People v Beltran (1985) case digest

G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing;
MANUEL PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-
appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep.
Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother).

They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the
house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.

When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of
gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at
the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct
assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

People vs Dollantes

That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the Municipality of Tayasan, Province of Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery,
and with intent to kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Marcos Gabutero, Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent of a person in authority
and which fact accused had full knowledge, while the latter was in the lawful performance of his official
duty or function as Barangay Captain or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo and hunting knives
with which the accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting the following wounds in the
victim, viz:

1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half (1/2) cm. in width, ten
(10) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal
space, 5 cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally and directed
vertically and slightly to the back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.

2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven and a half (11 1/2) cm.
depthness, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal space
about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the wound was oriented horizontally and
directed downward and slightly to the back.

3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk
about 26 cm. below the left clavicle and four (4) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound
was oriented obliquely.
 4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width, located at the right
anterior aspect of the trunk about twenty-one (21) cm. below the right clavicle and eight (8) cm.
away from the anterior line. The wound was oriented obliquely.

5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2) cm. in width located at
the anterior aspect of the upper extremity about nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half (1
1/2) cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially. The wound was oriented vertically.

6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the lateral aspect of
the right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the
posterior midline laterally. The wound was oriented horizontally.

7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the wound of entrance
measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width located at the
posterior aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line medially. The wound was oriented vertically.

8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located at the lateral aspect of
the left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below the elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the posterior
mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally.

9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four (4) cm. depthness located
at the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and
twelve (12) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed
downward, slightly to the right and posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.

10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and seven and a half (7) cm.
in depthness, located at the left posterior of the trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower angle of
the scapula, and seven (7) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely
and directed downward and slightly to the left.

11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and twelve (12) cm. in
depthness, located at the left posterior aspect of the trunk about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower
angle of the scapula and six (6) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented
obliquely and directed anteriority to the left.

12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the latter's untimely death.

Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)

The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:

That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said
barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start
the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement
known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was
brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to
keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of
accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting
knife. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain,
stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the
Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused participated in
the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took
turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the
Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to
be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the
 body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."
(Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).

The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana
Gabutero, the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who conducted the post mortem
examination of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat.
Jose Amis of the Integrated National Police.

On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny
Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a
careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was convinced that all the accused in this case conspired in the
commission of the crime.

Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty of the complex crime
of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court hereby finds the accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester, guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder, and hereby
sentences the above-mentioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Marcos Gabutero, jointly and severally, the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)

From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed. Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a separate brief.

The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

FIRST ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO
CERO AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND TACIO FAUSTO.

Ruling: The appeal is without merit.

The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.

The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye witnesses. They were: Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio
Cero and Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two other witnesses Garol and Cero
are not related to the victim or the accused. The testimonies of these three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy
cross-examination and were found credible and free from material contradictions by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).

Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what happened. He testified that when the Barangay Captain
started to deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN,
page 6, Oct. 7, 1983). The victim then approached to admonish him t the latter stabbed the victim on the arm.
Garol immediately approached the accused Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of the
accused. The accused Hugo Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was Garol who succeeded. The accused
Grengia then told him "Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17,
1983). Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes
rushed to and attacked the victim followed by the other co-accused in this case who also rushed at and stabbed the
victim. He specified that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were
carrying knives while the accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they stabbed the victim one
after another. He said that the accused Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all carrying stones
which they threw at the store of the victim's wife (TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).

This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was about three (3)
meters away and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo Garol as to what transpired that
night. He stated further that when he saw the Barangay Captain being stabbed he tried to approach the group but
he was held by Danny Esteban who said "do not try to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already gotten
what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro
Dollantes and Danny Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also testified that when he
returned to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously kicking the
dead body and shouting "who is brave among here. "

Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the testimonies of Garol and Cero. She also added that
Hugo Grengia wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to know that as a fact, because he told the
crowd not to long as Barangay Captain. She also testified that the accused Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of
tuba on the face of the deceased and that the victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft case
involving Hamlet Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).

It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and straightforward when they stated that they saw
appellants stab the victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by each of said appellants.

