7 Remedial Law Justice Del Castillo Digests

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations 2018
REMEDIAL LAW
Justice Del Castillo Digests
Chel Sy Tet Valeza Carmela Wenceslao
LCBO Chairperson Academic Affairs Remedial Law Chairperson
Chairperson
Nico Garcia Mike Uy
LCBO Vice Chair for Janine Tutanes Remedial Law Deputy
Internals Rod Zantua Chairperson
Academic Affairs Deputy
Steph Griar Chairpersons Celine Carpio
LCBO Vice Chair for Civil Procedure Subject Head
Externals
Khristel Calantoc
Pat Costales Criminal Procedure Subject
LCBO Executive Secretary Head
Ces Naga Jasfer Tagacay

LCBO Executive Treasurer Special Proceedings Subject
Head
Inno Loreto
Special Civil Actions Subject
Head
Karen Olivete
Evidence Subject Head
Remedial Law Justice Del Castillo Digests
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION
PAMARAN v. BANK OF COMMERCE

G.R. No. 205753 | 4 July 2016
Jurisdiction of Courts
DOCTRINE: Personal actions include those filed for recovery of personal property, or for enforcement of
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for injury committed to a
person or property.
FACTS:
• Rosa Pamaran (Rosa) alleged that her children (Rhodora and Sps. Bernabe) owned adjacent lots.
Purportedly, Rosa built her residential house on these lots with the consent of Rhodora and spouses
Bernabe
• Southmarine International Ltd. Co. (Southmarine) obtained loans from the Bank of Commerce
(Bankcom). Rhodora and Sps. Bernabe constituted real estate mortgages (REM) on their lots to
secure such loans. Rosa claimed that Bankcom neither included her house in determining the loan
amount nor obtained her consent to the REM. She added that Bankcom was aware of the existence
of her house on these lots.
• Subject lots were eventually foreclosed and their ownership was consolidated in favor of Bankcom.
Court granted writ of possession in favor of Bankcom.
• Rosa averred that because of these writs, she was dispossessed of her house. Thus, she prayed that
Bankcom be ordered to pay her damages amounting to the value of her house.
• Bankcom argued that while the Complaint is on for Damages, the same is a real action because it
concerns Rosa's claim of ownership over the subject house. It posited that the Complaint should
have been filed before the RTC Muntinlupa where such property is located.
• osa contended that this a personal action because while she cited real properties situated in
Muntinlupa City, she is not asking to be the owner or possessor thereof but is merely praying that
Bankcom be ordered to pay her damages corresponding to the value of her house. She likewise
affirmed that the venue is proper since she resides in Olongapo City.
• RTC: dismissed the Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case involves a personal action.
HELD: Yes, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 thereof, defines a real action as
one "affecting title to or possession of real property or interest therein;" and, all other actions are personal
actions. A real action must be filed in the proper court, which has jurisdiction over the subject real property,
while a personal action may be filed where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or if the defendant is a non-
resident, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Personal actions include those filed for
recovery of personal property, or for enforcement of contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for injury committed to a person or property.
• The Complaint specifically stated that this case is one for recovery of damages relating to the injury
committed by Bankcom for violating Rosa's right to due process, and right to enjoy her house. Rosa
repeatedly averred that she does not seek recovery of its possession or title. Her interest to the
house is merely incidental to the primary purpose for which the action is filed, that is, her claim
for damages.
• Clearly, this action involves Rosa's interest in the value of the house but only in so far as to
determine her entitlement to damages. She is not interested in the house itself. Indeed, the primary
objective of the Complaint is to recover damages, and not to regain ownership or possession of the
subject property. Hence, this case is a personal action properly filed in the RTC Olongapo, where
Rosa resided.
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ARACELI AND ARNEL CABRERA v. ANGELA FRANCISCO

G.R. No. 172293 | 28 August 2013
DOCTRINE: If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
FACTS:
• Atty. Gella executed a private document confirming that he has appointed Severino as
administrator of all his real properties consisting of 24 ha of land. When Severino died, Araceli and
Arnel, being the heirs, took over the administration of said properties.
• They were instructed by respondents to sell the property with a 5% commission to which they
introduced Erlinda, a real estate broker and President of ESV Marketing and Development
Corporation. Issue arose when respondents appointed Erlinda as the new administratix of the
properties and terminated Araceli’s and Arnel’s services.
• Petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents and demanded for their five percent commission
and compensation to no avail. Hence, on September 3, 2001, they filed a Complaint for Collection
of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damagesagainst respondents before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed before the RTC is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
HELD: No, in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance
would depend on the amount of the claim.
• However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
• In this case, it can be readily seen from the allegations in the Complaint that petitioners’ main
purpose in filing the same is to collect the commission allegedly promised them by respondents
should they be able to sell Lot No. 1782-B, as well as the compensation for the services rendered by
Severino, Araceli and Arnel for the administration of respondents’ properties. Captioned as a
Complaint for Collection of Agent’s Compensation, Commission and Damages, it is principally for
the collection of a sum of money representing such compensation and commission. Indeed, the
payment of such money claim is the principal relief sought and not merely incidental to, or a
consequence of another action where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money. In fact, petitioners in this case estimated their claim to be equivalent to five percent of the
purchase price of Lot No. 1782-B. Therefore, the CA did not err when it ruled that petitioners’
Complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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RP v. PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 198426 | 2 September 2015
DOCTRINE: Actions for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC pursuant to BP 129.
FACTS:
• Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc. (Principalia) is a recruitment agency
found by the POEA to have collected an EXCESSIVE placement fee and violated the POEA Rules.
The penalty is the cancellatioN of license.
• Principalia sought to stay the implementation of the POEA Order by filing with the RTC of
Mandaluyong a Complaint for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. It
contended that the immediate cancellation of its license not only deprived it of due process but
also jeopardized the deployment of hundreds of overseas Filipino workers. RTC issued a 72-hour
TRO.
• Principalia appealed the POEA Order with the DOLE Secretary.
• POEA filed a Motion to Dismiss with the RTC based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and forum shopping.
• Principalia argued that the present petition is already moot and academic since its 2007 license
which was ordered cancelled by the POEA had already long expired and in fact has been renewed
by the POEA many times over.
o A ruling on this Petition will no longer be of practical value considering that the subject matter
that Principalia then sought to enjoin was the immediate enforcement of the POEA Order
cancelling its 2007 license.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction case.
HELD: Yes, actions for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to BP 129. As a general rule, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
and technical training and knowledge of such agency. An exception to this is that of administrative
decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud, or error of law, and in such cases, injunction may be granted.
DARMA MASLAG v. ELIZABETH MONZON ET AL

G.R. No. 174908 | 17 June 2013
DOCTRINE: Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and
exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.
FACTS:
• Maslag filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original
certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon) et al.
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• MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s property
and was ordered to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to pay damages and costs of suit.
• Respondents appealed and RTC declared that the MTC was without jurisdiction over petitioner’s
cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40
of the ROC, which reads that RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
• Both parties acknowledged receipt of the October 22, 2003 Order,but neither presented additional
evidence before the new judge, Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr. (Judge Diaz De Rivera).
• Judge Diaz De Rivera reversed the MTC Decision. Petitioner is ordered to turn over the possession
of the 4,415 square meter land she presently occupies to Monzon. Case was remanded to the court
a quo for further proceedings to determine whether Maslag is entitled to the remedies afforded by
law to a builder in good faith for the improvements she constructed thereon.
• Petitioner filed a Notice of Appealfrom the RTC’s Resolution. It respectfully prayed that the
decision of the RTCbe reversed in toto.
• Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They
asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC
rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes. As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the property
which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzon’s title. Her primary relief was to recover
ownership of real property. Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint involves title to real property.
• An action "involving title to real property," on the other hand, was defined as an action where "the
plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that she owns such property or that she has the legal
rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same."Under the
present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction
belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property.In
the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real Propertydated November 12,
1991, which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit "A",showing that the disputed property has
an assessed value of ₱12,400only. Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction
of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in
determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is
divested of original and exclusive jurisdiction.
ATIKO TRANS, INC. v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE

G.R. No. 167545 | 17 August 2011
Jurisdiction over the Parties
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of
summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• 40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board M/S Katjana in Taiwan for shipment to
Manila.
o The shipment was covered by a Bill of Lading issued by petitioner Cheng Lie Navigation
Co., Ltd. with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet Manufacturing Co., Inc. as the notify party.
o The cargoes were insured against all risks by respondent Prudential Guarantee.
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• When M/S Katjana arrived in the port of Manila, it was found that one of the tinplates was
damaged.
• Oriental filed its claim against the policy. Prudential then paid Oriental the amount of losses it
suffered due to the damaged cargo.
• Prudential filed with the MeTC of Makati a Complaint for sum of money against petitioners Cheng
Lie and Atiko Trans, Inc.
• On March 20, 2000, Prudential filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that on
March 1, 2000, a copy of the summons was served upon petitioners thru the cashier Cristina
Figueroa and that despite receipt thereof, petitioners failed to file any responsive pleading.
• MeTC issued an Order declaring Cheng Lie and Atiko in default and allowed Prudential to present
its evidence ex-parte.
• In the RTC, Cheng Lie filed its own Memorandum of Appeal maintaining that the MeTC never
acquired jurisdiction over its person.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko?
HELD: Yes, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over
its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and
hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot.
• True, when the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of summons may be made only upon
the persons enumerated in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant can also be acquired by defendant’s voluntary appearance without
expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
• As held in La Naval Drug Corporation v. CA, the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
must be reasonably raised. Upon failure to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a court
to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction after unsuccessfully
trying to obtain such relief.
o In this case, it was only in Atiko’s Memorandum filed with the SC where they claimed, for
the first time, that it was not properly served with summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie?
HELD: No, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie as there was no proper
service of summons as to him.
• In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., it was held that when the defendant is a foreign juridical
entity, service of summons may be made upon:
o Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;
o The government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does not
have a resident agent; or
o Any of the corporation’s officers or agents within the Philippines.
• It should be recalled that Atiko was not properly served with summons as the person who received
the same was merely the cashier and is not one of the corporate officers enumerated in Sec. 11, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court.
• The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko not through valid service of summons
but by the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus, there being no proper service of summons upon
Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng
Lie.
MANGUBAT v. MORGA-SEVA
7
G.R. No. 202611 | 23 November 2015

Jurisdiction over the subject matter
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.
FACTS:
• Sps. Mangubat filed a case of Specific Performance against Morga-Seva, et al.
• Unsuccessful appeal by Morga-Seva et al proved fruitless and hence the decision became final. The
Heirs of Mangubat filed for a Complaint for Revival of the Decision of the RTC as the writ could
not be implemented due to evasion of Morga-Seva et al.
• A compromise was made with approval of the RTC. However Abner moved to substitute his father
upon the death of the latter.
• When Morga-Seva handed the payment but she alleged that the heirs refused to deliver the
property to her. Abner dismissed the former counsel and filed a motion to declare the amicable
settlement as null and void for want of consent and participation of the heirs. However, two of the
heirs filed a manifestation disagreeing with Abner’s course of action.
• The Trial Court rendered a ruling that Abner is not a real party interest
• The motion for execution of judgement of Morga-Seva was approved by the RTC.
• On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
HELD: No, Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Trial Court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action or lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. Here, it is undisputed that the RTC acquires jurisdiction over the person of
Abner having been asked for affirmative relief there from several times.
• In a petition for annulment of judgment on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely
an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction
means absence of or no jurisdiction that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction.
• Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The RTC jurisdiction over petitions for
revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court. It was held that an action for revival
of judgment may be filed either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the defendant or plaintiff resides. Here, the complaint was filed in the same RTC
which rendered the decision. The RTC has jurisdiction over the action and there is no valid
ground for the petition for Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA. An action for
annulment of judgment or final order if based in lack of jurisdiction must be brought before it is
barred by laches
HEIRS OF LATAYAN v. TAN

G.R. No. 201652 | 2 December 2015
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by law. Pursuant to RA 9700 of 2009, all cases involving cancellation of land ownership awards
and other titles under any agrarian reform program shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of DAR Secretary.
FACTS:
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• Simeon LATAYAN, represented by his son and attorney-in-fact, Leonides Latayan, filed an
Amended Complaint before the Provincial Adjudicator Davao City to have the Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) currently issued to Peing TAN and a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION be issued to his favor to obtain peaceful and lawful possession of the same.
o Simeon alleged that he is the registered owner of the said lots and his titles to the lots were
unilaterally and arbitrarily cancelled without his consent/knowledge and. Also, without
notice, the same were placed under the coverage of CARP sans payment of just
compensation. Simeon furthered that the lots should be exempted because they had been
fully developed the same into an agro-industrial estate and are currently leased as a
commercial farm. Since, Tan, among others, never occupied and introduced improvements
therein, they should be deemed as farmers-beneficiaries.
• Tan claimed that Simeon’s titles were cancelled in accordance with law and that, he was furnished
with a copy of the Notice of Coverage, Notice to Acquire and Notice of Land Valuation, together
with an invitation to a conference wherein the inclusion of the covered properties of CARP shall
be discussed.
• Provincial Adjudicator of Davao ruled in favor of Simeon: CLOAs were cancelled
o It ruled that Simeon was denied of due process since there was no proper observance of
the procedural steps of the implementation of CARP Law. That, it was the first time that
Simeon knew of the inclusion of his properties when he filed the petition for exemption
from the operation of CARP.
• On appeal, DARAB set aside the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision for lack of jurisdiction, as the
case partakes the nature of agrarian law and is purely administrative under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) Secretary.
• In a Petition for Review, CA: affirmed DARAB’s decision with modification.
o It held that it is the DAR’s Secretary who has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. When
the CLOAs were approved, it was based upon the investigation of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) over whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control, hence,
the authority to withdraw CLOAs in case a ground can be found to its withdrawal.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred when it ruled that DAR Secretary, and not DARAB, was the one who has
jurisdiction in the cancellation of CLOAs.
HELD: No, Simeon sought to cancel Tans’ registered CLOAs on the grounds: (1) that no agrarian dispute
was involved in this case; (2) that the subject lots are exempt from CARP coverage, and (3) that due process
of law was not observed when the original petitioner (Simeon) was divested of the ownership of the subject
lots.
• It thus stands to reason that it is the DAR Secretary that has jurisdiction to resolve the
controversy pursuant to applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence; pursuant to RA 9700 of 2009, all
cases involving cancellation of land ownership awards and other titles under any agrarian reform
program shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of DAR Secretary
LAMSIS v. DONG-E
G.R. No. 173021| 20 October 2010
DOCTRINE: There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a possible
jurisdictional objection and has every opportunity to raise said objection but fails to do so, even on appeal.
FACTS:
• Dong-E claims ownership over a certain subject property owned by her late grandfather, Ap-ap.
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• The heirs of Ap-ap executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of their brother Semon (Dong-E’s father),
who allowed his in-laws to stay on a portion of the lot.
• When Semon died, his children extra-judicially partitioned the property and allotted the subject lot
in favor of Dong-E. She allegedly paid the realty tax, occupied and improved the property while
at the same time, tolerating her first cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot.
• Petitioners allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions
thereof. Thus, Dong-E filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, Reconveyance
and Damages against all four occupants of the lot under a recognized ancestral land claim by the
DENR.
• Petitioners argued that the subject lot is a public land claimed by the heirs of one Smith who gave
them permission to occupy and that the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita were
fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid for lack of the parties’ and witnesses’ signatures.
• The issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the petition before the SC alleging
that under the IPRA, it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) which has
jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples.
• Dong-E insists that petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of the
IPRA of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted?
HELD: Yes, it is only before this Court, 8 years after the filing of the complaint, after the RTC and the CA
had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions
from the lower courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation
and resolution of their case and start all over again. As such, the issue of jurisdiction is considered to have
been barred by laches.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
MIÑOZA v. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 170914| 13 April 2011
Parties to Civil Actions
DOCTRINE: Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
To qualify as such, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
FACTS:
• In March 2001, Miñoza began the construction of a cockpit after securing from the municipal
officials the required permits. After being certified by the municipal engineer as 65% complete,
Mayor Lopez issued in favor of petitioner a temporary permit to hold cockfights at the newly-built
cockfighting arena.
• Six days later, the Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution declaring the cockpit as unlicensed. As a
result, Mayor Lopez revoked petitioners temporary license to operate.
• Subsequently, a municipal ordinance was approved to regulate cockfighting in the municipality.
• The Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution which opened for public bidding a 25-year franchise
of the cockpit operation.
• Among the qualified parties were Marcelo and petitioner’s uncle, Jose. Miñoza did not personally
join the bidding since he knew that Mayor Lopez will only thwart his bid because of the case he
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filed against him before the Ombudsman. Marcelo was declared the winner and a franchise for the
cockpit operation was granted in his favor.
• Miñoza filed a Complaint for the Annulment of both the bidding process and Municipal Ordinance
and for Damages alleging that the bidding was rigged and fraudulently manipulated to benefit
Marcelo, Mayor Lopez’s rumored business partner and financial backer.
• Marcelo moved to dismiss Miñoza’s complaint mainly for lack of cause of action and for estoppel,
arguing that petitioner was not even one of the bidders and that he never filed any protest during
the bidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Miñoza has the standing to challenge the bidding proceedings and the issuance of
the ordinance?
HELD: No, Miñoza, not being one of the bidders clearly has no personality to contest the alleged rigged
bidding as well as to pray for the annulment of the ordinance which granted the franchise to Marcelo.
• Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
• Real interest is meant as present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. To qualify as person to be a real party-
in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced.
• In the present case, the fact that Miñoza owns the cockpit does not clothe him with legal standing
to have the bidding proceedings annulled and to have Marcelo stripped off of the cockpit franchise.
Even assuming that the bidding proceeding was rigged thereby disqualifying Marcelo as a bidder,
the highest bidder would still be Jose, and not Miñoza who was not even a participant thereto.
Notably, Jose acted in his personal capacity when he applied to be one of the bidders and not on
behalf of the petitioner.
REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA

G.R. No. 165155 | 13 April 2010
DOCTRINE: Formal substitution of parties is not necessary when the real party-in-interest voluntarily
appeared, participated and presented evidence during the proceedings.
FACTS:
• Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land devoted to rice production. Petitioners are in
possession of the land as tillers.
• Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before
the DARAB alleging petitioners have not paid rent for 8 years.
• Among the named defendants were Avelino Santos and Pedro Bernardo who were already
deceased at the time of filing of the complaint. Thus, when the complaint for ejectment was filed,
the actual tillers on the land were already the successors-in-interest of Avelino and Pedro, namely
Delfin Sacdalan and Roberto Bernardo, respectively.
• Despite such disclosure, no amendment to implead the real parties-in-interest was made. Instead,
the Regional Adjudicator ordered the respective legal heirs to substitute the named decedents. No
formal substitution of party litigants took place.
• Notwithstanding the non-amendment of complaint and absence of formal substitution, the heirs
of Avelino and Pedro appeared and participated in the proceedings.
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ISSUE: Whether or not petition should be dismissed since it was filed against the petitioner’s deceased
predecessors-in-interest.
HELD: No, a real party in interest is defined as “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of a suit.”
• The real parties in interest, at the time the complaint was filed, were no longer the decedents
Avelino and Pedro, but rather their respective heirs who are entitled to succeed to their rights
(whether as agricultural lessees or as farmers-beneficiaries) under our agrarian laws. They are the
ones who, as heirs of the decedents and actual tillers, stand to be removed from the landholding
and made to pay back rentals to respondents if the complaint is sustained.
• Since respondents failed to correct their error (they did not amend the erroneous caption of their
complaint to include the real parties-in-interest), they cannot be insulated from the confusion
which it engendered in the proceedings below. But at any rate, notwithstanding the erroneous
caption and the absence of a formal substitution of parties, jurisdiction was acquired over the heirs
of Avelino and Pedro who voluntarily participated in the proceedings below. This Court has ruled
that formal substitution of parties is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared,
participated, and presented evidence during the proceedings.
HEIRS OF MEDRANO v. DE VERA

G.R. No. 165770|9 August 2010
DOCTRINE: Sec. 19, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the
substitution or joinder by a transferee pendente lite.
FACTS:
• The case concerns a 463-square meter parcel of land in the name of Flaviana De Gracia. When
Flaviana died, her compulsory heirs Hilaria and Elena, waived all their hereditary rights to
Flaviana’s land (through a private document) in favor of Francisca Medrano in consideration of
the expenses that Medrano incurred for Flaviana’s medication, hospitalization, wake and burial.
• When Hilaria and Elena died, some of their children affirmed the contents of the private document
executed by their deceased mothers while other refused to acknowledge the renunciation. This
prompted Medrano to file a Complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance, reformation of
instrument, and/or partition with damages against these dissenting heirs.
• Respondent Estanislao D. De Vera, then filed an Answer with Counterclaim and presented himself
as the real party-in-interest on the ground that some of the named defendants had executed a Deed
of Renunciation of Rights in his favor.
• RTC issued an order admitting De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim but separately declared the
named defendants in default. Medrano moved presentation of evidence ex parte which was
granted by the same court.
• Thereafter, RTC rendered a decision and ruling that ownership over the titled property has vested
in petitioners by virtue of good faith in possession for more than 10 years. In his petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA, De Vera argued that it was improper for the trial court
to have allowed Medrano to present her evidence ex parte because it had yet to rule on whether De
Vera had personality to participate in the proceedings.
• CA ruled in favor of De Vera and pointed out that the trial court should have exercised its authority
to order the substitution of the original defendants pursuant to Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court instead of requiring De Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention.
12
ISSUE: Whether or not De Vera could participate in the above Civil Case instituted by Medrano against
the dissenting Heirs of Hilaria and Elena
HELD: Yes, the trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not independent of
or severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named
defendants. His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would
be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Vera’s interest
cannot be considered and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants.
• It was therefore wrong for the trial court to allow Medrano to present evidence ex parte after it had
already admitted De Vera’s answer. What the trial court should have done is to treat De Vera (as
transferee pendente lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant, and to try the case on the basis
of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s participation pursuant to Rule 3, Sec. 19.
• The said provision gives the trial court decision to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by
the transferee. There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be substituted or joined in
the case because, in legal contemplation, his is not really denied protection and the same as his
transferors, who are already parties to the case. Petition was therefore DENIED.
MONSATO v. LIM
G.R. No. 178911 | 17 September 2014
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A letter could not be an initiatory pleading because it falls short to complying with
requirements under the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
• This case stemmed from a loan obtained by Eduardo from PAG-IBIG secured by mortgage of property.
Eduardo however failed to pay so an auction sale was commenced.
• PAG-IBIG however requested Sheriff De Guzman to defer the auction sale after finding that the amount
of loan is greater than the price of property to be sold. Yet, Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and
awarded it to highest bidder, Lim.
• PAG-IBIG now sent letter to Judge Monsato to intervene in the matter.
• Judge Monsato however assigned the matter to Judge Usman of RTC Branch 28 because he said
Eduardo is his relative.
• Branch 28 then conducted hearing. It found out and ruled that a formal petition or complaint was filed
which presents judicial issue therefore the auction sale is valid and Lim’s right as highest bidder is
considered.
• Lim then filed a motion for issuance of Writ of Possession before Branch 28. Simultaneously in branch
27, Monsato’s party filed a motion to lift the writ of possession.
• RTC rule din favor of Lim. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: Whether a complaint was actually filed which shall allow the court to consider taking matters on
validity of auction sale
HELD: No, RTC Branch 28 could not have acquired jurisdiction over the validity of proceedings of
auction sale because no initiatory pleading was filed. Only a latter of request to intervene was given to
Judge Monsato who in turn referred to Judge Usman.
Letters cannot be considered a pleading on the following grounds:

• Rule 6 Section 1 defines pleadings as written statements of respective claims and defenses of parties
submitted to the court
13
• Rule 7 requires parties to be identified, yet in this case they could not be identified; and the
requirements therein were not complied with: no caption, no docket number, no relief sought,
allegations not properly set forth, no verification against forum shopping
• Rule 3 requires cause of action, yet it was not properly mentioned in this case
Rule 141 requires payment of docket fees for a court to acquire jurisdiction, yet it was not done in this
case. Any decision made without jurisdiction renders it total nullity.
CALIBRE TRADERS v .BAYER PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161431| 13 October 2010
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, specific tests are applied to the
factual circumstances of the case and that non-payment of docket fees should not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided that the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period.
FACTS:
• Calibre Traders, Inc. was one of Bayerphil’s distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals
within the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to
Calibre after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1.75 million.
• Accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating
Calibre’s accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties,
refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business,
Calibre filed a suit for damages.
• In its Answer with Counterclaim, Bayerphil denied its alleged wanton appointment of other
distributors, reasoning that it could not be faulted for a difference in treatment between a paying
dealer and a non-paying one. It maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to avoid paying its
overdue accounts. Bayerphil also moved that Mario Sebastian and his wife Minda (Sebastians) be
impleaded as co-defendants, considering that the Sebastians bound themselves as solidary debtors
under the distributorship/dealership agreement.
• Calibre opposed Bayerphil’s motion to implead the Sebastians and moved to strike out the
counterclaim, reasoning that the spouses are not parties in its suit against Bayerphil and thus are
not the proper parties to the counterclaim. It stressed that the issues between the damages suit it
filed and Bayerphil’s counterclaim for collection of money are totally unrelated
• RTC ruled in favor Calibre ruling in particular that Bayerphil’s counterclaim was permissive in
character and that the latter did not pay the required docket fees. CA, however, reversed the trial
court’s findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayerphil’s counterclaim is considered to be compulsory
HELD: No, Bayerphil’s counterclaim is permissive but the trial court should have given it the opportunity
to pay the docket fees since it did avoid paying said fees.
• The following are the tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim? and
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(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort
and time by the parties and the court?”
JACINTO v. GUMARU
G.R. No. 191906 |2 June 2014
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader not by his
counsel, except when, for justifiable reasons he is unable to sign, he must execute a SPA designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
FACTS:
• A Decision was ruled in favor of Gumaru against Jacinto in an NLRC Case. Subsequently, a Writ of
Execution was issued to levy petitioner’s property to be sold at auction.
• Petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Execution but the same was
denied.
• Petitioner filed for Certiorari to CA assailing the resolutions of NLRC. The Petition contained a
verification and certification of non-forum shopping that was executed and signed by his counsel, Atty.
Daos.
• CA dismissed the petition for violating Sec 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court or the rule on
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
ISSUE: Whether a party unable to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum-Shopping can
authorize his counsel to sign on his behalf
HELD: Yes, if for reasonable or justifiable reasons a party is unable to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping, he may execute a SPA designating his counsel of record to sign the
Petition on his behalf.
• In this case, Jacinto executed a SPA authorizing his lawyer to file the petition in the CA and to sign
the verification and the certification on his behalf.
• The following are jurisprudential pronouncements respecting noncompliance with the requirements
on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
(1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
(2) As to verification, non-compliance or a defect therein does not render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance may be dispensed with.
(3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
(4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance or a defect therein, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons."
(5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
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invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them substantially
complies with the Rule.
(6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. Except fot justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf
BACOLOR v. VL MAKABALI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

G.R. No. 204325 | 18 April 2016
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A certificate against forum shopping must be signed by the party and in case his counsel
signs the same on his behalf, the counsel must be armed with a special power of attorney. The verification
of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement. It is intended to assure that the allegations
in a pleading are true and correct.
FACTS:
• Doctors Lynman Bacolor, Jeffrey R. Galura, Helen B. Torres, Fritzie C. Villegas, Raymond Canlas
and Zheila C. Torres, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against respondents
VL Makabali Hospital Inc. (the hospital), Alejandro S. Makabali, Melchor Catambing and Dax M.
Tidula.
• The Labor Arbiter (LA) found respondents guilty of illegally dismissing petitioners. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed and set aside the LA decision and dismissed the
complaints.
• Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
• The CA dismissed the petition upon a finding that the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping With Undertaking attached to the petition is executed by lawyer Carlos Raphael N.
Francisco, alleged counsel of record of petitioners Fritzie C. Villegas, Raymond Canlas and Zeila
C., Torres, not by the three petitioners themselves, in violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, and the ruling in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, et. al.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred.
HELD: Yes, the verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement. It is intended to
assure that the allegations in a pleading are true and correct. As such, the court may order the correction
of unverified pleadings, or it may act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. The verification
requirement is deemed substantially complied with when a person who has sufficient knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and matters alleged therein
have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Thus, there is substantial compliance if at least one
of the petitioners makes a proper verification.
• As properly pointed out by the CA, the Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping with
Undertaking executed by petitioners’ counsel is not valid. As stated in Altres, a certificate against
forum shopping must be signed by the party and in case his counsel signs the same on his behalf,
the counsel must be armed with a special power of attorney. Since petitioners’ counsel is not shown
to have been authorized by doctors Villegas, Canlas and Zheila to sign a certificate of non-forum
shopping on their behalf, the execution of said certificate by counsel violates the foregoing rules.
Nonetheless, the CA failed to consider the concept of “substantial compliance” to the requirements
of verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, as it has been shown that three of the six
petitioners executed their own verification and certificate against forum shopping.
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FCD PAWNSHOP & MERCHANDISING CO v. UNION BANK

G.R. No. 207914 | 18 January 2017
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: In situations where an Annulment Case and an Injunction case is filed at the same time, there
can be forum shopping because there can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM,
which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases
entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two
rulings will conflict with each other.
FACTS:
• Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Makati. They entrusted the original
owner's copy of TCT to Atty. Rowena Dionisio.
• It was later discovered that the said title was used as collateral by Sunyang Mining Corporation to
obtain a P20 million loan from respondent bank.
• Petitioners filed against UBP, Sunyang, to annul the Sunyang mortgage and claim for damages,
based on the premise that it was fraudulently mortgaged.
• Meanwhile, UBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property, and it bought the
same at the auction sale.
• Petitioners then filed a Complaint against UBP, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and several others
for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and certificate of sale issued, with injunctive relief.
UBP claimed that petitioners violated the rule against forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s contention is correct.
HELD: Yes, there is forum shopping 'when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court.'
• Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
(1) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO v. LIN

G.R. No. 207277| 16 January 2017
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: The procedures, quantum of evidence and reliefs of an administrative case are different from
that of a civil case. Hence, the finding of one is not necessarily binding upon the other.
FACTS:
• Respondent is the owner of six clusters of warehouses in Bulacan which she insured with
petitioner.
17
• The 5 warehouses were gutted by fire. The BFP then issued her a fire protection clearance after it
determined that the fires were accidental.
• However, according to Malayan’s pwn investigation, the fires were not accidental and so they
refused to pay Lin her insurance.
• The Insurance Commission reinvestigated and recommended that Malayan pay Lin her insurance.
However, Malayan still refused to pay
• Respondent then instituted a complaint against Malayan for collection of sum of money.
Subsequently, she also filed an administrative case before the Insurance Commision alleging that
Malayan should be held liable for unfair settlement claims and that their license be suspended or
revoked.
• Malayan filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the institution of the civil case and administrative
case constitutes forum shopping
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of a civil case and an administrative case shall constitute forum
shopping
HELD: No, such case would not constitute forum shopping. The findings of the trial court will not
necessarily foreclose the administrative case vice versa. True, the parties are the same, and both actions are
predicated on the same set of facts, and will require identical evidence. But the issues to be resolved, the
quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed, and the reliefs to be adjudged by these two bodies are
different.
LIM v. KOU CO PING

G.R. No. 175256| 23 August 2012
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: There can be no forum-shopping if the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
FACTS:
• FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT).
• FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to respondent Co for
the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
• Co then sold the same withdrawal authorities to petitioner Lily Lim for the alleged amount of P3.2
million or P64.00 per bag.
• Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800 bags of cement from FRCC. He then sold
some of the withdrawal authorities covering 10,000 bags back to respondent Co. (Remaining: 37,200
bags)
• Then FRCC no longer allowed Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the
withdrawal authorities. According to Co and the manager of FCCT, the plant implemented a price
increase and would only release the goods once Lim paid for the price difference or agreed to
receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities
were not subject to price fluctuations.
• Because of this, Lim filed an information for Estafa before the RTC of Pasig City. The criminal case
was dismissed. The civil liability was subsequently dismissed as well after the reception of the
evidence.
• Lim appealed the dismissal of the civil liability before the CA. While the appeal before the CA was
pending, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC of Manila.
The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
18
• In his defense, Co maintained that the two causes of action raise the same issue, which was Co’s
liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement, and should be dismissed on the
grounds of lis pendens and forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and
damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
HELD: No, a single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Art. 100 of the RPC, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may
be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
• The independent civil liability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code. It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
MACEDONIO v. RAMO
G.R. No. 193516 | 24 March 2014
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their
application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial justice.
FACTS:
• Macedonio paid Ramo 850k as earnest money for the purchase of the latter’s property. They executed
a deed of sale and Ramo assured petitioner that she would clear the property of liens and encumbrances
before petitioner pays the remaining balance. However, she failed to do so; thus, Macedonio filed a
civil case for rescission of contract and for damages against Ramo with the RTC.
• The parties mutually agreed to settle; however, they were unable to submit a compromise agreement
to the RTC.
o Macedonio filed for an MR
o RTC ordered that no incident will be taken up until the submission of the Compromise
Agreement
o The RTC set another hearing for the petitioner to be able to substantiate her MR but it did not
push through as petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to reset, which was granted.
o On the set hearing, RTC terminated the case
• Macedonio filed a Motion praying that Ramo return the 850k advance she made. Ramo opposed the
Motion arguing that the subject of the motion has become moot and academic for petitioner’s failure
to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order, and that the trial court’s order has been
final and executory.
• Macedonio filed a written Protest with the DENR and another civil case (second case) against
respondents for specific performance with damages in the RTC. Ramo filed to dismiss the case as
petitioner violated the rule against forum–shopping since there had already been a prior terminated
case and a pending Protest with the DENR.
• The Trial Court dismissed the second case for failure to inform the court of the existence of the first
case and the DENR Protest, pursuant to Sec 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether the non-compliance of Certification against forum shopping is a sufficient ground to
dismiss the second case
19
HELD: No, the dismissal of the second case was unwarranted. While petitioner should have informed the
trial court of the first case and the pending DENR Protest, the Supreme Court relaxed the certification
against forum–shopping requirement, as the rigid interpretation would cause substantial injustice to
petitioner.
• The Court has held countless times that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote
substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as possible be resolved
on the merits and not on technicalities. Besides, the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping
are not always applied with inflexibility.
• The interests of truth and justice are better served where the court, giving due consideration to
technical objections, goes deeper into the basic legal merits of the controversy and concentrates
itself on the fundamental principles of fairness and square dealing which always outweigh
technical considerations.
ORPIANO v. SPOUSES TOMAS

