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Operation Barbarossa
Operation Barbarossa (German: Unternehmen Barbarossa, for Frederick I) was the code name for Nazi Germany's
invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that began on 22 June 1941.[1] [2] Over 4.5 million troops of the
Axis powers invaded the USSR along a 2900 km (1800 mi) front.[3] In addition to the large number of troops, it also
involved 600,000 motor vehicles and 750,000 horses.[4] Planning for Operation Barbarossa started on 18 December
1940; the secret preparations and the military operation itself lasted almost a year, from spring to winter 1941. The
Red Army repelled the Wehrmacht's strongest blow, and Adolf Hitler had not achieved the expected victory, but the
Soviet Union's situation remained dire. Tactically, the Germans had won some resounding victories and occupied
some of the most important economic areas of the country, mainly in Ukraine.[5] Despite these successes, the
Germans were pushed back from Moscow and could never mount an offensive simultaneously along the entire
strategic Soviet-German front again.[6]
Operation Barbarossa's failure led to Hitler's demands for further operations inside the USSR, all of which eventually
failed, such as continuing the Siege of Leningrad,[7] [8] Operation Nordlicht, and Battle of Stalingrad, among other
battles on the occupied Soviet territory.[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Operation Barbarossa was the largest military operation in human history in both manpower and casualties.[14] Its
failure was a turning point in the Third Reich's fortunes. Most important, Operation Barbarossa opened up the
Eastern Front, to which more forces were committed than in any other theatre of war in world history. Operation
Barbarossa and the areas that fell under it became the site of some of the largest battles, deadliest atrocities, highest
casualties, and most horrific conditions for Soviets and Germans alike — all of which influenced the course of both
World War II and 20th century history.
German intentions
• When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labour shortage in the German industry could be relieved by
demobilization of many soldiers.
• Ukraine would be a reliable source of agriculture.
• Having the Soviet Union as a source of slave labour would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position.
• Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United Kingdom.
• The German economy needed more oil and controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this; as Albert Speer, the
German Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said in his interrogation, "the need for oil certainly
was a prime motive" in the decision to invade.[29]
Operation Barbarossa 4
Hitler ignored German economic naysayers, and told Hermann Göring that "everyone on all sides was always raising
economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From now onwards he wasn't going to listen to any more
of that kind of talk and from now on he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind."[34] This was
passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of an
invasion of the Soviet Union — that it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured intact.[34]
Beginning in March 1941, Göring's Green Folder laid out details of the
Soviet Union's proposed economic disposal after the invasion. The
entire urban population of the invaded land was to be starved to death,
thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allowing the
urban population's replacement by a German upper class. During the
Nuremberg Trials in 1946, Sir Hartley Shawcross said in March 1941,
as well as administrative divisions previously created, the following
divisions in the Russian East were planned:
Rudolf Hess and others at Heinrich Himmler's
• Ural (central and south Ural and nearest territories, created from "Building and Planning in the East" March 1941
planned east Russian European territorial reorganization) Exhibition
• West Sibirien (future west Siberia and Novosibirsk held lands)
• Nordland (Soviet Arctic areas: West Nordland (Russian European north coasts) and Ost Nordland (northwest
Siberian north coasts))
In summer 1941, German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be
administered in the following Reichskommissariates:
• Ostland (The Baltic countries and Belarus)
• Ukraine (Ukraine and adjacent territories)
• Kaukasus (Southern Russia and the Caucasus area)
• Moskowien (Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia)
Operation Barbarossa 5
“
We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down
”
—Adolf Hitler
Operation Barbarossa was to combine a northern assault towards Leningrad, a symbolic capturing of Moscow, and
an economic strategy of seizing oil fields in the south beyond Ukraine. Hitler and his generals disagreed on which of
these aspects should take priority and where Germany should focus its energies; deciding on priorities required a
compromise. Hitler thought himself a political and military genius. While planning Barbarossa in 1940-1941, in
many discussions with his generals, Hitler repeated his order: "Leningrad first, the Donetsk Basin second, Moscow
third."[1] [35] Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the east. He was convinced Britain
would sue for peace, once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union, the real area of Germany's interests. General
Franz Halder noted in his diaries that, by destroying the Soviet Union, Germany would destroy Britain's hope of
victory.
Hitler had grown overconfident from his rapid success in Western Europe and the Red Army's ineptitude in the
Winter War against Finland in 1939–1940. He expected victory within a few months and therefore did not prepare
for a war lasting into the winter. This meant his troops lacked adequate warm clothing and preparations for a longer
campaign when they began their attack. The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would prove
to be his undoing.[36]
German preparations
“
When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.
”
—Adolf Hitler
The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in the Balkans had
finished. By the third week in February 1941, 680,000 German troops were stationed on the Romanian-Soviet
border.[21] In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved 3.5 million German soldiers and about 1 million Axis soldiers
to the Soviet border, launched many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled materiel in the
East. The Soviets were still taken by surprise, mostly due to Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attack
only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet leader also believed the Nazis would be likely
to finish their war with Britain before opening a new front. He refused to believe repeated warnings from his
intelligence services on the Nazi buildup, fearing the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a war
between Germany and the USSR.[37] According to documentary series Battlefield, Hitler wired Stalin to say that the
troop massing along the Reich's eastern borders was to "keep them away from attacks by the West."
Spy Dr. Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date; Swedish cryptanalysts led by Arne Beurling also
knew the date beforehand, but Sorge and other informers (e.g. from Berlin Police dept.) had previously given
different invasion dates which passed peacefully before the actual invasion. In addition, British intelligence
gathering information through ULTRA warned the Soviet Union of impending invasion several months prior to 22
June 1941.[38]
The Germans set up deception operations, from April 1941, to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real
target: Operations Haifisch and Harpune. These simulated preparations in Norway, the Channel coast and Britain.
Operation Barbarossa 6
There were supporting activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises. Some
details of these bogus invasion plans were deliberately leaked.
Hitler and his generals also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. At Hitler's insistence, the German High
Command (OKW) began to develop a strategy to avoid repeating these mistakes.