There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their Identification for apart from being near the crime
scene which was well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19, 1983), these witnesses are
familiar with the appellants since they are all residents of the same locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that
the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against the appellants.

In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where the scene of the stabbing was clearly lighted
and no motive was shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate the appellants, identification would be
given full faith and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).

The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim while
the other accused did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75-76).

In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants pointed out that there are certain inconsistencies
that render the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.

For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim because as Garol
himself stated, when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away. The evidence shows however, that Garol
clearly testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio Captain, one after another and it was only after the Barrio
Captain fell to the ground that he ran towards the municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN, page 11,
Oct. 17, 1983).

Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to
the police authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).

However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and the omission of the same in the narration
in the report does not detract from the established fact that the victim was stabbed several times which caused his
death.

It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero
also testified that he was the one being stoned.

There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The fact that the store of the victim's wife was
stoned does not preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.

Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with precision the stabbing of the victim while
he was being hugged by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed by the group. Much less could
it be possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the
store of Severina Cadillero, to join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).

The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the deceased before he was embraced by appellant
Danny Esteban who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have
been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the language is unmistakable that in that at said point, the
stabbing and the killing being described by all the witnesses had already been accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies, the same are trivial and merely refer to
minor matters which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from the essential facts or vital details of the
crime pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As held by this Court, discrepancies in minor
details are to be expected from an uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations would
rather show the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them to make their testimonies
tally in every respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such trivial differences constitute fail-safe
reliability.

Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the admission of accused Hamlet
Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for Accused-Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7).
Thus the defense argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Sidrito Lokesio, Monico Dollantes and Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and were not at the scene of the
crime and that it was only accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim.

As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient evidence. On the contrary, an entry in the
Police Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental, shows that one Gloria
Callao, wife of the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused
Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is
behed by the Identification made by the prosecution witnesses and by the number and location of the victim's
wounds which are mute evidence that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).

As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the accused cannot prevail over positive
Identification by credible witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in the case at bar, it was not
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of said crime at the time of
its commission (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232).

On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense when he stabbed the victim is not sustained by the
records. As found by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of the incident, so that there was no
danger to the life and limb of the accused. The latter claims that he had to stab the victim who boxed him and
would not release his wounded hand (Rollo, p. 76). Apart from the obvious disproportion of the means used to repel
the alleged attack, three witnesses of the prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards
the victim and stabbed the latter at the back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination
(Exhibit "A") and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim which showed a stab wound at the back.
Furthermore, the nature, character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the victim, negates the accused's
claim of self-defense. (People v. Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered by "he victim are
indicative of aggression (People v. Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).

Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. Among
others, he pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that his name was not mentioned in the
report made by Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of the crime; that his name was not
included in the entry in the police logbook of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he
had no participation in the commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was
trying to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp. 13-16).

While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester did not participate in the
stabbing, the lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other accused in this case. They were
found to be holding stones which they threw at the store owned by the victim and his wife; they participated in
kicking and dancing around the dead body of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the
knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was
holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan."
(TSN, pp. 7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try
to interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14,
October 18,1983).

Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to
listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a
compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he was being stabbed and after the incident, he
never visited the victim's family.

Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as follows:

The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their acts, aimed at the same object,
and their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness
 of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of the defendants,
before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly shows that they acted in concert. (People v.
Emilio Agag, L-64951, June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty
of Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)

In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused,
there is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the
group..... Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in the felonious
undertaking." (Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186 [1985]).

Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible that all the stab
wounds were inflicted by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one person committed the crime
and that there is no conspiracy.

The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions propounded by the defense lawyer as to
the different possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have been inflicted. But testifying specifically on the
case at bar, he categorically stated that actually the wounds could be produced by a single bladed weapon with
different sizes but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.

Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:

Atty. Jayme:

Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos Gabutero, is it possible Doc,
that in accordance with your drawing that the wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed
weapon, is it possible, Doctor, that this wound was caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it possible
that this. I repeat the question, your Honor.

Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you "blunt and sharp bladed
weapon which is practically single bladed weapon, according to your physical findings there is
similarly in the weapons used, could we say practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as
those incised wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?

