Round 1

1NC
Offcase
 1
The US is combining hedging and reassurance in the Gulf now---
increased presence and military cooperation are reassuring
allies
Lynn E. Davis 14, Senior Political Science, RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and M.A. in
political science, Columbia University, “The Days after a Deal with Iran: U.S. Policies of
Hedging and Engaging,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE125/RAND_PE
125.pdf
A U.S. Approach Is Emerging That Emphasizes Hedging and Reassurance
From Obama administration statements and a growing consensus among U.S. regional experts, a set of U.S. policies and
assumptions seems to be emerging as to what policies the United States should pursue in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement with
Iran.3

• The nuclear agreement will offer Iran incentives in the form of graduated sanctions
relief for forgoing its pursuit of capabilities associated with nuclear weapons and for maintaining
limits on its nuclear infrastructure. Any further incentives, as well as all but minimal
engagement, need to wait in order to test Iran’s compliance with the agreement
and its behavior elsewhere in the region. The rationale for this narrow focus lies in the uncertainties as
to the Iranian domestic situation and what future Iranian behavior will be in the region. In this view, a nuclear agreement with Iran
will not change the fact that the Iranian regime, especially Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservative
establishment, view the United States as the chief source of global “oppression.” President Hassan Rouhani and other pragmatic
Iranians may aspire to more normal ties with the United States but the Islamic Republic remains a revolutionary state guided not
only by its interests of regime survival and maintaining territorial sovereignty, but also expanding its regional influence.4

• The consequences of potential Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement will be made explicit, including the threat of and clear
plan for a rapid reimposition of sanctions and of a potential military response against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

• U.S.
engagement (both diplomatic and military) with its partners in the region will
intensify and include additional military cooperation with Israel and the
GCC countries, military sales, the integration of GCC air and missile defenses,
and expanded maritime and air exercises. U.S. presence in the Gulf will remain
robust and retain capabilities for rapid strikes on the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. These steps will be primarily to
respond to concerns of partners over Iran and provide reassurance, but also to
reinforce the threat to Iran as to the consequences of violating the
agreement.5
This emerging U.S. approach is heavily informed by practical limitations. First, there is recognition among U.S. policymakers that
things are very uncertain as to what an agreement will mean for Iranian compliance, its intentions with respect to the nuclear
program, and the relationship of an agreement to its other regional policies. So, any
real change in U.S. policies toward
Iran, partners, and military posture, or any opening or relaxation of pressure, needs
to wait until Iran
demonstrates its willingness to implement the agreement—and perhaps even until
changes occur in Iran’s regional behavior. Second, U.S. domestic politics will constrain policymakers in the sense that even if
decisionmakers see an opportunity for an emerging détente with Iran, cooperation or normalization of relations with Tehran may
not be possible in the current U.S. political climate. Third, the anxieties
of U.S. regional partners
reinforce the need for the United States to move very slowly in any
engagement with Iran lest these partners interpret actions as the United
States abandoning their interests. Finally, these policies are consistent with a
view that to influence Iran, one needs to show a willingness to make the
costs outweigh any gains, in terms of its future implementation of the nuclear agreement and regional behavior.6

Withdrawal causes fast and immediate Saudi prolif---presence is

the key determinant of the US security guarantee
Christopher Clary 12, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for International and
Public Affairs at Brown University, PhD, Political Science, MIT, M.A. in National
Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to
Stop It,” The American Interest, Volume 7, Number 6, 6/10/12, http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2012/06/10/the-pak-saudi-nuke-and-how-to-stop-it/
The debate about military options on Iran has focused on the extent to which Tehran can be deterred, but it’s just as important to
consider the knock-on proliferation consequences of an Iranian bomb. The
path for Saudi nuclearization
is readily apparent and could occur rapidly—within months or years, not decades. Analyses
that perceive Iranian nuclearization as manageable typically discount the possibility of quick
Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons. In this vein, at least 11 other Middle Eastern states have developed
varying levels of interest in nuclear technology over the past decade or so.37 Few, however, could move as quickly as Saudi Arabia.

Stopping a proliferation chain reaction need not require preventive military strikes. Robust
U.S. security
guarantees to Saudi Arabia might dampen Saudi demand for a nuclear
deterrent. But making these guarantees credible could prove challenging.
Extended deterrence is inherently difficult. A state is attempting to guarantee that it will endanger its most vital interests (risk
nuclear attacks on its homeland) in order to protect more peripheral interests (prevent conventional or nuclear attacks on a third-
party state). In the Cold War, the United States relied on overseas basing to
demonstrate its commitment. By placing U.S. forces in harm’s way, it not only
increased military options in the region, but also made the U.S. commitment more credible. As
Thomas Schelling famously argued, “What can 7,000 American troops do [in Berlin], or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can
die.”38 In the Saudi case, however, the experience of the 1990s and 2000s suggests that a substantial U.S. military presence may
generate a great deal of popular resentment and thus prove unsustainable. Indeed, the
United States may have more
options basing U.S. troops on the Saudi Arabian periphery. To some extent, it
already does in Bahrain (home of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet) and Qatar (location of Al Udeid airbase). The
United States clearly hopes the newly inaugurated U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum will provide another way to demonstrate
“the rock-solid commitment of the United States to the people and nations of the Gulf.”39

It remains possible that the Obama Administration’s emphasis on ever-stronger economic sanctions, perhaps combined with covert
action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and scientists, might prevent Iranian nuclearization. If it doesn’t, however, then analysts
and policymakers must incorporate the risk of rapid Saudi nuclearization into their calculus regarding Iran. Moreover, given
Pakistan’s intrinsic importance as a large, Muslim, nuclear-armed state, U.S. policymakers should be wary of backing Islamabad into
a corner in which its elites see risky behavior as necessary. As frustrating and provocative as Pakistan is to the United States,
isolating it could easily backfire. Moreover, the desirability of curtailing U.S. support for Pakistan is not solely a function of that
nation’s support for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan or counter-terror efforts in Pakistan, but may instead be a function of
proliferation fears for the indefinite future. For that reason, too, the
United States should exercise great
caution in substantially reducing its regional presence, lest it set loose a set
of interlocking responses from regional actors that would be extremely
dangerous for all concerned.

Saudi capability is inevitable---motivation is key

Jeffrey Lewis 15, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build
a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To,” 6/12/15,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-
any-damn-time-it-wants-to/
[Table omitted]
it is deeply misguided to
While I don’t think it is terribly likely that Saudi Arabia will choose to build nuclear weapons, I think

conclude that Saudi Arabia (or pretty much any state) cannot do so. Simply put, Zakaria is wrong — and it’s not all that hard
to demonstrate why.¶ Zakaria isn’t explicit about what he believes to be the technical requirements for building a nuclear weapon, but he clearly thinks it is hard. Which was

the technologies
probably true in 1945 when the United States demonstrated two different routes to atomic weapons. Since then, however,

associated with producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium have

been developed, put to civilian use, and spread around the globe. The fact
that most states don’t build nuclear weapons has a lot more to do with
restraint than not being able to figure it out.¶ Zakaria’s argument that Saudi Arabia can’t build nuclear weapons is
pretty shallow and relies largely on two assertions: a flip comment about Saudi Arabia lacking even a domestic automotive industry, and a superficially data-driven claim about
Saudi Arabia’s “abysmal” math and science ranking.¶ First, automobile production is a terrible indicator of whether a state can build a nuclear weapon. The technologies are
really not at all similar — or at least they don’t have to be. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all succeeded in building nuclear weapons despite not having much of an auto
industry at home. And the Soviets were really good at building nuclear weapons, even though their cars famously sucked. ¶ And, anyway, Saudi Arabia is investing in a domestic

Saudi Arabia
auto industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is hoping the Meeya will be on the market by 2017. So, there’s that.¶ More importantly,

is investing in a civil nuclear industry. “Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program?” Zakaria
wonders. Oh, I don’t know, how about the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy? Somehow Zakaria never mentions that Saudi Arabia is

building a dedicated city for training nuclear scientists. I can’t predict whether this investment will pay
off, but then again neither can Zakaria — if he even knows it exists. ¶ Zakaria is also skeptical because, he writes, Saudi Arabia “ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and science
education, according to the World Economic Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita GDP, fares far better at
44.” ¶ Abysmally low for a rich country? Perhaps. But for a nuclear weapons state? Not nearly. Let’s do what he should have done and make a little table using his own data. Here
is a list of selected countries — in bold if they currently possess nuclear weapons — by “Quality of Math and Science Education.” (Again, this is his data. Don’t blame me!)¶ Using

Saudi Arabia would hardly be the least nerdy country to acquire a

Zakaria’s own measure,

nuclear weapon. Now, obviously I’d prefer to have historical data. But I strongly suspect that China’s and India’s
rankings weren’t nearly so high in 1964 and 1974 when they conducted their first nuclear
tests. The point is this: You don’t need to be a rich country, or have a great education system, to build a
bomb.¶ This should be no surprise. Did I mention that we just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, Trinity? Seventy years. What other 70-year-
old technology do we believe remains impossible for non-European countries to acquire, even after several have done so? You know what else was invented in the 1940s?
Microwave ovens, solid-body electric guitars, and the Slinky.¶ I don’t mean “acquire” in terms of buying a nuclear weapon off the shelf — I agree with Zakaria that is a nutty idea.
And I don’t mean purchasing a turn-key infrastructure to produce plutonium, as Syria did from North Korea, or highly enriched uranium as Libya did from Pakistan’s A.Q.

The fancy machine tools, materials, and components that

Khan. No, I mean building a bomb from scratch.

good enough to build the nuclear weapons of the 1970s are widely
were

available now. My favorite example is that one of the machine tools linked to the A.Q. Khan network was a used Denn machine tool. If you go to the Denn
website, they tell you what their machine tools can be used for: everything from armaments to kitchenware. And, be still Fareed Zakaria’s fluttering heart, auto parts. (Flow
forming machines make sweet rims.) Talk about dual use!¶ The United States was deeply skeptical that Pakistan could build centrifuges in the 1970s because of the country’s
limited industrial base. What U.S. analysts didn’t grasp was that Pakistan’s industrial base — and that of every other proliferator — was the entire world. There is no reason to

a proliferator
think this problem went away with A.Q. Khan. Take a spin around Alibaba, the big Chinese online B2B procurement site sometime.¶ Moreover,

doesn’t have to try to acquire the most modern centrifuges. When U.N. inspectors were stumbling
across the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s, they made a surprising discovery: Calutrons. These were an obsolete uranium enrichment technology
(electromagnetic isotope separation) from the 1940s that fell out of favor after World War II. Inefficient, sure, but good enough to make the highly enriched uranium for the

we’re lucky that nuclear weapons have not spread as

Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.¶ Frankly,

quickly as the technology to make them. Some of the success in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is down to sanctions,
export controls, and the occasional air strike. Most of the success, however, goes to the regime that discourages states that could build nuclear weapons from doing so in the first
place. ¶ If you ask a policy wonk whether the nonproliferation regime has been successful or not, the chances are better than even that you’ll hear about President John F.
Kennedy’s famous warning that “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these
weapons.” (It’s kind of a standard talking point we all learn early on.)¶ That didn’t happen — and credit usually goes to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To see
why, look at the countries that were in Kennedy’s list of 15, 20, or 25 nuclear-armed states. Kennedy’s estimate came from a 1963 briefing paper provided by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara that is now declassified. Here is McNamara’s chart: ¶ Look at those names. They aren’t rogue states, but rather a list of the world’s relatively industrialized
countries, along with a few developing regional powers like China and the UAR (The United Arab Republic was a brief political union of Egypt and Syria). The working
assumption behind Kennedy’s estimate was that any state that could build nuclear weapons probably would. That’s because, before the NPT, nuclear weapons were seen by
many people as just another weapon, part of any modern military’s future arsenal. In fact, virtually all the non-Warsaw Pact countries on this list seriously considered a nuclear
weapons program. Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland all had active nuclear weapons programs.¶ The NPT helped changed that. (In the case of Australia, Jim Walsh has written
a particularly compelling account of the role played by the NPT in constraining Canberra’s nuclear aspirations.) Treaties are absolutely necessary. It is simply not possible to
sustain a nearly universal regime through technology denial and military action. The regime depends on the vast majority of states choosing compliance, allowing the
international community to focus its enforcement efforts on a small number of hard cases like North Korea and Iran.¶ ¶ The nonproliferation regime can only function with the

The Saudis are clearly alarmed

support of those states that can build nuclear weapons, but choose not to — states like Saudi Arabia.

by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While I suspect that a lot of the talk about acquiring nuclear
weapons is intended to make the United States focus on Saudi security concerns, it doesn’t help to dismiss Riyadh’s anxieties by mocking their educational system and ability to

That means closer consultations on

go nuclear.¶ Rather, we need to focus on making sure the nonproliferation regime works for Saudi Arabia and other states.

expanded security arrangements, and crucially an attempt to head off an Iranian bomb with a negotiated
regional defense issues,

settlement. Fareed Zakaria may well win his bet that the Saudis will not have a bomb in 10 years, but it’s not because

they can’t have one. If he wins — and I hope he does — it’s because the United States and other powers
have successfully addressed Iran’s nuclear program and the regional
security issues that would push Riyadh toward a bomb. And who knows, maybe in 10 years we’ll all be
driving Meeyas.

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war---it’s fast and destabilizing

Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The
Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2011, NU Libraries
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support:
Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the
region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to
respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that
Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing
a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to
nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate
its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response
to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia
acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from
China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security
guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell
operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide
the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they
need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has
Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water
reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing
facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to
maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.

Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi

Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi
territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly
appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would
not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United
States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would
accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying
nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most
worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's
weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons?
How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either
the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi
government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly
destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle
East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding
the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear
weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the
NPT.
 2
The United States should:
 Significantly increase its military coordination with the
Arab States of the Persian Gulf and military presence in the
Arab States of the Persian Gulf, including synchronized
deployments, pooled base access, and training and joint
exercises
 Propose multilateral policy coordination between the
United States, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and the
Islamic Republic of Iran, including against the Islamic State
 Propose the creation of a new multilateral regional security
forum including the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the
Islamic Republic of Iran
The counterplan intervenes in the security dilemma and
integrates Iran into the regional security order---removes the
need for withdrawal
Frederic Wehrey 10/14, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, “Imagining a New Security Order in the Persian Gulf,” 10/14/15,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/14/imagining-new-security-order-in-persian-
gulf/ij3p
At the heart of the current dilemma is a clash of visions between the two sides of the Gulf
littoral: Iran seeks the departure of U.S. forces so it can exert what it regards as its rightful authority
over the region (which it believes is self-evident in the area’s geographic name). Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states
desire a continued American presence to balance what they see as Iran’s historical ambition of
hegemony.¶ A new window of opportunity may be opening to resolve this dilemma. The
nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
plus Germany—raises the possibility, albeit a distant one, of creating a new security order
in the Gulf, one that could improve relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab states and help reduce the
American military commitment. This has been accompanied by the concurrent rise of a more militarily capable bloc of Gulf Arab
states who—while still falling short of real self-sufficiency and, in the case of Yemen, using their capability irresponsibly—could
presage a new era of confidence among these historically jittery kingdoms.¶ Opponents and supporters of the Iranian nuclear
agreement have offered a dichotomy between a strategy of rolling back Iran or integrating the
country into the global order. But this is not a binary choice. The nuclear
agreement will empower Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which executes
Iran’s regional policies. But it could also create greater space for increased bilateral
engagement between the United States and Iran. The United States should, therefore, try to
foster Iranian integration in regional structures to encourage more
responsible Iranian behavior while imposing costs if Tehran continues to make
mischief in a way that threatens core U.S. interests.¶ Managing this balance between reconciling with and constraining Iran
will be a difficult diplomatic and political challenge. One immediate test for the strategy will be whether the United States and its
Gulf Arab partners can agree to create a more inclusive forum for multilateral discussion of Gulf security issues as a first step toward
eventually building a rules-based security architecture for the region.¶ This idea is not without precedent.
In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, regional security organizations have emerged with the goals of lowering tensions, resolving
disputes, managing crises, and preventing conflicts. Yet, the record of these organizations has been inconsistent.¶ In the Middle East,
the failure has been especially stark. The League of Arab States, encompassing countries throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, is bereft of real conflict prevention capability.¶ In
the Persian Gulf, the region’s only multilateral security forum—the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, as currently configured, the
GCC is little
more than a de facto collective defense alliance directed against Iran. It excludes
Iran, Iraq, and outside powers with a strong stake in the security of the region, such as China, the European Union (EU), India,
Japan, Russia, and the United States. Second, theGCC provides no multilateral venue for crisis
management, conflict resolution, or implementation of measures to strengthen
stability. In addition, it does not offer a mechanism for countries in the Gulf to candidly discuss threats and security needs.2
This is particularly problematic because GCC countries face multiple, cross-border challenges that require greater multinational
cooperation.¶ Opening
a new multilateral framework to Iran could be one
additional tool in a broader U.S. strategy of incentives and pressures to help
influence Iranian behavior. But the immediate benefits of this opening should not be overstated. The modest
gains afforded Iran by this structure would not outweigh the deeply entrenched drivers of Tehran’s policies. Iran’s dangerous
meddling in the region appears to be driven by a mix of ideological fervor, strategic deterrence, domestic factionalism, and a deeply
held belief among senior leaders that the Islamic Republic is and should remain the region’s indispensable nation. That said, low-
level dialogue between the Gulf states and Iran could be an important first
step in reducing tension and influencing Iran’s outlook. Further, this new
multilateral forum could expand to a more regularized dialogue on Iraq,
Syria, and Yemen.¶ Thus, a new regional security forum should be an integral
element of the United States’ long-term vision of a rules-based and more stable and
predictable security order in the Gulf. Without such an order, the United States will
likely remain stuck in the role of the region’s fire brigade, forced to take
greater ownership of problems that countries in the region must solve for
themselves, often with the United States in a supporting role. The aftermath of the nuclear
agreement with Iran, which imposes the dual requirements of containing and
engaging the country, provides both an opportune time and context to construct these arrangements.
Embedding the United States in a more robust regional security institution will
also allay the fears of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that it is withdrawing
from the region.

The region won’t change stabilize itself overnight---military

presence is necessary to reassure partners in the interim which
creates long-term cooperation
Jon B. Alterman 15, CSIS senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global
Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at CSIS, with Dr.
Kathleen Hicks, CSIS senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of
the International Security Program at CSIS, “Federated Defense in the Middle East,”
September 2015,
http://csis.org/files/publication/150909_Alterman_FederatedDefMiddleEast_Web.pdf
U.S. leadership in Middle East security is critical; disengagement from the
region is not plausible. The United States will have to make hard choices about what its priorities are, commit to
pursuing coherent policies aligned with them, and conduct consistent diplomatic and public messaging on them. The strategy must
achieve a balance between addressing short-term security imperatives that threaten U.S. interests and investing in regional
capabilities that enhance long-term stability. The challenge comes because long-term stability will also require more than military
capabilities. It will demand better governance, adherence to rule of law, respect for human rights, and more inclusive economic
growth. Many U.S. partners concede that the reform process is necessary, but they emphasize that it is fraught with danger. While
they appreciate U.S. support against external threats, they are resistant to what they see as well-meaning advice on sovereign issues.

There is no easy solution to the resultant tension. Change will come to the
region at a pace that is likely to be both uneven and unpredictable, and the United
States will have few tools with which to direct that change. In our judgment, the United States needs to pursue two tracks
simultaneously. The first is remaining true to U.S. values: insisting on maintaining human rights principles, vetting partner military
units, and inculcating respect for individual rights that is at the core of American political sensibilities. The United States should
speak out on those issues, sometimes in public, and sometimes when it makes partners uncomfortable. The second track is
rebuilding the trust deficit between the United States and its regional partners
in the wake of the Arab Spring and the P5+1 and Iran negotiations. That requires patiently
and methodically building partner capacity, in addition to helping the countries against urgent
threats. The United States should seek to remain the “indispensable partner” to its
regional partners, both in the immediate and longer term.

In addition, the United States should be prepared to address Iranian threats and
provocations, especially in the asymmetric and unconventional realms, even in the wake of a successful nuclear agreement
between the P5+1 and Iran. In fact, even after the agreement has been adopted, Iran is likely to cooperate in
some areas while undermining the interests of the United States and its allies in
others. The United States should be open to cooperating with Iran (on issues such as tactical
maritime security in the Gulf and countering violent extremism in Afghanistan), and it should look for ways to test
Iranian intentions. In the interim, until a new and less threatening Iranian
pattern of behavior manifests itself, the United States should be sympathetic to
partners’ requests for additional security assurances.
The policy disagreements following the Arab Spring have led the United States to move away from building ties with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia and to focus instead on smaller, very capable states in the region. It is arguable whether the United States can afford to
do so, given Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For their own part, these larger countries
are acting with more autonomy (e.g., the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and the Egyptian military actions in Libya, both of which
the UAE supports), while some smaller states such as Jordan and the UAE are actively participating with anti--ISG airstrikes in
Syria. All of these actions challenge decades-old assumptions about regional partners’ military capabilities and their political will to
use them. The United States must reframe its relationship with regional partners to
meet these changing realities.

A reappraisal of regional relationships should center on an important premise: not all strategically important countries in the region
are U.S. strategic partners. It
should identify and commit to policies that further those strategic
relationships while focusing transactional activities on common interests that
it shares with other partners. For example, focusing on transactional agreements with Egypt on counterterrorism, border security,
Sinai security, and North African stability, and emphasizing training over equipment, may help both the United States and Egypt
extricate the relationship from a lingering stalemate. The U.S. policy decision to reframe capability focus areas and end cash flow
financing for Egypt’s foreign military financing (FMF) is a step in the right direction, although it remains unclear how the United
States will press forward on governance and human rights concerns.1

Saudi Arabia’s trajectory is uncertain, with a new monarch and an unknown and untested defense minister. Its intervention into
Yemen demonstrates a willingness to take threats to its security head-on, but the current operations in Yemen raise several
questions. The Saudi government sees the Houthi uprising as a function of Iranian regional ambitions, and it is determined to act
decisively against Iranian influence. Yet, operationally, it is not clear how long Saudi Arabia can sustain military operations in what
is likely to be a protracted civil war. More broadly, the Saudi effort to use military tools to shape politics on the ground in Yemen has
not met with much success so far. The Houthi rebels seem undeterred, and the civilian toll continues to climb. Yemen’s already
precarious economic situation has become more tenuous, with millions of Yemenis at risk of disease and starvation, growing refugee
flows, and medical and transport systems coming to a standstill. In this environment, both al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and Islamic State affiliates have gained significant ground. The Saudi government must find a way to define victory in
Yemen that allows it to end its military operations, and such an outcome appears increasingly elusive.

The United States has supported the Saudi effort with intelligence and targeting support, as well as refueling, but there are signs of
increasing impatience with both the open-ended nature of the engagement and the threat of a massive man-made humanitarian
disaster. Some argue that the United States doesn’t have much space to argue with the Saudis on issues they see as affecting their
core interests. Clearly, there are a broad set of reasons for the United States to keep Saudi Arabia close, including the Saudi role in
global energy markets, U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation against radical groups and individuals, Saudi influence in regional
diplomacy, and even the potential to develop its own nuclear program if Iran proliferates.2

Because states do not automatically work to pursue their mutual interests, the
United States should lead its
allies and partners in building a multilateral framework to guide normative
behavior in the region. Formal alliances (i.e., collective defense agreements) between the United States
and Middle Eastern countries are not plausible in the near term, given politics in both the United States
and the Gulf. Yet, the complexity and range of threats, combined with the potential for unsynchronized
and unilateral action, call for something more robust than the Gulf security dialogues
that the United States has held with GCC members over the past 10 years. A structure including an annual
multilateral defense ministerial meeting and regular diplomatic and military
engagements at lower levels could do several things. It would enable the United States, extra-regional
allies, and partners to develop common threat assessments, to determine desired outcomes and objectives,
and to identify the strengths and limitations of each other’s capabilities and
capacity, both militarily and politically. It might also contribute to greater trust among
members, building more integrated capabilities and supplementing the
bilateral relationships with the United States that are likely to remain at the core of most GCC states’ defense
postures. Also, over time, a framework should seek to create an understanding of normative behavior for the use of force, raising the
political costs for unilateral action.
 3
Reduced presence means Gulf states switch allegiances to China-
--crushes U.S. leverage in a Taiwan crisis---base access and the
political relations sustained by a large presence are vital
Eduardo A. Abisellan 12, the U.S. Marine Corps Federal Executive Fellow in the
Brookings 21st Century Defense Initiative, 6/28/12, “CENTCOM’s China Challenge:
Anti-Access and Area Denial in the Middle East,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/28%20centcom%2
0china%20abisellan/28%20centcom%20china%20abisellan
First, it is important to establish just how critical the Middle East is to China. The
significance of the Middle East in fueling the global economy cannot be overstated: five of the top ten countries with proven oil
reserves are in the Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia alone possesses one fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves. Iran has 137 billion
barrels (bbls); Iraq, 115 bbls; Kuwait, 104 bbls; and the United Arab Emirates possesses 98 bbls of proven oil reserves.1

China, out of sheer economic necessity, has developed closer ties with these
Persian Gulf States in order to satisfy its voracious energy appetite. The World Energy
Outlook 2011 report predicts that the Chinese economy, notwithstanding a global economic downturn, will continue to grow at a rate
of 8.1 percent per year through 2020.2 Therefore, China’s quest for energy is a critical factor in sustaining its impressive economic
growth.

In 2010, China imported nearly 4.8 million barrels of crude oil per day (bbl/d), of which over 2.2 million (47 percent), came from the
Middle East. By comparison, 1.5 million bbl/d (30 percent) came from Africa, 176,000 bbl/d (4 percent) from the AsiaPacific region,
and 938,000 bbl/d (20 percent) came from other countries.”3 By 2020, China is anticipated to overtake the United States in terms
of oil imports, and by 2030 it will become the largest oil consumer in the world, consuming 15 million bbl/d- nearly double 2009
levels.4

China purchases oil from all parties regardless of their domestic political system; its primary concern has been and remains to fuel
its growing economy and ensure sufficient markets are available to sustain future energy demands and economic growth. A
secondary effect of increased Chinese dependency on Middle Eastern oil has been the significant rise in the amount of trade between
China and the Middle East. According to a recent article by James Chen, “The Emergence of China in the Middle East,” “from 2005
to 2009, the total trade volume between China and the Middle East rose 87 percent to $100 billion, and Middle East’s exports to
China grew by 25 percent. China is also the top source of the region’s imports, most of them being low-cost household goods.”5

Increased trade and infrastructure investments by Chinese firms in the Middle East and by Middle Eastern firms in China have
significantly brought the Middle East and Far East closer together. The relationships between China and the Middle East may have
started as the result of basic supply and demand economics, but just as
China’s energy needs are
projected to grow, so is its relationship with key oil producing states within
the Persian Gulf. Moreover, “Beijing’s calculations regarding a possible war with
the United States over Taiwan increases the importance of having powerful and
independent minded oil producing friends in the Middle East that will be
willing to supply oil in a contingency.”6
A more benign conclusion is that the Chinese have thus far remained ambivalent to regional issues. But this ambivalence (or rather strategy of non-intereferenence in domestic
matters) has come with political gains to Chinese compared to the US position with several key regimes. The Chinese do not challenge the local regimes and ruling monarchies
on issues such as democracy or human rights. It is both a friend and ally to competing nations in the region, the Gulf monarchs on one side of the Persian Gulf and Iran on the
other. This relationship has benefited both China and the region. Bilateral trade between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, “topped $70 billion in 2008; according to some estimates, the Sino-GCC trade volume will reach between $350 and $500 billion
by 2020.”7

Opposite the GCC, “China has become Iran’s largest trade partner since the United States began its attempt to negotiate with Iran and sanction simultaneously.”8 China has
taken advantage of the international sanctions against Iran to maximize and diversify its energy security position, “with bilateral exchanges worth $21.2 billion compared to
$14.4 billion three years earlier. Western sanctions have also paved the way for Chinese companies, which last year directly supplied Iran with 13% of its imports ($7.9 billion).”9

Despite the obvious dangers of courting opposing countries, China

provides the next best alternative
to the U.S. in the region. It is an alternative that comes without preexisting
conditions for friendship. The Chinese do not expound governmental or political system reform as conditions for
doing business. China leans towards authoritarian regimes without upsetting the status quo; the U.S. engages nondemocratic
regimes with an eye towards reform and promoting democracy, but this process is of course often messy and rife with tension as the
US tries to balance competing demands. In the end, the Chinese through trade, investment, and nonintrusive policies stand to be
looked at as a better friend, ally, and benefactor than the U.S., at least under the current governmental structures in the region.

The recent popular uprisings (Arab Spring) in North Africa, and the manner in which the U.S. abruptly abandoned a 30-year ally in President Mubarak of Egypt, further
complicated the US position. While the shift was likely on the right side of history, it has no doubt changed the perception of U.S. loyalty to its other regime allies. Gulf monarchs
began asking themselves how the U.S. would react in the event of similar popular uprising within their states. Would the U.S. stand beside them or abandon them? Most
interpreted the latter would be the case.

The U.S. and China walk a fine line between friendship with the established ruling class and the population represented by its authoritarian rulers. The rise of popular
democratic movements may benefit the U.S. more than China, but the true outcome of revolutions will not likely be known for years to come. The challenge for the U.S. will
remain its ability to balance its national interests and democratic ideology with the less intrusive Chinese view of the world. In this regard, the Chinese have a clear advantage:
they are not going to upset the status quo, nor do they come with some of the historical baggage from 50 years of involvement in the region that makes US relations even with
dissidents or popular democratic movements difficult.

Adding to these trends are calls from within the U.S. to wean America from foreign oil dependency. Public statements along these lines further reinforce the perceived need in
the Gulf States to seek new alliances and focus their efforts on where the demand for energy is projected to be the strongest- the Asia-Pacific region. The 2011 World Energy
Report predicts that Asian countries that lie outside the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will have the largest demand for oil, with China and
India topping the list, whereas OECD consumption rates will level off, if not decline.

Moreover, with new shale oil and gas discoveries in the United States and oil sands from Canada, many believe that “the U.S. is at the forefront of the unconventional
revolution.”10 According to PFC Energy, a Washington-based consultancy: By 2020, shale sources will make up about a third of total U.S. oil and gas production, by that time
the U.S. will be the top global oil and gas producer, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia… That could have far-reaching ramifications for the politics of oil, potentially shifting
power away from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries toward the Western hemisphere. With more crude being produced in North America, there's less likelihood
of Middle Eastern politics causing supply shocks that drive up gasoline prices. Consumers could also benefit from lower electricity prices, as power plants switch from coal to
cheap and plentiful natural gas.11

This obviously could be of great benefit to the U.S. However, the shift to actual energy self-reliance is not readily apparent. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, the U.S. currently leads the world in oil consumption and imports about 45 percent of its oil needs. In 2011, the U.S. consumed 18.8 million barrels per day
(MMbd) of petroleum products and imported 11.4 MMbd. 52 percent of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products imports came from the Western Hemisphere (North, South and
Central America, and the Caribbean including U.S. territories). About 22 percent of U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products come from the Persian Gulf countries of
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The largest sources of crude oil and petroleum products imports came from Canada (29 percent) and
Saudi Arabia (14 percent). Other sources of U.S. Net Crude Oil and Petroleum Products imports are: Nigeria (11 percent); Venezuela (10 percent); and Mexico (8 percent).12

Many will see the potential for increased domestic oil and gas production as a means to wean America off the Middle Eastern (Persian Gulf) oil spigot, retrench, and save costs
abroad. On the surface, the potential for domestic oil production to offset foreign imports alleviates the problem associated with dependency on Middle Eastern oil, such as the
fluctuation in prices due to instability, or in the worst case, the disruption of supplies due to regional conflict. Moreover, due to the fungible nature of oil; the fluctuation in prices
due to instability or conflict has the potential to impact the price of oil worldwide and thus impact global economies directly. Therefore, supplanting oil imports from volatile
and/or unstable regions with domestic production insulates the nation against potential supply disruptions and price hikes.

However, it is strategically shortsighted to believe that weaning the U.S. off Middle Eastern oil supplies will solve America’s national
security issues in this volatile region. The geopolitical and strategic implications of
continued U.S. presence and involvement in the Middle East (Persian Gulf)
transcend the basic need for oil imports from the region. The scope is much
broader and inextricably connected to the larger global economy and the
role the U.S. plays in exercising global leadership to confront emerging
threats, deter aggression, and assure allies around the world—many of whom are heavily reliant on
the free trade in energy (and goods) to fuel their economies. If the U.S. is not the guarantor of the free
flow of trade throughout the global commons, who will be?
Yet, a war- and deficit-weary U.S. government and a sluggish domestic economy, when coupled
with the rebalancing of U.S. interests to the Asia-Pacific region, could easily cloud the larger strategic
picture. The strategic issue is not whether the U.S. can or should become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil
and less embroiled in the region, but whether energy self reliance and a rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will
cause the U.S. to scale back its efforts from the Middle East altogether. The
latter would be a strategic mistake.
In short, U.S. willingness to support popular democratic uprisings, the expressed desire
to wean the nation off Middle Eastern oil, and growing oil demand and consumption in
the Far East are all conditions that could significantly influence, if not alter, the
geostrategic and political landscape of the Middle East in the 21st century. This set of
circumstances will reinforce Persian Gulf states’ incentives to distance
themselves from the U.S. and to develop even stronger partnerships with
nations such as China.
The impact of this of US needs in a crisis situation in the Asia Pacific may be
more noteworthy than often understood. The disruption of Chinese oil supplies
would likely be a prime U.S. objective during a crisis situation involving a
potential dispute with China over Taiwan, or another contingency scenario. But
the aforementioned factors may be reasons why Gulf States may not support U.S.
actions during a crisis between the U.S. and China: why bite the hand that increasingly
feeds you?
However, the U.S. is dependent on regional military bases, such as the U.S.
Navy’s Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, the U.S. Air Force’s Combined
Air Operations Center in Qatar, and other military capabilities based
throughout the Arabian Peninsula, to exercise its military options. Without
the assistance of regional partners or access to bases from which to
operate, military action would be difficult to initiate and sustain.
Constraints placed against the U.S. may range from Persian Gulf states
continuing to supply oil to China despite a conflict with the U.S. Or they
could deny the U.S. the ability to launch military actions against China from
their territory, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. to pursue a
comprehensive military campaign to interdict Chinese oil supplies.

Goes nuclear---U.S. deterrence key

Adam Lowther 15, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force
Global Strike Command; and Alex Littlefield, professor at Feng Chia University, 8/11/15,
“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,”
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-
and-america/
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims
build the rocket/missile and naval
in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to
create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly
escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly
their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to
a limited nuclear conflict.
Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to
how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Chinese Capabilities

In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the
Second Artillery Corps
possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from
China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East
Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers.
To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also
be developing a
new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads,
giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is
worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons
grade plutonium.

This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal?

Chinese Motivation

The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an
American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other
capabilities such as cyber are offensive.

Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced
warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While
not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear
warheads each year.

While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear
arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears
are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility.

As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming
nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic
missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United
States as vulnerable.

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a
conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the
U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to
force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the
United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force
in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United
States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A
kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese.
Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include
strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the
Chinese may
escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for
example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.

In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign
Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention
would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to

American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a
conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an
asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than
it is for the United States.
 4
The United States federal government should increase its
military presence, including joint exercises and training, in the
Arab States of the Persian Gulf.
The President of the United States should publicly articulate a
threat of military force against the Islamic Republic of Iran in
the event of Iranian violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action.
The United States should propose a strategic dialogue with the
Gulf Cooperation Council states over unconventional security
threats, increase defense capacity-building, training, joint
intelligence programs, and articulate limits on independent
military action, with the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Iran will cheat on the deal---only a credible threat of force
backed up by robust presence stops prolif---the plan makes the
threat of force impossible which causes nuclear war
Michael Mandelbaum 15, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “How to Prevent an
Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/how-prevent-iranian-bomb
The American political conflict will come to a head in September, when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accord—although the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it passes and has enough support among Democrats
to uphold the veto and perhaps even to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place. Still, however the domestic politics play
out, both
the deal’s supporters and its critics agree that the United States should
prevent Iran from getting a bomb. This raises the question of how to do so—whether
without the deal, after the deal expires, or if the Iranians decide to cheat.
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require
Washington to update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence, making Tehran understand
clearly in advance that the United States is determined to prevent, by force if necessary, Iranian nuclearization. ¶ A CREDIBLE
THREAT¶ The English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan that “covenants, without the
sword, are but words.” Any agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing
it, and the Iranian agreement does include such a mechanism: in theory, if Iran violates the agreement’s
terms, the economic sanctions that the accord removes will “snap back” into place. By itself,
however, this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating. The procedures
for reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable; even if imposed, the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed; and even as the sanctions have been in
place, Iran’s progress toward a bomb has continued. To keep nuclear weapons out of Tehran’s
hands will thus require something stronger—namely, a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure. ¶ The term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response is
“deterrence.” It is hardly a novel policy for Washington: deterring a Soviet attack on the United
States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War. Deterring Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in
the future will have some similarities to that earlier task, but one difference is obvious: Cold War deterrence was aimed at preventing
the use of the adversary’s arsenal, including nuclear weapons, while in the case of Iran, deterrence
would be
designed to prevent the acquisition of those weapons. With the arguable exception of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, the United States has not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear, including the Soviet Union, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Does the Iranian case differ
from previous ones in ways that justify threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club?¶ It does. An Iranian bomb would be
more dangerous, and stopping it is more feasible. The Soviet Union and China were continent-sized countries that crossed the
nuclear threshold before the U.S. military had the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage. Israel and India, like the United Kingdom and France before them, were friendly democracies whose
possession of nuclear armaments did not threaten American interests. Pakistan is occasionally friendly, is a putative democracy, and
crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to India’s having done so. The United States is hardly comfortable with the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal, but the greatest danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval, it could fall into the hands
of religious extremists—precisely the kind of people who control Iran now.¶ North Korea presents the closest parallel. In the early
1990s, the Clinton administration was ready to go to war to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime would dismantle its nuclear program. North
Korea continued its nuclear efforts, however, and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of George
W. Bush. Since then, North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its bombs and improving its missiles, presumably with the
ultimate aim of being able to threaten attacks on North America. It is worth noting that in 2006, two experienced national security
officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to achieve such a capability, Washington should launch a
military strike to destroy it. One of the authors was William Perry, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration;
the other was Ashton Carter, who holds that position today.¶ Bad
as the North Korean bomb is, an
Iranian one would be even worse. For in the case of North Korea, a long-
standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired nuclear weapons, with
the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military presence on the
Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953. For this reason, in the years since
Pyongyang got the bomb, its neighbors have not felt an urgent need to
acquire nuclear armaments of their own—something that would be likely in the case of Iranian
proliferation. ¶ Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United
States and the Soviet Union. A
Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states, all
having small and relatively insecure arsenals, would be dangerously
unstable. In a crisis, each country would have a powerful incentive to launch
a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its
neighbors. Accordingly, the chances of a nuclear war in the region would skyrocket. Such
a war would likely kill millions of people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the flow of crucial
supplies of oil from the region.¶ But if an Iranian bomb would be even worse than a North Korean bomb, preventing its emergence
would be easier. A U.S. military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the Korean Peninsula, one in
which the South would suffer greatly. (South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is located within reach of North Korean artillery.) This is one of
the reasons the South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike, and the United States has felt compelled, so far, to
honor South Korea’s wishes. In the Middle East, by contrast, the countries that would most likely bear
the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a U.S. counterproliferation strike—Saudi
Arabia and Israel, in particular—have made it clear that, although they are hardly eager for war with Iran, they would not
stand in the way of such a strike.¶ A LIMITED AIM¶ Deterring Iran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is
justified, feasible, and indeed crucial to protect vital U.S. interests. To be effective,
a policy of deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with the Iranian
regime knowing just what acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that
Washington will follow through on its threats.¶ During the Cold War, the United States was
successful in deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of communist initiatives. In 1954,
for example, the Eisenhower administration announced a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations,
including costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea, by promising an overpowering response. But the doctrine lacked the
credibility needed to be effective, and a decade later, the United States found itself embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam.¶ In
the case of Iran, the aim of deterrence would be specific and limited: preventing Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. One is the likelihood of Iranian
“salami tactics”—small violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic Republic closer to a bomb without any single
infraction seeming dangerous enough to trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such violations.
The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on Western Europe, but Iran is all too likely to
try to develop the technology needed for nuclear weapons clandestinely (the
United States believes it has an extensive history of doing so), and the loopholes in the
agreement’s inspection provisions suggest that keeping track of all of Iran’s
bomb-related activities will be difficult.¶ As for credibility—that is, persuading the target that force really
will be used in the event of a violation—this posed a major challenge to the United States during the
Cold War. It was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on North America, but the
United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands of miles away, even though in that case, retaliation would have
risked provoking a Soviet strike on the American homeland. Even some American allies, such as French President Charles de Gaulle,
expressed skepticism that the United States would go to war to defend Europe. The
American government
therefore went to considerable lengths to ensure that North America and Western
Europe were “coupled” in both Soviet and Western European eyes, repeatedly expressing its
commitment to defend Europe and stationing both troops and nuclear weapons
there to trigger U.S. involvement in any European conflict.¶ In some ways, credibly
threatening to carry out a strike against Iran now would be easier. Iran may have
duplicated, dispersed, and hidden the various parts of its nuclear program, and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense
systems, but the
U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and munitions
necessary to cause enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to
build a bomb by years, even without the use of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah), or attack American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-
American terrorism. But such responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishment.¶ The
problems
with deterring Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather
political and psychological. Having watched American leaders tolerate steady
progress toward an Iranian bomb over the years, and then observed the Obama administration’s avid pursuit of a negotiated
agreement on their nuclear program, Iran’s ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington
would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating. U.S.
President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position that Iran should not be permitted to have the
capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale, then abandoned it. He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He made it the core argument in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to
it is war, implying that American military action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover,
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iran’s meddling in Iraq over the past decade, even though Tehran’s support for Shiite
militias there helped kill hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States, particularly during
this presidency, to be a serial bluffer.¶ DOUBT NOT¶ All of this
suggests that in order to keep Iran
from going nuclear, the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an explicit,
credible threat of military action. To be credible, such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated. The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should enshrine such a policy in formal resolutions
passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration should reinforce the credibility of
its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval and air forces in the
Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency of military exercises
there in conjunction with its allies. As in Europe during the Cold War, the goal of U.S. policy
should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that the United States will uphold its
commitments.¶ The debate about the Iran nuclear deal has become politically polarized, but a policy of deterrence should
not be controversial, since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian bomb. In addition, a
robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the shortcomings of the
JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements. And since the
deterrence policy could and should be open ended, it would help ease worries about the
provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years. As during the Cold War, the
policy should end only when it becomes obsolete—that is, when Iran no longer poses a threat to the international community.
Should the Islamic Republic evolve or fall, eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions, the United
States could revisit the policy. Until then, deterrence is the policy to adopt.
GCC
 1NC Domestic Motives Alt Cause/Turn
Try or die for deterrence---Khamenei has inevitable domestic
motivations for sponsoring proxy wars, it’s only a question of
whether credible American power can deter escalation
Kenneth M. Pollack 14, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations,
“Near Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/middle-
east-and-north-africa/near-eastern-promises/p32891
Khamenei, also worries about the potential effects of a
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali

nuclear deal, although for different reasons. He has long agonized over the seductive
influence of American culture and fears that a constructive relationship
between the United States and Iran would subvert the theocratic state and taint
Iran's revolutionary image in the Muslim world. He has found more value
in leading the rejectionist pack than in joining the global order. Even if a nuclear deal emerged that interested him, he
might feel that the only way to placate the hard-liners he relies on would be to
assure them that the agreement would not otherwise moderate Iranian foreign policy. He might even try to secure their grudging acceptance of such a
deal by promising them a freer hand to make mischief abroad.¶ Consequently, it seems
. But the history of the
premature to assume that a nuclear accord with Iran will mean the end of Iranian regional aggression

region strongly suggests that the United States is the state best able to limit Iran's
aggressive efforts to overturn the regional status quo. Claims of Iranian
irrationality notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has always
demonstrated an unmistakable respect for American power. The Iranians are
generally careful not to cross explicit American redlines. They sometimes challenge and probe
U.S. prohibitions, but when they meet resistance, they usually step back, fearful of how

Washington might react. Iran, for example, has never kicked out the UN inspectors
who monitor its nuclear program, and it has never shipped its most lethal
weapons to Iraqi Shiite militias or Hezbollah. There are a small number of exceptions to this
pattern, but they have typically proved the rule: the Iranians have crossed American redlines

only when they have misjudged their exact position or perceived correctly that
they were not truly red.¶ Tehran has no such respect for its regional
adversaries, whom the Iranians regard with contempt. The feelings are mutual, and thus without the United States
there to deter Iran and intercede on behalf of U.S. allies, there is a high
probability of regional crises that could escalate in unpredictable ways and
threaten American interests, especially the price of oil.
 Offense---1NC
The Middle East won’t just magically stabilize itself---the aff
makes every metric of regional stability and cooperation worse--
-causes nuclear war
George P. Schultz 15, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover
Institution, former secretary of state, with Henry Kissinger, “No Sign of Restraint,”
Hoover Digest, 2015, No. 3, Summer, http://www.hoover.org/research/no-sign-
restraint
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation,
of Iran’s three and a half decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions,
and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East.
Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both
countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic
culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a
consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent
definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the
United States are remotely near such an under-standing. Even while combating common enemies,
such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its supreme leader)
continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international
order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of
jihad by other means.
The final stages of the nuclear
talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to
expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military
or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of
Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi
Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks
empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic
transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than
Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s, or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional
allies will conclude that the United States has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for
acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own
nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity.
Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse, and the disequilibrium of power
tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate
America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region
initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case.
The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally
assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance-of-
power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in
America’s strategic interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its
catastrophic con-sequences. Nuclear arms must not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The
passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement.

