[G.R. No. 102784.

April 7, 1997]
ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

On February 28, 1996 this Court decided the case affirming the appellate court that one Rosa
Lim was guilty of crime of Estafa.

Considering that the one entered into by the parties is a contract of agency, which contracts in
whatever form entered, shall be obligatory, And Weight of evidence is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It
depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case. And
all the elements of estafa under Revised penal Code are present in the instant case.

The Supreme Court acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rosa Lim praying
for her acquittal, this Court takes a second hard look at the present case in the light of the
various arguments raised by the movant.

FACTS:

Rosa Lim arrived in Manila from Cebu City sometime in October, 1987 with her friend
Aurelia Nadera. On October 8, 1987, they went to the Williams Apartelle in Timog, Quezon City,
where they met Victoria Suarez, a jewelry dealer. Suarez and Nadera knew each other since
the latter often sold jewelry for the former on commission basis. Nadera had previously
introduced Rosa Lim to Suarez as a wealthy businesswoman.
Lim was offered two pieces of jewelry by Suarez, to wit: one (1) 3.35 carat diamond ring
worth P169,000.00 and one (1) bracelet worth P170,000.00. The pieces were to be sold by Lim
on commission. Accordingly, Lim signed a receipt, prepared by Nadera for Suarez.
On October 12, 1987, before departing for Cebu, Lim called up Mrs. Suarez by telephone to
inform her that she was no longer interested in the ring and the bracelet. Suarez replied that she
was busy at the time and instructed her to return the pieces of jewelry to Nadera instead, who
would in turn give them back to Suarez. Lim then returned the jewelry to Nadera who issued a
handwritten receipt dated October 12, 1987.On March 21, 1988, Suarez, thru her counsel, sent
Lim a demand letter asking for the return of the ring. Lim, also thru counsel, sent a response
letter to Suarez averring that she had already returned both ring and bracelet to Nadera and as
such, she no longer had any liability to Suarez insofar as the said items were concerned. Irked,
Suarez filed a complaint for estafa under Article 315, par.1(b) against Rosa Lim.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Crime of Estafa has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable
doubt?

RULING:

The Supreme Court relying on the modified case of People vs. Nepomuceno which modified the
case of United States vs. Eustaquio that the delivery to a third person of the thing held in trust is
not a defense in Estafa. The court said In cases of estafa the profit or gain must be obtained by
the accused personally, through his own acts, and his mere negligence in permitting another to
take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1-b, of the Revised Penal Code; unless of course the evidence should disclose that
the agent acted in conspiracy or connivance with the one who carried out the actual
misappropriation, when the accused would be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. If
there is no such evidence, direct or circumstantial, and if the proof is clear that the accused
herself was the innocent victim of her sub-agent's faithlessness, her acquittal is in order.

Further Rosa Lim's assertion that she had returned the ring in question to Nadera, in
addition to the latter's unswerving testimony admitting the same, raises reasonable doubt as to
Lim's liability for estafa. Conversion or misappropriation has not been sufficiently proven. As
held in the case of People vs. Lopez:

"When a demand for the delivery of the thing promised, or the return of the money delivered in
trust, is made, and such demand is not fulfilled within a reasonable time, a presumption arises
that the amount has been misappropriated. This inference, however, is only deducible when the
explanation given by the accused for his failure to account for the money is absolutely devoid of
merits. Where the explanation does not completely destroy the presumption but at least raises
reasonable doubt that accused had misappropriated the amount in question, acquittal is in
order."

It is well-settled that the essence of estafa thru misappropriation is the appropriation or

conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert"
and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own or devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate
for one's own use includes, not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.