A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily
only a single bladed weapon.

Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different or several sizes, now, what is your
honest observation upon your physical findings, what will be themaximum weapon used? I have
here a zerox copy for your own reference.

A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds that have three em. in length, it
could be possible that the same kind of weapon or instrument has been used. This refers to
Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to the stab wounds because the size of the
incised wounds is difficult to determine.

Atty. Jayme:

Yes, the stab wounds only.

A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not indicated here, so it is possible that
there are 3 or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December 15, 1983)

Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho that the latter did not observe any contusions on
the body of the deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda round and kicked the body after the victim
was slain.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the examining doctor failed to find any contusion or
abrasion on the cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive proof that appellants did not
kick the deceased. It might be possible that kicks did not cause or produce contusions or abrasions or that they
were not noticed by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p. 22). Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking complained of, is
only one of the acts showing conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be said not to have been established.
The lower court also found that treachery was present in the commission of the crime, and that the accused Alfredo
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando Dollantes are as equally guilty as
principals by direct participation. These accused took turns in stabbing the victim. In fact the victim was caught by
surprise and did not have time to defend himself.

Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was
making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of
his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his
duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of
his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in
authority."

There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason could be found
to disturb the findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Justo vs CA

The offended party Nemesio B. de la Cuesta is a duly appointed district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
with station at Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Between 9:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 and 10:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00
a.m. on October 16, 1950, he went to the division office in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in answer to a call from said office, in
order to revise the plantilla of his district comprising the towns of Sarrat and Piddig. At about
11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary25 a.m., De la Cuesta was leaving the office in order to take his meal when he saw
the Appellant conversing with Severino Caridad, academic supervisor. Appellant requested De la Cuesta to go with
him and Caridad to the office of the latter. They did and in the office of Caridad, the Appellant asked about the
possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there was
no vacancy, except that of the position of shop teacher. Upon hearing Caridad’s answer, the Appellant sharply
addressed the complainant thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep
his promise.” The Appellant then grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of Caridad and challenged the offended
party to go out. The Appellant left Caridad’s office, followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of
one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta asked the Appellant to put down the paper weight but
instead the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of the complainant which was torn. Carlos Bueno
separated the protagonists, but not before the complainant had boxed the Appellant several times.” (Petitioner’s
Brief, pp. 17-18).
The present appeal is directed against that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw It is argued by Counsel, however, that when the complainant accepted the challenge to a fight and followed
the Appellant out of the room of Mr. Caridad, the offended party was no longer performing his duty as a person in
authority. There is no merit in this contention. The challenge was the result of the heated discussion between the
complainant and the Appellant occasioned by the latter’s disappointment when he was told that Miss Racela could
not be accommodated in the district of the former as there was no more vacancy in said district except that of a
shop teacher. Be this as it may, when the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the shirt of the complainant,
which is actually laying hands upon a person in authority, he did so while the latter was engaged in the
performance of his duties as the occasion of such performance, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary his failure to
accommodate Miss Racela as a teacher in his district as he had supposedly promised the Appellant.” (Petitioner’s
Brief, pp. 22-23.)
Petitioner argues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) that when the complainant accepted his challenge to fight outside and followed him out of the room of Mr.
Caridad where they had a verbal clash, he (complainant) disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the
privilege of protection as a person in authority; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that there was no unlawful aggression on Petitioner’s part because
there was a mutual agreement to fight.
Neither argument is tenable. The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties
of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. This is
apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in
authority “while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance”, the words “on
occasion” signifying “because” or “by reason” of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the
assault no official duty was being discharged (People vs. Garcia, 20 Phil., 358; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarySent. of
the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 24 November 1874; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary26 December 1877; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary13 June 1882 and 31 December 1896).
Thus, the Supreme Court of Spain has ruled that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“No es razon apreciable para dejar de constituir el delito de atentado el que no estuviera el guarda en el termino en
que ejercia sus funciones, pues resultado que se ejecuto con ocasion de ellas, esta circunstancias siempre es
suficiente, por si sola, para constituir el atentado, sin tener en cuenta el sitio en que haya ocurrido.” (Sent. 13 de
Junio de 1882) (1 Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 642- 643).
No other construction is compatible with the evident purpose of the law that public officials and their agents should
be able to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or injured by reason
thereof.
The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked because he had
accepted the accused’s challenge to fight, overlooks the circumstance that as found by the Court of Appeals, the
challenge was to “go out”, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight should be held inside
the office building in the plain view of subordinate employees. Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is
manifest that an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryto hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty
and fair play. In the present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts
clearly indicate that he was merely on his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon
him. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of preparing to meet an assault
at any time even before reaching the appointed place for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was
patently illegal. Appellant’s position would be plausible if the complaining official had been the one who issued the
challenge to fight; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut here the reverse precisely happened.
We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against Appellant.