If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the United States must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability
requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the
international community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability
to destabilize the Middle East and challenge the broader international order.
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the pro- jected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the
world’s challenges in the region. Rather
than enabling US disengagement from the Middle East, the
nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement
there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help
themselves.
 1NC Congress Alt Cause
Congressional provocations inevitable---empowers Iranian
hardliners
Mahmoud Pargoo 12/28, PhD candidate at Australian Catholic University in Sydney,
“Is Congress empowering Iranian hard-liners?” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iran-hardliners-gain-visa-waiver-program-
changes.html
Hassan Rouhani, who sternly criticized Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies, won the election and appointed Mohammad Javad Zarif as foreign minister. Consequently, and as a
result of the softening of the rhetoric and engagement in talks with the United States, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and six world
powers in July. The agreement was seen as evidence that if Iran engages in serious talks with the United States, issues can be gradually solved. Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah

Khamenei pointed to the likelihood of extending negotiations to other

Ali

non-nuclear issues if the United States proves to be trustworthy.¶ This line of

thinking, however, is changing with the recent series of US measures —
including the recent congressional vote to restrict visa-free travel to the United
States for those who have visited Iran in the past five years. Indeed, many in Iran
are coming to the conclusion that no matter what rhetoric or action the
Islamic Republic may assume, the United States will continue its enmity with Iran.
Thus, a new consensus is being formed — but this time, against the United States. People from almost

all political orientations have interpreted the new Visa Waiver Program (VWP) changes
as running counter to the JCPOA. Ali Larijani, the parliament speaker and a powerful conservative supporter of the nuclear negotiations, has
criticized the law, while many Reformist politicians have also condemned it as being against Iranian goodwill in engaging with the United States. Zarif, the foreign minister and

an
chief nuclear negotiator, has additionally said that the new law breaches the JCPOA.¶ When seen in the light of historical parallels, the recent developments could be

alarming sign that certain elements in the US foreign policy establishment

are seeking to paralyze [undermine] any effort to normalize relations with Iran.¶
Indeed, the reality is that previous efforts on the part of Iran to engage in strategic dialogue with the United States have been to no avail. In 2001, two weeks after the fall of
Kabul, an Iranian delegation attended the Bonn Conference, where it engaged in talks with the United States over the future of Afghanistan. Describing the Iranian delegation’s
cooperation at that time, James Dobbins, who was then the White House’s special envoy for Afghanistan, said, “All these delegations proved helpful. None was more so than the
Iranians.Ӧ Iran was hoping that those talks would extend to a broader range of issues, as former National Security Council, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency
official Flynt Leverett has said, but “that channel was effectively foreclosed when President [George W.] Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address labeled Iran as part of the
‘axis of evil.'” Indeed, that metaphor was utilized by hard-liners in Tehran to torpedo Reformists who were in favor of engagement with the West.¶ Daniel Heradstveit and G.
Matthew Bonham have studied the impact of the “axis of evil” discourse on the internal politics of Iran, concluding that it “strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives
vis-a-vis reformers.” The main problem with the metaphor was that it targeted “entire countries” — including their peoples — rather than problematic policies, or even political
leaders. Hence, “the metaphor mobilized the entire country — including ‘friends’ of the US.” Reflecting on the ultimate effect of the “axis of evil” discourse, Heradstveit and

the
Bonham concluded that it had “become a powerful rhetorical tool for mobilizing the ultra-conservative and anti-democratic forces in Iran.”¶ Similarly,

congressional vote to revise the VWP is a godsend for Iranian conservatives

— especially as the country is about to hold important parliamentary elections in

February. For hard-liners, and many others in Iran, the recent

congressional measures are evidence of that the United States will not cease its enmity
with Iranians. In this vein, the argument is that moderates and Reformists are wrong about that the United States’ enmity is at least partly because of the anti-
American rhetoric of conservatives, but rather as Ayatollah Khamenei stated in May 2014, “The enmity of our enemies is rooted in the resistance of the Islamic Republic against
global arrogance and against the hideous habit of dividing the world into the oppressor and the oppressed. Other issues are excuses. Today, their excuse is the nuclear issue. One
day, their excuse is human rights and another day, their excuse is something else.Ӧ History has shown that US Republicans prefer Iranian hard-liners over moderates and
Reformists when it comes to foreign policy. This has never been more evident than when 47 Republican senators wrote a letter to Iranian lawmakers in March. US President
Barack Obama did not exaggerate when he said, “They [Iranian hard-liners] do have much more in common with the [US] hard-liners.”¶ More than ever before, the de facto
alignment of Iranian and American hard-liners came into focus during the nuclear negotiations. Former Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi, who now serves as an adviser to
Rouhani, talked about the shared interests of Iranian extremists with those of US and Israeli extremists. “Today, the approach of extremists of Iran is the same as the extremists
like Netanyahu, the GOP and the American Congress,” Younesi said.¶ Today, moderates are at a historical crossroads in Iran: Their nuclear initiative — the biggest foreign policy
issue after the 1979 Islamic Revolution — has been proven to be a success. Rouhani has curbed inflation from 34.7% in 2013 to almost single digits. Economic growth is also
predicted to increase to 5% by next year, as sanctions are set to be lifted under the JCPOA. Almost all grounds for a stunning moderate and Reformist victory in the coming

hard-liners have also started a counteroffensive to recapture

parliamentary elections are in place. Yet,

ground that has been lost to Reformists and moderates. Nothing could have
helped hard-liners in Tehran more than the VWP changes. Once again, Republicans in the United
States betray Reformists and moderates in Iran.
 AT: Great Power Draw-In
No great power draw-in now
Thomas Juneau 15, assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School
of Public and International Affairs, “Iran’s Failed Foreign Policy: Dealing from a
Position of Weakness,” 5/1/15, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/iran%E2%80%99s-
failed-foreign-policy-dealing-position-weakness
Iran’s progress along the nuclear path has also had negative implications for the power it derives from partnerships. Moscow
and Beijing share common interests with Tehran, especially in their opposition to U.S.
preponderance. They are therefore willing to cooperate on specific issues to stymie U.S.
goals. Russia and China, however, believe that the prospect of a nuclear-
armed Iran would go against their interests. They are thus not sympathetic to
the prospect of a more powerful Islamic Republic assertively pursuing its regional
interests. They have also typically been careful not to damage their ties to Iran’s Arab
rivals at the expense of their ultimately limited ties to Tehran. As a result, the more
Iran has approached nuclear capability, the more they have supported tougher sanctions and the less they have been willing to
cooperate with Iran.
 AT: Oil Shocks
No impact to oil shocks and they won’t happen---newest data
obliterates their offense
Kahn 11 Jeremy Kahn, writer for Newsweek, IHT, and NYT, previous editor of the
New Republic, Masters in IR from LSE and B.S. in History from Penn, "Crude reality"
2/13
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full
Will a Middle Eastern oil disruption crush the economy? New research
suggests the answer is no -- and that a major tenet of American foreign
policy may be fundamentally wrong.
the world has been riveted by scenes of protest in the Middle
For more than a month,

East, with demonstrators flooding streets from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond. As the unrest has spread, people in the
West have also been keeping a wary eye on something closer to home:
the gyrating stock market and the rising price of gas. Fear that the
upheaval will start to affect major oil producers like Saudi Arabia has led speculators to bid up oil prices — and
led some economic analysts to predict that higher energy costs could
derail America’s nascent economic recovery.
The idea that a sudden spike in oil prices spells economic doom has
influenced America’s foreign policy since at least 1973, when Arab states, upset with Western support
for Israel during the Yom Kippur War, drastically cut production and halted exports to the United States. The result was a sudden quadrupling in crude prices and a deep global recession.

Many Americans still have vivid memories of gas lines stretching for
blocks, and of the unemployment, inflation, and general sense of
insecurity and panic that followed. Even harder hit were our allies in
Europe and Japan, as well as many developing nations.
The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak
Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock.

havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American

psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth
flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy.
Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term
military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain.

But a growing body of economic research suggests that this

conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less
susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent
history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable

and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage
once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become

less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude
prices overall than it was in 1973.
Terror
 UQ
Retaking Ramadi turns the tide against ISIS---the U.S. and Iraq
are winning now but continued engagement’s key
Zalmay Khalilzad 1-1, former director of policy planning in the Department of
Defense, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 1/1/16,
“The War Against ISIS After Ramadi,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-ramadi-
iraqs-war-against-isis-14774
These caveats aside, the recent success in Ramadi is significant, and may mark a
turning point in the war against ISIS. After the Iraqi army’s collapse in Mosul, Iraqi security
forces—especially its special forces—have largely recovered in terms of their reorganization,
professionalism and willingness to fight. Although the operation took a long time, Iraqi
Special Forces backed by the regular army, U.S. airpower and newly trained Sunni tribal forces
performed well against a talented enemy in a difficult urban environment.
Whereas previous successes against ISIS, such as in the Sunni Arab city of Tikrit, were spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shiite
militias, it was the Iraqi
security forces that took the lead in pushing ISIS out of the
heart of Ramadi. By all account, the Shiite militias played a minimal role.
Encouraging, too, was the role that recently trained Sunni Arab fighters
played in the liberation of Ramadi. The Sunni Arab role in the fight against ISIS is vital.
ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, had largely been defeated in 2006 and 2007. The growing sectarianism of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, however, radicalized sizable elements of the Sunni Arab community. ISIS emerged in Syrian sanctuaries, expanded into
the Sunni parts of Iraq and eventually became a voice for Sunni Arab disenchantment. More recently in Tikrit, where Shiite militias
took over Sunni cities, the short-term success against ISIS led to a wave of sectarian abuses against the local population. The
resulting Sunni Arab alienation gave ISIS a strategic victory amid the tactical defeat.

The liberation
of Ramadi provides the Iraqi government with another
opportunity to win over disenchanted Sunni Arabs and defeat ISIS. Three steps are
now necessary:

First, remaining ISIS pockets in Ramadi must be defeated and the city and its suburbs must be cleared. The army and local Sunni
forces should carry out this mission with coalition air and intelligence support. Avoiding collateral damage and abuses of the civilian
population to the absolute extent possible will help ensure that Sunni Arabs rally against ISIS.

Second, the Baghdad government and anti-ISIS Sunnis should move quickly to address the needs of the local population in terms of
security, good governance and services. A sizable reconstruction effort is needed to gain the confidence of the local population.
Recent surveys suggest that severe dissatisfaction with both Iraq’s central government and local politicians among Iraqi Sunnis
played a central role in the rise of ISIS.

Third, Iraqi leaders must expedite negotiations on the issue of Sunni self-rule in Anbar and other Sunni areas. Many Sunnis who
opposed the federalization of Iraq when the national constitution was ratified in 2005 now favor the type of autonomy that the
Kurds enjoy. The Iraqi constitution guarantees to provinces the right to pursue self-rule on local issues. Maliki’s decision to violate
the constitution and move against Sunni provinces pursuing the federal option was a major grievance in the Sunni Arab community.

Equally important, the Iraqi government will need to reach agreement on a scheme for power and resource sharing between the
central and local governments. Provincial guard forces should be given responsibility for maintaining local security to the maximum
extent possible.

Achieving these objectives will not be easy especially in the current circumstances when oil prices are low and the government faces
serious financial problems. On
the positive side, though, Prime Minister Abadi appears more
willing than his predecessor to address legitimate Sunni grievances. Opposition
from Shiite hardliners will remain a factor; Abadi’s recent decision to refuse the U.S. offer to deploy American attack helicopters, for
example, was driven in large part by the resistance of Iran-backed militias. Growing cross-sectarian
confidence in the Iraqi government will give Abadi the political capital to
resist hardline Shiite pressure.
Ramadi is an important test case, particularly because of the coming battles for
Fallujah and for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. If the coalition and Iraqi government
can develop a coordinated strategy to consolidate victory and make visible
progress on political and economic reconstruction, the playbook in Ramadi could
serve as a model for how to move against ISIS in Mosul and in Syria. In fact,
Ramadi could very well become a turning point if progress in the city
catalyzes a shift in the Sunni Arab community away from ISIS and toward the Iraqi
government.

The United States has limited influence, but active engagement by Washington
could tip the scales, transforming a temporary tactical advance in Ramadi
into an enduring strategic victory against the forces of instability and terror in Iraq.

ISIS losing territory now---territory is key

Zack Beauchamp 15, writer for Vox, formerly at ThinkProgress, “Map: ISIS has lost
9.4 percent of its territory this year,” 7/30/15,
http://www.vox.com/2015/7/30/9069705/isis-map-10-percent
ISIS has lost almost 10 percent of its territory so far in 2015, yet another
indication that the group, for all the terror it has sown in Syria and Iraq, is losing the war.¶ ¶ Defense
analysis group IHS Jane's 360 detailed the territorial loss in a report, which includes this map below estimating the change in ISIS's
territory between January 1 and June 29 of this year. Green shows territory ISIS has taken in those months, and red shows land that
it's lost:¶ Jane's estimates the total loss at 9.4 percent of what ISIS held when
the year began.¶ The year has included gain for ISIS, as well, most notably the Syrian city Palmyra and the Iraqi city
Ramadi. But according to Jane's analyst Columb Strack, "Successes in Palmyra and Ramadi came at
the expense of significant territorial losses elsewhere."¶ This points to one of
ISIS's most fundamental problems: It has too many enemies. You can see this in
another thing on the Jane's map, showing who gained territory: the Iraqi government, Syrian rebels
(labeled "Sunni insurgents"), and Kurdish forces in both Iraq and Syria. All of those groups are hostile to
ISIS, and two of them are backed by US airpower. ISIS's fighters might be skilled, but they can't
fight everyone at once.¶ Losing territory is a serious problem for ISIS. The whole idea
of ISIS, the thing that makes it really different from al-Qaeda, is that it claims to be the actual state: a
caliphate that governs and holds territory. It needs that territory to ideologically justify itself,
to collect the extortionary "taxes" it uses to fund its activities, and to attract ever more
foreign recruits.¶ "When they declared the caliphate, their legitimacy came to
rest on the continuing viability of their state," Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, told me in October. If they keep losing territory, their
funding and recruiting pool will slowly dry up.¶ Recent developments have been
bad for ISIS. Syrian Kurdish forces advanced dangerously close to ISIS's de
facto capital, Raqqa, in late June. Iraqi forces are pressuring ISIS in Anbar province,
home to Ramadi and ISIS stronghold Fallujah.
 Alt Causes/Backlash Turn---1NC
The plan causes increased support for dictators and Israel---
those are bigger sources of resentment
Hal Brands 15, Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, PhD in
History from Yale, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, “Fools
Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,” The Washington Quarterly • 38:2
pp. 7–28,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Brands_Summe
r%202015.pdf
The primary cause for doubt is that while stationing U.S. troops in Muslim countries has historically been one cause of anti-
American terrorism, it has never been the only one. That phenomenon also grew out of anger at U.S.
support for authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, Washington’s relationship
with Israel, the encroachment of Western cultural and economic influences on Muslim societies, and other
grievances that were prominent in early al-Qaeda pronouncements and still resonate today. In 2010, for instance, an al-
Qaeda spokesman announced that it would take more than withdrawing U.S.
troops from Muslim lands to make jihadist attacks stop. The United States would also have to end its support to
Israel, prohibit all trade and investment in that country, terminate all aid to “the hated regimes of the Muslim world,” cease “all
interference in the religion, society, politics, economy, and government” of the region, and so on. Anti-American terrorism has
always had a complex genesis, and avoiding U.S. military presence would address but one of the relevant
complaints.34¶ Were the United States to embrace offshore balancing, it would actually aggravate some of those
grievances further. A true offshore balancing strategy would make the United States more
reliant on authoritarian Arab regimes—like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan—as bulwarks of
stability in the region. It would imply an increase in military sales,
intelligence partnerships, and other support for these countries, and a
tolerance for precisely the sort of friendly-dictators approach that Muslim radicals
deplore. In the same vein, while many offshore balancers call on Washington to distance
itself from Israel, Colin Kahl of Georgetown University and Marc Lynch of George Washington University have rightly
noted that the logic of the strategy would certainly increase U.S. dependence on
that country as the strongest, friendliest military power in a very volatile region.35 In effect, then, offshore balancing
would require doubling down on policies which have long stoked jihadist resentment.
 Impact D---ISIS
ISIS can’t get WMDs
Matthew Cottee 14, research analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; and Dina Esfandiary,
research associate with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/15/14, “The very small Islamic State
WMD threat,” http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-threat7729
ISIS does seem interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear
In short,

weapons, but ambitions do not necessarily equate with reality. The

complexities of such weapons, combined with the difficulties involved in
obtaining and handling the necessary material, make the likelihood of its use remote.
Let’s not exaggerate the threat.

They’re nowhere near an existential threat

Daniel Benjamin 14, Nonresident Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institute, current
Director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding @
Dartmouth, “Hawks Exaggerate Islamic State Threat to the United States,” 8/17,
Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/17-hawks-
exaggerate-islamic-state-threat-benjamin
To judge by the doom-laden prophecies cascading in from Washington, the
United States faces a towering and imminent threat in the form of the militant group calling
itself the Islamic State, or ISIS. “They are coming here,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina intoned on Fox
News Sunday. “I think of an American city in flames because of the terrorists’ ability to operate in Syria and Iraq.” Senator Graham’s
friend Sena tor John McCain is no less alarmist. Calling for immediate air strikes in Iraq and Syria, he declared, “They are getting
stronger all the time . . . And their goal . . . is destruction of the United States of America.”Stoking the panic has been a very excitable
press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State fighters represented an “existential threat” to the United States. Set aside that
absurdity; no
terrorist group threatens our existence. (America has faced one existential threat in
modern times — the Soviet nuclear arsenal — and that is it.) But
is the Islamic State a huge and
menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United States today. The danger to
Iraq and its neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and
Syria, sowing sectarian conflict, and creating in its midst a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite
fearmongers: “Every day that goes by, ISIS builds up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States,” said New
York Representative Peter King, conjuring an image of a new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows,
and the threat to Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act. But, for now, it’s
important to understand
that even if marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating
Iraq’s hollowed-out military, that doesn’t mean they have genuine terrorist
skills. Consider the details: The Islamic State has never carried out a significant
attack outside of its neighborhood. In 2005, when its operatives were still part of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American warship in the Red Sea. More recently,
four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels by a young man trained in Syria. In other
words, we’ve seen no demonstrated ability to carry out the kind of complex international strike that kills dozens or hundreds, let
alone engulfs a US city in flames.
 Impact D---Cyber
No cyber-attack---air-gap and complexity solve
Michael Tanji 10, spent 20 years in the US intelligence community; veteran of the US
Army; served in strategic and tactical assignments worldwide; participated in national
and international analysis and policy efforts for the NIC, NSC and NATO; Claremont
Institute Lincoln Fellow and Senior Fellow at the Center of Threat Awareness; lectures
on intelligence issues at The George Washington University, 7/13/10, “Hacking the
Electric Grid? You and What Army?,”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/07/hacking-the-electric-grid-you-and-what-
army/
Grid-hacking is back in the news, with the unveiling of “Perfect Citizen,” the National Security Agency’s creepily named effort
to protect the networks of electrical companies and nuclear power plants. ¶ People have claimed in the past to be able to turn off the

internet, there are reports of foreign penetrations into government systems, “proof” of foreign interest in

attacking U.S. critical infrastructure based on studies, and concerns about adversary capabilities based on
allegations of successful critical infrastructure attacks. Which begs the question: If it’s so easy to turn off

the lights using your laptop, how come it doesn’t happen more often? ¶ The fact of the matter is that
it isn’t easy to do any of these things. Your average power grid or drinking-water system
isn’t analogous to a PC or even to a corporate network. The complexity of such
systems, and the use of proprietary operating systems and applications that are not
readily available for study by your average hacker, make the development of exploits for any uncovered

vulnerabilities much more difficult than using Metasploit. ¶ To start, these systems are rarely
connected directly to the public internet. And that makes gaining access to grid-controlling networks a
challenge for all but the most dedicated, motivated and skilled — nation-states, in other words.
2NC
Coop CP
 Hardliners
Hardline influence in foreign policy is locked in---means try or die for
deterrence
Sven-Eric Fikenscher 10/1, Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard
University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Why Iran’s Bellicose
Foreign Policy Is Unlikely to Change,” 10/1/15,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran%E2%80%99s-bellicose-foreign-
policy-unlikely-change-13976
the
As the deadline for Congressional action against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran has passed on September 17,
agreement is finally about to be implemented. Some supporters of the deal have argued that
in the absence of a stalemate over Tehran’s nuclear activities, the West can now
engage Iran to stabilize the Middle East, most notably with regards to rolling back the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). John Kerry fueled these hopes when he said that Iranian foreign minister Zarif had told him that thanks to the deal he
would be “empowered to work with and talk to you about regional issues.” Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, even voiced
hope that time might be ripe for an entirely new
“regional framework […] based on cooperation rather than confrontation.”
This optimism, however, underestimates the anti-American agenda and the influence of
Iran’s self-declared guardians of the revolution. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the key figure in the Iranian
political system, is a case in point. While President Hassan Rouhani has been very committed to concluding the nuclear deal,
Khamenei was the one who has always expressed reservations about engaging the United
States. He once compared his attitude to the negotiations to the behavior of a wrestler who sometimes “shows flexibility [for] technical
reasons,” but “should not forget who his opponent and enemy is.” From his perspective, the compromise on
the nuclear issue was a tacit concession to get much-needed sanctions relief and by
no means a blueprint for reconciliation . After Rouhani cautiously expressed his interest in
expanding Iran’s cooperation with “various countries,” the Supreme Leader
immediately pushed back and told his fellow citizens to “prepare for the
continuation of the fight against America.”
Some analysts have dismissed such statements as empty words to appease radical groups within Iran. Unlike the Supreme Leader’ s red
lines regarding the nuclear negotiations, this kind of rhetoric is, however, backed up by action. Iran’s Qods
Force––the wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is running the IRGC’s external operations and was
instrumental in supporting radical Shiite militias during the insurgency in Iraq––has reportedly plotted terrorist
acts against targets from Israel and the Gulf states , the key U.S. allies in the Middle East. Most notably, the
Qods Force was behind the attempt to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil in 2011. Apart from plotting its
own attacks, the Qods Force has also encouraged and supported Hezbollah in its endeavor to follow suit.

The Qods Force––and not the comparatively moderate forces that negotiated the nuclear deal––is
also in charge of coordinating Iran’s current military and diplomatic engagement
with respect to the region’s hot spots , such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In its capacity as primary
Iranian stakeholder in regional affairs, the Qods Force has dramatically stepped up
its activities and undermined regional stability in recent years. When the Assad regime was under
increasing pressure from the Syrian insurgents, the Qods Force teamed up with its long-standing proxy Hezbollah to keep the regime
from falling. To this day, Hezbollah militants and IRGC forces fight alongside Assad’s army. As a result, the Syrian regime has continued
its brutal attempts to suppress the popular revolt and thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Syria to join Sunni insu rgents,
including terrorist groups. In addition, the Qods Force has doubled down on its support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who drove
American forces out of the country a couple of months ago.

It is particularly noteworthy that the Qods Force increased its involvement in Syria and Yemen ,
although the United States and Iran simultaneously narrowed their differences on the nuclear
issue. In other words, the idea that a compromise on the nuclear file can undo the severe conflicts between the United States and Ir an
on other issues has so far been powerfully disproven. The odds that Iran is going to change its behavior in
the future are quite low. Things are rather likely to get even worse. In a recent speech, the Supreme Leader
vowed to keep up the support for the “oppressed people” of Yemen and––mentioning another
potential trouble spot––Bahrain. The continuation of the alliance between Iran and its only governmental partner in the region, the
Assad regime, is also pretty much a given.

It is true that Iran and the United States have demonstrated that they can find common ground, if both countries deem collaboration to
be in their interests. Supporters of deeper engagement with Iran are right to point out that efforts to roll back ISIL fall i nto that category,
but that should not overshadow the strikingly discrepant goals, values and interests both sides have. The
United States should
not act under the assumption that a long-standing foe, who has turned out to pursue
an extremely aggressive agenda that runs counter to its own, can be flipped into a friend. Instead, it
should now focus its efforts on containing Iran’s regional ambitions and preventing Iranian-inspired
terrorist attacks. In both cases, it will be crucial to seek new international allies to isolate and weaken the Qods Force.
 GCC Unity
GCC united high now
Ali Dastjerdi 10-26-15, The Gulf Cooperation Council in an Evolving Middle East, Harvard
Political Review, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/gulf-cooperation-council-evolving-
middle-east/
Unity in Conflict¶ In March of this year, Yemen’s Sunni-led central government lost all control of its northern regions to Shia
Houthi rebels, sparking the beginning of a civil war. The violence quickly turned into the latest iteration of proxy conflict between Iran
and the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as Iran took the side of the insurgents and Saudi Arabia backed the central government. The
conflict in Yemen quickly became a litmus test of influence for regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate s. Today,
the conflict has expanded to include a unified front of all GCC member states except Oman. ¶ GCC
members have come
together and acted nearly unanimously because of the stakes at hand. Khouri explained, “The
Yemen war is going to be a big problem for the Saudis and the greater GCC because Yemen is going to be a completely shattered state,
on major security
with millions of people trying to cross the Saudi border to find jobs, order, and livelihood.” It is clear that
issues, the GCC is still willing to respond with a unified show of force.¶ The GCC today has formed
highly integrated military capabilities. With the emergence of greater coordination in the realms of missile
defense, civil defense, and naval operations, the group has placed itself as a major military player in the
region. Even Oman, the group’s fringe member, is engaging in military integration and
cooperation with the other member states. GCC states have started to build the endurance of their people towards conflict by
framing soldiers as martyrs and exposing more men to conflict with greater troop rotation. This seems to refute any concern o f fatigue
and reluctance to counter Iran on military matters in the future. ¶ Knights predicted that the Middle East might be entering a new era of
sustained proxy warfare between the GCC and Iran: “I recently attended an unclassified U.S. intelligence community workshop o n future
trends in the Middle East, and one of the key predictions was that we may be entering 10 to 15 years of GCC -Iran proxy warfare,
including at least one accidental military-military clash between the sides. Neither Iran nor the GCC would seek a destructive war within
their advanced economies and societies but would instead fight in the many collapsed or failing states of the region.” ¶ Knights added that
GCC states roles’ in these conflicts could range from “providing money” to “actually providing combat forces.” These looming future
conflicts would likely further reinforce GCC member states desires to stay tactically unified. GCC states are aware that they can only
challenge Iran as a unified force. To
stave off Iranian dominance within the Arabian Peninsula and protect members’
security interests, the Gulf
States, including Oman, will likely converge on strategic matters. ¶
In order to avoid a break in unity, however, the GCC must tread carefully in its military
endeavors. Understanding that its members have differing economic interests, the group will likely only engage in conflict where
there is minimal risk of economic spillover. This is the only viable approach for a cohesive security strategy in a region of increasing
economic interdependence.¶ The GCC involvement in Yemen exemplifies this strategy. Yemen’s economy, even before the current crisis,
faced serious distress from declining oil resources and high unemployment. The Gulf nation has a tiny industrial base and its main source
of international trade and income is oil, the loss of which would have little economic impact given the current supply gut. –– Iran nor
Saudi Arabia has major investment stakes in the Yemeni economy. The conflict there means little for the overall economic outlook of the
region.¶ The
GCC today is cohesive where it needs to be and flexible where it can be. The future GCC
is likely to achieve greater unity by increasingly decoupling its military ambitions
from the individual economic goals of its member states.¶ Both the Iran nuclear non-proliferation
agreement and the current proxy conflict in Yemen have brought ideological differences within the GCC to greater light. Despi te this,
the organization today—and for the foreseeable future—is unified on matters of regional security
and stability. Ultimately any divergence on non-defense issues will be overshadowed by the deep desire of GCC states to stay
united on military matters.
China DA
 Perception UQ---2NC
China perceives that the U.S. can blockade its oil in a Taiwan crisis now
because of GCC proxies---the plan ends that
Christina Y. Lin 13, Visiting Scholar at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at
the University of California, Irvine, and a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins
University, 3/18/13, “CHINA’S STRATEGIC SHIFT TOWARD THE REGION OF THE FOUR
SEAS: THE MIDDLE KINGDOM ARRIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST,”
http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/03/chinas-strategic-shift-toward-the-region-of-the-
four-seas-the-middle-kingdom-arrives-in-the-middle-east/
While the United States and EU may not value these three countries, China sees them as
strategic assets to project China’s influence and counterbalance the United States. China
has traditionally been a strong ally of Iran, due to its geostrategic location in the
Persian Gulf and anti-American sentiments. The Chinese view that the United States
currently controls the west bank of oil rich Persian Gulf via its pro-American proxies
(e.g., Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states), rendering the Gulf an “internal sea” for the
United States. However, if China and Russia expand relations with Iran, they could
maintain a “minimum balance” to thwart possible U.S. naval embargoes against other
countries. If the United States and China should ever have a military clash over
Taiwan, Washington would not shut off China’s Gulf oil supplies since China, Russia,
and Iran control the Gulf’s “east bank.”[22]
 Assurance UQ
The GCC is sufficiently assured to still work with the US---most recent
dialogue
James F. Jeffrey 11/3, Philip Solondz distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute, “The
Manama Dialogue: Searching for Unity in the Face of Chaos,” 11/3/15,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-manama-dialogue-
searching-for-unity-in-the-face-of-chaos
[Jubeir = Saudi foreign minister]
From October 30 to November 1, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) convened its annual Manama
Dialogue, the flagship forum for Middle Eastern defense and security officials and
their foreign partners. This year's dialogue sought to inventory the multiple crises shaking the region and demonstrate unity amid threats
from seemingly all directions. One result was a sense of solidarity , at least among government officials, as well as a

new reluctance to criticize the United States or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries for the unhappy state of affairs. The
main takeaway message was clear: "Things are so serious that we all have to hang together."¶ Indeed, the 2015
dialogue took place in the most dramatic regional security environment since the conferences began over a decade ago. While last year's gathering focused
this year's discussions were held in the shadow of many other stunning
on the critical ISIS threat,

developments -- the Iran nuclear deal, Russia's military engagement in Syria and de facto alliance with Iran, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen,
political crisis in Turkey, potential conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and continued fears of American withdrawal from the region or security
rapprochement with Tehran. In various ways, the conference demonstrated a new sense of unity and
purpose among the United States, its European allies, and the GCC states, four of whose six leaders had voted with their
feet by avoiding the Obama administration's Camp David summit mere months ago in protest of the pending Iran deal. ¶ HIGH ATTENDANCE¶ The

attention that conferences like this generate beyond military officers, defense firm representatives, and GCC officials
typically signals the level of concern among the states involved and the international media. This year's
unusually high attendance by senior officials and journalists suggests deep concern .
Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi opened the proceedings with a keynote speech. Although his remarks were routine -- and perhaps more in line with
The
the worldview of his GCC financiers than with his actual policies back home -- his presence alone demonstrated the appeal of this year's conference. ¶

United States also sent a strong delegation led by CENTCOM head Gen. Lloyd Austin and Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken,
while the European officials in attendance included Germany's impressive defense minister Ursula von der Leyen and British foreign secretary Philip
Hammond. Among the usual gaggle of Middle Eastern officials was Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir, who came directly from the Syria talks in Vienna
and was easily the most dynamic presence at the event. ¶ SYRIA, NOT ISIS, IS THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM ¶ The Syrian crisis was the dialogue's most
salient theme, with a prominent role given to Khaled Khoja, president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. On that note,
Jubeir provided a detailed description of the Vienna talks. Although he was upbeat, he made clear that the talks had not achieved any breakthrough, and that
Saudi officials still believe the solution boils down to two ultimatums: "When does Bashar al-Assad go?" and "When do the 'occupying forces' (his definition:
Iran and Russia) leave?" On other Syria issues, he indicated room for compromise. But he insisted on a clear timeline -- up to six months for a new
government without Assad to be formed, and eighteen to twenty-four months for that new government to produce a new constitution and hold elections. He
characterized the Iranian and Russian position at Vienna as follows: Assad will only go if he is voted out in those elections, an argument that Jubeir roundly
rejected.¶ Blinken was also strong on the "Assad must go" theme but remained general on the details. He presented the standard Obama administration line
that the Russians were not succeeding in Syria and would soon find themselves bogged down in high costs and fading rapport with the Arab world. Many in
the audience challenged him here -- when he was accused of "subcontracting" the Syria job to the Russians (i.e., in the belief that combat fatigue would
eventually compel them to compromise on Assad's fate), he cited the supposedly potent indirect effect that new U.S.-trained anti-ISIS fighters would have on
the Assad regime. When pressed, however, he failed to clarify what exactly Washington's policy would be if such fighters were to fight Assad's forces directly.
the Saudi and U.S. positions on major issues at Vienna were very
He and Jubeir both suggested that

close, though other views sourced to Turkish officials suggested that there is more divergence, with Washington taking a softer line on when Assad
should go.¶ EMPHASIZING IRAN'S AGGRESSION, NOT THE NUCLEAR DEAL¶ Despite the specific focus on Syria, the real worry for most attendees was the
threat emanating from Iran's aggressiveness in the wake of the nuclear deal (or, as Jubeir described it, Tehran's "thirty-year record of aggression"). Russia's
intervention garnered heavy criticism in large part because many saw it as a deliberate empowerment of Iran's regional designs. Blinken confirmed that the
United States was ready to counter destabilizing Iranian activity throughout the Middle East, citing numerous examples of cooperation with regional
partners on military, intelligence, and diplomatic matters, including Yemen. ¶ The nuclear deal itself received little attention. Jubeir put the issue at least
temporarily to rest by claiming that the agreement had dealt with the Iranian nuclear threat "for the moment." For his part, Blinken asserted that America's
role in placing nuclear restraints on Iran was further proof of its engagement on regional security. He also asserted that the agreement was solely
transactional and would not engender U.S. reluctance to confront Iran.¶ AMERICA IS BACK -- MAYBE¶ While skepticism about U.S. intentions and staying
power ran through the audience, Blinken worked hard to emphasize Washington's engagement . His
message was blurred somewhat when he twice invoked the administration shibboleth that those who call for a more active American military role in the
region are essentially longing for a new Iraq quagmire (i.e., when he spoke of "large-scale, open-ended interventions" and "vast unintended consequences").
Jubeir who most
Nevertheless, he and General Austin wasted no opportunity to reinforce America's commitment and presence. ¶ Here again it was

effectively argued the "America is still with us" theme. He rejected arguments that
the temporary withdrawal of the last U.S. aircraft carrier in the region signaled a wider pull-out, and
spent considerable time echoing Blinken's praise for the U.S.-GCC military and
intelligence cooperation that has flowed from the Camp David summit (which King Salman pointedly did not attend). He even asserted
that bilateral cooperation against Iran had reached unprecedented levels. Recent U.S. military moves -- retaking Kunduz, keeping
forces in Afghanistan, having Special Forces participate in a raid in northern Iraq, and the decision to deploy Special Forces on the ground in Syria --
undoubtedly played a role in shaping this mood of solidarity .