Rosa Lim's sole purpose in delivering the pieces of jewelry to Aurelia Nadera, was for Nadera to
effect their return to Victoria Suarez. By no stretch of the imagination can the act of returning
said items to its rightful owner, although through the mediation of a third party, be considered as
conversion or misappropriation. Verily, that said act manifested Rosa Lim's recognition that the
pieces of jewelry do not belong to her. In doing so, she acknowledged Suarez' right of dominion
over them. Thus, it cannot be regarded as conversion or misappropriation in its true sense
sufficient to convict her for estafa. Lim did not deliver the bracelet and the ring to Nadera so
that the latter may re-sell them as her sub-agent. Her only purpose was to have them returned
to their rightful owner. Moreover, she delivered the said pieces of jewelry to one who is not a
total stranger, but to a person known to both her and Suarez and who, from all indications, enjoy
their mutual trust and confidence. To reiterate, this raises reasonable doubt as to the presence
of any criminal intent ascribed to her by the prosecution.

The act of Lim in returning the items to Nadera only shows that she had reason to believe that
the latter had the authority to receive the same. This belief was inspired by the fact that at the
time of the said transaction between Lim and Suarez, it was Nadera herself, in behalf of Suarez,
who prepared the receipt to be signed by Lim. In addition, Nadera was the one who introduced
Suarez and Lim to each other. Hence, Rosa Lim can at most be held negligent in returning the
ring to one whose authority to receive the same was subsequently refuted. Consequently, for
negligently assuming Nadera's authority to receive the ring, Lim cannot be held criminally liable.
Settled it is in our jurisprudence that there can be no estafa through negligence. At worst, she
should only be held civilly liable. Accordingly, we hold her liable to pay Vicky Suarez the full
amount of the ring as actual damages plus legal interest in the amount of six percent (6%) from
the time of extrajudicial demand.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 91869. October 19, 1992.]

MARCELINA SAPU-AN, ESTER ABIERA, FULGENCIO SOLAMILLO, ROGELIO ABIERA,

CARMELITA ABIERA and ESLIE ABIERA, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
CALIXTO TINGCAY, EUFRONIA ENOFERIO, CASIMIRO TINGCAY, and GAUDENCIA
ARAQUIN,Respondents.

FACTS:

The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has been
occupied since the last World War by both the petitioners and the private respondents, who now
mutually assert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.

The petitioners built their house near the center of the lot while the private respondents built
their house near the western boundary. Both parties made tax payments on the lot in the name
of Alfonsa Ohoy and caused separate surveys to be made on the land. The petitioners claim the
land by virtue of separate sales made by the original owners, namely Alfonsa ,Luciana, Porfirio
and Maria all surnamed Ohoy, to Candida Favor, Ceriaco Abiera, Josefa Abiera, and Roberto
(or Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest.

For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by inheritance from their mother,
Alfonsa Ohoy, who had in turn acquired it from her mother after the land had been partitioned
among her children.

Both the petitioners and the private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the
disputed land without objection from each other.

At the trial, the plaintiffs presented four witnesses, among them Zacarias Villegas, who testified
that his mother, Maria Ohoy, did not own any share in the disputed lot and that it belonged
exclusively to Alfonsa. He also said that he lived with the Tingcays for some time and that it was
really Marcelina Sapu-an who requested permission to live on the land. 1

They also submitted in evidence (1) tax declarations in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy from 1906 to
1949 and in the name of Calixto Tingcay for 1962; (2) receipts of tax payments made by them
for the period from 1953 to 1979; (3) two private documents dated December 15, 1964, and
March 18, 1947, respectively, evidencing the sale of coconut trees planted thereon, to third
persons; (4) a sworn statement on the current and fair value of the real property; and (5) a
survey of the land made by a geodetic engineer. 2

The defendants, for their part, presented two witnesses, Josefa Abiera, sister-in-law of
Marcelina Sapu-an, and Ester Abiera Solamillo, one of the petitioners, also presented (1) two
private deeds of sale in their favor; (2) receipts of tax payments on the land by Teopista and
Ester Abiera; and (3) a survey contract of the land prepared by a surveyor.

ISSUES:

1. Is the Principle on Equiponderance of evidence applicable in the case at bar?

2. Is the Rule on Genuineness and Due Execution of Document requirement on specific
denial applicable in the case?
3. Is court correct in affirming the decision of the trial Court?

RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence"
is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they
are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may
legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.

The Court ruled that it is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale
presented in evidence by the petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath,
and that under Rule 8, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to the document and not, in the case
at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not parties to the deeds of sale
but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.

It follows that the unauthenticated deeds of sale cannot serve as valid bases for the petitioners’
claim of ownership over the land in question.

Lastly the Court find that this case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have been correctly
appreciated by both the trial court and respondent court. Their conclusions in favor of the private
respondents are based on the evidence of record and there is no reason for this Court to
reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing that the challenged decision was reached
arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence, our clear and only duty on appeal is to uphold the
courts below. It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who
is in better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him.. We so affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 ROBERTO CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108738 | 17 June 1994

FACTS:

Andrea Mayor is a businesswoman engaged in granting interest-bearing loans and in

rediscounting checks. Cruz borrowed money from Mayor in the amount of P176,000.00 and
issued a postdated check for the same amount.
When the check matured, Mayor presented it to the drawee bank but the same was
dishonored. The reason given was: “account closed.” Cruz was then informed of the dishonor,
and he promised to pay. No payment was made; hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was
filed.
During trial, two witnesses were presented, Mayor and Marcelo Ladao, a representative
of Premiere Development Bank.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Mayor, finding Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to convict Cruz for violation of BP 22.

RULING:

YES. A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for
payment has the same effect of an ordinary check, hence, falls within the ambit of B.P. 22 which
merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds on credit . . . shall be punished by imprisonment…" (BP 22, Sec. 1)
The law punishes the issuance of a bouncing check not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the term and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.
Knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the
drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P.
22. As already aforestated, the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, 26 hence,
malice and intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential. Moreover, the fact that the check
issued is restricted is likewise of no moment. Cross checks or restricted checks are negotiable
instruments within the coverage of B.P. 22.
 CRISPINA SALAZAR v. GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. L-21727. May 29, 1970

FACTS:

Judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Civil Case No. 2269) in favor
of the plaintiff, Crispina Salazar, now petitioner; on appeal by the defendants, Guillermo
Gutierrez and Damaso Mendoza, the Court of Appeals reversed (CA-G.R. No. 19489-R); and the
plaintiff elevated the case to us for review bycertiorari. On February 24, 1953 respondent
Damaso Mendoza, a lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said canal, thereby stopping the flow of
the water and depriving Crispina Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation facilities which it had
formerly enjoyed. Her requests that the canal be rebuilt and the water flow restored having been
turned down, Salazar commenced the present suit on March 2, 1953, praying that these reliefs be
granted her by the Court and that the defendants be ordered to pay her actual damages in the sum
of P900, moral damages in the sum of P5,000, and P1,000 for attorney's fees, plus costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the use of the subject easement, notwithstanding the
non-registration of the same.

RESOLUTION:

It is a reasonable conclusion from the foregoing that the demolished canal supplying water to Lot
436 of the petitioner was merely extension of the system of conduits established long ago,
considering that in view of the topography of the area and the proximity of the said lot to the
main dike in Lot 433 it was more convenient to make the connection therewith than to draw
water directly from Sapang Tuyo. Article 118 of the Spanish Law of Waters allows the creation
of a compulsory easement of aqueduct for the purpose of establishing or extending an irrigation
system, and there is nothing to the contrary in the Civil Code.
 METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ANTONIO VILLANUEVA and GERTRUDES YARRA-
REYES
G.R. No. 109667 August 16, 1994