Alberto vs dela Cruz

Tanega vs masakayan

Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of
First Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in
the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.2 We declined to review on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion,
execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show
up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23,
1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested.1äwphï1.ñët

Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965
and March 23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.

On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served",
rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest.
Hence, the present petition.

Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.4 By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light
penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so the
succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence".5

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready
answer. Says Article 157:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the
term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have
taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by
using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other
 convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum
period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.7 This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his
sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take
place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides
for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking".9

A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 — from
whence Articles 92 and 93 of the present Review Penal Code originated — reads:

Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:

Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.

xxx xxx xxx

Las leves, al año.

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la
sentencia firme, o desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. x x x

Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia
firme", written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What remains reproduced in Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or evasion means
escape.10 Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence.

Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only
begin to run when he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:

El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido lugar la notificacion personal
de la sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal,
pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la
sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra
prescribir hoy la pena, pues que la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida por la notificacion hecha en
estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que en las penas
que consisten en privacion de libertad solo porda existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues
que si no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerramiento en el acto de
serle notifirada personalmente la sentencia.11

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run,
the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment —
was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.

People vs Abilong

Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of sentence under
the following information:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
 destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of
Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No.
B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of
said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision with the
following assignment of error:

1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally
liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason that
said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their
liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part
reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the English
language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in
case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus:

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y
maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de
libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .

We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted
in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro
as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has
been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held,
as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering
deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said
ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz.
Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters
the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment
wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.

Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having violated his judgment of destierro
rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila, can be sentenced under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks,
false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal Code, 1946, p. 322).
This negative position is supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla (Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).

The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated April 16, 1948, but
said decision has no application because in said case the legal question involved in the case at bar was not raised.
The Supreme Court did not consider the question of interpretation of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there
was occasion for considering the question, but the Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see the
question, at the time, is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed of human beings for whom infallibility is
beyond reach.

The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two authors who have considered the
question, although tenable under the English text of article 157, is not so under the Spanish text, which is the one
controlling because the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted by the Legislature in Spanish.

There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the appellant is entitled to acquittal. The
question now is whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing different from that which can be read in the
English text. The Spanish text reads as follows:

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y
maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de
libertad por sentencia firme; pero si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento, fractura
de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano,
violencia o intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o dependientes del
establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena sera prision correccional en su grado maximo.

The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia
firme," which are translated into English "by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." The prosecution contends that the words "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as
the word "imprisonment" in the English text, and that while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de
libertad" may include it.

The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it obliterates the grammatical, logical,
ideological function of the words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and English texts, respectively. There
should not be any question that, whatever meaning we may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has
to be conditioned by the verb "fugandose," (by escaping). "Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered independently
of "fugandose."

There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly translated into the English "by escaping."
Now, is there any sense in escaping from destierro or banishment, where there is no enclosure binding the
hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of the forms of the Spanish verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of
"evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the use of said words after the semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the
first period in the English text. Either the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun "escape" essentially pre-
supposes some kind of imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does not talk in
metaphors or parables.

"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or get clear, from or
out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To issue from confinement or enclosure of
any sort; as gas escapes from the mains." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or deliverance from injury or any evil; also the
means of escape. The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody. When the prisoner gets out of
prison and unlawfully regains his liberty, it is an actual escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)

"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.) .