Military commitment increasing now---solves assurance

Lara Seligman 11/8, defense reporter for Defense News, “Commander: US Navy Won’t
Back Down From Gulf,” 11/8/15, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-
daily/dubai-air-show/2015/11/08/commander-us-navy-wont-back-down-
gulf/75413122/
As geopolitical tensions reverberate across the Arabian Gulf, the US Navy
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates —

has no plans to back down, a top naval official said Sunday.¶ As the tip of the spear, the Navy has its most
advanced weapons technology ready for use in the Gulf.¶ The 5th Fleet is operating a
powerful laser weapons system, capable of destroying or disabling targets with dazzling accuracy, just off the coast
of Iran, according to Vice Adm. Kevin "Kid" Donegan, commander of Naval Forces Central Command. The new laser, deployed from the Afloat Forward
Staging Base Ponce, is a pivotal asset to defend against ballistic missiles, small attack boats and UAVs. ¶ Donegan told Defense News in a Nov. 8 interview at
the Dubai Air Show that his commanders have permission to use the weapon if a critical situation arises. He would not specify the rules of engagement for
the Navy is
the laser, but indicated the Navy is ready to use the weapon to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. ¶ In addition,

aggressively adding ships to the Gulf region in the next few years. By 2020, the 5th
Fleet will grow from 30 ships to 40 ships, Donegan said.¶ “We are definitely not leaving the region,” he said. “You are not
going to see the Navy leaving this region anytime soon.”¶ Donegan’s comments come at a critical point for US

relations in the region, with critics openly accusing the Pentagon of pulling out of the fight against the Islamic State. ¶ The number of
reported airstrikes by the US in Syria dropped after Russia began flying in the region, going from an average of seven strikes a day in August to less than four
strikes a day in October. The Pentagon has denied that Russia's presence has been the driver for that dip in strikes, instead blaming a series of factors
including an increased focus of US airpower on Iraq and environmental factors.¶ Adding to the perception that the US is drawing down forces in the Gulf,
the Navy currently has no carrier presence in the region . The USS Theodore Roosevelt left the Gulf in October,
marking the first time since 2007 the Navy hasn’t had a carrier deployed to the 5th Fleet's area of operations. The Roosevelt’s relief, the USS Harry S.
Truman, isn’t expected to arrive in the Gulf until this winter, leaving a carrier gap of at least two months. ¶ Some see the Roosevelt’s departure as a blow to
anti-ISIS operations. The Roosevelt carrier strike group carried out 1,812 combat sorties and expended 1,085 precision-guided munitions against ISIS,
the Navy
according to the Navy. Commanders can’t completely replace the capability the carrier and its airwing bring to the fight, Donegan said. ¶ But

is working hard to mitigate the impact of the temporary carrier gap on anti-ISIS
operations, Donegan said. Between US and coalition ships, for instance the French Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, the Navy has
about 30 vessels to 40 vessels in the region , in the US Central Command area of responsibility, he said. This includes
amphibious strike groups — which can deploy fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft — Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, mine-sweeping vessels and 10 coastal
patrol ships.¶ “You can’t completely replace what that kind of ship and airwing bring, not just in firepower but in situational awareness, understanding the
operational picture, but we’ve been able to do a pretty good job mitigating it,” Donegan said.¶ French leaders last week said it would deploy the Charles de
Gaulle carrier and a carrier strike group to boost its operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Donegan said the US has strong cooperation with
the French.¶ "Absolutely we are coordinating with the French. Each country that comes to the region, we work with them because we have some common
interests and where we have common interests we work together," he said. "Their team is very experienced in this region and in fact this will be the second
time in the same year they’ve been back."¶ On whether the de Gaulle's presence will fill the carrier gap, Donegan said the coalition nations are working to
coordinate their schedules. ¶ The two navies also have an agreement to operate their aircraft from each other’s carriers, Donegan said. ¶ "We actually have a
program where we they land on our ships and we land on theirs, so we've been doing that for a while,” Donegan said. “So we have really good
interoperability with the French.” ¶ The US Navy may also look to the UK in future to help protect the region. Speaking at the Dubai Airshow on Nov. 8, Phillip
Dunne, UK defense procurement minister, told reporters that the Gulf will be a focus of the upcoming Strategic Defense and Security Review, and indicated it
will likely contain an emphasis on increased presence in the region, which could eventually involve the UK’s two new aircraft carriers.¶ “I point you again to
the [SDSR], to see what more will be done, not just in this region but elsewhere within areas of NATO operations, for the UK to play a leading role,” Dunne
said. “As you know, we are in the process of building two aircraft carriers, which — when they are operational — will restore a very significant carrier strike
capability to the armed forces, which will give us potentially a full spectrum response.” ¶ Asked whether that means the UK could fill some of the “void” left
by the United States' perceived withdrawal from the region, Dunne was flat in his opinion.¶ “We don’t see the US as having left a void in the region,” he said. ¶
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubair also argued that the Pentagon’s presence in the
region has increased, despite the Roosevelt’s departure.¶ "The strategic agreement with the United States
has not changed. The American presence in the region has in fact increased whether an
aircraft carrier has been withdrawn or not,” Al-Jubair said at the Institute of Strategic Studies' Manama Dialogue earlier this month, adding that the

number of US troops in the region is almost at a record high. "I would say America’s
commitment to Gulf security when we measure it by what the US is doing and
providing and how the GCC states and the US are working , is at an all-time high. I would not
measure it by one aircraft carrier leaving the Gulf.Ӧ The US and Gulf nations are also now implementing

agreements to intensify cooperation in cybersecurity, military cooperation,

intelligence sharing, ballistic missile defense and maritime security, Al-Jubair said.¶ Aleksandar
Jovovic, principal at Avascent, said the optics of the Roosevelt’s withdrawal from the Gulf are “less than optimal,” but the ship’s

departure does not indicate the US is drawing down from the region .¶ “I don’t think the US

government has any intention of disengaging from the region anytime soon ,” he said. “All signs

point to the US wanting to maintain that pressure on ISIL .”

 Yes Chinese Revision
China’s foreign policy doctrine is aggressive and expansionist---
motivated by great-power aspirations
Aaron L. Friedberg 15, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton
University, 5/11/15, “The Sleeper Issue of 2016 Is China,”
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/2016-elections-beijing-
117831?paginate=false
The challenge from China has been growing since the end of 2012, which marked both the
reelection of an American president and the announcement of a new leadership team in Beijing. Since his elevation to the
positions of president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping has proven himself to be a
forceful, ambitious and effective figure. Moving quickly to consolidate his personal authority, Xi has also taken
steps to secure and extend the CCP’s monopoly on political power. The anti-corruption campaign that he launched immediately on
assuming office now targets thousands of mid-to-high-level officials in the military, state and Party bureaucracies. In addition to
eliminating opponents and potential rivals it is clearly intended to bolster the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Even as he goes after official corruption, Xi has overseen a wide-ranging crackdown on dissent, Internet
freedom and the operations of non-governmental organizations that seek to promote the development of civil society. According to the
Orwellian-sounding “Document 9” (“Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere”) issued in April 2013, these groups are
rooted in a dangerous Western “socio-political theory,” which holds that “in the social sphere, individual rights are paramount and ought
to be immune to obstruction by the state.” Such notions, together with the concepts of “Western constitutional democracy” and
“universal values,” threaten to weaken “the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership” and must be vigorously opposed.

Like his predecessors, Xi hopes to push through measures aimed at sustaining economic growth and, with it, popular support. B ut in
the political realm he is no reformer. To the contrary, China today is even more repressive
and more militantly nationalistic than it was only a few years ago.
Another pillar of Xi’s
program is the use of new rhetorical formulations that blend resentment over past
abuses by foreign powers, and warnings about their continued malign intentions, with references to
China’s glorious history, growing strength and future greatness . Xi has sought to back his bold
words with a sweeping, if still incomplete, vision for a “new Silk Road,” a series of massive infrastructure development proj ects that will
Xi has stepped up an
extend China’s reach and influence westward across all of continental Eurasia. Meanwhile, to the East,
aggressive campaign for asserting China’s maritime claims against its neighbors.
Towards the end of 2013 Beijing unilaterally announced the creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone
over a swath of ocean that includes islands currently controlled by Japan . In the past year
China has dramatically accelerated a campaign of land reclamation, creating island
bases that will greatly strengthen its ability to enforce its self-proclaimed right to
control virtually all of the waters and resources of the South China Sea.
Behind all of this is the steady, seemingly relentless expansion of Chinese military power. Of
particular concern to American planners is the rapid maturation of China’s so-called anti-access/area
denial[A2/AD] capabilities. As it builds out its network of sensors, missiles, ships,
submarines, aircraft, anti-satellite systems and cyber weapons Beijing evidently aims to
drive up the perceived costs and risks of any future U.S. attempt to project military
power into the Western Pacific. The belief that Washington might hesitate to come to the aid of friendly nations, or act to preserv e
freedom of navigation, could undermine its alliances while increasing the danger of miscalculation and war.
 China has been pushing
With the United States constrained by tight budgets and preoccupied with other problems,
hard, and with some success, to change the status quo and shift the balance of power in
its favor. While some China watchers continue to argue otherwise, it has become
increasingly difficult to escape the conclusion that Beijing’s ultimate aim is to displace the
United States and resume its traditional position as the preponderant power in Asia. This
is a strategic challenge of historic dimensions.
While attention remains riveted on other regions, there are a number of developments that could vault Asia, and China in part icular, to
the top of the foreign policy agenda. According to official statistics, economic growth has now fallen to its lowest level in twenty-five
years and the reality may be even worse. A continued slump could heighten regime anxiety about domestic instability and reinf orce the
tendency, evident since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2009, to use foreign quarrels to divert frustration and rally popular
support. China is already engaged in a pattern of provocative behavior towards its
maritime neighbors; towing oil rigs off Vietnam, reclaiming islands off the Philippines, and flying aircraft close to the
Senkakus. If one of these situations flares up , whether through inadvertence or by design, Beijing seems
more likely to escalate than to back down . Whatever China’s leaders intend, a crisis with the United States could
easily be the result.

Some older flashpoints, quiet for a time, may also be due for a flare up. In January 2016 Taiwan
will hold its own presidential election and the results could bring to power an
administration far less congenial to the mainland than the Kuomintang government that has ruled the
island for the past eight years. As it has done in the past, Beijing may use threats or displays of force to try
to influence the outcome of the election . In contrast to 1996, for example, when for lack of better options it fired
dummy missiles into the Taiwan Straits, China today has far more capability. In part as a result it may also have less patien ce.
 SQ Solves Pivot---1NC
Squo solves---shifting military forces to Asia now---makes the pivot
sustainable
Benjamin Schreer 13, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Why the
US ‘pivot’ to Asia is sustainable,” 3/14/13, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-us-
pivot-to-asia-is-sustainable/
One of the key questions US allies and partners have been asking is whether America will actually be able to pull off the Asia–Pacific
‘pivot’. More than twelve months after the announcement there are doubts persist all around; whether the US as a global power can
afford to shift more military assets from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific, whether growing pressure on the US defence budget might
render the ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalance’) unsustainable anyway, or even if the political will exists to persist in the face of risi ng Chinese power.
However, a good case can be made that the ‘rebalance’ is not only in full swing but will also be
sustainable in the long-run.
First, ashift of military assets away from other regions towards the Asia Pacific is
already underway. US ongoing strategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere don’t require a massive military footprint.
As the Pentagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance made clear, major US land wars are a thing of the past .
Deterring potential Iranian attempts to overthrow the regional status quo does not necessarily depend on the forward deployment of
strategic assets such as aircraft carriers. In fact, provided US aerospace forces in the Gulf are reinforced, US deterrence v is-à-vis Iran
could be more credible without high-value targets such as carriers. Moreover, counterterrorism operations in
Africa and South America will be conducted by a mix of special forces and CIA
operatives. And European NATO allies such as France and the United Kingdom have stepped up their leadership in military
operations in Northern Africa and the Levant.

As a result, the US has already reduced its presence in the Middle East by one aircraft carrier and some destroyers. The chie f of naval
operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert also recently told US Congress of plans to withdraw two
amphibious warships and two frigates from the waters off Africa, and to reduce the
numbers of ships in the US Southern Command to zero. At the same time, US forces redeploy towards
our region. The new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are on their way to be forward deployed in
Singapore. There have also been moves to further strengthen the American presence
in Japan and South Korea. Joint war games and training exercises in East Asia and elsewhere will go ahead as scheduled.
And USPACOM Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear testified that his permanently-assigned ground forces are
‘resetting their focus in the Indo-Asia-Pacific’, while the III US Marine Expeditionary Force had ended its
world-wide service rotations, allowing them to ‘once again concentrate on Pacific theater missions.’ The US seems indeed
willing to systematically prioritise capabilities required for the Asia–Pacific theatre.
Moreover, the doom and gloom in the Pentagon and among some US policymakers about the budget cuts
irreversibly crippling America’s military are vastly overblown. True, money will be tighter in the coming years. But as a new
study by The Hamilton Project argues, the real crisis for US defence spending is ‘not downward pressure on the defe nse budget, but
rather problems from within that budget’. These problems can be fixed by systematically redesigning forces for the new security
challenges and by creating a more effective and efficient defence acquisition system—admittedly easier said than done. But, even if the
much discussed ‘sequester’ takes effect in the medium to longer term, the US is set to outspend any other
power, including China, by a wide margin.
The Hamilton Project authors also state that militarily
America is ‘not about to be overwhelmed nor
have we fallen behind potential challengers’ (read: China). Yes, the US Pacific Navy will probably not be able
to arrest its long term decline and dramatically increase its fleet beyond today’s 290 major combatants. But it doesn’t have to; its
combined agility, firepower and operational reach allow it to dominate large parts of the Western Pacific and at least deny C hinese forces
from establishing sea control in contested maritime spaces. And America’s new ‘AirSea Battle’ operational concept signals to China that it
won’t be deterred from accessing some future East Asian crisis, based on an emerging US Navy paradigm of ‘the many, the cheap(er), and
the unmanned’. A
combination of forward deployed troops and ‘offshore balancing’ (eg the
ability to strike from safe distances) will
allow the US to sustain a powerful presence in Asia to
deter major power war.
Moreover, the
‘pivot’ is scalable. That’s to say, it can be adapted to changing strategic
circumstances. At this point of time, a modest strengthening of the US presence in Asia is just
about right. Anything else would smack of a disproportionate response to China’s military rise. Washington is not containing
Beijing. Indeed, as ASPI visiting scholar Ross Terrill argued recently on this blog , America’s view of China is still very much predicated on
the hope that China will become a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Should China ever turn into a truly revisionist power, America certainly has
the capacity to enter into an Asian ‘Cold War’. But until then, the
pivot’s true significance is not a rapid
increase of US military capabilities in Asia but in the political message it sends: the
US will remain engaged in this region for a very long time. Finally, the US would want to avoid the impression among some
allies, including Australia that it will continue to shoulder most of the burden.
 Not Zero Sum---1NC
Not zero sum with the ASPG
Kurt M. Campbell 14, Chair and CEO of the Asia Group, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should
Focus on Asia,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-04-18/far-eastern-promises
A second critique stems from the argument that it would be unwise or unrealistic to shift Washington’s focus from the Middle East to
Asia given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the instability in Egypt and Iraq, and the long-running confrontation between Iran and
According to this view, the
the Western powers. But this criticism relies on a caricature of the rebalancing strategy.
Middle East and South Asia have sapped U.S. power and prestige and the pivot is really an
attempt to cut and run by turning to the more peaceful and profitable shores of the Asia-Pacific. It is certainly true that the
Obama administration has tried to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. But even though resources are finite,
foreign policy is not a zero-sum game, and the criticism that paying more attention to
Asia is somehow an admission of strategic defeat in the Middle East misses a crucial reality :
during the past decade, the very Asian countries to which Washington wants to pay more attention have
quietly built a substantial stake in the furtherance of peace and stability across the Middle
East and South Asia and very much want the United States to preserve its influence in those regions.
Not long ago, most Asian nations were predominantly concerned with developments in their backyards and tended to see problems
elsewhere as someone else’s responsibility. One of the most important successes of President George W. Bush’s Asia policy was to
encourage the region’s rising powers to contribute more in other parts of the world. Partly in response, during the Bush years , for the
first time, many
East Asian governments developed an “out of area” perspective and
engaged more in diplomacy, development, and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Japan has
become a leading supporter of civil society development in Afghanistan , funding schools and
civil service organizations and training Afghans in criminal justice, education, health care, and agricu lture. In the wake of the Arab Spring,
South Korea began supporting development across the Middle East . Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand have provided material assistance to training programs for doctors, police officers, and teachers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
Australia and New Zealand have sent special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has been more active in the behind -the-scenes
diplomacy aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, addressing piracy on the high seas, and shaping Afghanis tan’s future.

Of course, encouragement from Washington is only one factor behind Asian countries’ growing involvement in the Middle East; a nother
undeniable element is their increasing thirst for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day,
more than twice the amount that the EU does. Asian
governments know that a hasty U.S. retreat from
the Middle East would carry with it unacceptable risks to their countries’ energy security and
economic growth. As a result, they have invested substantial political and financial capital in, and in
some cases sent military forces to, the Middle East over the course of more than a decade to supplement,
not supplant, the stabilizing role of the United States. Put simply, Washington’s Asian partners support
the pivot but would hardly cheer the prospect of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East --
and crucially, they do not seem to see any contradiction between these two positions .
 Plan Links/DA Turns Case
Draw-down in other areas still links to this advantage---draw-down in
the Middle East decks Asian allied assurance and deterrence
Seth Cropsey 14, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson Institute, former
Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and Bush administrations, “The
Rebalance to Asia: What Are Its Security Aims and What Is Required of U.S. Policy?” June
2014,
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1411/cropsey_rebala
nce_to_asia_corrected.pdf
But this statement goes far beyond the Asia-Pacific and the fashion in which the administration intends to shift attention toward Asia.
The over $1 trillion cuts to the defense budget that the Obama administration has already planned, accelerated by sequestrati on, will
hollow out the entire U.S. military. If military forces are to be substantially increased in one area,
they must be decreased in another or else placed in hangars, tied up at piers, or idled, thus saving the cost of paying
salaries, conducting training, repairing equipment, and performing needed maintenance. If, for example, the U.S. fleet is recalled
to home waters and significantly cut in other parts of the world in order to increase presence
in Asia, American global reach, influence, and power all wane. Waning power is a
global effect, and a greater presence in Asia will not stem the larger perception of an
America in strategic withdrawal from its post-WWII dominance. This offers Asians who
look to the U.S. for defense against an increasingly aggressive China little assurance that an effective rebalance
would provide them with security.
Terrorism
 UQ
ISIS is losing and terrorism is over – Iraqi military just retook Ramadi
Andy Castillo, 1-3-2016, "Iraq Hails Ramadi Liberation As Key Victory Against Isis,"
Oceanside Post, http://oceansidepost.com/2016/01/03/iraq-hails-ramadi-liberation-as-
key-victory-against-isis.html
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Ramadi on Tuesday to declare that the city has been liberated from control of Islamic
State militants, a victory that one army spokesman described as "epic". The Prime Minister had traveled to the city which on Sunday
was liberated from the Islamic State group, to congratulate the Iraqi forces for clinching the landmark victory against the

jihadists. Engineering teams are clearing bombs from streets and buildings. Iraqi military forces on Monday retook a strategic government complex
in the city of Ramadi fro... The US-led anti-IS coalition praised the performance of the Iraqi forces in retaking Ramadi, an operation in which it played a
significant role, training local forces, arming them and carrying out what it said were 600 airstrikes since July. "The prestige goes to the Iraqi military", said
political analyst Ihsan al-Shammari. "Greater involvement by Sunni Arabs is needed before the forces fighting Islamic State develop the capability to take,
hold and police predominantly Sunni Arab territories from the group", he said. When IS captured Ramadi earlier this year, the militants blew up the homes
of members of the security forces, but even those demolitions did not compare with the destruction wrought by the U.S.-led warplanes, according to al-
Belawi. TV pictures on Monday showed troops raising the Iraqi flag over the government complex in the city centre. Iraqi pro-Shia newspaper al-Adalah
The huge victories that were achieved by security forces indicate that the end of
says: "

terrorism is imminent". "We didn't expect them to retreat from a number of Ramadi areas today, where we entered without any
resistance, as if they evaporated", he said.Al-Belawi said the fighters retreated mainly to the eastern neighborhoods of Sijariya and Sufiya. In a televised
speech Monday, Abadi heralded the military operation that freed the key city from ISIL's control, some seven months after the group took it over. The foreign
secretary said that Daesh has been driven out of cities across the country by Iraqi forces, with support from the worldwide coalition. "In the main area of
ISIS's control this year - which is to say the parts of Iraq and Syria that they call their caliphate - they have lost some towns and some smaller cities, mainly
on the edges of their territory". First, though, the government will have to fix the damage and restore services in Ramadi to lure residents back, and keep
them loyal so ISIS remains on the run. "If the Sunni tribes are integrated within the establishment and the worldwide alliance keeps up its air assaults, it is
possible we will see Iraqi forces retake control of Mosul
the from IS". "I suppose the most frustrating thing is to watch
these Iraqis have to fight their way back into a building that was once the bastion of USA and Iraqi government power in Anbar", Platner said.

Our ev is predictive – Ramadi victory means Iraq will win back Mosul,
which will completely collapse ISIS territory and funding
Reuters, 12-27-2015, "Iraqi army declares victory over ISIS in Ramadi," Al Arabiya,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/01/03/UAE-summons-Iranian-
ambassador-after-Saudi-embassy-attack.html
Iraq's army said on Sunday it had defeated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters in a provincial capital west
of Baghdad, the first major victory for the U.S.-trained force since it collapsed in the face of an assault by the
militants 18 months ago. Victory in Ramadi, capital of mainly Sunni-Muslim Anbar province in the Euphrates River valley west of the
capital, deprives ISIS militants of their biggest prize of 2015. The fighters captured it in May after
government troops fled in a defeat which prompted Washington to take a hard look at strategy against the militants. After encircling the
city for weeks, the Iraqi military launched a campaign to retake it last week, and made a final push to seize the central adm inistration
complex on Sunday. "By controlling the complex this means that we have defeated them in Ramadi," said Sabah al-Numani, a spokesman
for the force leading the fight on the government side. "The next step is to clear pockets that could exist here or there in the city." State
television broadcast footage of troops, Humvee vehicles and tanks advancing through Ramadi streets amid piles of rubble and collapsed
houses. Some districts appeared to have been completely destroyed by the advance. Television also showed nighttime celebratio ns in
mainly Shi'ite cities south of Baghdad, for the victory in Anbar, with people dancing in the streets and waving Iraqi flags from cars.
Officials did not give any immediate death tolls for the battle. The government says most civilian residents of the city were able to
evacuate before it launched its assault. ISIS, also known as ISIL or Daesh, swept through a third of Iraq in June 2014 and de clared a
"caliphate" to rule over all Muslims from territory in both Iraq and Syria, carrying out mass killings and imposing a draconian form of
Islam. Since then, the battle against the group in both countries has drawn in most global and regional powers, often with co mpeting
allies on the ground in complex multi-sided civil wars. A U.S.-led coalition has been waging an air campaign against the fighters in both
countries, but rebuilding the Iraqi army to the point that it was capable of recapturing and holding territory has been one o f the biggest
challenges. In previous battles, including the recapture of former dictator Saddam Hussein's home city Tirkit in April, the Iraqi
government relied on Iran-backed Shi'ite militias for ground fighting, with its own army in a supporting role. Ramadi was recaptured by
the army itself, without relying on the militias, who were kept off the battlefield to avoid sectarian tensions with the mainly Sunni
population. "The complex is under our complete control, there is no presence whatsoever of Daesh fighters in the complex," Nu mani told
Reuters. The government said the next target after Ramadi will be the northern city of Mosul, by far the largest
population center controlled by Islamic State in either Iraq or Syria. " The
smooth victory in Ramadi should be
happy news for the residents of Mosul," Numani said. U.S. officials had hoped Baghdad would launch an assault on Mosul during
2015, but this was put off after the fighters swept into Ramadi. Dislodging the militants from Mosul , which had a
pre-war population close to 2 million, would effectively abolish their state structure in Iraq and
deprive them of a major source of funding, which comes partly from oil and partly from fees and taxes on
residents.
 A2 Fill-In
No regional fill-in
Colin Dueck 15, associate professor at George Mason University, with Roger Zakheim,
attorney, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a former deputy staff
director and general counsel on the House Armed Services committee, “Unleashed:
America Must Pummel ISIS,” 3/21/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/unleashed-
america-must-pummel-isis-12457
In one international crisis after another, Obama operates on the premise that if only the U.S. holds back
from robust action, others will step up to fill the gap and promote American
interests. After six years of experimentation, we have learned the untruth of this assumption. Iraq's
Sunni Arabs do not yearn to be ruled by ISIS. They do however fear ISIS, and they cannot stand up to ISIS
without some outside material support. Sunni Arab forces from outside Iraq can and should provide that support. But again,
U.S. allies in the region are not impressed when the White House talks yet refuses to get skin in

the game. Local populations will rally only if ISIS is physically defeated. And one
indispensible actor in ensuring that defeat is the United States of America. This is not simply a matter of regional
interests. It's a matter of U.S. interests, because ISIS threatens and kills Americans, as well as threatening regional stability.¶ ¶ A whole-hearted

and genuinely prudent campaign against ISIS is not impossible. Thoughtful non-partisan experts in
strategy such as Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College have suggested the United States could participate in a punitive ground expedition against ISIS,
not to be tied down in endless nation-building, but to batter ISIS and then withdraw major American combat units.¶ ¶ Obviously this would require
extremely careful thought as to what follows any subsequent U.S. drawdown. The outcome of U.S.-backed intervention cannot be simply to empower Shia
militias, allied as they are to Iran and hated by Sunni Arabs. Nor is it likely that Iraq is suddenly about to become a flourishing, peaceful, multi-ethnic
the chief purpose of a U.S.-backed ground
democracy. We should make no such promises. But from an American point of view,

campaign would be to push ISIS back from holding vast amounts of territory in the heart of the Middle East
that today function as a safe haven for terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies.
 Impact D
Homeland attacks are not their strategy
Daniel Byman 14, professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University and
the research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institution, “Five myths about the Islamic State”, 7/3/14,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-islamic-
state/2014/07/03/f6081672-0132-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
IS certainly has the potential to be a threat to the homeland, and intelligence and law enforcement services must remain on alert. Ye t for
now it does not appear focused on the United States and is not prioritizing the struggle
against the West — indeed, this is part of why it split with al-Qaeda. Baghdadi’s statement
on New York may have been misreported, or possibly a joke, as many of his guards were New
Yorkers. More important, IS’s actions so far suggest that it wants to use Western recruits as
fodder for its local and regional wars. Creating and sustaining an Islamic state and
fighting apostates are the priorities.¶ IS does pose a threat to Iraq and to regional stability. But the Obama
administration should beware of swallowing the group’s propaganda or assuming that it will inevitably
become stronger.

No state collapse --- family bonds, moderate culture, and resilient

institutions
Sunil Dasgupta 13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science
Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in
Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-
respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/
Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into
But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-
economic crisis’.

scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling
through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against
civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan,
tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements —
propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the
entire country.¶ Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal
institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural
conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s
resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to
do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war
demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements
, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil
do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future

war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

Regionalism
 Deterrence S Iran
Iran backs down in response to pressure---thirty years of empirics prove
Michael Eisenstadt 13, Kahn Fellow and director of the Military & Security Studies
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Not by Sanctions Alone: Using
Military and Other Means to Bolster Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” July 2013,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport13_Eisen
stadt2.pdf
Conventional wisdom says that Tehran
does not yield to pressure—it yields only to overwhelming
pressure.1 In fact, three decades of experience show that while the regime’s doctrine of
resistance (moqavemat) places a premium on not yielding to pressure, Tehran has made
major policy adjustments, even abandoning longstanding policies, when the expediency of the regime (maslahat) or
the national interest has required it to do so.2 For instance:
ƒ Iran
backed off after warning the United States in December 2011 that it would close the Strait
of Hormuz in response to new sanctions, after senior U.S. officials
intimated that such a move would
prompt a military response. And in January 2012, after warning the United States that it should not return an aircraft
carrier to the Persian Gulf, Iran backed down after Washington did so.

ƒ Iranian-supported Iraqi Special

Groups ceased rocket attacks on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in April 2008
after Iran was warned by the United States that continued attacks would provoke a
strong U.S. response. Likewise, Iranian-supported Iraqi Special Groups ceased rocket attacks on U.S. forward-operating bases
in Iraq that had killed fifteen U.S. soldiers in June 2011, after the United States passed on warnings to Tehran.3

ƒ Fearing
a U.S. invasion after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the Islamic Republic apparently
abandoned its nuclear weaponization efforts— presumably to avoid giving the United States a pretext for
invasion— though some weapons-related R&D activities have purportedly continued since then.4

ƒ After the 1992 assassination of a prominent Iranian Kurdish leader in a Berlin restaurant caused a number of European Union s tates to
suspend diplomatic ties with Tehran and censure the Islamic Republic, Iran ceased terrorist operations in Europe—apparently because it
considered its ties to Europe too important to be jeopardized by continued attacks.

ƒ After years of promising “war, war until victory,” Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
agreed to “drink from the poisoned chalice”
and end the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 when he concluded that Iran faced defeat at the
front, the use of Iraqi chemical weapons against Iranian cities, and open U.S. military intervention (which is how
he interpreted the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner over the Gulf in July 1988).

ƒ Iran initially attempted to counter U.S.-led convoy operations during the latter phases of
the Iran-Iraq War by indirect means—mining the waters of the Gulf, using Silkworm missiles against ships inside
Kuwaiti territorial waters, and conducting small-boat attacks against unescorted shipping—until a major clash between
U.S. and Iranian naval forces in April 1988, which inflicted heavy losses on the latter, caused
Iran to cease mining operations, halt Silkworm strikes, and dramatically reduce attacks on unescorted convoys.5

The question now is whether, under current circumstances, the United States can replicate the kinds of conditions that led Ir an in the
past to alter or abandon policies in which it had invested significant resources, prestige, and political capital. Might
Tehran be
willing to pay any price that the United States is likely to impose in order to achieve its
nuclear ambitions—much as Pakistan was willing to “eat grass” if necessary in order to obtain the bomb?6 Might the moral
victory represented by adhering to its principles and resisting the forces of “global arrogance,” regardless of cost, trump t he interests of
the regime? Past experience would seem to indicate that the answer is: not likely. On the field of battle and in the diplomatic arena,
tactical adjustments have been permitted when they served the interests of the Islamic
Republic or the Iranian nation.7 The election as president of Hassan Rowhani, a pragmatic conservative, makes it
likely that Iran will continue with such an approach.
 GCC Turns
The plan’s shift just causes smaller GCC states to choose sides between
Iran and Saudi Arabia---shatters collective security in the Gulf
F. Gregory Gause 10, John H. Lindsey Chair, Professor of International Affairs and Head of
the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service,
Texas A&M University, “How Damaging Are Worst-Case Scenarios in the Persian Gulf?”
chapter 10 of The Prudent Use of Power in American National Security Strategy, 2010,
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.p
df
The smaller Gulf States would be a different matter, if a withdrawal
from Iraq were accompanied by the
deconstruction of the American military base infrastructure built up since 1991 in
these states—a full withdrawal “over the horizon.” Kuwait and Bahrain would probably seek
refuge within a Saudi-Egyptian Arab alignment, as both have Shi’a populations (in Bahrain, the majority) whom their
leaderships see as potential allies in Iranian efforts to destabilize them domestically. The UAE has an ongoing territorial dispute with Iran
over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, but that has not precluded businesslike relations with Iran in the past.
The UAE, Qatar, and Oman would probably be more attentive to Iranian desires if the
U.S. were to exit the Gulf altogether.
Advocates of an over the horizon American role in the Gulf point to the domestic costs for
the hosts of American military forces. That is certainly the case in Saudi Arabia, where the American deployments
of 1990 to 1991 helped mobilize domestic Salafi-Wahhabi opposition to the regime, resulted in bombing attacks on American facilities in
1995 and 1996, and served as Osama bin Laden’s major rallying cry against the Al Saud. It would undoubtedly be so in Iraq as well, with
any remaining American military presence subject to attacks by extremists of every stripe and serving as a stick with which i ts domestic
and regional opponents could beat whatever government is ruling in Baghdad, on both nationalist and Islamist grounds. In the big
regional countries, foreign military presences are lightening rods of opposition and create serious problems for host governments.

That is not the case, however, in the smaller states of the Gulf. There has not been a
serious attack on any American military facility in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE or Oman, even during
the unpopular attack on Iraq in 2003. During the low-level uprising against the Bahraini government by the Shi’a opposition in the mid-
1990s, there were no attacks on or even demonstrations in front of the gates of the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. (There w as a large
demonstration at the U.S. embassy in April 2002, protesting Israeli military actions in the West Bank.) No American servicemen or
The American
women, who are ubiquitous on the streets and in the malls of Manama, the capital of Bahrain, were attacked.
military presence is popular in Kuwait, understandably so given Kuwait’s experience of Iraqi occupation from
August 1990 to February 1991. During the recent parliamentary election in May 2009, not one candidate campaigned on a platfor m of
getting the U.S. out of Kuwait. In
the other states, while the U.S. might not be as popular as in Kuwait, the American
military presences have not been targets of terrorists or mobilizing issues for
opposition groups. Perhaps it is because the small size and population of these countries make them easier to manage for
security forces; perhaps it is because their populations are accustomed to foreign forces from their long histories as British protectorates.
But the
domestic political costs for regimes in the smaller Gulf States of hosting
American military forces are slight, if they exist at all.
Withdrawal from Iraq would certainly entail risks to American interests (and to the implicit moral obligations the U.S. has t aken on
through its presence in Iraq), most notably in the prospects for even more Iranian influence in Iraq and in the pros pects (though not the
certainty) of a return to intense levels of civil violence in Iraq. Withdrawal even further, from
the Gulf itself to an
over the horizon position , could lead to a pro-Iranian realignment in the foreign
policies of some of the smaller Gulf States. However, withdrawal from Iraq also offers potential benefits, besides
the obvious ones of conserving American blood and treasure. Iran has been able to play second fiddle in the country, with the U.S. bearing
the costs of putting into power and protecting a pro-Iranian regime. With the U.S. gone, Tehran would have to pay greater costs for
supporting the friendly government in Baghdad and would inevitably get caught up in the frustrations of managing the conflict ing
ambitions of its Iraqi clients. If the U.S., with its power and wealth, could not successfully manage Iraqi politics, it is unlikely that Iran,
which is poorer and less powerful, could do so, even with its cultural and sectarian connections (which are not a completely positive
factor in Iraq). The results of the 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections presage some of the difficulties Iran will face. Their Shi’a allies split
into two competing lists, the State of Law list headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance list, which
combined the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and its longtime rival, the Sadrist movement. These two lists split the Shi’a vo te, allowing
former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya list to win the largest number of seats.

The plan causes GCC aggression---makes regionalism and cooperation

with Iran impossible
Col. Richard C. Taylor 14, British Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Has President
Obama Chosen The Right Strategic Approach To Iran With The 2013 ‘Dual Track’ Policy Of
Diplomacy And Sanctions?” May 2014, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA612208
A U.S. vision for regional security in the Middle East is an essential component of a Middle East narrative. Throughout, the
United
States will need to reassure the GCC nations of its commitment to deter Iranian
aggression. If the Geneva talks are successful and the Iranian economy revives, Iran will have to abandon its anti-American
identity, and will lose the logic of its victimhood narrative. Iran tried to offer a mutual defense pact with the GCC nations on the condition
of U.S. military withdrawal from the region. At the International Institution for Strategic Studies at Manama in December 200 5 Iran’s
deputy foreign minister, Muhammad-Reza Baqeri, agreed to regional security cooperation in the Gulf with “the caveat that there should
be a timetable for the
withdrawal of foreign military [implying the United States] from the
region.”260 However this is unacceptable to the GCC nations, as they will never have the
cohesion to form a security block such as NATO. Therefore a U.S. presence is essential
in the Gulf to protect freedom of commerce and the flow of hydrocarbons. One option to defuse tension, reassure GCC allies and counter
Iran’s victimhood narrative is to invite Iran to take a more coordinated joint role in the security of the Gulf waters. There is already
cooperation between Oman and Iran in the Straits of Hormuz: part of the U.S.-Iran engagement could therefore include an invitation to
Iran to observe or participate in joint exercises or patrolling. If Iran does genuinely give up nuclear w eapons, sponsorship of terrorism
and asymmetric destabilization activities in the Gulf States, it will expect an offer of some means of guarantee for the secu rity of its
homeland and its regime. However the talks tackle this request, it will need to be carefully balanced against American support for its
allies in the region.261 Although the United States has very potent strategic ways and means to persuade Iran to negotiate, i t needs to
improve its strategic communications with a convincing regional narrative in order to conclude the negotiations.

The final recommendation is to use all levers of state in a multi-track policy to persuade Iran to cease its malign influence in the region
and to reassure allies in order to promote regional stability and prosperity. Greater use of U.S. soft power may be needed to allow Iran to
compromise. Soft power could include support from transnational institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund
(IMF); development assistance for Iranian agriculture, infrastructure, education, energy, and environmental modernization; expanded
international trade and investment in the modernization of Iranian oil infrastructure; and lifting unilateral American sancti ons and
financial restrictions. Privately, both sides also know that for economic development to be effective enough to revive the Iranian
economy, it must be accompanied by political development.262 No matter how simplistically President Obama wishes to fix negotiations
to the nuclear program, the reality is that Iran cannot agree any compromise that does not include American soft power intervention to
revive the Iranian economy. Culturally, Iran has the strategic patience to hold out for this: the difficulty for the United S tates is how to sell
the compromise necessary for this ‘grand bargain’. Whilst the wider international community will see it as pragmatic realpolitik to
maintain the momentum of engagement, America’s regional allies will see it as a sign of weakness.

In parallel with soft power and diplomacy, the

United States will have to make clever and directed use of
its conventional and unconventional military power to reassure its regional allies and deter Iranian
malign influence and proxy activity. Israel wishes to see the international community’s focus remain on Iran rather than the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. It is also keen to avoid the quest for a Middle East nuclear-free zone returning to the UN agenda, as it would
jeopardize Israel’s regional arms hegemony.263 KSA enjoys the geopolitical influence that an isolated Iran provides, and is
wary
that an American departure from the Gulf will leave it exposed. The use of America’s
conventional and unconventional military power in the Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and reassure
regional allies is an essential integral part of any American approach to U.S.-Iran
negotiations. If the United States fails to convince its regional allies that its conventional
military deterrent will continue to overmatch the Iranian asymmetric threat, they will
interpret American reticence as withdrawal and seek security through other means
and partners. Some, like Saudi Arabia, will increase their military spending and accelerate their
proxy war with Iran. The smaller GCC nations are likely to hedge, and seek closer ties
with Tehran. Others have already sought more reliable help from Moscow, a trend that began after the Syrian chemical weapons
deal in late 2013.264 A regional strategy that is coordinated and communicated with America’s regional allies is the only mea ns of
reversing America’s declining influence in the Middle East and the consequent threat to regional security and global economic stability.
 GCC Turn---Solves The Aff
Only US presence solves Saudi détente---it’s the only way to create
accommodation between Iran and Saudi Arabia---the plan shatters any
shot at cooperation
Dalia Dassa Kaye 14, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, Senior Political
Scientist, RAND, “The Days After a Deal with Iran: Regional Responses to a Final Nuclear
Agreement,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE122/RAND_PE12
2.pdf
Even if Saudi Arabia opposes the type of final agreement laid out in the beginning of this report, Riyadh does not have the c apability to
scuttle its implementation. The Saudi regime is unlikely to adopt its most destructive counter—pursuing a nuclear weapons capability—
and its more likely counter—pressing Iran in other arenas—may not be sufficient to dissuade Iran from implementing the agreement.
What the United States should guard against however, is Riyadh complicating the chance a
nuclear deal will translate into positive spillover on other regional issues. For a
détente to emerge, Saudi Arabia would have to be open to the type of engagement it pursued
with Iran during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies of the 1990s and early 2000s.58 But at that time, the roles were
reversed. Saudi Arabia and Iran were flirting with one another, while the United States worried about the defection of Arab s tates to its
adversary. Today, Washington
and Tehran are trying to bridge divides while regional
partners worry about whether détente would come at the expense of their interests.
The traditional assurance toolkit will need to be part of the prescription for
assuaging Saudi concerns; it can help Riyadh feel comfortable enough to engage in
limited forms of cooperation with Iran should the opportunity arise in a post-deal
environment. The United States has already done much on this front, including upgrades to the
GCC states’ ballistic missile defense, joint exercises, an enduring U.S. carrier presence in the Gulf, and the
more than 35,000 American forces operating at bases within the GCC states.59 But there
are ways to increase this cooperation further; for example, the United States could make explicit security guarantees that formally bring
the GCC states under the U.S. nuclear umbrella— as is the case with Japan and South Korea—although some of the Arab Gulf states may
not want to be singled out in U.S. declaratory policy due to the sensitivity of tying themselves too close to Washington (and it is also not
clear whether Washington can or would want to credibly make such a commitment). Another approach could be for Washington to lend
diplomatic support to Saudi initiatives on other priority issues, such as the Middle East peace process. In addition, the United States wi ll
have to clearly communicate the objectives that motivate shifts in its military posture—like the “rebalance” to Asia—so as to avoid any
misperception that the United States is less committed to Gulf security.
 Impact D
No Russian intervention and no US/Russia escalation
Kapila 11—Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. PhD in strategic
studies (Subhash, MIDDLE EAST CHANGING DYNAMICS: STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES ON
POWER PLAY OF UNITED STATES, RUSSIA & CHINA,
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers44%5Cpaper4336.html)

Russia unlike the United States and China is not dependent on the Middle East for its energy security
as it has sizeable energy resources of its own and in fact underwrites the energy
security of European countries and elsewhere. Hence in terms of core strategic interests in
the Middle East, these do not revolve around energy security or defense of sea
lanes along which oil exports flow.
Russia has made strategic inroads and can count on Saudi
During the Post Cold War era, Russia could only count on Iran on its side in the Middle East. Today

Arabia and Turkey, two leading Middle East nations. With Saudi Arabia it has developed strong political ties and defense ties in terms of signing a US $ 2 billion arms deal.
Turkey as a result of change in foreign policy directions has established strong ties in terms of oil pipelines transit arrangements.

Russia also has good ties with Egypt, Jordan and Qatar The point to note is that Russia today
enjoys good relations with all Middle East countries which form the spider web
of security relationships designed to ensure the safety of US core strategic
interests in the Middle East.