FACTS

Private respondent Gertrudes Yarra-Reyes is a teller of petitioner bank at its Anda Street
Branch, Davao City. An unidentified person whom she presumed to be a bank employee left a
passbook of Corazon Ramirez Uy and withdrawal slip for the amount of P96, 370.00 behind her
teller's cage. Believing that the withdrawal was approved by Alfred Gee, the accountant cashier,
and being of the impression that he had already checked with the client who had authorized the
withdrawal, private respondent called the man and paid him the P96, 370.00. At day's end she
submitted all necessary documents including the withdrawal slip to bank Bookkeeper Esperidion
Linaza for clearance, for which she was cleared. The following day the bank manager informed
her that the P96, 370.00 withdrawal was not valid since there was no withdrawal slip for the said
transaction. Subsequently, a check was conducted and it was discovered that in another
computer located outside the private respondent's teller's cage, an entry of P96, 370.00 against
the account of another depositor, Mr. de Leon was made. This was followed by a "DEBIT
MEMO" entry of P0.60, then and "ERROR CORRECT" entry of P96, 370.00 and a final entry of
P60. These computer entries were evidently made to cover up the unauthorized withdrawal from
Mrs. Uy's account. Furthermore, the withdrawal slip in the custody of Mr. Linaza was still
nowhere to be found. It turned out that the passbook presented to private respondent was
fictitious. At that time, the genuine passbook of Mrs. Uy was in the custody of the Saving
Account bookkeeper.

The bank made respondent accountable for the P96,370.00 on the ground of
negligence for failing to ask the alleged representative of the depositor to present identification
papers and failing to verify the withdrawal with the client-depositor in view of the large amount
involved as required by the bank Manual of Procedures. Though allowed to continue working,
the bank started to deduct P1, 000.00 bimonthly from complainant's salary to answer for the
P96, 370.00 loss.

Private respondent protested this deduction which both Labor Arbiter and NLRC agree were
illegal.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by the NLRC in its resolution affirming
the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

RULING

Supreme Court ruled no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by the NLRC
in its resolution and the petition is DISMISSED.

The matter of evaluating the merits and demerits of the case, as long as the decision is
supported by the facts and the evidence is left to the sound discretion of the Labor Arbiter. It is
common knowledge as private respondent asserts that bank procedures have more often than
not been relaxed to accommodate special clients. They have often gone direct to bank officials
and insiders to facilitate their withdrawals. The bank cannot now throw the book on private
respondent after having tolerated such a practice and let her suffer full liability. After the bank
found itself helpless in catching the real culprits despite its resources, it cannot now shift the
blame to private respondent and sanctimoniously pronounce in its Position Paper, that "the
deduction (from private respondent's salary of the amount lost) is reasonable for the
reimbursement would take more than four (4) years and would still be gainfully employed." This
Court will not countenance this feigned magnanimity.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHRISTIAN SANDAGON Y PELAEZ
G.R. No. 106897 June 13, 1994

FACTS

Maricel Dolera testified that she was 15 years old at the time of the incident and was
staying with the family of her uncle, Rogelio Dolera, at Quezon City, where she was working as
a baby-sitter. She went to the Quezon Memorial Circle to look for Antonio Augis, another uncle,
who was to assist her in securing a residence certificate. Not finding him there, she approached
the appellant, Christian Sandagon, and asked him if he knew her uncle. He said yes and even
offered to accompany her to Antonio's house. She agreed gratefully and the two boarded a jeep
for Fairview. They alighted at a place near a vegetable patch, and there Sandagon's manner
suddenly changed. At knife point, she was taken to an uninhabited shanty where he forced
himself upon her. She tried to resist but had to submit in the end when he slapped and
threatened to kill her. He raped her twice that afternoon. Afterwards, Sandagon took her to a
restaurant and then to a four-bedroom house, where Sandagon had a drinking spree with his
friends until 8:00 in the evening. Sandagon and she slept in the sala that night and the appellant
again violated her. From there they went to several places, including Lagro and Laguna. They
were together everywhere they went and she could not ask for help from anybody because
Sandagon never left her side. Sandagon was a light sleeper and woke up immediately
whenever she did. She was virtually a prisoner, with Sandagon keeping close watch. Finally, a
month after her abduction, she told him she was agreeing to live with him and was thus able to
persuade him to allow her to get her clothes from her uncle's house. There she revealed her
ordeal to her family, which took immediate steps to bring Sandagon to justice.

