OUTLINE IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

ATTY. DUMABOC

CIVIL CODE took effect- August 30, 1950

FAMILY CODE took effect- August 3, 1988

FIRST WEEK:

I. Historical Background

A. Sources of Civil Code:

The Civil Code of Spain-principal basis effectivity: Dec.7, 1889 (Mijares v. Neri) OR
Dec. 8, 1889 (Benedicto v. Rama)
The Philippine Constitution of 1935
Statutes of Laws (Phil., American, European)
Rules of Court (local and foreign)
Decisions of local tribunals (particularly the Supreme Court)
Decisions of foreign tribunals
Customs and traditions of our people
General Principles of law and equity
Ideas from the Code Commission itself

B. Brief History of our Civil Laws

Premised principally on the old Civil Code (the Civil Code of Spain of 1889)
Prior to the Civil Code of Spain, civil code was found in the Recopilacion de las Leyes de
las Indias with the following as supplemental laws to be applied in the following order:
1. The latest Spanish laws enacted for the colonies
2. La Novisima Recopilacion
3. La Nueva Recopilacion
4. The Royal Ordinances of Castille
5. Leyes de Toro (Laws of Toro)
6. The Siete Partidas
II. Effect and Application of Laws

A. When laws become effective (ART. 2)

Executive Order No. 200 (PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY) SEC.2: Art. 2 of RA No. 386 (Civil Code of
the Philippines) and all other laws inconsistent with this EO are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Revised Administrative Code (EO 292):

Section 18- When laws shall take effect- Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless otherwise provided.
Section 19- Prospectivity- Laws shall have prospectivtity effect unless contrary is
expressly provided.
Section 20- Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances- In the interpretation of
a law or administrative issuance is promulgated in all the official languages, the English
text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission
or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
Section 21- No implied Revival of repealed Law- When a law which expressly repeals a
prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless the
repealing law provides otherwise.
Section 22- Revival of Law impliedly repealed- When a law which impliedly repeals a
prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing
law provides otherwise.
Section 23- Ignorance of the Law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Section 24- There shall be published in the Official gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public in nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general
application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as the
President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he
may authorize so to be published. The publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.

TANADA v. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27

Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative order. The right sought to be enforced by
 petitioners is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of the law where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates.
Issue: Whether or not publication is a sine qua non requirement for the law to take
effect.
Ruling: Publication of laws in the Official Gazette is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat.” The first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act reads:
there shall be published in the Official gazette..” The word “shall” used therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. The publication of all presidential
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law. The court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.

FUENTES v. ROCA GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010

Facts: Annulment of sale of land against spouses Fuentes on the ground of lack of
consent of one of the spouses as owner of the said land. Said consent was not given and
the signature was forged.
Issue: Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent had been forged.
Ruling: Rosario’s signature had been forged. The Law that applies to this case is Family
Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the property to
the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. Art. 124 FC does not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply
provides that without the other spouse’ written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. An action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. This action does not prescribe (Art. 1410).

B. MANDATORY EFFECT OF LAWS.

Article 3- Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal and whether substantive or
remedial. The maxim refers ONLY to mandatory or prohibitive laws, NOT to permissive
or suppletory laws.
Ignorance of foreign laws is NOT ignorance of the law but ignorance of the fact.
Ignorance of the law is not an excuse for not complying with it, ignorance of fact
eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence.
CONSUJI v. CA GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Facts: A construction worker of DM Consunji died when he fell 14 floors when the
platform which he was on board fell from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. His
widow filed with the RTC of Pasig City a complaint from damages against his employer.
The employer averred that the widow had already availed benefits from the State
Insurance Fund and that she cannot recover civil damages from the company anymore.
Issue: whether or not the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under
the Civil Code because she already availed damages under the Labor Code.
Ruling: The general rule is that claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that
the choice of remedy will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other
remedy. The EXCEPTION is where a claimant who has already been paid under the WCA
may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. Private respondent’s case
came under the exception because the private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s
negligence when she filed a claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. It
bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or mistake of fact. There
is no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed.
KASILAG v. RODRIGUEZ 69 PHIL 217
Facts: Contract of mortgage of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure
the payment of indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest.
Issue: WON the petitioner should be deemed possessor of the land in good faith
because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of acquisition by which
it is invalidated.
Ruling: Yes. From the facts established by the CA we can neither deduce nor presume
that the petitioner was aware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition.

ELEGADO v. CA 173 SCRA 285

Facts: Warren taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines,
died in Oregon, USA. His, son Ward Graham filed an estate tax return with the Philippine
Revenue Representative in San Francisco, USA. CIR, assessed the decedent’s estate in
the amount of P96,509.35. This assessment was protested by the law firm of Bump,
Young and Walker on behalf of the estate and was denied by the CIR. Petitioner was the
ancillary administrator and filed a second estate tax return with the BIR. The CIR
assessed the second estate tax return in the amount of P72,948.87 which was protested
by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law office.
Issue: WON the first assessment is valid being filed by foreign lawyers.
Ruling: The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was
invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not
 familiar with our tax laws and procedures. The first assessment is already final and
executory and can no longer be questioned.

MANZANO v. SANCHEZ 354 SCRA 1

Facts: Hermina Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. David
Manzano contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated”,
thus respondent judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that he knew that the two had been living together as spouses for 7 years as
manifested in their joint affidavit.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
officiating the said marriage.
Ruling: yes. The law provides that the parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other.

C. IRRETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
Article 4 Civil Code- Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.
GR: Laws are prospective.
EXC: If the laws themselves provide for retroactivity; If the laws are remedial in nature;
If the statute is penal in nature; If the laws are of an emergency nature and are
authorized by the police power of the government; If the law is curative; If a substantive
right be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are impaired.

Art. 256 Family Code- This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
RPC Art.22- Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person s
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the sentence.