G.R. No. 178611|14 January 2013
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: Forum shopping is done in the institution of two or more actions or precedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
FACTS:
• Spouses Orpiano owned, as part of their conjugal estate, an 809 sq m. lot in Quezon City.
• By virtue of a Decision by the Juvenile Court, wife Estrella was adjudged as an absent spouse. As
such, husband Alejandro was able to sell the lot in favor of Spouses Tomas for P12.1M on
installment basis. Then, TCT was issued in their favor despite not yet being fully paid.
• In 1996, Alejandro filed a collection case against Spouses Tomas for the balance amounting P4.3M.
However, during the pendency, he passed away. Hence, his heirs, including wife Estrella were
substituted.
• In 2005, Estrella filed an annulment of sale case against Spouses Tomas. She claimed that the
declaration of her husband that she was an absent spouse and the authority to sell was made
through misrepresentation, fraud and deceit. Hence, the transactions made were null and void.
• Spouses Tomas, in their answer, prayed for the dismissal on the ground of forum shopping arguing
that the filing of the annulment case was prompted by the denial of Estrella’s motion initiated in
the collection case to amend the Complaint to one for annulment of sale.
o The annulment case is Estrella’s attempt at securing a remedy which she could not obtain
in the collection case. The Tomas spouses added that the dismissal of the annulment case
would preclude the possibility that the two courts might render conflicting decisions.
•
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD: Yes, although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial
processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case should be
dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude.
• Forum shopping is done in the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. A
20
willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary
dismissal of the case.
• If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case, proceeds to finality,
not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as
envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might arise where after having paid the balance of the price as
ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and return of the property could be
decreed by the annulment court.
ANDERSON v. HO
G.R. No. 172590 | 7 January 2013
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel without the proper authorization
is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.
FACTS:
• Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Ho before the MeTC. She alleged that through
her mere tolerance, Ho is in possession of her parcel of land. Anderson served upon Ho a Demand
Letter to Vacate but despite receipt thereof, Ho refused.
• In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho averred that he possesses as part of his
compensation for services rendered to Anderson. Hence, he is entitled to the continued possession
thereof until such time that the property is sold and he is paid the 10% of the proceeds of its sale.
• MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. It gave much weight to
the written document executed by Anderson wherein she gave her consent for Ho to occupy the
Roosevelt property provided that the latter shall vacate the same if there is already a buyer for the
lot.
• On appeal, the RTC ruled to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to the determination in the
proper forum Whether or not the written document presented as proof was falsified. The Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sought to dismiss it as the certification against forum shopping was executed
not by the petitioner herself but by her counsel without attaching therewith any special authority
to sign on her behalf. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is justifiable reason to relax the rule on certification against forum shopping
HELD: No, the requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping is due to the fact that a certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the
principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It is the petitioner, and not always the
counsel, who is in the best position to know whether sheactually filed or caused the filing of a petition in
that case. If a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must
execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been
signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the
dismissal of the petition.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v PSPC

G.R. No. 205002 | 20 April 2016
Rules on Pleadings
21
DOCTRINE: To constitute forum shopping, the following elements must be present: (1) identity of the
parties; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for; and (3) any judgement rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata or litis pendencia in the action under consideration.
FACTS:
• District Collector of the Port of Batangas, issued a demand letter asking respondent PSPC to pay
the excise tax and value-added tax (VAT), plus penalty on its importations for years 2006 to 2008.
• PSPC refused to heed the demand and filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Customs (COC).
The COC denied the appeal of PSPC. On Petition for Review, the CTA denied its Motion for
Suspension Order against the collection of tax.
• The District Collector issued a Memorandum (Memo) ordering the delivery of the imported
shipments to satisfy PSPC’s tax liabilities.
• PSPC filed an Injunction with prayer for TRO with the RTC of Batangas to enjoin the
implementation of the Memo. In the Verification and Certification attached to the Complaint,
respondents declared that there is a pending case before the CTA, however, it involves different
issues and/or reliefs.
• Petitioners filed with the CTA a Motion to Cite respondents for Direct Contempt of Court. (Due to
forum shopping)
• Respondents maintain that the Batangas injunction case is different from the case pending before
the CTA as the former pertains to importations already released and transferred to the possession
of respondent PSPC while the latter pertains to "future importations" of respondent PSPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSPC committed willful and deliberate forum shopping.
HELD: No, he subject matter and causes of action are not the same
• Under prevailing jurisprudence, forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
o Litis pendentia;
o Res judicata; or
o Splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata.
• To constitute forum shopping the following elements must be present:
o Identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions;
o Identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set
of facts; and
o Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia
• In the CTA case is about the alleged unpaid taxes on its importation for the years 2006 to 2008. On
the other hand, the Batangas injunction case is about the 13 importations/shipments for January
to February 2010, which respondent claims are threatened to be seized by petitioners pursuant to
the Memo. The issues are not the same. In the CTA, the main issue involved is the validity of the
Letter-Decisions. While the Batangas injunction case was filed to question the validity of the Memo
and to oppose the seizure of the 13 importations/shipments. The reliefs are not the same. In the
CTA case, respondent PSPC seeks the reversal of the Letter-Decisions of petitioner COC to prevent
petitioners from imposing payment of taxes. While in the Batangas injunction case, respondent
PSPC seeks to prevent petitioners from entering its refinery and from seizing its importations
pursuant the Memo.
ASIA UNITED BANK v. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.
22
G.R. No. 191388 | 9 March 2011

Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: The trial court’s findings of fact are accorded with highest respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there are strong and compelling reasons to do so.
FACTS:
• Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage
over two parcels of land in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB).
o The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to P250 Million of Radiomarine Network,
Inc. (RMNI), doing business as Smartnet Philippines, to AUB.
• Goodland filed a complaint at the RTC of Biñan, Laguna for the annulment of the REM on the
ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’ verbal agreement
(“Annulment Case”).
• While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB,
prompting AUB to have the mortgaged properties foreclosed.
• The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction with AUB as the highest bidder.
• Before Goodland could consolidate its title, Goodland filed another complaint before the RTC of
Biñan against AUB and its officers, seeking to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the
consolidation of title in favor of AUB (“Injunction Case”).
• The RTC dismissed the Injunction Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. It held that (1) the Injunction Case and the annulment case are both founded on the same
transactions, essential facts, and circumstances, and (2) any judgment in the Annulment Case
regarding the validity of the REM would constitute res judicata on the Injunction Case.
• The CA reversed the RTC and ruled in favor of Goodland.
o It concluded that Goodland was not guilty of forum shopping when it initiated the
Annulment and Injunction cases.
o It held that the reliefs sought in the two cases were different since the Annulment Case
sought for the nullification of the REM, while the Injunction Case sought the nullification
of the foreclosure proceedings as well as to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of the
Petitioners.
o Finally, it held that the two cases were independent of each other because the facts or
evidence that supported their respective causes of action were different.
ISSUE: Whether or not the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction cases constitutes forum
shopping?
HELD: Yes, there is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court.
• The Court in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company explained that there are three ways in
which forum shopping can be committed:
o By filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia)
o By filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata);
and
o By filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is either litis pendentia or res
judicata).
23
• What is involved in this case is the third way of committing forum shopping, which is the filing of
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers.
o While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly
different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action
which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same, which is the alleged nullity
of the REM.
• There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of
injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is
already the subject of the Annulment Case. Hence, the petition is granted.
CEBU METRO PHARMACY v EURO-MED LABORATORIES

G.R. No. 164757 | 18 October 2010
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A person who is both the President and Manager of a corporation, without the submission
of a written authority from the board, is authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping on behalf of the said corporation
FACTS:
• Respondent Euro-Med Laboratories Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint for Sum of Money against
petitioner Cebu Metro Pharmacy, Inc. before the MTCC of Cebu City. Euro Med sought to recover
as payment the amount of P120, 219.88 with interest as payment for the various intravenous fluids
products which petitioner purchased from the former on several occasion.
• Cebu Metro, on the other hand, while admitting the obligation, raised in its Answer with
Counterclaim the following defenses: (1) Euro-Med has no cause of action; (2) that the complaint
is already barred by laches; (3) that Euro-Med committed fraud.
• MTCC resolved the case in favor of Euro-Med. It ruled that Euro-Med was able to prove by
testimonial and documentary evidence the existence of said obligation.
• Cebu Metro appealed to the RTC but the same was dismissed and affirmed in toto the decision of
MTCC. Cebu Metro went to the CA by way of Petition for Review.
• CA refused to give due course to the petition on the ground that the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed only by one Carmel Albao, Manager of Cebu
Metro, without any accompanying Secretary’s Certification/Board Resolution authorizing her to
execute said verification and certification. CA thus dismissed the petition pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule
45 of the ROC.
• Cebu Metro then filed a Motion for Reconsideration attaching therewith a Secretary’s Certificate
attesting to the approval of a Board Resolution declaring Albao as the newly elected President and
Manager and authorizing him to represent Cebu Metro in the court hearings. The CA, however,
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person who is both President and Manager of a corporation has the authority to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping despite the lack of board resolution attesting
to said authority
24
HELD: Yes, jurisprudence dictates that the president may sign the verification and the certification of non-
forum shopping. Hence, Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the authority to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping even without the submission of a written authority
from the board. As the corporation’s President and Manager, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition.
• In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her authority to act within the
domain of the general objectives of the corporation’s business and her usual duties in the absence
of any contrary provision in the corporation’s charter or by- laws.
ESPIRITU v. TANKIANSEE
G.R. No. 164153 | June 13, 2011
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: There is forum shopping where a party’s petition for certiorari and subsequent appeal seek to
achieve one and the same purpose.
FACTS:
• Espiritu, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Espiritu Group and Tan Group filed a Petition for
Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management and Control with the RTC against the
UOBP Group.
• The intervenors filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, but all of the parties
opposed the taking of their depositions via separate Motions for Protective Order and/or Objection
to Resort to Discoveries on the ground that resort to discovery procedure was already time-barred.
• The RTC initially denied the Notice to Take Depositions. The trial court issued orders denying all
modes of resort to discovery procedure.
• The Espiritu and Tan Groups filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA challenging the validity
of the RTC Decision and the Espiritu and Tan Groups attempted to resort to discovery procedure.
• The CA held that the Espiritu and Tan Groups failed to adduce evidence to establish that they filed
the Notice of Deposition within the 15-day period. From this adverse decision, only the Espiritu
Group appealed to the SC
• Meanwhile, while this case was pending resolution before the CA, the RTC rendered a Decision
from the main case in favor of the respondents. The Espiritu Group filed a notice of appeal. On the
other hand, petitioner Westmont Corp. filed for a petition for certiorari questioning the orders of
RTC in denying the deposition-taking procedures.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping by filing an appeal and petition for
certiorari?
HELD: Yes. The instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners’ appeal before the CA is the
appropriate and adequate remedy, and (2) the certiorari petition, subject matter of this case, constitutes
forum shopping.
• There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause,
are instituted by party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
• The appeal and certiorari petition raise similar arguments as they seek to achieve the same purpose
of annulling the CA Decision which denied the Notice of Deposition.
DISINI v SANDIGANBAYAN
25
G.R. No. 175730 | 5 July 2010

Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: The simultaneous availment of judicial remedies from different fora for exactly the same
ultimate relief and involving the same issues constitutes form shopping. It is a prohibited malpractice,
condemned for trifling with the courts and their processes.
FACTS:
• Republic filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against Petitioners.
• Despite the Republic’s earnest efforts, it failed to serve Summons upon petitioner Disini for it was
discovered that his last known address could not be ascertained. Thereafter, Republic filed an ex
parte motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication, as it could not be ascertained the
whereabouts of Disini, which was granted.
• Petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his responsive pleading within 60 days from
the publication of summons.
• Petitioner finally filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default alleging that he was unaware of the civil
case pending against him because he never received the summons or other processes from the
court, nor any pleadings from the parties of the case.
o His Answer contained affirmative defenses such as the respondent court’s failure to
acquire jurisdiction over his person through service by publication and the failure of the
Amended Complaint to state a cause of action against him.
• With the motion pending before it, the SB heard the Republic on its Urgent Manifestation and
Motion.
o Petitioner Disini’s lawyers were present during the hearing but were not allowed to
participate therein because of the prevailing default order against Disini.
• Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Lift Default Order. Republic then proceeded for the
ex parte presentation of evidence held before the SB. While petitioner was not allowed to
participate, he was notified thereof and his counsels were present to observe the same.
• Petitioner then filed this Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently, he filed a Supplement to the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition protesting the continuation of the ex parte proceedings before the SB
as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the SC, petitioner filed
with the SB a Second Motion to Lift The Order Of Default
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of forum shopping?
HELD: Yes, there is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in,
or already resolved adversely, by some other court. The filing of the instant petition while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the SB constitutes forum-shopping, which could have warranted
the outright dismissal of the petition.
• In this case, in filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default with the SB while the instant
Petition is pending with this Court, petitioner has unfairly doubled his chances of securing the
lifting of the default order.
UST v. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 165569| 29 July 2010
Rules on Pleadings
26
DOCTRINE: No Forum Shopping exists if the forum for which the party seeks for a favorable judgment,
is held to be without quasi-judicial power and therefore cannot make any disposition of the case, such as
the CHED in this case.
FACTS:
• A complaint for damages was filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez against the UST and its Board
of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University
Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records
(ToR).
o In his complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated with a degree in Nursing; he was
included in the list of the candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies.
And when he sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST’s Registrar’s Office, paid
the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite
repeated attempts, UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take
the nursing board examinations.
• Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they
refused to release respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been
enrolled in the university for the 3 semesters.
o After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had
primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of
the instant case was premature
• RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. CA Affirmed the denial of petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and
directed RTC to proceed with trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the rule against forum-shopping since respondent sought
recourse with both the CHED and the RTC
HELD: No, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Here, there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-
judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case—whether favorable or otherwise.
• Likewise, the Court held that the complaint states a cause of action. Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of
the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action. To clarify the essential test required to sustain dismissal on this
ground, we have explained that “[t]he test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to
constitute a cause of action, is whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition.” A perusal of the complaint
led the Court to a conclusion that assuming the facts alleged in therein are true, the RTC would be
able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the Complaint.
GENATO v. VIOLA
G.R. No. 169706 | 5 February 2010
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling.
27
FACTS:
• A complaint titled "Villa Rebecca Homeowners Association, Inc. versus Mr. William Genato and
spouse Rebecca Genato" was filed with the HLURB with regard to executed Contracts to Sell
and/or Lease Purchase Agreements with the Sps. Genato pertaining to housing units in Villa
Rebecca Homes Subdivision.
• Housing arbiter and subsequently the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered the decision in
favor of Sps. Genato and ordered complainants to resume payment of their amortization. This
decision became final and executor.
• A writ of Execution was issued and in connection therewith, the sheriff seized Rita Viola's two
delivery trucks and 315 sacks of rice.
• Respondent Viola then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Execution, with Prayers for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order.
• Viola also questioned the court’s jurisdiction over her person, contending that she was not
impleaded in the case
ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Rita Viola
HELD: Yes, the non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a
complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating
that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action.
• Respondent Viola, although her name did not appear in the title as a party, was one of the persons
who caused the preparation of the complaint and who verified the same. The allegations in the
body of the complaint indicate that she is one of the complainants.
• Viola is also estopped from questioning this matter as it was only raised when the final and
executor judgment of the HLURB was being executed against her.
GUYAMIN v. FLORES
G.R. No. 202189 | 25 April 2017
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A reply filed thereafter the reglamentary period is, like the belated answer, .a mere scrap of
paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.
FACTS:
• Respondents filed for Recovery of Possession against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they
are the registered owners of a property in Cavite and that petitioners are their relatives who for
many years have been occupying the subject property by the mere tolerance of their predecessors
and parents (the original owners of the same)
• Petitioners have been reminded to vacate the premises because respondents have decided to sell
the property. However, petitioners failed to vacate
• Ssummons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners, who nonetheless refused to
sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. This fact was noted in the court process server's Return of
Summons
• Respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants (petitioners herein) in Default, arguing that
despite service of summons, petitioners failed to file their answer
• RTC: declared peitioners in default for failure to file their responsive answer within the
reglementary period of 15 days (proceeded to receive respondents' evidence ex parte), and ruled
in favor of respondents (ordered petitioners to vacate)
• CA: affirmed
28
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of petitioner’s Answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in
default, and the latter's filing of a reply to their answer, cured the defective answer.
HELD: No, the filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and
the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply filed
thereafter is, like the belated answer, a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.
MAGTOTO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 175792| 21 November 2012
Rules on Pleadings
DOCTRINE: A party declared in default must show that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense
FACTS:
• Leonila Dela Cruz filed before the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
against the spouses Magtoto. She sold her three parcels of land to petitioner Ruben Magtoto. Ruben
issued several postdated checks.Most of the checks however were dishonored. Despite demands,
the balance remained unpaid. Hence, the Complaint.
• On June 6, 2003Spouses Magtoto were served with summons requiring them to file an Answer
within 15 days from notice. They thrice moved for extensions of time within which to file the same.
The RTC granted a final extension until August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer. They
failed to file an Answer and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss 2 days after the said date.The RTC
denied the Motion to Dismiss. Later, Atty. Canlas filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Appearance as counsel for petitioners.
• On January 23, 2004, Leonila filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to Render
Judgment Based on the Complaint. The RTC declared the spouses Magtoto in default on March
23, 2004 and Leonila’s presentation of evidence ex parte and formal offer of evidence followed.
• Three months after they were declared in default, the spouses Magtoto filed an Omnibus Motion
to Lift Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer and their Answer stating that it took them
awhile to secure the services of a new counsel.RTC denied this and found them liable to pay the
balance.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. Thus, the spouses Magtotofiled this Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners availed of the wrong remedy
HELD: Yes, petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Even if the petition is to be treated under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for
late filing. Petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on
October 30, 2006. They filed their Petition for Certiorari on December 29,thus beyond the 15 day period to
file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default was proper
HELD: Yes, Spouses Magtoto are unable to show that their failure to timely file an Answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that they have a meritorious defense pursuant to
Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Even before Atty. Canlas moved for the withdrawal of his
appearance, the period within which spouses Magtoto should have filed their Answer had already
expired.Negligence, to be ‘excusable,’ must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
29
granted against. Certainly, this is not the kind of negligence committed by the spouses Magtoto in this case.
More significantly, a review of the records does not convince the Court that the spouses Magtoto have a
meritorious defense.
TRAYVILLA v. SEJAS
G.R. No. 204970 | 1 February 2016
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments, Final Orders and Resolutions
DOCTRINE: The courts only acquire jurisdiction over cases once the proper docket fees has been paid.
With regards to Amended Complaints, additional docket fees must be paid when new causes of actions are
introduced. Failure to comply with these rules would divest the court with its jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS:
• Petitioner bought a parcel of land from respondent as evidened by a private handwritten
document. However, Sejas reasserted his right over the property after some time.
• Petitioner then filed a complaint against Sejas praying that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed
of sale over the property and transfer the same to them
• Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint specific performance, reconveyance, damages and
impleaded Juvy Paglinawan as Sejas subsequently sold the land to her
• Respondents then filed for a Motion to Dismiss as petitioners failed to pay the additional docket
fees for the amended complaint.
• The RTC denied the motion stating that the complaint is one for specific performance and is then
incapable of pecuniary estimation
• The CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the complaint is a real action as the
petitioners are not merely seeking that a deed of sale be issued in their favor but also the
cancellation of the TCT in the name of Paglinawan
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC lost its jurisdiction when petitioners failed to pay the additional docket
fees in their Amended Complaint
HELD: Yes, consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the
prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case
only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. Since the Amended Complaint of the
petitioners alleged new causes of action, the non-payment of additional docket fees for these new
allegations divested and ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
JULIAN v. DBP
G.R. No. 174193 | 7 December 2011
DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should
not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no
appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or order final and executory.
FACTS:
• DBP became the owner of the property after it foreclosed the same for failure of the previous owner,
Juliana, to pay the amortization of the loan that she obtained from the former.
30
• The actual occupant of the property, petitioner Juliana’s sibling, refused to vacate the premises
compelling DBP to file an Unlawful Detainer case. Judgment was rendered in favor of DBP.
• Before the Writ of Execution could be carried out, Juliana filed for the cancellation of DBP’s TCT
contending that the SPA executed by Thelma was no longer effective in view of the latter’s death.
• The parties were able to reach an amicable settlement. However, the RTC eventually dismissed the
case for failure of the parties to comply with its order to submit a joint motion to dismiss for an
unreasonable length of time.
• The order was set aside in consideration of Juliana’s payment of 10% of DBP’s claim. However, no
compromise agreement was still filed in court.
• Julian, through his new counsel, timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA dismissed the appeal for
non-payment of the required docket and other lawful fees.
• Seeking reconsideration, Julian attached to his motion Postal Money Orders as payment for the
docket fees, explaining that his failure to pay the required fees was due to oversight and non-
cognizance of the necessity to pay the same since his counsel did not inform him of such
requirement. The MR was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in strictly applying the rules on the payment of docket fees?
HELD: Yes, the justifications presented by petitioner for the non-payment of the docket fees are neither
convincing nor adequate to merit leniency. The consequence of such grave inadvertence renders the trial
court’s order final and executory.
• Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Failure of the appellant
to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
• The payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
• However, in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed
period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the
court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and
with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
• In the case at bar, petitioner only attempted to perfect his appeal by appending the postal money
orders to his MR one year and nine days too late.
GIPA v. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

G.R. No.177425|18 June 2014
DOCTRINE: Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and
jurisdictional
FACTS:
• Southern Luzon Institute (SLI) filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with
Damages against Gipa and his co-defendants.
• RTC ruled in favor of SLI. Thus, Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted by RTC.
• However, CA dismissed the appeal for it was not shown that the petitioners paid the appellate court
docket fees and other lawful fees.
o Petitioners paid the docket fee of P3,000.00
31
o Subsequently, CA, through a Minute Resolution, required petitioners to pay ₱30.00 for legal
research fund, which was not included in the P3,000.00 appeal fee.
o Despite the lapse of 9 months from the receipt of resolution, petitioners still failed to comply
o Thus, CA dismissed the appeal for nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal, as provided for under Sec 1(c)
Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules may be applied in this case
considering that petitioners fell short of paying the meager amount of P30.00
HELD: No, Section 4, Rule 41 requires the appellant to pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees.
• An appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. The requirement of paying the full amount of
the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure
but is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected.
The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
• In this case, petitioners were short of P30.00 and the CA could have dismissed the appeal outright.
However, CA still required petitioners, even if it was beyond the reglementary period to complete their
payment of the appeal fee even after 9 months. Since no payment was still remitted, the CA was
constrained to dismiss the appeal for non-perfection.
PALILEO v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

GR No. 193650 | 8 October 2014
DOCTRINE: The rules on filing of notice and proper service are not mere rules that may be looked upon,
and the relaxation of such rules must be done with utmost discretion.
FACTS:
• In an action for specific performance/sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of writs
of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff-
petitioner Palileo dated July 15, 2006 and received by Palileo on July 17, 2006.
• Defendant-respondent PDB filed by private courier service – specifically LBC – an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial, arguing therein that the trial court’s Decision was based on
speculation and inadmissible and self-serving pieces of evidence; that it was declared in default after
its counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference on account of the distance involved and difficulty
in booking a flight to General Santos City.
• Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent
courier service through LBC, but in their address of record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was no LBC
service at the time.
• On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by
registered mail as well. Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending
appeal.
• In a petition for certiorari, the CA affirmed the trial court decision but reversed itself upon MR, relaxing
the Rules in favor of PDB.
32
ISSUE: Whether or not CA was correct in relaxing the rules on with regards Planter’s late filing and
improper service.
HELD: No, the bank filed its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial one day late. The bank
received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days – or up to
August 1, 2006 – within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new
trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only
on August 2, 2006.
• The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days
– or up to August 1, 2006 – within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a
motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for
reconsideration and new trial only on August 2, 2006.
• Further, failure to TIMELY file such notice, barred Planter’s from questioning the said judgment by
appeal. The “presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the
adjudication made by the lower court” applies to it.
LHUILLER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS

G.R. No. 171092 | 15 March 2010
Summons
DOCTRINE:
• Special appearance to question a court’s jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance
• Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the Philippines.
FACTS:
• Edna Lhuiller filed a complaint for damages against British Airways before the RTC of Makati
alleging that on her flight to Rome, two of the flight attendants were rude to her and blatantly
refused to help her with her luggage.
• Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over
their person;
o that only courts of London, UK or Rome, Italy have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention
o that the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc., which
is not its resident agent in the PH
• Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-[arte Motion to Admit Formal Amendment to the Complaint and
Issuance of Alias Summons alleging that she found out that the resident agent of respondent in PG
is Alonzo Ancheta.
• RTC granted the respondent’s MTD hence this petitioner for certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PH courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a
Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling beyond the territorial limit
of any foreign country?
HELD: No, the Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between U.K and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. And since
the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
• Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before
o the court where the carrier is domiciled;
o the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
33
o the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
o the court of the place of destination.
• Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established
pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is
determined will the issue of venue be taken up.
• Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not
deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
o Sec. 20, Rule 14 of Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
▪ Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance.
SAGANA v. FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 161952 | 2 October 2009
Summons
DOCTRINE: For the validity of substituted service of summons, three requisites must concur: that the
personal service o summons was impossible; that there were efforts to locate the party and; that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence
(provided that this shall be stated in the proof of service/ officer’s return)
FACTS:
• Petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages alleging that respondent Richard Francisco,
with intent to kill and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh
• The process servers tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but was unsuccessful. At the
2nd attempt, respondent Michael, respondent’s brother, told the process server that Arnel no longer
lived at said address. Iconar however still left a copy of the summons to him.
• RTC issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served to respondent through his brother,
Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were furnished to respondent’s residence.
• Michael Francisco denied that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive summons
on behalf of his brother.
• The Trial Court ruled in favor of Sagana. Michael Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal.
• Court of Appeals held that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the
proceedings before the trial court. Since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, the trial courts decision was void.
• Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
• Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons
HELD: Yes, there was proper service of summons.

• In this case, personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although
unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of
work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's
return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Personal service of summons
was made impossible by the acts of the respondent in refusing to reveal his whereabouts. Also, the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence.
34
• An overly strict application of the Rules is not warranted in this case, as it would clearly frustrate the
spirit of the law as well as do injustice to the parties, who have been waiting for almost 15 years for a
resolution of this case.
• The purpose of summons is two-fold:
o to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
o to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
DELOS REYES v. RAMNANI

G.R. No. 169135 | 18 June 2010
Motions
DOCTRINE: A motion for the issuance of certificate of sale, being a non-litigious motion, is not defective
for the lack of three-day notice of hearing.
FACTS:
• On October 11, 1977, the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of
respondent Josephine Ramnani. Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of execution.
• Branch Sheriff Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the subject property
during which respondent was the highest bidder. Thus, a certificate of sale was executed in her
favor on even date and the trial court issued a writ of possession.
• Respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final
certificate of sale in her favor.
• Petitioner opposed on the ground that the motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and
that the trial court's October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by
prescription.
• RTC ruled in favor of respondent, ordered the issuance of the Final Certificate of Sale, and held
that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case.
• CA affirmed RTC’s decision holding that the respondent’s motion is a non-litigious motion; hence,
the three-day notice rule does not apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s motion is defective for lack of three-day notice of hearing.
HELD: No, Petitioner was given the opportunity to oppose the motion by his filing of a
Comment/Opposition, hence he cannot validly claim the he was denied a day in court.
• Rule 15 Sec 4 of the Rules of Court provide that all written motions should be set for hearing except
for non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party.
• In this case, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right
and petitioner cannot oppose the same given that his right to redeem had already expired.
• The subject motion herein falls under the class of non-litigious motions, wherein lack of notice of
hearing is not a fatal defect for the issuance of the order of writ of execution.
JOSE v. SUAREZ
G.R. No. 176111 | 17 July 2013
Motions
35
DOCTRINE: When a trial court is confronted to rule on a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, it has duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
FACTS:
• Carolina filed two Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu.
o One concerning 14 Chinabank checks totaling ₱1.5 million and the other pertaining to 10
Chinabank checks in the aggregate amount of ₱2.1 million
o Carolina claimed that Purita went to her house because the latter needed cash for her
business. Carolina gave Purita the cash she needed provided she would pay interest at 5%
monthly. In exchange for the cash, Purita issued checks. However, the checks were
dishonored upon presentment.
• The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. The corresponding
Information was filed against her.
• Purita filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ. The DOJ granted the petition and it ruled that the
transactions between Purita and Carolina do not constitute estafa and are merely contracts of loan
because Carolina was not deceived into parting with her money. It directed the City Prosecutor to
withdraw the information for estafa against Purita.
• The City Prosecutor moved for the withdrawal of the Information before the RTC.
o The RTC plainly denied the motion.
o Purita moved for a MR but was denied
• Purita filed special civil action for certiorari to the CA alleging that the said Orders of the RTC
failed to explain why the Motion to Withdraw Information was denied. Such omission amounted
to grave abuse of discretion because the judge failed to do his duty to make an independent
evaluation of the merits of the case in determining probable cause when faced with a Motion to
Withdraw Information.
• The CA granted the petition. It ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the
Resolution of the DOJ. Upholding the DOJ’s ruling that there is no probable cause to indict Purita
for estafa, the CA also held that the matter is the proper subject of a civil case as the parties engaged
themselves in a contract of loan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Judge failed to make its independent evaluation of the merits of the case
when it denied the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw Information.
HELD: Yes, when a trial court is confronted to rule on a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, it has a to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. In this, the RTC simply declared that it was denying
the motion for being unmeritorious, without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion.
• The RTC in both Orders automatically denied the motion to withdraw as it did not (1) positively
state that the evidence against Purita is sufficient to make out a case for estafa; (2) include a
discussion on the merits of the case; (3) assess if the DOJ’s conclusion is supported by evidence; (4)
look at the basis of the DOJ’s recommendation; (5) embody its assessment in the said Orders; and,
(6) state the reasons in denying the motion to withdraw information. Thus, it is plain from the said
Orders that the RTC failed to perform its bounden-duty to make an independent evaluation of the
merits of the case. The CA did not therefore err in declaring that such failure of the RTC constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
THENAMARIS v. CA
G.R. No. 191215| 3-Feb-14
36
Motions
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed
before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there
would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and
executory.
FACTS:
• Mendigorin filed a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund of
medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner Thenamaris, represented by its
general manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares with the Labor Arbiter. She is the widow of seafarer
Guillermo who was employed by Thenamaris. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon
cancer during the term of the employment contract between him and Thenamaris.
• LA promulgated his decision in favor of Mendigorin.
• On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision.
• Mendigorin moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied for lack of merit.
• Mendigorin’s counsel received NLRC’s decision. 62 days thereafter, she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari before the CA. She alleged that she had until
September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within
which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was then saddled and occupied with
equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to file the petition on time, especially since
the case involves voluminous documents necessary in the preparation thereof. Mendigorin asked
for an extension of 15 days from September 7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to
file the petition.
• On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
• CA noted that Mengodorin's Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from
procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, it entertained the petition
and directed private respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by Mendigorin should have been dismiss outright
for filing beyond the madatory and jurisdictional 60-day period.
HELD: Yes, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no
provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike under Rule 65
which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
Under exceptional cases, however, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound
discretion. Based on jurisprudence, the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time
did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited.
Jurisprudence also provides, some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule were
laid down:
(1) Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) To relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) Good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time
of the default;
(4) The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) The merits of the case;
(6) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules;
(7) A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
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(8) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;

(9) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault;
(10) Peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11) In the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) Importance of the issues involved; and
(13) Exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
DPWH SEC DATUMANONG et al. v. MALAGA

G.R. No. 204906 | 5 June 2017
Motions
DOCTRINE: Failure to state a cause of action would amount to the dismissal of the case.
FACTS:
• Malaga Whether or not the bid for the projects implemented by the DPWH in Brgy. Hibao-an Iloilo
City
• However, the said barangay was destroyed due to the typhoon and monsoon season
• The Secretary of DPWH, upon the recommendation of their Regional Director, issued a
Memorandum declaring that due to the urgency of the situation, the said project was to be
undertaken by the administration
• Malaga then filed a case for damages against the Secretary of DPWH for failure to formally award
her the project even if she was the lowest and complying bidder
• Petitoners argue that Malaga’s case failed to state a cause of action since she is not automatically
entitled to an award of a project subject to bidding by the mere fact that he is the lowest bidder as
she must still undergo a mandatory post-qualification procedure.
• Petitioner further states that, the award and the project was superseded by the DPWH’s decision
to undertake the project by the administration
ISSUE: Whether or not Malaga’s case failed to state a cause of action.
HELD: Yes, the Court agrees with the contention of the petitioners that the Memorandum of the DPWH
superseded the bidding process undertaken by the department. Such Memorandum rendered Malaga’s
case to be moot and hence, prematurely filed. Therefore, she has no valid cause of action against the
petitioner.
TABINO v. TABINO
G.R. No. 196219| 30 July 2014
Motions
DOCTRINE: A party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention to give
the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.
FACTS:
• Lazaro Tabino filed an ejectment case against Petitioner Mauricio Tabino, his brother, and the latter’s
wife with the MeTC as he claimed to be the true and sole owner of the land.
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• Before the ejectment case was filed, both Mauricio and Lazaro filed a protest with the DENR where the
latter ruled in favor of Mauricio in both protests
• MeTC and RTC affirmed DENR’s decision
• CA reversed DENR’s decision, granted the ejectment case Lazaro filed, and ordered Mauricio to vacate
the subject property
• Petitioners sought the reversal of the CA’s decision and argued that respondent should not have
resorted to the ejectment case; instead, he should have exhausted all administrative remedies made
available to him through the DENR. Petitioners add that respondent is guilty of forum-shopping in
filing the ejectment case without awaiting resolution of the pending DENR Protests.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on review the findings of fact by DENR
without exhaustion of administrative remedies
HELD: No, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is for lesser expenses and
for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
• Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers. The theory is that
the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular
expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so. Strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a
considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
• The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of
action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
UNITED ALLOY PHIL. CORP. v UCPB

G.R. No. 179257 | 3 November 2015
Motions
DOCTRINE: The dismissal the main action carries with it the dissolution of any ancillary relief previously
granted therein.
FACTS:
• Unialloy leased form UCPB parcels of land for a 3 year term with a stipulation that upon the
expiration of the term, Unialloy was to purchase the land on a staggered basis
• However, Unialloy filed a complaint against its chairman and UCPB for allegedly obtaining
fictuitous loans and that UCPB unilaterally rescinded the agreement
• Unialloy then prayed for the nullification of the unilateral rescisiion and, as an ancilliary relief, the
issuance of a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction
• RTC of Cagayan De Oro granted the TRO
• UCPB then filed for a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper veue, forum shopping and that
the case is a harassment suit
• The RTC, acting as a Special Commercial Court, granted the motion to dismiss
• UCPB then asked for the issuance of a writ of execution which was granted and executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Unialloy can still enforce its TRO
39
HELD: No. The main action of Unialloy against UCPB was already dismissed. Hence, the ancilliary relief
of the TRO is effectively dismissed alongside the main action. The Court has previously held that “the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction persists only until it is dissolved or until the termination of the
main action without the court issuing a final injunction “
PPA v. COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS &EMPLOYEES

G.R. No. 203142| 26 August 2015
Motions
DOCTRINE: A preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses is subject to the discretion of the court.
FACTS:
• Herein petitioners are employees who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on various
dates. Respondent Coalition of PPA Officers and Employees is an aggrupation of PPA employees
set up as a result of this case.
• Respondent sought to compel petitioner to pay all its employees cost of living allowance (COLA)
and amelioration allowance (AA), pursuant to the mandate of RA 6758. It further claimed that
petitioner withheld the payment of these allowances.
• Meanwhile, petitioner argued the ff as affirmative defenses:
o That respondent had no legal standing to file the Petition since it did not secure the
required powers of attorney from the PPA employees and that it is not the recognized
representative or bargaining/negotiating agent of the employees;
o That there is another pending case between the parties involving the same subject matter
and issues;
o That the official documents which constitute the basis for filing the Petition are hearsay as
they were obtained without petitioner's authority/clearance;
o That there was no prior demand for the fulfillment of the alleged obligation sued upon
o That res judicata exists and that there is no cause of action against it (as COLA and AA
payments to the employees were discontinued in 199 pursuant to a DBM Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10;
o That respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies relative to its claim; and
o That the case is really for a sum of money, which thus requires the payment of the
appropriate docket fees corresponding to the amount of COLA and AA being claimed.
• RTC: held that it can render judgment based on the pleadings submitted by the parties without
further hearings.
o A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed alleging that RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in its judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment on the pleadings was validly rendered?
HELD: Yes, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether or not there was a necessity
to hear the affirmative defenses presented by petitioner in its answer.
• If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided under the Rules
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had. (Sec. 6, Rule 16)
o The court in order to expedite the petition for mandamus had a valid reason to dispense
with the hearing.
REPUBLIC v HEIRS OF LIM
40
G.R. No. 195611 | 4 April 2016