Magno Quino, her uncle, corroborated that he instructed her to go to Quezon City Hall to
secure a residence certificate and to see another uncle, Antonio Augis, to assist her. However,
she did not return that day but when acting on her report, he and five friends apprehended the
appellant at the grocery store where he was waiting for Maricel and turned him over to police
authorities.

The medical examination of Maricel revealed a deep healed laceration of the hymen and
indicated she may have had more than one sexual intercourse. There was no external sign of
the recent application of any form of trauma upon her.

The appellant denied the charges and claimed he and Maricel were sweethearts. When
they left, it was she in fact who paid the lodging fees. From then on, they lived together as
husband and wife. They decided to ask permission from Maricel's uncle to get married, but the
latter vehemently objected and instead had him arrested and prosecuted for rape.

ISSUE

Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the alleged abduction and
multiple rapes.

RULING

Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and appellant Christian Sandagon is
acquitted on reasonable doubt and ordered to be released immediately.

It is not enough to say that a girl would not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape
complaint unless the charge is true. It is necessary to find that the complainant's story is by itself
believable independently of the presumption. Otherwise every accusation of rape would
inevitably result, without need of further evidence, in the conviction of the accused. This would
militate against the rule that in every criminal prosecution, including rape cases, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

The established doctrine is that the conviction of the accused must rest on the strength
of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Even if Sandagon's version may be
weak in spots, it nevertheless appears to be more credible than the story narrated by the
complainant.

Although Maricel was gone for one whole month, her family did not take any action to
look for her or to report her disappearance to the police. This inaction is more consistent with
the appellant's claim of elopement rather than the complainant's story of abduction and rape.

The appellant's failure to introduce in evidence letters or gifts exchanged between him
and Maricel, or other mementoes of their relationship, does not disprove his claim that they
were sweethearts. The best evidence of this was the fact that they traveled and lived together
as husband and wife for one whole month, during which period Maricel had many opportunities
to leave him if she wanted to but chose not to do so. At any rate, a romance need not be
documented with love letters and other protestations in writing but may develop on oral
understandings and even tacit consent, without benefit of written commitments.

Considering the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant, and

after weighing the evidence of the parties, the conviction of the appellant cannot be affirmed
because his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ORLANDO FRAGO
G.R. Nos. 104492-93 | 31 May 1994

FACTS:

On 1 October 1991, the trial court acquitted Orlando Frago in Crim. Case No. 9145 for
attempted rape, on "reasonable doubt occasioned by lack of clear and convincing evidence that
the accused indeed performed against Ronalyn Pastera overt acts constituting commencement of
the commission of the crime of rape. The Information alleges that in the early morning of 26
September 1990, at about three forty-five, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused
Orlando Frago —

. . . entered the room of the dwelling house of Philip Pastera where one
RONALYN PASTERA, a girl 9 years of age, was sleeping, and once inside the
room, with lewd design did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
hold her head and bodily carry said Ronalyn Pastera, thus commencing the
commission of a felony of Rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the said felony by reason of causes other
than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, Ronalyn Pastera was
awakened and shouted for help, thus forcing the accused to release Ronalyn
Pastera and ran away.

In his appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in convicting him on the basis of
an identification which was made without the assistance of counsel. He argued that it was during
his detention, when he was not assisted by counsel, that he was identified by Jicelyn.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was insufficiency of the identification of appellant Orlando Frago?

RULING:

A careful dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably shows that she has no
reliable basis for pointing to the accused as the person who raped her. A rule of long standing in
this jurisdiction, is that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing
upon the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
substance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted.

There are indeed reasons to deviate from the general rule. We have examined carefully
the entire transcript of stenographic notes and we do not hesitate to conclude that the exception
to the rule must be applied. There was no positive identification of Orlando Frago by Jicelyn. Her
testimony on direct examination supports this conclusion. While she would make it appear that
she was able to positively identify the accused, her account of the incident proved otherwise.

Appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution cannot rely on their
frailty to enhance its cause. The prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As
has been oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken
into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant ORLANDO

FRAGO guilty of rape in Crim. Case No. 9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is
ACQUITTED as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GILBERT DELA PEÑA Y PONCE
G.R. No. 104947 | 30 June 1994

FACTS:

On July 18, 1991, Erly Rose P. Marasigan, a nine (9) year old third-grade student in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila while traversing a shortcut route from her home to her school, noticed
a man standing at a corner of the alley, whom she later on identified as the defendant-appellant,
Gilbert de la Peña. As she passed by, he grabbed her left arm with both of his hands, pulled her
towards a grassy area and threatened bodily harm if she would not keep quiet. He kissed her and
attempted to insert his penis into her vagina to no avail because he did not have an erection
Failing in this, the accused-appellant instead fondled his victim's vagina and inserted his finger
into the vaginal orifice. Erly Rose cried, then tried to play dead.

An information signed by the state prosecutor, dated 30 July 1991, charged the accused
with the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE based on the complaint affidavit of the victim. However,
a criminal complaint signed by the state prosecutor subsequently charged the accused with
STATUTORY RAPE. Judge Teresita D. Capulong of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, found de la Peña guilty of STATUTORY RAPE.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence presented at trial negates a finding of Statutory Rape?

RULING:

In sustaining a charge of rape in cases where complete penetration had not occurred,
there is an underlying assumption of a male sexual organ physiologically capable of
accomplishing the act of full penetration at the time of the event, whether or not the latter had
actually occurred.

In the instant case, both the victim and the accused-appellant were in agreement in their
trial court testimonies that no penetration had occurred. In the absence of a conflict between the
statements made by the accused and that of his victim — made under oath — as to what actually
occurred at the time of the incident, we see no reason why this Court should sustain the trial
court's conclusion finding the defendant guilty of rape. Moreover, the medical findings support
our conclusion.

The trial judge's suggestion that the complainant's admission that there was no erection
cannot be given weight because finding out whether the accused-appellant's penis were erect
"would be the last thing on the mind of the victim complainant," flies in the face of the consistent
admissions by the complainant on different occasions that the fact of carnal knowledge did not
occur. Moreover, during the incident, she had the intelligence and the remarkable presence of
mind to take a grip of the situation she was in at the time of the attack and play dead. Given her
presence of mind, it would have been impossible for her not to notice whether or not the
accused-appellant's penis had been erect. In spite of her age, her acts during and after the attempt
provide no occasion for us to doubt the veracity of her statements.

We note that, at least, on one occasion, during her salaysay (sworn statement) before the
Valenzuela Police, the suggestion had been made by the complainant that carnal knowledge had
occurred during the incident. Using the vernacular she said: "(H)inubaran niya ako ng
panty. Pagkatapos sinikmuraan niya ako. Pagkatapos ay kinantot niya ako." However, following
clarificatory questions by the policeman — without suggestion or prodding — she stated that the
accused appellant had been unable to insert his penis into her genital orifice. She narrated the
same fact subsequently in her testimony before the trial court.
 Given the evidence, and the essential absence of conflict between the victim’s and the
appellant's testimonies in this case, a verdict finding the accused guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE
would be much more appropriate.
 G.R. No. 100910
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LORETO SALANGGA and LAURETO LOPEZ, accused. LORETO SALANGGA,

FACTS:

