
Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance with
duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The
construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this
Republic.
 The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.
Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this
is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually
acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more cruelty
than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate willed it — were the very ones who saved the little
girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on
the day of reckoning.
 Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of
treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of
"armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A
majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty,
convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of
each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due
to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the
applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be
inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision,
and the costs. So ordered.

REPUBLIC vs DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, June 6, 1994

 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision
dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645,
which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A.
No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
respondent on February 27, 1992.
 On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of
Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act
No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
 In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992,
and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six
months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the
petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila
(Rollo, pp. 24-26).
 On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline
for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked
that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24
 The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.
  On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the
following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued
by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of
a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5)
Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a
Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the
Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file
(Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court
 Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
 On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent
Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
 On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was
filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and
prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
 After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely
appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the
petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

VALLES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, August 9, 2000

 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
 Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
 On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC
No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient
proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc
dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
 "A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent
was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
 On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence
substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".1
 In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-
066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was
likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
 The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
 Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same
was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
 Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
 The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen
ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
 citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No.
95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental
governor.
 Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:
 a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian
national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
 b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
 c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
 Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath
that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship,
and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
 As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in
Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration
of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
 Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,3 that:
 "xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx"
 The petition is unmeritorious.
 The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
 Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
 Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
 SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
 The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
 SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States,
or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein. (underscoring ours)
 Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the
same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
 The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis
as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
 (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
 (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
 (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
 (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 19734 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.
 Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen,
she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited
private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate
of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on
March 3, 1988.
 Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
 (1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
 (2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
 (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
 (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
 (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
 (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
 (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
 In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6
and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7
 In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
 And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.
 Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
 Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must
go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
 Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic
Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
 "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
 xxx xxx xxx
 (d) Those with dual citizenship;
 xxx xxx xxx
 Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
 In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the
Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on
dual allegiance.9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act,
and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
 another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with
dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
 "xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification."
 Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it
is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed
to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. 11 This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
 Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport
of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the
Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough
to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was
effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.
 Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
 Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
 1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
 Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. 14 Indeed,
there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No.
95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these
two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal
of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits,
the petition cannot prosper.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
 Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.

BENGSON vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, May 7, 2001

 The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen."1
 Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.2
 On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
 SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
 xxx
 (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That
the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
 (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
 (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states
that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That
any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country.
Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to
the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as
a Filipino citizen x x x.
 Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
 On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
 Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become
a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
 On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its
resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
 Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:
 1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite
the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his
part.
 2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he
did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
 3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status.7
 The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with
out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
 Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
 The petition is without merit.
 The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
 (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
 (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
 There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.9
 As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10
 On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act
No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and
none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.14
 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
 Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
 Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
 Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
 As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
 In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
 xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.25
 Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
 In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630, which provides:
 Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
 Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
 Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
 Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
 Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
 Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38
of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
 The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-
born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire
his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
 A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's
jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
 discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence thereof,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET
nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.

ANGAT vs REPUBLIC, September 14, 1999

 The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29
December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Marikina City in Case No. N-96-03-MK,
entitled "in the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the
Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 965 and
263[0]."
 Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident
Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a
petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic
Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, "applying for
naturalization," he averred that —
 FIRST. — His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached
and made an integral part of this petition.
 SECOND. — His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro
Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas, U.S.1âwphi1.nêt
 THIRD. — His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which
he has been engaged since his arrival here in the Philippines.
 FOURTH. — He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of
the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. He is at
present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A."
 FIFTH. — He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at
petitioner's residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attached as
Annex "B."
 SIXTH. — He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien
registration is hereto attached as Annex "C."
 SEVENTH. — He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and
Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none of the
disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six
months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his
relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
 EIGHT. — He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government. He is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and
predominance of men's ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation
or incurable contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the
Philippines.
 NINTH. — It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the
United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen. 1
 On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for
initial hearing on 27 January 1997 2 which, along with the petition and its annexes, was received by
the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") on 10 May 1996.
 On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12 July
1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial reconsidered was found
to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other
things, that —
 A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering
that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under R.A. 8171. 3
 Concluding, the court ruled:
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set
aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning.
 SO ORDERED. 4
 After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on
04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz:
 After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo
Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
 The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order.
 Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality.
 SO ORDERED. 5
 On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the
OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of
jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently
with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of
R.A 8171. The motion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22
September 1997, it adjudged:
 This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19,
1997.
 The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is
composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-
General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the
application; that if their applications are approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, affect which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship and the Commission of Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate
of registration.
 The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization.
 The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a
consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996 and on October 04,
1996, the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines.
 On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State
in the subject petition and on March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion.
 The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that
this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the
Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case, the
order granting the same is therefore null and void.
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996
are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its re-filing before the Special Committee on Naturalization.
 SO ORDERED. 6
 A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order
asservating that since his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the Special
Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the President under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the
court a quo had the authority to take cognizance of the case.
 In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
 The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone
assignment of error that —
 The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to
Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application.
 Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization 7 filed on
11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines
when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on
03 October 1996.
 The contention is not meritorious.
 R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation
(a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity.
The pertinent provisions of the law read:
 Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as amended: Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
 (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
 (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association
for the predominance of their ideas;
 (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or
 (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
 Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau
of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
 Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the
Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No.
270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04
June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President
Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino
had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking
any and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated:
 This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as
a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones
and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then
President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically
and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect.
In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic
rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."
 The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not
every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be
treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not-repeal P.D. 725 but left it
to the first Congress — once created — to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law,
she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she
carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction
but on common sense as well. 11
 Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; 12 hence, when petitioner filed his petition on
11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under
P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, 13 promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A.
No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance.
 The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed
with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's
order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality 14 nor could be a
source of right on the part of petitioner. 15 It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-
96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic
Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630 17 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign
country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the
petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by
the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of
jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