CABALIT v. COA GR NO. 180236, Jan. 17, 2012

Facts: three employees from the LTO in Jagna, Bohol were found by the Ombudsman to
have perpetrated a scheme to defraud the government of proper motor vehicle
registration fees.
Issue: WON there was a violation of a right to due process when the hearing officer at
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the procedure under A.O No. 17
notwithstanding the fact that the said amendatory order took effect after the hearings
had started.
Ruling: Sec.5 (b) (1) Rule 3, of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as amended by A.O No. 17, plainly provides that the hearing officer may issue an order
directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective
verified position papers on the basis of which, the hearing officer may consider the case
submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that based on the
evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under
Sec. 5 (b) (2) and Sec.5 (b) (3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. The rule
in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the
rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or
where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioner failed to show that application
of A.O No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them.

REPUBLIC v. GRANDA GR NO. 187512, June 13, 2012

Facts: Yolanda and Cyrus Granada got married. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment when the company they were working was closed down. Yolanda claimed
that she had not received any communication from her husband. After 9 years, Yolanda
filed a petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The RTC declared Cyrus as
presumptively dead. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. It
argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest effort to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of
the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, not subject to
appeal.
Ruling: A petition for declaration of presumptive death (Art. 41) for the purpose of
remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC
Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by
express provision of Art. 247 FC. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary
appeal.

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES 234 SCRA 32 A.M No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts: Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for gross immorality
and appearance of impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda de Castro who are living together in a house the former had purchased,
whenever he is in Manila. Complainant saw respondent sleeping in the former’s bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told that respondent had been cohabiting with de Castro.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko. For the
respondent’s part, he alleges that Atienza was not married to de Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant’s claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by de Castro. He also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor on 1965,
but the same was not a valid marriage for lack of marriage license. The second marriage
with Ongkiko was still not valid for lack of marriage license. Respondent claims that
when he married de Casto in LA on 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license. He claims that Art.40 of the FC does not apply to him considering that
his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by Civil Code.
Issue: WON article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable to his first marriage.
Ruling: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Art. 256 of the FC, said article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case.

ACCENTURE v. COMMISSIONER GR NO. 190102, July 1, 2012

Facts: Petitioner, a VAT registered entity, is a corporation engaged in the business
providing management consulting, business strategies development, and selling and/or
licensing a software. It had an excess or unutilized input VAT credits. Thus, Accenture
filed with the Dept. of Finance an administrative claim for the refund or the issuance of
Tax Credit Certificate. DOF did not act on the claim of the petitioner. The latter filed a
Petition for Review with the CTA. The CIR answered that the sale by Accenture of goods
and services to its clients are not zero-rated transactions and that Accenture has failed
to prove that it is entitled to a refund. Ruling that Accenture’s services would qualify for
zero-rating under the 1997 NIRC only if the recipient of the services was doing business
outside the Philippines. Accenture argued that because the case pertained to the third
and fourth quarters of taxable year of 2002, the applicable law was the 1997 Tax Code
and not RA 9337, there was no requirement that the services must be rendered to a
person engaged in business conducted outside the Philippines to qualify for zero-rating.
Issue: WON the recipient of the services be “doing business outside the Philippines” for
the transaction to be zero-rated under Sec. 108 (B) (2) of the 1997 Tax Code.
Ruling: The Court upholds the position of the CTA en banc, because Section 108 (B) of
the 1997 Tax Code is a verbatim copy of Sec. 102 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code, any
interpretation of the latter holds true for the former. Even though Accenture’s petition
was filed before Burmeister was promulgated, the pronouncements made in that case
may be applied to the present one without violating the rule against retroactive
application. Therefore, the recipient of the services must be “doing business outside the
Philippines” to be qualified for the zero-rating. Accenture failed to establish that
recipients of its services do business outside the Philippines.

U.P v. DIZON GR NO. 18112, August 23, 2012

Facts: UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp. for the construction of
extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid 2, the 3 rd
was not paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still
failed to pay. Stern filed a complaint against UP. UP filed a motion for recon but was
denied by the RTC on May 7, 2002. UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. Stern
builders opposed such notice since its filing is belated and moved for the execution of
decision.UP countered that the notice of appeal is within the reglementary period
because the UP’s Legal Office Affairs received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002.
Issue: WON the fresh-period rule can be given retroactive effect .
Ruling: Equity calls for the retroactive application in the UP’s favor of the fresh-period
rule that the Court first announced in its ruling in Neypes v. CA. The retroactive
application of the fresh-period rule is valid because there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure. Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty.
Nolasco received the denial, the UP’s filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was
not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-
days counted from the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would
end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working
day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday within which to appeal, conformably with Sec. 1 Rule 22,
Rules of Court.

PERT/CPM v. VINUYA GR NO. 197528, September 5, 2012

Facts: Respondents were contracted by the agency for deployment to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer in Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. The contract was for 2 years,
approved by the POEA, providing 9 working hours/day, a salary of 1,350 AED with
overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing, free transportation, free
laundry, free medical and dental services. However, in Dubai, Modern Metals gave them
appointment letters with terms different from those signed in the Philippines. They
complained to their agency but to no avail. Due to unbearable living and working
condition they resigned from their job and indicated family/personal problems as their
reasons. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The
agency alleged that they were not illegally dismissed because they resigned voluntarily.
LA dismissed the complaint but the NLRC reversed the decision of LA. NLRC pointed out
that signing of different contract in Dubai is illegal.
Issue: WON RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010, restoring the subject
clause in Sec. 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively.
Ruling: The amendment introduced by RA 10022- restoring a provision of RA 8042
declared unconstitutional- cannot be given retroactive effect, not only because there is
 no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because retroactive application
will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of
the Serrano ruling- entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts. The agency and its principal, Modern Metal , committed flagrant
violations of the law on overseas employment. The Agency and Modern Metal are guilty
of contract substitution and breach of contract. The employees are effectively
constructively dismissed.

D. MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY LAWS, ART.5 WITH NCC ART.17 (3)

Art. 5 (NCC)- Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
GR: Violations of mandatory or prohibitory laws result in void acts or contracts.
EXC: When the law makes the act not void but merely voidable; When the law makes
the act valid, but subjects the wrong-doer to criminal responsibility; When the law
makes the act itself void, but recognizes some legal effects flowing therefrom; When the
law itself makes certain acts valid although generally they would have been void.
Art. 17 (3) NCC- Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Rules respective prohibitive laws:
GR: Foreign law, contract, or judgment can be given effect.
EXC: When public policy in the Philippines prohibits the same.