The strategy Hitler and his generals agreed on involved three separate army groups assigned to capture specific
regions and cities of the Soviet Union. The main German thrusts were conducted along historical invasion routes.
Army Group North was to march through the Baltics into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of
Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk and then Moscow, marching
through what is now Belarus and the west-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike the
heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing eastward over the steppes of
the southern USSR to the Volga and the oil-rich Caucasus.
Hitler, the OKW and the various high commands disagreed about what the main objectives should be. In preparing
for Barbarossa, most of the OKW argued for a straight thrust to Moscow, but Hitler kept asserting his intention to
seize the resource-rich Ukraine and Baltics before concentrating on the Soviet capital. An initial delay, which
postponed the start of Barbarossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941, may have been insignificant, especially
since the Russian muddy season came late that year. However, more time was lost at various critical moments as
Hitler and the OKW suspended operations in order to argue about strategic objectives.
The Germans also decided to bring rear forces (mostly Waffen-SS units and Einsatzgruppen) into the conquered
territories to counter the partisan activity they knew would erupt in areas they controlled.
Soviet preparations
Despite the impressions of Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak.
Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to
Germany. Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became
progressively more oriented toward military production. In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for
the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations.
On 5 May 1941, Stalin gave a speech to graduates of military academies in Moscow declaring: "War with Germany
is inevitable. If comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for two or three months that will be our good
fortune, but you yourselves must go off and take measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces"[39] . Many
highlight this as recognition by Stalin of the impending attack.
According to Taylor and Proektor (1974), the Soviet armed forces in the western districts were outnumbered, with
2.6 million Soviet soldiers vs. 4.5 million for the Axis. The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July
1941, though, amounted to a little more than 5 million men, 2.6 million in the west, 1.8 million in the far east, with
Operation Barbarossa 7
the rest being deployed or training elsewhere.[41] These figures, however, can be misleading. The figure for Soviet
strength in the western districts of the Soviet Union counts only the First Strategic Echelon, which was stationed on
and behind the Soviet western frontier to a depth of 400 kilometers; it also underestimates the size of the First
Strategic Echelon, which was actually 2.9 million strong. The figure does not include the smaller Second Strategic
Echelon, which as of 22 June 1941 was in process of moving toward the frontier; according to the Soviet strategic
plan, it was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Strategic Echelon by early July. The total Axis strength
is also exaggerated; 3.3 million German troops were earmarked for participation in Barbarossa, but that figure
includes reserves which did not take part in the initial assault. A further 600,000 troops provided by Germany's allies
also participated, but mostly after the initial assault.
Total Axis forces available for Barbarossa were therefore in the order of 3.9 million. On 22 June, the German
Wehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 German divisions), including 29 armoured and
motorized divisions, some 90% of its mobile forces, attacking on a front of 1200 km (750 mi) between the Baltic Sea
and the Carpathian Mountains, against NKVD border troops and the divisions of the Soviet First Operational
Echelon (the part of the First Strategic Echelon stationed immediately behind the frontier in the three western Special
Military Districts) because it had completed its deployment and was ready to attack about two weeks before the Red
Army was scheduled to have finished its own deployment with the Second Strategic Echelon in place. At the time,
41% of stationary Soviet bases were located in the near-boundary districts, many of them in the 200 km (120 mi)
strip around the border; according to Red Army directive, fuel, equipment, railroad cars, etc. were similarly
concentrated there.[42]
Moreover, on mobilization, as the war went on, the Red Army gained steadily in strength. While the strength of both
sides varied, in general the 1941 campaign was fought with a slight Axis numerical superiority in manpower at the
front. According to Mikhail Meltyukhov (2000:477), by the start of war, the Red Army numbered altogether
5,774,211 troops: 4,605,321 in ground forces, 475,656 in air forces, 353,752 in the navy, 167,582 as border guards
and 171,900 in internal troops of the NKVD.
In some key weapons systems, however, the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable. In tanks, for example, the
Red Army had a large quantitative superiority. It possessed 23,106 tanks,[43] of which about 12,782 were in the five
Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). However, maintenance and
readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks
needed for resupply beyond their basic fuel and ammunition loads.
Also, from 1938, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support, but after their
experiences in the Winter War and their observation of the German campaign against France, had begun to emulate
the Germans and organize most of their armored assets into large armour divisions and corps. This reorganization
was only partially implemented at the dawn of Barbarossa,[44] as not enough tanks were available to bring the
mechanized corps up to organic strength.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields
a balance of immediately-available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. The best Soviet tank, the T-34, was
the most modern in the world, and the KV series the best armored. The most advanced Soviet tank models, however,
the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2% of the total
Soviet tank force. But while these 1,861 modern tanks were technically superior to the 1,404 German medium
Panzer III and IV tanks, the Soviets in 1941 still lacked the communications, training and experience to employ such
weapons effectively.
The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and
readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge
(1936–1938). Of 90 generals arrested, only six survived the purges, as did only 36 of 180 divisional commanders,
and just seven out of 57 army corps commanders. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed,[45]
while more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable." Three of the five
Operation Barbarossa 8
pre-war marshals and about two thirds of the corps and division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less
experienced officers in their places; for example, in 1941, 75% of Red Army officers had held their posts for less
than one year. The average Soviet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German division
commander. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessary
for their jobs.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and
Soviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques.[46] Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing, explaining
why aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed, making easy targets
for the Luftwaffe in the first days of the conflict. Prior to the invasion the VVS was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe
reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspace.
The Soviet war effort in the first phase of the Eastern front war was severely hampered by a shortage of modern
aircraft. The Soviet fighter force was equipped with large numbers of obsolete aircraft, such as the I-15 biplane and
the I-16. In 1941, the MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1 were just starting to roll off the production lines, but were far
inferior in all-round performance to the Messerschmitt Bf 109 or later, the Fw 190, when it entered operations in
September 1941. Few aircraft had radios and those that were available were unencrypted and did not work reliably.