Intervention
DOCTRINE: When a party’s motion for intervention is dismissed, they can no longer appeal the case as a
whole but they can appeal the dismissal of their motion.
FACTS:
• Petitioner claims that Lot 42 is part of public domain
• Romamban and Parong opposed the petition claiming ownership over Lot 42E
• Lim and Josefat also claims that they have occupied Lot 42E and that they have a pending free
patent application
• CFI rendered a decision in favor of Romamban and Parong
• Romamban and Parong then subdivided the lots and sold them tp third parties
• The CA reversed the decision of the CFI and eventually became final and executory
• Lim and Josefat then filed with the RTC a complaint for accion publiciana and the cancellation of
the absolute sale against Romamban and Parong
• Petitioners filed a motion for Intervention which was granted but was late dismissed due to their
failure to prosecute
• RTC dismissed the complaint
• Petitioner applead to the CA arguing that the decision of the CA in the ealier case was conclusive
upon the nature and classification of Lot 42
• CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to appeal the case
HELD: No, Petitioner is not a party to the particular case. When their motion for intervention was
rebuffed, petitioner lost its personality to the case. Petitioner could have appealed the denial of its motion
for intervention but it did not do so. Consequently, petitioner is not left without a remedy. They can still
file for a reversion case against Romamban and Parong with respect to the portions of Lot 42E titled
under their names.
SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA v. METROBANK

G.R. No. 185145 |5 February 2014
Modes of Discovery
DOCTRINE: As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
FACTS:
• Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaintfor nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
Metrobank and Ortega, Sheriff of Malolos RTC.
• After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandumto require Metrobank’s officers to
appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with
41
Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-
square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
• Metrobank filed an Opposition and argued that:
o That pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are
considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the
petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories;
o That petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to
be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
• Petitioners submitted a Reply to Metrobank’s Opposition, stating that:
o That for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but
instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the
same during the presentation of its own evidence;
o And that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own
witness.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to respondent bank’s officers
before they can be subpoenaed.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
• In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial
and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper.
• Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief
at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the
principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents – as their
main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for
the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the
evidence of their opponent.
• The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot
prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be
pressured to hang itself from its own defense. Furthermore, it is true that under the Rules, a party
may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in
court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek
goes against the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide
the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not
be allowed to do.
SANTOS v. ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 183034 | 12 March2014
Trial
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for postponement rests on the court’s sound discretion
FACTS:
42
• Respondent Alcazar was the proprietor LCC. She instituted through her attorney-in-fact, Delfin
Chua, a Complaint against the petitioner-spouses Santos to collect the value of paint and
construction materials obtained from LCC.
o Respondent’s cause of action is based on a document entitled "Acknowledgment"
apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando.
• In their Answer, petitioners sought the dismissal of the Complaint stating that the document which
petitioner Fernando signed does not reflect the true contract or intention of the parties.
• Respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence. They argued that the Acknowledgment was not an
original copy and thus inadmissible in evidence.
• The trial court denied petitioners’ demurrer for lack of merit. The trial court also denied petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration and scheduled the presentation of evidence for the petitionerson
March 20.
• Petitioners moved to reset the scheduled hearing. On the scheduled hearing however, petitioners’
counsel failed to appear, prompting the trial court deny petitioners’ motion to reset, declare that
petitioners have waived their right to present evidence, and orderthe case submitted for decision.
• Petitioners went up to the CAon certiorari questioning the denial of petitioners’ demurrer.
• Meanwhile, the RTC eventually held petitioners liable. Petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that the trial court should not have pre-empted the case instead should
have awaited the resolution of the CA thereof. This was however denied.
• Eventually, the CA dismissed petitioners’ certiorari sustaining the trial court’s denial of their
demurrer.
• On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. With their Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied, petitionersfiled this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied their day in court
HELD: No, despite reminders and admonitions by the trial court, petitioners caused several continuances
of trial, which understandably prompted the trial court to finally deny their motion to reset the scheduled
hearing and declare a waiver of their right to present evidence. Petitioners filed their motion to reset the
March 20 scheduled hearing but the trial court did not act on the motion. Instead of attending the March
20 hearing, petitioners’ counsel proceeded to absent himself and attended the supposed hearing of another
case. This was improper. As we have held before, a party moving for postponement should be in court on
the day set for trial if the motion is not acted upon favorably before that day. He has no right to rely either
on the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse party. The grant or denial of a motion for
postponement rests on the court’s sound discretion. Thus, it is a matter of privilege, not a right.
ADOLFO v. ADOLFO
G.R. No. 201427 | 18 March 2015
Judgment and Final Orders
DOCTRINE: An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it “does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Teofilio filed for judicial separation of property with his estranged wife, Fe, alleging that
they bought a property thru conjugal funds, and had been separated in fact due to irreconcilable
differences.
43
o In her answer, Fe alleged that the property is not conjugal, but paraphernal property belonging
to her.
o Teofilio requested for admission, based on declaration on pleading trial court’s
pronouncement that subject property is indeed conjugal in a separate case for partition.
o Fe failed to answer the Request for Admission, hence, Teoflio filed a motion to render judgment
on the pleadings, alleging that since Fe failed to answer the request for admission, the matters
included in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, he is now entitled to judgment on the pleading based on Rule 34.
o The RTC granted the motion by Teofilo, treating it as a motion for summary judgment. It ruled
that judicial separation was proper, taking judicial notice of its decision in partition case that
the property is conjugal property. With Fe’s failure to provide a verified answer or denial
under oath to the request for admission of the documents, she is deemed to have admitted the
genuineness of the same.
• Separate civil case for partition - Fe’s sister Florencia and her husband Juanito (Gingoyons) filed a civil
case for partition with damages, alleging that in 1988, Fe sold a 300-square meter lot portion of the lot
to the spouses Gingoyon, but that the former refused to subdivide it. This time, Fe alleged that the
property was conjugal, and the sale was made without the signature of Teofilo, hence it was null and
void. The RTC ruled in favour of Fe and declared it conjugal property, hence, the Gingoyons appealed
to the CA.
• On appeal with CA – court reversed, hence appeal by Teofilio. The CA held that the trial court cannot
treat Adolfo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the
defending party’s failure to raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment,
such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions
or admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded,
while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions,
or admissions.
ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment was proper in this case.
HELD: NO.
Judgment on the Pleadings when Proper Summary Judgment when Proper
Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to Summary judgment is proper if the
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations pleadings, supporting affidavits,
of the adverse party’s pleading. depositions, and admissions on file
Answer “fails to tender an issue” if: (except as to the amount of damages),
• does not deny the material allegations in the complaint; or show that, there is no genuine issue as
• admits material allegations of the adverse party’s to any material fact and that the moving
pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or party is entitled to a judgment as a
omitting to deal with them at all. matter of law.
There is no application of either in this case. The RTC should not have taken judicial notice of the RTC
decision while it was still pending appeal. The basis of the action has yet to be determined during that time
period and as alleged, when CA decided on the case, it pronounced that indeed the subject property was
paraphernal property.
BASBAS v. SAYSON
G.R. No. 172660 | 24 August 2011
Judgments and Final Orders
44
DOCTRINE: Whenever the issues could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the
pleadings, a rendition of a Summary Judgment is proper
FACTS:
• Respondent Beata Sayson and her husband Roberto Sayson, Sr. filed a Petition for Registration of
an agricultural land. This was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and petitioners Basbas.
• The CFI adjudicated to the spouses Sayson the agricultural land and approved the registration
under their names.
• The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the CFI.
• When the decision became final and executory, a writ of possession was issued, but was never
implemented.
• The following year, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued to the spouses Sayson
pursuant to the CFI decision.
• An Alias Writ of Possession was issued but this could also not be implemented in view of the
refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. who claimed that the land they occupied is
not the same land subject of the CFI Decision. They further demanded that a relocation survey be
conducted.
• After a relocation survey was conducted, the RTC rendered a decision and ordered the original
oppositors Basbas et. al. to vacate the subject property.
• The Order was not implemented within the five-year period from the time it became final hence,
respondent Beata and her son, as successors-in-interest of Roberto, Sr., filed a Complaint for
Revival of Judgment.
• In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners admitted the allegations in some paragraphs of the
respondents’ Complaint and denied other parts as well.
• By way of special and affirmative defenses petitioners contended that the Order sought to be
revived is not the “judgment” contemplated under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence the
action for revival of judgment is improper. Also, petitioners averred that they can not be made
parties to the complaint for revival of judgment as they were not parties to the land registration
case.
• Respondents subsequently filed an Omnibus Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or
Summary Judgment contending that since petitioner’s Answer failed to tender an issue, they
having expressly admitted the material allegations in the complaint a judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rendition of a Summary Judgment is proper?
HELD: Yes, the rendition of a Summary Judgment and not a Judgment on the Pleadings is proper since the
petitioners’ Answer tendered issues which were not genuine. It practically admitted all the material
allegations therein and asserts the affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the
proper action and that petitioners are not proper parties to the case.
• The distinction between a Judgment on the Pleadings and a Summary Judgment are as follows:
o When the Answer fails to tender any issue – if it does not deny the material allegations in
the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by
admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on
the pleadings is appropriate.
o When the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts
affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper
provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue is an issue of fact calling for
the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived
or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.
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• To resolve the issues of whether a revival of judgment is the proper action and whether
respondents are the proper parties thereto, the RTC merely needed to examine the (1) the RTC
Order to determine whether same is a judgment or final order contemplated; and (2) the pleadings
of the parties and pertinent portions of the records showing who among the respondents were
oppositors to the land registration case, the heirs of such oppositors, and the present occupants of
the property.
CALUBAQUIB v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170658 | 22 June 2011
DOCTRINE: Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the
court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact
and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FACTS:
• President Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80, which declared a landholding located Tuguegarao
a military reservation site.
• Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession against Calubaquib
alleging that the latter unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth,
took possession of a five-hectare portion of the subject property, and allegedly refused to vacate
the subject property despite repeated demands to do so.
• Petitioners filed an Answer denying the allegation and maintained that they and their predecessor-
in-interest have been in open and continuous possession since the early 1900s.
• Given the RTC’s opinion that the basic facts of the case were undisputed, it advised the parties to
file a motion for summary judgment. Neither party filed the motion.
• Respondent expressed on two occasions its objection to a summary judgment.
o It explained that (1) summary judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and
vital factual issue, which is the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property,
and (2) the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.
• Without any trial, the RTC dismissed petitioners’ claim of possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner. It held that while Proclamation No. 80 recognized and respected the existence
of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners’ position could not be sustained, as there
was no right to speak of that was recognized by the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not rendering a summary judgment is proper in this case?
HELD: No, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
• The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of
fact, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. A factual issue raised by a
party is considered as sham when by its nature, it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such
that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove
it.
• In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary
judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the
pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or the witnesses in the affidavits that
they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition.
• In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties
filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court
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directed it to file the motion for summary judgment. It insisted that the case involved a genuine
issue of fact. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in
rendering summary judgment.
LOY, JR. v. SMCEU-PTGWO

G.R. No. 164886 | 24 November 2009
DOCTRINE: There can be no summary judgment where questions of facts are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.
FACTS:
• Loy and other petitioners filed a Complaint with Application for Preliminary Attachment for the
collection of unpaid attorney’s fees for the legal services they rendered to San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union amounting to at least 3 million pesos based in the Union’s Board Resolution
which defines the terms of paying Loy’s attorney’s fees.
• Later on, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties which reduced the amount of
attorney’s fees to 1.5 million.
• With this, Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Loy on the ground that there was a judicial
admission that legal services were indeed rendered that resulted benefits enjoyed by the workers
of the Union in 1992- 1995 CBA
• However, the Union opposed the Motion and argued that it only admitted the allegation in the
complaint insofar as the benefits enjoyed by the workers in the 1992-1995 CBA are concerned BUT
NOT the legal services allegedly rendered by Loy
• RTC: Granted the Motion for Summary Judgment
• CA: Reversed RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is ripe for summary judgment
HELD: No, the case is not ripe for summary judgment because the determination of the amount of
reasonable attorney’s fees requires presentation of evidence and a full- blown trial.
• AS A RULE:, rendition of summary judgment is allowed if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admission on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
• IN THIS CASE: In fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum merit, the determination of the importance of subject matter in controversy, extent of
services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer REQUIRE FULL- BLOWN TRIAL
where the party can adduce evidence to establish the right to lawful attorney’s fees.
GUBAT v. NAPOCOR
G.R. No. 167415 | 26 February 2010
DOCTRINE: Petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
• Plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat separately filed civil suits for
damages against the NPC and were represented by Atty. Mandangan and Atty. Gubat whose
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services were engaged at an agreed attorneys fees of P30,000.00 for each case and P600.00 for every
appearance.
• RTC rendered it’s decision in favor of the complainant.
• During NPC’s appeal however, Atty. Gubat filed an Entry and Notice of Charging Liento impose
his attorneys lien of P30,000.00 and appearance fees of P2,000.00 on each of the three civil cases he
handled, totalling P96,000.00.
• NPC moved to dismiss the appeal alleging that the parties have arrived at a settlement.
• Atty. Gubat filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his attorneys fees alleging that the
compromise agreement was made in bad faith to unjustly deprived him of his attorney’s fees .
• The trial court issued an order granting summary judgment and ordered NPC together with the
original complainants solidarily pay Atty. Gubat. Motion for reconsideration of the NPC was
denied
• NPC moved for certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo for
granting petitioners Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
• Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied. Hence
this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gubat’s resort to summary judgment is proper.

1. Whether or not petitioner’s resort to Rule 65 is proper
HELD: No, Atty. Gubat’s resort to summary judgment is not proper. A summary judgment is allowed
only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as to the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions and admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
• Atty. Gubat is not entitled to an immediate relief as a matter of law for the existence of bad faith is
a genuine issue to be tried.
• Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact and is
evidentiary. Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence,
and this necessitates an examination of the evidence of all the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s resort to Rule 65 is proper
HELD: No, the petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal. Petition for certiorari is available only when
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case,
the remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not only available but
also the proper mode of appeal.
HEIRS OF BIHAG v. HEIRS OF BATHAN

G.R. No. 181949 |23 April 2014
Post-Judgment Remedies
DOCTRINE: An aggrieved party is allowed a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order
denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC
FACTS:
• Petitioners alleged that Primitiva Bathan borrowed money from Francisco Bihag but since the latter
had no money at that time, Francisco mortgaged the subject property so that Primitiva may apply for
a loan.
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• Francisco died and petitioners asked for the return of the documents of the property. To no avail, the
petitioners discovered that respondents took possession of the land, prompting them to file a TRO.
• On March 20, 2006, RTC ruled in favor of respondents and dismissed the case. Petitioners filed an MR
but same was denied in its Aug. 11, 2006 Order
• Petitioners then filed a Notice of Appeal but was denied by the RTC, in its Jan 5, 2007 Order, on the
ground that:
o Petitioners received a copy of the March 20, 2006 decision on April 20, 2006 and filed an MR
on April 28, 2006 after the lapse of 8 days
o Petitioners received a copy of the Order denying their MR on Sept 22, 2006 and filed the
Notice of Appeal on Oct 2, 2006 after the lapse of 10 days
o Thus, RTC held that the Notice of Appeal was filed after 18 days or after the lapse of the 15
day reglementary period
ISSUE: Whether the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period
HELD: No, an aggrieved party is allowed a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order
denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to file the notice of appeal in
the RTC.
• However, while the Notice of Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC, the instant Petition must be
denied for the Order denying the Notice of Appeal has attained finality.
• A decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a
reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action
or proceeding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAMBOKU PEAK

G.R. No. 169745| 18 July 2014
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who participated
in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari.
FACTS:
• PALCEA-SUPER filed a Petition for direct certification election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to
represent the rank-and-file employees of Namboku, Inc.
• Namboku claimed that the members of the PALCEA-SUPER are only project employees. Hence, they
(PACLEA-SUPER) cannot represent Namboku’s regular rank-and-file employees.
• The Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of PALCEA-SUPER that they are regular employees
• Namboku appealed the Med-Arbiter’s Order to the Secretary of the Labor, maintaining that the
members of PALCEA-SUPER are mere project employees. Also, It contended that Sec 17, Rule VIII of
D.O. No. 40-03 is unconstitutional as it runs counter to Art 259 of the Labor Code.
• The Secretary of Labor affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s decision and rejected that D.O. No. 40-03 is
unconstitutional
• Namboku appealed Sec. of Labor’s decisions to CA
• CA granted Nomboku’s petition. It ruled that PACLEA-SUPER are project employees, hence, are not
similarly situated with the company’s regular rank-and-file employees; and nullified Sec 17, Rule VIII
of D.O. No. 40-03
• The Secretary of Labor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has locus standi to file the present petition
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HELD: No, under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who participated
in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari. A real party-in-interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avail of the suit.
• In this case, the Secretary of Labor was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as
a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of
jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real party-in-interest or vest her with authority to appeal the
Decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling.
• The real-parties-in-interest in this case is PACLEA-SUPER and it would have been its duty to appear
and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor for it is the one who is interested that the same be
sustained.
LAO v. SPECIAL PLANS INC

G.R. No. 164791 | 29 June 2010
DOCTRINE: Litigants should give the necessary assistance to their counsel and exercise due diligence to
monitor the status of the case for what is at stake is their interest in the case.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Selwyn Lao and Edgar Manansala entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent
Special Plans Inc. (SPI) over SPI’s building in Quezon City
• SPI sent a Demand Letter to the petitioners asking for full payment of rentals in arrears.
• Receiving no payment, SPI filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with the MeTC-QC, claiming that
petitioners have accumulated unpaid rentals
• Petitioners filed their Verified Answer claiming that they were constrained to incur expenses for
necessary repairs and for the repair of structural defects, which SPI refused to reimburse.
• MeTC ruled in favor of petitioners finding SPI solely responsible for repairing of structural defects
of the leased premises
• SPI appealed before the RTC QC and both parties submitted their memoranda.
• Thereafter, SPI’s counsel filed his Withdrawal of Appearance with the conformity of SPI, through
its Vice President Antonio San Mateo.
• RTC granted the Withdrawal of Appearance and ordered that all notices, orders and other court
processes in the case be forwarded to SPI at its address at 354 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
• SPI now prays that petitioners be ordered to pay 3% interest monthly as stipulated in the Contract
of Lease, arguing that it was not able to appeal the RTC and CA decision because it never received
said Decisions, considering that its counsel has migrated to another country
ISSUE: Whether or not SPI can still avail of affirmative reliefs
HELD: No, a party who has not appealed from a Decision cannot seek any relief other than what is
provided in the judgment appealed from.
• In this case, SPI did not appeal, thus it cannot obtain from CA any affirmative relief other than
those granted in the Decision of the court below
• SPI’s counsel, with the concurrence of its Vice President, withdrew his appearance, which the RTC
granted.
o The case was decided by the RTC and appealed by the petitioners to the CA. In due time,
CA rendered judgment on the same and petitioners filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
o SPI did not interpose an appeal from the RTC Decision nor from the CA Decision
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SPS. GUIDANGEN v. WOODEN

G.R. No. 174445 | 15 February 2012
DOCTRINE: The trial court’s findings of fact are accorded with highest respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there are strong and compelling reasons to do so.
FACTS:
• Respondent Wooden filed a complaint to compel petitioners spouses Guidangen to execute a
registrable document of conveyance of a house located at the PNP. She also sought to restrain the
spouses from entering and taking physical possession thereof.
• Wooden alleged that her husband, Nestor, was a member of the PNP and who bought the said
house from the spouses for a sum of money as evidence by a private document. Such document,
however, was taken by the spouses along with some other documents.
• The spouses Guidangen denied having sold the house to the spouses Wooden or having executed
a private document relative to its sale. They alleged that they built the old house and lived there
until 1988 after which they transferred to their new house. Since their transfer, they allowed Nestor
to live in the old house free of rent, and even entrusted to the couple the collection of rents from
tenants in the ground floor to defray the expenses for the maintenance of said house.
• The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Wooden was not able to prove the sale of the old
house with preponderance of evidence which would justify the court to compel the spouses
Guidangen to execute the documents of sale or conveyance.
• The CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly reversed the RTC?
HELD: No, it is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court’s findings of facts with the highest respect
and not to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons to do so. The reason
for this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters than appellate
courts. They are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of their
testimonies, but also by their demeanor on the stand.
• The RTC correctly found that Wooden failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
and in fact, merely relied on mere accusations and not on facts in making her claim against the
spouses Guidangen. As such, the sale and ownership of the subject property was not established
so as to warrant the execution of documents for the sale or conveyance of the property.
FERRER v. CARGANILLO
G.R. No. 170956 | 12 May 2010
DOCTRINE: Failure to indicate the full name of the appealing party as petitioner renders the case
dismissible.
FACTS:
• The petition involves 4 cases filed by petitioner Ferrer alleging the she is the owner of a lot in
Pangasinan, portions thereof are being tenanted by different respondents.
• (Third case is the only one with civpro issue)
• Felisa filed an ejectment case against Marcelina Solis. She contends:
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oThe tenant of the landholding, Pedro Solis, died in 1997 and survived by his wife,
Marcelina, who took over the cultivation of the 14,000 sq m landholding without her
knowledge and consent.
o During the lifetime of Pedro, he failed to pay lease rentals for 3 consecutive years. (1995-
1997)
• The third case is the only case wherein Felisa is not the owner of the parcel of land in question.
Although Felisa claims that she is the owner, PARAD records show that she is merely a
representative of the landowners.
• PARAD dismissed the case for lack of merit. Upon appeal, DARAB merely affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition should be dismissed for failure to state the full name of the appealing party
(the landowners) as petitioner?
HELD: Yes, section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among others, with
the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Section 4 of the same rule mandates, among others, that the petition should state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner.
• In this case, Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in the parties portion of the petition that she
is the landowner. Even in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, Felisa attested
that she is the petitioner in the instant case. However, it appears in the PARAD records that the
owners of the subject 14,000-square meter agricultural land are Rosa R. Pajarito, Elvira A. Madolora
and Anastacia F. Lagado. Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to
the first case against Marcelina.
NICOLAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 186107 | 20 April 2016
DOCTRINE: Basic is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
FACTS:
• Narcisa Nicolas, among 3 accused-persons (Cacho, Espiritu and Cagadas), were charged with the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents based on Ralph Adorable’s (Ralph)
Complaint-Affidavit.
o 3 Accused sold a land in Paranaque City to Sps Adorable and after having been paid,
Nicolas et al mortgaged the same land to a certain Emilio and Magdalena Marquez by
signing the names of the spouses as mortgagors in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and
Deed of Absolute Sale. Sps Adorable contended that it was impossible for them to have
signed the contract because they were both in Belgium at the time of mortgage.
o The payment with respect to the land was used by Nicolas et al to their own personal use
to the damage and prejudice of Sps Adorable in the amount of PHP644,600.00.
• Prosecution presented Ralph and his brother, Abel Adorable (Abel) which testimonies proved the
following: (1) sale transaction that had happened between Ralph and Nicolas; (2) execution of Deed
of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) under Ralph’s name; (3) the taking of the
original copy of the TCT issued under Ralph’s name by Nicolas; (4) the transfer of the TCT in
Ralph’s name to to the names of the 3 accused-persons herein, made by Nicolas herself.
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oIn fact, Nicolas apologized after having been confronted by Ralph when he returned from
Belgium and he was offered by Nicolas for a swap of a 300-meter lot in Greenheights
Subdivision for the sold lot; which did not even materialize.
o Ralph made several demands to return the title but to no avail.
• In defense, Nicolas denied the forgery and claimed that it was Ralph’s brother who mortgaged the
same to Spouses Marquez and later on sold the same to Cacho, Espiritu and Cagadas.
• RTC ruled in favor of Ralph and gave credence to the testimonies of Ralph and Abel. Convicted
Nicolas and acquitted Cacho, Espiritu and Cagadas.
• CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modification as to the amount of damages awarded.
o Nicolas raised issues concerning factual issues such as the sufficiency of evidence presented
by the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt and whether the CA
reviewed the evidence beyond what the trial court has done.
ISSUE: Whether Nicolas’ Petition for Review on Certiorari can prosper.
HELD: No, the issues raised by Nicolas were all questions of fact, thus it is not reviewable under Rule 45
petition. Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, the findings of fact of the appellate court
being conclusive.
HEIRS OF MIRANDA v. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 179638| 8 July2013
DOCTRINE: A decision for revival of a judgment is appealable but cannot modify, alter, or reverse the
original judgment, which is already final and executory.
FACTS:
• Petitioners representing themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda,
the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, and the spouses Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo.
• RTC rendered a Decision on August 30, 1999 upholding the validity of the tile. There was no appeal
hence the Decision became final and executory.RTC issued a Writ of Execution which was however
not implemented.
• Respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and Demolition
Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years
have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied this.
• Prompting respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment. The RTC rendered
a decision granting this.
• Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal through LBC which was opposed by respondent on the ground
that the Decision has long become final and executory.RTC later denied the Notice of Appeal.
• Thus, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA. The CA however denied the Petition
for Mandamus on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
• The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied, thus this recourse with petitioners asserting
that an action to revive judgment is appealable and that their appeal was perfected on time
ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed; (2) Whether an action for revival of
judgment is appealable
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HELD: Yes, notice of Appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case,
the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice
of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. It is established jurisprudence
that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the
date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing
of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by
the court on the 16th day. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for revival of judgment is appealable
HELD: Yes, an action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action itmay be filed either in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or
in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.A party
aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only
insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. In this case, petitioners assail the Decision dated
August 30, 1999, which is the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent.
Considering that the said Decision had already attained finality, petitioners may no longer question its
correctness.
MANGUARDIA v. VALLES
G.R. No. 177616 | 27 August 2014
DOCTRINE: Findings of fact of the RTC and CA may be set aside by SC when they are not supported by
the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts.
FACTS:
• This case is a dispute over Lot 835, owned by Simplicio and Marta Valles. They have siblings who are
Melquiades, Rustico, Visitacion and Catalina.
o When Marta died, she was survived by her illegitimate daughter, Encarnacion.
o When Simplicio also died, he was survived by his wife Villarica (passed away also), and
children, Felicisimo, Adelaida, Rosario, Juan, and Dominica.
o All of Simplicio's children died single and childless except Felicisimo who was survived by his
wife, Presentacion, and his children Graciano, Sulpicio, Teresita and Antonio (now deceased).
• Simplicio and Marta executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot in favor of Melquiades and
Rustico (brothers), Adelaida (Simplicio’s daughter) and Encarnacion (Marta’s daughter). [Felicismo not
included]
• After registration to their name, the new owners, in an agreement, subdivided Lot 835 into 4 lots (A, B,
C, and D).
• The heirs of Felicisimo filed for nullity of the titles and for damages in RTC, alleging that the Deed of
Absolute Sale is a forgery because Marta and Simplicio were long dead when the said document was
executed. Thus, all titles emanating therefrom are all null and void.
• The heirs of Sps. Manguardia contended that their predecessors-in-interest were innocent purchasers
in good faith, acquiring Lots 835-B and 835-C from their registered owners and occupants, Pedro and
Soledad.
o also averred that titles are registered and that actual possession spanned a period of over 30
years known to the respondents without any complaint or opposition, hence claim is barred
by prescription, estoppel and laches.
54
• The heirs of Leonardo and Rebecca (except Antonio Araza), heirs of Vargas, as well as Antonio Araza
raised the same averments
• RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale as null and void. There was no proof that the vendors, Marta
and Simplicio, were still alive in 1968 and had signed/thumb marked the sale document.
Consequently, the RTC also declared the series of documents of sale, including the Subdivision
Agreements and the corresponding Torrens titles issued subsequent to OCT, as null and void.
• CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Hence, Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised by the petitioners (determination of whether petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith) is a factual issue generally outside the scope of the
Supreme Court’s power in a petition for review on certiorari.
HELD: No, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by SC. The Court’s "role in a petition under Rule 45 is
limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court." This rule,
however, has exceptions. "Findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when such
findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a
misapprehension of facts." Considering the contention of petitioners that misinterpretation of facts was
committed, SC reviewed the facts of the case at hand.
JOSE v. NOVIDA
G.R. No.177374|2 July 2014
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The SC is not a trier of
facts.
FACTS:
• Petitioners, heirs of Felicisimo Jose, filed with DAR Region 1 a Petition for Reinvestigation and
Cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) against the respondents, and prayed that the respondent’s
EPs be cancelled and that new EPs be issued to them
o DAR Region 1 ruled in favor of petitioners Jose, that they have a better right over the subject
land and that EPs be generated in their favor
• Respondents Novida filed with DARAB Urdaneta a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioners Jose and prayed that they be placed in peaceful possession, cultivation and
enjoyment of the land
o DARAB Urdaneta ruled in favor of Novida as Felicisimo Jose voluntarily surrendered and
abandoned the subject property in favor of his creditors, migrated to USA and became a
naturalized American citizen
• Meanwhile, the DAR Secretary affirmed DAR Region 1’s Order
o Upon MR of Novida, the DAR Secretary remanded the case to DARAB
o DARAB QC affirmed DARAB Urdaneta’s decision
• CA affirmed DARAB QC’s decision
•
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioners may ask the SC to review the CA’s findings via Rule 45
HELD: No, a petition for review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only. The jurisdiction of the SC in
cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law.
55
• A review of the instant petition under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
• The SC is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not the SC’s function to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again.
• Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded
great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made
from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of
stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
ANGELES v. BUCAD
G.R. No. 196249| 21 July 2014
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of SC in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Factual issues are beyond the scope of this
Court’s authority to review on certiorari.
FACTS:
• Bucad and his co-employees filed a complaint against Angeles, their employer, for Illegal Dismissal
and for Money Claims.
• The Labor Arbiter ruled in Bucad’s favor.
• Angeles appealed to the NLRC to refute the charges against her but was dismissed by the latter for
failing to submit sufficient evidence to reverse LA’s findings.
• CA affirmed NLRC’s decision that no proof was submitted that respondent Ducusin, one of the
employees who Angeles claimed hatched the plan to harass them through the filing of labor complaints
– abandoned his employment.
• Petitioner, via a petition for Certiorari, asked the SC to reevaluate the evidence and issues of fact
relating to the dismissal of their employees – respondent Ducusin particularly
ISSUE: Whether the SC may reevaluate the evidence regarding Ducusin’s dismissal
HELD: No, the Court is not a trier of facts. The jurisdiction of the SC in cases brought before it from the CA
via Certiorari is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. In the exercise of its power of review, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not the SC’s function to analyze
or weigh evidence all over again.
• Moreover, factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest
of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
ALMENDRAS v. SOUTH DAVAO DEV’T CORP INC

G.R. No. 198209 | 22 March 2017
DOCTRINE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 are for questions of law or errors of judgment while a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
56
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed the present case to annul the deed of sale executed by respondents
• Respondent filed a Request for Admission against petitioner alleging that petitioner did not oppose
or appealed the inclusion of his property in the sale that was approved by the guardianship court
• Petitioner failed to file a sworn statement regarding his reasons as to why he cannot either deny or
admit the said matter
• Respondent then filed a motion for Summary Judgment
• Petitioner opposed the said motion claiming that:
o He was never personally served a copy of the Request for Admission;
o Respondents failed to comply with Sec 5, Rule 15 on the notice of hearing.
• The RTC ruled in favor of respondents stating that petitioner was served a copy and that
respondents complied with the notice of hearing
• Petitioner filed for a petition for review under Rule 45 directly to the SC alleging once again his
arguments before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review is the proper remedy for petitioner
HELD: No, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to questions of law or
errors of judgment. Whether or not petitioner received a copy of the motion on March 24, 2010 is a factual
issue and such is not within the ambit of a petition for review. The test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. The proper petition would have been a petition
for cetiorari under Rule 65.
ROM v. ROXAS & CO.