The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in all the remaining
parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the country. With freedom to move all over
the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any confinement from which he could escape.

The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the English "imprisonment," which gives the
idea exactly conveyed by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could
have had used a more precise Spanish word, but the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the less
precise words a broader meaning than is usually given to them.

"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always been used by jurist using
the Spanish language to mean "imprisonment." They have never given them the unbounded philosophical scope
that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.

Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion inhabitants of the world can be
considered free, as the freest citizen of the freest country is subject to many limitations or deprivations of liberty.
Under the prosecution's theory, should an accused, sentenced to pay a fine of one peso, evade the payment of it,
because the fine deprives him of liberty to dispose of his one peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157
of the Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six years. The iniquity and cruelty of such
situation are too glaring and violent to be entertained for a moment under our constitutional framework.

There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a sentence of destierro without punishment is
undesirable, but even without applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the act of the appellant cannot remain
unpunished, because his violation of the sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which
imprisonment up to six months is provided.

It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented in this case, but the gap cannot be filled
by this Court without encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.

Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code, by an increased in the
evaded penalty. This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided by article 157, which appear to be
disproportionate and arbitrary, because they place on equal footing the evader of a sentence of one day of
imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most
heinous crime. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve.

The appealed decision should be set aside.

Torres vs Gonzales

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then
Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive
Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against
him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

People vs Dioso

Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed by the Circuit Court of Rizal upon Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto
Abarca for the crime of murder.

The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal where both accused were serving
sentence, Abarca having been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide, and Dioso, of
robbery.

At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were members of the "Batang Mindanao" gang, while the victims
Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, also prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, belonged to a group known as the
"Happy Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had been involved in intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the
latest of which resulted in the death of one Balerio a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang

Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their gangmate, the two accused set their Minds to
avenge his death. They found the occasion to execute their nefarious design when they learned that Reyno and
Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital. At 6:15 in the 'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca,
feigning illness, went to the hospital to seek admission as a patient. He was accompanied by his co-accused Dioso.
Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their intended victims: Reyno was taking breakfast with Gomez was lying
down on a "tarima" [wooden bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno and spoke briefly to him, while
Abarca headed towards the "tarima". Then, both accused suddenly drew out their improvised knives matalas Abarca
raised the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed Gomez, as Dioso, almost simultaneously, attacked Reyno
with his knife. And after the latter had fallen, Dioso strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez.

When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they were met at the corridor by Prison Guard Enriquito Aguilar Both gave
themselves up and handed their weapons to him.

Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the NBI, who performed the autopsy, found that both accused died of
massive bleeding due to multiple stab wounds on the chest and abdomen. 1

The accused were immediately interrogated by prison investigator Buenaventura dela Cuesta; and they; readily
executed their respective sworn statements, wherein they admitted responsibility for the death of the victims. 2

In his sworn statement, Teofilo Dioso narrated how he delivered the death blow on Reyno, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

T Pagdating ninyo sa ward 6 ano ang inyong ginawa?

S Tumuloy ho ako kay Reyno at tinamong ko kung saan si Intsik

[Gomez] ngayon tinuro ni Reyno sa akin. Sabi ho iyong
nakakulambo. Pagkatapos, sinabi ko naman kay Abarca ang lugar
ni Intsik ngayon, pinuntahan naman niya. Pagtapat niya kay
 Intsik, sinipa ko si Reyno sabay bunot ng aking matalas at
sinaksak ko sa kanya. Noong sa pag-aakala kong patay na, iniwan
ko at tumulong ako kay Abarca sa pagsaksak kay Gomez. Noong
tumihaya na si Gomez, sumigaw ako kay Abarca na labas na tayo.
Tumakas ka palabas at noong nasa pasilyo kami ng hospital
nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin sinurender ang
mga matalas namin. Tapos karning makapag-surrender, dinala
kami ng guardiya sa Control Gate tuloy dito. [Exhibit "D", p. 21]

Jacinto Abarca on the other hand narrated his version of the killing as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

T Pagkatapos ninyong mapagkasunduan na manaksak sa ward 6,

ano ang inyong ginawa?