It appears that in the late afternoon of July 18, 1987, in Sitio Ogsing, Barangay Tacul,
Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, Imelda Talaboc was sent by her mother to fetch water from the
spring, or "bugac," the only source of water in the vicinity. Imelda left with two one-gallon
containers.
At around 5:30 to 6:30 of the same afternoon, when the dusk of twilight was enveloping the
area, one Ricky Monterde, a friend and brother in faith of the Talaboc's likewise went to fetch
water. On his way, he saw appellant Salangga walking about three meters ahead of Imelda. He
noticed that appellant kept glancing back towards Imelda who was carrying water containers.
Trailing the girl was accused Lopez who was walking behind her at a distance of about twenty
fathoms.
On the same occasion, Lenie Alingay, a twelve-year old elementary student residing at Sitio
Ogsing, was on her way home from her grandfather's house. She met Imelda at the downhill
crossing leading towards the barrio. Lenie explained that she was about four meters away from
Imelda, while the latter was following appellant and walking about two meters behind him. As
Imelda came abreast with Lenie, the former asked the latter if she was going to school on
Monday. Then, as Lenie proceeded on her way home, she saw that Lopez who was sitting on a
rice paddy suddenly stood up and followed Imelda. At about the same time, Lenie also saw
Ricky Monterde fetching water from the spring.
When Bernardo Talaboc, father of Imelda, came home from work, he was informed by his wife
that Imelda, whom she sent to the "bugac" earlier, was missing. Talaboc set out to look for
Imelda. On his way to the spring, he came upon two water containers left standing at a spot
about four hundred meters away from their house. Together with the members of his household
and some neighbors, they continued looking for Imelda. At around 8:00 o'clock that same night,
they found the corpse of Imelda lying in the bushes about twenty meters away from where the
water containers were earlier found.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Loreto Salangga of the crime charged on the
basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence.

RULING:

Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of facts of trial courts carry great weight for these
courts enjoy the advantage of having observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the witness
stand and, therefore, can discern if these witnesses are telling the truth or not. However,
likewise well-settled are the exceptions thereto, which are when (1) the conclusion is a finding
based entirely on speculations, (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion, and (4) the finding is based on a
misapprehension of the facts. The evidentiary bases for the conclusions of the lower court
having been demonstrated to be either incompetent in law or incredible in fact, the exceptive
circumstances have to be given full sway.

The prosecution's evidence regrettably leaves much to be desired, unfortunately as a

consequence of faulty investigative work in the first place. This Court must, however, be guided
by a rule of long standing and consistency that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of one or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

In a criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This
determinant, with the constitutional presumption of innocence which can be overthrown only by
the strength of the prosecution's own evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
irresistibly dictate an exoneration in this case. It is indeed a bitter truth for the victim's family to
face, that human justice seems to have failed then due to the foregoing confluent factors. The
court deeply commiserate with them and sincerely hope that, somehow and in God's own time,
divine retribution shall be visited upon the evil author of this human tragedy.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered to be immediately
released unless there are other grounds for his continued detention, with costs de oficio.
 ATTY. EDWIN BETGUEN, et al. complainants,
vs.
DOMINGA P. MASANGCAY, respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1986, Jovita G. Cabanag and Luz Ancheta filed separate criminal complaints for
grave oral defamation against respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 901 and 902, respectively. After joint trial, respondent was
found guilty of intriguing against honor under Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code and was
imposed a fine of P200.00 and ordered to indemnify complainants in the amount of P5,000.00
each. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the conviction was affirmed in toto. The Court of
Appeals likewise affirmed respondent's conviction. The records of the case (C.A.-G.R. No
10643) were then remanded to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Quirino, on November 18, 1991,
through registered mail with Registry Receipt No. P-5007. These records are the subject of the
present controversy.
On November 27, 1991, respondent Masangcay, allegedly received from a certain Betty Nasto,
an employee of the Post Office of Cabarroguis, Quirino, a parcel from the Court of Appeals with
Registry Receipt No. P-5007, which as later discovered, contained the records of C.A.-G.R. No.
10643. The fact of receipt by respondent is attested to by the Acting Postmaster of the aforesaid
town, Santiago Palaruan, and evidenced by the signature of respondent on the registry book of
the Post Office. However, the records of the case are nowhere to be found in the RTC of
Quirino nor is there any record of its receipt by respondent in the court's logbook.
The loss of the records and its alleged receipt by respondent was only discovered when
complainants Cabanag and Ancheta, tired of awaiting the outcome of the appeal, went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court to inquire about the status of their cases. There being no record of
the return of the records to the RTC, they were told to inquire at the Court of Appeals. It was
upon such inquiry with the appellate court that they discovered that the records of the case were
already transmitted back to the RTC. After a thorough investigation, all evidence pointed to
respondent as the last person in possession of the records.
Complainant Atty. Betguen, Clerk of Court of RTC Cabarroguis, Quirino, issued a memorandum
to respondent requiring her to explain why she should not be held administratively liable for
concealment of the records. In her answer, respondent denied any responsibility for the loss of
the records.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent who received and concealed the records of the case was therefore
sufficiently established by substantial evidence?