G.R. No. 169331|5 September 2011
DOCTRINE: When a court, tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.
FACTS:
• Roxas & Co. sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land from the coverage of Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) claiming that these were already classified by a valid zoning
ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, and which ordinance was approved prior
to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted the Application for Exemption.
• Petitioners, as the farmer-beneficiaries of the land filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that
the application for exemption is already barred by laches or estoppel considering that Certificates
of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) have been issued to them way back. The DAR dismissed the
case.
• A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA but was dismissed for being an improper remedy.
It ruled that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Sec. 1, Rule 43 of Rules of
Court.
• Petitioners insist that a certiorari petition, instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, is the proper remedy since what they principally questioned before the CA was the
jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of the application. Furthermore, that even assuming
57
that a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal, they can still resort to the remedy of
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the remedy
of appeal is not available in this case?
HELD: No, petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of appeal. Sec. 6150 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates
that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules further direct
that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
DAR Secretary.
• Petitioners’ assertion that a certiorari petition is the proper remedy since what they principally
questioned was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of respondent’s application is
incorrect. It is the law which confers upon the DAR the jurisdiction over applications for
exemption. The submission of proof of payment of disturbance compensation (which was
petitioner’s basis) is not jurisdictional as to deprive the DAR of the power to act on an application
for exemption.
BOARDWALK BUSINESS v. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. 181182| 10 April 2013
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
FACTS:
• Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing domestic
corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW) merchandise. Villareal is one of
Boardwalk’s distributors of RTW merchandise.
o Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint for replevin with MeTC of Manila against
Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the Villareal's alleged failure to pay a
car loan obtained from the former.
• The MeTC rendered its decision favoring Boardwalk.
• Villareal appealed to the RTC which reversed the ruling of the METC
o Boardwalk filed an MR but it was denied. Boardwalk filed a MOTEX to file a petition for
review and praying that it be granted 30 days. It paid the docket fees with RTC of Manila.
Boardwalk also filed a notice of appeal with same RTC but the court denied for being
wrong mode of appeal.
• The CA dismissed outright Boardwalks's petition for review. It ruled that Boardwalk erred in filing
its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC. It should have paid with the CA
as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk’s
erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it ruled that there was as if no Motion for Extension
was filed, and the filing of its Petition with the appellate court was late and beyond the
reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42.
o CA added that Boardwalk’s prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was
irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 days should only be granted for the most
compelling reason which Boardwalk was not able to show in its petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing Boardwalk's petition for review
58
HELD: Yes, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In this case,
Boardwalk failed to strictly comply with the Rules. First, Boardwalk filed its petition beyond the
reglementary period. Second, it also failed to accompany the petition with the a verification and a
Certification against forum shopping. Third, Boardwalk also erroneously paid the docket fees with the
RTC. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 42 of the ROC, the payment should have been made to the clerk of court of the
CA. Since Boardwalk paid the docket fees to the wrong court, its appeal is not deemed perfected. And
lastly, Boardwalk's sought of an extension of 30 days to file the Petition for Review which contravenes the
Rules. Under Rule 42, it only allows an extension of 15 days for compelling reasons. Neither it showed that
there is a compelling reason to extend the filing of the petition for review.
MARAVILLA v. RIOS
G.R. No. 196875 | 19 August 2015
DOCTRINE: A petition for review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition
FACTS:
• Joseph RIOS filed criminal case against Teddy MARAVILLA for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries. Maravilla was driving his jeep when he collided to the motorcycle Rios
was driving which then resulted to Rios being injured and incapacitated for 90 days.
• MTCC absolved Maravilla of criminal liability but held him civilly liable (pay temperate damages)
• Rios appealed to RTC, which modified the decision: deleted the temperate damages but made
Maravilla liable for actual and compensatory damages. No award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
• Maravilla filed a PETITION FOR REVIEW before the CA but was dismissed.
o CA denied his petition because he was not able to attach a copy of the information filed
before the MTCC, RTC and their respective briefs and other pieces of evidence and
documents, which are necessary for a better understanding and resolution of the instant
petition and he failed to incorporate a written explanation why the preferred personal
mode of filing under Section 11, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, was not availed of.
o Maravilla claimed a liberal application of procedural laws and filed a motion for
reconsideration with attachments of certain portions of the lower court records of the case.
o CA still denied his motion because it is still lacking as Maravilla failed to attach the
pertinent records that will support his defense against Rios (i.e. excerpts of the transcript
of stenographic notes, the respondent's formal offer of evidence, and the trial court's Order
admitting said formal offer of evidence)
ISSUE: Whether Maravilla’s Petition for Review was correctly dismissed due to technicalities.
HELD: Yes, under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review
shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the requirements regarding the contents of and the documents, which should
accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
• Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached in the petition. Only those,
which are relevant and can support the material allegations in the petition and those that will make
59
out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion shall be attached. Also, if in such a case that the
relevant records can be found in another document which is already attached in the current
petition, it need not be attached since now the SC can view such, it being a part of the petition.
Furthermore, if in such a case of dismissal, petitioner can still cure the defect by immediately
submitting the same or if the Court finds that the reinstatement shall serve the higher interest of
justice, the case shall be decided on the merits.
ROVIRA v. HEIRS OF DELESTE

G.R. No. 160825 | 26 March 2010
DOCTRINE:
• In the cases not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary to perfect
the appeal.
FACTS:
• This case originated from suit for recovery of ownership and possession of land wherein Dr.
Deleste was a party to.
• Herein petitioner Atty. Rovira filed as an incident to the said case a motion to resolve his claim for
attorney's fees for services rendered to Dr. Deleste. The respondents filed their opposition to the
said motion.
• RTC:
o Awarded Atty. Rovira his attorney’s fees
o Respondents filed their opposition and the RTC granted their notice of appeal, ordering
that the order be transmitted to the CA.
o Atty. Rovira filed an MR alleging that the notice of appeal failed to comply with the
requirements hence RTC set aside its order and dismissed the appeal of the defendants.
o Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied, hence filing a petition
for certiorari with the CA.
• CA found the trial court to have committed grave abuse of discretion as it was already divested of
jurisdiction over the case when the respondent’s appeal was perfected
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents perfected their appeal and thereby divested the trial court of
jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees
HELD: Yes, the respondents perfected their appeal by the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and the
time to appeal of petitioner having expired, the CA correctly found that the trial court had already lost
jurisdiction over the case
• Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. In such a
case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the
case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining
within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
• In the case at bar the main case handled by petitioner lawyer has already been decided with finality
up to the appeal stage and is already in the execution stage. The trial court has also already resolved
the incident of attorney's fees. Hence, there is no reason why the original records of the case must
remain with the trial court.
• The respondents did not strictly follow Rule 13, Sec. 11 on priorities on modes of service but since
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and
60
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be avoided.
TFS, INC.v. CIR

G.R. No. 166829 | 19 April 2010
DOCTRINE: Although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an appeal is indispensable to prevent
delays, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage
may nevertheless warrant the suspension of the rules.
FACTS:
• Petitioner TFS, Inc., engaged in the pawnshop business, received a Preliminary Assessment Notice
for deficiency VAT and EWT. Petitioner insisted that there was no basis for the issuance of PAN.
However, CIR informed petitioner that a Final Assessment Notice was issued.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
o During trial, petitioner offered to compromise for deficiency EWT so petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw to appeal on the deficiency EWT, leaving only the issue of VAT be
threshed out.
• April 29, 2004, CTA upheld the assessment of the CIR representing deficiency VAT. MR denied.
• August 16, 2004, petitioner filed before the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review.
• August 24, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA but was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
• September 16, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc but was dismissed
for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not CTA En Banc strictly applied the technical rules of procedure to the detriment of
justice?
HELD: Yes, procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.
• An appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory. However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict
application of the rules for perfecting an appeal.
• Although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an appeal is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage
may nevertheless warrant the suspension of the rules.
• In the instant case, we are constrained to disregard procedural rules because we cannot in
conscience allow the government to collect deficiency VAT from petitioner considering that the
government has no right at all to collect or to receive the same. Besides, dismissing this case on a
mere technicality would lead to the unjust enrichment of the government at the expense of
petitioner, which we cannot permit. Technicalities should never be used as a shield to perpetrate
or commit an injustice
GO v. SUNBANUN
G.R. No. 168240 | 9 February 2011
61
DOCTRINE: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
FACTS:
• Respondents Sunbanun filed a suit for damages against Aurora Go, her husband Yiu Wai Sang,
and Yiu-Go Employment Agency, claiming that the spouses Aurora and Sang occupied a portion
of their house in Cebu under a one-year lease contract and had used the premises as the business
office of Yiu-Go Employment Agency. This allegedly increased the risk of loss by fire, and thus
constituted a breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the Sunbanuns made.
• In her Answer, Aurora averred that the leased floor was used as a private residence and denied
that their employment agency held office there. She also argued that she had no knowledge of the
existence of the insurance contract, and that whether the house was used as a business office or as
a private residence was immaterial as there was no increased risk of fire either way.
• The RTC found only Aurora liable and ordered her to pay the damages, costs and other fees.
Aurora filed her motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
• Aurora’s counsel filed a motion for extension of 15 days within which to file Aurora’s notice of
appeal, explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was
running for mayor in Leyte.
• Her counsel thereafter filed the said notice of appeal, which was denied by the RTC. It held that
since the motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal is denied for lack of merit, the
notice of appeal is considered to have been filed out of time.
• A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA, and which was dismissed for being procedurally
flawed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for extension to file the notice of appeal was correctly denied?
HELD: Yes, the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are relaxed
only in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations.
• In the case at bar, the motion for extension was correctly denied as the reason for such extension
was not per se, a compelling and a highly exceptional one. It is the responsibility of the client to
make herself available to her counsel even during the election period, hence, this does not warrant
the extension of the period provided by the Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of appeal was correctly denied?
HELD: No, the notice of appeal was timely filed due to the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in the
case of Neypes v. CA.
• The Court in Neypes ruled that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal
after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC.
• As a rule, procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Neypes, which was
rendered in September 2005, shall be applied to the present case and thus, Aurora is entitled to
benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules.
• The denial of Aurora’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision which found her liable was
received by her on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the
fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus,
had timely filed such notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.
BARANGAY DASMARINAS v. CREATIVE PLAY CORNER SCHOOL

G.R. No. 169942 | 24 January 2011
62
DOCTRINE: A second motion for extension for filing a petition for review will only be granted if there are
compelling reasons present in the case.
FACTS:
• On June 28, 2004, petitioner Barangay Dasmariñas, through Legaspi, filed a Complaint-Affidavit
before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati, charging Creative Play Corner School (CPC) and its
alleged owners, herein respondents, with Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents.
• Respondents denied the allegations and averred that there was no proof for the commission of the
crime.
• Assistant City Prosecutor Esguerra-Ochoa recommended the dismissal of the case for failure to
establish probable cause. The DOJ likewise dismissed the Petition for Review.
• Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.
• Before the petitioner was able to file its petition before the CA, it first sought for an extension of
time of fifteen (15) days from May 13, 2005 or until May 28, 2005 within which to file the same due
to counsel’s heavy workload.
• The CA granted the extension in a Resolution. Subsequently, petitioner asked for another extension
of five (5) days from May 28, 2005 or until June 2, 2005 for the same reason given in its first motion
for extension.
• However, petitioner filed the petition by mail only on June 7, 2005. Because of this, the CA denied
the Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review.
• Petitioner avers that the second extension was due to the sudden death in the family of the handling
lawyer. Thus, petitioner argued that when the petition was filed on June 7, 2005, it is still within
the period of extension prayed for in said final motion for extension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is entitled to a second extension?
HELD: No, the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to
file a petition for review, may only grant a further extension when presented with the most compelling
reason. However, the same is limited only to a period of another fifteen (15) days.
• The CA was justified in denying the Second Motion for Extension as the reason relied upon by the
petitioner was not compelling.
• The ratiocination of the CA, which was affirmed by the SC, are as follows:
o While Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court allows it a great leeway in the exercise of
discretion in granting an additional period of fifteen (15) days for filing a petition for
review, said Rules limit such discretion in the grant of a second extension only to the most
compelling reasons presented by the movant.
o The reason given by petitioner for the extension sought in its first and second motions for
extension, i.e. pressure and large volume of work of counsel, is, as held by jurisprudence, is not
an excuse for filing a petition out of time.
o As for the last extension, a third extension is not authorized by the Rules of Court.
o No details as to the degree of relationship between the counsel and the deceased was given
for the court to determine whether such reason is indeed compelling.
ARAULLO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 194169| 4 December 2013
63
DOCTRINE: Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
• This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal case with a prayer for salaries, benefits, and damages
filed by Araullo against Club Filipino. It then became final and executory after it was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
• The labor case was remanded to the NLRC for computation of petitioner’s actual entitlements.
Labor Arbiter Panganiban directed the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit to compute the
liabilities of Club Filipino.Arbiter Panganiban then issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself.
• The labor case was raffled toLabor Arbiter Anni. Petitioner then filed a 4 th Ex-Parte Manifestation
with Very Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Execution.Because of this,Club Filipino thus filed
a Motion to Recompute.
• Arbiter Anni issued a Writ of Execution as computed by the NLRC Computation and Examination
Unit. Club Filipino moved to quash the Writ of Execution claiming that Arbiter Anni improvidently
issued the writ without the required order approving the computation and without giving notice
of such approval to the parties.
• Arbiter Anniquashed the Writ of Execution through an order and enjoined the sheriff from
conducting further execution. Later, an order voluntarily inhibiting himself was issued.
• Petitioner filed with the NLRC petition to set aside the order quashing the Writ of
Execution.However, this was denied for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint with the
Ombudsman against public respondents for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
• The Ombudsman denied this and held that the quashing of the Writ of Execution was done to
correct an error in the proceedings in the labor case as there were pending motions and incidents
that remained unresolved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order quashing the writ of execution was valid
HELD: Yes, during execution proceedings, errors may be committed such that the rights of a party may be
prejudiced, in which case corrective measures are called for.When the writ was issued, there was as yet no
order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was
a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. Since it was issued in contravention
of the law, it is irregular and defective, and there was no need to hear Club Filipino’s motion to quash. A
void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. It is not necessary
to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order as it may simply be ignored.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner availed of the wrong remedy
HELD: Yes, after the decision of the Ombudsman, petitioner went directly to this Court via this Petition
for Certiorari. This is not allowed. It is settled jurisprudence that appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
SANTOS v. LITTON MILLS INC.

G.R. No. 170646|22 June 2011
DOCTRINE: Rules of procedure should be relaxed when there is substantial and subsequent compliance.
64
FACTS:
• Santos was hired as a clerk by respondent Litton Mills.
• The Personnel manager of Litton Mills directed Santos to explain in writing why no disciplinary
action should be imposed on her after having been caught engaging in an unauthorized
arrangement with a waste buyer. Santos merely denied the accusation.
• A criminal complaint for robbery/extortion was lodged against Santos. Pending the administrative
investigation, she received a Letter of Termination from Litton Mills for obtaining or accepting
money as a result of an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer, an act considered as
affecting company interests.
• Santos filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against Litton Mills.
• The Labor Arbiter and NLRC dismissed the complaint after finding that there was just cause for
dismissal. The CA likewise dismissed the petition on the following grounds:
o Santos failed to indicate the actual addresses of the parties but mentioned that the parties
may be served through their respective counsels whose addresses were clearly specified;
and
o Santos failed to indicate in her Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping that
there were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing of the complaint.
• Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration explaining that her petition substantially complied
with the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 46 of ROC. Nonetheless, she submitted her faithful compliance
with the Rules by indicating the complete addresses of the parties and of their counsels and
submitting a revised Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not liberality and leniency should be extended to Santos for the minor lapses she
committed so that substantial justice would not be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities?
HELD: Yes, since there was substantial and subsequent compliance in this case, the Court resolved to apply
the liberal construction of the rules if only to secure the greater interest of justice.
• The mention of the parties’ respective counsels’ addresses constitutes substantial compliance with
the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 46 of Rules of Court which provides in part that the petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the parties,
• The Court has time and again relaxed the rigid application of the rules to offer full opportunity for
parties to ventilate their causes and defenses in order to promote rather than frustrate the ends of
justice.
MATHEUS v. MEDEQUISO
G.R. No. 196651| 3 February 2016
DOCTRINE: With respect to certifications against forum-shopping, we have repeatedly held that “non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof. (Section 3 Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
FACTS:
• The Tagbilaran MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents P30,000.
• Petitioner interposed an appeal before the RTC of Bohol. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTCC. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the RTC upheld its judgment.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA however it was dismissed by the court.
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• The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping
was sworn to not before a notary public but before a clerk of court ergo considered as improperly
verified and treated as unsigned and dismissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not clerks of court are at liberty to notarize complaints, answers, petitions, or any other
pleadings on a daily or regular basis.
(2) Whether such action would lead to the dismissal of the case.
HELD: No, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize documents or administer
oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. Clerks of court should
not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to
their official functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not such action would lead to the dismissal of the case
HELD: No, a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA, submitting together with the petition a
certification on non-forum shopping. Under the same Rule, “the failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit
for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany
the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR

G.R. No. 165036 | 5 July 2010
DOCTRINE: The withdrawal of an appeal renders the lower court’s decision final and executory.
FACTS:
• Petitioner is a duly registered corporation engaged in the retail of medicines and other
pharmaceutical products and operates drugstores in Central Luzon under the business name and
style of Mercury Drug.
• Petitioner filed with respondent CIR a request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate.
• A day later, petitioner filed with the CTA a Petition for Review but the latter denied petitioner’s
claim for insufficiency of evidence. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the CTA En Banc a Petition
for Review
• The CTA En Banc resolved to deny due course, and dismissed the Petition for Review for failure
of petitioner to attach a Verification, a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as well as a Special
Power of Attorney and a Secretary’s Certificate, authorizing petitioner’s counsel to file the Petition
for Review.
• Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that the Petition for Review was sufficient in form
because the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was already attached to the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari.
• The CTA En Banc denied reconsideration. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court was filed.
• Instead of filing a reply to the comments, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw, praying that the
case be dismissed without prejudice.
o According to petitioner, the amount of tax credit being claimed for 2002 would just be
included in its future claims for issuance of a tax credit certificate since the said amount
was carried over to its 2003 Income Tax Return (ITR).
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ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA En Banc’s decision was rendered final and executory upon the filing of the
Motion to Withdraw?
HELD: Yes, an appellant who withdraws his appeal must face the consequence of his withdrawal, such as
the decision of the court a quo becoming final and executory.
The dismissal of the instant case should be with prejudice. By withdrawing the appeal, petitioner is
deemed to have accepted the decision of the CTA which denied its request for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. As such, it may no longer included the claimed
amount in future claims.
TEANO v MUNICIPALITY OF NAVOTAS

G.R. No. 168164 | 15 February 2016
DOCTRINE: Annulment of judgement must be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and of lack
of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• Petitioners were registered occupants of lands within a National Housing Authority Industrial
Development Project (NHAIDP) as well as registered owners of a residential improvement in
Navotas.
• The Municipal Treasurer demanded payment of real estate taxes on the properties. The
municipality issued four warrants of levy against Petitioners.
• The RTC denied Petitioners’ TRO to enjoin the enforcement of the warrants of levy through a public
auction.
• Four years after, Petitioners filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgement with the CA bereft of any
particulars. The CA denied because there was no allegation of grounds, material dates, affidavit of
service and position papers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the annulment of judgement.
HELD: Yes, annulment of judgment is an exceptional remedy in equity that may be availed of when
ordinary remedies are unavailable without fault on the part of the petitioner. It must be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud, and of lack of jurisdiction. While the Petition does not need to state
categorically the exact words “extrinsic fraud” or “lack of jurisdiction” as grounds for the annulment of
judgment, still, it is necessary that the allegations should be so crafted to establish the ground on which
the petition is based.
• Extrinsic fraud is "that which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
case to the court, or used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy." On
the other hand, lack of jurisdiction involves the want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the case. The belated claim of petitioners that the RTC
acted without jurisdiction because of its alleged validation of an illegal auction does not qualify as
lack of jurisdiction contemplated as ground for annulment of judgment. the RTC duly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioners when they filed the complaint.
DIONA v. BALANGUE
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G.R. No. 173559| 7 January 2013

DOCTRINE: Under Section 2, Rule 47of the ROC a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction but jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process
as additional ground to annul a judgment..
FACTS:
• Balangue obtained a loan of ₱45,000.00 from Diona payable in six months and secured by a REM
over their property located in Marulas, Valenzuela. When the debt became due, Banlangue failed
to pay despite of the demand. Diona filed with the RTC a complaint praying that Balangue be
ordered to pay the obligation plus an interest of 12% per annum, damages and cost of the suit, and
foreclosure of the REM, if the Balangue failed to pay the obligation.
• The RTC granted the complaint but the court ordered Balangue to pay 5% monthly interest.
• The RTC issued a writ of execution. But since the writ cannot be satisfied, Diona filed a petition of
the foreclosure of REM.
• Balangue filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Balangue
alleged that the parties did not agreed in writing any interest rate and that the court erroneously
ordered the payment of 5% monthy interest.
o The RTC granted the Motion of Balangue and changed the interest from 5% monhtly to
12% per annum.
• Displeased with the decision of the RTC, Diona filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
o The CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding
the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum.
• With the same appellate court, Balangue filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution
Sale with Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5%
monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their
right to due process.
o The CA first dismissed the Petition but upon MR, it granted petition and annuled the RTC's
ruling. The CA ruled that the monthly interest rate of 5% is excessive and was not agreed
upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of
12% per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the
same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly
provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect.
While under the Rules, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul
a judgment.
• In this case, the grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in
the Complaint and is a violation of due process. Courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without
first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require
that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court.
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ANGELES v. CA
G.R. No. 178733 | 15 September 2014
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
DOCTRINE: Trial courts have ‘residual jurisdiction’ at the stage when appeals are perfected or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal.
FACTS:
• Sps. Coronel filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance
and damages in RTC against Elisa Angeles et al. RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Coronel declaring the TCT
null and void, and new ones be issued in favor of the Spouses.
• Angeles et al. filed their Notice of Appeal, while Sps. Coronel moved for execution of the judgment
pending appeal, which RTC denied. Sps. Coronel moved for reconsideration. Angeles et al. appealed
in CA.
• Meanwhile, RTC reconsidered its Order and granted Sps. Coronel’s motion for execution pending
appeal. A Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was thus issued. Angeles was evicted from the subject
property as a result of its enforcement.
• Later on, Angeles filed a Petition for Contempt with the CA against herein Officer-In-Charge Martin,
Deputy Sheriff Astorga, Clerk III Boco, and John Does. It alleged that Martin et al., defied RTC Order
to elevate the records of the case to the CA and acted in collusion with Sps. Coronel to ensure that the
they obtain execution pending appeal; that the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was hastily and
irregularly issued.
• Martin sought the dismissal of the Petition, alleging that she had no authority or control over the
proceedings and the non-transmittal of the records to the CA was not intentional but came as a result
of RTC’s giving due course to the various motions filed by the parties. Astorga and Boco denied the
accusations against them, and without a stay order, they were duty-bound to enforce the orders and
writs of the trial court.
• CA dismissed the Petition for Contempt. Martin et al. were merely implementing the orders issued by
RTC and that no stay order was issued against the enforcement of the subject writ of execution.
• Angeles’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had the authority to grant execution pending appeal and issue the writ
HELD: Yes, Respondent public officers acted faithfully in carrying out the trial court’s directives. If
petitioner doubted these directives arguing that RTC lost jurisdiction over the case when her appeal was
perfected, then she should have questioned them by filing the corresponding appeal or petition in order to
set them aside.
• Also, the issuance and implementation by the individual respondents of the writ of execution pending
appeal is not a contemptible disregard of the CA’s jurisdiction. RTC had the authority to grant
execution pending appeal and issue the writ. The record of case was transmitted to the CA only on
February 27, 2006. Prior to the transmittal of the original record, the trial court may order execution
pending appeal. The ‘residual jurisdiction’ of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.
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NAPOCOR v. TARCELO and HEIRS OF SANTOS

G.R. No. 193650 | 8 October 2014
DOCTRINE: The basis of issuance of Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment should always be
consistent with the previous ruling it is hinged on.
FACTS:
• Respondents are owners of two lots in Batangas City. NAPOCOR sought to expropriate portions of the
said lots for construction of pipeline.
o Batangas RTC ordered condemnation and set just compensation at P1k/sqm
o CA affirmed with modifications the decision – which later on became FINAL and
EXECUTORY and ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT was done.
• Respondents now moved for execution and Writ was ordered (WE). Later, a Notice of Garnishment
(NG) was served on the Manager of Land Bank for satisfaction of just compensation.
o NAPCOR moved to QUASH, claiming that such WE and NG was inconsistent as to the RTC
order in setting amount of just compensation.
o RTC: denied motion. MR also denied and CA also denied appeal.
• Main contention of NAPOCOR was the Sheriff’s computation as reflected in the Notice of Garnishment
is erroneous in that it is being made to pay for more than what was adjudged; just compensation should
be limited to the value of that portion so taken, and not the entire property of which such portion forms
part. It cites cases where the computation and payment of just compensation was limited to the value
of the affected portions only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in holding that WE and NG were consistent with the previous
RTC ruling.
HELD: Yes, as provided in the two recommendation as indicated in the commissioner reports, what was
to be the basis of the just compensation was only the affected areas. Such was the basis of the first RTC
deicision wherein it stated int dispositive portion that only the affected areas shalle be covered as to
computation of just compensation. Thus, the WE and NG had no basis and the CA erred in declaring that
there was no difference between the expopriation proceeding judgment and the basis of the WE and NG.
• It is not declared that NPC should pay for the entire area of respondent’s properties, but rather, pay
the full and fair market value of the property and not merely pay a 10% easement fee. Stated simply,
the NPC should pay for the full per-square meter value of the affected portions, and not just the fraction
thereof.
BPI v. COQUIA
G.R. No. 167518 | 23 March 2011
DOCTRINE: The court may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since a final
and executory judgment can no longer be attacked or modified.
FACTS:
• Respondent Coquia’s stint with BPI lasted for 26 years which commenced in 1972 when he was
assigned as bookkeeper and was thereafter promoted to various positions in different BPI
branches.
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• Respondent alleged that on June 3, 1998, he was instructed to take a vacation leave starting June 4,
1998 on account of an internal audit to be conducted in BPI Dagupan Branch.
• Two days after he returned to work, he was asked to continue his leave of absence until the auditors
shall have concluded their examination.
• Coquia was put under preventive suspension for 30 days due to further investigation of the various
irregularities found to have been committed by him.
• Coquia received a show cause memo directing him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for committing serious offenses/violations of bank policies on the
basis of the internal auditor’s findings. He was also advised in the memo that a hearing will be
held to give him an opportunity to ventilate his side.
• A Notice of Termination was served on Coquia. He then filed a complaint for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against BPI and some of its corporate officers.
• The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding Coquia’s dismissal illegal, and ruling that there was
no factual basis for the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon the latter since, while he may
have involved himself in some irregular transactions, the same nevertheless had redounded to the
benefit of the bank without fraudulent intent on his part.
• The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, ruling that respondent has conducted
unsound banking practice in transgression of Central Bank rules and regulations in authorizing
the encashment of a check instead of sending it first for clearing and in maliciously engaging in
irregular transactions.
• CA sustained the award of separation pay as reinstatement was no longer possible due to the
strained relations between BPI and Coquia.
• On March 4, 2009, the Special Former Eleventh Division of the CA rendered a Decision holding the
dismissal of respondent Coquia as legal since violations of bank policies, rules and regulations,
amount to an abuse of the trust reposed in him by his employer.
o As a result, the NLRC’s award of separation pay and accumulated leave credits were
reversed and set aside. However, the CA, on equitable grounds, still granted respondent
Coquia financial assistance for his 26 years of service to the bank.
• BPI argues that the propriety of the payment of separation pay is the subject matter of an earlier
petition it filed, so that the portion granting such award in favor of respondent Coquia should not
be binding on the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not BPIs prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay is barred
by the principle of res judicata?
HELD: Yes, BPI’s prayer to set aside the award of separation pay is barred by res judicata since the judgment
rendered in the CA case has already become final and executory.
• Res judicata dictates that a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same cause of action since that
judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to
any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been
adjudged therein.
• The elements of res judicata are that (1) the former judgment has attained finality; (2) the court
which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, an identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. All these elements are present in this case.
• As a rule, the courts may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since
a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the Supreme Court.
71
• This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing further can be
done except to execute it. A judgment must be final at some definite time as it is only proper to
allow the case to take its rest on grounds of public policy and sound practice.
• Although there are recognized exceptions to this fundamental principle, such as nunc pro tunc
entries, void judgments and cases which would not cause any prejudice to any party, none of
these exceptions obtain in the case at bench.
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

G.R. No. 168382 | 6 June 2011
DOCTRINE: Once a decision has already been rendered final and executory, it can no longer be altered
and modified.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) is a legitimate labor organization
and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of Respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL).
• ALPAP claims that PAL committed unfair labor practices, which then caused ALPAP to file a
notice of strike against PAL.
• The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and ordered that the strikes and lockouts at PAL be prohibited.
• Despite such Order, ALPAP continued to go on strike. This constrained the DOLE to issue a return-
to-work order on June 7, 1998.
• However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when the ALPAP officers and members reported back to
work. Because of this, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply with
the return-to-work order.
• ALPAP filed a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL and contended that its counsel received a
copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, justifying their non-compliance therewith
until June 26, 1998.
• DOLE Secretary declared the strike conducted by ALPAP illegal and likewise pronounced the loss
of employment status of the officers who participated in the strike.
• ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a Motion requesting the said office to conduct
an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should be
reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in the
strike
• In the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, declaring the strike as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP
officers and members who participated therein to have lost their employment status, an appeal
was taken by ALPAP, which was dismissed by the CA and affirmed by the SC. The Decision
became final and executory on August 29, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision rendered by the DOLE can still be altered?
HELD: No, it is settled in law that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect. Subject to recognized exceptions, the principle
of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as “nothing further can be done except to execute it.”
• In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its
members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike. However, such proceeding would
entail a reopening of a final judgment, which is not permitted by the Court.
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• Although the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the
names of those who actually participated in the strike, such omission cannot prevent the execution
of the judgment rendered. Hence, the petition is denied.
DELA MERCED v. GSIS

G.R. No. 167140 | November 23, 2011
DOCTRINE: Determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last
resort.
FACTS:
• The Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the
mortgaged properties.
• Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners’ predecessor, Dela Merced, filed a complaint praying
for the nullity of the said foreclosure on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of
these lots at the time of the foreclosure.
• The Court nullified GSIS’s foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part
of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses.
• Pursuant to the finality of the Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution, to which GSIS
opposed, citing as basis Sec. 39 of R.A. 8291, which allegedly exempts GSIS’s funds and properties
from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes.
• Petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on the TCT which covers the subject lots.
Subsequently, the TCT was cancelled and new individual titles were issued to Victorino and
Dimaguila, thereby carrying over the annotation of lis pendens to the said individual titles.
o Both titles had the notice of lis pendens which was carried over
o Both Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the litigation involving GSIS’s ownership over
the subject properties, and were bound by the outcome of the litigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS can still raise the issue of exemption?
HELD: No, the issue of GSIS’ alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally decided against GSIS
when this Court denied GSIS’ petition for review. The denial rendered the CA Decision final and executory.
• GSIS’s attempt to resurrect the same issue by interjecting it in this proceeding is barred by the
principle of “law of the case” which states that “determinations of questions of law will generally
be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already
been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort.”
• The Decision allowing the execution of the judgment against GSIS is the “law of the case” and
controls the proceedings which are already in the execution stage.
ISSUE: Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS can be enforced against their successors-in-
interest or holders of derivative titles?
HELD: Yes, when a transferee pendent lite takes property with notice of lis pendens, such transferee
undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation and shall be bound thereby.
• In the present case, the individual titles of the properties had the notice of lis pendens and in effect,
the transferees of the properties had notice of the litigation involving GSIS’s ownership over the
subject properties.
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• The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject
of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
DALANGIN v. PEREZ
G.R. No. 178758 | 3 April2013
Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgment
DOCTRINE: Written notice of the execution sale is required to be given to the judgment debtor via Circular
No. 823 Amending Section 18, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
• Respondents Perez spouses sold to petitioners Dalangin spouses a parcel of land. The latter,
however, failed to pay in full despite demand. Thus, the Perez spouses filed a Complaint against
the petitioners for recovery of a sum of money with the City Court of Batangas. Petitioners failed
to file their Answer hence, they were declared in default and the Perez spouses were allowed to
present their evidence ex parte.
• On June 15, 1971 the City Court of Batangas rendered its Decision finding petitioners liable. No
appeal having been taken, the Decision became final and executory. Pursuant to this, a Writ of
Execution was issued.
o The Provincial Sheriff of Batangas then levied upon and sold the petitioners’ properties at
auction. The execution sale was conducted on March 15, 1972and a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of the Perez spouses.
o For failure to redeem, the sheriff executed a Final Deed of Conveyance and a Writ of
Possession was issued by the City Court. The Perez spouses thus came into possession of
the property. While the Writ of Possession was received by petitioners’ son.
• Twelve years after the City Court’s issuance of the Writ of Possession, petitioners filed a case for
annulment of the sheriff’s sale. Petitioners prayed that the sheriff’s sale, Certificate of Sale and the
Final Deed of Conveyance be nullified and voided for lack of publication and notice of the sheriff’s
sale, and for inadequacy of the purchase price of the subject properties in the amount of ₱4,187.00.
• RTC upheld the validity of the sheriff’s sale. It ruled that while it appears that there was no notice
of sheriff’s sale, petitioners nevertheless received copies of the Writ of Execution and the
subsequent Writ of Possession, which should serve as adequate warning of the continued action.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, this petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not written notice of execution sale shall is required to be given to the judgment
obligor?
HELD: No, at the time of the execution sale on March 15, 1972, the applicable rule is Rule 39, Section 18 of
the 1964 Rules of Court. The foregoing rule does not require written notice to the judgment obligor.
Respondents are thus correct in their argument that at the time of the execution sale, personal notice to the
petitioners was not required under Rule 39, Section 18 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
• Notice to the judgment obligor under the 1964 Rules of Court was not required, or was merely
optional; publication and posting sufficed.It was only in 1987 that the Court required that written
notice of the execution sale be given to the judgment debtor, via Circular No. 823 amending Rule
39, Section 18 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the alleged failure on the part of the respondents to
furnish petitioners with a written notice of the execution sale did not nullify the execution sale.
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PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
GEORGE S. SY v. AUTOBUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS INC.