No resource wars---takes out their warrant for great power draw-in

Tetrais 12—Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS).
Past positions include: Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly (1990-1993);
European affairs desk officer, Ministry of Defense (1993-1995); Visiting Fellow, the Rand
Corporation (1995-1996); Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of
Defense (1996-2001).(Bruno, The Demise of Ares,
csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf)
The Unconvincing Case for ‘‘New Wars’’ ¶ Is the demise of war reversible? In recent years, the metaphor of a new ‘‘Dark Age’’ or ‘‘Middle
Ages’’ has flourished. 57 The rise of political Islam, Western policies in the Middle East, the fast development
of emerging
countries, population growth, and climate change have led to fears of ‘‘civilization,’’ ‘‘resource,’’
and ‘‘environmental’’ wars. We have heard the New Middle Age theme before. In 1973, Italian writer Roberto
Vacca famously suggested that mankind was about to enter an era of famine, nuclear war, and
civilizational collapse. U.S. economist Robert Heilbroner made the same suggestion one year later. And in 1977, the great
Australian political scientist Hedley Bull also heralded such an age. 58 But the case for ‘‘new wars’’ remains as
flimsy as it was in the 1970s.¶ Admittedly, there is a stronger role of religion in civil conflicts. The proportion of internal
wars with a religious dimension was about 25 percent between 1940 and 1960, but 43 percent in the first years of the 21st cen tury. 59
This may be an effect of the demise of traditional territorial conflict, but as seen above, this has not increased the number o r frequency of
wars at the global level. Over the past decade, neither Western governments nor Arab/Muslim countries have fallen in to the trap of the
clash of civilizations into which Osama bin Laden wanted to plunge them. And ‘‘ancestral hatreds’’ are a reductionist and uns atisfactory
approach to explaining collective violence. Professor Yahya Sadowski concluded his analysis of post-Cold War crises and wars, The Myth
of Global Chaos, by stating, ‘‘most of the conflicts around the world are
not rooted in thousands of years of
history--they are new and can be concluded as quickly as they started.’’ 60¶ Future
resource wars are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the
Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has
been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwait--a nationwide bank robbery--may go down in history as being the last great
resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation
to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are
the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. ¶ China’s and India’s
energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over
the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as
oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously
untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically
attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and
political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been
overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We
no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. In
an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any
other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There
may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean,
but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.
1NR
 1NR – China DA
Switching to an over-the-horizon strategy is sufficient to cause GCC
states to seek security guarantees from China---triggers global
instability
Sarah A. Emerson 14, President of Energy Security Analysis and a Principal at ESAI Energy,
an energy research and forecasting firm; and Andrew C. Winner, Professor of Strategic
Studies and the Chair of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College,
Spring 2014, “The Myth of Petroleum Independence and Foreign Policy Isolation,” The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 21-34
Despite the shifts in oil flows, non-energy interests and the stickiness of
commitments will keep the United States engaged in the region. The United States
remains committed to the safety and security of the Gulf Arab states, and has an even
stronger commitment to the security of Israel. Even if the United States remains fully
engaged in the security of the region, there will be questions about its staying power.
Changes in military technology may exacerbate concerns about U.S. commitment.
Specifically, increased and improved anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities will
likely cause the United States to base and operate differently in the region than it has in the
past, including perhaps deploying forces in over-the-horizon configurations.22 While
logical militarily, states may view such changes in deployment and/or operating
patterns as evidence of decreased commitment.
To counter this perceived drop in U.S. staying power, regional states may accelerate
their own efforts to secure the area. In the case of the Gulf Arab states, they would have
a number of options. One is to increase cooperation with one another, an option that
historically has been pursued only at the margins. Another would be to engage in self-
help strategies, something limited more by small populations than by finances. If regional
states were to include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic
missiles in this self-help rubric, it could be highly destabilizing.23 A last option would
be to seek one or more outside additional security guarantors such as China. If Beijing
were both able and willing to overcome the limitations discussed above, its involvement
would generate instability on a more global scale. Other Asian states dependent on Persian
Gulf flows would likely see a significant Chinese role in the Gulf as adding uncertainty,
rather than diminishing it.
1NR – Saudi DA
 1NR – Kicking Saudi
Deterrence requires a massive force in the Gulf---light footprint doesn’t
solve
Matthew Kroenig 12, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
“Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-01-
01/time-attack-iran
These security threats would require Washington to contain Tehran. Yet deterrence would come at a heavy
price. To keep the Iranian threat at bay, the United States would need to deploy naval and ground units
and potentially nuclear weapons across the Middle East, keeping a large force in the area for decades to
come. Alongside those troops, the United States would have to permanently deploy significant
intelligence assets to monitor any attempts by Iran to transfer its nuclear technology. And it would also need to devote
perhaps billions of dollars to improving its allies’ capability to defend themselves. This might include helping Israel const ruct submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and hardened ballistic missile silos to ensure that it can maintain a secure second-strike capability. Most of all,
to make containment credible, the United States would need to extend its nuclear umbrella to its partners in the region, pled ging to
defend them with military force should Iran launch an attack.

In other words, to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would need to make a substantial investment
of political and military capital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis and at a time when it is
attempting to shift its forces out of the region. Deterrence would come with enormous economic and geopolitical
costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained hostile to U.S. interests, which could mean decades or longer. Given
the instability of the region, this effort might still fail, resulting in a war far more costly and destructive than the one t hat critics of a
preemptive strike on Iran now hope to avoid.
1NR – Iran DA/CP
 OV
It causes rapid nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the
Atlantic, January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-
armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are ma dmen
who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are building nuclear
weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. ¶ It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about
the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on
absolute power.¶ Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons
against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and
sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the
destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities. ¶ The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may
not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the
chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with
Israel.¶ Warp-Speed Escalation¶ The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East
in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and
prone to warp-speed escalation.¶ Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s
Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets.
Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense
of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand.¶
Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes
Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is
to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening
Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of
August’ on steroids.”¶ Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile
launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or
imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons
to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? ¶ Bruce Blair, the co-
founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a
sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards,
making an accidental exchange more likely.¶ “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed
states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces --
mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger
alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false
indications that the other side has initiated an attack.” ¶ Then comes the problem of misinterpreted
data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has
decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ¶ ‘Cognitive Bias’¶ Blair notes that in a crisis it
isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader
will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that
increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.¶
Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two
countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far-fetched --
make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t
have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we
nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.Ӧ The
answer to this predicament is to deny Iran
nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of
preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped
before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”

It outweighs the case---Middle Eastern prolif is uniquely likely to

escalate---structural checks on other nuclear wars means only we access
extinction
Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long.
It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are
based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to
miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally
considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly , upsetting
the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.
More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly
steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the
bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike
capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but
survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely
vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight
times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled
to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level
commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation . Moreover, if early
warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would
increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might
be unattributable or attributed incorrectly . That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a
first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined
with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against
the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war .
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons
from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive
action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging
nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant
risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that
nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear
arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons
vulnerable to attack or theft.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar
nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military
technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling
or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance
systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a
fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be
highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with
a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and there by increase its
ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced
military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictab le
consequences.

No defense---lack of C&C and poly-nuclear strategic dynamics

Shmuel Bar 13, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel,
February, “The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast,” Hoover Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a military nuclear capability may fail
The likelihood that the current

a “poly-nuclear” Middle East, which may include

has raised debate in academic and strategic communities regarding the implications of

after Iran states such as Saudi Arabia (under the current or a future more-jihadi-oriented regime), Turkey, Egypt (under the Muslim Brotherhood
regime), Syria (or a successor state/states thereof), Iraq (or successor states) and Libya. Some respected strategic

theorists regard the Cold War experience as highly relevant to such a scenario and point at the fears that permeated the
western military establishments of a nuclear China and the fact that a nuclear Indian subcontinent did not result in nuclear war, despite mutual hostility and frequent outbreaks of

crisis. Kenneth Waltz even suggests that the very possession of nuclear weapons tempers military adventurism
and inculcates a degree of strategic responsibility commensurate with the grave consequences that would result from nuclear conflict.1¶ However, two decades after the Cold War, it

it was not only deterrence based on mutually assured destruction (mad) that prevented outbreak of nuclear
is clear that

war between the two superpowers, but also the stringent procedures of command and
control over the nuclear arsenals that reduced the risks of their use in escalation scenarios or unauthorized use. Furthermore, it is clearer today than during the Cold War that
the “culture” of command and control differed considerably in the different nuclear countries

and was influenced by military structure, political culture, and levels of confidence of the political leadership in the military.2 Therefore, even if we assume that the

leaderships of the region will normally wish to avoid nuclear confrontation , it

behooves us to explore the command, control, communication (c3) and Intelligence (c3i) capabilities that may be applied in these
countries. ¶ There are no indications that any Middle Eastern Muslim country — with the
possible exception of Iran — has begun to develop a doctrine for use and command and control of such weapons. In Commented [EM1]:
the veteran nuclear powers, such doctrines and command and control systems developed over the years through constant processes of design, planning and exercises, and

In the types of regimes that exist in the Middle East, on the other hand, it is
involvement of the academic community.

such methodical planning will not take place and doctrine will evolve
reasonable to assume that

through discussions between the leadership and a small circle of trusted advisors. The chosen paradigms of
command and control will, however, be influenced by the cultural, political, and organizational features of these regimes, such as: ¶ Personalized or religiously motivated leaderships.¶
Islamic views regarding the nature and role of nuclear weapons and the moral permissibility of using nuclear weapons.¶ Existing c3 of existing “strategic weapons” (chemical,
biological, ssm) and existing c3 in conventional situations — levels of centralization, culture of delegation of authority, levels of trust in the regular military as opposed to special
regime guards forces.¶ Willingness to incur civilian casualties by deployment of weapons in highly populated areas.¶ Nuclear aspirations in the Middle East have been motivated by a
variety of considerations: deterrence, a need for a weapon of compellence, honor, regional and international stature, and others. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons and the
circumstances through which the state achieves nuclear weapons will influence the development of c3 and the considerations that will guide the operational concept. Some (such as
Iran) may see nuclear weapons as a means to undermine the balance of power in the region. Others may see them as necessary in order to counterbalance the former. In any case,

the strategic environment of a poly-nuclear Middle East will be exceedingly dynamic

and even volatile . It will differ from the stability of the latter part of the Cold War3 — and will probably be more like
the instability of its early years, but with many nuclear players. In such a volatile environment, the paradigms of command and control may

mean the difference between controlled tensions and nuclear confrontation .

 Nuclear Terror Impact
Turn nuke terror – prolif causes diversion to terrorists
Shmuel Bar 13, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel,
February 2013, “The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast,” Hoover Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
Having acquired nuclear weapons in contravention to their npt obligations, Middle Eastern
regimes will probably be extremely sensitive regarding the possibility of further
unauthorized transfer — from ideological or material motives — of nuclear materials,
expertise, hardware, components, or weapons from themselves to adversaries. This is a
critical issue already today in the Pakistani context. The r&d organizations in the Middle
East — unlike their Cold War predecessors — may be more likely to emulate A.Q.
Khan in Pakistan, not only maintaining a role in the decision-making processes after
completing development of the weapons, but also becoming “back doors” to the
weapons they devised, particularly in scenarios of breakdown of the states. Unlike
the scientific institutions of the Soviet Union, which had little or no prior interaction with
potential customers for their know-how, and whose efforts to capitalize on their access
could be relatively easily monitored and disrupted by the successor state (Russia) and the
West, these elements have wide access to potential clients.
 AT: Perm Plan + Various Planks
Robust presence is key to the threat of force---empirically succeeds at
deterring prolif in the Middle East
James Phillips 10/2, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage
Foundation, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the Next President Should Do,” 10/2/15,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-the-
next-president-should-do
2. Strengthen U.S. military forces to provide greater deterrence against an Iranian
nuclear breakout. Ultimately, no piece of paper will block an Iranian nuclear breakout. The
chief deterrent to Iran’s attaining a nuclear capability is the prospect of a U.S. preventive
military attack. It is no coincidence that Iran halted many aspects of its nuclear weapons program in
2003 after the U.S. invasion of and overthrow of hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Libyan dictator
Muammar Qadhafi, motivated by a similar apprehension about the Bush Administration, also chose to give up his
chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

To strengthen this deterrence, it is necessary to rebuild U.S. military strength, which has
been sapped in recent years by devastating budget cuts. The Obama Administration’s failure to provide for the national defense
will shortly result in the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf region for the
first time since 2007. Such signs of declining U.S. military capabilities will exacerbate the risks
posed by the nuclear deal.

Forward-deployed presence is key to deterrence---sends critical signals

and deters
war

Bilal Y. Saab 15, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, “The New Containment: Changing
America’s Approach to Middle East Security,” July 2015,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_New_Containment.pdf
It is always hard to measure deterrence success, because the absence of war does not necessarily prove that deterrence worked (a host
of other factors could have led to the preservation of peace). However, it is assumed that the
United States’ preponderant
military presence in the Gulf, its ability to effectively project military power and quickly transfer military assets from
other regions, and its willingness to use force help deter the occurrence of large-scale interstate
war in the Middle East. Such forward-deployed US military presence in the region will
continue to serve as a key factor contributing to deterring major war in that part of the
world.
Since the risk of major Arab-Israeli war is much reduced in today’s regional environment, the
more likely scenario of
interstate war in the Middle East is currently one in which Iran and its allies go to arms with
its adversaries—be it Egypt, Israel, or some Arab Gulf states. Many have argued that Obama damaged US credibility when he
decided not to take military action against Syrian leader Bashar Assad, despite drawing a “red line” against the use of chemi cal weapons.
Credibility is essential to deterrence effectiveness, and US deterrence did take a hit
following the Syrian episode, but one should not exaggerate its significance or conclude
that it caused Iran to feel that it now has license to attack its neighbors.
A rational actor more often than not, Iran understands the language of deterrence
and knows better than to provoke the United States—the most powerful military on earth.
In short, aside from more effective diplomacy, there is little the United States can add to its conventional military deterre nt posture in the
Middle East to make it more robust. But as argued below, there is more it should do, along with its regional partners, to enh ance its
unconventional capabilities in the region to deter Iran from indirectly destabilizing other countries.
 AT: Pressure Increases Prolif (Mousavian)
We have the best theoretical defense of how treaty compliance operates-
--credible military deterrence is key to make sanctions effective and
ensure compliance in the event of sanctions failure
Michael Singh 15, managing director and Lane-Swig senior fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, former worker on Middle East issues at the National Security
Council, “This Deal or War? Misadventures in Deterring Iran,” 9/15/15,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/this-iran-deal-or-war-misadventures-in-deterring-
iran/
Paradoxically, even had U.S. military threat been credible, the “this deal or war” formulation would still have been false; i ndeed, it would
have disproved itself. The
United States did not and does not desire a conflict with Iran, but
retains the capacity to prosecute one if necessary. By contrast, the Iranian regime cannot
afford a military clash with the United States. If Iranian leaders felt that the United States
would respond militarily to certain nuclear advances (or other actions), they most likely would be
deterred from taking those actions.
During the final phase of the nuclear talks, the United States sacrificed its leverage by forsaking deterrence. In any negoti ation, each party
must compare the deal on offer with the likely alternatives. By denigrating or dismissing the alternatives to a negotiated accord —
whether strengthened sanctions or military action — Western negotiators allowed Iran to hold out for a better deal. Despite U.S.
assertions that officials were ready to walk away from the negotiating table, in reality American rhetoric suggested that we had nowhere
to go.

This might all now be primarily a matter of historical interest were it not for the fact that deterrence
will continue to
play a vital role in enforcing or improving the nuclear accord in the coming years.
States adhere to treaties not because they harbor a sense of fairness or deference to
legal authority, but because they keenly appreciate their national interests. These
commitments are kept out of concern for the consequences of other courses of action
rather than mere fealty to the text. In this sense, treaties tend not to shape reality but
codify it — states often would take the actions pledged in a treaty even in its absence. In such cases, what treaties usefully provide is
enhanced exchange of information. Rather than each side simply guessing about whether the other is taking a particular action , treaties
provide a mechanism for dialogue and verification to provide greater assurance, thereby preventing misunderstandings.

Therefore, Iran must continue to believe it remains in its interest to keep its
commitments as the nuclear deal is implemented. For this to be the case, the consequences of
violating the deal must be serious and credible. These should include renewed sanctions, which are certainly
preferable to military action if they can be made effective. But sanctions work only with the cooperation of
other states, including some (like Russia or China) that are unlikely to be sympathetic
to U.S. concerns regarding Iranian behavior. Even with broad international support, the pressure of sanctions may be
insufficient or take effect too slowly to deter Iran in a scenario where it is
determined to gain nuclear weapons.
For this reason, the United States must retain and project a credible military option in the
event of Iranian violations. This will not only deter Iran, but will also provide a powerful
incentive to other states to urge Iran to keep its commitments. In the event of an Iranian failure to
comply with the deal, a credible U.S. military option will also help convince other states to
join the United States in re-imposing sanctions, even if only to avert an American military
action against Iran that would be damaging to their interests.
 AT: Iran Defensive
Iran’s motives for prolif are internal, not external---their nuclear
program empirically increased as security threats decreased
Julian Bernard 12, Master of Social Science’s Candidate in Political Science, School of
Political Studies, University of Ottawa, “Domestic Politics and Nuclear Proliferation in Iran,”
2012,
https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/23564/1/Bernard_%20Julien_2012_rese
archpaper.pdf
According to realist intuitions, the
These latest dynamics in Iran’s already perplexing nuclear saga deserve particular attention.

states will seek to develop nuclear

long-time reigning theory and model by which to study nuclear weapons proliferation, “

weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through
alternative means.”4 However, the nuclear program’s newfound public face and inflexibility come at a time

when Iran’s security environment has been altered to its advantage. Although far from a faded
memory, Iran’s devastating war with Iraq has long passed, two of Iran’s foremost security

concerns have been resolved with the forced ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the American military footprint in the region is finally winding down , seen most

recently with the withdrawal of the remaining US combat forces from Iraq in late December 2011.

Although much uncertainty in the region remains in spite of these latest developments, no external threats
exist for which Iran would require a nuclear deterrent. In fact, the only possible threat which Iran could face
springs from its uncompromising desire to acquire nuclear weapons-related technology, a desire often compared to a “runaway train with no brakes”8 by
President Ahmadinejad and his hardline colleagues, making the regime’s perceived need for a nuclear weapons capability (of course according to a realist
perspective) a self-fulfilling prophecy9 . Of course and in spite of its enhanced security environment, a “conspirational interpretation of politics”10 is bound
to continue in Iran, this belief that subversive forces, both foreign and domestic, are plotting to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran at every corner (this
paranoia has certainly increased following the United States’ invasion of Iraq and policies of calling for regime change11), however, as some have already
pointed out, “hard-liners will find it increasingly difficult to justify their policies and their retention of power by referring to a hostile, predatory external
environment”.¶ That being said, any analysis of nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran would be hard-pressed to completely disregard Iran’s perceived
vulnerability, as far more than simple power asymmetries enter the threat perception calculus of state leaders, as constructivists rightfully argue. However,
what the above exposé does accomplish is to vindicate the very sound assumption that what security imperatives may have
accounted for the nuclear program’s revival in the mid-1980s may not account for
the program’s continued persistence. Let’s remember, while the nuclear program was reactivated (1986) at the height of the
Iran-Iraq War, largely confirming realist intuitions (reactivated in response to power asymmetries), since then, “ the program has been

marked by persistence rather than urgency. As the absence of a crash program would
suggest, the motives for investing in a nuclear option stem more from political than security
imperatives.Ӧ Scholars have long advocated for a more nuanced approach to the study of nuclear weapons proliferation, with this in mind, this
study will attempt to unravel the following question: What principal motivation accounts for Iran’s current hardline administration’s public and determined
Iran’s current
quest for nuclear weapons-related technology? Adopting a domestic politics model of nuclear weapons proliferation, it will be agued that

nuclear policy is designed as a calculated ploy, set forth by the regime’s hardliners, to
undermine and discredit the regime’s internal opponents. As Chubin explains, “The domestic power
struggle over resources and power is still the main issue in Iran. The nuclear issue is one — albeit
critical — aspect of it.”16¶ The domestic politics model of nuclear weapons proliferation offers a unit-level analysis of the causes of nuclear weapons
proliferation, focusing on a specific set of actors which have historically played a determining role in a number of proliferation case-studies. Sagan identifies
these key actors as being:¶ “the state’s nuclear energy establishment (which includes officials in state-run laboratories as well as civilian reactor facilities);
important units within the professional military (often within the air force, though sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion); and
politicians”.17¶ The first variant of this approach holds that powerful interest groups (scientific-military-industrial complex) often develop following a
The scientific and military communities especially have much to
state’s decision to invest in nuclear technology.

gain from the state’s decision to stay the nuclear course for reasons as varied as funding and prestige18 .
These parochial interests drive these actors to build broader coalitions, which for example, can push
the scientific community to inflate the advantages of a nuclear breakthrough or encourage the military to relay skewed threat perceptions to their leaders
increasing the value of a nuclear deterrent.¶ In Iran, there is some evidence suggesting the formation of a nuclear lobby, although pieces of physical evidence
are few and far between. Some authors claim “the head of [Iran’s] AEO [(Atomic Energy Organization)] is among the most vocal proponents of the
program”20 and that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with its growing presence in government, is actively campaigning for a nuclear weapons
capability as it is most likely to “oversee their storage, training, and deployment infrastructure.”21 Others refute these facts altogether22, setting the stage
for this model’s second variant.¶ The second variant of the domestic politics model, the one adopted throughout this paper, focuses on politicians’
Iran has entered a period of
“perceptions of the bomb’s utility and of its symbolism.”23 It must be understood that

revolutionary upheaval, and identity crisis of sorts that pits the forces embracing reform
against those advocating “retrogressive tradition.”24 While the twin pillars of the conservatives’ power base,
notably their material and ideational supremacy over their internal rivals, were strengthened in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, largely the
product of the revolutionary fervor which swept the country and Ayatollah Khomeini’s implicit, although at times wavering support, following the death of
the Father of the Revolution, this superiority was gradually usurped and undermined by two consecutive two-term presidencies. This period in Iranian
history, that of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami’s (1997-2005) tenures as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
according to President Ahmadinejad and many of his hardline colleagues, amounted to an era of great “betrayal of the revolution”25 . This, many argue,
because both Rafsanjani and Khatami threatened their political survival, “directly undermining the hard line conservatives’ prerogatives”.¶ While his
election may have come as a surprise to many, if not all, domestic and international spectators, soon after taking office, there would be little speculation on
how Ahmadinejad would seek define his tenure as president of the Islamic Republic. As Takeyh notes, “Ahmadinejad came into office determined to rekindle
the revolutionary fires that seemed long extinguished” 27 , the same fires which had catapulted the conservative hardliners at the pinnacle of the Iranian
polity nearly three decades earlier. In his quest, President Ahmadinejad has attempted to exploit and manipulate the nuclear issue in two distinct but
interrelated ways. First, President Ahmadinejad has attempted to exploit the nuclear issue in an attempt to foment and manufacture a crisis with the West,
thereby renewing the populace’s long-held feeling of embattlement. As Wehrey et al. explain, President Ahmadinejad has illustrated “the combined utility of
a siege-like mentality and the issue of nuclear power in consolidating internal support for the regime”. ¶ Second,there has been a
concerted effort to craft a concrete link between the nuclear program and Iranian
national identity. Ahmadinejad and those around him have attempted to depict the nuclear program as embodying, at times rather too
perfectly, those core principles that animated the 1979 Revolution: self-reliance, independence and equality30 . As Green et al. explain, the nuclear

program has gained an almost “mythic significance in linking these […] themes.”¶ In closing, it should be remembered that
even “clandestine nuclear programs are taken seriously by the opponents and tacit nuclear deterrence works”32, however, if a nuclear program is to gain
added symbolic meaning, as in a tool for internal political consumption and legitimation which will be argued the case in Iran, nuclear intentions need to be
known. Therefore, what was described in the introductory paragraphs of this section, notably the popularization of the nuclear issue and an unprecedented
belligerent nuclear posture, at the very least gives reason for this study’s hypothesis. As Chubin writes, “Above all, the nuclear issue is
one of symbolism”.

The aff can’t solve---Iran’s primary motivates for prolif are internal, not
external
Clifton W. Sherrill 12, MSIR Professor and Academic Advisor at Troy University, Pacific
Region, “Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy,” Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_19-
1_sherrill_iran_bomb.pdf
This analysis holds that the Iranian regime is motivated by a desire for coercive power externally and a need to maintain its radical
Islamist image internally. Hence, attempting
to dissuade the regime from acquiring nuclear
weapons by addressing defensive security concerns will not succeed. Provision of a
security guarantee, extension of a nuclear deterrent umbrella, or creation of a regional security compact that
includes Iran, fail to meet the Islamist regime’s needs. Domestically, the regime seeks to
buttress eroding support by emphasizing its Islamist character and by equating nuclear
technology with nationalist pride. In addition, the IRGC provides institutional support to the
nuclear program. To combat this, the United States can offer support for domestic Iranian opponents of nuclear arms; however, the
success of the regime’s nationalist argument has drastically limited the set of organized opponents. Moreover, with negligibl e American
influence in Iranian policymaking circles, US efforts are effectively limited to public diplomacy. Thus, prospects for
countering the domestic drivers of nuclear weapons are dim.
Round 4
1NC
T
 T
The affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government
action
Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about
hypothetical government action
Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et
al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4
each topic contains certain key elements, although
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions,

An agent doing the acting ---

they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1.

“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of
evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part

of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt

here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A
specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives
direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing
The entire debate is about
interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred.

whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer
sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Military presence requires physical stationing of armed forces

Degang Sun 13, Ph.D. in International Affairs from Shanghai International Studies
University, senior visiting researcher at Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College,
University of Oxford and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, associate professor of Political
Science and a senior researcher at the Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International
Studies University, “The Strategic Evolution of US Military Presence in Iraq,”
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/184516/ichaptersection_singledocument
/203d394c-0bcc-4350-8b67-c39f73e87668/en/7.pdf
military presence refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign state’s
In this chapter, foreign

where a certain number of armed forces are stationed and which has military activities,
jurisdiction,

organized institutions, and military facilities.7 It is by nature the geographical and functional extension of a country’s
domestic military deployment.
First is fairness:
Foregoing topical action makes neg engagement and strategy
impossible---finite prep means the neg needs a stable point of clash to
prepare---any alternative structurally favors the aff because they set the
terms for the debate and can permute alternatives---fairness is critical to
any benefit from debate and engagement with a well-prepared opponent
Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—
monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and
subverts any meaningful neg role
Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28,
2007
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position.
Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The
affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently
resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of
departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic
consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the
arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balance d
argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also
undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes
the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970,
p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A
desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of
voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for
respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon
months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases
that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies.
Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate
in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of
time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate
but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of
thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We
assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only
through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we
are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and
informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the
world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation
(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor
international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The
case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the
international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the
dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative
response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing
them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful
exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not
accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

Next, military debates are good:

Specific debates about war and the military are critical to effective
public deliberation---a provisional point of stasis is key
Amy Gutmann 4, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the
School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Communication in the Annenberg School for
Communication at Penn, “Why Deliberative Democracy?” 2004,
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7869.html
To go to war is the most consequential decision a nation can make. Yet most nations,
even most democracies, have ceded much of the power to make that decision to their chief executives--to their presidents and

prime ministers. Legislators are rarely asked or permitted to issue declarations of war. The decision to go to war , it would seem, is

unfriendly territory for pursuing the kind of reasoned argument that characterizes
political deliberation.
Yet when President George W. Bush announced that the United States would soon take military action against Saddam Hussein, he and his advisors
recognized the need to justify the decision not only to the American people but also to the world community. Beginning in October 2002, the administration
found itself engaged in argument with the U.S. Congress and, later, with the United Nations. During the months of preparation for the war, Bush and his
colleagues, in many different forums and at many different times, sought to make the case for a preventive war against Iraq.1 Saddam Hussein, they said, was
a threat to the United States because he had or could soon have weapons of mass destruction, and had supported terrorists who might have struck again
against the United States. Further, he had tyrannized his own people and destabilized the Middle East.

In Congress and in the United Nations, critics responded, concurring with the judgment that Hussein was a terrible tyrant but challenging the administration
on all its arguments in favor of going to war before exhausting the nonmilitary actions that might have controlled the threat. As the debate proceeded, it
became clear that almost no one disagreed with the view that the world would be better off if Saddam Hussein no longer ruled in Iraq, but many doubted
that he posed an imminent threat, and many questioned whether he actually supported the terrorists who had attacked or were likely to attack the United
States.

This debate did not represent the kind of discussion that deliberative democrats hope for, and the deliberation was cut short once U.S. troops began their
invasion in March 2003. Defenders and critics of the war seriously questioned one another's motives and deeply suspected that the reasons offered were
really rationalizations for partisan politics. The administration, for its part, declined to wait until nonmilitary options had been exhausted, when a greater
moral consensus might have been reached. But the remarkable fact is that even under the circumstances of war, and in the face of an alleged imminent
threat, the government persisted in attempting to justify its decision, and opponents persevered in responding with reasoned critiques of a preventive war.

The critics are probably right that no amount of deliberation would have prevented the war, and the supporters are probably right that some critics would
deliberation that did occur laid the
never have defended going to war even if other nonmilitary sanctions had ultimately failed. Yet the

foundation for a more sustained and more informative debate after the U.S. military
victory than would otherwise have taken place. Because the administration had given reasons (such as the threat of
the weapons of mass destruction) for taking action, critics had more basis to continue to dispute the original

decision, and to challenge the administration's judgment. The imperfect deliberation that preceded the war
prepared the ground for the less imperfect deliberation that followed.
Thus even in a less than friendly environment, deliberative democracy makes an appearance, and with some effect. Both the advocates and the foes of the
war acted as if they recognized an obligation to justify their views to their fellow citizens. (That their motives were political or partisan is less important than
that their actions were responsive to this obligation.) This problematic episode can help us discern the defining characteristics of deliberative democracy if
we attend to both the presence and the absence of those characteristics in the debate about the war.

What Is Deliberative
Democracy?
Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the
laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that citizens
Deliberative democracy makes room for many
give in return. But not all issues, all the time, require deliberation.

other forms of decision-making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by executives), as long as the
use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process. Its first and most important

characteristic, then, is its reason-giving requirement.

The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find
The reasons are neither merely procedural ("because the majority
fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject.

favors the war") nor purely substantive ("because the war promotes the national interest or world peace"). They are reasons that should
be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.

The moral basis for this reason-giving process is common to many conceptions of democracy. Persons should be treated not
merely as objects of legislation , as passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take
part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their representatives. In deliberative democracy an
important way these agents take part is by presenting and responding to reasons , or by
demanding that their representatives do so, with the aim of justifying the laws under which they must live together. The reasons are

meant both to produce a justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual
respect. It is not enough that citizens assert their power through interest-group bargaining, or by voting in elections. No one seriously suggested that
the decision to go to war should be determined by logrolling, or that it should be subject to a referendum. Assertions of power and expressions of will,
though obviously a key part of democratic politics, still need to be justified by reason. When a primary reason offered by the government for going to war
turns out to be false, or worse still deceptive, then not only is the government's justification for the war called into question, so also is its respect for citizens.

A second characteristic of deliberative democracy is thatthe reasons given in this process should be accessible
to all the citizens to whom they are addressed. To justify imposing their will on you, your fellow citizens must give
reasons that are comprehensible to you. If you seek to impose your will on them, you owe them no less. This form of reciprocity means

that the reasons must be public in two senses. First, the deliberation itself must take place in
public, not merely in the privacy of one's mind. In this respect deliberative democracy stands in contrast to
Rousseau's conception of democracy, in which individuals reflect on their own on what is right for the society as a whole, and then come to the assembly and
vote in accordance with the general will.2

A deliberative justification does not even

The other sense in which the reasons must be public concerns their content.

get started if those to whom it is addressed cannot understand its essential content . It
would not be acceptable, for example, to appeal only to the authority of revelation, whether divine or secular in nature. Most of the arguments for going to
war against Iraq appealed to evidence and beliefs that almost anyone could assess. Although President Bush implied that he thought God was on his side, he
did not rest his argument on any special instructions from his heavenly ally (who may or may not have joined the coalition of the willing).

some of the evidence on both sides of the debate was technical (for example, the reports of
Admittedly,

Citizens often have to rely on experts. This

the U.N. inspectors). But this is a common occurrence in modern government.

does not mean that the reasons, or the bases of the reasons, are inaccessible. Citizens are justified
in relying on experts if they describe the basis for their conclusions in ways that
citizens can understand; and if the citizens have some independent basis for believing the experts to be trustworthy (such as a past
record of reliable judgments, or a decision-making structure that contains checks and balances by experts who have reason to exercise critical scrutiny over
one another).

To be sure, the Bush administration relied to some extent on secret intelligence to defend its decision. Citizens were not able at the time to assess the validity
of this intelligence, and therefore its role in the administration's justification for the decision. In principle, using this kind of evidence does not necessarily
violate the requirement of accessibility if good reasons can be given for the secrecy, and if opportunities for challenging the evidence later are provided. As it
turned out in this case, the reasons were indeed challenged later, and found to be wanting. Deliberative democracy would of course have been better served
if the reasons could have been challenged earlier.

deliberative democracy is that its process aims at producing a decision that is

The third characteristic of

binding for some period of time. In this respect the deliberative process is not like a talk show or an academic seminar. The
participants do not argue for argument's sake; they do not argue even for truth's own sake (although the
truthfulness of their arguments is a deliberative virtue because it is a necessary aim in justifying their decision). They intend their

discussion to influence a decision the government will make , or a process that will affect how future
decisions are made. At some point, the deliberation temporarily ceases, and the leaders make a decision. The
president orders troops into battle, the legislature passes the law, or citizens vote for their representatives. Deliberation about the decision to go to war in
Iraq went on for a long period of time, longer than most preparations for war. Some believed that it should have gone on longer (to give the U.N. inspectors
time to complete their task). But at some point the president had to decide whether to proceed or not. Once he decided, deliberation about the question of
whether to go to war ceased.

deliberation about a seemingly similar but significantly different question

Yet

continued: was the original decision justified? Those who challenged the justification for the war of course did not
think they could undo the original decision. They were trying to cast doubt on the competence or judgment of the current administration. They were also
trying to influence future decisions--to press for involving the United Nations and other nations in the reconstruction effort, or simply to weaken Bush's
prospects for reelection.

deliberative democracy--its process is dynamic.

This continuation of debate illustrates the fourth characteristic of

Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the
decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future. It
keeps open the possibility of a continuing dialogue, one in which citizens can
criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the basis of that criticism . Although a
decision must stand for some period of time, it is provisional in the sense that it must be open to
challenge at some point in the future. This characteristic of deliberative democracy is neglected even by most of its
proponents. (We discuss it further below in examining the concept of provisionality.)

Keeping the decision-

Deliberative democrats care as much about what happens after a decision is made as about what happens before.

making process open in this way--recognizing that its results are provisional--is important for two reasons.
First, in politics as in much of practical life, decision-making processes and the human understanding upon which they depend are

imperfect. We therefore cannot be sure that the decisions we make today will be
correct tomorrow, and even the decisions that appear most sound at the time may appear less justifiable in light of later evidence. Even in the
case of those that are irreversible, like the decision to attack Iraq, reappraisals can lead to different choices later than were planned initially. Second, in
politics most decisions are not consensual. Those citizens and representatives who disagreed with the original decision are more likely to accept it if they
believe they have a chance to reverse or modify it in the future. And they are more likely to be able to do so if they have a chance to keep making arguments.

One important implication of this dynamic feature of deliberative democracy is that the continuing debate it requires should observe what we call the
principle of the economy of moral disagreement. In giving reasons for their decisions, citizens and their representatives should try to find justifications that
Deliberative democrats do not expect deliberation always
minimize their differences with their opponents.

or even usually to yield agreement. How citizens deal with the disagreement that is endemic in political life should therefore be
a central question in any democracy. Practicing the economy of moral disagreement promotes the

value of mutual respect (which is at the core of deliberative democracy). By economizing on their
disagreements, citizens and their representatives can continue to work together to
find common ground, if not on the policies that produced the disagreement, then on related policies about which they stand a greater
chance of finding agreement. Cooperation on the reconstruction of Iraq does not require that the parties at home and abroad agree about the correctness of
the original decision to go to war. Questioning the patriotism of critics of the war, or opposing the defense expenditures that are necessary to support the
troops, does not promote an economy of moral disagreement.

The university is key---productive friction over military policy is critical

to reclaim the debate and check the deregulation of the military
Donald Downs 12, Professor of Political Science, Law, and Journalism at UW-Madison,
director and co-founder of the University’s Wisconsin Center for the Study of Liberal
Democracy, with Ilia Murtazashvili, Arms and the University: Military Presence and the Civic
Education of Non-military Students, p. 31-4
a normative and theoretical framework ¶ As noted, one
of our tasks is to provide a normative and
theoretical framework that helps us conceptualize the relationship between the
military and universities as institutions . To accomplish our task, we offer a theoretical framework that
emphasizes the following: (1) the military is one of several clusters in society with a
distinctive perspective; (2) integration of these clusters improves the ability to
formulate public policies through a process we describe as “productive friction”; and
(3) the university is a microcosm of civil–military relations that can improve
citizenship and public reason by encouraging productive friction between the
military and non-military spheres of American society. In turn, this friction can
strengthen civic culture by lessening the civil–military gap. We briefly introduce each of these
dimensions, which we consider more fully in the following chapter. ¶ First, our theoretical framework presupposes that there are distinct
clusters in American life. The “clusterization” of society can present problems for the balance
between the military and civilian institutions, especially when groups become
polarized on creedal issues.69 But at the same time, our argument for integration of diverse perspectives, specifically a
distinctly military perspective, requires (or at least accepts the fact) that there are clusters in society . If there were no gap
in knowledge and perspectives between those in the military and others in society,
then nothing would be lost by excluding a military perspective . 70 In our framework, the
problem for society is not the existence of clusters but rather the degree of
integration and communication among clusters, each of which brings its own
perspective to the table.¶ We are most interested in the military cluster. For our purposes, it is not essential to define all
the features of the military perspective in developing our theoretical framework. We simply posit the military as a distinct cluster –
although our empirical studies and those of others show that military students and military historians, in particular traditi onal military
historians, do present different perspectives. Unlike most studies of the military gap, our concern is not with ideological differences
among clusters but rather in different expertise in the cluster. The military cluster may have an ideology similar to that of the general
public, yet our concern is less with their politics than with their expertise. In particular we are less concerned with the defining features
it is not the
of clusters than in discussion of the degree to which these clusters are integrated, for as we shall argue,
existence of different perspectives but rather their integration that is a key to civic
and liberal education.¶ The second component of our theory is that diverse perspectives can help
people and societies solve complex problems, particularly issues involving war and
national security. We draw especially on the insights of diversity theorists who have
shown that inclusion of individuals from diverse perspectives can improve the
ability of a group to solve problems. This is the general point of Scott E. Page’s book The Difference: How the Power
of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Page emphasizes that diverse groups are usually better at solving
problems in all walks of life.71 We apply Page’s perspective on learning in arguing that integration
of a military
perspective improves public policy – in particular, policies involving war or national security –
because the military offers one of the most distinctive and diverse perspectives that students can encounter in their academi c life.¶ The
third component of our framework is emphasis on the university as a microcosm of civil–military relations.
Much of the
literature on the civil–military gap emphasizes civilian control of the military, a
concern that has much to do with the rise of fascism and militarism in the twentieth century. As
Michael Desch has argued, this negative result is more likely if civilian and military leaders do
not forge sufficient common ground on policy. Fascism is not a realistic threat in America, but problems
associated with an unhealthy relationship between these two sides should be taken seriously. Two reasons the Russian military became
less amenable to civilian control during the 1990s, for example, were (1) that the end of the Cold War led to the unraveling of military
and civilian consensus regarding military policy and (2) that new civilian leadership had less experience and education in mi litary
matters.72 The seminal statement of the necessity of civilian control of an increasingly professionalized and institutionalized military is
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. The university is a microcosm of these relations, but one in which the
practitioners of security policy and the voters and politicians that govern policy have
opportunities to see the other. These interactions promise to reduce the threat of a
widening civil– military gap, so it is critical to encourage balance and understanding
between these different institutions.
¶Our framework thus integrates the concepts of military clusters and productive friction,
applying them in order to better understand the nature of interactions within the
university. The university is one of the key institutions in society that can either
encourage or discourage productive friction. We posit that the university does best
for students by encouraging productive friction. In the pages that follow, we evaluate
how well the university does in encouraging this process.¶ To be clear, we are not
advocating a military perspective. We offer a less controversial claim: The best state
of affairs, as far as pedagogy is concerned, is to integrate the military perspective,
not to promote it; the process itself is the key, not the particular answers that arise
from it. In this respect, our approach to knowledge is decentralized in that it
prescribes a struggle among competing views. It is the lack of the facilitation of
interaction of diverse perspectives with which we disagree.