Whether or not the respondents Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct warrants her dismissal?

RULING:

Respondent, having been found guilty of willfully and maliciously causing intrigue against a
person for the purpose of tainting his honor and reputation, is consequently guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude. On this score alone, her dismissal from the service is warranted.
However, the crux of the case involves the charges of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct in the
service committed by concealing the records of the case entitled "People vs. Dominga
Masangcay" which respondent allegedly received upon its transmittal from the Court of Appeals.
An assiduous review of the records of this case establishes respondent's guilt of the aforesaid
charges.
It should be noted that before respondent was confronted with her signature on the registry
book, she absolutely denied receiving the parcel containing the missing records, even arguing
that she is not the only one receiving mail matter of the court. After the registry book was
presented to her, however, she altered her posture and admitted having received the records
but denied having opened or concealed the same. Respondent avers that she did not know that
the parcel contained the records of her personal case. She affirms that after receiving the same,
she indorsed the records to her immediate superior, one of the herein complainants Atty.
Betguen. Respondent is not credible when she claims that she was unaware that the parcel
contained the records of her appealed case. The Court of Appeals places the docket number of
the appealed case being remanded outside the mailed parcel for control purposes. Having been
employed with the court since 1983, respondent is presumed to know this procedure. In fact,
since part of her duties included receiving and recording mail matter of the court, it is incumbent
upon respondent to know of such practice. Having appealed the case herself, it was natural for
respondent to know the docket number of her case and thereafter to monitor the arrival of her
case upon its remand from the appellate court. Respondent had every opportunity for
committing the act of concealing the records of her case having acknowledged receipt of the
same from the post office.

Respondent's actuation in concealing the records of her case amounts to dishonesty and gross
misconduct in office warranting her dismissal from service under Section 22 (a) and (c), Rule
XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). Being
in charge of court records for years, respondent was well aware that court records are
confidential documents which may not be taken out of court without proper authority and without
the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity. But in blatant disregard of
such rule of confidentiality, respondent concealed the records of her conviction, in an obvious
attempt at self-preservation.
For committing the act complained of, respondent displayed gross or serious misconduct in
office deserving of the extreme penalty of dismissal. Misconduct in office warranting removal
must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the
duties of the office; a transgression of some established and definite rule or action, an unlawful
behaviour or gross negligence by the public officer; or the acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules. In the present case, respondent abused her position as Clerk IV of the Office of the Clerk
of Court in charge of receiving court records and documents, in order to carry out her intention
to thwart the promulgation of the decision convicting her. Respondent feigns innocence of the
act complained of by passing the blame to herein complainant, Atty. Betguen. Respondent
avers that being the custodian of the records, the liability for the loss of the subject records
should fall upon Atty. Betguen.
The argument has no merit, Atty. Betguen, overall custodian of court records in his capacity as
Clerk of Court, could not be faulted for the loss of the records as alleged by respondent.
Respondent had direct control over the documents and records being transmitted to the court,
who violated the established procedure to be followed upon receipt of court documents.
Finally, it is quite ironic and unfortunate for respondent that through the commission of the acts
complained of, she only succeeded in aggravating her dilemma. Where at the onset, her only
predicament was her conviction for the crime of intriguing against honor, her malicious intent to
frustrate the ends of justice mired her even more into a deeper hole from which there is now
neither reprieve nor escape.

WHEREFORE, respondent Dominga P. Masangcay is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification to
hold office in any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent's dismissal is without prejudice to any other liability.