The poor performance of VVS (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily, Soviet Air Force) during the Winter War with Finland had
increased the Luftwaffe's confidence that the Soviets could be mastered. The standard of flight training had been
accelerated in preparation for a German attack that was expected to come in 1942 or later. But Soviet pilot training
was extremely poor. Order No 0362 of the People's Commissar of Defense, dated 22 December 1940, ordered flight
training to be accelerated and shortened. Incredibly, while the Soviets had 201 MiG-3s and 37 MiG-1s combat ready
on 22 June 1941, only four pilots had been trained to handle these machines.[47]
The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared, and units were often separated and without transportation to
concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-designed artillery pieces, some of the guns
had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely
well-equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were
sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a
single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The army was in the midst of reorganizing the
armor units into large tank corps, adding to the disorganization.
As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality in the
field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, insufficient motorized logistical
support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantage.
In August 1940 British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week after Hitler
informally approved the plans for Barbarossa.[38] Stalin's distrust of the British led to his ignoring the warnings,
believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war.[38] [48] In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own
intelligence services and American intelligence made regular and repeated warnings of an impending German
attack.[49] However, Stalin chose to ignore these warnings. Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in
general and making significant preparations, he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler.[50] He also had an
ill-founded confidence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which had been signed just two years before. Last, he also
suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR.[51]
[52]
Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire back
without permission when attacked — though a partial alert was implemented on 10 April — they were simply not
ready when the German attack came.[48]
Enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did attack. However, these
forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the Red Army. In 1938, it had adopted, on the
instigation of General Pavlov, a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations. Infantry divisions,
reinforced by an organic tank component, would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones. Then came the shock of
Operation Barbarossa 9
the Fall of France. The French Army, considered the strongest in the world, was defeated in a mere six weeks. Soviet
analysis of events, based on incomplete information, concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by a
reliance on linear defence and a lack of armored reserves.
The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the infantry divisions
would henceforth be concentrated in large formations.[53] Most tanks would also be concentrated into 29 mechanized
corps, each with over 1031 tanks.[54] Should the Germans attack, their armoured spearheads would be cut off and
wiped out by the mechanized corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the German
infantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in Ukraine, was to be enormously reinforced to be
able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German Army Group South, it would swing north through
Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North. With the complete annihilation of the encircled German Army
thus made inevitable, a Red Army offensive into the rest of Europe would follow.[55] [56]
According to Viktor Suvorov, Stalin planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West.
Stalin's idea was to fuel Hitler's aggressive plans against Europe, and only after the capitalists had exhausted
themselves fighting each other, would the USSR make their strike. For this reason Stalin provided significant
material and political support to Adolf Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to “liberate” the whole
of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that German Barbarossa actually was a pre-emptive strike that
capitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the 1941 borders. Some others who support the idea
that Stalin prepared to attack, like Mikhail Meltyukhov, reject this part of Suvorov's theory, arguing that both sides
prepared for attack on their own, not in response to the other side's preparations.
Although this thesis has drawn the attention of the general public in some countries,[57] , and has been supported by
some historians, it has not been accepted by the majority of western historians.[57] [62]
Order of battle
Operation Barbarossa 10
Numerous smaller units from all over Nazi-occupied Europe, like the "Legion of French Volunteers Against
Bolshevism" (Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme), supported the German war effort.
The invasion
Aside from the roughly 3.2 million German ground troops engaged in, or earmarked for the Eastern Campaign, about
500,000 Romanian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, and Italian troops accompanied the German forces, while the
Army of Finland made a major contribution in the north. The 250th Spanish "Blue" Infantry Division was a
formation of volunteered Spanish Falangists and Nazi sympathisers.
Luftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration, supply dumps, and airfields, and mark
them for destruction. The Luftwaffe's task was to neutralize the Soviet Air Force. This was not achieved in the first
days of operations, despite the Soviets having concentrated aircraft in huge groups on the permanent airfields rather
than dispersing them on field landing strips, making them ideal targets. The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed
1,489 aircraft on the first day of operations.[67] Hermann Göring — Chief of the Luftwaffe — distrusted the reports
and ordered the figure checked. Picking through the wreckages of Soviet airfields, the Luftwaffe's figures proved
conservative, as over 2,000 destroyed Soviet aircraft were found.[67] The Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft on the first day of
combat. The Germans claimed to have destroyed only 3,100 Soviet aircraft in the first three days. In fact Soviet
losses were far higher: some 3,922 Soviet machines had been lost (according to Russian Historian Viktor
Kulikov).[68] The Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority over all three sectors of the front, and would maintain it
until the close of the year.[69] The Luftwaffe could now devote large numbers of its Geschwader (see Luftwaffe
Organization) to support the ground forces.
Operation Barbarossa 13
Opposite Army Group North were two Soviet armies. The Wehrmacht
OKH thrust the 4th Panzer Group, with a strength of 600 tanks, at the
junction of the two Soviet armies in that sector. The 4th Panzer Group's
objective was to cross the Neman and Daugava Rivers which were the
two largest obstacles in the advance to Leningrad. On the first day, the
tanks crossed the River Neman and penetrated 50 mi (80 km). Near
Raseiniai, the armoured units were counter attacked by 300 tanks of
the 3rd and 12th Soviet Mechanized Corps. It took four days for the
Germans to encircle and destroy the Soviet armour who lacked fuel,
ammunition and coordination. By the end of the first week the Soviet Crossing of the Daugava (Dvina) river by the
[70] 20th Panzer Division
Mechanized Corps had lost 90% of its strength. The Panzer Groups
then crossed the Daugava near Daugavpils. The Germans were now
within striking distance of Leningrad. However, due to their deteriorated supply situation, Hitler ordered the Panzer
Groups to hold their position while the infantry formations caught up. The orders to hold would last over a week,
giving time for the Soviets to build up a defence around Leningrad and along the bank of the Luga River. Further
complicating the Soviet position, on 22 June the anti-Soviet June Uprising in Lithuania began, and on the next day
an independent Lithuania was proclaimed.[71] An estimated 30,000 Lithuanian rebels engaged Soviet forces, joined
by ethnic Lithuanians from the Red Army. As the Germans reached further north, armed resistance against the
Soviets broke out in Estonia as well. The "Battle of Estonia" ended on 7 August, when the 18th Army reached the
Gulf of Finland coast.[72]
Opposite Army Group Centre were four Soviet armies: the 3rd, 4th,
10th and 11th Armies. The Soviet Armies occupied a salient that jutted
into German occupied Polish territory with the Soviet salient's center at
Białystok. Beyond Białystok was Minsk, both the capital of
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and a key railway junction. AG
Centre's two Panzer Groups' goal was to meet at Minsk, denying the
Red Army an escape route from the salient. The 3rd Panzer Group
broke through the junction of two Soviet Fronts in the north of the
salient, and crossed the River Neman while the 2nd Panzer Group Captured Soviet equipment.
crossed the Western Bug river in the South. While the Panzer Groups
attacked, the Wehrmacht Army Group Centre infantry Armies struck at the salient, eventually encircling Soviet
troops at Białystok.