G.R. No. 176898 | 3 December 2012
Preliminary Injunction
DOCTRINE: The grant or the denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• Respondent Autobus purchased Konvecta air-conditioning units with petitioner’s company.
However, it was agreed that the latter will finance the acquisition of 22 units of bus engine and
chassis from the company CMC and 22 bus deluxe bodies from AMC.
• Petitioner will pay the amortizations for 14 months and on the 15th month, Autobus will pay
petitioner for the cost of the buses in 36th monthly installments. As security, it will first execute a
Chattel Mortgage in favor of CMC, and when petitioner settles the account on the 14th month, it
will issue a new Chattel Mortgage of the buses in favor of petitioner.
• The 22 bus units were delivered to respondent by CMC in three batches. After the delivery of the
first batch, respondent delivered to petitioner five TCTs which were under the name of Gregorio
Araneta.
• Petitioner, however, defaulted in paying the amortizations to CMC, forcing the latter to demand
payment from respondent. Consequently, respondent was compelled to pay some of the
obligations directly to CMC or return the five titles
• Consequently, due to the failure of petitioner to settle the obligations with CMC, respondent filed
a complaint for Specific Performance against petitioner.
• Eventually, respondents whether or not the case and was ordered by the court to return the 5 titles
to respondents since petitioner failed to comply with the agreement. Respondent filed a Motion for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction commanding the petitioner to return the five titles.
RTC granted the motion.
• Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
RTC which the CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC is correct in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction?
HELD: Yes, the grant or the denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Accordingly, it must be issued only upon a clear showing that the following requisites are
established: (1) the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; (2) there is
a material and substantial invasion of such right; and (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to
prevent irreparable injury to the applicant.
• RTC has sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites
for its issuance of such writ were established. There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case.
o Respondent has a right to recover the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with
his obligation to respondent.
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o Petitioner defaulted in his obligations to CMC which compelled the respondent to directly
pay CMC some of the obligations of the petitioner. Since the condition for the delivery of
the land titles which is the payment by the petitioner of the obligations of the respondent
to CMC has not been complied with by the petitioner, there is no further justification for
the petitioner to hold on to the possession of the land titles
ANGELES CITY v ANGELES CITY ELECTRIC CORPORATION

G.R. No. 166134 | 29 June 2010
Preliminary Injunction
DOCTRINE: The issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of national internal revenue taxes
requires proof of the existence of a clear right to be protected and urgent necessity to prevent serious
damage.
FACTS:
• Angeles Electric Corporation (AEC) was granted a legislative franchise under RA 4079 to construct,
maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and power system to generate and distribute electric
light, heat and power for sale in Angeles City, Pampanga.
• PD 551 provided for a reduction of the franchise tax of electric franchise holders.
• The Local Government Code thereafter conferring upon provinces and cities the power to impose
tax on businesses enjoying franchise. As such, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City enacted
the Revised Revenue Code of Angeles City (RRCAC).
• Metro Angeles Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc. (MACCI), which AEC is a member, filed
with the Sangguniang Panglungsod a petition seeking the reduction of the tax rates and a review of
the provisions of the RRCAC.
o It alleged that the RRCAC is oppressive and excessive, and that it was published only once
and that no public hearings were conducted prior to its enactment.
• The City Treasurer then issued a Notice of Assessment to AEC for payment of business tax, license
fee and other charges. Thereafter, City Treasurer levied on the real properties of AEC for the latter’s
• This prompted AEC to file with the RTC an Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying and disposing at
public auction its properties.
• RTC issued a TRO followed by an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
conditioned upon the filing of a bond
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC’s issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was proper?
HELD: No, two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, namely:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
• The requisites of injunction have been satisfied, since there exists a right on the part of the AEC to
be protected of its rights of ownership and possession of the properties subject of the auction sale,
and that the acts (conducting an auction sale) against which the injunction is to be directed, are
violative of the said rights of the respondent
• Moreover, petitioner, who has the burden to prove grave abuse of discretion, failed to show that
the RTC acted arbitrarily in granting the injunction.
o Petitioner relied on the prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to restrain the
collection of taxes however there is no such prohibition in the case of local taxes.
o Before issuing the injunction, the RTC conducted a hearing where both parties were given
the opportunity to present their arguments.
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o During the hearing, AEC was able to show that it had a clear legal right over the properties
to be levied and that it would sustain serious damage if these properties, which are vital
to its operations, would be sold at public auction.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
DARAGA PRESS v. COA

G.R. No. 201042 | 16 June 2015
Review of judgments or final orders of the COA
DOCTRINE: COA, a quasi-judicial body, and their factual findings should be accorded with great respect
for they are authorized by law to adjudicate money claims against the government.
FACTS:
• DBM Sec. Andaya requested COA to validate and evaluate the request of Nur Misuari for release of
funds to cover ARMM’s obligation to Daraga for textbooks.COA assigned auditors to evaluate –
commissioners could not ascertain the actual receipt of textbooks.
• Daraga filed for money claim with COA.
o COA – Denied money claim based on Fraud Audit and Investigation Office validation report
which yielded same result with first evaluation. There are discrepancies, inconsistencies and
inaccuracies, as well as the lack of appropriation for the purchase of the subject textbooks
considering that the Special Allotment Release Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on part of COA in denying money claim?
HELD: No, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the respondent COA, which
are undoubtedly supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded great respect and finality.
• Contrary to the claim of petitioner Daraga, there is sufficient reason for the respondent COA to
doubt and disregard the documentary evidence presented by petitioner DPI as the FAIO found
inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies in the dates and figures stated in the documents.
It bears stressing that petitioner DPI has the burden to show, by substantial evidence, that it is
entitled to the money claim. Corollarily, it has to prove the actual delivery of the subject textbooks
by presenting substantial evidence or "evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support [such] conclusion." Which Daraga failed to do so.
• The respondent COA, as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC v. YANG CHI HAO

G.R. No. 165332 | 2 October 2009
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
DOCTRINE: Errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment, may be entertained in a petition for
certiorari.
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FACTS:
• Yang Chi Hao filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC.
• The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition, cross-examined Yang Chi Hao and his
witnesses, but did not present any of its own evidence.
• The RTC denied the Petition for Naturalization.
• Yang Chi Hao filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), which the RTC granted.
• The OSG filed an MR but the RTC denied the same.
• Instead of filing an ordinary appeal before the CA, the OSG filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65.
o The OSG claims that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it reversed its original decision.
• The CA dismissed the petition of the OSG because it was the wrong legal remedy.
o The proper recourse was an ordinary appeal to be filed within 15 days from the receipt of
the OSG’s MR denial
• OSG files a Petition for Certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OSG’s petition for certiorari has merit?
HELD: No, a basic requisite of the special civil action of certiorari, which is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Where appeal is available, certiorari generally does not lie. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost
or lapsed remedy of appeal.
• By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. There was no whimsicality or patent abuse of
discretion as would amount to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
o The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reconsidered its earlier decision and
granted Yang Chi Hao’s petition for naturalization.
• In this case, an appeal was not only available, but also mandated by Sections 11 and 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
o The OSG is not without a remedy to assail the grant of citizenship. In addition, it may
also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the proper proceedings, if it
can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.
o It has been stated that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and this Court will decline
to sift through the evidence submitted by the parties, particularly here, where such
evidence was not presented before the trial court.
POWER SITES & SIGNS, INC. v. UNITED NEON

G.R. No. 163406 | 24 November 2009
DOCTRINE: In a petition for certiorari, only a certified true copy of the assailed judgment, order, or
resolution is appended.
FACTS:
• Power Sites is a corporation that installs billboards.
• United Neon is also a corporation that installs billboards.
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• United Neon began construction of a billboard one meter away from the billboard construction of
Power Sites.
• Power Sites claimed that United Neon’s billboard construction obstructed their billboard
construction.
• In a letter-complaint, Power Sites requested the Muntinlupa City Engineer and Building Official to
revoke United Neon’s building permit and to issue a cease and desist order against it.
• Before a resolution could be made by the City Building Official, Power Sites filed a Petition for
Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order with
the RTC.
• The RTC granted Power Sites’ petition.
• United Neon then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA.
o United Neon claimed that the grant of preliminary injunction was unwarranted because
Power Sites only prayed for a prohibitory injunction in its original petition, but the Order
went as far as to grant a mandatory injunction.
• The CA invalidated the order of the RTC.
• Power Sites now comes to the SC; one of its arguments of which are that the CA should have
outright dismissed the Petition for Certiorari since United Neon failed to attach all the relevant
pleadings, in disregard of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Power Sites’ contention is correct?
HELD: No, section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:“The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.”
• A plain reading of the provision indicates that there is no specific enumeration of the documents
that must be appended to the petition, other than a certified true copy of the assailed judgment,
order, or resolution.
PEOPLE v SOBREPENA
G.R. No. 204063 | 5 December 2016
DOCTRINE: A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It does not include
correction of the trial court's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon.
FACTS:
• Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna, an educational institution in
Laguna, who were charged for allegedly committing Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment.
By reason thereof, respondents were incarcerated.
• Invoking the provisions of Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court and in their belief that the evidence of their guilt is not strong, respondents filed a
Petition for Bail.
• Prosecution opposed the Petition for Bail and presented its witnesses to strengthen the guilt of
accused respondents.
• RTC: denied Petition for Bail. RTC found that there is evident proof against all the accused and
held that the evidence of guilt for all the accused is STRONG.
• On appeal, CA was convinced that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Orders. According to the CA, it further found:
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o That there is doubt as to whether there is strong evidence against respondents for the
charge of estafa or large scale illegal recruitment;
o That the evidence available on record merely showed that Union College provided the
venue and the English language training course that there were no statements to the effect
that Union College is acting as a job placement agency;
o That there is no direct evidence to show that Carandang was illegally enticed by
respondents to enroll at Union College;
o That there is no direct evidence showing that respondents overtly represented that they
have the power to send the trainees abroad for employment; and finally,
o That there is no evidence that respondents are flight risk.
ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
committed by RTC?
HELD: No, grave abuse of discretion is an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been
committed in gave abuse of discretion when the same was done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence executed whimsically or arbitrarily in a manner so parent and so gross.
• It is stressed that "a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It
does not include correction of the trial court's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings
thereon. It does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof."
o The findings and assessment of the trial court during the bail hearing were only a
preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecution's evidence for the limited purpose
of determining whether respondents are entitled to be released on bail during the
pendency of the trial.
• An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been gave abuse discretion when the
same was done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence executed whimsically or
arbitrarily in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
CABUNGCAL v. LORENZO
G.R. No. 160367 | 18 December 2009
DOCTRINE: The remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
• The Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued Resolution No. 27 s. 2001 declaring the
reorganization of all offices of the municipal government.
• The Resolution was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan via Resolution No. 154 s. 2001.
• Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 80 s. 2001, approving and adopting the
proposed new staffing pattern of the municipal government.
• The Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the same through Resolution No. 299 s. 2001.
• The Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, respondent Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a memorandum
informing all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the reorganization, all
positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective applications for the
newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern on or before January 10, 2002.
Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.
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• Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, filed with the CA a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order.
o Respondents were sued in their official capacities.
o Petitioners sought to prohibit respondents from implementing the reorganization.
o While the case was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter
terminating the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not
selected for the new positions.
• The CA denied the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus and prohibition proper in the case at bar?
HELD: No, it bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary
forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.
• The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case. One of the exceptions of the
said rule is when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. If such is present, the resort to
the appellate court would be proper.
• Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. The
jurisdiction lies with the CSC and not the appellate court.
PASCO v. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 165554 | 26 July 2010
DOCTRINE: A decision based on a compromise agreement is immediately final and executory and cannot
be the subject of appeal therefore certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for an aggrieved party.
FACTS:
• Respondents filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioners before the MTC
of Bulacan.
• Petitioners obtained a loan in the amount of P 140,000.00 from Filomena (now deceased). Lauro
Pasco executed a chattel mortgage on his jeep in favor of Filomena.
• Despite demands of the heirs, petitioners refused to either pay the balance of the loan or surrender
the jeep.
• Parties entered into a compromise agreement. However, petitioners filed a motion to set aside
decision alleging that the Agreement was not understood by them and questioned MTC’s
jurisdiction arguing that the Agreement amounted to P 588,500.00, which exceeded the MTC’s P
200,000.00 jurisdictional limit. MTC denied the motion.
• Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the RTC.
• RTC dismissed the petition. CA also dismissed the appeal holding that the MTC had jurisdiction,
since the principal amount of the loan only amounted to P140,000.00; Cresencia was duly
authorized by her co-heirs to enter into the Compromise Agreement; Petitioners improperly sought
recourse before the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy
was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy?
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HELD: Yes, a decision based on a compromise agreement is immediately final and executory and cannot
be the subject of appeal, for when parties enter into a compromise agreement and request a court to render
a decision on the basis of their agreement, it is presumed that such action constitutes a waiver of the right
to appeal said decision.
• From the express language of Rule 41, the MTC's denial of petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Decision
could not have been appealed.
• While there may have been other remedies available to assail the decision, petitioners were well
within their rights to institute a special civil action under Rule 65.
HEIRS OF GAYARES v. PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS

G.R. No. 178477| 16 July 2012
DOCTRINE: “Heavy workload” alone is not considered a compelling reason to justify a request for
extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
• Gayares was hired by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation on behalf of its principal, Kuwait
Oil Tanker Co., S.A.K., as an able Seaman. The contract was for a period of 9 months. Prior to his
departure, he underwent medical examination and was found "fit to work" by the examining
physician. But after a month, he was repatriated to the Philippines for medical reasons.
• Upon return, Gayares filed a complaint for disability/medical benefits, illness allowance, damages
and attorney’s fees against the respondents.
• The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering respondents to pay Gayares disability benefits,
sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees. According to the LA, Gayares’ disability of
"blephasrospasm with oramandibular dystonia" was contracted during his employment and not
pre-existing as contended by the respondents considering that he was diagnosed "fit to work" by
the company-physician.
o Pacific and Kuwait Oil filed an appeal with the NLRC.
o During the pendency of the appeal, Gayares died and was substituted by his heirs.
• The NLRC rendered its Decision and opined that Gayares could not have contracted the illness
during the term of his employment contract, it having manifested a mere 22 days after embarkation
and considering that the said disease is hereditary. Neither was there any proof that Gayares’
employment contributed or even aggravated his illness. Gayares Heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
• The heirs received on January 3, 2007 a copy of the November 30, 2006 NLRC Resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration. However, instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari, petitioners
opted to file a Motion for Extension of Time which was received by the CA on March 5, 2007.
• The CA denied petitioners’ Motion for Extension of Time and dismissed the case. According to the
CA, requests for extension of time under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may only be
allowed for "compelling reason." The CA observed that mere pressure and volume of work cannot
be considered "compelling reason" to justify a request for extension. Heirs counsel cite "heavy
pressure of work" as the sole reason for their failure to file their petition on time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for extension to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be
granted?
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HELD: No, heavy pressure of work is not considered a compelling reason to justify a request for an
extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing
alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.
• Under Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the ROC The general rule is to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-
day reglementary period. A 15-day extension is the exception to the rule and the request may only
be granted for compelling reason. In this case, the heirs sought a 15-day extension from the CA
since they failed to file their petition within the 60-day reglementary period due to heavy workload
of their counsel.
V.C. PONCE v. MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE

G.R. No. 178431| 12 November 2012
DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie as a substitute for failure to file an appeal
within the reglamentary period.
FACTS:
• The Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint against VCP for the expropriation of its property.
The municipality intended to develop the property for its landless residents.
• The RTC of Parañaque sustained the municipality’s right to expropriate the said property and to a
writ of possession.
o During the stage of determination of just compensation with appointed commissioners,
VCP did not participate in the meetings despite notice and that appointed commissioner
of VCP did not contribute due to frequent absences. The commissioners submitted their
appraisal report to the RTC
• Judge Madrona rejected the commissioners' report and valued the property based on the value and
character of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint in 1987.
o VCP moved for a reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
• 58 days since VCP received the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration, it filed with the CA
a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari, which the CA granted.
• VCP filed its Petition for Certiorari. It justified its resort to the extraordinary remedy on the ground
that "there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law that is available
to the petitioner." It assailed the trial court’s rejection of the appraisal report as a grave abuse of
discretion. VCP maintained that the appraisal, which is based on the property’s value at the time
of its taking in 2002, is correct.
• The CA dismissed the petition. CA observed that an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 was available
to VCP and would have constituted a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to correct any error in
the RTC Decision. VCP, for unknown reasons, failed to avail itself of the said remedy within the
reglementary period. Having lost its right to appeal, VCP resorted to a Petition for Certiorari in the
hope that it could nevertheless, obtain a reversal of the RTC Decision. The CA held that certiorari
is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy?
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HELD: No, appeal is a speedy remedy, as an adverse party can file its appeal from a final decision or order
immediately after receiving it. A party, who is alleging that an appeal will not promptly relieve it of the
injurious effects of the judgment, should establish facts to show how the appeal is not speedy or adequate.
• VCP attempts to excuse itself from the effects of its negligence by alleging that an appeal would
not have been speedy and adequate for its purpose.
• VCP cannot explain, why an appeal would not be speedy and adequate to address its assigned
errors. VCP cannot complain of delay because it was guilty of delay itself, and it even waited until
the 58th day of its receipt of the CA Decision before taking action. VCP resorted to certiorari as a
substitute for its lost appeal.
• A court with appellate jurisdiction can review both the facts and the law, including questions of
jurisdiction. It can set aside an erroneous decision and even nullify the same, if warranted. VCP’s
empty contention is untenable. Thus, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
PNB v. ARCOBILLAS
G.R. No. 1796481| 7-Aug-13
DOCTRINE: The well-settled rule is that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
FACTS:
• The PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account of Nomad-Spoor was credited with
US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent of ₱5,517.10, Arcobillas, the assigned
teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch, erroneously posted US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of
US$5,379.10. Said amount was later withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor to the damage of PNB in the
amount of ₱214,641.23.
• After seven months, an investigation made by PNB and administratively charged Arcobillas with
neglect of duty. PNB adjudication board found her guilty of gross neglect of duty and meted her a
penalty of forced resgination with benefits.
• Arcobillas instituted a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against PNB.
• The Labor Arbiter found no sufficient evidence to establish gross and habitual negligence and
ordered the reinstatement of Arcobillas with payment of backwages. PNB appealed to the NLRC.
• The NLRC rendered a decision affirming with modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. PNB
received a copy of the said Decision. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, PNB filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. Thus, PNB filed its Petition for
Certiorari before the CA.
• Despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, the CA took cognizance of
PNB’s Petition for Certiorari. Nevertheless, it dismissed the same in a Decision and affirmed the
decision of the NLRC with modification.
• Both parties filed an MR but was denied. PNB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in recognizing the Petition for Certiorari under Rule filed by PNB
without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC?
HELD: Yes, the well-settled rule is that the filing of a MR is an indispensable condition to the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for this rule is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify
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such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions.
• The finality of the NLRC’s Decision does not preclude the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten days
from the parties’ receipt of its Decision will only give rise to the prevailing party’s right to move
for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a Petition for
Certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations.
• However, based on jurisprudence, laid down exceptions to the rule on filing an MR as
indispensable prerequisite in the filing of certiorari under R65:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relied by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and,
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
• In PNB's case, it failed to allege which exceptions its case falls. Neither did it present any reasonable
justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the
NLRC.
VENZON v. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA

G.R. No. 178031 | 28 August 2013
DOCTRINE: The case constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have
availed of the remedy under Rule 41 (appeal), and not Rule 65 (petition for certiorari).
FACTS:
• Spouses Venzon obtained a ₱5k loan from respondent secured by a mortgage on their house and
lot and covered by two Tax Declarations.
• In her complaint against the bank, she alleged that when she offered to pay the balance, the bank
refused to accept the payment and subsequently sold the property at an auction for P6.4K to the
bank being the highest bidder. Moreover, the foreclosure proceedings were null and void for lack
of notice and publication of the sale, lack of sheriff’s final deed of sale and notice of redemption
period.
• In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent claimed that petitioner did not make any payment
on the loan and denied all other allegations. It also averred that foreclosure proceedings were
regularly done and all requirements were complied with. Publication was not needed because the
property was exempted from such, it not exceeding P100K according to the Rural Banks Act.Also,
cause of action has long prescribed as the case was filed only in 2005 or 18 years after the foreclosure
sale; and that petitioner is guilty of laches.
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• In her Reply, petitioner insisted that the foreclosure proceedings were irregular and that
prescription and laches do not apply as the foreclosure proceedings are null and void to begin with.
RTC dismissed the case and upheld the validity of the foreclosure proceedings.
• A petition for certiorari was filed before the CA but it was denied. The appellate court ruled that
petitioner should have interposed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certiorari was proper in assailing the trial court’s dismissal?
HELD: No, this constitutes a dismissal with the character of finality. As such, petitioner should have
availed of the remedy under Rule 41, and not Rule 65.
• The Court finds no error in the CA’s treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The trial court’s
Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order, disposing of the issue of
publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very core of petitioner’s cause of action
in the case – and declaring the same to be unnecessary pursuant to the Rural Banks Act, as
petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not exceed ₱10,000.00, and thus leaving petitioner without
basis to maintain her case.
ALDOVER v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 167174| 23 September 2013
DOCTRINE: Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its principal office
is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• The Reyeses were the registered owners of a certain lot. They obtained a loan from Antonia
Aldover secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the said property. When the Reyeses failed to pay,
Aldover caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. At the foreclosure sale conducted,
Aldover emerged as the winning bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor which was
annotated at the back of TCT.
• Aldover filed with the RTC a verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was
granted upon posting of a bond. Later, a Writ of Possession directing the Branch Sheriff to place
Aldover in possession of subject lot was issued. The Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate but later he
sent a Partial Report to the court stating he cannot fully implement the writ because there are
several other persons who occupy portions of the lot.
• In view of the Sheriff’s Partial Report, a Special Order of Demolition was granted to Aldover.
Respondents thus filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Injunction with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, this was dismissed.
• Respondent then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Attached
Amended Petition. The CA reconsidered and granted the issuance of a TRO.
• Later, the CA sought to grant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondent
posted the required bond; thus, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
• Petitioner thus sought recourse via Petition for Certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
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HELD: No, grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at
all in contemplation of law. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of
its jurisdiction.
• Measured against jurisprudentially established parameters, the CA’s disposition to grant the writ
was not without basis. A petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to review intrinsic
correctness of the public respondent’s ruling. Thus, whether the CA committed errors in
proceedings, misappreciated the facts, or misapplied the facts or misapplied the law beyond the
Court’s power of review in this case.
• In this case, respondents have indubitably shown that they are in actual possession of the disputed
portions of subject property through deeds of conveyances, contracts to sell, and receipts.
o Their actual possession of the property was likewise confirmed by the Sheriff’s partial
report. Their possession raises a disputable presumption that they are the owners.
o There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the
disputed portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of the
main case.
• Moreover, there is no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
where a party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard and had exhaustively presented
all its arguments and defenses such as in this case.
PLDT v. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 163999 | 9 July 2014
DOCTRINE: A special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of denial
of the motion for reconsideration of the order. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory
prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
• PLDT conducted an investigation on the alleged illegal International Simple Resale (ISR) activities
(likened to a jumper), where it was confirmed that INFILNET and EMS were operating ISR activities.
PLDT then requested NBI to apprehend them.
• NBI, through Atty. Embido, conducted surveillance and after grant of search warrants by RTC, NBI
agents raided the INFILNET and EMS offices where electronic gadgets, and equipment were seized.
• Ocampo, Hipolito, Merjilla, and Carandang were then charged with simple theft before RTC. Ocampo
et al. moved to Suppress or Exclude or Return Inadmissible Evidence Unlawfully Obtained, and
assailed the validity of the Search Warrants.
• RTC heard the Motion to Suppress that was revived due to the CA’s earlier Decision. But as there was
failure to appear and present evidence to substantiate their Motion, the RTC denied it.
• Ocampo et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari in CA without filing an MR. CA reversed the RTC rulings
arguing that Ocampo et al. had no intention to delay the resolution of the Motion. CA also said that the
RTC should have granted the subpoena because the documents are necessary to support their Motion
to Suppress.
• PLDT moved for reconsideration but the CA denied. PLDT now assails the propriety of CA’s reversal
of the Orders of the RTC that in filing the petition for Certiorari, respondent failed to observe
procedural rules.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course and granting the Petition for Certiorari despite
evident procedural lapses (lapse of 60-day period, and failure to file motion for reconsideration)?
HELD: Yes, petition for Certiorari should be filed within 60 days from notice of denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
• Rule 65, Sec. 4 provides that a special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within 60
days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from the notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution being assailed.
o Here, Ocampo et al. were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 11, 2002, and denying their application for subpoena duces tecum, on
October 18, 2002. Records show that their Petition for Certiorari to assail the Orders
was only filed on January 20, 2003, beyond the 60-day period.
• The absence of a motion for reconsideration, Petition for Certiotrari should have been
dismissed. Filing a motion for reconsideration is a pre-requisite for filing Petition for Certiorari.
o Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari.
o In this case, Ocampo et al. admitted they failed to file a motion for reconsideration
prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they alleged that their counsel
verbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress, which
the RTC flatly denied in open court. It is also unlikely for their counsel to have moved
for a reconsideration considering that he appeared only after the hearings were over.
Petition granted.
CANDELARIA v. RTC Judge FIDER-REYES

GR No. 173861 | 14 July 2014
DOCTRINE: It is an essential requisite for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper that a party seeking a writ
must be able to show that there is absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Candelaria and Basit were arrested in a buy-bust operation in Pampanga for selling
counterfeit Fundador Brandy. On the strength of the Joint Affidavit of the police operatives, petitioners
were formally charged in an Information dated July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in relation to
Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines.
o During arraignment, they pleaded not guilty and filed a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence
based on the inadmissibility of evidence alleging that the evidence obtained were in violation
of their constitutional right against unreasonable searchers and siezures. They allege that at
time of arrest they were not committing nor attempting to commit a crime.
• RTC – Denied motion saying that any objection must be done BEFORE plea. Failure to quash
information before the arraignment estopped them from filing such remedy
o Petitioners’ moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, petitioner filed for a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash?
HELD: No, it is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the writ
whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
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in the ordinary course of law. “[H]e must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate xxx.” And pursuant to this rule, Petition for Certiorari is
dismissible.
• The petitioners in this case failed to allege that there was no appeal or other more plain and speedy
remedy available to them. Further, arguendo, certiorari under Rule 65 is designed to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not judgement.
• The denial is a mere error in judgement and hence subject to an appeal. The Court did not find any
grave abuse of discretion on part of RTC. The RTC thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted
and rendered judgement based on such. The petition must fail.
LACSON v. MJ LACSON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 168840 | 8 December 2010
DOCTRINE: A question of fact that entails re-evaluation of factual findings cannot be brought before the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
• MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc. alleged that petitioner Lacson, its former president, milled
the sugar cane produce of the corporation’s hacienda under his own name and against the
instructions of the Board of Directors. Thus, he was no longer reelected as president.
o Notwithstanding, Lacson refused to relinquish his post to the newly elected president. He
continued to manage the hacienda, harvest and mill the sugar canes under his own name,
and refused to turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof.
• MJ Lacson filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin Lacson
from performing the duties and responsibilities as president of the said corporation, from
managing the hacienda and from harvesting and milling the sugar cane produce thereof.
• The parties were able to arrive at an Amicable Settlement, which was approved by the RTC. It was
stipulated in the Settlement that Lacson agrees to immediately execute a Promissory Note in favor
of MJ Lacson in the amount of P7,531,244.84 representing cash advances previously made to Lacson
by the said corporation for expenses incurred for sugar crop year 2003-2004.
• Lacson later filed a motion for partial modification of the judgment by compromise alleging that
prior to the submission of the Amicable Settlement for approval, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) installed a group of farmer-beneficiaries who allegedly cut the standing crops in the
hacienda, and that such act could not be stopped by him because of the existing TRO. Because of
this, Lacson believed that there was a need to reduce the amount covered by the promissory note.
• The RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the same, ruling that MJ Lacson’s non-disclosure
to Lacson of the impending installation of CARP farmer-beneficiaries and its subsequent inaction
did not constitute vices of consent or fraudulent acts that would justify the partial modification of
the judgment by compromise.
• Before the SC, one of the issues advanced by the Lacson was that the non-disclosure by respondent
of the impending installation of the CARP farmer-beneficiaries and its subsequent inaction
constituted vices of consent or fraudulent acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can pass upon the issue advanced by petitioner with respect to the alleged
vices of consent or fraudulent acts?
HELD: No, citing Diokno v. Cacdac: “It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a
trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
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again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside the province of the instant
Petition for Certiorari.”
• A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
PADRE v. BADILLO
G.R. No. 165423 | 19 January 2011
DOCTRINE: Despite the existence and availability of the right of appeal, a resort to a petition for certiorari
is proper when the writs issued are null and void or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
FACTS:
• In a prior case, the respondents Badillos were adjudged as the lawful owners of 5/6 portion of a
certain property. When this decision became final and executory, a complaint was filed before the
MTC against the property’s occupants, including petitioner Padre.
• The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the lots.
• Padre filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the MTC had no jurisdiction since the
assessed value of the subject property was beyond its P20,000.00 jurisdictional limit as provided in
R.A. 7691.
• The motion was denied by the MTC; hence, by way of a special civil action for certiorari, Padre
elevated the case to the RTC. The RTC, however, dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No, in civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction only if the assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does not
exceed P20,000.00.
• In the case at bar, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC and not to the MTC since the assessed
value of the property was P26,940.00. As such, the MTC decision should be considered null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC can entertain the petition for certiorari despite the availability of an appeal?
HELD: Yes, as a general rule, the existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to
certiorari. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, such as “when the writs issued are null and void or
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.”
• The RTC was correct in entertaining the special civil action for certiorari since the exceptions
abovementioned apply to the case at bar, namely, that the MTC had no jurisdictional authority to
try the case. Notably, the MTC should have instead dismissed Padre’s petition on the ground that
the question of jurisdiction should have been raised by way of an appeal.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (PAG-IBIG FUND) v. SPS. SEE

G.R. No. 170292| 22 June 2011
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DOCTRINE: A party that loses his right to appeal by his own negligence cannot seek refuge in the remedy
of a writ of certiorari.
FACTS:
• The Sps. See were the highest bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a property that was
mortgaged to Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-Ibig Fund). They paid the bid price in cash
to Sheriff Arimado and in turn were issued a Certificate of Sale wherein Sheriff Arimado
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price.
• Despite the expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig refused to surrender its certificate of title
to the Sps. See because it had yet to receive their payment from Sheriff Arimado who was found to
have spent the money for his personal use.
• Due to Pag-ibig’s refusal to recognize their payment, the Sps. See filed a complaint for specific
performance with damages against Pag-ibig and Sheriff Arimado before the RTC.
• On February 21, 2002, the RTC ordered Pag-ibig to deliver the documents of ownership to Sps. See
on the ground that when the latter paid the purchase price to Sheriff Arimado, such payment
effected a discharge of their obligation to Pag-ibig.
o Pag-ibig filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC on March 15,
2002.
o Pag-ibig received the denial of its motion for reconsideration on March 22, 2002 but took
no further action. Hence, on April 23, 2002, RTC issued a writ of execution of its February
21, 2002 Decision.
• On May 24, 2002, Pag-ibig filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in order to
annul and set aside the February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC.
• The CA denied the petition on the ground that (1) Pag-Ibig’s remedy was to appeal the February
21, 2002 Decision of the RTC and not to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 since at the time
the petition was filed, the RTC Decision had already attained finality, and (2) the remedy of
certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari was the proper remedy?
HELD: No, Certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. It is proper only when
appeal is not available to the aggrieved party.
• In the case at bar, the February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC was appealable under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court because it completely disposed of Sps. See’s case against Pag-ibig. Notably, Pag-
ibig did not explain why it did not resort to an appeal and merely allowed the RTC’s decision to
attain finality. In fact, the February 21, 2002 Decision was already at the stage of execution when
Pag-ibig belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. Clearly, Pag- ibig lost its right to
appeal and tried to remedy the situation by resorting to certiorari.
• It is settled, however, that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the party’s own
negligence or error in the choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was timely filed assuming this is the correct remedy?
HELD: No, even assuming arguendo that a Rule 65 certiorari could still be resorted to, Pag-ibig’s petition
would still have to be dismissed for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
• Rule 65, Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-day period is counted “from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution” being assailed, or “from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration,” and not from receipt of the writ of execution which seeks to enforce the assailed
judgment, order or resolution.
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• In the present case case, Pag-ibig received the RTC Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration
on March 22, 2002; it thus had until May 21, 2002 to file its petition for certiorari. However, Pag-
ibig filed its petition only on May 24, 2002, which was the 63rd day from its receipt of the RTC’s
order and obviously beyond the reglementary 60-day period.
ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANINANG v. CA

G.R. No. 167284 | 6 July 2011
DOCTRINE: An act will be struck down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion only when
the abuse of discretion is capricious and whimsical.
FACTS:
• During her lifetime, Clemencia filed a reconveyance case against respondent spouses Ladanga. The
complaint seeks to annul the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by Clemencia in favor of the spouses
over a Diliman property and a Cubao property on grounds of lack of intent to convey and lack of
consideration.
• Clemencia died during the pendency of the reconveyance case and was substituted by her heir,
Bernardo. Meanwhile, such death also brought about probate proceedings between Maninang,
who was represented by the Quisimbing Torres (QT) law firm, and Bernardo. Maninang claimed
that the Clemencia bequeathed to her the entire estate in her last will and testament.
o The probate case was eventually decided based on a Compromise Agreement which
identified certain properties of the estate and provided for their distribution among the
parties. It further provided that as to “any other properties, known or unknown,” Maninang
would get 35% interest while QT would get 15% interest.
• The reconveyance case was finally decided in favor of Clemencia’s estate. The RTC ordered the
reconveyance of both the Diliman and Cubao property to Bernardo for and in behalf of the
deceased.
• The spouses Ladanga appealed to the CA with regard to the Diliman property. At this stage, the
Estate of Maninang and QT filed a motion for joinder of additional parties, claiming that they had
50% undivided interest in the Cubao property which the trial court adjudicated in favor of the
estate of Clemencia. Furthermore, they posited that while the Cubao property was not specifically
identified in the Agreement in the probate case, it still falls under the clause “any other property,
known or unknown.”
• The CA, without acting on the motion for joinder of additional parties, affirmed the RTC’s decision
with respect to the Diliman property. The spouses Ladanga appealed the said decision to the SC.
• The SC, acting on the spouses Ladanga’s appeal, affirmed the CA decision and therefore attained
finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion?
HELD: No, CA did not commit with grave abuse of discretion because the subject of the appeal and the
interest of the petitioners are different.
• Grave abuse of discretion “implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
• In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion considering that the issues raised by petitioners
were not related to the subject matter before the CA. The petitioners’ interest is in the Cubao
property, while the subject of the appeal before the CA was the Diliman property.
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VDA. DE MENDEZ v. CA
G.R. No. 174937 | 13 June 2012
DOCTRINE: A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based
on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• Vda. de Mendez filed a complaint before the RTC for nullity of Deed of Sale, Transfer Certificate
of Title, Tax Declaration and other relevant documents, and reconveyance of property with
damages against the Sps. Dabon. She alleged that that she is the registered owner of the subject
property, that she never sold the said property to the Sps. Dabon, and that her signature in the
Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
• The Sps. Dabon contended that there was a valid sale as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.
• The RTC ruled in favor of the Sps. Dabon and the CA, on appeal affirmed the RTC decision. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the SC.
• The Sps. Dabon prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Vda. de Mendez should
have filed a petition under Rule 45 and not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner availed of the proper remedy?
HELD: No, under the Rules of Court, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a judgment, final order,
or resolution of the CA is to file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from.
• Unlike a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if such loss or lapse was due to one’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.
• In this case, the remedy of appeal was available; thus, the filing of a petition for certiorari was inapt.
Vda. de Mendez should have filed a petition under Rule 45 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the Resolution dated September 12, 2006 which denied her motion for reconsideration.
• Furthermore, there are only certain cases when certiorari may be allowed despite the availability of
an appeal, such as:
(a) When public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) When the broader interest of justice so requires;
(c) When the writs issued are null and void; and
(d) When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
• No such persuasive reason exists in this case. Assuming arguendo the SC considers the present
case as an exception, the petition must still fail as no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction was committed by the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC in favor of
the Sps. Dabon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed under Rule 45 can still be considered as a petition filed under Rule
65?
HELD: No, in certain cases, the Supreme Court has considered petitions erroneously filed under Rule 65
as filed under Rule 45.
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• However, this cannot be done in the present case because the petition was filed only thirty-three
(33) days after receipt of the September 12, 2006 Resolution, hence, was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
NAPOCOR v. SAMAR
G.R. No. 197329 |8 September 2014
Expropriation
DOCTRINE: In expropriation proceedings, compensation should be based on the time of ACTUAL

TAKING of property in accordance to Section 4, Rule 67.
FACTS:
• NAPOCOR sought to expropriate Sps. Samar’s land in Camarines Sur for construction of transmission
line. Wherein RTC later ordered issuance of Wirt of Condemnation; which lead NAPOCOR to initiate
construction.
• Later, same RTC ordered dismissal without prejudice the case for failure to prosecute on side of
NAPOCOR.
o Committee on Appraisers failed to fix amount of compensation
o No deliberation nor effort was done to appraise property.
o Further, no appeal nor new expropriation proceeding was commenced by NAPCOR after
dismissal.
• Sps. Samar now sought for compensation and damages and filed the same with same RTC.
• RTC: ordered NAPOCOR to pay Sps. Samar P 1,020,000.
o NAPOCOR appealed, assailing decision contending that valuation of property should have
been based on price during time of taking. Following Sec. 4, Rule 67.
• CA: Denied appeal; Rule 67 cannot apply, because case is not of expropriation, but case instituted was
one for compensation and damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in affirming RTC decision fixing amount of property in contravention of
Rule 67.
HELD: Yes, NAPOCOR was correct and stated that the basis of compensation was supposed to follow the
date of expropriation proceeding and not the subsequent filing of complaint for compensation and
damages.
• Though the expropriation proceeding was dismissed for failure to prosecute, the basis for valuation
should still have been based on the time of ACTUAL TAKING of the property and not on the time
when compensation suit was commenced, pursuant to Rule 67.
MERCADO v. LBP
G.R. No. 196707 | 17 June 2015
Expropriation
DOCTRINE: For the proper determination of just compensation, it must be arrived at based on the
guidelines under Sec. 17, RA 6657 and outlined in a formula provided in DAR A.O. No. 5.
FACTS:
• Sps. Nilo and Erlinda Mercado’s 9.8940 hectares of agricultural land in Davao City was subjected to
CARP coverage by PARO. The Spouses were offered 287,227.16 as just compensation.
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• Nilo rejected LBP’s valuation, claiming that the fair market value is ₱250,000/hectare, as the subject
portion is suited for agriculture and has improvements, it is adjacent to an eco-tourism area, and is
suitable for housing and other uses.
• Summary administrative proceedings were conducted to determine just compensation. RARAD
sustained the valuation by LBP.
• Nilo appealed to the DARAB, but pursuant to the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, a decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and on preliminary determination and payment of just compensation
must be brought directly to the proper SAC.
• Sps. Mercado filed a Complaint for payment of just compensation before RTC acting as SAC.
• LBP argued that it made a proper valuation based on DAR A.O. No. 5 and Sec. 17 of RA 6657.
• RTC ruled that the factors under Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and the formula used by the DAR in computing
just compensation are mere guide posts and could not substitute the judgment of the court in
determining just compensation. It fixed the just compensation of the subject land at ₱25.00 per square
meter. It also denied LBP’s motion for reconsideration.
• CA set aside the RTC ruling and favored LBP. It ruled that RTC should have applied the formula under
DAR A.O. No. 5 and considered the factors under Sec. 17 of RA 6657 in determining just compensation.
By applying the formula CA came up with the same valuation as that of LBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC should have applied the formula under DAR A.O. No. 5 and considered the
factors under Section 17 of RA 6657?
HELD: Yes, RTC should observe guidelines for the proper determination of just compensation: (1) just
compensation must be valued at the time of taking of the property expropriated, or the time when the
owner was deprived of the use of his property; and, (2) just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to
the guidelines in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and outlined in a formula provided in DAR A.O. No. 5.
• Both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the property’s value at the time of its taking.
Thus, it is premature to make a final determination of the just compensation due to petitioners.
RTC did not conform with the guidelines Sec. 17 R.A. 6657. It merely stated in general terms that
it exercised its judicial prerogative and considered all the facts of the case, including the evidence
and applicable laws, to conclude that the amount of ₱25.00 per square meter is reasonable just
compensation for the subject portion.
• CA, on its part, also erred when it adopted the valuation made by LBP. The valuation factors to be
considered in determining just compensation under Sec. 17, RA 6657, include the acquisition cost
of the property, current value of like properties, the nature, actual use and income thereof, the
sworn valuation of the owner, tax declarations and assessment of government assessors. CA failed
to consider all those factors.
• As SC cannot receive new evidence from the parties for the prompt resolution of this case, it is
remanded. Case was REMANDED.
METROPOLITAN BANK TRUST CO. v. LAMB CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. 170906 | 27 November 2009
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession even
during the redemption period.
FACTS:
• Lamb Construction obtained a 5.5M loan from Metrobank and secured such by executing a real
estate mortgage over 6 parcels of land.
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• Lamb Construction failed to pay the loan upon maturity so Metrobank filed a petition for extra-
judicial foreclosure over the 6 properties.
• In the auction sale, Metrobank was the highest bidder and was issued a Certificate of Sale.
• In the RTC, during the period of redemption, Metrobank filed a verified petition for issuance of a
writ of possession.
o Demands to Lamb Construction to turn over actual possession were refused.
• The RTC denied Metrobank’s petition because it failed to deposit the surplus proceeds from the
foreclosure sale.
• The CA ruled that Metrobank is entitled to a writ of possession but is obliged to return the surplus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Metrobank is entitled to a writ of possession?
HELD: Yes, the general rule is that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession even during
the redemption period. The exception to the general rule in Sulit v. CA withheld the issuance of a writ of
possession because the mortgagee failed to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale
which was equivalent to 40% of the mortgage debt; the court decided based on equitable considerations.
• The exception made in Sulit does not apply when the period to redeem has already expired or
when ownership over the property has already been consolidated in favor of the purchaser. In
other words, even if the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, a writ of possession must
still be issued.
• In the instant case, the period to redeem has already lapsed. The failure of the mortgagee to deliver
the surplus proceeds does not affect the validity of the foreclosure sale. It gives rise to a cause of
action for the mortgagee to file an action to collect the surplus proceeds.
PTA OF ST. MATTHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY v. METROBANK