NERWIN v. PNOC GR NO. 167057, April 11, 2012

Facts: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of
about 60,000 pieces of wood poles and 20,000 cross-arms. The contract was awarded to
Nerwin being the lowest bidder. However, NEA’s board of director passed a Resolution
reducing by 50% the material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A
losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy, filed a complaint alleging that documents
Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid were falsified. NEA allegedly held
negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80 contract. PNOC- energy development
corporation issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a
civil action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another
bidding.
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of RA 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of TRO and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the SC on government
projects.
 Ruling: The RTC gravely abused its discretion when it entertained the complaint of
Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the
express provisions of Sec.3 and 4 of RA 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by
respondents of the O-ILAW Project and when it issued the TRO and preliminary
injunction.

E. WAIVER OF RIGHTS ARTICLE 6, NCC ARTICLE 2035

Article 6- Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.
Rights- may be Real (against whole world) or Personal (against particular individual)
Waiver- the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right.
Requisites of a valid waiver:
1. The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver;
2. The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express;
3. The person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing; otherwise,
he will not be renouncing anything;
4. In certain instances, the waiver, as in the express remission f a debt owed in favor of
the waiver, must comply with the formalities of a donation;
5. The waiver must not be contrary to law, moral, public policy, public order or good
customs; and
6. The waiver must not prejudice others with a right recognized by law.

Rights that cannot be renounced:

1. Natural rights (right to life)

2. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist (future inheritance)
3. Those renunciation of which would infringe upon public policy
4. Waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law

Art. 2035 NCC: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

1. The civil status of persons;

2. The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
3. Any ground for legal separation;
4. Future support;
5. The jurisdiction of courts;
6. Future legitime
GUY v. CA GR NO. 163707, September 25, 2006

Facts: The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of Sima Wei (a.k.a Rufina
Guy Susim). Private respondents alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes. Petitioner, who is one of the children of the deceased filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be
settled without the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioner also alleged that the
claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her
children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.

Issue: WON a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritances of the wards.

Ruling: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Not having been authorized by the court, the
release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have
waived their supposed rights as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate
children of the decedent.

AUJERO v. PHILCOMSAT GR NO. 193484, January 18, 2012

Facts: In 1967, the petitioner started working for respondent as an accountant in the
latter’s finance department. After 34 years of service, the petitioner applied for early
retirement. His application was approved effective Sept. 15, 2001, entitling him to
receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to 1 ½ of his monthly salary for ever
year of service. At that time, the petitioner’s salary was P274,805.00. On Sept.12, 2001,
the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following
his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. Almost 3 years
thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid benefits and that the amount he
received was unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his
quitclaim null and void.

Issue: WON the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid.

Ruling: While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees
who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to
evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary
settlement of a laborer’s claim should be respected by the courts as the law between
 the parties. Considering the petitioner’s claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat
to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.

F. REPEAL OF LAWS ART.7, FC 254

Article 7 (NCC)- Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When
the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Sources of law: Constitution, laws, administrative or executive acts, orders and

regulations.
Rules of revival of laws:
1. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless expressly so provided.
EX: Law A is expressly repealed by Law B. if Law B is itself repealed by Law C, is Law A
revived? No, unless Law C expressly so provides.
2. When a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself
repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language
of the repealing statute provides otherwise.
EX: Law A is impliedly repealed by Law B. Law B is later repealed by Law C. Is Law A
revived? Yes, unless Law C provides otherwise.

Operative Fact Doctrine- this is when a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.

Art. 254 of the Family Code contemplates an express repeal and implied repeal.

G. JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ARTS.8-9

Article 8- Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. (SC decisions)
Doctrine of Stare Decisis- adherence to precedents. Purpose is to stabilize the law by the
SC. This doctrine should not be applied if there is a conflict between the precedent and
the law.
Obiter Dicta are opinions not necessary to the determination of the case.
Article 9- No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373, October 19, 2007

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silvero having undergone sex reassignment surgery,
sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. Trial court granted his petition. CA however, upon appeal filed by the Republic,
reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there is now law allowing the change of
entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: WON Rommel’s first name and sex can be changed by reason of sex
reassignment.
Ruling: No Law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the rules of court. It is true that article 9
of the NCC mandates that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it.

PESCA v. PESCA GR NO. 136921, April 17, 2001

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four
children. She contends that respondent showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. Petitioner and her children left the
conjugal home. 2 months later, petitioner and her children went home to give her
marriage a second chance, but things did not turn out as expected. In one incident, she
was assaulted by respondent in front of their children. Petitioner sued respondent
before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Issue: WON the guidelines in the case of Republic v. CA and Molina should be taken to
be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
Ruling: The CA did not err in its assailed decision for there was no absolute evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
doctrine of stare decisis ordained in Art.8 (NCC) expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. It
is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” Both decisions in Santos
and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina
are mandatory in nature.

DE CASTOR v. JBC GR NO. 191002, April 20, 2010

 Facts: This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of Pres.GMA to Associate
Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of SC. The conflicting provisions are Art.7, Sec. 15
and Art. 8, Sec. 9 (Constitution).
Issue: WON the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art.7, Sec.15
(Midnight appointment ban) does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
Ruling: Prohibition under Art.7 Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the SC or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Art.7 is devoted to the Executive
Department, and among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. Art. 8 is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of members of the SC, among others. The constitutional commission did
not extend the ban on presidential appointment during the period stated in Art. 7 sec.
15. Election ban on appointments does not extend to the SC. The court upheld its March
17, 2010 ruling that the prohibition under sec.15 art.7 does not apply to vacancies of the
SC.

TY v. BANCO FILIPINO GR NO. 188302, June 27, 2012

Facts: Banco Filipino wanted to purchase real properties as new branch sites for its
expansion program. Ty, a major stockholder and a director of Banco Filipino, organized
to incorporate Tala Realty Corp to hold and purchase real properties in trust for the
respondent. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to the respondent the properties for 20
years, renewable for another 20 years at the respondent’s option with a right of first
refusal in the event Tala Realty decides to sell them. However, in Aug.1992, Tala realty
repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself and demanded payment of rentals,
deposits and goodwill, with a threat to eject the respondent. Thus, the respondent filed
17 complaints against Tala Realty with 17 RTCs nationwide.
Issue: WON the Court’s ruling in GR No. 137533 applies as stare decisis to the present
case.
Ruling: Yes. The Court’s in GR No. 137533, one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala
Realty against the respondent arising from the same trust agreement in the
reconveyance case subject of the present petition, that the trust agreement is void and
cannot be enforced.

H. DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT, ART.9, 10, RPC 5

Article 9 (NCC)- No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Article 10- In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Dura Lex Sed Lex
 Article 5 (RPC)- Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law and in cases of excessive penalties.

I. PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM, Article 11-12

Article 11- Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
Custom- is a rule of human action established by repeated acts and uniformly observed
or practiced as a rule of society, through the implicit approval of the lawmakers and
which is therefore generally obligatory and legally binding.
Requisites before Courts can consider customs:
1. A custom must be proved as a fact.
2. Must not be contrary to law, public policy or public order.
3. Must be a number of repeated acts.
4. The repeated acts must have been uniformly performed.
5. There must be a juridical intention to make a rule of social conduct.
6. There must be a sufficient lapse of time.

Article 12- A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

Kinds of Customs: General Custom (custom of the place); Propter Legem (in accordance
with law) or Contra Legem (against the law).

J. COMPUTATION OF TIME
Legal periods, Art.13, as amended by Sec. 31, EO 292, The Revised Administrative Code
of 1987.
Sec. 31 EO 292- Legal Periods- “Year” shall be understood to be 12 calendar months;
“month” of 30 days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific month contains, “day”, to a day
of 24 hours, and “night”, from sunset to sunrise.

COMMR. v PRIMETOWN GR NO. 162155 AUGUST 28, 2007

Facts: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or
credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled
for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase cost of labor and
materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and
remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were
claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with.
However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in
CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec. 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the 2 year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to art. 13 as
amended by Sec. 31, EO 292. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April
14, 1998, and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after
Primetown filed its adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Issue: WON petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ruling: Pursuant to EO 292, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC
defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain. The Court held that Administrative Code of 1987
impliedly repealed Art.13 NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled
for the refund since it is filed within the 2 year reglementary period.

MONTAJES v. PEOPLE GR NO. 183449, March 12, 2012.

Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault before the MTC of Agusan
del Norte. When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On December 29, 2005, the
MTC issued its judgment finding petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. Petitioner filed a MR which the RTC
denied in an Order dated May 4, 2007. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
extension of time to file a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying
for an extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within
which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for review on June 5,
2007. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for being filed out of time.
Issue: WON the CA erred in denying due course to his petition for review for being filed
out of time.
Ruling: Based on Sec. 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period
during any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this case,
the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a
Saturday. Petitioner’s filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day of filing
which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his
motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5,
2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5,
2007. The CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on
our clarification in A.M No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for
should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the
expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of the period
which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007, was already two days
late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal
application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
K. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Theories of Territoriality, Art. 14, Article 2 RPC
Article 14 (NCC)- GR: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
public international law and to treaty stipulation.
EXC: The principles of public international law; The presence of treaty stipulations.
Article 2 (RPC)- Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws
of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within
the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Phillipine ship or air ship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise
of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations
defined in Title 1 of Book 2 of this Code.

RAYRAY v. CHAE KYUNG LEE GR NO. 18176, October 26, 1966

Facts: Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to Chae Kyung Lee. Defendant’s
whereabouts being unknown and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea summons
was served by publication. Plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default. The
court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground: that the court could not nullify a
marriage contracted abroad; and that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed
for.

Issue: WON the court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Ruling: In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation; the person of the parties
therein; and in actions in rem and quasi in rem, the res. The subject matter of the
present case is the annulment of the plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant, which is
within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance. The same acquired jurisdiction over
plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint
herein. Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of
summons by publication. This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the
parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world. Jurisdiction of the same
depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of
marriage. Plaintiff is a citizen of the Philippines. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction.

Nationality Theory, Art. 15, FC 26 (2)

Article 15 (NCC)- Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

Scope of Nationality Principle: Family rights and duties; Status; Condition; Legal Capacity

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO JR. 39 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the
Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June
8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

Issue: WON the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. Under the nationality
principle embodied in Art.15 of the NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner.

PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA 174 SCRA 653

Facts: Imelda Pilapil is a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent Erich
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child together. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on Jan.23, 1983. The divorce decree was promulgated on Jan.15,
1986, on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was
granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, the
latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983.

Issue: WON private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer married as decree of divorce was already issued.

Ruling: The law specifically provided that in prosecution of adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file a complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse,
the latter obtained a valid divorce decree in his country and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the
same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.

QUITA v. CA 300 SCRA 40

Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
Francisco, California USA. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died intestate. On August 31, 1972,
Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for the issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage between Arturo and petitioner subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.

Issue: WON petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that
she had secured a divorce decree in the USA and in fact had twice remarried.

Ruling: Private respondent and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting, thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.

ELMAR PEREZ v. CA, CATINDING GR NO. 162580, January 27, 2006

Facts: Private respondent Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to
obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of First Civil Court of San
Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Perez in the State of
Virginia in the US until October 2001. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that
the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which “dissolved” the
marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her
marriage to Tristan was deemed void. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

Issue: WON Perez has legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be-
intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife.

Ruling: No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.

SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS GR NO. 133743, February 6, 2007

Facts: During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Mary Lee Corwin.
However, Corwin, an American citizen filed a complaint for Divorce before the family
court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, USA which issued a decree granting absolute
divorce and awarding child custody.On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition
for letters of administration before the RTC. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was the decedent’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo, since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
Issue: WON a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr case involved a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner. The court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by a foreign spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under the
Philippine law. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there
is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA.

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. CA GR NO. 167109 February 6, 2007.

Facts: Petitioner married to Orlando on June 4, 1950, in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,

they migrated to the US and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in 1988. Two months after the divorce,
or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages against Orlando and Merope.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling: The records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and
divorce. Before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which
must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORP v. ECHIN GR NO. 178551, October 11, 2010

Facts: Respondent was hired by petitioner in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,

Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a
two-year contract with a monthly salaray of US$1,200.00. Within a year, respondent
was terminated for not passing the probationary period which was under the
Memorandum Agreement. Ministry denied respondent’s request and she returned to
the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal. LA rendered a judgment in favor of respondent
and ordered petitioner to her salary for 3 months unexpired portion of the contract.
Petitioner appealed to the CA contending that their principal being a foreign
government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.