S Ang sabi pa niya na bukas na tayo titira pagkatapos ng

almosalan tapos naghiwalay na kami baka pa marinig ng iba.
Kaninang umaga . pagkatapos naming kumain lumabas na ako sa
ward 2 at nakita ko siya sa pintuan ng ward 4 na naghihintay sa
akin. Ngayon, pumasok muna siya sa ward 4 at kumuha ng
sigarilyo at pagkatapos tumuloy kami sa ward 6. Pagdating namin
sa ward 6, siya ang umuna dahil sa hindi ko pa alam kung saan
naka puwesto ang mga Happy Go [gang]. Pagkatapos lumapit siya
doon sa nakaupo hindi ko alam kong kumakain o hindi at ako
naman ay umupo sa isang tarima sa tabi ni intsik iyong tinira ko
tapos bigla na lang siya bumunot ng matalas niya bago tinira
iyong nakaupo sabay sabi na "tira na". Pagkatira niya, ako naman
ay lumapit doon sa tarima ni intsik [Gomez] bago ko biglang tinaas
ang kulambo dahil nakahiga siya tapos tumakbo. Hinabol ko tapos
paghabol ko, nadapa siya tapos sumuot sa silong ng tarima. Doon
ko siya inabutan at sinaksak ko. Ngayon sa pagsaksak ko sa
kanya, biglang dumating itong si Dioso at tumulong sa akin sa
pagsaksak. Hindi nagtagal, sumigao si Dioso ng 'tama na' bago
kami tumakbo palabas ng ward 6. Noong nasa pasilyo kami ng
hospital, nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin
sinurender ang mga matalas namin. Pagkatapos naming ma
surrender ang mga matalas nang dinala kami ng guardiya sa
labas. [Exhibit "C ", p. 2].

Dioso revealed the motive for the killing as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

T Bakit naman ninyo ni Abarca sinaksak sina Reyno at Gomez sa

ward 6?

S Dahil po doon sa nangyari kay Balerio. Si Balerio po ay sinaksak

ng mga "Happy Go" at iyong panaksak namin kanina ay iyon ang
ganti naming mga BM sa mga "Happy Go". [Exhibit "D", p. 1]

Of similar tenor is the following statement of Abarca: têñ.£îhqwâ£

T lbig mo bang sabihin, iyong mga sinaksak ninyo sa hospital

kanina ay iyon din ang pumatay sa sinasabi mong kakusa ninyo
na si Balerio?

S Hindi ho pero katatak nila iyong pumatay kay Balerio. Pareho

silang miembro ng "Happy Go Lucky" gang. Ngayon ang pagka
panaksak namin kanina sa hospital noong dalawa na miembro ng
"Happy Go" ay ganti naming mga BM [Batang Mindanao] sa
pagkapatay nila kay Balerio. [Exhibit "C", p. 1].

When arraigned for the crime of murder, both accused voluntarily entered the plea of guilty. Thereafter the trial
court required the presentation of evidence to determine the degree of their culpability. At the hearing, they
acknowledged the voluntary execution of their respective confessions.
The trial court correctly found that the crime was perpetrated with alevosia. As revealed by the accused themselves,
they inflicted the fatal blows while Gomez was lying down under a mosquito net, and Reyno was taking his
breakfast. Clearly, neither of the victims was in a position to defend himself from the sudden and unexpected
assault.

It is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to impugn the lower court's conclusion as to their guilt.
Instead, they seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court by invoking the circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. We find no necessity to discuss at length the effects of such mitigating
circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the
crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony [murder] is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the
complete absence thereof. 3

But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the
accused to reclusion perpetua

ACCORDINGLY, accused Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Dumlao vs Comelec

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao
assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal
protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues.
The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the
term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against
them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites
so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that
the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office
as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than
65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more
than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For
one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for
in the challenged provision.

Quinto vs comelec

uinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of
R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court
upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum
since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge
of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could
result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as
ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state
interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

ang ladlad vs comelec

NG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in
their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection
of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government
action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.