G.R. No. 176518| 2 March 2010
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the issuance of a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during
the period of redemption is ministerial. It ceases to be ministerial if there is a third party holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor.
FACTS:
• Spouses Ilagan applied for and were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(MBTC) in the amount of P4,790,000.00 secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the parcels of land.
• Upon default, MBTC instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure and a Certificate of Sale was issued in
its favor after being the highest bidder.
• During the period of redemption, MBTC filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession.
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order against MBTC and the
Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac on the ground that it cannot be ejected being a third party.
• Trial court directed that the writ be implemented by placing MBTC in physical possession of the
property
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are “third parties” against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued
and implemented?
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HELD: No, as a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale
and during the period of redemption.
• However, this rule is not without exception. We held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex
parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming
a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
• In this case, petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not claiming a right
adverse to the judgment debtor.
o Petitioner did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely averred actual "physical
possession of the subject school premises". Petitioner-teachers' possession of the said
premises was based on the employment contracts they have with the school.
o As such, it would be specious to conclude that the teachers and students hold the subject
premises independent of or adverse to SMCA. In fact, their interest over the school
premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school.
CERTEZA v. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK

G.R. No.190078 | 5 March 2010
DOCTRINE: The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have
more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid.
FACTS:
• Petitioners obtained a P 1,255,000.00 loan from Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) secured by 2 parcels
of land, with all the buildings and improvements existing thereon.
• Upon default, PSB instituted an action for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM pursuant to Act
No. 3135.
• PSB emerged as the sole and highest bidder in the public auction.
• Petitioners sought the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for allegedly having been
conducted in contravention of the procedural requirements prescribed in the Procedure in
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of REM (AM No. 99-10-05-0). They contend that the auction sale
conducted failed to comply with the two-bidder rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not there may be only one bidder in a foreclosure sale?
HELD: Yes, the requirement for at least two participating bidders provided in the original version of
paragraph 5 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 is not found in Act No. 3135. The CA correctly ruled that it is no longer
required to have at least two bidders in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
• The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more
than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. A.M. No. 99- 10-05-0, as amended, no longer
prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. It is further held that
"Except for errors or omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders,
to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, simple mistakes
or omissions are not considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant
thereto".
• In view of the foregoing, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted in this case is regular and
valid. Consequently, the subsequent issuance of the writ of possession is likewise regular and valid.
Hence, it is no longer necessary for this Court to rule on the other issues presented by the
petitioners, which are also grounded on the supposed irregularity in the auction.
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FORTALEZA v. LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288| 15 August 2012
DOCTRINE: Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, courts
should maintain the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ
of possession.
FACTS:
• Spouses Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Lapitan in the amount of P1.2 million subject to
34% interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over their residential house and lot in Los Banos, Laguna.
• When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the debt including the interests and penalties, the Spouses
Lapitan applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM before the Office of the Clerk of Court
and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City.
• Dr. Lapitan and his wife, the creditors son, were the highest bidders. They were issued a Certificate
of Sale which was registered with the Registry of Deeds.
o The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and
a title of the property was issued in their name.
o The spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property.
• Thus, Dr. Lapitan filed with the RTC a writ of possession. They assert their right of possession over
the property Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
o For failure of the spouses Fortaleza to appear at the hearing, the RTC allowed Dr. Lapitan
to present evidence ex parte.
o The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty
of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already
been issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan.
• The spouses Lapitan elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court dismisses the petition and
ruled that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the
proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious. Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the
issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of writ of possession is an adversarial proceeding?
HELD: No, the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial if there is a third
party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
• Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of
his adverse possession.
• Here, there are no third parties holding the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor.
o It was spouses Fortaleza themselves as debtors-mortgagors who are occupying the subject
property. They are not even strangers to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex parte
writ of possession was applied for.
• Unless a case falls under recognized exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence, the Court
uphold the ex parte, non-adversarial, summary and ministerial nature of the issuance of a writ of
possession as outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
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GATUSLAO v. YANSON
G.R. No. 191540 | 21 January 2015
DOCTRINE: Issuance of Writ of Possession is a ministerial duty of the court when the applicant is the
purchaser of the property or his rightful successor who steps into his shoes.
FACTS:
• This case stemmed from a loan obtained by Gatuslao’s predecessor in interest (PDI) with PNB.
• As a security for the loan, the PDI mortgaged her house. She failed to pay so PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the properties. PNB was the highest bidder so the title was transferred to its name.
• PNB then sold the property to Yanson.
• Gatuslao as the heir, filed an action for annulment of foreclosure mortgage and auction sale.
• Yanson filed a petition for issuance of writ of possession. Court granted.
• Gatuslao now assails the issuance of the writ, arguing that it could not issue while an annulment action
is pending and that Yanson is not the purchaser at the auction sale.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of possession should be granted?
HELD: Yes, a writ of possession may not be stayed by pending action for annulment of mortgage or
foreclosure. For the reason of the writ’s ministerial character.
• The foreclosure proceedings are valid because it complied with the procedure under Act 3135.
o The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period
except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
o No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
• Upon the expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the purchaser, as
confirmed owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court upon proper application and proof of title.
VICTORIAS MILLING CO. v. CA

G.R. No. 168062 | 29 June 2010
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
DOCTRINE: In an ejectment case mandated to be tried under summary procedure, the paramount
consideration is its expeditious and inexpensive resolution without regard to technicalities.
FACTS:
• Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondent International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) before the MCTC of E.B. Magalona-Manapla
• IPI filed its Answer with express reservation that said Answer should not be construed as a waiver
of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the person of IPI, for non-service of summons on the
proper person
o IPI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, Cebu City to question the jurisdiction of the
MCTC over its person.
• CA issued a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION enjoining the public respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of E. B. Magalona-Manapla, from proceeding with the unlawful detainer case
and disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the leased premises during the pendency of
this petition until further orders from this Court.
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• VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution, on the ground that the
questioned CA Resolution is patently null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is allowed in a case for unlawful detainer?
HELD: No, it must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not mention the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
• The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules.
• Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the service of
summons, there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused to IPI so as to call
for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions for certiorari.
• The present situation, where IPI had filed the prohibited petition for certiorari; the CA's taking
cognizance thereof; and the subsequent issuance of the writ of injunction enjoining the ejectment
suit from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner, and the ensuing delay
is the antithesis of and is precisely the very circumstance which the Rule on Summary Procedure
seeks to prevent.
o Considering that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA is categorically prohibited,
the CA should not have entertained the same but should have dismissed it outright.
HEIRS OF ISIP v. QUINTOS

G.R. No. 172008| 1 August 2012
DOCTRINE: In forcible entry cases, a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land.
FACTS:
• Pontino owns a lot. Rogelio Sr. took posession of the lot. Pontino sold his lot to Datu but the latter
failed to pay the full price. Despite non-payment of the full price, Datu sold the lot to Toyo Keiki
who employed Rogelio Sr. to manage its water system put up in the said lot. The lot was ultimately
sold from Pontino to De Guzman. De Guzman with Quintos et al. put up the Roniro Enterprises
which took and operate the water system from Jedco Corporation by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
• Rogelio sr. died but his heirs were still occupying the lot. Quintos et al enticed the heirs to put up
a car repair shop to undertake repairs for an insurance company. On the pretext by Quintos et al.
that during an inspection by the insurance company the heirs must first vacate the property, the
heirs vacated the property. When they came back they were no longer allowed by respondents to
enter the premises. The heirs filed an ejectment case on ground of forcible entry.
• The heirs argue that respondents deprived them of the possession of their lot through deceit,
strategy, and stealth. They aver that Quintos et al deceived them to temporarily vacate the premises
on the pretext that they must convince the insurance inspectors that the premises are being used
solely for commercial purposes. They were thus allegedly tricked to move out and once the
respondents achieved their goal, they were prevented from entering the premises by posting
security guards at the gates.
ISSUE: Whether or not Quintos et al (with De Guzman and Isip) committed forcible entry?
HELD: No, in cases of forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry
centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
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• It is clear that Quintos et al have prior possession de facto. Rogelio Sr. was in possession of the
subject but Pontino not only possessed and occupied the lot but also had a title over the disputed
property. By virtue of a Deed of Assignment between Pontino and Jedco Corporation, which the
latter relinquished in favor of De Guzman, Quintos et al enjoy the right of prior possession de facto.
o In addition, the possession of respondents was lawful from the beginning since it was
acquired through lawful means and thus no forcible entry was committed. Although
Rogelio Sr. was able to occupy the lot, he was in fact possessing the same in the name of
the Quintos et al, as an employee of the latter.
o Whatever right to possess the heirs have in this case cannot be superior to that of Quintos
et al since it was from the latter that their predecessor-in-interest derived his claim of
possession.
VALERIANA VILLONDO v. CARMEN QUIJANO, ET AL

G.R. No. 173606 | 3 December 2012
DOCTRINE: 'Interest' within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. A real party-in-interest is one who has a legal right. The action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
FACTS:
• Valeriana filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against
Carmen et al. She alleged that latter intruded their land, destroyed the crops, and posted “No
Tresspassing” preventing and depriving them from their residence and harvest.
o She argued that Carmen can never assert ownership over the property because it is a
government land. Also, Carmen’s parents, ceded their plantations on the subject land to
her husband Daniel Villondo (Daniel) for P2,000.00 as declared in a "Kasabutan" and that
Her family had prior possession of the land as her husband started tilling the same even
before the war. When she married him in 1948, they continued to occupy and cultivate the
land together with their five children.
• On the other hand, Carmen interposed that the alleged "Kasabutan" was never brought to her
attention by her parents. In any case, she asserted that such allegation of Valeriana even supports
her claim of prior possession. Also, she showed her tax declarations over the land.
• More importantly, they questioned Valeriana’s legal personality to sue, contending that "Daniel T.
Villondo," the named tiller in the Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099, is the real party-in-interest
and thus should be the plaintiff in the suit and not Valeriana.
o They claimed that "Daniel T. Villondo" is actually Valeriana’s son Romualdo Villondo
(Romualdo), a construction worker who had never even cultivated the subject land.
Respondents refuted Valeriana’s claim that the named tiller in the Certificate refers to her
husband "Daniel P. Villondo,"who was awarded by the government a Certificate of
Stewardship over another parcel of land in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she filed?
HELD: Yes, sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, Section 1, Rule 70 of the
ROC clearly allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the
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property against the alleged usurper. She has a right or interest to protect as she was the one dispossessed
and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry.
• Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely
affect her claim to possess the subject property.
o The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in
a forcible entry case. This matter already delves into the character of her possession.
• In ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable.
Furthermore, the MTCC correctly considered Valeriana as a real party-in-interest and correctly
delved strictly with the issue of physical possession. Notably, the CA, other than dismissing the
case for lack of cause of action, did not seem to dispute the MTCC's factual finding of Valeriana's
prior physical possession.
o Absent any evidence of respondents' prior physical possession, Valeriana, who has
cogently convinced us that she was dispossessed of the land by force, is entitled to stay on
the property until she is lawfully ejected by others who can prove in a separate proceeding
that they have a better right.
PRO-GUARD SECURITY v. TORMIL REALTY & DEV’T

G.R. No. 176341 | 7 July 2014
DOCTRINE: Demand to Vacate is the reckoning point when a lessee is required to pay rentals to the
adjudged lawful possessor.
FACTS:
• This stemmed from a property owned by Manuel whom he assigned to two separate and distinct
individuals.
• First assignment was made to Tormil while the second one was to Pabalan.
• Pabalan constructed building thereof and rented the 3rd floor to Pro-Guard.
• With the simultaneous assignments, Tormil filed a petition to SEC requiring Manuel to deliver him the
documents of the property as exchange to shares of stocks Tormil will issue to Manuel.
• SEC granted Tormil. Thus, Tormil sent letters to Pabalan and Pro-Guard asking them to validate their
possession of the property or enter into a lease contract with Tormil.
• The letters were ignored so Tormil sent demand letters to Pro-Guard to vacate the premises.
• Yet the demand letters were still unheeded so Tormil filed ejectment suit before MeTC.
• MeTC ruled in favor of Tormil. Pro-Guard appealed to RTC but affirmed MeTC.
• Again it was appealed to CA which affirmed RTC and held that Tormil was able to prove a case of
unlawful detainer under Rule 70 when he presented his tax declarations and titles over the parcels.
• Pro-Guard appealed saying it has no rentals due to Tormil during the time when it was in possession
of the 3rd floor and when its possession was by mere tolerance of Tormil.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reckoning of rental payments shall be made from demand to vacate?
HELD: Yes, in unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is in prior lawful possession but eventually
becomes unlawful upon expiration or termination of the right to possess.
• Filing of such action is within a year after withholding possession (meaning: dispossession has
not lasted for more than a year).
• In this case, Pro-Guard had been in lawful possession of the property before Tormil demanded
them to vacate.
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DEL ROSARIO v. GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION

G.R. No. 170575 | 8 June 2011
DOCTRINE: The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of whether
an action is one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Del Rosario, claiming to be the registered owner of a lot in Roxas City, filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation which took possession and
occupancy of the said lot.
• The complaint alleged that Del Rosario merely allowed the Foundation to make use of the land for
several years without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, the latter’s possession of the property
is only be tolerance. Furthermore, that demand letters were sent to the Foundation for the payment
of monthly rentals and to vacate the property but the same was left unheeded.
• The Foundation, in its Answer, alleged that it took possession of the subject property by virtue of
a Memorandum of Agreement entered into by it and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful
owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the Foundation was lawful, being a
lessee thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an unlawful detainer in this case?
HELD: No, the proper remedy for Del Rosario was to file a complaint for forcible entry and not the instant
suit for unlawful detainer.
• The Court, in Sumulong v. CA, differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-à-vis
unlawful detainer, to wit:
o In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.
o The possession in forcible entry is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has
the prior possession de facto. On the other hand, the possession in unlawful detainer was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant’s right to continue possession.
• For forcible entry, the words “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth” shall include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and
exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom.
o The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.
o Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery
and to gain entrance into or remain within the residence of another without permission.
o Strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the
subject property.
• In the case at bar, the employment of force is deduced from Del Rosario’s allegation that the
Foundation took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent and
authority. Strategy is also illustrated in Del Rosario’s allegation pertaining to the personalities
involved behind the transaction. Del Rosario, in his complaint, further alleged that the Foundation
took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.
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Assuming that all these are true, it follows that the Foundation’s possession was illegal from the
very beginning.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action has already prescribed?
HELD: Yes, considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time of
dispossession, such action in this case has already prescribed when the complaint was filed. As a
consequence, the complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the Foundation.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH v. ANDO

G.R. No. 195669 | 20 May 2016
Forcible entry and Unlawful Detainer
DOCTRINE: The filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the pendency of an action for
recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does
not amount to forum-shopping.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
and damages against herein respondents in their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford
Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI) before the MTCC of Mandaue City.
• MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its Complaint should not be dismissed for its failure to
comply with the requirement on the certification against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5
of the Rules of Court.
o That BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a complete
statement of the present status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of
certain parcels of land earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI
and the MBC against BUCCI.
• MTCC: dismissed the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to comply with
the rule on certification against forum shopping.
• On appeal before RTC: affirmed with prejudice
o Held that BUCCI was guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath that
there was another action involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending
before another court.
• CA: held that the MTCC and the RTC correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case.
o Found that BUCCI indeed failed to state in the certification against forum-shopping in the
unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the land ownership recovery
case; and that such failure impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not BUCCI committed forum-shopping?
HELD: No, the issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded, the
material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); whereas the
issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful owner
of the disputed parcels of land.
• In this case, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and
the land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two
cases. There is no forum shopping.
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MANZANILLA v. WATERFIELDS.
G.R. No. 177484 | 18 July 2014
DOCTRINE: To make a case of Unlawful detainer, there must be: a) failure to comply with conditions of
contract [to determine cause of action] and b) demand to comply and demand to vacate the premises [for
the court to acquire jurisdiction]
FACTS:
• Sps Manzanilla leased their property to Waterfields for 25 years reckoned from the date they amended
the said lease.
• Waterfields failed to pay monthly rentals so Waterfields sent letter to the Spouses promising to pay.
• Spouses then filed before MTC a Complaint for Ejectment on the ground that Waterfileds failed to pay
rentals on time despite demand.
• Waterfields allege in its answer that it is responsible for the improvements of the leased land and so
suffered business losses that’s why it failed to pay on time. It would be unjust to vacate them and hold
them liable for damages.
• MTC ruled in favor of Spouses Manzanilla.
• CA however reversed and found no cause of action against Waterfields. Because based on the amended
lease contract, the rental deposit may be utilizd to compensate for any unpaid rentals by Waterfields.
ISSUE: Whether there is a case of unlawful detainer?
HELD: Yes, the requisites for unlawful detainer to prosper have been satisfied.
Two requisites must concur for unlawful detainer to prosper:
a) Failure to pay rent or failure to comply with conditions of lease – this talks about the cause of
action.
• In this case, the lease contract was validly presented and its validity is proven.
• The non-payment of rentals gave rise to the cause of action since it is a violation of the lease
conditions. In fact, the letter of Waterfields promising to pay rentals already rendered them in
arrears. It is a clear admission of default.
b) Demand to pay or comply and demand to vacate – this talks about jurisdictional requirement
• Facts revealed that Spouses demanded Waterfields to pay and its filing of complaint
constitutes a demand to vacate.
SILVERIO v. SILVERIO
G.R. No. 186589 | 18 July 2014
Contempt
DOCTRINE: Since indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, a hearing is required
to resolve the charges, and cannot be based merely on written pleadings.
FACTS:
• RTC issued an Omnibus Order in a Special Proceeding regarding the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
S. Silverio. The order granted the Letters of Administration to Ricardo Silverio, Jr.in lieu of Silverio, Sr.
o Ricardo Silverio, Sr. is the surviving spouse of the decedent Beatriz, with whom he had
children: Ricardo Jr., Edmundo, Ligaya and Nelia Silverio-Dee.
o The subject matter of Special Proceeding is the decedent’s intestate estate, which includes
shares of stock in PDC and a residential house in Urdaneta.
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• Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.’s
appointment as the new administrator.
• CA issued 2 Resolutions, which in effect, granted Nelia’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the execution of the Omnibus Order.
• Ricardo Jr. filed an "Appeal under Rule 45 and/or Certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65" with the SC with a
prayer for the issuance of RO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking the reversal of CA’s
resolution and the issuance of injunctive relief.
• Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent 2 letters, one each to Ricardo Sr. and Lorna Silverio.
o Ricardo Jr. demanded in the 1st letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the
rights of a stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting with
third persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records.
o In the 2nd letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta
Village.
• Ricardo Sr. and Lorna filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with CA praying that Ricardo Jr. be
declared in indirect contempt of court as the demand letters violate and defy the CA’s Resolutions
enjoining his appointment as administrator pursuant to the Omnibus Order.
• CA dismissed the petition, finding it inappropriate to rule on whether Ricardo Jr. committed certain
acts violative of Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ricardo Jr. may be liable for Indirect Contempt?
HELD: No, what is most essential is that the alleged contemnor be granted an opportunity to meet the
charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. Due process must be observed at all times. The
respondent in an indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.
• Rule 71, Sections 3 and 4 provides the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished
for indirect contempt. These procedural requisites were not observed in this case.
(a) There must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt.
(b) The respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
(c) There must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's
answer.
(d) Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
CRUZ v. GINGOYON
G.R. No. 170404 | 28 September 2011
Contempt
DOCTRINE: A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt.
FACTS:
• This case stemmed from a civil complaint filed by petitioner Cruz against his neighbor, Mina, for
abatement of nuisance. In the said case, Cruz sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance
the “basketball goal” which was permanently attached to Mina’s residence but protrudes to the
alley which serves as the public’s only right of way.
• Mina was declared in default hence, Cruz presented his evidence ex-parte.
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• After trial, respondent Judge Gingoyon declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance. However,
the case was dismissed on the ground that Cruz lacked locus standi since an action for abatement
of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual.
• Cruz sought reconsideration, alleging in his Motion that the basis for which the judge has gathered
his information in arriving at his decision was because he was communicating with Mina, off the
record, even if the latter has already been declared in default.
• Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing and directed Cruz to substantiate his serious charge or
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Cruz, however, failed to appear during
the hearing. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order giving Cruz another 10 days to
show cause.
• Cruz complied with the Show Cause Order but Judge Gingoyon, nonetheless, issued an Order
finding Cruz guilty of direct contempt of court.
• An Order of Arrest was issued against Cruz and the latter filed an urgent ex-parte motion to post
bond and quash warrant of arrest, averring that he already filed a petition for certiorari before the
SC. The same was denied for failure to attach the alleged duly filed petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cruz is guilty of direct contempt?
HELD: Yes, a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent to ‘misbehavior committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt proceedings before the same’ within the meaning
of Rule 71(1) of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt.
• The act of a litigant in openly accusing the judge of communicating with the defendant off the
record, without factual basis bring the court into disrepute.
• Cruz was correctly found guilty of direct contempt of court in alleging in his Motion for
Reconsideration that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off record,
which is considered as a grave offense. Such allegation against Judge Gingoyon is unsubstantiated
and bereft of factual basis, and was even repeatedly made despite Judge Gingoyon’s outright
denial of communicating with Mina.
• Even assuming that the conclusion of Cruz is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in
cases of contempt. “Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be
observed and enforced.”
ISSUE: Whether or not abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC in denying the ex-parte motion?
HELD: No, since Cruz filed a petition for certiorari with the SC on the same day he filed his ex-parte motion
but only at a later time, then it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed
with the SC. As such, at the time he filed his ex-parte motion, he is considered as not yet having availed of
the remedy of certiorari and the execution of the judgment for contempt may not be suspended.
• The RTC acted well within the bounds of its authority in denying the ex-parte motion. Pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but he may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. In such
cases, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of the petition,
provided that such person files a bond fixed by the court.
TRINIDAD v. FAMA REALTY

G.R. No. 203336 | 6 June 2016
Contempt
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DOCTRINE: Where contempt is committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of contempt charges
in court is observed only when there is no law granting contempt powers to these quasi-judicial entities.
(Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on Contempt).
FACTS:
• This case refers to a Petition for Contempt filed directly before the SC.
o Gerardo and Corazon Trinidad offered to buy from Fama Realty (FAMA) 14 lots of the St.
Charbel Executive Village located at Mindanao Avenue, Tandang Sora, Quezon City for
PHP17,620,800.00.
• A controversy arose regarding Sps. Trinidads’ payments which prompted them to file with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) an action for specific performance against
FAMA and its president.
o HLURB ordered FAMA to execute the appropriate deed of sale over at least 3 lots and the
reservation application for the rest of the lots are hereby cancelled.
o FAMA appealed before the Office of the President but was dismissed and affirmed
HLURB’s decision.
o FAMA appealed before the CA.
• CA denied FAMA’s petition for lack of merit.
• Writ of Execution was issued and served upon FAMA , who in turn sent a Demand Letter to the
o Spouses demanding the issuance of 60 postdated checks totaling PHP 12,334,560.00.
o The Spouses filed a Motion to Clarify the computation of the purchase price payable to
FAMA as they believed that the above amount demanded was more than what they
believed was still owing to FAMA.
o HLURB Arbiter re-computed the remaining balance covering the 10 lots under the RAs
and directed FAMA to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale for the said 10 lots, upon payment
of the said balance. FAMA countered the computation made by the HLURB Arbiter with
a computation different from what was already computed by the HLURB Arbiter. Spouses
claimed that FAMA’s recomputation was made in bad faith.
o Spoused filed for an instant petition for contempt before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s petition for contempt filed before SC is proper?
HELD: No, where contempt is committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of contempt charges in
court is observed only when there is no law granting contempt powers to these quasi-judicial entities. This
case falls under the exception in Section 12, Rule 71 since there is a law granting contempt powers to
HLURB.
• The spouses should have sought to cite FAMA in contempt before the HLURB itself, and not this
Court. Executive Order No. 648, the HLURB Charter, grants the HLURB Board the power:
To cite and declare any person, entity or enterprise in direct or indirect contempt whenever any person,
entity or enterprise commits any disorderly or disrespectful conduct before the Commission or in the presence
of its members or authorized representatives actually engaged in the exercise of their official functions or
durin the conduct of any hearing or official inquiry by the said Commission, at the place or near the premises
where such hearing or proceeding is being conducted with obstruct, distract, interfere or in any other way
disturb, the performance of such functions or the conduct of such hearing or proceeding; or whenever any
person, enterprise or entity fails or refuses to comply with or obey without justifiable reason, any lawful
order, decision, writ or process of the Commission.
• In this case, Sps. Trinidad should have invoked the contempt powers of HLURB when FAMA
perceived misbehavior, disobedience, and disregard of the Order made by the HLURB’s Arbiter
and the Board itself. SC does not have jurisdiction to resolve the instant Petition.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
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ALFONSO v. SPS. ANDRES

G.R. No. 166236 | 29 July 2010
Extrajudicial Settlement
DOCTRINE: Publication of extrajudicial settlement is not needed to pass title to heirs.
FACTS:
• Spouses Andres filed a complaint for accion publiciana with damages against Noli Alfonso and
Sps. Fundialan. They alleged that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Marcelino Alfonso is required before their father, Jose, could validly transfer the subject
property.
• RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of extrajudicial settlement is needed in order to transfer the property to
heirs?
HELD: No, in Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of extrajudicial
settlement that was neither notarized nor published.
• Title of property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs, but it is subject
to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of
paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the
death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.
• The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose
evidences their intention to partition the inherited property. It delineated what portion of the
inherited property would belong to whom.
o The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published,
being deemed a partition of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer ownership
over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.
NAVIA v. PARDICO
G.R. No. 184467 | 19 June 2012
Writ of Amparo
DOCTRINE: It is essential in an amparo petition to establish that the disappearance was carried out with
the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
FACTS:
• A vehicle of Asian Land arrived at the house of Lolita Lapore. Two uniformed guards immediately
asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. The guard saw Bong and told him that he and
Ben, his brother, should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was
lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
• Bong and Ben admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to
a post nearer to the house of Lolita. Since there was no complainant, Navia, the supervisor of the
security guards, ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect
that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury. Lolita also signed the logbook
below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
• Subsequently, petitioners receive an invitation from the police station requesting them to appear
relative to a complaint of Virginia Pardico about her missing husband Ben.
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• According to Respondent however, Bong and Ben were unlawfully arrested. Navia also allegedly
inflicted injury towards Ben and even threatened to kill him after admitting that he and Bong
attempted to took the lamp. Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards’ logbook
twice wherein she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.
• The following morning, Virginia made efforts to find her husband but to no avail. Virginia then
filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC which granted it, thus this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective?
HELD: Yes, Ben’s disappearance does not fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or the Rule on The
Writ of Amparo. In an Amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government.
• This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not
contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that
the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance.
• Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is
a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. REYNALDO

G.R. No. 164538 | 9 August 2010
Prosecution of Offenses
DOCTRINE: The remedy for the non-inclusion of those ought to be charged and not included in the
complaint is to include them in the information.
FACTS:
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila with the crime of estafa.
• In the affidavit of petitioner’s audit officer, it alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending
operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.
o Respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee that authorized
Universal to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks
deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch.
• Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only
intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
• Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant prosecutor found petitioners’ evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa.
• Secretary of Justice also dismissed the petition since it noted that it chose only to file a case of estafa against
its employees and not against their big-time client Universal who benefited from the transaction and was
given the benefit to pay on installment basis.
• CA also affirmed the decision stating just as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase
transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot
be made liable for the same transactions.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the non-inclusion of the officers of Universal is a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint?
HELD: No, the non-inclusion of officers of Universal is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint. Their
non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor from prosecution of
the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.
• Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be
responsible therefor.
• Thus, the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the
evidence may show to be responsible for the offense.
• The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in
the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the
information.
ABELLANA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174654 | 17 August 2011
Prosecution of Civil Action
DOCTRINE: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Abellana extended a loan to private respondents spouses Alonto, secured by a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over two (2) lots in Cebu.
• A Deed of Absolute Sale was then prepared by Abellana and signed by the spouses, thereby
conveying the said lots to him. The said Deed was notarized in Cebu allegedly without the Spouses
Alonto appearing before the notary public.
• Abellana, by virtue of the Deed of Sale, caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the
lots to third persons.
• An Information was filed charging Abellana with estafa through falsification of public document
for “imitating, counterfeiting, signing or causing to be imitated or counterfeited the signature of
the spouses Alonto, and thereby causing it to appear that the spouses Alonto participated in the
execution of the Deed of Sale when they did not so participate.”
• The RTC found Abellana guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.
• The CA reversed the RTC and acquitted Abellana, ruling that the conviction of petitioner for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding with respect to Abellana’s civil liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of acquittal extinguished the civil liability of Abellana?
HELD: No, the acquittal in this case was merely because of the infringement of Abellana’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when the RTC instead convicted him of
falsification of a public document.
• A judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
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did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party
in the same criminal action.
• In the case at bar, there was no declaration by either courts that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. As such, the extinction of the criminal action did not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abellana should be held civilly liable?
HELD: No, the acts allegedly committed by Abellana did not cause any damage to the spouses Alonto.
• Civil liability can only arise when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, causes damage to another. Based on the records of the case, no damage was caused to
the spouses Alonto because they actually signed the document although they did not personally
appear before the notary public for its notarization.
• The defective notarization also did not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Sale and the spouses’ non-
appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements
contained in the Deed. Only sufficient, clear and convincing evidence can overcome such
presumption as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the Deed. In the absence
of such proof, the Deed must be upheld and shall remain valid.
LIM v. MINDANAO WINES

G.R. No. 175851|4 July 2012
Prosecution of Civil Action
DOCTRINE: Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil liability.
FACTS:
• Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H &
E Commercial owned by Emilia. Emilia issued four PNB checks but two of these checks bounced
for the reasons ‘account closed’ and ‘drawn against insufficient funds’. Mindanao Wines
demanded from H & E Commercial the payment for the two bounced checks but the demand
went unheeded.
• Mindanao filed with the MTCC of Davao City a criminal case against Emilia for violations of BP
22.
• After the prosecution rested its case, Emilia filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming insufficiency
of evidence. She asserted that not one of the elements of BP 22 was proven because the witness
merely relied upon the reports of the salesman, the purchases covered were unauthorized, and
that it was never established that the bank dishonored the checks or that she was given notice of
dishonor.
• The MTCC of Davao City granted the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted Emilia. It ruled that
the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of violation of BP 22, that fact of dishonor of
the two subject checks, thus the guilt of Emilia has not been established beyond reasonable doubt
o However, the MTCC still found her civilly liable because when she redeemed one of the
checks during the pendency of the criminal cases.
• Emila appealed to the RTC, she contended that the dismissal of the criminal aspect of the case
based on the ground of insufficient evidence should also dismiss the civil aspect of the criminal
case.
o The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC. It ruled that the dismissal was based on
reasonable doubt and not on insufficiency of evidence.
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• On appeal to CA, it affirmed in toto the ruling of the lower courts. The CA emphasized that even
if acquitted, an accused may still be held civilly liable if a) the acquittal was based on reasonable
doubt or b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Emilia’s BP 22 cases likewise includes the dismissal of their civil
aspect?
HELD: No, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.
• Even though the MTCC granted the demurrer of evidence filed by Emilia on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, the MTCC in its judgment expressly stated that her guilt was indeed not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Furthermore, MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential element of BP 22 was
missing, i.e., the fact of the bank’s dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element
of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks was presented by the prosecution.
o This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the
prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence
required in criminal cases.
o Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing
debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of
evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence.
DE GUZMAN v. GONZALEZ III

G.R. No. 158104 | 26 March 2010
Preliminary Investigation
DOCTRINE: In preliminary investigation, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Angelita de Guzman was the municipal treasurer of Claveria, Cagayan.
• When her office was subjected to an audit, it was revealed that there was a shortage of P368,049.42.
The audit team demanded that de Guzman explain herself and to produce the missing funds
within 72 hours, but no compliance was made.
• De Guzman was then indicted for malversation of public funds before the RTC.
• Alleging that she was not able to participate in the preliminary investigation as she was out of the
country, she moved for and was granted a reinvestigation where she submitted her counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidence.
• After the reinvestigation, the prosecutor recommended that the charges against de Guzman be
dismissed for insufficiency to establish a probable cause, arguing, among others, that de Guzman’s
cashbook has not been certified by the COA auditors. Despite this, the Graft Investigation Officer
recommended to proceed with the prosecution.
• The Deputy Ombudsman approved the prosecution of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause despite the non-
certification of de Guzman’s cashbook?
HELD: Yes, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect—not on clear and convincing evidence of
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guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
• The Graft Investigation Officer and the Deputy Ombudsman were acting well within their
authority when they recommended and decided to proceed with the prosecution.
o Citing Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court held that the finality of the COA
report was not necessary in determining Whether or not the prosecution should proceed
with the case. The filing of the information against de Guzman notwithstanding the non-
certification of her cashbook was not premature, whimsical, or arbitrary.
• The Court reiterated the principle that the discretion to determine whether a case should be filed
or not lies with the Ombudsman. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled for as a policy of non-interference by the courts in
the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.
EVANGELISTA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 163267 | 5 May 2010
DOCTRINE: Once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the discretion of the court.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Teofilo Evangelista was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
• After posting bail, Evangelista filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings and the Holding of a
Preliminary Investigation, which was granted by the RTC.
• Upon investigation, the prosecutor found no probable cause to indict Evangelista and
recommended the dismissal of the case. The prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information
but was denied.
• After trial, the RTC found Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
• Evangelista then filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the RTC. After the new trial,
the RTC still found him to be guilty of the crime. CA affirmed.
• In this case, Evangelista is arguing, among others, that he was denied his substantive right of
preliminary investigation when the RTC disregarded and denied the prosecution’s Motion to
Withdraw Information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary investigation
HELD: No, there is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding the result
of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise
of judicial discretion.
• Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court is not
dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor.
CORPUZ v. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 149261 | 15 December 2010
114
DOCTRINE: The determination of probable cause for the filing of an Information in court is an executive
function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the
Secretary of Justice.
FACTS:
• A complaint-affidavit was filed by the respondent Assistant Solicitor General del Rosario accusing
herein petitioner Assistant Solicitor General Corpuz for libel.
• After preliminary investigation, the Investigating Prosecutor, in her Resolution, found probable
cause and explained that the words “there is no such thing as palabra de honor as far as ASG del
Rosario is concerned” contained in a 1997 Memorandum is defamatory as it tends to discredit
respondent’s integrity as Assistant Solicitor General.
o Furthermore, that the Memorandum was addressed not only to respondent but to all
Assistant Solicitors General, hence, reveals the absence of good intention on her part in
making the imputation. In fine, the evidence presented has sufficiently established a
probable cause to indict respondent with the crime of libel.
• An Information for libel was filed against Corpuz before the RTC. An appeal was made before the
DOJ, which was denied. The subsequent appeal to the CA was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion was committed by the prosecutor?
HELD: No, the prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent since such determination is an
executive function of the prosecutor. Judicial review is allowed only where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
• Petitioner Corpuz failed to establish the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor so as to allow judicial review.
• The presence of the elements for the crime of libel was duly established during the preliminary
investigation stage and which clearly showed prima facie a well-founded belief that a crime of libel
has been committed and that petitioner probably committed it. This, however, is not a finding of
guilt, such determination of which must be made in a full-blown trial.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. REYNALDO

G.R. No. 164538 | 9 August 2010
DOCTRINE: Judicial review may be allowed where grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutor in the
conduct of preliminary investigation has been established.
FACTS:
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila with the crime of estafa.
• In the affidavit of petitioner’s audit officer, it alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending
operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.
o Respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee that authorized
Universal to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional checks
deposited in its account at petitioners Port Area branch.
• Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only
intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
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• Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant prosecutor found petitioners’ evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa.
• Secretary of Justice also dismissed the petition since it noted that it chose only to file a case of estafa against
its employees and not against their big-time client Universal who benefited from the transaction and was
given the benefit to pay on installment basis.
• CA also affirmed the decision stating just as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase
transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot
be made liable for the same transactions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may review the finding of the public prosecutor in preliminary
investigation
HELD: Yes. By way of an exception to the general rule that a public prosecutor is afforded wide latitude of
discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, judicial review is allowed where grave abuse of
discretion by the prosecutor has been established. This case falls under the EXCEPTION.
• In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. The Secretary of Justice,
however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
• The findings of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and
contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. A preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is “not a part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
• In this case, the public prosecutor and Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand.
VILLAMOR & BONAOBORA y TAYSON v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200396 | 22 March 2017
Arrest
DOCTRINE: A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to
barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant.
FACTS:
• Villamor and Bonaobora were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and
soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng” and possessing a list of
various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash.
• In Amended Informations, Villamor was also charged as a collector in an illegal numbers game,
while Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator
• Prosecution presented four policemen as witnesses:
o That there was an informant on the illegal gambling in Catanduanes as well as a civilian
asset proceeded to Bonaobra’s residence to confirm the report;
o That upon arrival at the target area, accused were seen in the act of counting bets
o That they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the
table consisting of cash, the “papelitos,” a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen.
• Thereafter, petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were
investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
116
• RTC: found accused guilty and gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held
that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game. CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest?
HELD: No, after a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners.
o It was not properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the
presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Penaflor,
they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the petitioners’ right against unreasonable searches and
seizures?
HELD: No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra’s compound without a valid warrant of
arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and
seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.
• Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of
probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without
the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution
and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
o “Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and
seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree.”
REBELLION v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 175700 | 5 July 2010
Arrest
DOCTRINE:
• A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under
any of the following circumstances: 1) In flagrante delicto; 2) Hot pursuit arrest; 3) Arrest of escaped
prisoner.
• An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or
to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
FACTS:
• Police officers were on routine patrol along a street in Mandaluyong, when they chanced upon two
individuals in the act of exchanging something.
• The officers introduced themselves and inquired from petitioner Salvador Rebellion what he was
holding. The petitioner took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which the
officers confiscated. The officers also found on petitioner a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. The petitioner was then arrested by the officers.
• The objects confiscated tested positive for shabu. On the basis thereof, the petitioner was charged
with violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended.
• After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
117
• On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not committing
any crime when he was arrested. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s arrest is valid?
HELD: Yes, petitioner’s arrest is a valid warrantless arrest.