TABASA vs COURT OF APPEALS, August 29, 2006

 The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial
by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie
Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
 The Facts
 The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father,
Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization
(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization 6), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one
year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23,
1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was
brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7
 Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation
Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8,
Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:
 1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as a balikbayan;
 2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S.
Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondent’s Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
 3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be
summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8
 The BID ordered petitioner’s deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996,
in the following summary deportation order:
 Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent
[petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued
against him, and that the respondent’s Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked.
 By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives
apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
 In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, ‘81461’ should be ‘86461’], 30
May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does
not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further,
under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings
lie where the passport of the alien has expired.
 It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10
 Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771.
Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be
issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the
cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a
change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen
as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years
old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
 At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12
 On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on
June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioner’s detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily
deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the
CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would
be considered submitted for decision. 13 Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the
petitioner’s temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14
 However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
 The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under
RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an
undocumented alien.
 The Court’s Ruling
 The Court finds no merit in this petition.
 RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
 Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
 (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
 (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association
for the predominance of their ideas;
 (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
 (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
 Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
 He does not.
 Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
 To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
 a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
 b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
 Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born
Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a
minor.
 Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171,
his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation
where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship
and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18
the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation
is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life
much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the
minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still
a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13,
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of
the petition for repatriation.
 Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons
in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they
acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly
to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
 In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can
possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
 Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
 Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the
Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
 Section 1. Composition.—The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the
Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
 Sec. 2. Procedure.—Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to
R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the
same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration
(emphasis supplied).
 Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.—The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
 Sec. 4. Effectivity.—This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
 In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999,
applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their
birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements
were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the
reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
 What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live
birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a
certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue
of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285
designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22,
1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. 22 Thus,
petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
 Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
 Even if petitioner––now of legal age––can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless
failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention
that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is
notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a
 petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino
citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic
necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the
latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified." 23
 Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must
prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes
that the reference to ‘political or economic reasons’ is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely
accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
 Petitioner’s argument has no leg to stand on.
 A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of
repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on
June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos
the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic
necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers
clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the
Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the
following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA
8171, to wit:
 Ms. Domingo: x x x
 From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed
that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.
 The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to be
found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives
because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those
who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we
have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.
 Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but
rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their
families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this
body. (Emphasis supplied.)
 xxxx
 x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos
who leave their country. And the two types—the economic and political refugees—are the ones being
addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship
through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the country because of political
persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to
the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs of the country,
they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because they are treated no different
from any other class of alien. 26
 From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely
worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than
political or economic necessity.
 Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of
renouncing allegiance to one’s native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his
political allegiance," and his father’s loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot
therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27
 This argument has no merit.
 While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one’s native country is necessarily a political act, it
does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner.
To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The
sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic
and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes
and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and
that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
 Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the
satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to
forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this
crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
 Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the
1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an
applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to
choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like
petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition
for repatriation.
 Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
 Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship;
therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
 This theory is incorrect.
  As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown
that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
 Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:
 2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation
proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation
by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV
shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis
thereof.
 3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him,
the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989). The automatic
loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners
may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28
 In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
 It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary
documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an
alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or
Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the
privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper authorities. There is no
showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary
judgment. x x x 29
 Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an
undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such
deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.