This is key to check the worst excesses of militarism and hold

policymakers accountable---particular debates about specific policies is
key
Ewan E. Mellor 13, Ph.D. candidate, Political and Social Sciences, European University
Institute, 2013, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and
UAVs,”
http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why_policy_relevance_is_a_moral_necessity_Just_war
_theory_impact_and_UAVs
This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to
engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more
fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John
Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael
Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just
war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of
“how we should act.”37
Kelsay argues
that:

[T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured
participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who
choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving
and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to
influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express
and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38
He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete
deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at
its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the
need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the
specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or
unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in
accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the
war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in
waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of
being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms.
Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more
general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be
involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social
critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war
theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is
constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and
language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a
mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists
between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and
principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to
spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our
common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These
principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand
and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the
categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the
legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for
political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within
war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be
held to account on this basis.
Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated,
a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to
political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47
Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is
disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of
citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the
policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers,
however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth
in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their
concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers
will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In
contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part
of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political
leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are
informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the
idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the
public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a
grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it
is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing
conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant
moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies
and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or
engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has
been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with
these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian
sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing
policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war
tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting
hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the
just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism
that are necessary for democratic politics.52

Next is democratic deliberation:

The affirmative’s rejection of an affirmation of the resolution destroys
constraints on debate and makes effective deliberation impossible
Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric.
Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of
CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law,
JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision
Making, 121-4
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion
or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or

policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it
would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this statement.
Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas,
proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites
decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective
decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example,
general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration . How many illegal
immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities?
Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not
speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the
opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are
unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and
businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should
we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to
you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation
become U.S. citizens? Surely

about the topic area of illegal immigration . Participation in this “debate” is likely to
be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without
focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the
controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best
understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an
understanding about the objective of the debate. This enables focus on substantive
and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing
argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in
unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, general feelings of tension without
opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure
of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate . Of
course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For example, claims are presented and
supported within speeches, editorials, and advertisements even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from
informal to formal, and may not call upon an audience or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal discourse occurs as conversation
or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on
a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumentation calling upon their audience
or adjudicator to decide. The proposition provides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a
process of compromise, it is important to identify the beginning positions of competing
advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center , or consensus position. It is
frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders
are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”);
however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that

the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In academic debate, the proposition
provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate,
the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be
made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated,
socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible
job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to
maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues,

might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this”
or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the
state of public education could join together to express their frustrations , anger, disillusionment, and emotions

regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about

the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A
gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be
done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is
opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more
judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The
statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of
Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational
problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to
be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus
contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for
better results. In academic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced
opportunity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the

proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective

decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis
for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as
‘"homelessness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have
an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example,
the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much
basis for dear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effective than physical force for some
purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social
change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of
competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats
in any debate, at some point, effective and
for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However,

meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood

proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general
subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of
writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What
does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A
more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain
crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty
This is not to say
with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution.

that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo-
cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the

controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that
debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of
difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Minimal guidelines to ensure a relative balance in the debate are

necessary to effectuate democratic engagement, and the process of
argumentative exchange is the best way to solve their offense---their
interpretation makes dialogue impossible
Lincoln Dahlberg 5, The University of Queensland, Center for Critical and Cultural Studies,
Visiting Fellow, The Habermasian public sphere: Taking difference seriously?, Theory and
Society (2005) 34:111-126
I believe this critique of power, transparency, and the subject is largely based upon a
poor characterization of Habermas’ position. There are three main misunderstandings
that need to be cleared up here, to do with power as negative, as able to be easily removed,
and as able to be clearly identified. First, Habermas does not define power as simply
negative and as therefore needing to be summarily removed from the public sphere.
The public sphere norm calls for “coercion-free communication” and not power-free
communication. Habermas emphasizes the positive power of communicative
interaction within the public sphere through which participants use words to do
things and make things happen.60 Communicative rationality draws on the “force of
better argument” to produce more democratic citizens, culture, and societies.
Subjects are indeed molded through this constituting power, but their
transformation is towards freedom and autonomy rather than towards subjugation
and normalization. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, to act according to a norm is not the
same as to be normalized.61 The public sphere norm provides a structure through
which critical reflection on constraining or dominating social relations and
possibilities for freedom can take place. As Chambers argues, rational discourse here
is about “the endless questioning of codes,” the reasoned questioning of
normalization.62 This is the very type of questioning critics like Lyotard, Mouffe, and
Villa are engaged in despite claiming the normalizing and repressive power of
communicative rationality. These critics have yet to explain adequately how they
escape this performative contradiction, although they may not be too concerned to
escape it.63
The form of power that is to be excluded from discourse in the public sphere is that
which limits and disables democratic participation and leads to communicative
inequalities. Coercion and domination are (ideally) excluded from the public sphere,
which includes forms of domination resulting from the maldistribution of material
and authoritative resources that lead to discursive inequalities. This emphasis on the
ideal exclusion of coercion introduces the second point of clari- fication, that the
domination free public sphere is an idealization for the purposes of critique. Habermas is
more than aware of the fact that, as Nancy Fraser, Mouffe, and Young remind us, coercive
forms of power, including those that result from social inequality, can never be
completely separated from the public sphere.64 Claims that such power has been
removed from any really-existing deliberative arena can only be made by ignoring or
hiding the operation of power. However, this does not mean that a reduction in
coercion and domination cannot be achieved. Indeed, this is precisely what a
democratic politics must do. To aid this project, the public sphere conception sets a
critical standard for evaluation of everyday communication. Chambers puts this
nicely:
Criticism requires a normative backdrop against which we criticize. Crit-icizing the
ways power and domination play themselves out in discourse presupposes a conception of
discourse in which there is no [coercive] power and domination. In other words, to defend
the position that there is a mean- ingful difference between talking and fighting, persuasion
and coercion, and by extension, reason and power involves beginning with idealizations.
That is, it involves drawing a picture of undominated discourse.65
However, this discussion of the idealizing status of the norm does notanswer claims that it
invokes a transparency theory of knowledge. Iwould argue that such claims not only fall
prey to another performa-tive contradiction – of presupposing that the use of rational
discourse can establish the impossibility of rational discourse revealing truth and power –
but are also based on a poor reading of Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality.
This is the third point of clarification. In contrast to the metaphysics of presence, the
differentiation of persusion from coercion in the public sphere does not posit a naive
theory of the transparency of power, and meaning more generally. The public sphere
conception as based upon communicative rationality does not assume a Cartesian
(autonomous, disembodied, decontextualized) subject who can clearly distinguish
between persuasion and coercion, good and bad reasons, true and untrue claims, and
then wholly re-move themselves and their communications from such influence. For
Habermas, subjects are always situated within culture. The public sphere is posited
upon intersubjective rather than subject-centered rationality. It is through the
process of communicative rationality, and not via a Cartesian subject, that
manipulation, deception, poor reasoning, and so on, are identified and removed, and
by which meanings can be understood and communicated. In other words, it is
through rational-critical communication that discourse moves away from coercion
or non-public reason towards greater rational communication and a stronger public
sphere. The circularity here is not a problem, as it may seem, but is in fact the very essence
of democratization: throughthe practice of democracy, democratic practice is advanced.
This democratizing process can be further illustrated in the important and challenging case
of social inequalities. Democratic theorists (bothdeliberative and difference) generally
agree that social inequalities al-ways lead to some degree of inequalities in discourse. Thus,
the ide-alized public sphere of full discursive inclusion and equality requires that social
inequalities be eliminated. Yet how is social inequality to
befullyidentified,letaloneeliminated? The idealization seems wholly in-adequate given
contemporary capitalist systems and associated social inequality. However, it is in
the very process of argumentation, even if flawed, that the identification and critique
of social inequality, and thus of communicative inequality, is able to develop. Indeed,
public sphere deliberation often comes into existence when and where people become
passionate about social injustice and publicly thematize problems of social inequality. Thus
the “negative power” of social inequality – as with other forms of coercion – is brought to
light and critique by the very discourse it is limiting.
This is not to say that subjects are merely effects of discourse, that there are no critical
social agents acting in the process. It is not to say that
125 subjects within discourse cannot themselves identify negative forms of power, cannot
reflexively monitor their own arguments, cannot rationally criticize other positions,
and so on. They can, and in practice do, despite the instability of meaning. The point is
that this reasoning and understanding is (provisionally) achieved through the
subject’s situatedness in discourse rather than via a pre-discursive abstract subject. As
Kenneth Baynes argues, it is through discourse that subjects achieve a degree of
reflective distance (what we could call autonomy) from their situations, “enabling
them to revise their conceptions of what is valuable or worthy of pursuit,[and]to
assess various courses of action with respect to those ends.” 66 Democratic discourse
generates civic-oriented selves, inter-subjective meanings and understandings, and
democratic agreements that can be seen as the basis of public sovereignty. How-ever,
the idea of communicatively produced agreements, which in the public sphere are known
as public opinions, has also come under ex-tensive criticism in terms of excluding
difference, criticism that I wantto explore in the next section.
The ends of discourse: Public opinion formation
The starting point of discourse is disagreement over problematic validity claims.
However, a certain amount of agreement, or at least mutual understanding, is
presupposed when interlocutors engage in argumentation. All communication
presupposes mutual understanding on the linguistic terms used – that interlocutors
use the same terms in the same way.67 Furthermore, in undertaking rational-critical
discourse, according to Habermas’ formal pragmatic reconstruction, interlocutors also
presuppose the same formal conditions of argumentation. These shared
presuppositions enable rational-critical discourse to be undertaken. However, as
seen above, meaning is never fixed and understanding is always partial.
Understanding and agreement on the use of linguistic terms and of what it means to be
reasonable, reflexive, sincere, inclusive, non-coercive, etc. takes place within discourse
and is an ongoing political process.

The impact outweighs---an ethos of democratic deliberation is key to

solve all social
problems

Doug Schuler 8, Instructor @ Evergreen State College, “CULTIVATING SOCIETY’S CIVIC

INTELLIGENCE: PATTERNS FOR A NEW ‘WORLD BRAIN’”, Information, Communication &
Society 4:2 2001 157–181
In a recent issue of Wired Magazine, consummate computing pioneer Bill Joy (2000) unveiled a trio of apocalyptic scenarios that he believes could be
unleashed in the not-too-distant future. These unpleasantries, resulting from unrestrained, unprincipled and unregulated genetic engineering, nano-
big nightmares of the twentieth century (such as environmental
technology and robotics (GNR), can be added to the list of

disasters, nuclear and bacteriological warfare which may yet plague us. Each of these
technologies, according to Joy, could abruptly unleash problems on so vast and
unprecedented a scale that any of humankind’s responses would be completely
overwhelmed. That such a notable ‘priest’ had so seriously challenged the central teachings of the technological (and economic) church was not
missed by the US media where the story was featured on the front page of the New York Times and other prominent newspapers. ¶ Ironically, computers are
at the forefront of the problems Joy describes; without them those catastrophes would be inconceivable. Computers are, in fact, the only indispensable
element in each of three problems. Joy’s scenarios centre on technological development outstripping humankind’s ability to control it. Our ‘fail safe point’
may have been passed according to Joy. A variant on Malthusian predictions (much disparaged but impossible to disprove) may be finally bearing the bitter
fruit that Malthus foresaw. The planet’s burgeoning population and its deteriorating
environmental condition, coupled with humankind’s propensity towards disagreement and
strife, its disregard for nature and its penchant for exploiting her innermost secrets may provide an ideal set
of preconditions for a sudden and profound technological ambush.¶ Joy, of course, is not alone in his warnings. Indeed, our era could be
characterized as the age of such warnings. Many scientists have documented the monumental changes

that humankind is currently loosing upon the natural environment. In another recent article scientists
concluded that the human- originated changes currently being wrought on the planet have attained the magnitude of a geologic force (Karl and Trenberth
1999). Nobody knows the consequences of ignoring these changes. Yet it is a matter of obvious importance to the inhabitants – human and otherwise – of the
disregard may be catastrophic.¶ Anticipating and possibly averting ecological and
earth. A cavalier

other nightmares would probably require changes to our ways of thinking and acting ;
changes which, depending on their scope and severity, are likely to be extremely difficult to enact. People are loath to change habits developed, cultivated,
and rationalized over a lifetime. Humankind, similarly, is unlikely to modify cherished habits to avert problems of the future based on contested evidence of
human
new circumstances, especially ones that may not seem to appropriate to their lives. ¶ Joy’s predictions border on the apocalyptic; in his mind

extinction within a generation is possible. Assuming that his predictions have even a germ of possibility, the
obvious question is what can be done to understand the situation, avert potential disasters and
develop a more sustainable relationship with our social and natural environments.
The equally important but less obvious issue is identifying the underlying conditions that would
help make even a partial resolution of the problems become conceivable. This paper is an
attempt at describing these conditions and how the idea of a ‘civic intelligence’ might play a useful role. THE WORLD BRAIN AND OTHER UTOPIAN VISIONS ¶
Joy’s concerns, and others like his, were formerly found only in science fiction for it is in that genre that technological and social possibilities are most
creatively explored. For that reason I would like to invoke the memory of H.G. Wells, the English science fiction writer, historian, generalist and visionary,
who did not live to see the Internet or other recent technological achievements. Wells was not just a science fiction writer who integrated technological
scenarios with social issues and outcomes; he was also a historian who searched for broad historical patterns: ‘I dislike isolated events and disconnected
details’ (Wells 1971). Wells was also deeply concerned about the human condition and devoted considerable thought to the prospects of enlightened social
amelioration. He discussed, for example, in the 1930s a number of collective problems that would become increasingly apparent in the following seventy or
so years (including environmental problems and weapons of mass destruction). ¶ Wells believed that there was a ‘conspicuous ineffectiveness of modern
knowledge and . . . trained and studied thought in contemporary affairs’. As a collective body, we are failing to address collective problems in spite of
immense individual talent and specialized knowledge. In his quest for possible antidotes, he dismisses all types of ideologies and religions as unsuitable. He
also rejected rule by ‘some sort of é lite, in which the man of science and the technician will play a dominating part’. Joy, of course, would be a member of such
a group, even though that group is responsible to some degree as the perpetrator of the challenges that Joy warns about. Wells places his faith in ‘science’
and not ‘men of science’. Science, in his view, should ‘enlighten and animate our politics and determine the course of the world’. To this end he asks, ‘Is there
any way of implementing knowledge for ready and universal effect?’ His answer is a world encyclopedia which would provide an intellectual backbone for
the human race, a‘worldbrain’that‘woulddojustwhatourscatteredanddisorientedintellectual organizations of today fall short of doing. It would hold the
world together mentally’.¶ Wells placed his faith in the establishment of a world encyclopedia, a single artefact packaged as a series of bound volumes which
would apparently be so accurate, that people would have little choice but to make the right collective decisions based on diligent study. Unfortunately very
few people could afford to purchase this set of volumes and fewer still would read them in their entirety and absorb the knowledge therein. Nor is the
existence of facts tantamount to the existence of ‘objective’ interpretations of the facts or obvious policies or courses of action based on those facts. ‘Facts’
have meaning only when interpreted and they have power only when they have consequences. Without saying so directly, Wells suggests that society
becomes more ‘intelligent’ by making its citizenry more mindful of the facts. ¶ Perhaps the most ambitious project along these lines was the one proposed by
the German philosopher Leibniz. Leibniz was an advocate for artificial intelligence some 300 years before its official inception. He conceived of an invention
that would be a type of artificial patriarch, almost a god. He immodestly proclaimed in 1679 that his ¶ invention uses reason in its entirety and is, in addition,
a judge of controversies, an interpreter of notions, a balance of probabilities, a compass which will guide us over the ocean of experiences, an inventory of all
things, a table of thoughts, a microscope for scrutinizing present things, a telescope for predicting distant things, a general calculus, and innocent magic, a
non- chimerical Cabal, a script which all will read in their own language; and even a language which one will be able to learn in a few weeks, and which will
soon be accepted amidst the world.¶ The system had two extremely powerful components: a universal represen- tation system; and a universal calculus for
ratiocinating over the facts in the system’s vast information stores. Leibniz anticipates Joy’s concerns but, unlike Joy, appears to be an uncritical promoter at
least of the particular manifestation that he envisions. He presupposes that some type of ultra-rational system could actually be constructed and that it could
– and would – be used for decision making that was best for all; the idea that the system could be somehow subverted or misused was not considered.¶
History has indeed furnished us with a host of projects that would enlighten us in some near-mechanical fashion. These include Bacon’s House of Solomon,
Otlet’s Office of Documentation and Palais Mondial. Some years later, in 1888, the prominent American pragmatist, John Dewey, also believed that what was
wrong with society was a failure of intelligence and information. Dewey, along with support from Franklin Ford, a financial journalist planned to offer his
own version of a ‘world brain’ in the form of a weekly newspaper entitled Thought News. This ill-fated idea was universally panned and Dewey and Franklin
Schemes like those advanced by the
failed to produce a single issue of the Thought News. THE PROJECTS UNRAVEL BEFORE THEY BEGIN ¶

visionaries above always fall short of their utopian objectives; they usually fail to recognize one or more fundamental
barriers that stand in the way. Their projects are often disconnected from social realities . Some of the
projects, Wells’s world encyclopedia, for example, would depend on the ability to mobilize large numbers of people in the development of some single
artefact. On top of that, there is little or no social or cultural desire demonstrated for the product nor evidence that it would be used at all, much less with the
a grand idea, how ever
utopian results envisioned by the encyclopedia’s prime advocate. ¶ What many visionaries fail to notice is that

obvious to the perpetrator as a ‘solution’ , must be coherently embedded in a system

of existing social forces, institutions and conceptualizations . While we ultimately will discuss some ideas
for a ‘world brain’ that avoids the undoings of the other utopian projects, we will first examine two additional arguments why establishing a ‘world brain’ or
The co-operation of the people is likely to be
other utopian scheme is difficult.¶ THE ‘IMPOSSIBILITY’ OF DEMOCRACY¶

necessary for any required changes in our techniques for addressing the problems
that Joy and others have presented. Co-operation that is willingly embraced through non-coercive means is
more reliable and more easily sustained. For those reasons, it appears that democracy in one form or another may
be necessary. In addition, the potential reach and malleability of the Internet and other new communication technologies further suggest that it
may be possible to devise applications, services and institutions within the evolving world communication network that would support and strengthen these
democratic approaches. Communication is key to any effective democratic system
, certainly, . Projects along
these lines, while reminiscent of Wells’s world brain visions, would need to be more aligned with the preconditions that support conceptual and
technological innovation if they are to be used and useful. ¶ Democracy, as nearly everybody knows, is highly 􏰝 awed in practice: the wrong people can
become elected for the wrong reasons and do the wrong things once in of􏰝 ce. Candidates can be favoured for their tousled hair, their dimpled smile, their
lineage, the slogan du jour. Once in power, elected of􏰝 cials may acquiesce to special interests (Greider 1993) or be undermined through media-induced
scandal (Castells 1998). Running for of􏰝 ce (in the USA) is so costly that only the very rich have any chance of getting elected (it was estimated that the New
York state Senate race would probably cost over one hundred million dollars). The role of the media, lobbyists, rich patrons, professional public relations
campaigns and dirty tricks further frustrate any attempt to understand or to participate meaningfully in the ‘democratic process’. ¶ The task of collective self-
rule – democracy – has been called an impossible task. Indeed, its impossibility can even be ‘proved’, in much the same way that engineers had ‘proved’ that
bee 􏰝 ight is impossible. The task of democracy – if it’s done remotely well (so the story goes) – is so exacting, so all-encompassing, yet so frustrating and
ultimately unpredictable, that it’s been called an ‘impossible’ enterprise. Lippman (1925), in particular, was sceptical of the idea of an ‘omnicompetent’
citizen who possesses sufficient knowledge to participate effectively in the political process. Lippman notes that even though civic affairs was his
professional avocation, he was unable to monitor the relevant data, initiatives and ideas that he believed would minimally be necessary for him to sustain
competence in this area. To be minimally competent in the area that this paper addresses, for example, a person should be well acquainted with democratic
theory, world systems, communication technology, political economy, public policy, environmentalism and the state of the world, and many other topics.
Each of these areas is characterized by shifting opinions, initiatives and discourses, in
additiontoanoverabundanceofempirical,veri􏰝abledata(whoseinterpretations are then disputed). (Interestingly, as Wells points out, our elected leaders
themselves are far from omnicompetent. Their chief skills, campaigning and political manoeuvring, are, in large part, responsible for their success, while
their competency in other matters may be underdeveloped.) ¶ Asimilarcriticismcan,ofcourse,bedirectedtowardsanyelitebody,however humanely and well
disposed they are towards governing the rest of the citizenry. But does Lippman’s critique render democracy ‘impossible’ or merely the idea of
‘omnicompetence’ and its purported indispensability. I would claim the latter. Reality is unfathomably complex and we are each incapable of ‘knowing’ even
democracy is not optional; decisions have to be
one aspect in its totality. But, impossible or not, democracy or some approximation of

We have no choice but to cultivate systems of governance that can help us

made.

constructively engage with our collective concerns. Lippman’s critique is valuable, but not to support the
conclusions for which it was originally marshalled. Lippman demonstrates the fallibility of basing a system of governance on the idea of omnicompetency.
Indeed, any system of governance should assume the impossibility of omnicompetence and the inescapable reality of imperfect competence, while not
allowing ourselves to be defeated by it. This means, in software parlance, turning a ‘bug’ into a ‘feature’. It may be, in fact, the impossibility of
omnicompetence that makes democracy the only viable choice for a system of governance. DUMBING DOWN THE CITIZEN ¶ In the early 1970s Harry
Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital (1998) demonstrated how the process of ‘dumbing down’
workers, primarily through severely reducing their on-the-job responsibility, 􏰝 exibility, and autonomy (often called ‘de-skilling’) increases
management control and, hence, profits to the advantage of capital. Since the idea of civic intelligence will
soon be discussed here, we may hypothesize brie􏰝 y about whether these ideas may also have some applicability

outside the workplace. Is it possible that the citizenry is being ‘dumbed down’ in similar
ways? And, if so, can we ‘run the processes in reverse’ to undo the damage ?¶ The key to Braverman’s

analysis is the decomposition of broad workplace responsibilities by management into

discrete constituent parts, which are then used to force workers to perform within circumscribed ranges. This process, often in
the name of ‘efficiency’, dramatically lessens the scope and directionality of worker
power. How could this process be replicated in realms outside of the workplace? The first responsibility to be jettisoned
(as ‘outside’ their primary work responsibility) in the civic sphere under such a redefinition would be the

consideration of issues relating to general social implications. Thus workers and labour unions should
focus exclusively on jobs and job security (and not, for instance, the social consequences of the jobs); artists should explore and

express their individual feelings; scientists and researchers should pursue what is fundable within a narrow, specialized niche –
computer science, physics and other ‘technical’ disciplines would expel implications of their subject matters from the curriculum, while measuring success
purely in terms of monetary return on investment. Citizens, of course, would spend much of their non-working life shopping, buying items that will
This general process
maximize their individual comfort and status while keeping the economic machine running at maximum capacity. ¶

removes the ‘politics’ of labour, leisure and learning; indeed it naturally results in the ‘de-skilling’ of the citizen.
Economists are the pioneers in this process by adapting and advocating the use of an
economic calculus as the sole determinant for all of our decisions . This is the ultimate dumbing
down; it reduces human aspirations and agency to that of a greedy and unthinking

automaton. The media ‘de-skill’ the citizenry in several ways as well, according to a variety of scholars. Castells (1997), for example, shows how the
media’s 􏰝 xation with political scandal encourages cynicism and political disengagement on the part of the citizenry. The media often promotes ‘the
spectacle’ (Garber et al. 1993) at the expense of the intellectually taxing. The ill effects of money on the media, politics and elections also further increase the
distance between citizens and public affairs (Schuler 2001). Furthermore, Robert Putnam shows convincingly that, at least in the USA, the virtually overnight
spread of commercial broadcast television was a primary culprit in the steady degradation of US civic life over the last several decades (Putnam 1996). One
can only wonder what effects this new electronic ‘opiate of the masses’ will have as it continues its spread on cultures outside the USA.¶ The questions as to
whether and to what extent citizen ‘de-skilling’ has been orchestrated, and by whom, will not be discussed in depth in this paper (although the
transformation of the USA from a country of citizens to a country of consumers is certainly an appropriate and provocative topic to contemplate in this
civic de-skilling is likely to dampen civic intelligence by
regard). It is suf􏰝cient to say that

influencing the content of, and the conditions under, which issues are placed on the public agenda,
and by trivializing and polarizing discussion and deliberation on important public
matters. Certainly each de-skilling step introduceschangesinbothinstitutionalization,theprescribedprocessesthrough which actions are advanced and
validated, and in conceptualization of what everyday life entails; each step helps erect the ordinary and the extraordinary barriersto civic intelligence. ¶ WHO
– OR WHAT – WILL GOVERN?¶ If the dire scenarios that Joy describes (or even the less dramatic, but no less worrisome, environmental catastrophes that
Since
atmospheric and other scientists warn us about) have even a minuscule chance of occurring, an urgent need to consider ways to avert them arises.

‘solutions’ to these problems are likely to be protracted and multi-pronged, and involve large segments of
the citizenry, a correspondingly urgent need to analyse the preconditions underlying
the development and successful implementation of these ‘solutions’ also arises. What
‘environments’ – social and technological – would be hospitable to the satisfactory resolving of these problems? If we could imagine humankind finding
better responses to our myriad problems, old and new, what circumstances and resources need to be in place and what steps could be taken that would
support these new responses? These preconditions we can call ‘civic intelligence’
and steps or perhaps a ‘world
brain.’¶ What choices face us in the design of this ‘civic intelligence?’ What attributes could it have? One hypothetical expression of ‘civic intelligence’ would
be a massively complex computer system which would make intelligent decisions on society’s behalf. This option would be a twenty-􏰝rst century
manifestation of Leibniz’s dream, a terrifying cybernetic Frankenstein-on-a-chip from the same
cupboardofnightmaresthatJoyopenedinhisWiredarticle.Thelimitationsofthis approach are manifold but are worth mentioning brie􏰝y. The impossibility of
accurately, adequately and comprehensively representing infinitely complex situations with discrete computer logic comes to mind, as do the problems
surrounding the implementation of the decisions. Would police or other armed organizations receive their instructions from such an ‘intelligent’ system?
The problem of the biases and assumptions of the system’s creators becoming embodied (forever?) in such a system is also a sobering and disturbing
thought. Imagine an International Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘expert system’ free to impose
economic‘restructuring’onhaplessregionsaccordingtothearcanetheoremsof economists!¶ Otherapproacheswhichrelymoreheavilyonintelligenceofthenon-
arti􏰝cial variety include having a small elite group making the decisions, nobody making decisions (let the ‘free market’ reign, for example), or a system in
which citizens play a strong role. Political scientist, Robert Dahl (1989), suggests that these three systems – dictatorship, anarchy and democracy, as well as
‘polyarchy,’ a hybrid of the others – constitute the entire list of possibilities.¶ Wells suggested that scientists (at least in his day) would sometimes yearn for a
society that would apply their (eminently reasonable) principles and clamour for their leadership and Lippman believed that an elite group should govern
because of the impossibility of omnicompetence. What Lippman didn’t acknowl- edge was that omnicompetence is impossible for small groups as well as for
individuals. America’s ‘best and brightest’, for example, engineered America’s tragic war with Vietnam. Regardless of the role of an elite, the non-elite
citizenry will necessarily also have a strong role to play. If an elite group, for example, devises solutions or sets of solutions they’d then have the thankless
and potentially impossible job of ‘convincing’ (through rational appeal, propaganda or force) the rest of us to accept their jeremiads and prescriptions. A
democratic approach, on the other hand, would be to enlist the aid of the citizenry at the onset as part of the overall project. The population or at least a large
majority may need to ‘buy in’ and adopt – without coercion or deception – ideas and actions that would be unacceptable without suitable participation in the
A more radically democratic view (and the one that might
process (Pateman 1970) that developed those ideas and actions.

is that the often neglected, sometimes ‘dumbed down’ citizenry might

ultimately be seen as the obvious choice)

provide the intelligence, creativity, energy and leadership that is needed to

recognize, formulate and reconcile the problems that we are faced with .¶ As we have seen
governance shouldn’t be entrusted to an omnicompetent elite or an infallible computer system; both are impossible to achieve. Nor should governance blind
luck through the fantasy that the status quo and/or the ‘free market’ will miraculously solve current problems and avert future ones through benign and
unanticipated side effects. A democratic system of governance, then, is the only viable alternative and civic intelligence that is strongly democratic – in spite
of the problems previously discussed – shows the greatest promise for an effectiveandequitablesystemofgovernance. This approach increases distribution of
creativity and attention while, at the same time, reducing concentration of power away from those people with vested interests in maximizing their gain
(often short-term) over the (often long-term) gain of the larger population. There is mounting evidence that this democratization is occurring. As McKibben
(2000) points out, the vast majority of Seattle’s anti-WTO protesters were demonstrating on behalf of somebody else, an impossibility according to homo
economicis. Keck and Sikkink (1998) report that ‘advocacy networks often involved individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a
An effective and equitable system of governance would
ratio- nalist understanding of their “interests”’.

help promote the creativity of the civic sector which is, as Castells (1997) and others remind us,
responsible for launching the major social movements of the last century, including
the environmental, civil rights and the women’s movement.¶ CIVIC INTELLIGENCE: TOWARDS A ‘WORLD
BRAIN’¶ Civic intelligence, as I propose it, is relatively prosaic: it refers to the ability of humankind to use information and communication in order to engage
in collective problem solving. The term has nothing to do with the metaphysical musings on ‘global consciousness’, ‘hyperintelligence’ and the like, which are
expected, by some, to emerge spontaneously at some time in the not too distant future ushered in by global communication networks. Like the ‘intelligence’
of an individual, civic intelligence is a relative form that can be less or more effective and creative. Thus it can be developed incrementally through human
effort, not through sudden inexplicablerevolutionanticipatedbyfaithorspirituallonging.Civicintelligence extends the notion of social capital (Putnam 2000) to
include an agenda, an orientation towards action in addition to one of observation and study. By transcending the individual, civic intelligence adds another
Civic intelligence is a form of collective intelligence. It is a premise of this chapter
level to the idea of ‘intelligence’.

this type of intelligence, probably to a much higher degree than an individual’s

that

intelligence, can be improved and made more effective. And how people create, share and act upon
information is crucial to that. Intelligence implies an orderly process for assessing situations, ranging over possible responses and determining and enacting
appropriate actions. It also implies looking into the future insofar as that is possible, and making decisions in the present that will help make future
situations advantageous at best, tractable at worst. Sometimes, of course, this will mean some postponing of expected bene􏰝 t. Another important element of
intelligence is the ability to acknowledge changingcircumstancesandtoadaptappropriately.Plansandothertemplatesfor action are indispensable;
unfortunately they are not infallible. ¶ Intelligence is the latent capability to interpret, respond and survive. Its reference point is human and the seat of
intelligence is the human brain. The human brain is, of course, a remarkable organ, one whose complexity is unmatched in natural or human-made products.
The brain stores information in the form of memory and in reflexive and habitual patterns of responses. It takes in information about the environment in a
variety of forms – from ‘low- level’ sensory data to highly symbolic and abstract conceptual information. It integrates all of this information, helps to regulate
all the systems and functions in the body and is largely responsible for the body’s thoughts and actions. Although the brain (and the nervous system) is the
organ where thought and decision occurs in the human body, it is certainly not in charge of everything; it can’t, for example, decide to deprive the left foot of
nutrients. This contrasts with social systems whicharemorerecon􏰝gurable;atleastintheory.Thegovernment,forexample, can decide to stop funding health
care programmes or subsidies to weapon developers. It is also important, for communication in the human body and for our analytic purposes, to realize
the relationships of its
that although the collection of systems that constitute the human body (or even the brain) is an integrated whole,

subsystems aren’t wholly co-operative; there are conflicting needs and requests that
can’t all be met. Conflict – and the need to resolve conflict – is crucial in both
individual and collective intelligences.

Our model of debate creates a democratic ethos of care for the world, a
scholarly orientation focused on particular points of commonality and
contestation that can be used to challenge the conditions that make up
our world---that’s critical to effective worldbuilding and social change
Ella Myers 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University
of Utah, 2013, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World, p. 123-125
As I have suggested, such gathering occurs by way of specific, politicized worldly things,
objects of debate and dispute that link citizens to one another in both agreement and
controversy (see chapter 3). Such objects are shared, even though, contra Arendt, they are not precisely the same for all involved.
Worldly things are fluctuating, contested third terms. They are called by different names, tied to incompatible
projects, rejected by some as insignificant. Yet these slippery, inconstant matters of concern nonetheless mediate

relations between people , enabling both their separation from and connection to one
another. The public expression of “innumerable perspectives” preserves distinction
while the fact that divergent voices refer to and speak about—even disagree about—
a specific, identifiable object of dispute fosters a sense of connection. For the world to
be felt as a mediating presence, Arendt contends, depends upon “our speaking with one
another” in “public political space,” where “things can first be recognized in their many- sidedness.”46 It is when
citizens engage with each other in this way, voicing and hearing a “plurality of
standpoints” on a particular, contested thing , that “the world thrusts itself between
them.”47
Arendt believes that democratic politics, characterized by the exchange of opinions and ideas
among diverse citizens, is the primary activity that generates the world’s power to relate and
separate.48 Why is this? According to Arendt, when people participate in associative politics with
their peers, they engage in an exchange of opinions that is about the world at
present , about the action to be taken , and about how the world will look in the
future .49 The world is, quite simply, “that about which we speak” as citizens. And it is through our “speaking with
one another about it” that the world can appear as something common , in the specific sense of
existing between us.50

The world- as- intermediary is, to a large extent, produced through this exchange; it is not
simply there prior to it. As Arendt explains, “The world comes into being only if there are perspectives; it exists as the
order of worldly things only if it is viewed this way, now that, at a given time.”51 The world can interest only if it is “ta lked about by
human beings” who make it a shared “object of discourse.”52 More specifically, it
is in political space, “an area where there
are many voices” discussing “affairs of the world,” that this special kind of commonality is
forged.53 To express one’s doxa in the presence of other citizens is to reveal “the world as it opens itself to me.” This revelatio n
affirms distance, on the one hand, because the world “opens itself” differently to every individual. At the same time, the expression of
“what appears to me” also affirms the existence of a world which “opens to everyone” and thus links us together.54 For the wo rld to act
as an intermediary requires “the presence of others in a politically organized sphere,” something which cannot be taken for granted.55 It
is on a “meeting ground” of citizens, of “men in all their variety” who “see and hear” from different positions, that the world can emerge,
however briefly, as something common, in the specific sense of lying between people.56

Returning to the account I presented in chapter 3, one can appreciate that when
citizens associate with one
another in relation to a specific worldly thing , whether in cooperative solidarities or
antagonistic publics, the world’s mediating qualities are thereby intensified . Public
discussion and contestation over a particular matter , which has a mutual claim on

participants’ attention , heightens awareness of an in- between. Indeed, the world

appears as an intermediary by way of many particular things or matters of concern that serve
as third terms, connecting and dividing citizens . This means that although democratic action in concert is
motivated in the first place by the desire to affect the conditions under which humans live, it is also through association with ot hers that
the world’s status as an inbetween is elicited and reinforced.

Now an answer to the question, What does it mean to care for the world as an in- between?, becomes clearer. What, in connection with
caring for the world as a collective home, does a democratic ethos entail? Caring for the world as a potential
intermediary means fostering practices and building institutions that provide as
many citizens as possible with meaningful opportunities to articulate their innumerable
perspectives in the presence of one another and to influence the conditions under
which they live . This is the way that “commonness of the world” is cultivated and
realized. Put plainly, this dimension of care for the world calls for broad efforts of democratization: the expansion of the power of
ordinary citizens to participate in their own government through multiple and accessible sites for the exchange of opinions and decision
making.

The form of reading a topical affirmative is a better route to

deconstruction than reflexively rejecting the invocation of the state---
contextually affirming strategic uses of sovereignty when they have clear
benefits disrupts the unconditional nature of sovereignty and is itself
deconstructive
Jacques Derrida 4, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University
of California, Irvine, 2004, For What Tomorrow? A Dialogue With Elisabeth Roudinesco, p.
91-92
J.D.: A moment ago you spoke of regicide as the necessity of an exception, in sum. Well, yes, one can refer provisionally to Carl Schmitt
(whatever one may think of him, his arguments are always useful for problematizing the “political” or the “juridical”; I examined this
question in Politics of Friendship). He says in effect that a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception. Sovereign is he
who effectively decides the exception. The revolutionaries decided that at that moment that it was necessary to suspend justice and—in
order to establish the law [droit] and to give the Revolution its rights—to suspend the rule of law [l’Etat de droit]. Schmitt also gives this
definition of sovereignty: to have the right to suspend the law, or the rule of law, the constitutional state. Without this category of
exception, we cannot understand the concept of sovereignty. Today,
the great question is indeed, everywhere, that
of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its own name or another, literally or figuratively, this
concept has a theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was transferred to the monarch,
said to have a “divine right.” Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to the nation, with the same the-
ological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God. Today,
wherever the word “sovereignty” is
spoken, this heritage remains undeniable, whatever internal differentiation one may recognize in it. How
do we deal with this? Here we return to the question of heritage with which we began. It is necessary to
deconstruct the concept of sovereignty, never to forget its theological filiation and to be ready to call this filiation
into question wherever we discern its effects. This supposes an inflexible critique of the logic of the
state and of the nation-state. And yet—hence the enormous responsibility of the
citizen and of the heir in general, in certain situations—the state, in its actual form, can resist certain
forces that I consider the most threatening. What I here call “responsibility” is what dictates
the decision to be sometimes for the sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its
deconstruction (“theoretical and practical,” as one used to say) according to the singularity
of the contexts and the stakes. There is no relativism in this, no renunciation of the
injunction to “think” and to deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very
condition of decision and responsibility—if there is any. I am thinking for example of the incoherent
but organized coalition of international capitalist forces that, in the name of
neoliberalism or the market,31 are taking hold of the world in conditions such as the “state” form; this is
what can still resist the most. For the moment. But it is necessary to reinvent the conditions of resistance. Once again, I
would say that according to the situations, I am an antisovereignist or a sovereignist —and I
vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain times and a sovereignist at
others. No one can make me respond to this question as though it were a matter of
pressing a button on some old-fashioned machine. There are cases in which I would
support a logic of the state, but I ask to examine each situation before making any
statement. It is also necessary to recognize that by requiring someone to be not unconditionally
sovereignist but rather soyvereignist only under certain conditions, one is already
calling into question the principle of sovereignty. Deconstruction begins there. It
demands a difficult dissociation, almost impossible but indispensable, between unconditionality (justice without power) and sovereignty
(right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionaliry, even when it seems impossible, and not sovereignty, even
when it seems possible.

Must use institutional legal analysis and calculations to achieve justice

Jacques Derrida 2, director of studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales,
“Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” Acts of Religion, p. 257-8
This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the unpresentable over the determinable,
cannot and should not [ne peut pas et ne doit pas] serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-
political battles , within an institution or a state, between institutions or states. Abandoned to itself, the
incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the
worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation . It is always
possible, and this is part of the madness of which we were speaking. An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture
the opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded. But incalculable justice commands calculation .
And first of all, closest to what one associates with justice, namely, law, the juridical field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but
also in all the fields from which one cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: the ethical, the political, the
economical, the psycho-sociological, the philosophical, the literary, etc. Not
only must one [il fautJ calculate,
negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable , and negotiate without a rule
that would not have to be reinvented there where we are "thrown," there where we find ourselves; but one must [ilfaut] do so
and take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality,
politics, or law, beyond the distinctions between national and international, public and private, and so on. The order of this il faut does
not properly belong either to justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by exceeding each one in the direction of th e other-which
means that, in their very heterogeneity, these two orders are undissociable: de facto and de jure [ en fait et en droit] .
Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total . To
keep this from being a truism, or a triviality, one must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges
one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited . This
was true for example in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the
emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the
world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical
emancipatory ideal. One cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with
sophistication, without at least some thoughtlessness and without forming the worst complicities . It is true that
it is also necessary to re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of emancipation ,
enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the strange structures we have been describing. But beyond these identified
territories of juridico-politicization, on the grand geo-political scale, beyond all self-serving mis-appropropriations and hijackings,
beyond all determined and particular reappropriations of international law, other areas must constantly open up that can at first
resemble secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a violence, even a terrorism and other forms of ho stage taking
are at work. The examples closest to us would be found in the area of laws [ loisJ on the teaching and practice of languages, the
legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra -uterine
conception, bio-engineering, medical experimentation, the "social treatment" of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs,
homelessness, and so on, without forgetting, of course, the treatment of what one calls animal life, the immense question o f so-called
animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I am coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if
his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure or traditional.
Case
 DA
Reduced effectiveness of U.S. presence in East Asia triggers global
nuclear war
Andrew T.H. Tan 15, Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences, University of New
South Wales, 2015, “Preventing the next war in East Asia,” in Security and Conflict in East
Asia, ed. Tan, p. 228-230
The absence of effective regional institutions, regimes, norms and laws that could regulate
tensions and conflicts between states has meant that the geostrategic environment in
East Asia is reminiscent of that in Europe before the world wars, characterized by
changing power balances and the outbreak of serious inter-state crises. A regional
war in East Asia would have devastating global consequences. Three of the key players, namely
the USA, China and Japan, are, in that order, the three largest economies in the world. More seriously,
any conflict could escalate rapidly into nuclear war, as the conventional war
capabilities of the USA could compel North Korea and China to resort to weapons of
mass destruction, such as nuclear missiles and biological and chemical weapons. By 2013 the possibility of open warfare in
East Asia had been taken seriously, with widespread warnings that tensions between China and Japan, for instance, had reached the
highest levels since the end of the Second World War. Due
to the possibility of misperception and
miscalculation, accidental war could break out - however implausible from a rational perspective that might
sound.

What can be done to prevent possible conflict in East Asia? One of the key lessons of the previous two world wars is the need for strong
international institutions, regimes, norms and laws which could better manage the inevitable conflicts of interests between s tates.
Another important lesson, taken from the Cold War in Europe, has been the need for a long process of confidence and security building
measures - such as the Conventional Forces in Europe process - which would improve transparency and build trust, to accompany the
parallel processes of deep dialogue, engagement and cooperation. This could eventually lead to more intrusive forms of regionalism
which could reduce tensions, resolve or manage disputes without resort to violence, and more generally keep the peace among t he main
regional powers.