• A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under
any of the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 112. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court)
• Upon review of the case, the SC found that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner was effected
under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113 or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. Thus, his case comes under
the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the accused properly questioned the legality of his arrest on appeal?
HELD: No, an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
PEOPLE v. AMPER
G.R. No. 172708 | 5 May 2010
Arrest
DOCTRINE: An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or
to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, which should be made before
arraignment.
FACTS:
• Accused Joseph Amper was charged with the complex crime of robbery with rape committed
against “AAA”.
• Amper pleaded not guilty during arraignment. Trial then ensued.
• The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
• On appeal to the CA, the accused raised the irregularity of his arrest for the first time. Despite this,
the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Can the accused raise the issue of irregularity of his arrest for the first time in the CA?
HELD: No, an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground, which should be made before
arraignment.
118
• This is not allowed considering that he was already properly arraigned and even actively
participated in the proceedings. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect when
he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
GREGORIO SINGIAN JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 195011-19 | 30 September 2013
Trial
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
• Atty. Orlando Salvador, PCGG Consultant, tasked to examine and study the reports and
recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all government
financing institutions found that petitioner’s company ISI applied for a 5 year-confirmed
irrevocable deferred letter of credit amounting to US$2,500,000.00 (₱16,287,500.00) to finance its
purchase of a complete line of machinery and equipment.
o However, the Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest
loans specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with
undue haste.
• As a result, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint 1996, for violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No. 3019. Thereafter, the corresponding eighteen
(18) Informations against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep.
Act No. 3019were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
o It was alleged in the Information for Section 3(e)and 3 (g) that PNB Directors conspired
and criminally entered with officers of ISI including petitioner by accommodating and
granting several loans despite knowing that it lacked sufficient capitalization or failed to
give adequate collateral as in fact it failed to pay loans.
• On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. Sandiganbayan dismissed
the criminal case but trial with respect to the remaining cases ensued.
• In 2010, petitioners, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that there is lack
of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official, the contracts with PNB were not manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, the loans were not characterized as behest because of
the presence of sufficient collaterals and even so, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any
participation.
• Sandiganbayan dismissed the Demurrer to Evidence. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Demurrer to Evidence was validly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan?
HELD: Yes, the court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt. It must be emphasized that the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be
left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
119
• A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain the issue.
• A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed unless accused has established that such
judicial discretion has been gravely abused thereby amounting to a lack of excess of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE v. GO
G.R. No. 191015 | 6 August 2014
Trial
DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
• Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed for two counts of Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Documents with City Prosecution of Manila against Go in relation to the loans
obtained by them. Information was filed upon finding probable cause.
• Prosecution presented evidence: managers check deposited from bank’s account to prove that Go
misappropriated funds that should rightfully belong to the bank, bank was placed under
receivership due to misappropriated funds, signature of Go different from his other documents
• Go filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.
Motion was granted by the RTC.
• The Prosecution thru OSG filed petition for Certiorari to CA saying that the order of RTC was
issued with grave abuse of discretion and they were deprived of its day in court.
• CA dismissed the petition and declared RTC order final and so double jeopardy attached. There
are no pieces of evidence identifying that it was Go and respondents who falsified the documents.
ISSUE: Whether granting demurrer to evidence is proper?
HELD: No, the grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
RTC’ grant of demurrer to evidence was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
• The grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
• The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt
o Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances.
o To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the
crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.
• In this case, Court finds that the prosecution has presented those competent evidence to sustain
the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that
respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof
120
PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)

G.R. No. 174504 | 21 March 2011
Trial
DOCTRINE: An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Such order is
reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
• Private respondent Barcenas was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of P.D. 1445
(Government Auditing Code of the Philippines) for having obtained cash advances from the City
Government of Toledo and failing to liquidate the same.
• The prosecution presented its lone witness, filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
• Barcenas filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. A demurrer
to evidence was then filed.
• The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer and dismissed the case on the ground that at the time
the case was filed in court, Barcenas had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter
hereof. Hence, the element of damages is wanting.
• A petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Sandiganbayan’s resolution was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction?
HELD: No, in criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal
order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
• For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.
• Although the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrer on the ground relied upon, such error
committed was an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which was in effect a judgment on the
merits from which no appeal may be had.
o In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrer on the ground that
the liquidation has been subsequently made. Actual damage to the government arising
from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of the offense
punished under P.D. 1445. Instead, the mere failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is
the gravamen of the offense.
o Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the
law, this cannot be relied upon to reverse the order of dismissal as petitioners failed to
establish that the same was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Petition is DISMISSED.
EFREN S. ALMUETE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 179611| 12 March 2013
Judgment
121
DOCTRINE: The practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial court for promulgation of the
judgment of the appellate court should be immediately discontinued.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Almuete, Ila and Lloren were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised
Forestry Code. On their scheduled date of promulgation, counsel of petitioners informed the trial
court that Almuete and Lloren were sick and that Ila was not notified.
o Trial Court found the absence inexcusable and convicted them. Hence, warrants if arrest
were issued against them.
• They moved for reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit. Instead of filing an appeal, they
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted and ordered their acquittal. But SC reversed
the same and reinstated the RTC decision. Petitioner filed an MR but was again denied by SC in a
Resolution.SC then issued an Entry of Judgment.
• Unfazed, petitioner filed 2nd and a 3rdMotion for Reconsideration, which were denied by this SC.
• Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s
September 8, 1998 Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July
26, 2006 Resolution.
• On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation of the
September 8, 1998 Decision.
• RTC denied the Repromulgation. The MR was likewise denied. CA dismissed the petition and
denied the MR in a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for repromulgation of judgment is validly denied?
HELD: Yes, the denial of the motion for repromulgation is valid and consistent with Administrative
Circular No. 16093 (Procedure After Affirmance or Modification of the Supreme Court/Court of Appeals
of Judgments of Conviction in Criminal Cases).
• The circular provides that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for
promulgation of the affirmance or modification by the SC/CA of judgments of conviction is no
longer allowed. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing unnecessary expense, but it
could also create security problems where the convict was already under detention during the
pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the
court.
• Hence, such denial of the motion for Repromulgation by the RTC is valid. No abuse of discretion
could also be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of the
petitioner.
PEOPLE v. QUITA
G.R. No. 212818 | 25 January 2017
Appeal
DOCTRINE: When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court, unless the trial court had overlooked,
disregarded, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and significance which, if
considered, would have altered the result of the case.
122
FACTS:
• Gregorio Quita, alias Greg (GREGORIO), and Fleno Quita, (brothers) alias Eddie Boy (FLENO)
were indicted for murder for killing ROBERTO SOLAYAO.
• Paquito Solayao (PAQUITO) was the father of SOLAYAO and claimed that he knew Gregorio and
Fleno as they were the ones who deliver water. He also stated that he saw Gregorio holding
Roberto’s hand at the back while Roberto was being stabbed by Fleno
• Defense stated Gregorio had ever known the victim or met him even once and that he did not
commit the said crime. He was only made to sign a blank piece of paper. He statd that he was never
brought to the prosecutor’s office. Fleno was apparently was in bicutan at the time of the incident.
• RTC convicted accused. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may change the factual findings of both the RTC and CA?
HELD: No, the rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence.
• The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses because of [its] unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grueling examination.
o Gregorio’s appeal before this Court is predicated essentially upon the selfsame lone
assignment of error set forth in his Brief with the CA.
• Since the factual findings by the CA are binding upon this Court, especially when the CA’s
findings unite with the RTC’s factual findings, as in this case, this Court is not at liberty to reject
or disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. The Court is satisfied that the factual findings
of both lower courts are in accord with the evidence on record.
PETRON GASUL LPG DEALERS v. LAO

G.R. No. 205010 | 18 July 2016
Search and Seizure
DOCTRINE: Generally, the search warrant application must be filed with the court, which has territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the offense was alleged to be committed except for compelling reasons.
FACTS:
• Complainants requested assistance from the NBI-CAR for investigation and prosecution of persons
and/or establishments in the Cordillera and Mountain Province engaged in illegal trade of
petroleum products and/or sale or possession of underfilled LPG.
• After a test-buy and a series of investigations, the NBI filed with RTC-La Trinidad applications for
search warrants against Benguet Gas and Baguio Gas (Respondents).
• It declared that his applications included Baguio Gas even if it is located in Baguio City because of
"compelling reasons of urgency, subject, time, and place."
o He explained that a) time is of essence here as the volume of LPG cylinders being illegally
refilled by Baguio Gas reflected the capacity of its facilities to perpetrate illegal acts
resulting to unhampered illegal trade of LPG and unhampered underfilling of LPG
products or possession of underfilled LPG cylinders for the purpose of sale, distribution,
exchange or barter; b) the brisk sales of LPG cylinders may result in the depletion of stocks,
leaving nothing to be seized if a search warrant will be eventually issued but at a later date;
and, c) the immediate hearing on and issuance of a search warrant are precautions against
possible leakage of information to Baguio Gas.
123
• After serving the search warrants against Respondents, they moved for the Quashal of the search
warrants because the offenses were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-La
Trinidad and for failure to show any “compelling reason” that would warrant its issuance outside
the courts of Baguio.
ISSUE: Whether there were compelling reasons to justify the issuance of the search warrants in RTC-La
Trinidad?
HELD: Yes. Generally, the search warrant application must be filed with the court, which has territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the offense was alleged to be committed. This, however, is not an ironclad
rule. For compelling reasons, which must be expressly stated in the application, a search warrant
application may be filed in a court other than the one having jurisdiction over the place where the
purported offense was committed and where the search warrant shall be enforced.
The above-cited portions of the search warrant applications satisfactorily comply with the required
statement of compelling reasons why they were filed in RTC-La Trinidad and not in a court in Baguio City.
The period of time between the test-buy and the filing of the applications does not by itself negate the
strength of the applicant's allegations or his testimony, including that of his witness. It even strengthens
the case as it shows that thorough investigations were first made so that the applications would not just be
filed hastily without first obtaining sufficient evidence in support of the probable cause necessary for the
issuance of search warrants.
In issuing search warrants, the court must consider the subject, the time and the place of its enforcement.
When the RTC-La Trinidad initially granted search warrant applications against respondents, the same
was based on its sound judicial discretion.
PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOC v. ANG

G.R. No. 199371 | 3 February 2016
Search and Seizure
DOCTRINE: Facts discovered during surveillance operations conducted by the authorities on the basis of
information and evidence provided by the complainants constitute personal knowledge which could
form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
FACTS:
• Petitioners Petron LPG Dealers Association and Total Gaz LPG Dealers Association, together with
other liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) associations, filed a letter-complaint before the NBI-Ilocos
Regional Office, requesting assistance in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and
prosecution of respondents Ang, et al. and Nation Gas.
• It mainly alleged that respondents are engaged in illegal trading of LPG products and/or
underfilling, possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG products in violation of Sections 2 (a) and
(c), in relation to Sections 3 and 4 of BP Blg. 335 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 18656.
• Trial court issued Search Warrant, to which Respondent filed Motion to Quash said search warrant.
• Issuing court released an Order quashing the subject warrants.
o It held that De Jemil and Antonio had no personal knowledge that Nation Gas was not an
authorized LPG refiller of the complaining LPG companies/associations and that the
certifications issued by the LPG companies were hearsay.
• CA denied the appeal of petitioner.
124
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause in issuing the search warrant?
HELD: No, probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.
• Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the
circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a
flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.
o The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he
or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
• The Court finds the evidence presented sufficient to prove probable cause; the issuing court and
the CA thus patently erred in quashing the search warrants.
PEOPLE v. COLLADO
G.R. No. 185719| 17 July 2013
Search and Seizure
DOCTRINE: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be upheld in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the same.
FACTS:
• PO2 Noble received information from that spouses Collado were engaged in selling shabu and that
drug users were using their residence for their drug sessions. A buy-bust operation team was
thereafter formed. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as
a regular buyer of shabu. When PO2 Noble was handing over the marked money to Marcelino, the
latter motioned that the same be given to his wife, Myra.Marcelino then took from his pocket a
small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble.
• While PO2 Noble noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple around which
were seven persons. PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene.
PO2 Noble introduced himself as a policeman and arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was
able to confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet of white crystalline substance.
PO2 Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004" on both the plastic sachets of white
substance sold to him by Marcelino and the one found inside the metal container.
• SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they
found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a
table littered with various drug paraphernalia. The buy-bust team arrested all these persons,
advised them of their constitutional rights, and brought them to police headquarters for
investigation and drug testing.
• The RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. 9165. Appellants question the validity of
the buy-bust operation because of: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-compliance with the
procedures laid down under RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged extortion of money from them by PO2
Noble in exchange for dropping the charges against them.
125
ISSUE: Whether the buy-bust operation was valid despite lack of warrant of arrest?
HELD: Yes, the arrest was valid. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto.
• The arrest was effected after the spouses performed the overt act of selling the sachet of shabu and
Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Arrest made by the police
officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants were
committing the said crimes.
• Assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question
the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether the subsequent search and seizure made by the police is likewise valid?
HELD: Yes, since the arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
“a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant."
• The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were
lawfully arrested. The subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise
valid.
EVIDENCE
DIEGA v. CA
G.R. No. 173510 | 15 March 2010
Admissibility of Evidence
DOCTRINE: An accused may be convicted by circumstantial evidence if:

(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences were derived have been established; and
(3) The combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
FACTS:
• AAA was a 13-year old girl who usually passes a farm, where appellant was employed as a stay-
in security guard on her way to school.
• On March 17, 1995, AAA failed to return home and her dead body was discovered inside the
plantation the next day.
• The police investigation revealed that one Juanito saw the appellant stooping down and noticed
AAA without undergarments lying unconscious on the ground. Appellant threatened to kill
Juanito if he would reveal to anyone what he witnessed.
o It was also found out that although appellant reported for work on March 17, 1995, he was
not in his post and could not be located.
o AAA’s aunt testified that prior to the commission of the crime, appellant always looked
lecherously at AAA.
• Appellant was found guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide before the RTC. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented are strong enough to convict the accused?
HELD: Yes, considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged herein, the
weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well settled rule that an
126
accused can be convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence
is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.
• Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is
sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been established; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
• In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. Some
circumstantial evidence cited by the Court are as follows:
o The appellant lived and worked as a security guard in the farm where AAA was raped
and killed. And, AAA routinely passed by the farm on her way home, and the appellant
displayed lewd interest whenever he saw AAA by touching her arms and making lewd
comments.
o Although the appellant reported for duty on the day the crime was committed, he was not
on his post and could not be located.
o On March 17, Juanito identified the appellant, clad only in short pants, as the only person
beside the unconscious AAA, whose blouse was unbuttoned and crumpled, and whose
skirt was raised above her knees, near the banana grove inside the farm. And, appellant
threatened to kill Juanito.
o During the police investigation, the appellant had several scratches on his arms, neck, and
body, which the investigators determined to have been caused by fingernails.
o The autopsy revealed that AAA was raped, beaten and strangled to death on or about the
time and date Juanito saw the appellant beside the unconscious body of AAA.
o The appellant also fled his residence before the warrant of arrest could be served by the
police.
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176229 | 19 October 2011
DOCTRINE: Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation renders inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not other excluded by law or the rules, is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
FACTS:
• This is a case involving a violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. United Arab Emirates Airlines
Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at NAIA and among its passengers were 13 Hongkong
nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists.
• At the arrival area, the said individuals presented a Bag Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Cinco. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers and upon inspection, found
chocolate boxes in each bag of almost the same size. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the
chocolate boxes and opening one of them, saw white crystalline substances contained in
transparent plastic bags. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of six of
the accused.
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• The NARCOM, upon examination, found the substances to be shabu. The 13 tourists were then
brought to the NBI for further questioning and the drugs were confiscated and turned over to the
Forensic Chemist.
• Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) only against petitioner and his five co-accused. Accordingly, six separate Informations
were filed against the accused. Upon reinvestigation which gave way to the finding of conspiracy,
a single Amended Information was filed.
• The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged.
o Ho Wai Pang filed an appeal to the exclusion of the other co-accused, alleging among
others that the statements made during the custodial investigation must be excluded as
evidence since he was not assisted by counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statements made during the custodial investigation must be excluded?
HELD: No, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only
to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
their conviction. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not
otherwise excluded by law or the rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
• Petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his
guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently
used in evidence against him.
• Petitioner’s conviction was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting
shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. The testimony of Cinco,
who witnessed the entire incident, provided direct evidence as she was eyewitness to the very act
of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, her testimony was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence need not be corroborated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conspiracy was sufficiently established?

HELD: Yes, although no direct evidence to conclude conspiracy was found to exist, there are enough
circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy.
• Based on circumstantial evidence, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused’s collective
conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Yes, the evidence adduced against petitioner is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
• Petitioner’s defense, consisting mainly of denials, failed to successfully rebut the evidence for the
prosecution. As a rule, the affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or
facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.
PEOPLE v. BIGLETE
G.R. No. 182920 | 18 June 2012
128
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
• While Alcos was driving a passenger jeepney, he was shot by a motorcycle driver. Biglete, the
owner of the motorcycle, was charged with the crime of murder.
• The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
o Susan Alcos (the wife of Arnel) testified that she was seated beside Arnel in the jeepney
during the incident. She testified that after Arnel was shot, she was able to see Biglete in a
red T-shirt driving a red motorcycle and holding a gun. She further testified that she did
not see any other person holding a gun at that time.
o Andaya (traffic enforcer) testified that he saw a motorcycle following a jeepney. The driver
of the motorcycle, who was wearing a red T-shirt, then fired at the driver of the jeepney.
o Panganiban testified that, after hearing a bump on the gate of his house, he saw that a red
motorcycle crashed into his gate. Near the motorcycle was a revolver.
o Police Officer Calabia testified that Biglete reported to him that his motorcycle was
carnapped. Since nobody could tell if such incident had transpired, Calabia told Biglete to
return the next day to subscribe his statement. Biglete, however, did not return. When
Calabia went to Biglete’s address as indicated in his statement, Biglete was found not to be
a resident thereat. He subsequently went missing until 3 years after the incident, when he
was finally arrested.
• Biglete argues that he could not have been the one who killed Arnel. According to him, at the time
of the incident, he was hit with a piece of wood while he was riding his motorcycle. When he fell
down from the motorcycle, somebody got hold of the same. He and his cousin then went to their
uncle who is a police officer and the day thereafter, he reported the incident to Calabia, stating that
his motorcycle was carnapped.
o Furthermore, he argues that there is no direct evidence imputing him of the crime. What
were presented by the prosecution are only circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict Biglete?
HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for
conviction: (1) when there is more than one circumstance; (2) when the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
• In this case, Susan’s testimony that she saw Biglete holding a gun after Arnel was shot, was
corroborated by Andaya. Also, the combination of the events as testified by the witnesses leads to
the conclusion that Biglete killed Arnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Biglete’s denial and alibi should prevail over the evidence of the prosecution?
HELD: No, aside from being inherently weak, Biglete’s denial and alibi were unsubstantiated. He did not
present his cousin or his uncle to corroborate his testimony. His defense is thus self-serving. Placed side
by side with the evidence presented by the prosecution, Biglete’s denial and alibi must fail.
PEOPLE v. SOLANO JR.

G.R. No. 199871 | 4 June 2014
129
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial Evidence is sufficient to convict an individual charged of Rape with Homicide
because if testimony of prosecution fits the puzzle of a whole story, they are credible and relevant, and they
add to the facts that no one was last seen with the victim but the accused.
FACTS:
• This involves a charge of Rape with Homicide against Solano for raping and causing the immediate
death of a 12-year old girl.
• The Trial Court rendered Solano guilty based on circumstantial evidence. This was affirmed by CA.
• The conviction was based on the following circumstantial evidence provided for by the prosecution’s
witnesses:
o Testimony of Canon: on the morning of the incident, he was about 50-60m away from the
grassy place where he saw Solano chasing AAA.
o Testimony of Nestor: he was 9m away in a grassy place where he saw Solano holding an
unconscious AAA by her armpits while dragging her on the ground. Thereafter, he was
informed that AAA had been missing so he went to Chief Campo and told what he saw.
o Testimony of Chief Campo: he and a group of 30 persons went to the site where AAA’s body
was found. After learning of Nestor’s report, he proceeded to apprehend Solano. Solano,
according to Chief, confessed that he raped and killed AAA but he was remorseful and
repentant.
o Testimony of Municipal Health Office: finding that AAA’s genitalia showed blood oozing out
from vagina and marked with hymenal lacerations.
o Cross-examination of Solano: admitted holding grudge on AAA’s family because his sister was
raped by one of AA’s relatives.
• The main contention now of Solano is that the decision of conviction may not be based on
circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict someone of Rape with Homicide?
HELD: Yes, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following are present:
(1) There is more than one circumstance
(2) The facts from which inferences are derived are proven
(3) The combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
• In this case, the testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses are credible and logical when taken together.
It fits the puzzle of the whole story. The fact that no one was last seen with AAA but Solano added
to the facts established by the prosecution’s witnesses.
BANKARD, INC. v. ALARTE

G.R. No. 202573| 19 April 2017
Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence
DOCTRINE: Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. As a rule, he
who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.
FACTS:
• BANKARD INC. (Now, RCBC Bankard Services Corporation) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of providing credit card services. It filed a collection case against Luz P. ALARTE.
o It alleged that Alarte applied and was granted credit accommodations which she had
utilized and garnered credit availments amounting to PHP67,944.82.
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o Despite receipt of a written demand from Bankard, Alarte still refused to pay her
outstanding obligations. She also failed to file her answer despite service of summons.
o Bankard filed a Motion to Render Judgment.
• MeTC: dismissed Bankard’s case for lack of preponderance of evidence. It merely submitted a
single statement of account, which only reflected the late charges and interest charges accrued to
Alarte’s account.
o There is no indication that Alarte herself made the alleged purchases, thus, the alleged
outstanding balance in the said account cannot just be implicated against Alarte.
• RTC: affirmed in toto.
• CA: affirmed. Bankard failed to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence.
*Note that all throughout the proceedings, Alarte did not participate, answered, commented or filed anything
as against Bankard’s claim.
ISSUE: Whether Bankard has sufficiently presented evidence to support its pecuniary claim?
HELD: No, the burden of proving is always on the party alleging the affirmative issue.
• Since Bankard was alleging that Alarte had incurred an outstanding balance of PHP64,615.64, it
should have added pieces of evidence which will show Alarte’s credit history and proving that
there were indeed loan transactions which have existed between them, after all, credit card
arrangements are simple loan transaction between the card issuer and the card holder.
• SC pointed out that Bankard’s petition was not well-prepared and not well-argued, hence, the
confusion it brought to the lower courts. After having been apprised that there is insufficient
evidence, Bankard could have just produced the simple summary of respondent's account; the
source of her debt, such as the credit card transactions she made in the past and, her past statements
of account to prove that the July 9, 2006 statement of account was merely a running or accumulated
balance and did not necessarily involve immediate credit card purchases.
SANTOS v. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE

G.R. No. 171129 | 6 April 2011
Presumptions
DOCTRINE: A lessee is not estopped from denying the title of the lessor existing after the commencement
of the lease.
FACTS:
• Santos leased a portion of his property to the National Statistics Office (NSO). Without the NSO’s
knowledge, however, Santos had mortgaged the leased premises, which was eventually foreclosed.
Despite this, Santos entered into second and third contracts of lease with the NSO.
• When NSO found out about the foreclosure, it stopped making rental payments to Santos under
the new lease contracts.
• Santos made demands against NSO to pay unpaid rentals and to vacate the premises. The NSO,
however, refused to pay and vacate the same.
• Santos filed an ejectment suit against NSO.
o The NSO argues that, pursuant to the foreclosure, Santos is no longer the owner of the
leased premises. Thus, he has no legal right to demand it to pay subsequent rentals and to
vacate the premises.
o Santos, on the other hand, argues that the NSO cannot deny his title over the property. Sec.
2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that the lessee cannot deny the title of the lessor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NSO can question Santos’ title over the premises?
131
HELD: Yes, what a lessee is estopped from denying is the title of his lessor at the time of the commencement
of the lease. If the title asserted is one after such commencement, the presumption will not apply. Hence,
the lessee may show that the lessor’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself, and he is not
estopped from denying a claim for rent.
• In this case, the title being asserted by Santos is his title not at the commencement of the lease, but
during the subsistence of the lease when the NSO had stopped paying rentals. Therefore, NSO may
question Santos’ title during such time.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP v.

LOURDES MENDOZA
G.R. No. 176949 | 27 June 2012
Quantum of Evidence
DOCTRINE: In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or “greater weight of the evidence” is
required.
FACTS:
• Lourdes, proprietor of Highest Steel, filed for a sum of money against Asian Construction for
alleged unpaid purchase of fabricated steel materials and supplies amounting P1.2M despite
repeated demand for payment. But Asian Construction moved for a bill of particulars on the
ground that no copies of the purchase orders and invoices were attached to the complaint to enable
petitioner to prepare a responsive pleading to the complaint.
o To prove her case, respondent presented the testimonies of (1) ArtemioTejero (Tejero), the
salesman of Highett who confirmed the delivery of the supplies and materials to petitioner,
and (2) Arvin Cheng, the General Manager of Highett.
• The presentation of evidence for petitioner, however, was deemed waived and terminated due to
the repeated non-appearance of petitioner and its counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove her claim by preponderance of evidence?
HELD: Yes, it bears stressing that in civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or greater weight of the
evidence is required. In this case, except for a bare denial, no other evidence was presented by petitioner
to refute respondents claim. Thus, we agree with the CA that the evidence preponderates in favor of
respondent.
• Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the Charge Invoices were properly identified and authenticated
by witness Tejero who was present when the supplies and materials were delivered to petitioner
and when the invoices were stamped received by petitioner’s employee, Barandon.
LNS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER v. PADUA, JR.

G.R. No. 179792 | 5 March 2010
Quantum of Evidence
DOCTRINE: Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no
probative value. 
FACTS:
• Respondent Padua filed a Sworn Statement before POEA against LNS International and Sharikat
Manpower for violations of Section 2(b), (d), and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers
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(Charging fees greater than the allowable fees, collecting fee without issuing receipt, engaging in
acts of misrepresentation in connection with recruitment and placement of workers).
o Padua alleged that he applied as auto-electrician with LNS and was assured of a job in
Saudi Arabia. He paid processing fees, etc., but he was not issued the corresponding
receipts.
o He added that it was Sharikat (another agency) which processed his papers and deployed
him to Saudi Arabia.
o He returned to the Philippines for he was not allegedly paid his salaries.
• LNS admitted that Padua applied for employment abroad, but Padua withdrew all document
submitted to LNS. It submitted the withdrawal letter signed by Padua. It denied that it endorsed
Padua’s application papers to Sharikat.
• POEA found LNS liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation. Charges against
Sharikat was dismissed. DOLE affirmed.
• CA affirmed. It ruled that affirmative assertion of respondent that he paid petitioner a placement
fee is entitled to great weight than the bare denials of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove that petitioner is liable for non-issuance of receipt
and misrepresentation?
HELD: No, bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient
to support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. The self-serving and unsubstantiated
allegations of respondent cannot defeat the concrete evidence submitted by petitioner.
• The respondent did not deny the due execution of the withdrawal form as well as the genuineness
of his signature and thumb mark affixed therein. He even admitted signing the same.
• There is likewise no basis for the POEA, DOLE, and the CA’s conclusion that it was petitioner that
endorsed respondent’s documents to Sharikat.
• Other than respondent’s selfserving claim, there is no proof whatsoever that petitioner endorsed
respondent’s application papers to Sharikat. Petitioner’s denial of these allegations was
corroborated by the withdrawal form proffered as evidence, the existence and due execution of
which were not disputed by respondent.
VIDAR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177361 | 1 February 2010
Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions
DOCTRINE: A judicial admission is binding upon the party making it and can only be contradicted
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
FACTS:
• Army officer, Sgt. Dioneda was brutally murdered and valuables taken from his house in Sorsogon. A
criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide was filed under an information against petitioners Vidar,
Butalon, Marbella and several Does.
• The wife and sister-in-law of Dioneda testified that while they were watching television, three
armed men barged inside and ransacked the house and took a wallet, helmet and a gun. They
witnessed the 3 men together with more or less 10 other people surrounding Dioneda who was
lying on the ground. They saw Marbella and Vidar firing a volley of shots causing Dionedas death.
After which they fled the area. The sister-in-law also stated that she could not forget the face of the
3 malefactors and she was sure that they were the ones who barged inside their house and killed
her brother.
133
• Petitioners denied the accusations against them. The three accused stated that they were in their
house at the time of the crime and that they did not know the deceased. They also stated that the
possible motive against them was that they were members of the New Peoples Army.
• RTC rendered a decision finding all guilty of robbery with homicide.
• CA affirmed but modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. It gave credence to the
eyewitnesses on account of the victims’ death and the identity of the petitioners.
• The petitioners averred that the delay of almost a year in filing formal charges against them casts
serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence was sufficient and credible to prove the commission of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Yes, in the pleadings filed before the trial court and in the appellate court, petitioners were steadfast
in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape criminal
liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed the crime. A judicial
admission conclusively binds the party making it. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
MARQUEZ v. ESPEJO
G.R. No. 168387 | 25 August 2010
Documentary Evidence
DOCTRINE: In case of doubt, it is the intention of the parties that prevails. The intent can be seen from
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
FACTS:
• Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two agricultural lands: (1) Lantap
Property and (2) Murong Property.
o Lantap Property is tenanted by Respondents Nemi.
o Murong Property is tenanted by Petitioners Marquez.
• Espejos mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain
loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, RBBI foreclosed and bought the properties.
• Espejos bought back one of the properties. The Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where
the property was located but only mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which
title corresponds to the Murong property.
• RBBI, pursuant Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property.
o Both VLTs described the subject as an agricultural land located in Brgy. Murong and
covered by TC No. T-62836 (however, this corresponds to the Lantap Property)
• After payment, petitioners were issued Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). CLOA
stated that the property is located at Brgy. Murong.
• More than 10 years after, respondents filed a Complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) for the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs.
• OIC – RARAD decided that the subject of the Deed of Sale (Espejos & RBBI) is the Murong
Property, and the subject of the VLTs is the Lantap Property, the VLT merely has typographical
errors. DARAB reversed above decision.
• CA upheld decision of OIC –RARAD. CA held that the Best Evidence rule shall apply. Since the
Deed of Sale state the TCT number, which referred to the Murong Property, the Deed of Sale is
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indeed referring to the Murong property. For the VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT
No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admitted contents of the Deed of Sale and VLT express the true intention of
the parties?
HELD: No, best Evidence Rule and Parol Evidence Rule are inapplicable. The case at bar falls under the
exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule specifically - “An intrinsic ambiguiy mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement.”
• As such, the resolution necessitates an examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence in
order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is
the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not
its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would
give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.
• The subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property, and
not the Murong property. And, the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in
favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. This may be seen
from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
HEIRS OF OCHOA v. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170071| 16 July2012
DOCTRINE: The requirement of authentication of documents does not apply to public documents.
FACTS:
• This case addressed a Motion for Reconsideration filed by G & S Transport. The petition stemmed
from a complaint for Damages filed by the heirs against G & S with the RTC on account of Jose
Marcial’s death while onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G & S.
• The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage. One of the awards originally
granted by the RTC was P 6,537,244.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed this but deleted the award for loss of earning capacity on the ground
that the income certificate issued by Jose Marcial’s employer, the USAID, is self-serving, unreliable
and biased, and that the same was not supported by competent evidence.
• The Supreme Court affirmed the decision finding G & S liable but ordered to pay the heirs
P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
• Thus, G & S filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the USAID Certification used as basis
in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in evidence because it was not properly
authenticated and identified in court by the signatory thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the USAID Certification is inadmissible in evidence?
HELD: No, it is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must first be proved. However, it must be remembered that this requirement of
authentication only pertains to private documents and "does not apply to public documents, these being
admissible without further proof of their due execution or genuineness.”
• USAID is the principal United States agency that extends assistance to countries recovering from
disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms and that it is an
independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the
Secretary of State of the United States. It was created through Executive Order 1097319 by President
135
John F. Kennedy on November 3, 1961 pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.Cruz’s,
USAID’s Chief of the Human Resources Division, issuance of the subject USAID Certification was
made in the performance of his official functions, he having charge of all employee files and
information as such officer. Thus, it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public document
pursuant to paragraph (a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court –“the written official acts, or records
of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.”
• Hence, and consistent with our above discussion, the authenticity and due execution of said
Certification are already presumed. Moreover, as a public document issued in the performance of
a duty by a public officer, the subject USAID Certification is prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
HEIRS OF SALUD v. RURAL BANK OF SALINAS

G.R. No. 168164 | 6 April 2016
DOCTRINE:
• The opinion of handwriting experts is not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion.
• Handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person.
FACTS:
• This concerns a parcel of land with a building located in Cavite which was previously owned by
Corazon Afable Salud (Corazon) to which she left to her HEIRS.
• The Heirs instituted a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Mortgage, Special Power of
Attorney, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Certificate of Sale and Damages, with injunctive relief
against RURAL BANK OF SALINAS (THE BANK), Carmencita, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the RTC-Cavite City, and the Cavite Register of Deeds.
o They have learned that Carmencita, through forging Corazon’s signature in a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA), made it appear that she has the authority to mortgage the subject
property in exchange of a PHP2M loan.
o The Bank’s President and Manager, Teodoro Salud (Corazon’s close relative), alleged that
Corazon has been a long-time borrower of the Bank and in the execution of the alleged
SPA contract, mortgage contracts and loan applications, Corazon was there and she even
granted authority to Carmencita to be the named borrower.
o An NBI Handwriting Expert, Jennifer Dominguez examined the 2 signatures from 2
different documents and found that the signatures were not written by one and the same
person. Out of the 19 sample signatures of Corazon, 2 of which were disregarded to be true
and genuine and such were submitted by the Bank. (note: during cross-examination,
Jennifer said that it could have been written by the same person)
o The notary public who notarized the said SPA also testified and said that when the SPA
was brought to him, it was already signed and he did not inquire whether it was Corazon
who signed it and what was the document for.
• RTC dismissed the Heirs’ complaint and ruled in favor the genuineness of Corazon’s signature on
the alleged SPA.
136
• CA found merit in the Bank’s appeal and held that opinions of handwriting experts are merely
persuasive and not conclusive hence not binding on the courts. Upheld the validity of the SPA
document being a notarized one.
ISSUE: Whether the findings of the NBI Handwriting Expert binds the Court in determining its
genuineness?
HELD: No, the opinion of handwriting experts is not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s
function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. The courts
may consider such findings but they are not compelled to adopt the findings of a handwriting expert.
• In two separate instances during her testimony and cross-examination, NBI Examiner gave two
different conclusion regarding the genuineness of Corazon’s signature, that it could have been
made by one and the same person OR it could have been written by the same person; which now
made her testimony and findings unreliable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the genuineness of the handwriting was proved?
HELD: Yes, handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting
of such person because he has seen the person write or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
• The Bank did not merely rely on the handwriting expert’s opinion but instead presented witnesses
who provided positive testimony regarding the execution of the SPA document. That they
witnessed Corazon’s affixing her signature in the SPA and during its notarization.
o It was clearly established that Corazon was present at the time the mortgage contract was
executed at the Bank’s premises. Thus, the alleged SPA document is more convincing to
believe to have been signed and executed by Corazon herself, on the same day the
mortgage was actually made, in the presence of the notary public of the Bank. The belief
that Carmencita forged the SPA is absurd because there was no reason for her to do that
since Corazon was already there. (note: Corazon was a long time borrower of the Bank)
TITAN CONSTRUCTION v. DAVID, SR.

