Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug.

3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with
homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The
private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record
or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the
Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information
for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders
before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not
guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex
Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the
crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended
Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's
decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of
the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the
SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask
for a preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as
to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since
both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on
the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the
proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment
in absentia and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel
within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final.2?r?l1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 4,
2007 Resolution4 and the September 4, 2007 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98502.

Factual Antecedents

This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R. No. 144332 and
promulgated on June 10, 2004.

Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 687 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines," as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8 docketed as Criminal Case No.
2672.9?r?l1

On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioners counsel informed the trial court
that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The
RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as
scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8, 1998 Decision reads:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel
Lloren y dela Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as
amended, they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum period.
Costs against the said accused.

SO ORDERED.12?r?l1

Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren13 and issued warrants
of arrest against them.14?r?l1

Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the
promulgation, the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty
imposed.15?r?l1

On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16?r?l1

Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 49953, with the CA.17?r?l1

On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in this wise:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. On the basis of
the evidence on record, accused Efren S. Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charge against him.

The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence of the accused Ila and
Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the
complete records of this case be remanded to the court a quo.

SO ORDERED.18?r?l1

The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court
via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
144332.

On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioners acquittal and reinstated the RTCs September 8,
1998 Decision and its October 12, 1998 Order, to wit:cralawlibrary

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated September 8, 1998 and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19?r?l1

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated January 17, 2005.20?r?l1

On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21?r?l1

Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied by
this Court in its March 28, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively.22?r?l1

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still appeal the RTCs
September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its
July 26, 2006 Resolution.24?r?l1
On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation25 of the
September 8, 1998 Decision.

It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts
for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC
in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision which was
reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49?r?l1

The promulgation of judgment is valid.

Petitioners attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTCs September 8, 1998
Decision must likewise fail as this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of
Appeals.50 As this Court has explained, there was no reason to postpone the promulgation
because petitioners absence was unjustifiable.51 Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of petitioner.52?r?l1

It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained finality. In fact, an
Entry of Judgment was made by this Court on February 15, 2005.

Petitioners right to appeal has prescribed.

As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision, we rule in the
negative.

In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioners acquittal by the CA as it was made
with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari
is not allowed because "the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of
its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by appeal by writ of error."54 Thus, in filing
a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.
Thus:cralawlibrary

In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused, respondents herein, guilty of the
crime charged based on the evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment as provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and 305 of
the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn the
decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on its merits, and
for the nullification of the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial courts denial of their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error, from the
decision on its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal of the petitioners in due course
was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the
findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty
imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors of the trial court, whether
assigned or unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ
of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the
trial court on its merits. They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them,
alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against
them being merely hearsay and based on mere inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere
errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved the appellate court to have
dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.

The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its
conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent
Almuete of the crime charged.

The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of
its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review
perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are
correctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting
respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain
jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case
to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory
authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case,
the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be
based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate
courts decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)