While the imperative to take regionalism seriously is there, it remains to be seen whether there is tar-sighted leadership among the key
state actors in East Asia to do so, even when the terrible consequences of a regional conflict are obvious and no one actuall y wants such a
conflict to occur. Much depends on the two key players in East Asia, namely the USA and China. While the USA faces serious economic
and financial difficulties, and its long-term decline is evident, it remains a key player in the region. China must thus realize that unless it
arrives at an accommodation with the USA as well as its allies in managing regional security, it cannot hope to maintain regional stability
in the long term, which it needs for its economic modernization and development. While it believes that the balance of power is shifting
in its favour, it has to understand that effective regional influence ultimately has to be earned, not imposed. Similarly, th e reality of
China's rise means that Washington must learn to accommodate it - the alternative being a dangerous and destabilizing amis race that
would bankrupt the USA and lead to unpalatable outcomes, such as a general conflict. Learning to live with a peer competitor requires
leadership, engagement and dialogue, rather than instinctively reaching out for a Cold War containme nt strategy.

The two countries must therefore begin a broad-ranging dialogue to manage not just their relations but also regional security, as they are
key players in ensuring stability in the region. In this respect, a glimmer of hope can be discerned from China's unusual silence and lack
of open support for its traditional ally. North Korea, even as it carried out its unprecedented brinkmanship since the young Kim took
power. China has also openly criticized North Korea for its nuclear tests and has supported United Nations sanctions, and there are clear
signs of disarray in China's traditional policy of uncritical support for North Korea, as its behaviour could lead to unpalatable outcomes
for China, such as an unwanted war on the Korean peninsula, or the acquisition of nuclear arms by Japan and South Korea. In April 2013,
for instance, President Xi Jinping obliquely criticized North Korea, stating that 'no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the
whole world into chaos for selfish gains ... while pursuing its own interests, a country should accommodate the legitimate interests of
others' (Washington Post 2013). Media reports also indicate a flurry of visits by US officials to Beijing in early 2013 to discuss the
situation in North Korea (New York Times 2013a). The surprise purge and execution in late 2013 of Kim Jong-un's powerful uncle, Jang
Song-thaek, who had been the key interlocutor in China's relations with North Korea, has also demonstrated that China is not in co ntrol
of events in North Korea (New York Times 2013b). Thus, there is the possibility that China and the USA could in fact cooperate in
managing regional security, such as over the Korean peninsula.
The high tensions and historical animosities between China and Japan are more difficult to resolve, but these require strong and capable
foreign policy leadership on the part of both countries, which appear to be lacking at this time. China, in particular, needs to understand
that the long-term consequences of its promotion of nationalism by arousing anti-Japanese sentiments domestically would lead to an
unstable regional neighbourhood and ultimately conflict with Japan, surely an undesirable outcome given that the two countrie s are each
other's major trading partners with much to gain from joint cooperation. On Japan's part, the failure by its leaders, particularly
conservative right-wing politicians, to come to terms with its role in the Second World War has led to various controversial statements
which have only played to anti-Japanese nationalism in China and South Korea. As CNN noted in an opinion piece in May 2013, 'nearly 68
years after surrender, some Japanese conservatives are engaged in counterproductive battles over history - that make Japan appear weak
and undignified, unable to take the measure of its history* (CNN 2013a). As an analyst noted regarding Shinzo Abe's performance as
Prime Minister, Abe has in fact undermined Japan's interest by 'preserving redundant renderings of Japan in the 21st century, negating
the positive and responsible record of Japan as a post-war nation-state' (Kersten 2013: 50). The high tensions in 2013-14 between the
two countries, which are both now on a quasi-war footing, points to the urgent need for conflict and crisis management mechanisms to
be immediately implemented to hold tensions in check. Ultimately, both governments would need to stop fuelling nationalist sentiments,
and instead focus on maintaining stability as well as preserving the benefits arising from the deep economic interdependence between
the two countries.

The long-term decline of the USA's influence in the region, despite the fact that it has pledged to maintain or even increase its mili tary
presence in East Asia, is probably unavoidable. However, an
effective US presence and role in the region
remains essential. Through deterrence as well as engagement as an equal power,
China could be persuaded to take part in dialogue about the management of regional
security instead of making unilateral military moves which raise tensions and might
spark conflict. This requires other states in the region to help to shore up regional stability by becoming more effective security
partners, first by investing in their own military capabilities, and second by providing more effective regional secur ity cooperation.
The reason for this is not, however, to contain China, given that much greater efforts will
have to be made to engage it, but to ensure the maintenance of a regional balance of
power that would channel foreign policy choices towards more peaceful means of
resolving disputes. Ultimately, however, China and the USA will have to find the strategic wisdom and political will to work
out some form of entente cord idle in East Asia if conflict in the region is to be avoided.
 AT: Subject Violent
Subject formation is not inherently violent and doesn’t dictate broader
politics
Nancy Fraser 95, “False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler,” Ch 3
in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, p 68, google books
This brings me to the second set of claims implicit in Butler'spost- structuralist account of subjectivity —normative, as
opposed to onto- logical , claims. Such claims arise, first, in relation to the social practices through which subjects are constituted. Here Butler follows
insists that subjects are
Foucault in claiming that practices of subiectivation are also practices of subjection. Like him, she

constituted through exclusion; some people are authorized to speak authorita- tively because others are silenced. Thus, in Butler's
view, the consti- tution of a class of authorized subiects entails "the creation of a

domain of deauthorized subjects, pre-subjects, figures of abjection, populations erased

from view." ¶ But is it really the case that no one can become the subject of speech
without others' being silenced? Are there no counterexamples? Where such
exclusions do exist, are they all bad? Are they all equally bad? Can we distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate exclusions, better from worse practices Of
subiectivation? Is subject-authorization inherently a zero-sum game? Or does it only
become one in oppressive societies? Can we overcome or at least ameliorate the
asymmetries in current practices Of subjectivation? Can we construct practices, institutions,
and forms of life in which the empowerment Of some does not entail the
disempowerment Of others? If not, what is the point Of feminist struggle? ¶ Butler offers no help in thinking about
these issues. Nor can she, I submit, so long as she fails to integrate critical-theoretical considera- tions into her poststructuralist Foucauldian framework.
That frame- work, I have argued elsewhere, is structurally incapable of providing satlsfactory answers to the normative questions it unfailingly solicits.13 It
needs modification and supplementation, therefore, in order to be fully adequate to the feminist project. In addition to her claims about the social practices
of subiectiva- tion, Butler also makes normative claims about the relative merits of different theories of subjectivity. She claims that some such theories are
"politically insidious," whereas others are progressive or emanci- patory. On the insidious side is the view of subjectivity as possessing an ontologically intact
reflexivity that is not an effect of cultural processes of subjectivation. This view, according to Butler, is a "ruse of power" and an "instrument Of cultural
Is it really? There is no denying that foundationalist theories of subjectivity
imperialism." ¶

have often functioned as instruments of cultural imperial- ism. But is that due to
conceptual necessity or historical contingency? In fact, there are cases where such
theories have had emancipatory effects—witness the French Revolution and the
appropriation Of its foundationalist view of subjectivity by the Haitian "Black Jacobin,
Toussaint de I 'Ouverture.14 These examples show that it is not possible to deduce a
single, univocal political valence from a theory of subjectivity . Such theories, too, are bits of cultural
discourse whose meanings are subject to "resignification. ¶ How, then, should we resolve the Benhabib-Butler dispute over "the death of man"? I conclude
that Butler is right in maintaining that a culturally constructed subject can also be a critical subject, but that the terms in which she formulates the point give
rise to difficul- ties. Specifically, "resignification" is not an adequate substitute for "critique, since it surrenders the normative moment. Likewise, the view
the
that subiectivation necessarily entails subjection precludes nor- mative distinctions between better and worse subjectivating practices. ¶ Finally,

view that foundationalist theories of subjectivity are inherently oppressive is

historically disconfirmed, and it is conceptually incompatible with a contextualist theory of meaning. The upshot, then, is that feminists
need to develop an alternative conceptualiza- tion of the subject, one that integrates Butler's poststructuralist emphasis on construction with Benhabib's
critical-theoretical stress on critique.
 AT: Liberalism Impacts (Zanotti/Chandler)
Only active engagement with institutions can resolve liberalism’s
political and social determinates---their description of power and
liberalism as global, free-floating forces reproduces dominant narratives
that power cannot be held accountable
David Chandler 10, U Westminster, Globalising Foucault,
http://www.davidchandler.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Global-Society-Chandler-
response.pdf
For the advocates of global power, the divorce of power and politics is reflected in
the disappearance of politics and the return to the operation of power independently
of political contestation or engagement. This is why Kiersey argues that individuals
should no longer be understood as autonomous political subjects but instead as objects shaped and created by
“global capitalism” or “the emergence of relations of biopolitical capitalism ”. In the process of the creation and subjugation of individuals,

these relations of global power are actively reproduced. For Kiersey, this framework of the autonomous subject

cannot be a critique of power but merely part of its reproduction and enforcement .
Rosenow, similarly, takes fundamental issue with a critique focused upon the rights-subject of modern politics, claiming that the assumption of a “universal
subject” as a vantage point of critique is an invalid one.

While power operates globally it appears that even the aspiration to develop a
political critique is held to be invalid and is an act either of oppression or of
complicity. For Rosenow, all we can do is describe and study how, on the surface, different regimes of power might
work. Heterogeneity is central to this critical framing, which asserts that global power cannot be critiqued as having a
centre or a structured set of instrumental goals.17 However, more importantly, there is no standpoint or universal perspective from which power can be critiqued or understood in
political terms. In this allegedly Foucauldian framing of the global, power stands outside the world of politics, unknowable except by the consequences of its actions. The sovereign of
the global is no more of a political subject than the global citizen in the cosmopolitan perspective and is labelled by meaningless and interchangeable abstractions: usually involving a
mixture of terms such as “capitalism” and “liberalism” with varying prefixes such as “post-”, “neo-”, or “late-”, used conjunctively with words sometimes used by Foucault, such as
“governmentality” or “biopolitics”

The work of Foucault is not the subject of this paper. However, it seems to me that Foucault’s work had little in common methodologically with the
“Foucauldians in IR” referred to here. It is certainly possible to read Foucault as having asserted an intimate relationship between politics and power and to
Ironically, perhaps, we can
have explored the shifting discourses through which this relationship was played out within the liberal problematic.

find in Foucault an exploration of the centrality of the state and its relationship to
society as the foundational basis for differing rationalities of governing, asserting
that the ideational forms of liberal rule were not free-floating nor purely structurally determined but
products of social and political relations. His discussions of governmentality and
biopolitics concerned the methods by which the liberal state secured and legitimated
itself through its relationship with society. His discussion of the Birth of Biopolitics, in
particular, challenged the view that the modern state was no longer the focus of
power and of politics, explaining the discursive shift to institutionalism as a way of legitimising power in response to the crisis of liberal
framings of representative legitimacy in post-war Germany.

Conclusion

For Foucault, the contestation of governing rationalities—frameworks of

understanding the objectives and methods of governing—was the essence of politics. Today’s
governing rationality is that of the global disjunction between politics (confined to the nation-state) and power (alleged to be free-floating and
unaccountable). In a context where it is held that governments can no longer aspire to control, to know, or to plan, it appears that government is reduced to the

regulation or administration of externalities as a globalised world appears to operate beyond conscious human
intervention. In this framework, the aspirations of modernity appear to be little more than an
oppressive fiction or a dangerous hubris along with the view of the autonomous
subject capable of knowing and transforming the external world. The Foucauldians in IR tend
to reproduce this governing rationality of the migration of power to the global and
unaccountable flows of cyberspace suggesting that critique lies precisely in revealing that power lies

beyond the contested claims of political reason.

The modern framing of the relationship between power and politics is in crisis as
governments increasingly appear to be rudderless and agenda-less in a world where
the mechanisms of representation have broken down . Nevertheless, it appears that a solution to this crisis is at hand,
precisely in the discourse that power has freed itself from the territorial shackles of politics, thereby setting a new series of limits and possibilities for government intervention and

rather than critiquing the governing rationalities of our age, the

policy making. If this is the case, then

Foucauldian boom in IR can perhaps be understood as part of the process of rationalising and
enforcing the dominant narratives of the impossibility of holding power to political
account. My concern is that whereas Foucault offered a critique of governing rationalities, it
appears that, at least in the discipline of IR, Foucauldians could be merely offering an
apologia for them.
 AT: Metaphysical Critique (Mwajeh)
Critiquing metaphysical concepts and subjectivity doesn’t alter political
realities---institutional engagement key
Z Al-Mwajeh 5, Indiana University of Pennsylvania The School of Graduate Studies and
Research Department of English, CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN ETHICS OF ALTERITY
VERSUS EMBODIED (MUSLIM) OTHERS,
https://dspace.iup.edu/bitstream/handle/2069/23/Ziad%20Al-Mwajeh.pdf?sequence=1
However, alterity-oriented postmodernism can be described as idealistic in a Platonic
sense. Plato’s “Myth of the Cave” enacts a dialectical ascension or progress toward an ideal republic governed by reason. Plato’s world of matter is
preceded and to some extent controlled by the world of ideas, or by the Logos. Postmodern alterity seems to submit to the Platonic
idea-matter dialectics. Thus, the postmodernists critique metaphysical, linguistic, or symbolic

superstructural systems as if fixing the idea translates into fixing praxis. One implicit
assumption is that knowledge translates into ethics. In other words, it seems that postmodernists do not
only consider man ‘good,’ but also assume that the moment one is enlightened about the good, he/she

will automatically choose it by virtue of its being good. I am not particularly opposed to such idealism. On the contrary,
the problem with such idealism is that it underestimates political and economic
contexts, pressures, motivations, and even the desire for power regardless of the
consequences, sometimes. Postmodern thought does not problematize the passage from
metaphysics or the moment of knowledge into action. It seems that the moment we
know that our metaphysical or epistemological foundations are other-unfriendly
automatically translates into abandoning those ways in favor of more just
arrangements such as alterity ethics. Thus, postmodernists retain Platonic residues
whenever they assume that self-other enduring conflicts are primarily caused by
ideational or metaphysical systems. They, too, become idealists whenever they do not
problematize the assumption that the world of ideas precedes the world of matter—
almost in a causal manner—or whenever they assume their automatic translatability
as if fixing the philosophical or epistemological system would automatically fix the Commented [EM2]:
institutions and practices that stem from them. 3
postmodern thinking remains ‘abstract’ and ‘idealized’ by assuming that
In other words,

correcting metaphysical wrongs will guarantee a better world in the realm of matter,
or that the realm of matter can be corrected at the realm of ideas . Moreover, we usually equate utopian
thinking with wishful, yet “impractical,” proposals. Sometimes, however, postmodernism suggests a dystopia, whenever it is associated with the loss of a community based on justice
and satisfaction.4 Such loss is usually attributed to different factors such as technological, capitalist-consumerist developments (Jameson; Baudrillard; Guy Debord). Conservative
critics also voice their dissatisfaction with any ‘identity-politics’ postmodernism that compromises academic protocols and research methods by replacing them with personal,
experiential, racial, gendered, and any other minority distinctive constituency. That is, it is no longer a question of whether what one says submits to academic and logical standards of
conviction and verification as much as it is a matter of “who” says it that makes the difference (Jeffery Wallen’s Closed Encounters highlights such issues). Even minority and non-
conservative critics such as Rey Chow sound uneasy toward making race, gender, and sexual orientation a priori authoritative positions. In Ethics after Idealism, she shows that the
desire to do justice to minority voices can be abused by both parties, mainstream and minority subjects. I think what she is uneasy about is postmodern performativity. Minority and
mainstream, although they have valuable and referential descriptive values, can be performed and played out. In academia, being a female or coming from a previously colonized
region invests the person with powers and rights, sometimes at the expense of critical and academic norms.5
2NC
 A2 Caputo
Asking you to “vote aff to embrace chaosmic learning practices” is
incoherent, because if it’s chaosmic, you can’t decide on a single winner.
Embracing the event in the context of education can’t be used to
conclusively call for voting for someone, so the best their framework can
result in is a coin flip of “maybe aff, maybe neg.” Next paragraph of their
author concludes.
John D. Caputo, Syracuse University, 2012, "Teaching the Event: Deconstruction,
Hauntology, and the Scene of Pedagogy" Philosophy of Education,
http://ojs.ed.uiuc.edu/index.php/pes/article/view/3597/1218
Accordingly, I
reimagine my haunting spirit not as an omnipotent God but as a weak force,
a quiet call, an invitation, a solicitation.15 This God is not a “necessary being” but a “maybe,” a
“perhaps,” whose “might” is the subjunctive might of the might-be it whispers in my ear. Perhaps the name of the
event that takes place in teaching, the name of the spirit that haunts everything that is going on in teaching, is
nothing more or less than the spectral workings of “perhaps .” Perhaps we require a pedagogy of
weakness, of the “weakness of the school,” of the university, as the place whose suppleness and plasticity allows the event to take place,
allows the promise, the “perhaps” to take place. Perhaps the very idea of the event is this “perhaps,” to
expose ourselves, teachers and students alike, to the quiet power of “perhaps,” the weak force of “perhaps”
that steals over unawares everything that passes itself off as “present.” Perhaps, the event that takes place in the
school is to let the subtle and oblique energies of the “perhaps, ” of possibilities hitherto
unimagined, slip in like a fog and make everything tremble with a future we cannot see coming. Perhaps, the ghost that
scares us the most is the soft voice of “perhaps .”
 T Version Solves War
Literal anti-war advocacy works---challenging elite consensus in favor of
war by providing a different interpretation of the reality and meaning of
events prevents a society-wide rally to war
Adam J. Berinsky 7, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for
Military Conflict,” Journal of Politics, Volume 69, Issue 4, pages 975–997, November 2007
Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public
scholars
will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict. Other

contend that the balance of elite discourse influences public support for war. I draw
upon survey evidence from World War II and the current war in Iraq to come to a
common conclusion regarding public support for international interventions. I find little
evidence that citizens make complex cost/benefit calculations when evaluating military action. Instead, I find that patterns of elite

conflict shape opinion concerning war. When political elites disagree as to the
wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a
common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to
wage war.¶ In recent years, a charitable view of the mass public has emerged in the public opinion and foreign policy literature. Increasingly,
scholars have attributed “rationality” to public opinion concerning war. Many political scientists and policymakers argue that unmediated events—the
successes and failures on the battlefield—determine whether the mass public will support military excursions. The public supports war, the story goes, if the
benefits of action outweigh the costs of conflict and should therefore have a place at the policymaking table. ¶ In this paper, I argue that military events may
shape public opinion, but not in the straightforward manner posited by most scholars of public opinion and war. I draw upon and expand the work of
Integrating research on
scholars who contend that the balance of elite discourse influences levels of public support for war.

heuristics and shortcuts with information-based theories of political choice, I

demonstrate that patterns of conflict among partisan political actors shape mass opinion on war. It is not the direct influence of wartime
events on individual citizens' decisions that determines public opinion, as “event response” theories of war support claim. Instead, consistent with the “elite
cue” theory I advance in this paper,the nature of conflict among political elites concerning the
salience and meaning of those events determines if the public will rally to war. To a
significant degree citizens determine their positions on war by listening to trusted sources —

those politicians who share their political predispositions.¶ I present evidence from World War II and the

Second Iraq war, two cases that span 65 years of American history, to come to this
common conclusion. In both wars, I find that significant segments of the mass public possessed little knowledge of the most basic facts of
these conflicts. Thus, there is little evidence that citizens had the information needed to make cost/benefit calculations when deciding whether to support or
I find that patterns of elite conflict shaped opinions both
oppose military action. Instead,

throughout the six years of World War II and during the Iraq conflict. When elites
come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great
latitude to wage war. But when prominent political actors take divergent stands on
the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. Furthermore, even in cases—such as the Iraq war—where
prominent political actors on one side of the partisan divide stay silent, the presence of a prominent partisan cue giver can lead to divergence in opinion. In
sum, while members of the mass public are not lemmings—they have agency to determine their own opinion and may even, in the aggregate, reasonably
react to changing events—in the realm of war, any apparent rationality arises largely through the process of elite cue taking, not through a reasoned
cost/benefit analysis. The mass public is rational only to the extent that prominent political actors provide a rational lead.
 A2 Norms Bad
All arguments are framework arguments---exclusion args rely on a false
dichotomy because debate requires continual judgment about which
arguments are persuasive and which can be dismissed even though this
usually happens implicitly---the role of the negative is always to say that
it was bad for the aff to say what they did---impact is wrong bc we don’t
have the power to impose a norm, only to persuade you that their
argumentative practices should be rejected
Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown
University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290
Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position."
How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-
giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of
cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad
Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want
to impose reason on people , which is a form of power and oppression. But what can
this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful
and persuasive , even an argument in favor of argument . It simply is not the case that
an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is
tantamount to oppressive power . To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assu me this is to
assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any
individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps
Robbins will say, "I am not
imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for
would be, if it were enforced ." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I
simply argue in favor of, I promote , an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic
and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I

write can be cast as an arm of the police .

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to
political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms
of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:
Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree
only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most
interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army fa cing a
guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and
capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short,
that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.

Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves , but those are
somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the
sudden elevation of
stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out
repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every
object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as
thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets

cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that
to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic
proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication
in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is
hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the
policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant
disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus
on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I
hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political
response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for
a liberal democratic culture of argument , and to suggest ways in which argument is
not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less
political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more dir ect and
sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a
proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and
policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of
arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of
argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is
because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and in deed
necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

There is a way to make Robbins’s point more narrowly which would run something like
this: Anderson has a very restricted notion of how argument should play out , or appear,
within academic culture, given the heavy emphasis on logical consistency and normative
coherence and explicitness. This conception of argument is too narrow (and hence
authoritarian). To this I would reply simply that logical consistency and normative
coherence and explicitness do not exhaust the possible forms, modes, and strategies
of argumentation . There is a distinction to be made between the identification of
moves that stultify or disarm argument , and an insistence on some sort of single
manner of reasoned argument . The former I am entirely committed to; the latter not
at all , despite the fact that I obviously favor a certain style of argument, and even despite the
fact that I am philosophically committed to the claims of the theory of communicative reason. I do address the issue of diverse forms and
modes of argument in the first and last chapters of the book (as I discuss above), but it seems that a more direct reflection on the books
own mode of argumentation might have provided the occasion for a fuller treatment of the issues that trouble Robbins.

Different genres within academe have different conventions, of course, and we can and
do make decisions all the time about what rises to the level of cogency within specific
academic venues, and what doesn't. Some of those judgments have to do with
protocols of argument. The book review, for example, is judged according to whether the reviewer
responsibly represents the scholarship under discussion, seems to have a good grasp of the body of scholarship
it belongs to, and convincingly and fairly points out strengths and weaknesses . The book forum is
a bit looser-one expects responsible representation of the scholarship under discussion, but it can be more selectively focused on a key
set of issues. And one expects a bit of provocation, in order to make the exchange readable and dramatic. But of course in
a forum
exchange there is an implicit norm of argument, a tendency to judge whether a
particular participant is making a strong or a weak case in light of the competing
claims at play. Much of our time in the profession is taken with judging the quality of all
manner of academic performance, and much of it has to do with norms of argument,
however much Robbins may worry about their potentially coercive nature .
1NR
T
 Anti-War Activism Solves
Bush could have escalated the war further absent significant anti-war activism – it
also proves other useful skills beyond influencing policy
Heaney 12, Assistant Professor of Organizational Studies and Political Science @ Umich
(Michael, “The Policy, Political, and Social Effects of the Antiwar Movement after 9/11,”
https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/the-policy-political-and-social-
effects-of-the-antiwar-movement-after-911/)
Of course,it is impossible to establish definitely the nonimpact of the antiwar movement
on policy. Doing so requires the evaluation of counterfactual scenarios that cannot be
tested empirically. For example, if there had been no antiwar movement at all – if nobody had
protested the war policies of the Bush Administration – it is plausible to believe that the administration would

have been emboldened to take more aggressive military actions, possibly invading
Syria or Iran. Or, perhaps the Bush Administration would have had the confidence to pursue more ambitious conservative domestic policies.
Personally, I am inclined to believe that the movement did have these types of restraining effects but, as a social scientist, it is impossible to demonstrate
To claim that the policy and political effects of the antiwar movement
them convincingly.

were limited is not to say that the movement was unimportant. Indeed, the social effects
of the movement may have been its most lasting contribution. The antiwar
movement exposed millions of people to their first experiences with activism, which
will likely shape the way that many of them think of, and participate in, politics for
the remainder of their lives.[7]
The movement provided critical opportunities for activists to learn about new tactics
and to implement them on unfamiliar terrain .[8] Alliances and conflicts within coalitions shaped the structure of the
social networks of movement participants.[9] The movement provided activists with opportunities to

explore their identities[10] and to create new organizations by hybridizing elements

of intersecting social movements.[11] In many ways, we have only begun to see the long-term
consequences of a generation shaped by the antiwar movement.
 Friedrich---Predictability
They link worse to predictability bad because they reduce the entire
world to indeterminacy and text---the conclusion is always the same
because applying deconstruction to any text or debate practice always
produces haunting and aporias
Friedrich 12—Department of Classics, Dalhousie University (Rainer, The Enlightenment
Gone Mad (II) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives,
http://www.bu.edu/arion/the-enlightenment-gone-mad-ii-the-dismal-discourse-of-
postmodernism%E2%80%99s-grand-narratives/)
--- “masquerade[ing]” was in the original article ---
FROM ICONOCLASM TO MESSIANISM:¶ THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF DESTRUCTION¶ “What remains irreducible to any deconstruction,
what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, . . . an idea of justice —which we distinguish from
law or right and even from human rights. . . . And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad about this desire for justice.” —
Jacques Derrida¶ deconstruction reveals itself as a totalizing metanarrative in several modes.
Through its “axial proposition . . . that there is nothing outside the text ,”30 it presents itself as a
pantextualism (à la “all the world’s a text, and all the men and women merely readers”). Thus, what
ordinarily passes for extra-textual reality, say, historical events such as wars and revolutions,
are declared by Paul de Man to be “texts masquerade[ing] in the guise of wars and revolutions,” while “death
is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament .”31 Asserting that writing is prior to speaking as the
condition of its possibility, it sets itself up against logocentrism as a grammatocentrism—as totalizing as
it accuses logocentrism of being. Designed to subvert the claim of any text and discourse to
an adequate ground—to a logos that enables it to produce a stable, determinate,
decidable, and coherent meaning or truth—deconstruction operates as a totalizing
negative hermeneutics. As a negative hermeneutics, patent in poststructuralism’s wholesale assault on Western rationality,
its grand narrative is in its origins largely iconoclastic. ¶ ICONOCLASTIC DESTRUCTION¶ Its chief narrator, Jacques Derrida has been
dubbed by a Swiss journal Herr der Brüche, “Lord of Ruptures.” The sobriquet is apt, as iconoclastic Deconstruction’s aim is indeed the
exposure of ruptures and their subversive force in texts and discourses. To savor its Grand Narrative one has to
go along, counter-intuitively, with a certain topsy-turviness in its main tenets. The priority of writing over speaking is
one of them; reality equaling textuality, another. A third one derives from deconstruction’s idiosyncratic
reading of Saussurian linguistics,32 according to which the material elements of language
(phonemes, signifiers) and of its conceptual meanings (the signifieds) are constituted through opposition to,
and difference from, other phonetic and semantic elements. The deconstructionist reading has the linguistic
sign (= signifier + signified) attain its identity from differential relations as the condition of its possibility: hence its bizarre and
mind-boggling tenet of the priority of difference over identity.¶ Now, the linguistic sign, arising as it does
out of such a differential matrix, is said to connote all the differences from which it sprang as the basis of its identity. This makes
the determination of meaning problematic: so much so that meaning is declared indeterminate, or rather its
determination deferred indefinitely. Thus it is not just difference that is operative in the production of linguistic signs and their
meanings, but difference cum deferral. Both terms are fused in Derrida’s neologism différance, exploiting the double meaning of French
différer (‘to differ’/’to defer’). Différance, then, denotes both the production of meaning from difference and the simultaneous deferral of
its determination. Hence the Grand Narrative’s postulate of the fundamental indeterminacy
and undecidability of meaning in all linguistic entities: every linguistic entity, by virtue of its
being embedded in a polysemic network of differential/ ‘differantial’ relations, has an overabundance—a surplus, an overload—
of signification whose various elements are at odds with one another, thus preventing univocal meaning from
being determined and decided. As a result, the determination of meaning is postponed to the Greek Calends. ( Obviously, the
meaning of deconstructionist tenets is exempted from fundamental indeterminacy and
undecidability; for they are treated as determinate self-evident truths and eternal
verities: a deconstructionist ceases behaving as a deconstructionist , as much as Nietzsche
ceases acting as a perspectivist and skeptic, when they are advancing their own philosophical

enterprises .)¶ Différance, then, is deconstruction’s principal and originary (and yes, Derrida’s protestations notwithstanding,
foundational and unifying)33 force, inscribed in the very tissue of language—quaking, quivering, and reverberating in each and every of
its textual and discursive productions. Universally operative in all texts and all discourses, différance both generates effe cts of meaning
and truth and, by holding their determination in interminable abeyance by the play of differences, undermines them at the same time. In
this way, the movement of différance imparts to language and discourse a Dionysian turbulence and disorder, and, what is the same,
inscribes in them deconstruction as an inherent force (of which more below). As Roland Barthes remarked in an obiter dictum:
poststructuralism seeks to show not the order but the disorder of a text. Or, as the Herr der Brüche would have it, not the c oherence of a
text but its ruptures.¶ Nevertheless, the texts and discourses of the Western intellectual tradition are generally
assumed to make the rightful claim that there is at their center a grounding and controlling
logos in one form or another, giving rise to an intelligible textual order ; and that they arguably do express and
constitute a degree of semantic stability in the form of decidable and determinate meanings and truths. The Grand Narrative
of deconstruction concedes this, but it hastens to add that this is all a phantasmagoria
fabricated through a ruse of logocentrism: ever since Plato, we are told, Western logocentrism has been, and
still is, attempting, with apparent success, to arrest or, if you will, freeze the movement of différance. By forcing a freeze on
its Dionysian turbulence, it is extracting from, or forcing on, texts determinate meaning and
decidable univocal truth, eclipsing in the act the differential tissue that is the origin of all
signification. In the process Western logocentrism, so the grand narratives goes, either coercively
assimilates and homogenizes, or, failing that, excludes, marginalizes, and represses all that which does
not fit the conceptual order and determinate meaning it is said to have arbitrarily extracted
from, or forced on, texts and discourses. In short, by freezing the movement of différance (and suppressing the inherent self-
deconstruction) in texts, logocentrism does violence to all that is other than itself. It stands
accused of wholesale repression of alterity. But différance does not take it lying down. This core force of
language strikes back by mobilizing the army of deconstructers to unfreeze differance, by re-activating the
inherent deconstruction of texts and discourses: it has the repressed Other return in the form of paradoxes,
aporias, incoherences, illogicalities, and contradictions that subvert the seemingly stable
meaning of the texts and turn their apparent logocentric order into Dionysian chaos. The “deconstruction of all the
significations that have their source in that of the logos,” and “particularly the signification of truth,”34 is to restore the reign of
différance. Différance exacts merciless vengeance from logocentrically ordered texts for having tried to escape it. In the en d these texts,
hitherto merely indeterminate and undecidable as to their meaning, are determinately and decidedly reduced to clusters of paradoxes,
self-contradictions, and aporias—and predictably so, as this is deconstruction’s routine. With every deconstructive operation,
Logocentrism takes a whacking—but hey, didn’t it ask for it? ¶ The strikingly raw
negativity is patent in the verbs
that describe the deconstructive operation: “unravel,” “pull down,” “annihilate,” “dismantle”. There
are the occasional affirmative claims: that deconstruction is bearing witness to the
repressed Other and aids its re-assertion, restoring in the process the vibrant life of a Dionysian turbulence and
liberating anarchy to language that logocentrism is said to stifle. But the forms in which
deconstruction has the Other assert itself belie this claim: paradox and aporia, by
their very nature, effect in texts and discourses [is] not turbulent life, but the
opposite—paralysis, death.¶ Equally striking in Miller’s concise description is the inadvertent disclosure that
deconstruction’s conclusions are always already built into its premises—thus its
routine procedure amounts to one huge petitio principii . Feed any text, any discourse into
the preprogrammed interpretative machine called deconstruction, and you know in
advance that it will inevitably come out at the other end, with depressing regularity
and predictability,38 as an ensemble of undecidable aporias and paradoxes—as a text or
discourse turned against itself, with hidden ruptures laid bare, its structure collapsed, its meaning imploded.
Miller’s deconstructive reading of Wordsworth’s poem A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal39 is a paradigmatic case in point. By
smuggling into it all sorts of thematic and referential contraband, the deconstructive critic
turns the poem into a cluster of contradictory significations . The overall experience is to be, in
Miller’s description, that of “an aporia or boggling of the mind.” It is an arbitrary procedure that is to make
sure that the outcome is always what the totalizing grand narrative of
deconstruction has postulated and known all along: namely, that all texts will turn
out to be self-lacerating, aporetic, self-contradictory, full of fissures and internal ruptures—in
short, self-deconstructive.
Case
 AT: Subject Formation
Ascribing violence to metaphysical concepts like “the human” is
essentialist and wrong---abstract philosophy does not determine politics
Joseph M. Schwartz 8, The Future of Democratic Equality, p 59-60, google books
To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain
democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the
democratic project. It is to contend that one’s epistemology determines one’s
politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed “reactionary” and “left cultural conservatism” to belief
in “reactionary” “foundationalist humanism”42 Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity. For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace
the post-structuralist “non-definability of woman” as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a “woman.”43 But this is itself a “closed” position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic
feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color

has there
experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves:

ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary “ethical” values as
being those of “instability and flux”? Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But
only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women’s and gay and lesbian movement
would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist “anti-essentialist
epistemology.” Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect
their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and
democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan “ethics” are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can

A politics of radical
rightfully ban certain forms of “agonal” (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.¶

democratic pluralism cannot be securely grounded by a whole-hearted epistemological

critique of “enlightenment rationality.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a
belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least
a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice , even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and
believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, democratic norms are developed by political practice

and struggle rather than by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a
trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and

epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s
metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals
(Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Sosuan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss);

anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian

feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser).¶ Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a
politics; such attempts simply replace enlightenment meta-narratives with
postmodern (allegedly anti-) meta-narratives. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which
post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off the structural position of “the agent.”
A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their

post-structuralist theory has abandoned the institutional analysis of

epigones Foucault and Derrida),

social theory for the idealism of abstract philosophy.

Their impact claim is reductionism at its worst---can’t explain

oppression where Western metaphysics hasn’t been instituted
Wolin 4—Distinguished Professor of History at the CUNY Graduate Center (Richard, The
Seduction of Unreason, 226)
 Derrida has been keen on exposing the integral relationship between
¶ Throughout his career,

“metaphysics” and “violence,” leading one to believe—implausibly—that all injustice and oppression can be traced back to the
history of metaphysics. Yet in the eighteenth century the “rights of man and citizen” evolved from

the eminently metaphysical idea of modern natural law. One might reasonably conclude that metaphysics, in the guise of the
“rights of man,” provided the conceptual leverage necessary to overthrow the ancien régime.13 Hegel arrived at this verdict in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History when, referring to modern natural law, he made

Derrida places an
the uncontroversial assertion that “the French Revolution received its first impulse from Philosophy.”14 Like Heidegger and Nietzsche before him,

explanatory burden on metaphysics that the concept cannot bear. How, for example, would
Derrida explain the prevalence of injustice and oppression in those parts of the world in which Western
metaphysics has had a negligible impact? What role do nonmetaphysical sources of
oppression— those attributable, say, to indigenous cultural factors—play in the
deconstructionist worldview? And what about the progressive influence of metaphysics for
contemporary ideas of human rights— ideas that played such a paramount role in the
justly celebrated¶ 226¶ “revolutions of 1989”?15 In all of these respects, the habitual deconstructionist
correlation between “violence” and “metaphysics” seems to have been grossly
exaggerated—if it ever existed at all.
 AT: Bare Life
‘Wars for humanity’ are an ahistorical myth
Benno Gerhard Teschke 11, IR prof at the University of Sussex, “Fatal attraction: a critique
of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory”, International Theory (2011), 3 :
pp 179-227
For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a
structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-
cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization
of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals.
Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's ‘spaceless
universalism’. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify

Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-
politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international
relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal
modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend
the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’ world-ordering, then and now. For in the
cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-
capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual

lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already
substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the
capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the
survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and
early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international
ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the
early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as ‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior,
there is more evidence to suggest that theseconfrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden
and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between
the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain

that the ‘liberal West’ coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant
authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even
Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by

the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal
subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and
geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea
that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project
and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories
as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by
long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the
And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a
conventional policy expression is ‘blowback’.

conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and
collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of
analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign
power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of
emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic
idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually
explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria)
and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies
of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once
These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term
they step out of line.

liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal
‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-
supervised ‘informal empire’, which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse
and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders
challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.
 Seeing Like a State
Their “seeing like a state” argument links equally to them---they see the
state like a state---the assumption that institutions are always the enemy
is pure neoliberal ideology
Sarah Banet-Weiser 12, Director of the School of Communication and Professor at USC
Annenberg, 2012, Authentic™: The Politics of Ambivalence in a Brand Culture, p. 224-225
18. Examining the contemporary moment, in other words, means that we need to, as
James Scott has eloquently pointed out, understand how neoliberalism authorizes not
just corporate institutions and governments but also individuals to "see like a state."
James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). As Judith Halberstam has pointed
out, "For Scott, to ‘see like a state’ means to accept the order of things and to
internalize them; it means that we begin to deploy and think with the logic of the
superiority of orderliness and it means we erase and indeed sacrifice other more local
practices of knowledge, practices, moreover, that may be less efficient, may yield less
marketable results, but may also, long term, be more sustaining." See Judith Halberstam,
"Beyond Broadway and Main: A Response to the Presidential Address" American Quarterly
61, no. i (2009): 35. But, importantly, the neoliberal context is also a broader set of
ideologies that allows for what Jacques Ranciere calls a "distribution of the sensible,"
where "seeing like a state" within neoliberalism is conceived of precisely in antistate
terms, where what is considered "sensible" is understanding the state as the enemy
of the people and privileging the individual as the central interlocutor in all areas of
life, and where those practices that "may be less efficient, may yield less marketable
results" are positioned as the opposite of the sensible, indeed, as pure nonsense. Jacques
Ranciere, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Lockhill
(London: Continuum, 2004).
[Italics in original]
 Solvency
Taking a determinate stand on the resolution is necessary to through
yourself into the true moment of politics when action is required---the
aff remains forever mired in shallow ethical reflection
Enns 7—Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University (Diane, Beyond Derrida: The
Autoimmunity of Deconstruction, Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 10:1)
There are alternative ways to articulate politics, ethics and justice—or forgiveness,
hospitality and democracy—without appealing to a notion of alterity in matters of justice
and politics that it seems we can only articulate as a regulative ideal or ineffable
beyond. This does not negate the effectiveness of Derrida’s attention to theantinomies of politics, nor does it suggest that undecidability is paralyzing
and that theonly solution is a normative, calculative approach. I am suggesting that we have not even begun to assess the role of the unconditional in political
actualities (as opposed to political thought)—whether we speak of an incommensurable alterity or anundeconstructible justice—and this is where Derrida
has not helped us much. This reading of actualities, of events, is something that political practitioners and actors have long practiced and acknowledged,
constantly in confrontation as they are with their others—not their incommensurable others but the others they must sometimes struggle to understand or
die at the hands of. Merleau-Ponty put it wisely in a 1960 interview: in actuality political life is not fixed into either/or dilemmas, and politicians are not as
Manichean as is commonly thought. There are moments for affirmation and moments for negation:
these are moments of crisis. Beyond these moments, ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are the politics of
an amateur . Let me emphasize this point: by refusing to abide by the yes and the no the
philosopher does not stand outside politics, but is confined to doing what everyone,
and especially the professional politician, does .29 Here is a very rare testament by a philosopher to the insight of the

political practitioner, perhaps the very coming philosopher Derrida has invoked, but political philosophers are not strangers to this refusal either;30 my

complaint is not merely another allusion to the seemingly insurmountable gap between
thought and practice, but about a kind of philosophy that hails itself as politically
important, yet clings to a justification or ethical ground that means very little in the
event, in the moment of crisis, action and decision. There may be obstacles for the theorist in
thinking the event and in acting—the constant and often tediously slow work of “translating” ideas—but the gap will
not be closed by creating a beautiful and complicated logic that never leaves the pages we
write or read. When asked whether he is in despair over the situation in Israel and Palestine, Shuli Dichter tells Simone Bitton, director of Mur: “Were I
[in despair] I wouldn’t be here. Were I [in despair] I wouldn’t talk. Silence frightens me most. Desperate people keep silent. I’m not [in despair] I’m
fighting.”31 Is it a pure idea of freedom or justice that motivates this man to act; is it an
injunction “from on high”? On the contrary, it appears to be his confrontation with
suffering and inequality—not an unconditional injunction so much as an inability to
tolerate the pain of others, which anyone may or may not feel in this encounter, may
or may not act upon. Like countless other political actors, Dichter already knows, is forced to acknowledge
on a daily basis, the exigencies of political crises, and therefore the risk that any political

program will miss its mark. If we are to engage in philosophy that does not break
with politics, we have to look there, where the moment of crisis demands a thinking
that has no alibi, that is not seduced by a regulative ideal or pure á-venir . Gasché’s statement
about the impossibility of closure in Derrida could be a demonstration of the very

autoimmunity of deconstruction. What was once a startling insight, even a shocking

intervention, has come to immunize itself against its own other or others . Thinking about the
“good” autoimmunity, this is as it should be. We could turn Derrida’s words concerning community back to him: deconstruction needs to cultivate its own
autoimmunity in order to stay “alive,” in order to remain “open to something other and more than itself.” This other might be the
very practitioner Derrida believes the coming philosopher should be, and a justice
focused on commensurability rather than incommensurability, commonality rather
than difference, and the conditional rather than the unconditional.
 AT: Must Occur Outside Political Order
Reject their deterministic view of an all-encompassing liberalism which
crushes agency
Laura Zanotti 15, Associate Professor of Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech,
Re-Conceptualizing Political Agency beyond Universal Normativity,
www.aspect.vt.edu/documents/workingpapers_zanottispring2015.pdf
Both in its “individualistic” version (i.e. a positions that focus on the parts’ attributes) and in its “structuralist’ versions (i.e. positions that focus on detecting the organizing principles
of the whole) substantialism has underpinned the position of scholars belonging to very different traditions, such as neorealist, neoliberals, post- Marxists as well as some post-
modernists. Substantialist structuralism explains the whole in terms of a few overarching principles that determine the parts’ behavior, and posits the parts as having given attributes
before their contextual interactions. Scholars such as Hardt and Negri (2000) and Giorgio Agamben (1998) borrow Michel Foucault’s terminology but not his methodology and

structuralist positions share an

embrace substantialist assumptions (Zanotti, 2013). While favoring divergent political aspirations, substantialist-

ontology that represents agents as monads endowed with fundamental characteristics and qualities and that explains social phenomena and
political dynamics through a few, ahistorical overarching principles. Regardless of what the organizing
principle of choice is (i.e. anarchy for Waltz, Empire for Hardt and Negri, or the liberal biopolitical order for Agamben), it is

reified as an inescapable deterministic factor that shapes the behavior of actors and
structures the outcomes of their deeds. In a structural-substantialist framework the
structure always tends to reproduce itself, thus re-directing and re-orienting actor’s
political engagements towards preserving the status quo. The ways out of the
determinism of this script are few. Short of changing the organizing principle of the
system (as a conservative substantaliststructuralist like Waltz would have it), totally withdrawing from the “script” of
power (as Prozorov (2007), who embraces Agamben suggested) or constituting th “multitude as one” to fight the mighty “Empire” (as Hardt and Negri would
like it), agents can do very little to change “what is”. In summary regardless of their

stated political preferences, these positions are politically conservative because they
stifle political imagination and straightjacket options for action.
Chris Brown’s has recently called for a “‘critical problem-solving’ theory, that is, theory that relates directly to real-world problems but approaches them
from the perspective of the underdog” (Brown, 2013, 483). A change of perspective in the direction Browns suggests demands in my view a reflection on the
ethical and political implications of IR ontologies and methodologies. In this paper I embrace Michel Foucault’s methodology and political intent as my
starting point for exploring these connections. In “Questions of Method,” from which the excerpts above are taken, Michel Foucault (1991) established a
relation between the problem of truth and the political. In taking issues with some of the most dogmatic streams of Marxism, Foucault defended an
intellectual and political project centered on deconstructing what is taken for granted instead of devising an overarching principle for explaining all that
happens in society or for establishing a more desirable social order. Foucault did not aspire to guaranteeing “an appropriate outcome. ” Instead, he aimed at
displacing certainties and at “participating in the “difficult displacement of forms of sensibility”.