Moscow at first failed to grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe that had befallen the USSR. Marshall Timoshenko
ordered all Soviet forces to launch a general counter-offensive, but with supply and ammunition dumps destroyed,
and a complete collapse of communication, the uncoordinated attacks failed. Zhukov signed the infamous Directive
of People's Commissariat of Defence No. 3 (he later claimed under pressure from Stalin), which ordered the Red
Army to start an offensive. He commanded the troops “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping near Suwałki and
to seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 26 June" and “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in
Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction” and even “to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24.6”[73] This
maneuver failed and disorganized Red Army units, which were soon destroyed by the Wehrmacht forces.
On 27 June, 2 and 3 Panzer Groups met up at Minsk, advancing 200 mi (320 km) into Soviet territory and a third of
the way to Moscow. In the vast pocket between Minsk and the Polish border, the remnants of 32 Soviet Rifle, eight
Operation Barbarossa 14
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The German
troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement. Operations were
Operation Barbarossa 15
now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation. Hitler had
lost faith in encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers. Hitler now believed he could
defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant
seizing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and a
speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the north. He also wanted to link up with the
Finns to the north.
Fedor von Bock and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa, vehemently argued in favor
of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemy's
capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet
communications and transportation system. More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red
Army was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital. But Hitler was
adamant, and issued a direct order to Guderian, bypassing his commanding officer von Bock, to send Army Group
Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.
Oryol which was 75 mi (121 km) south to 9 July 1941 Subsequent advances - to 1 September 1941 Encirclement
and battle of Kiev - to 9 September 1941 Final Wehrmacht advance - to 5
of the Soviet first main defence line. December 1941
Three days later the Panzers pushed on
Bryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the west. The Soviet 3rd and 13th armies were now encircled. To the north,
the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Soviet Armies. Moscow's
first line of defence had been shattered. The pocket yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the
start of the invasion to three million Soviet soldiers captured. The Soviets had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for
the defense of Moscow.
On 13 October, 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within 90 mi (140 km) of the capital. Martial law was declared in
Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon the weather had deteriorated. Temperatures fell while
there was a continued rainfall, turning the unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowing the German advance
on Moscow to as little as 2 mi (3.2 km) a day. The supply situation rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German
Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were re-organized. The pause gave the
Soviets, who were in a far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of
newly activated reservists. In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies which included 30
divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalin
there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. With the Siberian forces came over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.
The Germans were nearing exhaustion, they also began to recall Napoleon's invasion of Russia. General Günther
Blumentritt noted in his diary:
They remembered what happened to Napoleon's Army. Most of them began to re-read Caulaincourt's
grim account of 1812. That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I can still see Von
Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and standing before the map
with Caulaincourt's book in his hand.[78]
On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on
Moscow. Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no delay allowed to
improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies. The
Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the
northeast. 2nd Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south. As the Soviets reacted
Operation Barbarossa 17
to the flanks, 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and
ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. However, in the south, 2nd Panzer Army was being
blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies attacked the 2nd
Panzer Army and inflicted a shocking defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16th
Army back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement.
On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 15 mi (24 km) of Moscow, and could see the
spires of the Kremlin,[79] but by then the first blizzards of the winter began. The Wehrmacht was not equipped for
winter warfare. Frostbite and disease caused more casualties than combat, and dead and wounded had already
reached 155,000 in three weeks. Some divisions were now at 50% strength. The bitter cold also caused severe
problems for their guns and equipment, and weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe. Newly built-up Soviet units
near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a massive counterattack which
pushed the Germans back over 200 mi (320 km). The invasion of the USSR eventually cost the German Army over
250,000 dead and 500,000 wounded, the majority of whom became casualties after 1 October and an unknown
number of Axis casualties such as Hungarians, Romanians and Waffen SS troops as well as co-belligerent Finns.
Later events
Shirer argues that the fatal decision of the operation was the
postponement from the original date of 15 May because Hitler wanted
to intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greek
advances against Italy's occupation of Albania. However, this was just
one of the reasons for the postponement — the other was the late
spring of 1941 in Russia, compounded by particularly rainy weather in
June 1941 that made a number of roads in western parts of the Soviet
Union impassable to heavy vehicles. During the campaign, Hitler German Soldiers with destroyed Soviet tank at
Kaunas
ordered the main thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward to
help the southern army group capture Ukraine. This move delayed the
assault on the Soviet capital, though it also helped secure Army Group Center's southern flank. By the time they
turned to Moscow, the Red Army's fierce resistance, the mud following the autumn rains and, eventually, snow,
brought their advance to a halt.
In addition, resistance by the Soviets, who proclaimed a Great Patriotic War in defence of the motherland, was
much fiercer than the German command had expected. The border fortress of Brest, Belarus illustrates that tenacity:
attacked on the very first day of the German invasion, the fortress was expected to fall within hours, but held out for
weeks. (Soviet propaganda later asserted it held out for six weeks).[80] German logistics also became a major
problem, as supply lines grew very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the rear. The Soviets carried out
a scorched earth policy on some of the land they were forced to abandon in order to deny the Germans food, fuel,
and buildings.
Despite the setbacks, the German advance continued, often destroying or surrounding whole armies of Soviet troops
and forcing them to surrender. The battle for Kiev was especially brutal. On 19 September Army Group South seized
control of Kiev, and took 665,000 Soviets prisoner. Kiev was later awarded the title Hero City for its heroic defence.