MERCADO vs MANZANO, May 26, 1999

 Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
 Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
 Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
 In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division
said:
 What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano
as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is
based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
 In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
 Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US
citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
 The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
 Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
 WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
 On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
 Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
 On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion
was opposed by private respondent.
 The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling
 of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc read:
 As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He
acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of
jus soli.
 He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him
to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
 It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US
citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
 At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7,
1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty
three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before
the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
 WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.
 We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position
of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
 ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to
the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
 Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
 This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc
and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner
contends that —
 [T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
 A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
 1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37
years old; and,
 2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
 B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
 C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming
that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
 We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano — whether
petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in
the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene
granted.
 I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
 Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC
in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to
set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
 Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person allowed to initiate an
action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the
Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is
so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
 xxx xxx xxx
 Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
 Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment."
 The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election
for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
 sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases
in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City,
was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice
mayor of Makati City.
 Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention
only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of
the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
 Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
 Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
 The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to
a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC
en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the
denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
 This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
 II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
 The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local
position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City
of Makati. 8
 Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in
this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in
explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
 To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
 (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's'
country such children are citizens of that country;
 (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
 There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
 Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition.
 With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the
1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
10

 . . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual
allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages
or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
 What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of
dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country.
There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-
Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And
until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the
 Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
 When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of
citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second
allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been
worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
 Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia,
and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-
owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital
outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
 And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section,
probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS
INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
 In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11
 . . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense
that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a
freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution
and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined
in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to
rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact
that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the
anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and
deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant
to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to
the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on
the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens
professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time
that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
 Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed
out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered
a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
 By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
 SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with
dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution,
Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a
natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
 On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would
want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
 SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are
such countries in the world.
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
 SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without
any overt act to claim the citizenship.
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if
he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
 SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of
the Republic.
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
 This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject
or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In
Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
 [W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty
to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to
require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign
will and power of the people of this Republic.
 III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
 The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955,
of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of
the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
 Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when
private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he
reached the age of majority.
 In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
 6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
 xxx xxx xxx
 10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
 11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
 12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE
OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF
MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
 The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was
held: 17
 It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in
the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
 On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
 By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in
1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
  These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
 There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no
law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
 Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which
he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the
filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to
him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private
respondent in the case at bar:
 . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact
that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . .
[T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he
is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that
there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied."
 To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
 On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
 His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt
 SO ORDERED.

LEE HONG HOK vs DAVID, December 27, 1972

 Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of
respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is
that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was
rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a
legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from
persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the
competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but
implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.
Such an assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent.
We affirm.
 The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is
no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from
the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired
lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order
of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to
which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano
David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales
application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to
the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of
the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter
 the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a
private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only
remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In
this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the
purchase of the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered
in the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was
done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale
and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer
of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the
said deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4
 On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be
attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place,
notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was
accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It
does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the
government to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a
public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there
is no justification for reversal.
 1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set
forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a
member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent
(Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July
31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners
thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to
private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but
notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a
restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As was there
categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it
is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is
a question between the grantee and the government." 7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in
accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
 2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known
distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is
not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and
the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in
its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound
did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did
note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a case of
Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was
adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than
the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of
the matter in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees
cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having
acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded
away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish." 17
 It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated
public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19
They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this
case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being
correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
 Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public
land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government."
24 It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of

acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the
northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that
the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of
error is devoid of merit.
 3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra:
"According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and
during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales
patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act
496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from
the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land
Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree
of registration issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has been followed since then. 31 The latest
case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said,
and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than
that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens
Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase
within a period of five years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
indefensible.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of
March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants

JUSMAG PHILIPPINES vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, December 15, 1994