I make my case on the connections between ontologies, epistemology and ethics by arching back to a debate that has become a classic in IR, i.e. the one between the most famous
proponent of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz and his critics. I continue by assessing critical realism’s contribution to a non-substantialist understanding of ontology, epistemology and
ethics. I focus on the work of IR scholar Heikki Patomäki (2002) to argue that while maintaining an attachment to some overarching explanatory “structural” features, critical realism
rejects substantialism and adopts a relational ontology. In particular the notion of “emergence” challenges structuralist determinism. I continue by addressing the more radical non-
substantialist ontology proposed by the feminist realist philosopher of science Karen Barad (2007) and by exploring the relevance of her notion of “intra-agential agency” for ethics.

Both critical realism and, to a greater extent, Karen Barad’s version of scientific realism open an ontological space where
conceptualizations of political agency and ethics rooted upon praxis and contingent
configurations (instead of universal normative abstractions) are possible. In this vein, instead of
relying upon abstract theorizations of “what is right” across time and places, ethical decisions must include practical

assessments of what is possible under specific circumstances, as well as gauge Commented [EM3]:
political consequences and distributional effects. This position leads to a
reconfiguration of political agency that moves away from universal prescriptions
rooted upon universal normativity, and sees ethics as a method or an “attitude” that
embraces uncertainty and mutable contingent conditions rather than static recipes
for action.
Round 6
1NC
Offcase
 1
The US is combining hedging and reassurance in the Gulf now---
increased presence and military cooperation are reassuring allies
Lynn E. Davis 14, Senior Political Science, RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and M.A. in political
science, Columbia University, “The Days after a Deal with Iran: U.S. Policies of Hedging and
Engaging,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE125/RAND_PE12
5.pdf
A U.S. Approach Is Emerging That Emphasizes Hedging and Reassurance
From Obama administration statements and a growing consensus among U.S. regional experts, a set of U.S. policies and assumptions
seems to be emerging as to what policies the United States should pursue in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement with Iran.3

• Thenuclear agreement will offer Iran incentives in the form of graduated sanctions relief for
forgoing its pursuit of capabilities associated with nuclear weapons and for maintaining limits on its
nuclear infrastructure. Any further incentives, as well as all but minimal engagement, need to wait in
order to test Iran’s compliance with the agreement and its behavior elsewhere in the
region. The rationale for this narrow focus lies in the uncertainties as to the Iranian domestic situation and what future Iranian
behavior will be in the region. In this view, a nuclear agreement with Iran will not change the fact that the Iranian regime, especially
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservative establishment, view the United States as the chief source of global
“oppression.” President Hassan Rouhani and other pragmatic Iranians may aspire to more normal ties with the United States but the
Islamic Republic remains a revolutionary state guided not only by its interests of regime survival and maintaining territorial sovereignty,
but also expanding its regional influence.4

• The consequences of potential Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement will be made explicit, including the threat of an d clear plan
for a rapid reimposition of sanctions and of a potential military response against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

• U.S. engagement (both diplomatic and military) with its partners in the region will intensify and
include additional military cooperation with Israel and the GCC countries, military
sales, the integration of GCC air and missile defenses, and expanded maritime and air
exercises. U.S. presence in the Gulf will remain robust and retain capabilities for rapid strikes on the
Iranian nuclear infrastructure. These steps will be primarily to respond to concerns of partners over Iran
and provide reassurance, but also to reinforce the threat to Iran as to the
consequences of violating the agreement .5
This emerging U.S. approach is heavily informed by practical limitations. First, there is recognition among U.S. policymakers that things
are very uncertain as to what an agreement will mean for Iranian compliance, its intentions with respect to the nuclear progr am, and the
relationship of an agreement to its other regional policies. So, any real change in U.S. policies toward Iran, partners, and
military posture, or any opening or relaxation of pressure, needs to wait until Iran demonstrates its
willingness to implement the agreement —and perhaps even until changes occur in Iran’s regional behavior.
Second, U.S. domestic politics will constrain policymakers in the sense that even if decisionmakers see an opportunity for an emerging
détente with Iran, cooperation or normalization of relations with Tehran may not be possible in the current U.S. political climate. Third,
the anxieties
of U.S. regional partners reinforce the need for the United States to move
very slowly in any engagement with Iran lest these partners interpret actions as the
United States abandoning their interests . Finally, these policies are consistent with a
view that to influence Iran, one needs to show a willingness to make the costs
outweigh any gains, in terms of its future implementation of the nuclear agreement and regional behavior.6
Withdrawal causes fast and immediate Saudi prolif---presence is the key
determinant of the US security guarantee
Christopher Clary 12, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for International and
Public Affairs at Brown University, PhD, Political Science, MIT, M.A. in National Security
Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to Stop It,” The
American Interest, Volume 7, Number 6, 6/10/12, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2012/06/10/the-pak-saudi-nuke-and-how-to-stop-it/
The debate about military options on Iran has focused on the extent to which Tehran can be deterred, but it’s just as importa nt to
consider the knock-on proliferation consequences of an Iranian bomb. The
path for Saudi nuclearization is
readily apparent and could occur rapidly—within months or years, not decades. Analyses that perceive
Iranian nuclearization as manageable typically discount the possibility of quick Saudi acquisition of
nuclear weapons. In this vein, at least 11 other Middle Eastern states have developed varying levels of interest in nuclear
technology over the past decade or so.37 Few, however, could move as quickly as Saudi Arabia.

Robust U.S. security guarantees

Stopping a proliferation chain reaction need not require preventive military strikes.
to Saudi Arabia might dampen Saudi demand for a nuclear deterrent. But making these
guarantees credible could prove challenging. Extended deterrence is inherently difficult. A state is attempting
to guarantee that it will endanger its most vital interests (risk nuclear attacks on its homeland) in order to protect more p eripheral
interests (prevent conventional or nuclear attacks on a third-party state). In
the Cold War, the United States relied on
overseas basing to demonstrate its commitment . By placing U.S. forces in harm’s way,
it not only increased military options in the region, but also made the U.S. commitment more credible. As
Thomas Schelling famously argued, “What can 7,000 American troops do [in Berlin], or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die.”38 In
the Saudi case, however, the experience of the 1990s and 2000s suggests that a substantial U.S. military pr esence may generate a great
deal of popular resentment and thus prove unsustainable. Indeed, the United States may have more options basing
U.S. troops on the Saudi Arabian periphery. To some extent, it already does in Bahrain (home of
the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet) and Qatar (location of Al Udeid airbase). The United States clearly hopes the newly inaugurated U.S.-GCC
Strategic Cooperation Forum will provide another way to demonstrate “the rock-solid commitment of the United States to the people and
nations of the Gulf.”39

It remains possible that the Obama Administration’s emphasis on ever-stronger economic sanctions, perhaps combined with covert
action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and scientists, might prevent Iranian nuclearization. If it doesn’t, however, then analysts and
policymakers must incorporate the risk of rapid Saudi nuclearization into their calculus regarding Iran. Moreover, given Paki stan’s
intrinsic importance as a large, Muslim, nuclear-armed state, U.S. policymakers should be wary of backing Islamabad into a corner in
which its elites see risky behavior as necessary. As frustrating and provocative as Pakistan is to the United States, isolati ng it could easily
backfire. Moreover, the desirability of curtailing U.S. support for Pakistan is not solely a function of that nation’s support for the U.S.
presence in Afghanistan or counter-terror efforts in Pakistan, but may instead be a function of proliferation fears for the indefinite future.
For that reason, too, the
United States should exercise great caution in substantially reducing its
regional presence, lest it set loose a set of interlocking responses from regional
actors that would be extremely dangerous for all concerned.

Saudi capability is inevitable---motivation is key

Jeffrey Lewis 15, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any
Damn Time It Wants To,” 6/12/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-
saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/
[Table omitted]
 it is deeply misguided to conclude
While I don’t think it is terribly likely that Saudi Arabia will choose to build nuclear weapons, I think

that Saudi Arabia (or pretty much any state) cannot do so. Simply put, Zakaria is wrong — and it’s not all that hard to demonstrate why.¶ Zakaria
isn’t explicit about what he believes to be the technical requirements for building a nuclear weapon, but he clearly thinks it is hard. Which was probably true in 1945 when the United

the technologies associated with producing

States demonstrated two different routes to atomic weapons. Since then, however,

plutonium and highly enriched uranium have been developed, put to civilian use,
and spread around the globe. The fact that most states don’t build nuclear weapons
has a lot more to do with restraint than not being able to figure it out .¶ Zakaria’s argument that Saudi
Arabia can’t build nuclear weapons is pretty shallow and relies largely on two assertions: a flip comment about Saudi Arabia lacking even a domestic automotive industry, and a
superficially data-driven claim about Saudi Arabia’s “abysmal” math and science ranking.¶ First, automobile production is a terrible indicator of whether a state can build a nuclear
weapon. The technologies are really not at all similar — or at least they don’t have to be. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all succeeded in building nuclear weapons despite not having
much of an auto industry at home. And the Soviets were really good at building nuclear weapons, even though their cars famously sucked. ¶ And, anyway, Saudi Arabia is investing in a

Saudi Arabia
domestic auto industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is hoping the Meeya will be on the market by 2017. So, there’s that.¶ More importantly,

is investing in a civil nuclear industry. “Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program?” Zakaria wonders. Oh,
I don’t know, how about the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy? Somehow Zakaria never mentions that Saudi Arabia is building a

dedicated city for training nuclear scientists. I can’t predict whether this investment will pay off, but then again neither can Zakaria
— if he even knows it exists. ¶ Zakaria is also skeptical because, he writes, Saudi Arabia “ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and science education, according to the World Economic
Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita GDP, fares far better at 44.” ¶ Abysmally low for a rich country? Perhaps.
But for a nuclear weapons state? Not nearly. Let’s do what he should have done and make a little table using his own data. Here is a list of selected countries — in bold if they currently

Saudi Arabia
possess nuclear weapons — by “Quality of Math and Science Education.” (Again, this is his data. Don’t blame me!)¶ Using Zakaria’s own measure,

would hardly be the least nerdy country to acquire a nuclear weapon. Now, obviously I’d prefer to have
historical data. But I strongly suspect that China’s and India’s rankings weren’t nearly so high in 1964 and 1974 when

they conducted their first nuclear tests. The point is this: You don’t need to be a rich country, or have a great
education system, to build a bomb.¶ This should be no surprise. Did I mention that we just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, Trinity?
Seventy years. What other 70-year-old technology do we believe remains impossible for non-European countries to acquire, even after several have done so? You know what else was
invented in the 1940s? Microwave ovens, solid-body electric guitars, and the Slinky.¶ I don’t mean “acquire” in terms of buying a nuclear weapon off the shelf — I agree with Zakaria
that is a nutty idea. And I don’t mean purchasing a turn-key infrastructure to produce plutonium, as Syria did from North Korea, or highly enriched uranium as Libya did from

The fancy machine tools, materials, and components that

Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan. No, I mean building a bomb from scratch.

were good enough to build the nuclear weapons of the 1970s are widely available now.
My favorite example is that one of the machine tools linked to the A.Q. Khan network was a used Denn machine tool. If you go to the Denn website, they tell you what their machine
tools can be used for: everything from armaments to kitchenware. And, be still Fareed Zakaria’s fluttering heart, auto parts. (Flow forming machines make sweet rims.) Talk about dual
use!¶ The United States was deeply skeptical that Pakistan could build centrifuges in the 1970s because of the country’s limited industrial base. What U.S. analysts didn’t grasp was
that Pakistan’s industrial base — and that of every other proliferator — was the entire world. There is no reason to think this problem went away with A.Q. Khan. Take a spin around

a proliferator doesn’t have to try to acquire the

Alibaba, the big Chinese online B2B procurement site sometime.¶ Moreover,

most modern centrifuges. When U.N. inspectors were stumbling across the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s, they made a
surprising discovery: Calutrons. These were an obsolete uranium enrichment technology (electromagnetic isotope separation) from the 1940s that fell out of favor after World War II.

we’re lucky that

Inefficient, sure, but good enough to make the highly enriched uranium for the Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.¶ Frankly,

nuclear weapons have not spread as quickly as the technology to make them . Some of the
success in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is down to sanctions, export controls, and the occasional air strike. Most of the success, however, goes to the regime that discourages
states that could build nuclear weapons from doing so in the first place. ¶ If you ask a policy wonk whether the nonproliferation regime has been successful or not, the chances are
better than even that you’ll hear about President John F. Kennedy’s famous warning that “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world
in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” (It’s kind of a standard talking point we all learn early on.)¶ That didn’t happen — and credit usually goes to the 1970
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To see why, look at the countries that were in Kennedy’s list of 15, 20, or 25 nuclear-armed states. Kennedy’s estimate came from a 1963
briefing paper provided by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that is now declassified. Here is McNamara’s chart: ¶ Look at those names. They aren’t rogue states, but rather a list
of the world’s relatively industrialized countries, along with a few developing regional powers like China and the UAR (The United Arab Republic was a brief political union of Egypt
and Syria). The working assumption behind Kennedy’s estimate was that any state that could build nuclear weapons probably would. That’s because, before the NPT, nuclear weapons
were seen by many people as just another weapon, part of any modern military’s future arsenal. In fact, virtually all the non-Warsaw Pact countries on this list seriously considered a
nuclear weapons program. Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland all had active nuclear weapons programs.¶ The NPT helped changed that. (In the case of Australia, Jim Walsh has
written a particularly compelling account of the role played by the NPT in constraining Canberra’s nuclear aspirations.) Treaties are absolutely necessary. It is simply not possible to
sustain a nearly universal regime through technology denial and military action. The regime depends on the vast majority of states choosing compliance, allowing the international
community to focus its enforcement efforts on a small number of hard cases like North Korea and Iran.¶ ¶ The nonproliferation regime can only function with the support of those

The Saudis are clearly alarmed by the

states that can build nuclear weapons, but choose not to — states like Saudi Arabia.

possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While I suspect that a lot of the talk about acquiring nuclear weapons is intended to make the
United States focus on Saudi security concerns, it doesn’t help to dismiss Riyadh’s anxieties by mocking their educational system and ability to go nuclear.¶ Rather, we need to focus on

That means closer consultations on regional defense issues, expanded

making sure the nonproliferation regime works for Saudi Arabia and other states.

security arrangements, and crucially an attempt to head off an Iranian bomb with a negotiated settlement. Fareed Zakaria may well win his bet that the
Saudis will not have a bomb in 10 years, but it’s not because they can’t have one. If he wins — and I hope he does
— it’s because the United States and other powers have successfully addressed Iran’s nuclear
program and the regional security issues that would push Riyadh toward a bomb. And
who knows, maybe in 10 years we’ll all be driving Meeyas.

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war---it’s fast and destabilizing

Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi
Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia
have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed
Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading natio n in the Muslim
world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which
could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist
that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan.
During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the
region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security
guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the
infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves
within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is
currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a
second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might
accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its ow n.

Alternatively, Pakistan
might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and
deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory , a practice that the
United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear
weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim
forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops . Pakistan,
for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth
against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being
how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with
its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition
influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of
India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by
whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other
nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their
ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation : each additional state that
acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather
than violates, the NPT.
 2
The United States should:
 Significantly increase its military coordination with the Arab States
of the Persian Gulf and military presence in the Arab States of the
Persian Gulf, including synchronized deployments, pooled base
access, and training and joint exercises
 Propose multilateral policy coordination between the United
States, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and the Islamic Republic
of Iran, including against the Islamic State
 Propose the creation of a new multilateral regional security forum
including the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the Islamic
Republic of Iran
The counterplan intervenes in the security dilemma and integrates Iran
into the regional security order---removes the need for withdrawal
Frederic Wehrey 10/14, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Imagining a New Security Order in the Persian Gulf,” 10/14/15,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/14/imagining-new-security-order-in-persian-
gulf/ij3p
At the heart of the current dilemma is a clash of visions between the two sides of the Gulf littoral:
Iran seeks the departure of U.S. forces so it can exert what it regards as its rightful authority over the region
(which it believes is self-evident in the area’s geographic name). Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states desire a
continued American presence to balance what they see as Iran’s historical ambition of hegemony. ¶ A new
window of opportunity may be opening to resolve this dilemma. The nuclear agreement
between Iran and the P5+1—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany—raises the
possibility, albeit a distant one, of creating a new security order in the Gulf, one that could
improve relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab states and help reduce the American military commitment. This has been
accompanied by the concurrent rise of a more militarily capable bloc of Gulf Arab states who—while still falling short of real self-
sufficiency and, in the case of Yemen, using their capability irresponsibly—could presage a new era of confidence among these
historically jittery kingdoms.¶ Opponents and supporters of the Iranian nuclear agreement have offered a dichotomy between a strategy
of rolling
back Iran or integrating the country into the global order. But this is not a
binary choice. The nuclear agreement will empower Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, which executes Iran’s regional policies. But it could also create greater space for increased
bilateral engagement between the United States and Iran. The United States should, therefore, try to
foster Iranian integration in regional structures to encourage more responsible Iranian
behavior while imposing costs if Tehran continues to make mischief in a way that threatens
core U.S. interests.¶ Managing this balance between reconciling with and constraining Iran will be a difficult diplomatic and political
challenge. One immediate test for the strategy will be whether the United States and its Gulf Arab partners can agree to crea te a more
inclusive forum for multilateral discussion of Gulf security issues as a first step toward eventually building a rules-based security
architecture for the region.¶ This idea is not without precedent . In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, regional security
organizations have emerged with the goals of lowering tensions, resolving disputes, managing crises, and preventing conflicts. Yet, the
record of these organizations has been inconsistent. ¶ In the Middle East, the failure has been especially stark. The League of Arab States,
encompassing countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, is bereft of real conflict prevention capability. ¶ In
the Persian
Gulf, the region’s only multilateral security forum—the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—suffers from a number of shortcomings. First,
as currently configured, the GCC is little more than a de facto collective defense alliance
directed against Iran. It excludes Iran, Iraq, and outside powers with a strong stake in the security of the region, such as
China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Second, the GCC provides no multilateral
venue for crisis management, conflict resolution, or implementation of measures to
strengthen stability. In addition, it does not offer a mechanism for countries in the Gulf to candidly discuss threats and
security needs.2 This is particularly problematic because GCC countries face multiple, cross-border challenges that require greater
multinational cooperation.¶ Opening
a new multilateral framework to Iran could be one
additional tool in a broader U.S. strategy of incentives and pressures to help influence
Iranian behavior. But the immediate benefits of this opening should not be overstated. The modest gains afforded Iran by this
structure would not outweigh the deeply entrenched drivers of Tehran’s policies. Iran’s dangerous meddling in the region appears to be
driven by a mix of ideological fervor, strategic deterrence, domestic factionalism, and a deeply held belief among senior lea ders that the
Islamic Republic is and should remain the region’s indispensable nation. That said, low-level
dialogue between the
Gulf states and Iran could be an important first step in reducing tension and
influencing Iran’s outlook. Further, this new multilateral forum could expand to a more
regularized dialogue on Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.¶ Thus, a new regional security forum
should be an integral element of the United States’ long-term vision of a rules-based and
more stable and predictable security order in the Gulf. Without such an order, the United States
will likely remain stuck in the role of the region’s fire brigade, forced to take greater
ownership of problems that countries in the region must solve for themselves , often with
the United States in a supporting role. The aftermath of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which
imposes the dual requirements of containing and engaging the country, provides both an
opportune time and context to construct these arrangements. Embedding the United States in a more robust
regional security institution will also allay the fears of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states that it is withdrawing from the region.

The region won’t change stabilize itself overnight---military presence is

necessary to reassure partners in the interim which creates long-term
cooperation
Jon B. Alterman 15, CSIS senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global
Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at CSIS, with Dr.
Kathleen Hicks, CSIS senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the
International Security Program at CSIS, “Federated Defense in the Middle East,” September
2015,
http://csis.org/files/publication/150909_Alterman_FederatedDefMiddleEast_Web.pdf
U.S. leadership in Middle East security is critical; disengagement from the region is
not plausible. The United States will have to make hard choices about what its priorities are, commit to pursuing coherent
policies aligned with them, and conduct consistent diplomatic and public messaging on them. The strategy must achieve a balan ce
between addressing short-term security imperatives that threaten U.S. interests and investing in regional capabilities that enhance long -
term stability. The challenge comes because long-term stability will also require more than military capabilities. It will demand better
governance, adherence to rule of law, respect for human rights, and more inclusive economic growth. Many U.S. partners conced e that
the reform process is necessary, but they emphasize that it is fraught with danger. While they appreciate U .S. support against external
threats, they are resistant to what they see as well-meaning advice on sovereign issues.
There is no easy solution to the resultant tension. Change will come to the region at a
pace that is likely to be both uneven and unpredictable, and the United States will have few tools with
which to direct that change. In our judgment, the United States needs to pursue two tracks simultaneously. The first is remai ning true to
U.S. values: insisting on maintaining human rights principles, vetting partner military units, and inculcating respect for individual rights
that is at the core of American political sensibilities. The United States should speak out on those issues, sometimes in pub lic, and
sometimes when it makes partners uncomfortable. The second track is rebuilding
the trust deficit between the
United States and its regional partners in the wake of the Arab Spring and the P5+1 and Iran
negotiations. That requires patiently and methodically building partner capacity, in addition to
helping the countries against urgent threats. The United States should seek to remain the “indispensable
partner” to its regional partners, both in the immediate and longer term.
In addition, the United States should be prepared to address Iranian threats and provocations,
especially in the asymmetric and unconventional realms, even in the wake of a successful nuclear agreement between the P5+1 a nd Iran.
In fact, even after the agreement has been adopted, Iran
is likely to cooperate in some areas while
undermining the interests of the United States and its allies in others. The United States should be
open to cooperating with Iran (on issues such as tactical maritime security in the Gulf and countering violent
extremism in Afghanistan), and it should look for ways to test Iranian intentions. In the interim,
until a new and less threatening Iranian pattern of behavior manifests itself, the United
States should be sympathetic to partners’ requests for additional security assurances.
The policy disagreements following the Arab Spring have led the United States to move away from building ties with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia and to focus instead on smaller, very capable states in the region. It is arguable whether the United States can affor d to do so,
given Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For their own part, these larger countries are actin g
with more autonomy (e.g., the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and the Egyptian military actions in Libya, both of which the UAE
supports), while some smaller states such as Jordan and the UAE are actively participating with anti--ISG airstrikes in Syria. All of these
actions challenge decades-old assumptions about regional partners’ military capabilities and their political will to use them. The
United States must reframe its relationship with regional partners to meet these changing realities.
A reappraisal of regional relationships should center on an important premise: not all strategically important countries in the region are
U.S. strategic partners. It
should identify and commit to policies that further those strategic
relationships while focusing transactional activities on common interests that it shares with
other partners. For example, focusing on transactional agreements with Egypt on counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and
North African stability, and emphasizing training over equipment, may help both the United States and Egypt extricate the relationship
from a lingering stalemate. The U.S. policy decision to reframe capability focus areas and end cash flow financing for Egypt’ s foreign
military financing (FMF) is a step in the right direction, although it remains unclear how the United States will press forward on
governance and human rights concerns.1

Saudi Arabia’s trajectory is uncertain, with a new monarch and an unknown and untested defense minister. Its interventio n into Yemen
demonstrates a willingness to take threats to its security head-on, but the current operations in Yemen raise several questions. The Saudi
government sees the Houthi uprising as a function of Iranian regional ambitions, and it is determined to act decisively against Iranian
influence. Yet, operationally, it is not clear how long Saudi Arabia can sustain military operations in what is likely to be a protracted civil
war. More broadly, the Saudi effort to use military tools to shape politics on the ground in Yemen has not met with much success so far.
The Houthi rebels seem undeterred, and the civilian toll continues to climb. Yemen’s already precarious economic situation ha s become
more tenuous, with millions of Yemenis at risk of disease and starvation, growing refugee flows, and medical and transport systems
coming to a standstill. In this environment, both al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State affiliates have gained
significant ground. The Saudi government must find a way to define victory in Yemen that allows it to end its military operations, and
such an outcome appears increasingly elusive.

The United States has supported the Saudi effort with intelligence and targeting support, as well as refueling, but there are signs of
increasing impatience with both the open-ended nature of the engagement and the threat of a massive man-made humanitarian disaster.
Some argue that the United States doesn’t have much space to argue with the Saudis on issues they see as affecting their c ore interests.
Clearly, there are a broad set of reasons for the United States to keep Saudi Arabia close, including the Saudi role in globa l energy
markets, U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation against radical groups and individuals, Saudi influence in regional diplomacy, and even the
potential to develop its own nuclear program if Iran proliferates.2
Because states do not automatically work to pursue their mutual interests, the
United States should lead its allies and
partners in building a multilateral framework to guide normative behavior in the
region. Formal alliances (i.e., collective defense agreements) between the United States and Middle Eastern countries are
not plausible in the near term , given politics in both the United States and the Gulf. Yet, the complexity and
range of threats, combined with the potential for unsynchronized and unilateral action, call for something more
robust than the Gulf security dialogues that the United States has held with GCC members over the past 10 years. A
structure including an annual multilateral defense ministerial meeting and regular
diplomatic and military engagements at lower levels could do several things. It would enable the
United States, extra-regional allies, and partners to develop common threat assessments, to determine desired
outcomes and objectives, and to identify the strengths and limitations of each other’s
capabilities and capacity, both militarily and politically. It might also contribute to greater trust
among members, building more integrated capabilities and supplementing the
bilateral relationships with the United States that are likely to remain at the core of most GCC states’ defense postures.
Also, over time, a framework should seek to create an understanding of normative behavior for the use of force, raising the political costs
for unilateral action.
 3
Reduced presence means Gulf states switch allegiances to China---
crushes U.S. leverage in a Taiwan crisis---base access and the political
relations sustained by a large presence are vital
Eduardo A. Abisellan 12, the U.S. Marine Corps Federal Executive Fellow in the Brookings
21st Century Defense Initiative, 6/28/12, “CENTCOM’s China Challenge: Anti-Access and
Area Denial in the Middle East,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/28%20centcom%20
china%20abisellan/28%20centcom%20china%20abisellan
First, it is important to establish just how critical the Middle East is to China . The significance of
the Middle East in fueling the global economy cannot be overstated: five of the top ten countries with proven oil reserves are in the
Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia alone possesses one fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves. Iran has 137 billion barrels (bbls); Iraq, 115
bbls; Kuwait, 104 bbls; and the United Arab Emirates possesses 98 bbls of proven oil reserves.1

China, out of sheer economic necessity, has developed closer ties with these Persian Gulf
States in order to satisfy its voracious energy appetite. The World Energy Outlook 2011 report predicts that
the Chinese economy, notwithstanding a global economic downturn, will continue to grow at a rate of 8.1 percent per year through
2020.2 Therefore, China’s quest for energy is a critical factor in sustaining its impressive economic growth.

In 2010, China imported nearly 4.8 million barrels of crude oil per day (bbl/d), of which over 2.2 million (47 percent), came from the
Middle East. By comparison, 1.5 million bbl/d (30 percent) came from Africa, 176,000 bbl/d (4 percent) from the AsiaPacific region, and
938,000 bbl/d (20 percent) came from other countries.”3 By 2020, China is anticipated to overtake the United States in terms of oil
imports, and by 2030 it will become the largest oil consumer in the world, consuming 15 million bbl/d- nearly double 2009 levels.4

China purchases oil from all parties regardless of their domestic political system; its primary concern has been and remains to fue l its
growing economy and ensure sufficient markets are available to sustain future energy demands and economic growth. A secondary effect
of increased Chinese dependency on Middle Eastern oil has been the significant rise in the amount of trade between China and the Middle
East. According to a recent article by James Chen, “The Emergence of China in the Middle East,” “from 2005 to 2009, the total trade
volume between China and the Middle East rose 87 percent to $100 billion, and Middle East’s exports to China grew by 25 perce nt. China
is also the top source of the region’s imports, most of them being low-cost household goods.”5

Increased trade and infrastructure investments by Chinese firms in the Middle East and by Middle Eastern firms in China have
significantly brought the Middle East and Far East closer together. The relationships between China and the Middle East may h ave
started as the result of basic supply and demand economics, but just as
China’s energy needs are projected to
grow, so is its relationship with key oil producing states within the Persian Gulf .
Moreover, “Beijing’s calculations regarding a possible war with the United States over Taiwan
increases the importance of having powerful and independent minded oil producing
friends in the Middle East that will be willing to supply oil in a contingency.”6
A more benign conclusion is that the Chinese have thus far remained ambivalent to regional issues. But this ambivalence (or rather strategy of non-intereferenence in domestic
matters) has come with political gains to Chinese compared to the US position with several key regimes. The Chinese do not challenge the local regimes and ruling monarchies on
issues such as democracy or human rights. It is both a friend and ally to competing nations in the region, the Gulf monarchs on one side of the Persian Gulf and Iran on the other. This
relationship has benefited both China and the region. Bilateral trade between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar, “topped $70 billion in 2008; according to some estimates, the Sino-GCC trade volume will reach between $350 and $500 billion by 2020.”7

Opposite the GCC, “China has become Iran’s largest trade partner since the United States began its attempt to negotiate with Iran and sanction simultaneously.”8 China has taken
advantage of the international sanctions against Iran to maximize and diversify its energy security position, “with bilateral exchanges worth $21.2 billion compared to $14.4 billion
three years earlier. Western sanctions have also paved the way for Chinese companies, which last year directly supplied Iran with 13% of its imports ($7.9 billion).”9

Despite the obvious dangers of courting opposing countries, China

provides the next best alternative to the
U.S. in the region. It is an alternative that comes without preexisting conditions for
friendship. The Chinese do not expound governmental or political system reform as conditions for doing business. China leans
towards authoritarian regimes without upsetting the status quo; the U.S. engages nondemocratic regimes with an eye towards re form
and promoting democracy, but this process is of course often messy and rife with tension as the US tries to balance competing demands.
In the end, the Chinese through trade, investment, and nonintrusive policies stand to be looked at as a better friend, ally, and benefactor
than the U.S., at least under the current governmental structures in the region.

The recent popular uprisings (Arab Spring) in North Africa, and the manner in which the U.S. abruptly abandoned a 30-year ally in President Mubarak of Egypt, further complicated
the US position. While the shift was likely on the right side of history, it has no doubt changed the perception of U.S. loyalty to its other regime allies. Gulf monarchs began asking
themselves how the U.S. would react in the event of similar popular uprising within their states. Would the U.S. stand beside them or abandon them? Most interpreted the latter would
be the case.

The U.S. and China walk a fine line between friendship with the established ruling class and the population represented by its authoritarian rulers. The rise of popular democratic
movements may benefit the U.S. more than China, but the true outcome of revolutions will not likely be known for years to come. The challenge for the U.S. will remain its ability to
balance its national interests and democratic ideology with the less intrusive Chinese view of the world. In this regard, the Chinese have a clear advantage: they are not going to upset
the status quo, nor do they come with some of the historical baggage from 50 years of involvement in the region that makes US relations even with dissidents or popular democratic
movements difficult.

Adding to these trends are calls from within the U.S. to wean America from foreign oil dependency. Public statements along these lines further reinforce the perceived need in the Gulf
States to seek new alliances and focus their efforts on where the demand for energy is projected to be the strongest- the Asia-Pacific region. The 2011 World Energy Report predicts
that Asian countries that lie outside the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will have the largest demand for oil, with China and India topping the list,
whereas OECD consumption rates will level off, if not decline.

Moreover, with new shale oil and gas discoveries in the United States and oil sands from Canada, many believe that “the U.S. is at the forefront of the unconventional revolution.”10
According to PFC Energy, a Washington-based consultancy: By 2020, shale sources will make up about a third of total U.S. oil and gas production, by that time the U.S. will be the top
global oil and gas producer, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia… That could have far-reaching ramifications for the politics of oil, potentially shifting power away from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries toward the Western hemisphere. With more crude being produced in North America, there's less likelihood of Middle Eastern politics
causing supply shocks that drive up gasoline prices. Consumers could also benefit from lower electricity prices, as power plants switch from coal to cheap and plentiful natural gas.11

This obviously could be of great benefit to the U.S. However, the shift to actual energy self-reliance is not readily apparent. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
the U.S. currently leads the world in oil consumption and imports about 45 percent of its oil needs. In 2011, the U.S. consumed 18.8 million barrels per day (MMbd) of petroleum
products and imported 11.4 MMbd. 52 percent of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products imports came from the Western Hemisphere (North, South and Central America, and the
Caribbean including U.S. territories). About 22 percent of U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products come from the Persian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The largest sources of crude oil and petroleum products imports came from Canada (29 percent) and Saudi Arabia (14 percent). Other sources of
U.S. Net Crude Oil and Petroleum Products imports are: Nigeria (11 percent); Venezuela (10 percent); and Mexico (8 percent).12

Many will see the potential for increased domestic oil and gas production as a means to wean America off the Middle Eastern (Persian Gulf) oil spigot, retrench, and save costs abroad.
On the surface, the potential for domestic oil production to offset foreign imports alleviates the problem associated with dependency on Middle Eastern oil, such as the fluctuation in
prices due to instability, or in the worst case, the disruption of supplies due to regional conflict. Moreover, due to the fungible nature of oil; the fluctuation in prices due to instability or
conflict has the potential to impact the price of oil worldwide and thus impact global economies directly. Therefore, supplanting oil imports from volatile and/or unstable regions with
domestic production insulates the nation against potential supply disruptions and price hikes.

However, it is strategically shortsighted to believe that weaning the U.S. off Middle Eastern o il supplies will solve America’s national
security issues in this volatile region. The geopolitical and strategic implications of continued U.S.
presence and involvement in the Middle East (Persian Gulf) transcend the basic need for
oil imports from the region. The scope is much broader and inextricably connected to the
larger global economy and the role the U.S. plays in exercising global leadership to
confront emerging threats, deter aggression, and assure allies around the world—many of whom
are heavily reliant on the free trade in energy (and goods) to fuel their economies. If the U.S. is not the guarantor of
the free flow of trade throughout the global commons, who will be?
Yet, a war- and deficit-weary U.S. government and a sluggish domestic economy, when coupled with the
rebalancing of U.S. interests to the Asia-Pacific region, could easily cloud the larger strategic picture. The
strategic issue is not whether the U.S. can or should become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil and less embroiled in the
region, but whether energy self reliance and a rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will cause the U.S. to
scale back its efforts from the Middle East altogether. The latter would be a strategic
mistake.
In short, U.S. willingness to support popular democratic uprisings, the expressed desire to
wean the nation off Middle Eastern oil, and growing oil demand and consumption in the Far
East are all conditions that could significantly influence, if not alter, the geostrategic and
political landscape of the Middle East in the 21st century. This set of circumstances will
reinforce Persian Gulf states’ incentives to distance themselves from the U.S. and to
develop even stronger partnerships with nations such as China.
The impact of this of US needs in a crisis situation in the Asia Pacific may be more
noteworthy than often understood. The disruption of Chinese oil supplies would likely
be a prime U.S. objective during a crisis situation involving a potential dispute with
China over Taiwan, or another contingency scenario. But the aforementioned factors may
be reasons why Gulf States may not support U.S. actions during a crisis between the U.S.
and China: why bite the hand that increasingly feeds you?
However, the U.S. is dependent on regional military bases, such as the U.S. Navy’s Fifth
Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, the U.S. Air Force’s Combined Air Operations Center
in Qatar, and other military capabilities based throughout the Arabian Peninsula, to
exercise its military options. Without the assistance of regional partners or access to
bases from which to operate, military action would be difficult to initiate and sustain.
Constraints placed against the U.S. may range from Persian Gulf states continuing to
supply oil to China despite a conflict with the U.S. Or they could deny the U.S. the
ability to launch military actions against China from their territory, thus making it
more difficult for the U.S. to pursue a comprehensive military campaign to interdict
Chinese oil supplies.

Goes nuclear---U.S. deterrence key

Adam Lowther 15, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force
Global Strike Command; and Alex Littlefield, professor at Feng Chia University, 8/11/15,
“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,”
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-
america/
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s
aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the
build the rocket/missile and naval
South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),
capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a
situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that
American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclea r thinking,
there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict.
Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how
a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Chinese Capabilities

In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the
Second Artillery Corps possesses
forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an
additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and
largest economic centers.

To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a
sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing
a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a
way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not
the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium.

This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal?
Chinese Motivation

The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability th at will serve to deter an American
first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such
as cyber are offensive.

Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads
and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear
peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year.

While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuc lear
arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are
not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility.

As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear
force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile
defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United Stat es as
vulnerable.