Army Group North, which was to conquer the Baltic countries and eventually Leningrad, reached the southern
outskirts of Leningrad by August 1941. There, fierce Soviet resistance stopped it. Since capturing the city seemed
too costly, German command decided to starve the city to death by blockade, starting the Siege of Leningrad. The
city held out, despite several attempts by the Germans to break through its defenses, unrelenting air and artillery
attacks, and severe shortages of food and fuel, until the Germans were driven back again from the city's approaches
in early 1944. Leningrad was the first Soviet city to receive the title of 'Hero City'.
Operation Barbarossa 18
In addition to the main attacks of Barbarossa, German forces occupied Finnish Petsamo in order to secure important
nickel mines. They also launched the beginning of a series of attacks against Murmansk on 28 June 1941. That
assault was known as Operation Silberfuchs.
Soviet tactical errors in the first few weeks of the offensive proved catastrophic. Initially, the Red Army was fooled
by overestimation of its own capabilities. Instead of intercepting German armour, Soviet mechanised corps were
ambushed and destroyed after Luftwaffe dive bombers inflicted heavy losses. Soviet tanks, poorly maintained and
manned by inexperienced crews, suffered an appalling rate of breakdowns. Lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a
logistical collapse. The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous. Without tanks or sufficient
motorization, Soviet troops could not wage mobile warfare against the Axis.
Stalin's orders not to retreat or surrender led to static linear positions that German tanks easily breached, again
quickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies. Only later did Stalin allow his troops to retreat
wherever possible and regroup, to mount a defense in depth, or to counterattack. More than 2.4 million Soviet troops
had been captured by December 1941, by which time German and Soviet forces were fighting almost in the suburbs
of Moscow. Most of these prisoners were to die from exposure, starvation, disease, or willful mistreatment by the
German regime.
Despite the Axis failure to achieve Barbarossa's initial goals, the huge Soviet losses caused a shift in Soviet
propaganda. Before the onset of hostilities against Germany, the Soviet government had said its army was very
strong. But, by autumn 1941, the Soviet line was that the Red Army had been weak, that there had not been enough
Operation Barbarossa 19
time to prepare for war, and that the German attack had come as a surprise.
Outcome
The climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Center, already short on supplies because of the
October mud, was ordered to advance on Moscow; forward units of the 2nd Panzer Division's 38 Panzer Pioneer
Abteilung (38PzPi.Abtl.)[81] (armored engineers) came within sight of the spires of the Kremlin when they reached
the rail line just south of the town of Lobnya, 16 km (9.9 mi) from Moscow, on 1 December 1941. Soviet troops,
well supplied and reinforced by fresh divisions from Siberia, defended Moscow in the Battle of Moscow, and drove
the Germans back as the winter advanced. The bulk of the counter-offensive was directed at Army Group Center,
which was closest to Moscow.
With no shelter, few supplies, inadequate winter clothing, chronic food shortages, and nowhere to go, German troops
had no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland. The Germans avoided being routed by Soviet
counterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and exposure.
At the time, the seizure of Moscow was considered the key to victory for Germany. Nowadays, historians debate
whether the loss of the Soviet capital would have caused collapse; but Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve that
goal. In December 1941, Germany joined Japan in declaring war against the United States.
The outcome of Operation Barbarossa hurt the Soviets at least as badly as the Germans, however. Although the
Germans had failed to take Moscow outright, they held huge areas of the western Soviet Union, including the entire
regions of what are now Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, plus parts of Russia proper west of Moscow.
German forces had advanced 1050 mi (1690 km), and maintained a linearly-measured front of 1900 mi (3100
km).[82] The Germans held up to 500000 sq mi (1300000 km2) of territory with over 75 million people at the end of
1941, and went on to seize another 250000 sq mi (650000 km2) before being forced to retreat after defeats at
Stalingrad and Kursk. However, the occupied areas were not always properly controlled by the Germans and
underground activity rapidly escalated. Wehrmacht occupation was brutal from the start, due to directives issued by
Hitler himself at the operation's start, according to which Slavic peoples were considered a race of Untermenschen.
This attitude alienated the population, while in some areas (such as Ukraine) it seems that some local people had
been ready to consider the Germans as liberators helping them to get rid of Stalin. Anti-German partisan operations
intensified when Red Army units that had dissolved into the country's large uninhabited areas re-emerged as
underground forces, and under the German repressive policies. The Germans held on stubbornly in the face of Soviet
counterattacks, resulting in huge casualties on both sides in many battles.
The war on the Eastern Front went on for four years. The death toll may never be established with any degree of
certainty. The most recent western estimate of Soviet military deaths is 7 million that lost their lives either in combat
or in Axis captivity. Soviet civilian deaths remain under contention, though roughly 20 million is a frequently cited
figure. German military deaths are also to a large extent unclear. The most recent German estimate (Rüdiger
Overmans) concluded that about 4.3 million Germans and a further 900,000 Axis forces lost their lives either in
combat or in Soviet captivity. Operation Barbarossa is listed among the most lethal battles in world history.
The Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention (1929). However, a month after the German invasion in
1941, an offer was made for a reciprocal adherence to the Hague convention. This 'note' was left unanswered by
Third Reich officials.[83]
Operation Barbarossa 20
Weather
A paper published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hitler's plans miscarried
before the onset of severe winter weather. He was so confident of quick victory that he did not prepare for even the
chance of winter warfare in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties
(about 23% of its average strength of 3,200,000 troops) in the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 November
1941, General Eduard Wagner, Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported "We are at the end of our
resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter."[86]
The German forces were unready to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of the USSR. In autumn,
terrain slowed the Wehrmacht's progress. Few roads were paved. The ground in the USSR was very loose sand in
summer, sticky muck in autumn, and heavy snow in winter. German tanks had narrow treads with little traction and
poor flotation in mud. In contrast, the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV had wider tracks and
were far more mobile in these conditions. The 600,000 large western European horses the Germans used for supply
and artillery movement did not cope well with this weather. The smaller horses the Red Army used were much better
adapted to the climate and could even scrape the icy ground with their hooves to dig up the weeds beneath.
German troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in the autumn and winter of 1941. Equipment
had been prepared for such winter conditions, but the severely overstrained transport network could not move it to
the front. Consequently, the troops lacked adequate cold-weather gear, and some soldiers had to pack newspapers
into their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to below -30 °C (-22 °F). While at least some cold
weather uniforms were available, they rarely reached the Eastern Front because Hitler ordered that supply lines give
more priority to shipments of ammunition and fuel. To operate furnaces and heaters, the Germans also burned
precious fuel that was in short supply. Soviet soldiers, in contrast, often had warm, quilted uniforms, felt-lined boots,
and fur hats.
German weapons malfunctioned in the cold. Lubricating oils were unsuitable for these temperatures, leading to
engine malfunction and misfiring weapons. To load shells into a tank’s main gun, frozen grease had to be chipped off
with a knife. Soviet units faced less severe problems due to their experience with cold weather. Aircraft had
insulating blankets to keep their engines warm while parked. Lighter-weight oil was used. German tanks and
armored vehicles could not move due to a lack of antifreeze, causing fuel to solidify.
Due to the fact that few Russian roads were paved, when the rains and snow came in late October and early
November, most of the main roads turned to mud and with a combination of longer supply lines, the German
Operation Barbarossa 22
advanced stalled within sight of the spires of Moscow. The Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive led primarily by
Siberian troops trained for harsh winter combat recently arriving from the east along with the numerous T-34 tanks
held in reserve advanced up to 100 mi (160 km) in some sectors, showing that mobile warfare was still possible in
the Russian winter.
When the severe winter began, Hitler feared a repetition of Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow. He ordered
the German forces to hold their ground defiantly in the face of Soviet counterattacks. This became known as the
"stand or die" order. While some historians have argued that this order prevented the Germans from being routed,
others contend that this order restricted Germany's ability to conduct mobile defensive warfare and led to heavy
casualties from battle and cold.
Aftermath
With the failure in the Battle of Moscow, all German plans of a
quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet
counter offensives in the Winter of 1941 caused heavy casualties
on both sides, but ultimately lifted the German threat to Moscow.
Nevertheless despite this setback, the Soviet Union suffered
heavily from the loss of big parts of its army, allowing the
Germans to mount another large scale offensive in the summer of
1942, called Case Blue, now directed to the oil fields of Baku.
This offensive again failed in the same way as Barbarossa, the
Germans conquering vast amounts of no-mans-land, but ultimately
failing to achieve their final goals with the defeat at Stalingrad.
With the now running Soviet war economy and its much greater
manpower reserves, the Soviet Union was able to simply
outproduce and outnumber the Germans who were not prepared
for a long war of attrition. This way the last German all out
offensive in 1943 in the Battle of Kursk failed. After three years of
constant warfare the Germans were exhausted and so the Soviets
were finally able to defeat the Germans decisively in Operation
Bagration in summer 1944. This led to a chain of fast Soviet Soviet World War II poster depicting retreating Nazis,
among them Hitler and Göring. It reads : "Death to the
victories which now pushed the Germans back to Berlin in just one
German Occupiers!"
year, leading to the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945.
See also
• Eastern Front (World War II)
• Winter War
• Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II
• Black Sea Campaigns (1941-44)
• Siege of Leningrad - the siege began in 1941 and was ended in 1944.
• Continuation War – the war at Finnish front
• Operation Silberfuchs and Blaufuchs – the attack on the Soviet Arctic and German–Finnish general operational
plans
• Molotov Line – An incomplete Soviet defence line at the start of Operation Barbarossa
• Operation Northern Light – Summer of 1942 was another major attack against besieged Leningrad
• Captured Tanks and Armoured cars for German use in Russian Front
Operation Barbarossa 23
References
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ISBN 978-0-3754-1086-4
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• Bethell, Nicholas., Time–Life (2000). Útok na SSSR : druhá světová válka (Attack on the USSR: World War 2).
Prague: Svojtka & Co. ISBN 80-7237-279-3.
• Clark, Alan (1965). Barbarossa: The Russian–German Conflict, 1941–45. New York: Willam Morrow & Co.;
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• Erickson, John (2003). The Road to Stalingrad. London: Cassell Military. ISBN 0-304-36541-6.
• Erickson, John and Dilks, David eds (1994). Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
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• Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan (2004). "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of
Barbarossa", War in History, Vol. 11, Issue 1., pp. 61–103.
• Farrell, Brian P (1993). "Yes, Prime Minister: Barbarossa, Whipcord, and the Basis of British Grand Strategy,
Autumn 1941", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 4., pp. 599–625.
• Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) (1991). Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London: Frank
Cass. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.
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0-7524-1979-X.
• Glantz, David M. (1998). Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Kansas: University Press
of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0879-6.
• Glantz, David M. (2005). Colossus Reborn: the Red Army at War, 1941–1943. Kansas: University Press of
Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1353-6.
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001). Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. Connecticut; London:
Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-08459-5.
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Operation Barbarossa 24
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• Reviewed by Peter Konecny, Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 34 Issue 2. (August, 1999) pp. 288–290.
• Wieczynski, Joseph L.; Fox, J.P. (1996). "Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on The Soviet Union, 22
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• Ziemke, Earl F. (1987). Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Washington DC: United States Army Center
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Operation Barbarossa 25
• Ziemke, Earl F. (1966). Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington DC: United States
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• Мельтюхов, М.И. (2000). Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939–1941
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Моscow: AST. ISBN 5170078765. Available online [89] in Russian.
• Pictures taken by German soldiers during this operation: http://worldwar2photos.info/
• lt. Kolobanov and KV-2. Notable engagements of KV series against outnumbering enemy forces: http://wio.ru/
tank/ww2tank.htm
External links
• Operation Barbarossa [90] Original reports and pictures from The Times
• Relationship between the campaigns in the Balkans and the invasion of Russia [91] and associated timeline [92] in
The German Campaigns in the Balkans a publication of the United States Army Center of Military History
• Multimedia map [93]—Covers the invasion of Russia including Operation Barbarossa
• Operation Barbarossa [94]—Detailed analysis of the operation by author Bevin Alexander.
• Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence. The Soviet History of World War II [95], 28 October
1959.
• Huge very detailed online map on 22 June 1941. Dislocation of Soviet and German airforce and ground units in
one hour before invasion. [96]
References
[1] Higgins, Trumbull (1966), Hitler and Russia, The Macmillan Company, pp. 11–59, 98–151
[2] Bryan I. Fugate. Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. Novato: Presidio Press, 1984.
[3] World War II Chronicle, 2007. Legacy/ Publications International, Ltd. Page 146.
[4] Yad vashem - Chronology of the Holocaust (http:/ / www1. yadvashem. org/ about_holocaust/ chronology/ 1939-1941/ 1941/
chronology_1941_9. html)
[5] A.J.P Taylor & Colonel D. M Proektor, p. 106
[6] A.J.P Taylor & Colonel D. M Proektor 1974, p. 107
[7] Simonov, Konstantin (1979). "Records of talks with Georgi Zhukov, 1965–1966" (http:/ / www. hrono. ru/ dokum/ 197_dok/ 1979zhukov2.
html). Hrono. .
[8] Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941–44 (Studies in Russian and Eastern European History), edited by John Barber and Andrei
Dzeniskevich. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-4039-0142-2).
[9] The siege of Leningrad. By Alan Wykes. Ballantines Illustrated History of WWII, 3rd edition, 1972. Pages 9-61, and, Scorched Earth. (pages
205 - 240) By Paul Carell. Schiffer Military History, 1994. ISBN 0-88740-598-3 and, Finland in the Second World War. Between Germany
and Russia. Palgrave. 2002. (pp. 90 - 141)
[10] Military-Topographic Directorate, maps No. 194, 196, Officer's Atlas. General Staff USSR. 1947. Атлас Офицера. Генеральный штаб
вооруженных сил ССР. М., Военно-топографическоее управление,- 1947. Листы 194, 196
[11] Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945 ISBN 0-14-027169-4 by Richard Overy Page 91
[12] The World War II. Desk Reference. Eisenhower Center Director Douglas Brinkley. Editor Mickael E. Haskey. Grand Central Press,
Stonesong Press, HarperCollins, 2004. ISBN0-06-052651-3. Page 210.
[13] Siege of Leningrad. Encyclopedia Britannica (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ bps/ topic/ 335949/
Siege-of-Leningrad#tab=active~checked,items~checked>/ bps/ topic/ 335949/ Siege-of-Leningrad& title=Siege of Leningrad -- Britannica
Online Encyclopedia)
[14] Peter Antill, Peter Dennis. Stalingrad 1942. Osprey Publishing, 2007,ISBN 1846030285, 9781846030284. p. 7.
[15] Bendersky,Joseph W., A History of Nazi Germany: 1919-1945, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, ISBN 083041567X, page 177
[16] Müller, Rolf-Dieter, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment, Berghahn Books, 2002, ISBN
157181293, page 244
[17] Shirer 1990, p. 716
[18] Rauschning, Hermann, Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims, Kessinger Publishing,
2006,ISBN 142860034, pages 136-7
Operation Barbarossa 26
[19] Text of the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (http:/ / www. fordham. edu/ halsall/ mod/ 1939pact. html), executed 23 August 1939
[20] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 30, ISBN 0300112041
[21] Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, 1990 ISBN 0671728687, page
668-9
[22] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 57, ISBN 0300112041
[23] Brackman, Roman, The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life, London and Portland, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, ISBN 0714650501,
page 341-3
[24] Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, pp. 59, ISBN 0300112041
[25] Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L. (1997), Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations,
1922-1941, Columbia University Press, pp. 202–205, ISBN 0231106769
[26] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 127, ISBN 0275963373
[27] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 129–130, ISBN 0275963373
[28] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 138, ISBN 0275963373
[29] Yergin, Daniel (1991), The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-671-79932-0 p. 334
[30] Overy, R. J. (2004), The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0393020304
[31] Brackman, Roman (2001), The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life, Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0714650501
[32] Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007), Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler,
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, Da Capo Press, ISBN 0306815389
[33] Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001), Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, Yale University Press, pp. 69–70,
ISBN 030008459
[34] Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group,
pp. 162, ISBN 0275963373
[35] Bryan I. Fugate. Operation Barbarossa. Strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941. Novato: Presidio Press, 1984.
[36] Albert Speer identifies these points in the The World At War series in the episode "Barbarossa".
[37] Whaley, Barton:_ Codeword BARBAROSSA, Cambridge, London 1973, ISBN 0-262-73038-3, pp.1-10.
[38] Waller 1996, p. 192.
[39] N. Lyashchenko, 'O vystuplenii I. V. Stalina v Kremle, 5 maya 1941', Volkogonov Papers, reel no.8, p.1.
[40] Meltyukhov 2000:446 (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ 11. html) Table composed by the author according to: История
второй мировой войны. Т. 4. С. 18; 50 лет Вооруженных Сил СССР. М., 1968. С. 201; Советская военная энциклопедия. T. I. M., 1976,
С. 56; Боевой и численный состав Вооруженных Сил СССР в период Великой Отечественной войны (1941–1945 гг.). Статистический
сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.). М., 1994. С. 10–12; РГАСПИ. Ф. 71. Оп. 25. Д. 4134. Л. 1–8; Д. 5139. Л. 1; РГВА. Ф. 29. Оп. 46. Д. 272.
Л. 20–21; учтены пограничные и внутренние войска: Пограничные войска СССР в годы Второй мировой войны, 1939–1945. М., 1995.
С. 390–400; РГВА. Ф. 38261. Оп. 1. Д. 255. Л. 175–177, 340–349; Ф. 38650. Оп. 1. Д. 617. Л. 258–260; Ф. 38262. Оп. 1, Д. 41. Л. 83–84;
РГАЭ. Ф. 1562. Оп. 329. Д. 277. Л. 1–46, 62, 139; Д. 282. Л. 3–44.