G.R. No. 169548 | 15 March 2010
DOCTRINE: Clear and convincing evidence can overcome the legal presumption of authenticity and due
execution of a notarized document.
FACTS:
• Spouses David acquired a property during their marriage. They separated de facto and no longer
communicated with each other.
• However, Respondent Manuel David discovered that Martha had previously sold the said
property to Petitioner Titan.
• Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance against Titan.
o He alleged that the sale was executed by Martha without his knowledge and consent, and
therefore void.
o Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and it relied on a notarized
Special Power of Attorney signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the
property on behalf of the spouses
• RTC ruled in favor of Manuel.
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oIt found that the SPA does not bear the genuine signature of Manuel. Hence, it is spurious
and void.
• CA affirmed.
o It ruled that Titan did not object to the presentation of an expert witness questioning the
genuineness and due execution of the Special Power of Attorney.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notarized Special Power of Attorney is valid?
HELD: No, a notarial document (or the Special Power of Attorney) enjoys a prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal
presumption. However, such clear and convincing evidence is present here.
• While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in the
notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed.
• The details of Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Martha’s are
complete. The absence of Manuel’s data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and
that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, Manuel’s positive testimony that he never signed
the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not
Manuel’s true signature.
PEOPLE v. MAMARUNCAS
G.R. No. 179497 | 25 January 2012
Testimonial Evidence
DOCTRINE: The credibility of a witness is not affected by: (1) minor inconsistencies in his testimony, so
long as there is consistency in his testimony regarding the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the assailant; (2) the failure of a witness to the crime to give assistance to the victim as such inaction is
not contrary to human nature; and (3) discrepancies between an affidavit executed outside the court and a
testimony given in open court.
FACTS:
• Batoon, Gepayo, and two others were working inside Batoon’s auto repair shop when suddenly,
Palao, Mamaruncas, and Ampuan arrived. Palao showed Batoon an arrest warrant and told the
latter he was serving it against Batoon.
• Batoon told Palao to just wait awhile as they would settle the matter after he finishes tuning-up an
engine but Palao suddenly reacted by slapping Batoon’s stomach and pointing a pistol at him.
Batoon tried to grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same.
• As these two wrestled for control of the gun, Mamaruncas shot Batoon from behind, and this was
followed by another shot by Ampuan. Palao finished him off with another shot, thereby causing
his death.
• Gepayo saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. Meanwhile, Inspector Mijares
appeared at the scene of the crime and were able to catch the assailants.
• The RTC charged Palao, Mamaruncas, and Ampuan with murder. It gave full faith and credence
to the evidence of the prosecution as they were able to present the testimonies of Gepayo and of
Inspector Mijares, both of who testified that there were 3 assailants in this case.
• Mamaruncas and Ampuan now argues that Gepayo’s testimony is doubtful based on the
following:
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o There was serious inconsistency on whether he knew Ampuan before the incident;
o His actuation of just watching the incident without giving any assistance to Batoon is
contrary to human nature;
o Gepayo failed to identify Mamaruncas as one of the assailants; and
o In his affidavit, he identified Palao and Ampuan as one and the same person, but later
on testified to the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gepayo’s testimony is doubtful?
HELD: No, findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters bet left to the trial court.
Hence, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, the trial court’s assessment must be respected.
• The inconsistency in Gepayo’s testimony pertains only to collateral matters and has no substantial
effect on the nature of the offense. What matters is that there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant. Such inconsistency is therefore
inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayo’s testimony.
o Gepayo’s failure to give assistance to Batoon is within the bounds of expected human
behavior especially since in this case, the accused were armed with guns. His omission
therefore does not destroy his credibility.
o Although Gepayo did not positively identify Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was
still able to point out that there was a third person who accompanied Palao and Ampuan.
This is also bolstered by the inspector’s testimony that he saw 3 assailants.
DE LEON v. BPI
G.R. No. 184565 | 20 November 2013
DOCTRINE: Testimonial evidence must be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.
FACTS:
• Spouses De Leon executed a Promissory Note binding themselves to pay Nissan Gallery Ortigas
the amount of ₱458,784.00 in 36 monthly installments. To secure the obligation, petitioner-spouses
constituted a Chattel Mortgage over a 1995 Nissan Sentra.
• Nissan Gallery Ortigas, with notice to petitioner-spouses, executed a Deed of Assignment of its
rights and interests under the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citytrust
Banking. Citytrust was merged with and absorbed later by BPI.
• Petitioner-spouses, however, failed to pay their monthly amortizations. BPI later sent a demand
letter but to no avail.
• BPI filed before the MeTCa Complaint for Replevin and Damages. In their Answer, the petition
said that their obligation was extinguished because the mortgaged vehicle was stolen while the
insurance policy was still in force. They allegedly informed Citytrust of the theft of the mortgaged
vehicle through its employee, Endaya. Thus, they claimed that they should have collected the
insurance proceeds and applied the same to the remaining obligation
• The MeTC ruled in favor of BPI declaring the spouses liable. The MeTC considered the testimony
of petitioner ManolitoDe Leon regarding the receipt of Citytrust of the papers necessary to
formalize his report on the loss wasdubious and self-serving.
• The RTC reversed the MeTC ruling and gave credence to the testimony of petitioner Manolito that
he informed Citytrust of the theft of the mortgaged vehicle by sending through fax all the necessary
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documents.There was sufficient notice of the theft, thus BPI should have collected the proceeds of
the insurance policy and applied the same to the remaining obligation.
• The Court of Appeals sought to reverse the ruling of the RTC and reinstate the ruling of the MeTC.
Thus this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manolito De Leon’s testimony is credible?
HELD: No, testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must also "be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience." A credible witness must,
therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story.
• In this case, petitioner Manolito's testimony that he sent notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged
vehicle to Citytrust through fax lacks credibility especially since he failed to present the facsimile
report evidencing the transmittal.
o His failure to keep the facsimile report or to ask for a written acknowledgement from
Citytrust of its receipt of the transmittal gives us reason to doubt the truthfulness of his
testimony. His testimony on the alleged theft is likewise suspect.
o To begin with, no police report was presented. The insurance policy was also renewed
even after the mortgaged vehicle was allegedly stolen. Despite repeated demands from
respondent BPI, petitioner-spouses made no effort to communicate with the bank in order
to clarify the matter. The absence of any overt act on the part of petitioner-spouses to
protect their interest from the time the mortgaged vehicle was stolen up to the time they
received the summons defies reason and logic.
GARCIA v.DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS

G.R. NO. 180843| 17 April 2013
DOCTRINE: If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction.
FACTS:
• Makapugay (succeeded by nephews and nieces Amanda, Justo and Augusto) owns a 2.5 ha farm
which was tilled by Eugenio (succeeded by children Garcia, Salamat and Pedro) as an agricultural
lessee under a leasehold agreement.
• Before Makapugay died, she appointed Amanda as attorney in fact. Thereafter, when Eugenio
died, Amanda and Pedro entered into an Agreement entitled “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” followed
by an agricultural leasehold contract covering the land.
o Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator.
• Subsequently, Pedro died and his wife, respondent Dominga took over as agricultural lessee.
• Meanwhile in 1996, landowners Amanda and Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat entered into a
“Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa” whereby sisters were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees.
• Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights
against Pedro’s heirs. Dominga allegedly deprived the sisters of Pedro of their right. Also, they
alleged that an agreement was entered by the siblings in which they would alternately farm the
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land on a per season basis but Pedro reneged on this hence cultivated the land all by himself and
misrepresented to Amanda that he is the sole heir of Eugenio.
o That is why Amanda corrected this by virtue of a new Kasunduan recognizing the sisters
as co-lessees of Pedro.
• But Dominga averred that when Eugenio died, only Pedro cultivated the land and the sisters never
assisted him. Also the Kasunduan executed by Amanda and sisters were self-serving.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s statute?
HELD: Yes, what the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration
in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides,"[i]f one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled
to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."
• In this case, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold
agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into
with petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s
surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted
and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her inability to
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.
• If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement with
Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have confronted
Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-
lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father
Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and
long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold.
As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus precluded from
questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.
ESPINELI v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179535 | 9 June 2014
DOCTRINE: Where the testimony of a witness on a statement made by another person is offered merely
to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made, it is considered as an
independently relevant statement, and is admissible in evidence.
FACTS:
• Espineli, together with Paredes and 3 other unidentified persons, were charged with the murder of
Alberto Berbon before the RTC. When Espinelli was arrested, he entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment.
o Alberto Berbon was shot in front of his house by unidentified malefactors who immediately
fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
• Later on, the group of Atty. Dizon of NBI arrested Romeo Reyes for Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon, who confided to them his willingness to give information regarding the Berbon case. NBI
Agent Segunial interviewed Reyes and reduced his statement into writing (Sinumpaang Salaysay).
o Reyes claims that he saw Espinelli and Paredes board a red car while armed with firearms
o That Espinelli told Paredes "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon."
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• Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released but jumped bail and was never heard of again. NBI
Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
• Other testimonies presented by the prosecution are:
o Sabina Berbon’s testimony (Alberto’s widow), stating that Reyes sought from her financial help
for his family’s protection due to his statements to the NBI regarding the death of Alberto.
o Rodolfo Dayao’s testimony, that he sold his red car to 3 persons who came to his residence. He
later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by the police officers.
• Espinelli did not adduce evidence but filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. No action
was taken by RTC, thus, Espinelli just moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.
• RTC found Espinelli guilty of murder. On appeal, CA affirmed but modified the crime to Homicide.
Hence, appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony on the sworn statement of Reyes is hearsay and is
therefore inadmissible in evidence?
HELD: No, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial on the matters confided to him by Reyes cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence because Segunial’s testimony was not presented to prove the truth of Reyes’
statements, but only for the purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such
narration of facts.
• It is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that
Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial.
o In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule
does not apply. NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to
testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the prosecution sought to
be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement
and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof.
PEOPLE v. SUMILHIG
GR No. 178115 | 28 July 2014
DOCTRINE: The time-tested rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the
negative averments of the accused, the former deserves more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight.
FACTS:
• Appellants, Jojo and Carding Sumlihig, and Saloli, together with Enoc, Montibon, and Limama were
charged with doble murder and double frustrated murder in the slaying of Cresjoy and Rolly
Santander and serious wounding of Marissa and Micel Santander.
o Only appellants pleaded not guilty and faced trial, while the rest remained at large.
• The prosectution established that Jerry Masagalang, Eugenion Santander and Mario Santender were at
the living room at aroung 6:30pm when they heard gun shots at the kitchen and saw the 6 accused
razing bullets at the 4 victims while having dinner.
o It was also alleged that Jojo shouted “At last, I have retaliated.”
• The accused interposed the defense of alibi.
o Jojo – At time of incident he claimed to be with his in-law’s and further alleged that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime for inability to walk due to gunshot wound
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in left knee. Nevertheless, he admitted harboring ill-will against family for he believed it was
them who was responsible for the massacre of his family.
o Carding – claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He further alleged that he was
a 4-hour walk away from place of incident.
o Saloli – claimed to be with his wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crimes charged based on the testimonial evidence
presented?
HELD: Yes, appellants’ conviction was based on the positive identification by the prosecution witness and
as a rule “alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness.
• Further, Jojo’s motive was established upon his testimony having a personal vendetta against the
Stantanders.
• There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Mario’s identification of the appellants considering that (1)
Jerry was just six meters away from them; (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all
the accused as most of them are his relatives; and, (3) Mario knows Jojo ever since he was small.
o Besides, “[t]ime-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve]
more credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight.”
PEOPLE v. BRITA
G.R. No. 191260 | 24 November 2014
DOCTRINE: Few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses referring to minor
details and not actually touching upon the central facts of the crime do not impair their credibility.
FACTS:
• 2 Informations were filed against Brita for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. After pleading
not guilty in his arraignment, he filed a Petition for Bail.
• Based from a tip by a confidential informant that a certain "Boboy", later identified as Brita, was
engaged in rampant selling of illegal drugs in Western Bicutan, Taguig. A buy bust sale was
consummated and Brita was apprehended. PO2 Tejero recovered from Brita the buy-bust money, and
marked the plastic sachet thereof with "MDB-1."
• Meanwhile, PO3 Orias frisked Brita and found 2 sachets containing suspected shabu. PO3 Orias
marked the recovered plastic sachets with "MDB-2" and "MDB-3."
• The team brought Brita and the confiscated items to the Taguig Police Station. The seized items were
turned over to P/Insp. Paningbatan, who in turn gave the same to the evidence custodian. After
preparing the request for laboratory examination of the specimen, PO2 Tejero and the investigator
brought the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
• For the defense, their witnesses testified that at the time of the alleged buy-bust operation, Brita was
actually sleeping in a room at the 2nd floor of their house when suddenly, police officers entered their
house and immediately handcuffed Brita.
• RTC found Brita guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC Decision.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant claims that there is doubt in the credilbity of the police officers
as prosecution witnesses since there were inconsistencies in their testimonies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses affect their
credibility?
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HELD: No, the inconsistencies pointed out by Brita, it has been held that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon
the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility.
• The testimonies of PO2 Tejero and PO3 Orias of what really transpired, from the time the
confidential informant disclosed to their chief the illegal activities of appellant up to the time of his
arrest, deserve great respect and credence as the same came from the direct account of law
enforcement officers who enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy bust team were inspired
by any improper motive their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.
PEOPLE v. DELFIN
GR No. 190349 | 10 December 2014
DOCTRINE:
• Where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant
and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to.
• It is settled rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated with improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so
actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
FACTS:
• This is a case of rape of an 11-year old by Delfin. The rape allegedly happened twice. First instance was
in the public market where accused brought the victim in a secluded place. The second one was inside
a jeepney where AAA slept. In both instances, Delfin threatened AAA not to tell anyone about the
incident, otherwise, her family will be harmed.
• AAA, remained silent about the 2 incidents. Alfter experiencing difficulty in urinating, as well as pain
and swelling in her abdomen, she told her aunt BBB about the rape incidents and identified Delfin as
her rapist. BBB brought AAA to the hospital for examination. The results revealed that AAA suffered
from laceration of the hymen.
• Delfin contended that the allegations against him were fabricated. He asserted that the filing of the
complaints was instigated by “CCC” in order to take revenge on Delfin for reporting their involvment
in illegal drug activities before.
• However, the RTC gave weight and credence to AAA’s testimony and declared Delfin guilty of two (2)
counts of statutory rape.
• CA - could not be held liable for statutory rape since the prosecution was not able to prove that “AAA”
was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of the alleged rape. Delfin was convicted with simple
rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the material inconsistencies in AAA’s testimonies renders the prosecution’s
evidence unreliable and insufficient to support conviction?
HELD: No, the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies do not detract from the actual fact of rape. Where
the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot
have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. Moreover, the RTC and the CA have already held that
her testimony was straight forward, credible, and spontaneous. And since the trial courts have firsthand
account of the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment in court during trial, the factual findings of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed by
the CA, as in this case.
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PEOPLE v. BIO
G.R. No. 195850|16 February 2015
DOCTRINE: Mere lapses in procedures does not invalidate a seizure if the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items can be shown to have been preserved through the chain of custody.
FACTS:
• An asset reported to P/Supt. Whether or notg the alleged illegal drugs activities of Bio. A buy bust
team was formed, where PO2 Salonga would act as the poseur-buyer. When the buy-bust sale was
consummated, the accused was apprehended and brought to the police station.
• Bio, the buy-bust money, and 2 plastic sachets, were then brought to the Police Station.
• As for Bio, his defenses are denial and extortion. He claimed that he was just buying charcoal when
arrested. One of the policemen who is not familiar to him demanded P80,000.00 for settlement.
• RTC found Bio of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence,
petition.
o Appellant claims that there is denial of due process allegedly because he was not assisted by
counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not evidence gathered to convict the accused is admissible?
HELD: Yes, it has already been heled that the infractions of the Miranda rights render inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. Here, appellant’s
conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the
prosecution witness.
• In this case, Salonga’s positive identification of appellant brushed aside the accused’s defenses of
denial and frame-up or extortion. Aside from being not substantiated with strong and convincing
evidence, the Court has viewed such defenses with disfavpr fpr they can easily be concocted.
PEOPLE v. BRITANICO
G.R. No. 201836 | 22 June 2015
DOCTRINE: It is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a startling and
dangerous experience.
FACTS:
• Three brothers, together with their father, (Britanicos) were charged with Murder. The father died
in detention while one of the siblings was a minor, thus cases against them were dismissed.
• During trial, prosecution presented eyewitness Rolando who narrated that while he was on his
way to the house of his uncle (the victim), he saw the 4 accused hack the victim with the use of
bladed weapons. Fearing for his life, he hid in the grassy portion for about 10 minutes. Upon seeing
his uncle fall to the ground, Rolando left and immediately informed his cousin Alma about what
happened to her father.
• Remaining 2 accused brothers could only offer denial and alibi.
• RTC: convicted appellants with the crime of Murder
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oDid not lend credence to the denial and alibi of the 2 accused brothers in view of the
positive identification by a prosecution eyewitness (Rolando)
• CA: affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rolando's testimony is reliable to sustain conviction?
HELD: Yes, it is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a startling and
dangerous experience.
• Hence, we do not find it unnatural, as the appellants claim, for Rolando (prosecution witness) to
hide in the grassy area upon witnessing the hacking of his uncle (victim).
• Moreover, the failure of Rolando to immediately report the incident to the authorities did not
diminish his credibility. Rolando's actuations should not be measured against the expectations of
appellants.
PEOPLE v. LAGANGGA
G.R. No. 207633 | 9 December 2015
DOCTRINE: If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
FACTS:
• AAA and her 3 children were sleeping when she was awakened by a man wearing some mask and
black clothes. She shooed him away because she thought he was a dog but it was apparently
LAGANGGA whom she recognized when he threatened and soon after punched her on the
stomach and she lost consciousness.
o Only AAA’s testimony was presented during trial.
o RTC found AAA’s account of her painful ordeal credible and sincere and gave it full
probative wight.
• Lagangga admitted having sex with AAA but stated it was consensual since he was “invited” to
do it. RTC convicted Lagangga. CA affirmed.
• Hence, this petition where accused questioned the credibility of the testimony of AAA.
ISSUE: Whether the crime was sufficiently proved by the sole testimony of the victim?
HELD: Yes, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal
with. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
• Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.
• Essentially, the argument of appellant as premised, boils down to the issue of credibility. Often,
when the credibility of the witness is in issue, the trial court’s assessment is accorded great
weight unless it is shown that it overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated a certain fact or
circumstance of weight which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.
• In this case, AAA’s positive indentifcation of the appellant as the one who threatened her with a
knife and boxed her on the abdomen rendering her unconscious and upon regaining her
consciousness her undergarment was removed, are clear and consistent.
ISSUE: Whether the absence of medical certificate is fatal to support conviction?
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HELD: No, the absence of a medical certificate is NOT fatal to the cause of the prosecution. In view of the
intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the
testimony of the offended party.
• Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of
conviction if such testimony is credible. Moreover, the absence of external injuries does not negate
rape. In fact, even the presence of spermatozoa is not an essential element of rape.
HEIRS OF SALUD v. RURAL BANK OF SALINAS

G.R. No. 168164 | 6 April 2016
DOCTRINE:
• The opinion of handwriting experts is not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion.
• Handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person.
FACTS:
• This concerns a parcel of land with a building located in Cavite which was previously owned by
Corazon Afable Salud (Corazon) to which she left to her HEIRS.
• The Heirs instituted a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Mortgage, Special Power of
Attorney, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Certificate of Sale and Damages, with injunctive relief
against RURAL BANK OF SALINAS (THE BANK), Carmencita, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the RTC-Cavite City, and the Cavite Register of Deeds.
o They have learned that Carmencita, through forging Corazon’s signature in a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA), made it appear that she has the authority to mortgage the subject
property in exchange of a PHP2M loan.
o The Bank’s President and Manager, Teodoro Salud (Corazon’s close relative), alleged that
Corazon has been a long-time borrower of the Bank and in the execution of the alleged
SPA contract, mortgage contracts and loan applications, Corazon was there and she even
granted authority to Carmencita to be the named borrower.
o An NBI Handwriting Expert, Jennifer Dominguez examined the 2 signatures from 2
different documents and found that the signatures were not written by one and the same
person. Out of the 19 sample signatures of Corazon, 2 of which were disregarded to be true
and genuine and such were submitted by the Bank. (note: during cross-examination,
Jennifer said that it could have been written by the same person)
o The notary public who notarized the said SPA also testified and said that when the SPA
was brought to him, it was already signed and he did not inquire whether it was Corazon
who signed it and what was the document for.
• RTC dismissed the Heirs’ complaint and ruled in favor the genuineness of Corazon’s signature on
the alleged SPA.
• CA found merit in the Bank’s appeal and held that opinions of handwriting experts are merely
persuasive and not conclusive hence not binding on the courts. Upheld the validity of the SPA
document being a notarized one.
ISSUE: Whether or not the genuineness of the handwriting was proved?
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HELD: Yes, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person.
• The Bank did not merely rely on the handwriting expert’s opinion but instead presented witnesses
who provided positive testimony regarding the execution of the SPA document. That they
witnessed Corazon’s affixing her signature in the SPA and during its notarization. It was clearly
established that Corazon was present at the time the mortgage contract was executed at the Bank’s
premises.
o Thus, the alleged SPA document is more convincing to believe to have been signed and
executed by Corazon herself, on the same day the mortgage was actually made, in the
presence of the notary public of the Bank. The belief that Carmencita forged the SPA is
absurd because there was no reason for her to do that since Corazon was already there.
(note: Corazon was a long time borrower of the Bank)
SEA LION FISHING v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 172678 | 23 March 2011
Offer and Objection
DOCTRINE: The trial court cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered.
FACTS:
• The vessel F/V Sea Lion, owned by Sea Lion Fishing, was being used by a team of people for
poaching.
• The people on board the vessel were arrested and thereafter charged with violations of numerous
special laws. F/V Sea Lion was confiscated and used as evidence in these criminal cases.
• The trial court, in addition to finding Sea Lion Fishing guilty, ordered that F/V Sea Lion be put
under the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard.
• Sea Lion Fishing filed a motion for reconsideration of the order charging the custody of F/V Sea
Lion. Attached to the motion was a copy of an alleged certificate of registration issued by the
Maritime Industry Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sea Lion Fishing is entitled to custody of the F/V Sea Lion?
HELD: No, under Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence not formally offered cannot be
considered by the court. In this case, the certificate of registration has not been formally offered. Therefore,
it cannot be considered by the court so as to rule that Sea Lion Fishing is the owner of F/V Sea Lion.
CATACUTAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 175991 | 31 August 2011
Offer and Objection
DOCTRINE: Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent
evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although
admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose for which it is offered.
FACTS:
148
• Private complainants Posesano and Divinagracia were appointed and promoted by the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III at the Surigao
del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT). These promotional appointments were duly
approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
• The approved appointments were formally transmitted to petitioner Catacutan but the private
complainants were not able to assume their new position since Catacutan refused to implement
the said appointments despite written order from the CHED and CSC.
• A complaint was filed against Catacutan for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful order
before the Office of the Ombudsman. An Information was subsequently filed, charging Catacutan
with violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for refusing to implement the
promotion/appointments, thereby causing undue injury to complainants as well as to the school.
• The RTC found Catacutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan affirmed the same.
• Catacutan filed a petition before the SC alleging, as his defense, that he was denied due process as
he was not able to controvert the findings of the RTC. He contends that he was not able to present
the CA Decision rendered in another administrative case, which denied his administrative liability
and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private
complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
ISSUE: Whether or not Catacutan was denied due process?
HELD: No, there is no denial of due process when the RTC did not allow Catacutan to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which
it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding at hand. This is especially true when
the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative
matter.
• The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if
the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter.
• In Paredes v. CA, the Court held that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions
for the same act or omission. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and exclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the
evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be
presented in the criminal cases.
• Even assuming that the RTC erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision,
Catacutan may still avail of the remedy provided in Sec. 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the tender of excluded evidence.
• Notably, Catacutan also failed to include the CA Decision in his offer of exhibits. As a rule, any
evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered
by him. Evidence that is not formally offered shall be excluded and rejected, and likewise cannot
be taken cognizance of on appeal.
PEOPLE v. CABRERA
G.R. No. 190175|12 November 2014
Offer and Objection
DOCTRINE: When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal
FACTS:
149
• Police Officers Palconit, Cabuenas and Cunan conducted a buy bust operation after receiving
information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay, Cebu and a report from a confidential
asset of the Illegal activities of Cabrera.
• Palconit posed as a buyer with the confidential asset. They approached Cabrera who was standing
outside his house and the buy bust sale was consummated. After the signal, Cabuenas and Cunan
rushed to the scene and arrested the Cabrera.
• Palconit marked the 2 sachets and brought the same to the PNP lab for examination. The following
day, a complaint/information was filed against Cabrera charging him with violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. PNP lab revealed that the substance was shabu.
• Cabrera pleaded not guilty and denied all accusations. He alleged that he was outside of his house
washing his clothes when two men approached him to buy shabu in exchange for P200. He went
to the house of a certain Campo where he got the shabu. The police then arrived and searched his
house, but recovered nothing. Cabrera added that he knew Palconit and would not sell him drugs
knowingly.
• RTC: convicted Cabrera. Cabrera appealed to the CA alleging confidential informant and the
marked money was not presented in court.
• CA affirmed RTC ruling. There is no need to present in court the confidential informant, because the
confidential informant is only required when there are material inconsistencies in the testimony of the
prosecution witness.
ISSUE: Whether Cabrera validly raised his objection as to lack of physical inventory of the seized items in
the chain of custody on appeal?
HELD: No, objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
• Records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the
seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the police officers to maintain an
unbroken chain of custody.
• The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on the ground
of lack of physical inventory but on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
witness.
• In this case, CA had already concluded that the identity of the seized drugs was established by the
prosecution and its integrity is preserved despite the failure to strictly comply with the chain of custody
rule.
PEOPLE v. GABUYA
G.R. No. 195245 | 16 February 2015
Offer and Objection
DOCTRINE: Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
FACTS:
• This case involves a charge of Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of dangerous drugs.
• A buy bust team was formed upon information from a confidential informant was relied to PNP
Caloocan. The team prepared the marked money and assigned officers of their roles.
• The Buy Bust team then transpired where Gabuya was identified and arrested.
150
• The seized items were turned over to a Police officer who marked and inventoried the same. Then
brought to lab for examination. It revealed that the items are shabu.
• With that, the RTC convicted Gabuya. This was affirmed by CA.
• Gabuya now contends that his conviction should be overturned because the operation did not comply
with Section 21 of Dangerous Drugs Act: (1) the items were not marked in his presence; and (2) the
whereabouts of the seized items where not known to him, and so broken chain of custody
ISSUE: Whether objections to the non-compliance with Section 21of Dangerous Drugs Act will render the
seized evidence inadmissible?
HELD: No, it is a well-established rule that no one can raise a question for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
• It must be noted that during trial, Gabuya failed to raise the objections before the trial court. Seized
sachets of illegal drugs during a buy bust is admissible in evidence when objection to its
admissibility is not raised during trial, yet in this case the prosecution was able to prove chain of
custody.
• Nonetheless, going to the merits, the Court finds that prosecution was able to prove an unbroken
chain of custody
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
PAJE v. CASINO
G.R. No. 207366 | 3 February 2015
Special Proceedings
DOCTRINE: The validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
FACTS:
• This case involves the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into by SBMA and Taiwan
Cogeneration Corp. (TCC) for the building of a power plant in Subic Bay. TCC later assigned its rights
to RP Energy. SBMA Ecology Center issued Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the
construction, installation and operation of CFB Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant.
• The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo, Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales and Liga ng
mga Barangay of Olongapo issued separate Resolutions on different dates expressing
objection/opposing to the construction and urged to consider safer alternatives.
• Later, Hon. Teodoro Casiño, et. al. (Casiño Group) filed before the SC a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje, in his capacity as Sec. of DENR.
• The Court issued such writ and refer back the case to CA for hearing.
CA Rulings:
• denied the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and application for an environment protection order due
to failure of the Casino Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balance and healthful ecology
was violated or threatened.
• invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with Sec. 59 of the IPRA Law and Secs. 26 and 27 of the LGC
• invalidated the ECC first and second amendment for failure of RP Energy to comply with the
restrictions in the ECC
• invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without the prior
consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned.
151
ISSUE: Whether or not the Casiño Group is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan?
HELD: No, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such it is predicated
on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
• A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable
connection was shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a
mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
• The 3 witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not experts on the CFB technology or on
environmental matters. They even admitted on cross-examination that they are not competent to
testify on the environmental impact of the subject project. The Casiño Group failed to prove the
alleged negative environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy presented several
experts to refute the allegations and to assure that the project has an environmental management
plan which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws
and standards.
152

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DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations 2018

Ces Naga Jasfer Tagacay

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION

PAMARAN v. BANK OF COMMERCE

ISSUE: Whether or not the case involves a personal action.

ARACELI AND ARNEL CABRERA v. ANGELA FRANCISCO

DARMA MASLAG v. ELIZABETH MONZON ET AL

ISSUE: Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

ATIKO TRANS, INC. v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE

G.R. No. 202611 | 23 November 2015

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.

HEIRS OF LATAYAN v. TAN

REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA

HEIRS OF MEDRANO v. DE VERA

Letters cannot be considered a pleading on the following grounds:

CALIBRE TRADERS v .BAYER PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayerphil’s counterclaim is considered to be compulsory

BACOLOR v. VL MAKABALI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred.

FCD PAWNSHOP & MERCHANDISING CO v. UNION BANK

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s contention is correct.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO v. LIN

LIM v. KOU CO PING

ORPIANO v. SPOUSES TOMAS

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v PSPC

ASIA UNITED BANK v. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 191388 | 9 March 2011

CEBU METRO PHARMACY v EURO-MED LABORATORIES

G.R. No. 175730 | 5 July 2010

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of forum shopping?

MAGTOTO v. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners availed of the wrong remedy

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default was proper

GIPA v. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

PALILEO v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

LHUILLER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS

ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons

HELD: Yes, there was proper service of summons.

DELOS REYES v. RAMNANI

(8) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;

DPWH SEC DATUMANONG et al. v. MALAGA

ISSUE: Whether or not Malaga’s case failed to state a cause of action.

UNITED ALLOY PHIL. CORP. v UCPB

ISSUE: Whether or not Unialloy can still enforce its TRO

PPA v. COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS &EMPLOYEES

ISSUE: Whether the judgment on the pleadings was validly rendered?

REPUBLIC v HEIRS OF LIM

G.R. No. 195611 | 4 April 2016

SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA v. METROBANK

• Metrobank filed an Opposition and argued that:

• Petitioners submitted a Reply to Metrobank’s Opposition, stating that:

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied their day in court

ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment was proper in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rendition of a Summary Judgment is proper?

CALUBAQUIB v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE: Whether or not rendering a summary judgment is proper in this case?

LOY, JR. v. SMCEU-PTGWO

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is ripe for summary judgment

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gubat’s resort to summary judgment is proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s resort to Rule 65 is proper

HEIRS OF BIHAG v. HEIRS OF BATHAN

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAMBOKU PEAK