 The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the
Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at bench.
 JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(public respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the
Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner.
 First, the undisputed facts.
 Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP)
working at JUSMAG-Philippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his
dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the
incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His
services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. 2 He was also advised that he
was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his
leave.
 On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and
Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 3
He asked for his reinstatement.
 JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United
States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality
to sue and be sued. 4
 In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint " for
want of jurisdiction." 5 Private respondent appealed 6 to the National Labor Relations Commission
(public respondent), assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune from suit for alleged violation of our
labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating its immunity from suit for its non-contractual,
governmental and/or public acts.
 In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC 8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held
that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the
principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee relationship
under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the
services of private respondent on December 18, 1969.
 The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America, 9 where the "United States
Government (was considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a) contract of
stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the local courts."
 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue on
illegal dismissal.
 Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
 I
 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
 A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED; AND
 B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
 II
 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
 A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSMAG AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT; AND
 B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
 We find the petition impressed with merit.
 It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.
 JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21, 1947, between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.
As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of Air, Naval and Army group, and its primary task was to
advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval matters. 11
 Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services required by the
Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel,
except personal servants, shall be borne by the Republic of the Philippines."
 This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) of the Philippines, dated January 23, 1991, the United States Government, thru its Embassy,
manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to cover the salaries of security assistance support
personnel" and security guards, the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and housing, and the cost of
utilities. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated April
18, 1991. 13
 Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and JUSMAG-Philippines, thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S. Brigadier General Robert G.
Sausser. The Agreement delineated the terms of the assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991, the
relevant parts of which read:
 a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards currently
contracted between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and the Security Assistance Support
Personnel (SASP). . . . .
 b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty uniformed
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG.
 c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore, the
AFP agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no more than 74 personnel to designated positions with
JUSMAG.
 d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. The term "Operational
Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring
recommendations; firing recommendations; position classification; discipline; nomination and approval
of incentive awards; and payroll computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of
JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. For the period of time that there is an exceptional funding agreement
between the government of the Philippines and the United States Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay
the total payroll costs for the SASP employees. Payroll costs include only regular salary; approved
overtime, costs of living allowance; medical insurance; regular contributions to the Philippine Social
Security System, PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA); and the thirteenth-
month bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those
previously defined above. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this agreement will be
funded and paid by the AFP.
 e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their current rate of
pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of employment thereafter subject to
renewal of their appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3).
No promotion or transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their
pay and benefits.
 f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at established AFP civilian
rates. Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be made available to the Comptroller,
JUSMAG, by the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP. Additionally, any legally mandated changes in salary levels or
methods of computation shall be transmitted within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ to
Comptroller, JUSMAG.
 g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief, JUSMAG-
Philippines. Any termination of these personnel thought to be necessary because of budgetary
restrictions or manpower ceiling will be subject to consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure
that JUSMAG's mission of dedicated support to the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.
 h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP.
(Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current SASP). Any termination of services, other
 than voluntary resignations or termination for cause, will result in immediate payments of AFP of all
termination pay to the entitled employee. Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses
and annual leave will be presented to the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later than 14 calendar days prior
to required date of payment.
 i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social Security System.
 A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 227, dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding agreement for the
salaries of SASP and security guards until December 31, 1992.
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against
the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the
United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not
prosper.
 In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized
principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and
its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is anchored on the principle of the
sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation
of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). 17
 Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State,
without its consent or waiver. However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et al., 18 we recognized an
exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a state, thus:
 . . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or
name the officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself
may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has
descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into
such contract. . . . . (emphasis ours)
 It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of America 19
was decided.
 In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States
Government for stevedoring services at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. It then sought to
collect from the US government sums of money arising from the contract. One of the issues posed in
the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the defendant
United States, a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court upheld the
contention of Harry Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private
person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from
which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract."
 The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that
the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in
local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought about by their
increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. 20 Thus, in
United States of America vs. Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with
respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority."
 As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US
vs. Ruiz, supra:
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
 We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature of
the act. Ergo, since a governmental function was involved — the transaction dealt with the improvement
of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay — it was held that the United States was not
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
 Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove was employed as a
cook in the Main Club located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, John Hay Air Station. He was
dismissed from service after he was found to have polluted the stock of soup with urine. Genove
countered with a complaint for damages. Apparently, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay
Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government
in its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and available to the
general public, thus, the services are operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental
activity. Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the Court (En Banc) said:
 The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to
justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if
it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later
dismissed Genove. For the matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
 immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
 Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the
sovereign state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. 24 Such is the case at bench.
Prescinding from this premise, we need not determine whether JUSMAG controls the employment
conditions of the private respondent.
 We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped
from denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent. On the
contrary, in its Opposition before the public respondent, JUSMAG consistently contended that the (74)
SASP, including private respondent, working in JUSMAG, are employees of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra, (2) the exchange of
notes between our Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the United States, thru the US
Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the Agreement on May 21, 1991, supra between the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and JUSMAG.
 We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than twenty
(20) years. Considering his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more compassionate
treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Nonetheless, the Executive
branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, can take
the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working for JUSMAG, pursuant to the
aforestated Military Assistance Agreement.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the impugned
Resolution dated January 29, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.