[41] A.J.P Taylor & D. M Proektor,p98
[42] Meltyukhov 2000:414
[43] N.P.Zolotov and S.I. Isayev, "Boyegotovy byli...", Voenno-Istorichesskiy Zhurnal, N° 11: 1993, p. 77
[44] The Russian Front by James F. Dunnigan, Arms & Armour Press 1978, p 82, 88 ISBN 0-85368-152-X
[45] Rayfield 2004, p. 315.
[46] Dunnigan, Russian Front, pp 93-94
[47] Bergström, p11-12
[48] Glantz & House 1995, p. 42.
[49] Waller 1996, pp. 196-8.
[50] Waller 1996, p. 202.
[51] Roberts 1995, p. 1293.
[52] Wold at War series: Volume 5. Supported by Dr. Grigori Tokaty (1909-2003), defected to Britain 1947.
[53] Roberts 1995, p. 1297-1298
[54] Glantz 1991, p. 96.
[55] Roberts 1995, p. 1212-14.
[56] Roberts 1995, p. 1309-1310.
[57] Teddy J. Uldricks. The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler? Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp.
626-643
[58] André Mineau. Operation Barbarossa: ideology and ethics against human dignity Rodopi, 2004. ISBN 9789042016330
[59] Viktor Suvorov, Thomas B. Beattie. Icebreaker: who started the Second World War? Hamish Hamilton, 1990. ISBN 0241126223,
9780241126226
[60] Chris Bellami. Absolute war. Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Vinage, 2007. ISBN 9870375724718. p.103.
Operation Barbarossa 27
[61] Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives, Anchor, (1997) ISBN
0-385-47954-9, pages 454-459 "In view of the fact that Germany at present keeps its army fully mobilized with its rear services deployed, it
has the capacity of deploying ahead of us and striking a sudden blow. To prevent this I consider it important not to leave the operational
initiative to the German command in any circumstances, but to anticipate the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it is in
the process of deploying and before it has time to organize its front and the coordination of its various arms".
[62] R. C. Raack Reviewed work(s):Was the USSR Planning to Attack Germany in 1941? by Joseph Bradley Source: Central European History,
Vol. 32, No. 4 (1999), pp. 491-493)
[63] Bergström 2007, p. 130:Uses figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen;
WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin
[64] Meltyukhov 2000, (electronic version) (http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ index. html). Note that due to the fact that Russian
archives have been and to an extent still are inaccessible, exact figures have been difficult to ascertain.
The official Soviet sources invariably over-estimated German strength and downplayed Soviet strength, as emphasized by David Glantz
(1998:292). Some of the earlier Soviet figures claimed that there had been only 1,540 Soviet aircraft to face Germany's 4,950; that there were
merely 1,800 Red Army tanks and assault guns facing 2,800 German units etc.
In 1991, Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov published an article on this question (Мельтюхов М.И. 22 июня 1941 г.: цифры
свидетельствуют // История СССР. 1991. № 3) with other figures that slightly differed from those of the table here, though had similar
ratios. Glantz (1998:293) was of the opinion that those figures “appear[ed] to be most accurate regarding Soviet forces and those of Germany's
allies,″ though other figures also occur in modern publications.
[65] Keith E. Bonn (ed.), Slaughterhouse: Handbook of the Eastern Front, Aberjona Press, Bedford, PA, 2005, p.299
[66] John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, Cassel Military Paperbacks, 2003 edition, p.172
[67] Bergström 2007, p. 20
[68] Bergstrom 2007, p. 23.
[69] Glantz & House 1995, p. 49.
[70] Glantz & House 1995, p. 51.
[71] (Lithuanian) Gediminas Zemlickas. Pasaulyje—kaip savo namuose, Mokslo Lietuva, 11 February 1998, No. 3 (161) (http:/ / ic. lms. lt/
ml/ 161/ zemlickas. htm)
[72] Bergstrom 2007, p. 36.
[73] as cited by Suvorov: http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ suvorov7/ 12. html
[74] Bergstrom 2007, p. 70.
[75] According to http:/ / www. soldat. ru/ doc/ casualties/ book/ chapter5_13_08. html based on German sources (see site reference page)
[76] Tartu in the 1941 Summer War (http:/ / www. bdcol. ee/ fileadmin/ docs/ bdreview/ bdr-2003-9-13. pdf). By Major Riho Rõngelep and
Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen (2003). Baltic Defence Review 9
[77] Glantz & House 1995, p. 77.
[78] A. Clark 1995, p. 165.
[79] Shirer, William (1964), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pan, pp. 1032
[80] "A Day By Day Diary of WWII" (http:/ / www. bartcop. com/ 41081218. htm). . Retrieved 13 June 2006. See also Charles Messenger, The
Chronological Atlas of World War Two (New York: Macmillan Publishing 1989), p. 63.
[81] Strausß, Franz Joseph, Die Geschichte der 2.(Weiener)Panzer Division, pg 337. DÖRFLER im NEBEL VERLAG, Eggolsheim DE.
[82] Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, 11 October 2001, page 7
[83] Beevor, Stalingrad. Penguin 2001 ISBN 0141001313 p60
[84] German Attack of USSR ISBN 80 - 7237 - 279 - 3
[85] van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Cambridge, 1977. ISBN 0-421-29793-1
[86] "CSI" (http:/ / www. cgsc. edu/ carl/ resources/ csi/ Chew/ CHEW. asp). . Retrieved 2 April 2010.
[87] http:/ / www. rus-sky. org/ history/ library/ w/
[88] http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ meltyukhov/ index. html
[89] http:/ / militera. lib. ru/ research/ suvorov3/ index. html
[90] http:/ / www. timesonline. co. uk/ tol/ system/ topicRoot/ Operation_Barbarossa/
[91] http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ books/ wwii/ balkan/ 20_260_5. htm
[92] http:/ / www. history. army. mil/ books/ wwii/ balkan/ append. htm
[93] http:/ / english. pobediteli. ru/
[94] http:/ / www. militaryhistoryonline. com/ wwii/ articles/ barbarossa. aspx
[95] http:/ / www. foia. cia. gov/ CPE/ CAESAR/ caesar-25. pdf
[96] http:/ / www. krunch. ru/ page/ june22/
Article Sources and Contributors 28
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