Issue: WON petitioner is immune from suit.

Ruling: According to RA 8042: “The obligations covenant in the recruitment agreement

entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not
coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until
the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said agreement. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining
the issues presented.

TUNA PROCESSING v. PHI. KINGFORD GR NO. 185582, February 29, 2012

Facts: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (licensor) was a co-patentee of US Patent, Philippine Patent

and Indonesian Patent and 5 Philippine tuna processors. They entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement which provides for the enforcing of said patents, granting
licenses under it and collecting royalties, and for the establishment of petitioner. The
parties likewise executed a Supplemental MOA and an Agreement to Amend MOA. Due
to a series of events, the licensees including respondent withdrew from petitioner and
reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, USA, and won the
case against respondent. To enforce the award, the petitioner file a Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of
Makati City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied so it sought for the
inhibition of Judge Almeda and Judge Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-
raffled, in turn granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
Petitioner filed a petition for review, that although a foreign corporation established in
the State of California, not licensed to do business in the Philippines, can enforce a
foreign arbitral award.

Issue: WON TPI can sue in the Philippines.

Ruling: It is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award, SC deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations
not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts.
When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this
case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the
arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other
party to enter into contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation
of the result. Clearly, on the matter to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected
not because it favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because RA 9285 has
certainly erased any conflict of law question. When a party enters into a contract
whether containing a foreign arbitration clause or not, shall submit itself to arbitration
and be bound by the contract.

DOCTRINE OF LEX REI SITAE Art. 16- GR: Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. EXC: However, intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.

RENVIO (means referring back) PROBLEM: The problem arises when there is a doubt as
to whether a reference in our law to a foreign law- is a reference to the INTERNAL law of
said foreign law; or is a reference to the WHOLE of the foreign law, including CONFLICTS
RULES.

AMOS v. BELLIS GR NO. L-23678, June 6, 1967

Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the US. He had five
legitimate children with his first wife whom he divorced, 3 legitimate children with his
second wife and finally 3 illegitimate children. 6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he
executed 2 wills, apportioning the remainder of the estate and properties to his 7
surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition
claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled
according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of 2 separate
wills.

Issue: WON Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights.
Ruling: Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law,
is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters in
Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Where the testator of
Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his
national law. Since Texas does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes is valid. The SC held that the illegitimate children
are not entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law, which is the national law of the
deceased.

TAYAG v. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, GR NO.L-23145, November 29, 1968

Facts: In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left behind properties here
and abroad. One property she left behind were two stock certificates covering shares of
stocks of the Benguet consolidated, Inc. (BCI). Said stock certificates were in the
possession of the Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the
domiciliary administrator of the estate of Perkins. Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag
was appointed as the ancillary administrator of the properties of Perkins she left behind
in the Philippines. A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them
is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates. A case ensued and eventually, the
trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn over the stock certificated to Tayag. CTC-NY refused.
Tayag then filed with the court a petition to have said stock certificates be declared lost
and to compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in the replacement thereof. The trial
court granted Tayag’s petition. BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot
possibly issue new stock certificates because the two stock certificates declared lost are
not actually lost; that the trial court as well as Tayag acknowledged that the stock
certificates exist and they are with CTC-NY; that according to BCI’s by laws, it can only
issue new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen or destroyed certificates of stocks, only
after court of law has issued a final and executory order as to who really owns a
certificate of stock.

Issue: WON the arguments of BCI are correct.

Ruling: No. BCI is a corporation who owes its existence to Philippine laws. It has been
given rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under the law
and one of those is to follow legal court orders. It is not immune from judicial control
because it is domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing full
allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from local court orders. The final
recourse then is for our local courts to create legal fiction such that the stock certificates
in issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist in the hands no CTC-NY. This is
 valid. As held time and again, fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of
legitimate ends have played an important part in its development.

L. RULES ON PROHIBITIVE LAWS

LEX LOCI CELEBRACIONES, Article 17
Article 17- The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country which they are executed (Lex Loci
Celebrationis). When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by the Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution (Exterritoriality).
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their onjects public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA v. KITAMURA GR NO. 149177 November 23, 2007
Facts: In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. Ltd., a Japanese firm, was
contracted by the DPWH to supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access
Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA)
with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in
Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year. In January 2000, DPWH awarded the
Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to
head the road project. But in February 2000, Hasegawa the general manager of Nippon
informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon
to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Issue: WON the complaint against Hasewaga be dismissed.
Ruling: No. The case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and
damages. Such is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The SC emphasizes that the contention that Japanese laws
should be applied is premature. In conflict cases, there are three phases and each next
phase commences when one is settled, to wit: 1. Jurisdiction- Court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the property, the res. 2.
Choice of Law- once a local court take cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws
must automatically apply. The Court must determine substantive law when applied to
the merits for fairness to both parties. 3. Recognition and enforcement of judgment. The
invocation of petitioner’s choice of law is premature by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict of laws between Japan and ours. Under the state of the most
significant rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and to the
parties. In a case involving contract, the court should consider where the contract was
made, was negotiated, was performed and the domicile, place of business or place of
incorporation of the parties.

RAYTHEON v. ROUZIE GR NO. 162894, February 26, 2008

Facts: BMSI, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Connecticut
and Rouzie Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract. BMSI hired Rouzie as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Rouzie secured a
service contract with the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit
against BMSI and Rust for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, and
breach of employment contract. The complaint averred that BMSI, Rust and Raytheon
had combined and functioned as 1 company. Raytheon sought the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
convenience. Raytheon’s contention is that the written contract between Rouzie and
BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut.
Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction. WON the complaint should be dismissed on the
ground of forum non convenience.
Ruling: Yes, the RTC had jurisdiction. On the matter of jurisdiction over conflicts-of-laws
problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try
the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case
is filed. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that Philippine Courts or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.
No. Under the Doctrine of Forum Non-Convenience, a court, in conflict-of-laws,
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient”or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
The propriety of dismissing a case based of this doctrine requires a factual
determination.

TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355

Facts: Vicenta Escano, 27 yrs. old, got married with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 yrs.old. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in
the civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between
who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew
their vows as suggested by the former’s parents. Vicenta continued living with her
parents while Tenchavez went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for passport
 indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the US and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later approved and issued by the Second
Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Moran, an American, in
Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on Aug. 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged have dissuaded
Vicenta form joining her husband.
Issue: WON the divorce sought by Vicenta is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
Ruling: Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez an Escano are still married.

Art. 26 (2) FC- Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

M. SUPPLETORY NATURE OF CIVIL CODE

Article 18- In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this code.
III. HUMAN RELATIONS
A. APPLICATION
Principle of Abuse of Rights (Article 19)
Article 19- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights, and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

GLOBE MACKAY v. CA 176 SCRA 778

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate supervisor Ferraren and to the
Executive Vice President and General Manager Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry
told Tobias that he was the number one suspect and ordered him one week forced
leave. When Tobias returned, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to
take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials
for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private
investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports
from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Examiner are in
 favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of 6 criminal
charges against Tobias but were dismissed. Tobias was terminated and sought
employment with the RETELCO; but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a suit against
petitioners for the alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abuse acts.
Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages against private respondent.
Ruling: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage against private respondent. The court has already ruled that the right of
the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.

FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC) NOW BANK OF PHIL. ISLANDS v. PACILAN JR, 465 SCRA 372
Facts: Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank. He issued several
postdated checks, the latest one amounting to P680.00. The said check was presented
to the petitioner for payment but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of
Pacilan has been closed on the evening of the same date on the ground that it was
improperly handled. The last check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff
deposited the amount the following day. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but
after the bank did not reply, he filed an action for damages against it and the employee
who closed the account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account
was malicious and intended to embarrass him.
Issue: WON the petitioner is liable for damages.
Ruling: No. The award of damages under Art.19 is unjustifiable. The petitioner has the
right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and regulations on regular
demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner abused its rights in the
exercise of its duties. The acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the
closure of the account cannot be considered as bad faith or done with malice but a
mere simple negligence of its personnel.

B. DUTY TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH

Acts contrary to law (article 20)
Article 20- Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Acts contra bonus mores (article 21)
Article 21- Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
 BUNAG JR v. CA 211 SCRA 440
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were sweethearts, he invited her to take their merienda at
the Aristocrat in Manila, which plaintiff obliged. But instead to Aristocrat, he brought
plaintiff to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening,
defendant brought plaintiff to his grandmother in Las Pinas, where they lived as
husband and wife for 21 days. Defendant and plaintiff filed their respective applications
for a marriage license. On October 1, 1973, defendant filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license. Defendant left and never returned, humiliating
plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents. Plaintiff was ashamed when he
went back home and could not sleep nor eat because of the deception done by
defendant. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages for the alleged breach of promise to
marry.
Issue: WON plaintiff is entitled for damages based on such ground.
Ruling: In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

C. ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

TANJANCO v. CA 18 SCRA
Facts: From December 1957, petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted the respondent,
Araceli Santos, both being of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s
promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge
sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which
eventually led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to
resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of unemployment,
Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not
fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the Court that
Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for
support and damages. Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages on the ground of breach of promise to
marry.
Ruling: No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of legal age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant. Such is not compatible to the idea
of seduction. One cannot be held liable for breach of promise to marry.

BAKSH v. CA 219 SCRA 115

Facts: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987,
for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical
exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even
went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced
the respondent to live with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived
with petitioner. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied respondent in the apartment while he
was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement
and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages on the ground of breach of promise to
marry.
Ruling: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a
woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures a
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry
led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

ABANAG v. MABUTE, AM P-11-2922, April 4, 2011

Facts: The complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondents promise,
she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her
pregnancy, respondent brought her to a manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs
to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually
abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She stopped
schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered. The respondent denied the
complainants allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless.
Issue: WON respondent is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
Ruling: We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and
respondent were consensual. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent
and they eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the
respondent’s office. They continued their relationship even after the complainant had
suffered miscarriage.

EXCEPTION: WASSMER v. VELEZ 12 SCRA 649 (1964)

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary
preparations for the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations, buying
of wedding dress and other apparels and other wedding necessities. On September 2,
1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to
 attend the wedding because his mom opposed the wedding. Wassmer sued Velez for
damages.
Issue: WON defendant is liable for damages on the ground of breach of promise to
marry.
Ruling: This is not a case of a mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
through all the preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21.

D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS.

Action In Rem Verso, Article 22- Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Essential Requisites of “Accion In Rem Verso”:
1. One party must be enriched and the other made poorer.
2. There must be a casual relation between the two.
3. The enrichment must not be justifiable.
4. There must be no other way to recover.
5. The indemnity cannot exceed the loss or enrichment.

Article 23- Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not
due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited.

Example: Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the cultivated highland of
B. A’s cattle are saved, but B’s crops are destroyed. True, A was not at fault but he was
benefited. It is but right and equitable that he should indemnify B.

Article 24- In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Parens Patriae- means the father or parent of his country. Refers to the sovereign power
of the state in safeguarding the rights of person under disability.

Article 25- Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period
of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the
instance of any government or private charitable institution.
E. RIGHTS TO PERSONAL DIGNITY AND PRIVACY

Article 26- Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:

1. Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect or other personal condition.

Remedies: An action for damages; an action for prevention; or any other relief.

F. LIABIILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 27- Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

LEDESMA v. CA AND DELMO, 160 SCRA 449

Facts: A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude,
because the President, herein petitioner, of the West Visayas College neglected his duty
to inform the student on the result of a case against the latter which has, as its
punishment, the removal of the awards of the student. Said case was the extension of
loans to students, which the president contends to be against the school rules and
regulations, and which the student innocently performed in her capacity as the
treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in accordance to the Constitution and By-
laws of the club, on the belief that said constitution was presented and approved by the
president. The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after
being denied for reconsideration by the president, where upon investigation, it was
found out that the student acted in good faith and that her awards be reinstituted. The
president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and even e-mailed the director
to reverse its decision.
Issue: WON the petitioner is liable for damages under Art.27 of the NCC.
Ruling: Yes, the president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant
disregard of the student’s rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows
neglect of duty without just cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of
the NCC.
G. CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ART.29, 30, 31
PADILLA, ET AL. v. CA, 129 SCRA 558
Facts: Petitioner, et al., was charged of grave coercion. On Feb. 1964, around 9 am at
Camarinas Norte, the petitioners willfully and feloniously prevented Antonio Vergara
and his family form closing their stall at the Public Market. Petitioners forcibly opened
the door of the stall and brutally demolished the stall using axes the carrying away the
goods and merchandise. Such acts of the petitioners were said to be pursuant to an
ordinance. Roy Padilla and company also took advantage of their public position, being
the Mayor of the said municipality and the others being policemen. The CFI finds them
guilty. The CA acquitted the accused but ordered to pay jointly and severally 9,600 as
actual damages.
Issue: WON petitioners are liable to pay damages even if they were acquitted for their
criminal charges.
Ruling: Yes. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt. No separate action is necessary considering the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceeding.

CANCIO v. ISIP, GR NO. 133978 November 12, 2002

Facts: Cancio filed cases of violation of BP 22 and cases of estafa against respondent.
The BP 22 cases were dismissed on the ground of “failure to prosecute.” As to the estafa
cases, the prosecution moved to dismiss after failing to present its second witness. The
prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said
criminal cases. The trial court granted it petition. Cancio then filed the instant case for
collection of some of money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the
estafa cases. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that
petitioner’s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Issue: WON the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a
civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases.
Ruling: No, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, under Art. 100 (RPC) and independent civil
liabilities. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject, however, to the caveat under Art. 2117 NCC that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. Under the
present Rules, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in criminal action.

SANTOS v. PIZZARO, 465 SCRA 232, July 29, 2005

Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was
eventually convicted in Devember 1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate
civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the MCTC. In October 2000,
 Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris, the president and
chairman of Viron Transit. Viron moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among
others, prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from
the accrual of the cause of action.
Issue: WON the action is barred on the ground of prescription.
Ruling: While the cause of action ex quasi delict has prescribed, petitioners can still
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving
cause of action ex delicto. This is so because, the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. The dismissal of the
action based on culpa aquillana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
of the employer.

FRIAS v. SAN DIEGO-SISON, 520 SCRA 244, April 3, 2007

Facts: Bobbie Rose Frias owns a house and lot acquired from IMRDC through a deed of
sale and covered by TCT in the name of IMRDC. Frias, as the first party, and Dra. San
Diego-Sison as the second party, entered into a MOA over the property. Frias received
from San Diego-Sison 2 million cash and 1 million post-dated check dated Feb.28, 1990,
instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale. Frias then gave the TCT in the name of
IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. San Diego-Sison decided not to
purchase the property and informed Frias through a letter reminding of the agreement
that the amount of 2 million be considered as a loan payable within 6 months. However,
Frias failed to pay San Diego-Sison who later filed a complaint for sum of money with
preliminary attachment.
Issue: WON the compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months only as
stipulated in the contract.
Ruling: The Court said that the phrase “for the last 6 months only” should be taken in
the context of the entire agreement.

H. VIOLATION OF RIGHTS, Article 32

MHP GARMENTS, INC. v. CA, 236 SCRA 227
Facts: The Constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and
seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. MHP Garments Inc, was awarded by the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts
uniforms, supplies, badges and insignias. In their MOA, MHP Garments was given the
authority to- undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms
and other scouting supplies. MHP received information that private respondents were
selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. On October 1983,
without any warrant, petitioner and other constabulary men went to the stores of
 respondents and seized the items. The seizure cause commotion and embarrassed
private respondents. The items were turned over to the petitioner for safe keeping. A
criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against respondents. During its
pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondents the sum of 3, 100 in
order to be dropped from the complaint. The Fiscal rendered a decision dropping the
case of unfair competition and ordered petitioner to return the seized items. The seized
items were not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents filed a civil
case against petitioner for sums of money and damages.
Issue: WON private respondents are entitled to damages.
Ruling: Yes. The Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.

I. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS, ARTICLE 33

REYES v. SEMPIO-DIY AND MALICSI, 141 SCRA 208
Facts: Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The
aggrieved party was Reyes, the petitioner herein. The accused pleaded guilty and
because of this petitioner was not able to make a reservation of her right to file a
separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Malicsi for
damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Malicsi which was
the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor.
Issue: WON petitioner may file a separate civil action.
Ruling: The failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did
not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under article 33 of
the NCC, there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil
action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case
and such reservation is not necessary.

YAKULT PHILIPPINES v. CA, 190 SCRA 35

Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. Later, a complaint for damages was filed by respondent represented by
his father, against petitioner in the RTC. The trial court rendered a decision awarding
damages to respondents. Petitioner’s appealed on the ground that the civil action for
damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, being without malice,
cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art.33 of the NCC.
Issue: WON a civil action instituted after criminal action was filed, before presentation
of evidence by the prosecution, would prosper even if there was no reservation to file a
separate civil action.
 Ruling: Yes. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately. Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without
previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless, it was instituted before the
prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge was informed
thereof.

CASUPANAN v. LAROYA, August 26, 2002.

Facts: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and
the other owned by Capitulo and driven by Casupanan, two cases were filed before the
MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage of property. The case was on preliminary investigation
when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. Upon
motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, MCTC dismissed the civil case. On
MR, Casupanan insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
Issue: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case.
Ruling: Yes. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
RPC while the civil case is based on culpa-aquiliana actionable under Art.2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code. There is no question that the offended party in a criminal action can
file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Sec.3 of Rule 111.

J. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, ARTICLE 36

QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO, 158 SCRA 674
Facts: Private respondent claims to own the land and petitioner, through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in his
affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an administrative case
is pending before the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties involving
the same piece of land. In the administrative case, petitioner dispute the right of the
respondent over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot.
Petitioner argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondent’s
right to eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence, a prejudicial question which
bars a judicial action after its termination.
Issue: WON the administrative case is a prejudicial question which would operate as a
bar to said ejectment case.
Ruling: The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Sec.5, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: the Civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. However, because of the
intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the possibility of the Land Authority in
deciding in favor of petitioner which will terminate or suspend private respondent’s
right to eject petitioner, the SC gave the lower court and advise. This advise became the
basis for deciding the case. While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving 2
court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity,
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the
parties, as well as the need to resolve the parties right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule’s analogous application to
the case at bar.

CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179

Facts: Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from
its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known as barangay Karangalan. The City Council
of pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Brgy.
Karangalan in Pasig City. Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, S.1996, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscites were accordingly. Cainta moved to suspend or
cancel the plebiscites scheduled and filed 2 petitions with the COMELEC for settlement
boundaries. Cainta claimed the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should
be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the
Court.
Issue: WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of the 2 barangays should be
suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
government.
Ruling: Yes. The plebiscite on the creation of Brgy. Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta by
the Antipolo RTC. In the same vein, the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of Brgy.
Napico should be annulled and set aside. The civil case involving the boundary dispute
between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed
barangays may be held.

UMALI v. IAC, 186 SCRA 680

Facts: Petitioners are the officers of the OROSEA. As officers, they purchased from the
spouses Edano, Lot No.49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Province of Quezon for
the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in 4 installments issuing for this purpose four checks
drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first check was honored upon
presentment. By arrangement, a deed of absolute sale was executed by vendors. A TCT
was issued in the name of OROSEA. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of 1M from the
Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for the second
payment fell due, petitioners asked, for 2 times, deferment of its presentation of
payment. The second renewal check was dishonored due to lack of funds. As a result,
the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. OROSEA filed a
complaint in the CFI against Edano spouses for the annulment/recission of the Contract
of Sale by and between OROSEA. Petitioners filed a “Motion to Suspend Arraignment
and Further Proceedings with a Supplemental Motion to Suspend Proceedings.” This
was opposed by the CFI and affirmed by the CA.
Issue: WON the complaint filed by petitioners for the annulment of the Contract of Sale
is a prejudicial question.
Ruling: Given the nature of prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised, we
agree with the ruling of CA that the resolution of the issues in civil case is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused, hence, no prejudicial
question is involved in two cases.

TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 249 SCRA 342

Facts: Della Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor
sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for
the Sanggunian Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the
Department of Local Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a
petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The
latter, however, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Tuanda to recognize private
respondents as sectoral representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the
RTC of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents
as sectoral representatives. Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the
Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 on
the ground that petitioners refused to give them their per diems, salaries and other
privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a prejudicial
question exists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City.
Issue: WON the civil case is a prejudicial question.
Ruling: The issue in the civil case constitutes a prejudicial question to warrant
suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners. The facts and issues involved in the civil action and criminal case are closely
related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioner’s alleged partiality
and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries and per diems as
sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were
made in accordance with law. The conditions and elements of de facto officers are the
following: There must be a de jure office; There must be actual physical possession of
the office in good faith. One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated
elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.

BOBIS v. BOBIS, GR NO. 138509, July 31, 2000

Facts: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the
same respondent contracted a second marriage with Petitioner Imelda Maribella-Bobis
on January 25, 1996, and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without marriage license.
Issue: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling: No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and is such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, it was held that the pendency
of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of
marriage.

BELTRAN v. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106

Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine
Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
of his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Judge Cervantes denied the foregoing motion.
Issue: WON the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling: The SC finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. (PASI) v LICHAUCO, 496 SCRA 588, July 27, 2006
Facts: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into by a
consortium of private telecommunications and the Department of Transportation and
Communications, they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name PASI.
They requested the then DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, Jr., for official government
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine Orbital Slots to PASI for its AGILA satellites
by a letter dated June 18, 1996. When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations
for the launching, operation and management of the satellites by, among other things,
obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its business
partners, and making an initial payment. When they requested Land Bank’s
confirmation of its participation in a club loan for the government’s assignment to PASI
of orbital slots, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina Lichauco sent a letter to the bank
controverting the said assignment, clearly stating that orbital slots can no longer be
assigned to PASI. PASI claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it
subsequently came to learn that another company whose identity had not been
disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot, filed a complaint
before the RTC against Lichauco. PASI filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Lichauco for gross violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. Because a
prejudicial question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau,
the criminal suit was dismissed and reconsideration was denied. Hence, PASI is in
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON there exists a prejudicial question, and if in the affirmative, WON the
dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order.
Ruling: Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed
bidder of the orbital slot is, in the civil case declared valid for being within Lichauco’s
scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no
prohibited act to speak of, nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have
been suffered by the petitioner. No, according to Yap v. Paras, Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court directs that “the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and
that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or
the investigating officer.”

OMICTIN v. CA AND LAGOS, 512 SCRA 70, January 22, 2007

Facts: Omictin Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag, Phils., filed a complaint of estafa
against Lagos due to the latter’s refusal, despite repeated demands, to return the 2
company vehicles entrusted to him while he was still the president of the firm. Lagos
moved for the suspension of the criminal proceedings due to the existence of a
prejudicial question in view of a pending case before the SEC filed by the latter against
the petitioner.
Issue: WON there is a prejudicial question.
Ruling: The resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine
the guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa is
abuse of confidence under Art. 315 par.1 (b) of the RPC is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender. Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged
offended party Saag Phils.Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject
vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such demand on the company’s
behalf. Lagos is challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils. Inc., in the
corporate case. If the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if
no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

MAGESTRADO v. PEOPLE AND LIBROJO, 527 SCRA 125, July 10, 2007
Facts: Before the MeTC of Quezon City, a criminal case for perjury was filed against
Francisco Magestrado. Francisco then filed a motion for suspension of proceedings
based on a prejudicial question alleging that the civil cases for recovery of a sum of
money for cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title and damages both pending before
the RTC of Quezon City must be resolved first.
Issue: WON the criminal case should be suspended pending the outcome of the civil
case.
Ruling: No. The pending civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a
loan was obtained by Francisco from Elena Librojo and whether the former executed a
real estate mortgage involving the property. On the other hand, the criminal case
involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an
affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
said title. It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other.