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possib le, some analysts believe that a
conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would
come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to
accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from
intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and
non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States
may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a
cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative
weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and
control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the
Chinese may escalate to the use of a
nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-
escalation.
In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese
waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be
viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American
conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign
against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and
capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.
 4
The United States federal government should increase its military
presence, including joint exercises and training, in the Arab States of the
Persian Gulf.
The President of the United States should publicly articulate a threat of
military force against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the event of Iranian
violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The United States should propose a strategic dialogue with the Gulf
Cooperation Council states over unconventional security threats,
increase defense capacity-building, training, joint intelligence programs,
and articulate limits on independent military action, with the Gulf
Cooperation Council states.
Iran will cheat on the deal---only a credible threat of force backed up by
robust presence stops prolif---the plan makes the threat of force
impossible which causes nuclear war
Michael Mandelbaum 15, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb:
The Case for Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/how-prevent-iranian-bomb
The American political conflict will come to a head in September, when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accord—although the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it passes and has enough support among Democrats to
uphold the veto and perhaps even to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place. Still, however the domestic politics play out,
both the deal’s supporters and its critics agree that the U nited States should prevent Iran
from getting a bomb. This raises the question of how to do so—whether without the deal,
after the deal expires, or if the Iranians decide to cheat. Stopping Iranian nuclear
proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to update and adapt its Cold
War policy of deterrence, making Tehran understand clearly in advance that the United States is determined to prevent, by
force if necessary, Iranian nuclearization. ¶ A CREDIBLE THREAT¶ The English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan
that “covenants, without the sword, are but words.” Any agreement requires a
mechanism for enforcing it, and the Iranian agreement does include such a mechanism: in theory, if Iran
violates the agreement’s terms, the economic sanctions that the accord removes will “snap back” into
place. By itself, however, this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating. The procedures
for reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable; even if imposed, the renewed sanctions
would not cancel contracts already signed; and even as the sanctions have been in place, Iran’s progress toward
a bomb has continued. To keep nuclear weapons out of Tehran’s hands will thus require something
stronger—namely, a credible threat by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using
force to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. ¶ The term for an effort to prevent something by threatening
forceful punishment in response is “ deterrence.” It is hardly a novel policy for Washington : deterring a
Soviet attack on the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War. Deterring Iran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some similarities to that earlier task, but one difference is obvious: Cold W ar deterrence
was aimed at preventing the use of the adversary’s arsenal, including nuclear weapons, while in the case of Iran, deterrence
would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those weapons. With the arguable exception of
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States has not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear, including the Soviet Union, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Does the Iranian case d iffer from
previous ones in ways that justify threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club? ¶ It does. An Iranian bomb would be more
dangerous, and stopping it is more feasible. The Soviet Union and China were continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear
threshold before the U.S. military had the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with minimal
collateral damage. Israel and India, like the United Kingdom and France before them, were friendly democracies whose possessi on of
nuclear armaments did not threaten American interests. Pakistan is occasionally friendly, is a putative democracy, and crossed the
nuclear threshold in direct response to India’s having done so. The United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nu clear arsenal,
but the greatest danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval, it could fall into the hands of religious extremists—
precisely the kind of people who control Iran now. ¶ North Korea presents the closest parallel. In the early 1990s, the Clinton
administration was ready to go to war to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, before signing an agreement that the
administration said would guarantee that the communist regime would dismantle its nuclear program. North Korea continued its nuclear
efforts, however, and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of George W. Bush. Since then, North Korea
has continued to work on miniaturizing its bombs and improving its missiles, presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to threaten
attacks on North America. It is worth noting that in 2006, two experienced national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if
Pyongyang were ever to achieve such a capability, Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it. One of the author s was
William Perry, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration; the other was Ashton Carter, who holds that position
today.¶ Bad as the North Korean bomb is, an Iranian one would be even worse. For in the
case of North Korea, a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it
acquired nuclear weapons, with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953. For this reason, in the
years since Pyongyang got the bomb, its neighbors have not felt an urgent need to
acquire nuclear armaments of their own—something that would be likely in the case of Iranian proliferation. ¶
Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United State s and the
Soviet Union. A
Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states, all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals, would be dangerously unstable. In a crisis, each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors. Accordingly, the chances of a nuclear war in
the region would skyrocket. Such a war would likely kill millions of people and could deal a devastating blow to the
global economy by interrupting the flow of crucial supplies of oil from the region. ¶ But if an Iranian bomb would be even worse than a
North Korean bomb, preventing its emergence would be easier. A U.S. military strike against North Korea would probably trigge r a
devastating war on the Korean Peninsula, one in which the South would suffer greatly. (South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is located within
reach of North Korean artillery.) This is one of the reasons the South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike , and the
the countries that
United States has felt compelled, so far, to honor South Korea’s wishes. In the Middle East, by contrast,
would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a U.S. counterproliferation
strike—Saudi Arabia and Israel, in particular—have made it clear that, although they are hardly eager for war with Iran, they
would not stand in the way of such a strike .¶ A LIMITED AIM¶ Deterring Iran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is justified,
feasible, and indeed crucial to protect vital U.S. interests. To be effective, a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with the Iranian regime knowing just what acts
will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will follow through
on its threats.¶ During the Cold War, the United States was successful in deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in
preventing a broader range of communist initiatives. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower administration announced a policy of massive
retaliation designed to deter communist provocations, including costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea, by pro mising an
overpowering response. But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective, and a decade later, the United States found itself
embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam. ¶ In the case of Iran, the
aim of deterrence would be specific and
limited: preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. One is
the likelihood of Iranian “salami tactics”—small violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic Republic closer to a bomb
without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting
such violations. The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on Western Europe, but Iran is all too
likely to try to develop the technology needed for nuclear weapons clandestinely (the
United States believes it has an extensive history of doing so ), and the loopholes in the
agreement’s inspection provisions suggest that keeping track of all of Iran’s bomb-related
activities will be difficult.¶ As for credibility—that is, persuading the target that force really will be used in the
event of a violation—this posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War. It was certainly
credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on North America, but the United States also sought to deter an attack
on allies thousands of miles away, even though in that case, retaliation would have risked provoking a Soviet strike on the A merican
homeland. Even some American allies, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, expressed skepticism that the United States would go
to war to defend Europe. The American government therefore went to considerable lengths to
ensure that North America and Western Europe were “coupled” in both Soviet and Western European eyes,
repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and stationing both troops and nuclear
weapons there to trigger U.S. involvement in any European conflict.¶ In some ways, credibly
threatening to carry out a strike against Iran now would be easier. Iran may have duplicated,
dispersed, and hidden the various parts of its nuclear program, and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems, but the
U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause enough
damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years, even without the use
of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy,
Hezbollah), or attack American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism. But such responses could do only limited
damage and would risk further punishment. ¶ The problems with deterring Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons are not practical but rather political and psychological. Having watched
American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an Iranian bomb over the years, and then observed the Obama
administration’s avid pursuit of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program, Iran’s ruling clerics may well
doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian
cheating. U.S. President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position that Iran should not be permitted to
have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale, then abandoned it. He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He made it the core argument in favor of the JCPOA that the alternat ive to it is
war, implying that American military action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover, neither he nor
his predecessor responded to Iran’s meddling in Iraq over the past decade, even though Tehran’s support for Shiite militias t here helped
kill hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States, particularly during this presidency, to be a serial
bluffer.¶ DOUBT NOT¶ All of this suggests that in order to keep Iran from going nuclear, the
JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an explicit, credible threat of military action . To be
credible, such a threat must be publicly articulated and resolutely communicated. The
Obama administration should declare such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should
enshrine such a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration should
reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval
and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency of military
exercises there in conjunction with its allies. As in Europe during the Cold War, the goal of U.S. policy
should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that the United States will uphold its
commitments.¶ The debate about the Iran nuclear deal has become politically polarized, but a policy of deterrence should not be
controversial, since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian bomb. In addition, a robust policy
of deterrence would help address some of the shortcomings of the JCPOA without
sacrificing or undermining its useful elements . And since the deterrence policy could and
should be open ended, it would help ease worries about the provisions of the accord that
expire after ten or 15 years. As during the Cold War, the policy should end only when it becomes obsolete—that is, when
Iran no longer poses a threat to the international community. Should the Islamic Republic evolve or fall, eliminating the nee d for vigilant
concern about its capabilities and intentions, the United States could revisit the policy. Until then, deterrence is the policy
to adopt.
Pak Collapse
 Leverage Turn
The plan creates strategic dependence on Saudi Arabia---wrecks
leverage
Hal Brands 15, Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, PhD in History
from Yale, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, “Fools Rush Out? The
Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,” The Washington Quarterly • 38:2 pp. 7–28,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Brands_Summer%
202015.pdf
The primary cause for doubt is that while stationing U.S. troops in Muslim countries has historically been one cause of anti-American terrorism, it has never
been the only one. That phenomenon also grew out of anger at U.S. support for authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, Washington’s relationship with Israel,
the encroachment of Western cultural and economic influences on Muslim societies, and other grievances that were prominent in early al-Qaeda
pronouncements and still resonate today. In 2010, for instance, an al-Qaeda spokesman announced that it would take more than withdrawing U.S. troops
from Muslim lands to make jihadist attacks stop. The United States would also have to end its support to Israel, prohibit all trade and investment in that
country, terminate all aid to “the hated regimes of the Muslim world,” cease “all interference in the religion, society, politics, economy, and government” of
the region, and so on. Anti-American terrorism has always had a complex genesis, and avoiding U.S. military presence would
address but one of the relevant complaints.34¶ Were the United States to embrace offshore balancing, it would actually aggravate some of those grievances
would make the United States more reliant on authoritarian
further. A true offshore balancing strategy

Arab regimes—like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan—as bulwarks of stability in the
region. It would imply an increase in military sales, intelligence partnerships, and
other support for these countries, and a tolerance for precisely the sort of friendly-dictators
approach that Muslim radicals deplore. In the same vein, while many offshore balancers call on Washington to distance itself from Israel, Colin Kahl of
Georgetown University and Marc Lynch of George Washington University have rightly noted that the logic of the strategy would certainly increase U.S.
dependence on that country as the strongest, friendliest military power in a very volatile region.35 In effect, then, offshore balancing would require
doubling down on policies which have long stoked jihadist resentment.¶ Offshore balancing represents a
problematic framework for counter-terrorism in other ways, too. As the aftermath of the U.S. drawdown in Iraq in 2011 demonstrated, removing U.S. forces
from a still-unstable situation can compromise counter-terrorism gains made to date and permit the insecurity in which extremist groups prosper.
Moreover, offshore balancing would weaken the infrastructure and partnerships that have been used to fight terrorist organizations. As Robert Art of
Brandeis University has written, America’s post-9/11 campaign in Afghanistan relied heavily on overseas bases and contingents that would presumably be
subject to reductions or liquidation under an offshore-balancing scenario. (The more recent anti-Islamic State campaign has also relied on such assets.)
Similarly,U.S. forward deployments and commitments have long provided leverage that
Washington can use to secure greater assistance on the “quieter phase of fighting terrorism”—the intelligence-
sharing, diplomatic cooperation, and other behind-the-scenes measures that are essential to countering extremist groups.36 Were the United

States to reduce its security posture, one would expect that this leverage would also shrink. In sum,
offshore balancing is no panacea regarding counterterrorism: it offers some advantages, but brings major liabilities as well.
 LeJ Weak
LeJ is weak – leadership is being easily killed – post-dating matters
Reuters 12/13 “Death toll in northwest Pakistan blast rises to 24,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-blast-idUSKBN0TW0BW20151213
(LeJ), an Islamist group whose sectarian
"This is revenge for the killing of Muslims by the Syrian president and Iran," said Ali bin Sufyan, spokesman for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

ideology is closely aligned with Islamic State. He was speaking to Reuters by phone.
Earlier this week Reuters reported that a Shi'ite unit of Pakistani fighters known as the Zeinabiyoun were joining the war against Islamic State in Syria. Many come from Parachinar,
which has a large Shi'ite population, unusual in Sunni-majority Pakistan.

Regional sources said there were hundreds of Pakistanis fighting in Syria.

Sufyan said Parachinar residents should not travel to Iran or Syria to fight in the war there on behalf of the Shi'ites.

The explicit linkage of the Pakistan bombing to the war in Syria will alarm Pakistani officials, who are keen to play down reports that Islamic State is seeking to establish a foothold in
their country.

A couple of small militant groups who splintered from the Pakistani Taliban pledged
allegiance to Islamic State, but they have not had much impact.
But across the border in Afghanistan, militants who split from the Taliban and pledged allegiance to IS have established training camps, taken over territory and clashed with the
Taliban.

Like Islamic State, which set up a cross-border caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, the LeJ wants to kill or expel Pakistan's minority Shi'ites and establish a Sunni theocracy.

The LeJ had once enjoyed the open support of Pakistan's powerful spy agency, the
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, but the group suffered a series of
setbacks this year.
The leader of LeJ, his two sons and several top officials were shot dead in police
custody this July; police say they were trying to escape. Last month another top LeJ commander was shot by
police while in custody.
 Pressure Now
Other Arab states are an alt cause and the US is already pressuring the
Saudis to stop funding the LeJ
Tony Cartalucci 13, geopolitical researcher and writer based in Bangkok, Destroying a
Nation State: US-Saudi Funded Terrorists Sowing Chaos in Pakistan, December 24, 2013,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/destroying-a-nation-state-us-saudi-funded-terrorists-
sowing-chaos-in-pakistan/5323295
In terms of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, as well as the infamous Lashkar-e-Taiba that carried out the 2008 Mumbai, India
attack killing over 160, both are affiliates of Al Qaeda, and both have been linked financially, directly to Saudi
Arabia. In the Guardian’s article, “WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists,” the US State Department
even acknowledges that Saudi Arabia is indeed funding terrorism in Pakistan: ¶ Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest
source of funds for Islamist militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba – but the
Saudi government is reluctant to stem the flow of money, according to Hillary Clinton.¶
“More needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qaida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist
groups,” says a secret December 2009 paper signed by the US secretary of state. Her memo urged US diplomats to
redouble their efforts to stop Gulf money reaching extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.¶
“Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide,” she said. ¶ Three
other Arab countries are listed as sources of militant money: Qatar, Kuwait and the
United Arab Emirates.¶ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has also been financially linked to the Persian Gulf
monarchies. Stanford University’s “Mapping Militant Organizations: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” states under “External Influences:”¶ LeJ
has received money from several Persian Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates[25] These countr ies
funded LeJ and other Sunni militant groups primarily to counter the rising influence of Iran’s revolutionary Shiism.
 Impact D
No state collapse --- family bonds, moderate culture, and resilient
institutions
Sunil Dasgupta 13 Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science
Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in
Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-
respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/
Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into
But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-
economic crisis’.

scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling
through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against
civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan,
tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements —
propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the
entire country.¶ Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal
institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural
conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s
resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to
do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war
demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements
, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil
do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future

war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

Iran
 Impact D
No impact to containment---US presence constrains Iran---competition
will occur within a regional framework
Imad Salamey 15, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the
Lebanese American University, Member of the Middle East Task Force on Religion, Identity,
and Counter Extremism at the Atlantic Council, and the President of the Center for Arab
Research and Development, “Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and
Engagement in a New Era,” August 2015,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20World%20-
%20Web.pdf
The nuclear agreement and its accompanying political and security ramifications have been describe d as a looming catastrophe by
skeptics, and a piece of masterful diplomacy by enthusiasts. Opponents fear that the deal will feed the Iranian appetite for expansionism
and encourage its pursuit of regional dominance. Proponents are pleased to avert military confrontation, and see this as an opportunity
for regional cooptation. Both sides agree, however, that a
‘New Deal Middle East’ is replacing the defunct
Sykes-Pico order. This rapprochement is sure to both refrain Iranian foreign policy
while simultaneously complicate the struggle for regional control. A contentious politics that will
considerably increase the superpowers’ leverage over regional players. At least three critical factors are framing the curren t discourse
and shaping future Iranian security relations with the Arab World.

The first of these factors is the fact that the

current regional stalemate has exposed the limitations
of Iran’s offensive power. Ultimately, Iran’s submitting to a nuclear deal, with the same conditions
that were offered to the reluctant regime more over a decade ago, is clear recognition of its own confinements.
Years of suffocating economic sanctions and multiple-front wars have depleted Iran’s resources
and brought its economy to its knees. Iran’s proxy wars have strengthened its strategic destabilization
capabilities and, consequently, contributed to its political bargaining power. These tactics, however, have failed win over or
stabilize a state. Worse, the investment cost has far exceeded any gains. Bashar Al Assad, Hassan Nassrallah, and Ali Abdallah
Salleh will never repay their dues. Victory for these proxies would have come at a much higher price: Iran would have had to offer a
Marshall Plan to rebuild, rehabilitate, and maintain what they have helped destroy.

Clearly, the limits of Iranian’s regionalism have been well established. It is further constrained by the stakes of other regional contenders
such as the KSA, Turkey and Israel, who have been proven to be capable and ready to sabotage Iran’s regional ambitions.

The second of these factors is that the agreement releases Iran from some political pressure. Not only
does it lessen the uncertainty caused by the snowballing collapse of totalitarian Arab regimes, but it also reduces the poten tial of a direct
military attack against its nuclear facilities. A
safer Iran boosts the opportunities for local moderates
to engage in negotiated settlements and normalize relations with its neighbors.
Ahmadinejad-Khamenei’s messianic crusade to prepare the world for redemption can now be domesticated by the realism of the
Rafsanjani-Khatami foreign policy doctrine and Rouhani’s negotiated nuclear agreement.

Domestic digestion of the immense financial rewards and international cooperation

opportunities will intensify internal disputes over the course of Iranian foreign policy. The centrality of the
Supreme Leader, his critical call to ‘export the revolution’ and his reliance on informal state networks to consolidate his theocratic rule
will continue to challenge state institutionalism. Guaranteeing Iran’s regional leverage with Shia communities, however, woul d certainly
help to curb the Wilayat al-Faqih’s adventurism.

Finally, the agreement will infuriate Arab-Iranian power struggle . Post-colonialism has left many Arab
states structurally deficient, deeply divided and chronically unstable. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen are a mong those states, leaving
them exposed to extensive foreign meddling. The struggle to control the oil market and strategic routes will only fuel sectar ian enmity
and exacerbate regional volatility. Iranian influence in contested states with substantial Shia presence will continue to grow at the
expense of traditional Sunni Arab influence.
Thus, a
New Deal Middle East will feature international recognition and incorporation
of Iran into regional power constellations, which will intensify rivalry to assert
dominance. At the same time, and in light of power constraints and regional
deadlock, the rewards attained will perpetuate Iran’s foreign and security
aspirations in the Arab World within an arranged and internationally determined code of
conduct.
 1NC Domestic Motives Alt Cause/Turn
Try or die for deterrence---Khamenei has inevitable domestic
motivations for sponsoring proxy wars, it’s only a question of whether
credible American power can deter escalation
Kenneth M. Pollack 14, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Ray
Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, “Near
Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-
north-africa/near-eastern-promises/p32891
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also worries about the potential effects of a nuclear deal,
although for different reasons. He has long agonized over the seductive influence of American
culture and fears that a constructive relationship between the United States and Iran
would subvert the theocratic state and taint Iran's revolutionary image in the
Muslim world. He has found more value in leading the rejectionist pack than in joining the global
order. Even if a nuclear deal emerged that interested him, he might feel that the only way to placate the hard-

liners he relies on would be to assure them that the agreement would not otherwise moderate Iranian foreign policy. He might even
try to secure their grudging acceptance of such a deal by promising them a freer hand to make mischief

abroad.¶ Consequently, it seems premature to assume that a nuclear accord with Iran will mean the end of Iranian regional aggression . But the
history of the region strongly suggests that the United States is the state best able to limit
Iran's aggressive efforts to overturn the regional status quo. Claims of Iranian
irrationality notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has always demonstrated an
unmistakable respect for American power. The Iranians are generally careful not to
cross explicit American redlines. They sometimes challenge and probe U.S. prohibitions, but when they meet
resistance, they usually step back, fearful of how Washington might react. Iran, for
example, has never kicked out the UN inspectors who monitor its nuclear program, and it

has never shipped its most lethal weapons to Iraqi Shiite militias or Hezbollah. There are a
small number of exceptions to this pattern, but they have typically proved the rule: the Iranians have crossed

American redlines only when they have misjudged their exact position or perceived
correctly that they were not truly red.¶ Tehran has no such respect for its regional
adversaries, whom the Iranians regard with contempt. The feelings are mutual, and thus without the United States there to
deter Iran and intercede on behalf of U.S. allies, there is a high probability of regional
crises that could escalate in unpredictable ways and threaten American interests, especially the price of oil.
 1NC Congress Alt Cause
Congressional provocations inevitable---empowers Iranian hardliners
Mahmoud Pargoo 12/28, PhD candidate at Australian Catholic University in Sydney, “Is
Congress empowering Iranian hard-liners?” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iran-hardliners-gain-visa-waiver-program-
changes.html
Hassan Rouhani, who sternly criticized Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies, won the election and appointed Mohammad Javad Zarif as foreign minister. Consequently, and as a result of the
softening of the rhetoric and engagement in talks with the United States, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and six world powers in July. The

Khamenei
agreement was seen as evidence that if Iran engages in serious talks with the United States, issues can be gradually solved. Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

pointed to the likelihood of extending negotiations to other non-nuclear issues if the

United States proves to be trustworthy.¶ This line of thinking, however, is changing with
the recent series of US measures — including the recent congressional vote to
restrict visa-free travel to the United States for those who have visited Iran in the past five
years. Indeed, many in Iran are coming to the conclusion that no matter what rhetoric or
action the Islamic Republic may assume, the United States will continue its enmity with
Iran. Thus, a new consensus is being formed — but this time, against the United States. People from almost all
political orientations have interpreted the new Visa Waiver Program (VWP) changes as running
counter to the JCPOA. Ali Larijani, the parliament speaker and a powerful conservative supporter of the nuclear negotiations, has criticized the law, while many
Reformist politicians have also condemned it as being against Iranian goodwill in engaging with the United States. Zarif, the foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, has

an alarming sign that

additionally said that the new law breaches the JCPOA.¶ When seen in the light of historical parallels, the recent developments could be

certain elements in the US foreign policy establishment are seeking to paralyze

[undermine] any effort to normalize relations with Iran.¶ Indeed, the reality is that previous efforts on the part of Iran
to engage in strategic dialogue with the United States have been to no avail. In 2001, two weeks after the fall of Kabul, an Iranian delegation attended the Bonn Conference, where it
engaged in talks with the United States over the future of Afghanistan. Describing the Iranian delegation’s cooperation at that time, James Dobbins, who was then the White House’s
special envoy for Afghanistan, said, “All these delegations proved helpful. None was more so than the Iranians.”¶ Iran was hoping that those talks would extend to a broader range of
issues, as former National Security Council, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency official Flynt Leverett has said, but “that channel was effectively foreclosed when
President [George W.] Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address labeled Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil.'” Indeed, that metaphor was utilized by hard-liners in Tehran to torpedo
Reformists who were in favor of engagement with the West.¶ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham have studied the impact of the “axis of evil” discourse on the internal politics
of Iran, concluding that it “strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives vis-a-vis reformers.” The main problem with the metaphor was that it targeted “entire countries” —
including their peoples — rather than problematic policies, or even political leaders. Hence, “the metaphor mobilized the entire country — including ‘friends’ of the US.” Reflecting on
the ultimate effect of the “axis of evil” discourse, Heradstveit and Bonham concluded that it had “become a powerful rhetorical tool for mobilizing the ultra-conservative and anti-

the congressional vote to revise the VWP is a godsend for Iranian

democratic forces in Iran.Ӧ Similarly,

conservatives — especially as the country is about to hold important parliamentary

elections in February. For hard-liners, and many others in Iran, the recent
congressional measures are evidence of that the United States will not cease its enmity with
Iranians. In this vein, the argument is that moderates and Reformists are wrong about that the United States’ enmity is at least partly because of the anti-American rhetoric of
conservatives, but rather as Ayatollah Khamenei stated in May 2014, “The enmity of our enemies is rooted in the resistance of the Islamic Republic against global arrogance and
against the hideous habit of dividing the world into the oppressor and the oppressed. Other issues are excuses. Today, their excuse is the nuclear issue. One day, their excuse is human
rights and another day, their excuse is something else.Ӧ History has shown that US Republicans prefer Iranian hard-liners over moderates and Reformists when it comes to foreign
policy. This has never been more evident than when 47 Republican senators wrote a letter to Iranian lawmakers in March. US President Barack Obama did not exaggerate when he
said, “They [Iranian hard-liners] do have much more in common with the [US] hard-liners.”¶ More than ever before, the de facto alignment of Iranian and American hard-liners came
into focus during the nuclear negotiations. Former Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi, who now serves as an adviser to Rouhani, talked about the shared interests of Iranian extremists
with those of US and Israeli extremists. “Today, the approach of extremists of Iran is the same as the extremists like Netanyahu, the GOP and the American Congress,” Younesi said.¶
Today, moderates are at a historical crossroads in Iran: Their nuclear initiative — the biggest foreign policy issue after the 1979 Islamic Revolution — has been proven to be a success.
Rouhani has curbed inflation from 34.7% in 2013 to almost single digits. Economic growth is also predicted to increase to 5% by next year, as sanctions are set to be lifted under the

hard-liners have also

JCPOA. Almost all grounds for a stunning moderate and Reformist victory in the coming parliamentary elections are in place. Yet,

started a counteroffensive to recapture ground that has been lost to Reformists and
moderates. Nothing could have helped hard-liners in Tehran more than the VWP
changes. Once again, Republicans in the United States betray Reformists and moderates in Iran.
 GCC Turn
The Middle East won’t just magically stabilize itself---the aff makes every
metric of regional stability and cooperation worse---causes nuclear war
George P. Schultz 15, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover
Institution, former secretary of state, with Henry Kissinger, “No Sign of Restraint,” Hoover
Digest, 2015, No. 3, Summer, http://www.hoover.org/research/no-sign-restraint
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of
Iran’s three and a half decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an
opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in
government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle
East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and
a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposescongruent
definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the United States
are remotely near such an under-standing. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has
declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its supreme leader) continue to
profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some
senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means .
The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and
entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in
multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran
occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless
political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic
transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than
Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s, or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies
will conclude that the United States has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence
to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if
necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends
toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse, and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an
irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from
Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current
administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East
will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of
Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance-of-power theory suggests the need to bolster
the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic con-sequences. Nuclear arms must
not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel
deepening American involvement.
If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the United States must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability
requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international
community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the
Middle East and challenge the broader international order.
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the pro- jected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the
world’s challenges in the region. Rather
than enabling US disengagement from the Middle East, the
nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on
complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.

Maintaining presence is key to assurance and effective multilateral

security efforts---the plan fragments collective action and causes
escalating instability---turns the whole case
Jon B. Alterman 12, CSIS senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global
Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at CSIS, “The Gulf
Cooperation Council States,” chapter 5 of Gulf Kaleidoscope: Reflections on the Iranian
Challenge, ed. Jon Alterman, May 2012,
http://csis.org/files/publication/120518_%20Alterman_GulfKaleidoscope_Web.pdf
The complication in all of this is that the
instinct of many countries is to follow the U nited States
reluctantly rather than to lead emphatically on Middle East security issues. Russia and China are
the most troubling in this regard. While neither country has a preference for a nuclear Iran, neither seeks a dominant and tr iumphant
United States, either. Each country seems destined to create some friction with the United States on Iran. At the same time, neither
country has a preference for all-out war, which would threaten regional stability and also hold out the prospect of no counterbalance to
U.S. influence in the Gulf. One
of the ways that the United States can sustain international unity is to
remind all parties that it retains a war option while doing everything possible to find
diplomatic alternatives to exercising it.¶ The GCC governments are unlikely to be wholly pleased with such an approach,
because it leaves them in a state of some uncertainty. Even less likely to be satisfied is the government of Israel, which ha s staked out a
position that it faces an existential threat from Iran. Winning these countries’ acquiescence
in the longer term,
and persuading each that the U.S. policy is one taken deliberately and out of strength
rather one taken idly out of weakness, will be a major challenge. Essential to each is persuading
them that the United States retains the capability and intention of pursuing other options
should collective action fail.¶ Such an outcome would fall short of full success, and regional tensions would remain—and
some say they would remain intolerable. Iran would be an enduring problem that needed to be managed. For those seeking a “solution”
to the Iran problem, it is not that. If the alternative is complete success, the middle ground would count as failure. ¶ Yet, achieving
complete success is both unlikely and unverifiable. With no agreed starting point and no clear ending
point, and a host of contingencies in between, there seems little way to avoid at least some period of
deeper uncertainty in efforts to change Iranian behavior.¶ The task, really, is to thread the needle
between the many, many ways to fail on Iran , versus the scant number of ways to succeed. Defining success
too narrowly moves it well beyond reach; defining it too broadly leaves the world a more dangerous place for decades to come. The
fact that the world has a stake in this creates a powerful incentive for cooperation,
especially given the alternatives.¶ As this volume has made clear, there are few who view collective action as either
the most desirable course or a task for which they have much appetite. In most situations, many countries seek their own waivers for
self-interested action, while asking others to sacrifice for the benefit of the whole. Collective action will prolong tensions rather than end
them. Yet, efforts
to drive a collective effort on Iran hold out the prospect of achieving
the best outcomes, especially over a five- or ten-year period. There are a wide variety of imponderables in the intervening
period—not least having to do with the gyrations of oil prices and the demonstration effects of political change in the Arab world, plus
the potential for generational change in Gulf leaderships and in Iran itself—that could shape outcomes in unpredictable ways. Some hold
out the prospect of changing the motivations of the Iranian government. At the very least, they will present opportunities for influencing
Iranian decisionmaking. International
solidarity increases the odds of efficacy in this regard.¶
Essential to all of this is that the United States maintains its military role in the Gulf and
sustains the role it plays as a principal guarantor of regional security. Were it to
cease to do so, it would risk greater conflict, as Israelis, Gulf Arabs and the Iranians
themselves tested the new bounds of their behavior. It would also send a signal about U.S. commitment to
energy security, making it harder for the United States to retain any durable presence in the region (as Britain knows after its 1971
withdrawal “East of Suez”). Clumsily done, regional states will see the United States as a necessarily evil whose presence is resented and
tolerated only so long as it serves short-term interests. In such an environment, regional states would expect the United States to devote
extraordinary resources to sustaining a system that deals with Iranian threats, while each seeks official and unofficial avenues to pursue
their own policies in ways that undermine U.S. efforts. Skillfully
done, the United States will transition to a
different kind of regional leadership. In this scenario, regional states would not only
welcome the U.S. role but actively support it. They would understand the broader context and the alternatives,
and they would have confidence that their solidarity would make acceptable outcomes more likely. ¶ It is hard to foresee any scenario in
which the United States would wholly neglect any of the strategies described here—engagement, containment, and deterrence. It is
likely, instead, to pursue them in different measure depending on circumstances. Ensuring
that allies and other powers feel
as much a stake in the strategies as they do in the outcomes does not guarantee success, but it
makes success far more likely.
2NC
Coop CP
 LET A/O
No nuclear escalation even if they win a high-magnitude internal link
Sumit Ganguly 14, professor of Political Science at the Indiana University, Bloomington
where he holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations and
directs the Center on American and Global Security, interviewed by DW, Deutsche Welle,
Germany’s international broadcast network, 10/9/14, “Analyst: 'Pakistan is likely testing
Modi's resolve',” http://www.dw.de/analyst-pakistan-is-likely-testing-modis-resolve/a-
17982537
Indian and Pakistani troops continued to exchange heavy fire over their border in the
divided Himalayan region of Kashmir on Wednesday, October 8, leading to the death of five more civilians. The area, claimed in its entirety by the nuclear-
armed neighbors, has been the scene of some of the most intense fighting between the two countries in years, with both sides trading accusations of
targeting civilians and violating a border truce. A total of nine Pakistani and eight Indian civilians have been killed since fighting erupted more than week
ago, according to media reports. India and Pakistan have fought two wars over the territory which is
currently divided along a disputed border, known as the Line of Control (LoC). The latest outbreak of hostilities comes after New Delhi called off peace talks
Ganguly, India expert and
with Islamabad last month following Pakistan's consultation with Indian Kashmiri separatist leaders. Sumit

professor of Political Science at the Indiana University Bloomington says in a DW interview that while
the current escalation is a reflection of the current state of bilateral ties, it is unlikely that

the cross-border shelling will escalate into a major conflict as both sides seem aware

of the enormous human and material cost this would have. DW: Who do you believe is responsible for the
latest flare-up of violence along the border? Sumit Ganguly: It is hard to apportion blame. However, I suspect that it stems from the recent breakdown in

Pakistani and Indian troops are said to regularly exchange fire along
talks between the two countries.

the disputed border. What are the main reasons behind this? Simply stated because a cease-fire agreement has long expired, Pakistan's
military is probably ramping up for renewed hostilities as it turns its gaze eastwards given the impending withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. It
is also, in all likelihood, testing the resolve of the Modi government. What impact will the latest ceasefire violations have on the ties between the two

countries? Not much. Relations are already at fairly low ebb. There were hopes of a thawing in ties following Modi's
the peace talks between the two
invitation to Sharif to attend his inauguration as prime minister in May. But after that

countries were canceled as Abdul Basit, the Pakistani ambassador to India, chose to invite Kashmiri separatists on the eve of the talks
despite a clear injunction from New Delhi not to do so. What are the chances of such violations escalating into a major conflict? I doubt that it

will escalate as both sides are well aware of the costs thereof. The costs would be both
human and material and would be worse for Pakistan given the dire state of its
economy, its internal disorder and its lack of substantial external supporters barring China
and Saudi Arabia. Even the Chinese may have second thoughts about supporting Islamabad.

Peace talks now solve the impact

Ayaz Gul 15, 2/14/15, VOA News, Call Could Ease India-Pakistan Tensions,
www.voanews.com/content/phone-call-tension-india-pakistan/2644371.html
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s move to revive contacts with neighboring
Pakistan by phoning his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, is being widely welcomed as a good
omen for easing regional tensions.¶ Bilateral relations have been particularly tense since August, when New Delhi abruptly
canceled high-level peace talks with Islamabad. It cited a meeting between Pakistan's top diplomat in New Delhi and separatist Kashmiri leaders, contacts
India previously had never objected to.¶ The suspension of the dialogue led to deadly military clashes along the so-called Line of Control dividing the
Himalayan region, in violation of a 2003 cease-fire.¶ Pakistan's military on Saturday again accused Indian forces of opening “unprovoked" fire, saying it had
killed a civilian in Pakistani Kashmir.¶ Visit by foreign secretary¶ However, Modi’s call to Sharif on Friday has raised hope that tensions will subside in the
coming days. Officials in both countries said the Indian leader told Sharif he would soon send his foreign secretary to Islamabad and other regional capitals. ¶
The Pakistani prime minister, while speaking to reporters Saturday, briefly discussed the conversation.¶ He said Modi
wanted to resume the bilateral dialogue. He added that Pakistan will talk to the Indian foreign secretary when he comes to
 Obama’s recent visit to India might have played a role in
Islamabad.¶ Some analysts say that President Barack

persuading Modi to re-engage with Pakistan. A day before the Indian leader called Sharif, the Pakistani leader spoke by
phone with Obama. ¶ Mushahid Hussain, who chairs the Pakistani Senate Defense Affairs Committee, said several things led to Modi's bid to restart contacts
with Pakistan.¶ Modi's domestic position "is no longer unassailable," Hussain said. "It has become somewhat shaky after two elections which he was
expected to win and which he did not. Secondly, I think it is very clear that Obama did push and prod Modi to resume the dialogue process, because Obama
needs Pakistan for stabilizing Afghanistan.”

No India-Pakistan nuclear escalation from shelling or terrorism

Jaideep Prabhu 14, writer for DNA India, 10/11/14, “Why India's recent response to
Pakistan's ceasefire violation is a welcome change,”
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/analysis-why-india-s-recent-response-to-pakistan-s-
ceasefire-violation-is-a-welcome-change-2025269
Last week,the Pakistani Army started shelling Indian positions along the Line of Control -
This is a customary tactic for aiding terrorists to cross
the de facto border between India and Pakistan.

over from Pakistan - occupied Kashmir into India. What was not usual, however, was India's response to its neighbour's violation of the
border and ceasefire agreement - Delhi ordered its Border Security Force to take all appropriate

measures to subdue the enemy offensive. Indian troops responded to the Pakistani
firing on their posts with a barrage of artillery fire that has destroyed several of the
Pakistani Army's permanent positions along the LoC. Several civilians have also been killed in border towns on
both sides as both armies tried to take their intimidation directly to the civilians. Predictably, there have also been several counsels of restraint and
proportionate response with concern expressed about escalation implicitly alluding to Pakistan's low nuclear threshold. While such analysis has been the
mainstay of international and domestic commentary during every skirmish between the two South Asian neighbours, it has little to offer by way of solutions:
we all understand that war is bad, that precious national resources are wasted on armaments, and that conflict
escalation between nuclear rivals has horrific worst-case scenarios. But what does
one do, short of abject surrender and supplication, to pacify a crisis driven nuclear state that engages in
asymmetric warfare? The Modi government has refused to become a victim of escalation
terror and so far responded well to the situation. By not expanding the scope of the
firefight yet increasing its intensity until it delivered tangible results - the destruction of
permanent posts - India has forced Pakistan to either back down or be responsible for

further escalation . This is undoubtedly an unstable situation, relying on Islamabad for peace to prevail. However, the nuclearisation of the
Islamic Republic - with tacit approval from the United States and direct assistance from China - has removed the ball from India's court in a large way. The

fear of conflict escalation to nuclear proportions is not insignificant but has been exaggerated
beyond reason . It is nothing short of nuclear terrorism by Pakistan to hold the slightest Indian military action, even static defensive
manoeuvres, as grounds for nuclear release. There can be little existential threat perception In Islamabad without a corresponding Indian deployment of
A robust
additional troops on the LoC, cancellation of personnel leave, air force readiness, and the several other telltale signs of preparations for war.

response to cross-border firing or infiltration alone hardly qualifies as escalation. In

reality, Islamabad's nuclear threshold must necessarily be higher to allow
operational and diplomatic flexibility. It is unlikely military planners in Delhi take
Pakistan's stated posture any more seriously than military planners in Islamabad do
India's doctrine of massive retaliation.
Zero chance of solvency---LeT is embedded into the Pakistani state and
funding is inevitable
Geoffrey Kambere 11, Naval Postgraduate School CTFP Fellow, “The Financing of Lashkar-
e-Taiba”, 2011 was last date cited, https://globalecco.org/ctx-v1n1/lashkar-e-taiba
Most observers claim that the LeT is a terrorist group supported by the Pakistani state. Ashley Tellis
believes "itis important to end the farce of treating these entities as if they are truly free
agents, acting on their own accord, un-tethered to the state organs from which they derive protection, succor, and
support."[31]¶ Likewise, Bill Roggio, a managing editor of The Long War Journal, attests that " LeT receives support from
Pakistan's military and its intelligence service."[32] In addition, Tankel, writing for the New American
Foundation, asserts that Pakistani financial and organizational support to LeT increased
significantly during the 1990s.[33] Furthermore, Abubakar Siddique argues that LeT was able to expand quickly and
launch jihad in the contested area of Himalayan Kashmir in the 1990s because it had been encouraged by Pakistan's army to do so.[34]
As a final example of state sponsorship, Jyoti Trehan claims that the ISI
gives both genuine and counterfeit
money directly to LeT.[35]¶ Despite evidence of Pakistan's support to militant groups including LeT, Pakistan denies the
allegations. After 9/11, Musharraf was forced to act against indigenous-based militants in Kashmir; however, his actions were
questionable because LeT and JeM continued to operate beyond the "Line of Control (LoC)" in the contentious Kashmir area. As
reported:¶ Pakistan has refused to crack down on homegrown terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, despite
their covert and overt support for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terror groups. Inside Pakistan's military and intelligence services,
which are the real powers in Pakistan, groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are seen as "strategic" depth against India,
and are used as instruments of foreign policy.[36] ¶ However, Tankel claims that the Pakistan government's direct support to LeT via ISI
started to diminish in 2002 following international pressure and the threat of war with India.[37] ¶ Charities¶ LeT
exploits
JuD's social welfare organization with its more than 50,000 registered members to
spread its influence and to raise funds.[38] Within Pakistan, donation boxes are placed in
many JuD offices and shops spread out all over the country, and at public gatherings, where
money is solicited for the continuation of LeT's ideology and to celebrate the martyrdom of
fighters.[39]¶ For example, within Europe, Britain is a major center for fundraising for LeT because of its very large Pakistani immigrant
population.[40] But some of the
money raised for JuD charitable activities is used to finance
LeT's operations; in fact, funding for the plot to use liquid bombs to detonate transatlantic aircraft in 2006 was funneled
through the charities that raised funds in British mosques for earthquake victims in 2005.[41] Additionally, JuD officials of ten travel to
Saudi Arabia seeking donations for new schools at highly inflated costs that in turn are directed to fund LeT militant operations.[42] ¶
LeT also receives charitable aid directly, especially from donors in Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states. According to Jonathan Fighel, Saudi Arabia covertly supports and promotes the "Saudi-Wahabbi political and
religious influence in the Sunni Muslim world"[43] through its worldwide network of charities. LeT is one beneficiary.[44] In Kuwait, the
Revival of Islamic Society has also provided direct support to al-Qaeda and LeT.[45]¶ Businesses¶ LeT
controls many
legitimate businesses, including fish farms, a hospital, a market, agricultural tracts, mobile clinics, and ambulance
services.[46] The "farmers and labor wing" at JuD is responsible for the collection of ushr, an
Islamic land tax, which is compulsory for farmers who must contribute 10 percent of
their total produce to charity for the provision of essential services , especially in areas where
the government of Pakistan has failed to provide those social services.[47] Notably, the group collects hides of most of the animals
slaughtered during the holy festivals of Eid al-Adha and sells them for a profit.[48] This practice has emerged as a big boost to the group's
income as it is estimated that during each Eid festival at least 1.2 million animal hides are collected.[49] ¶ Illegal Activities¶ LeT's
illegal fundraising activities include false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, Commented [CO4]:
and involvement in the drug trade. With false trade invoicing, the LeT overcharges for its goods or services. For
example, the group sometimes adds an extra "5 to 10 Pakistani rupees for the jihad to
the bill especially when selling various Jihadi publications ."[50] Conversely, under-invoicing occurs
when Kashmiri carpet dealers reduce the value of their exports to Gulf countries, and the difference in the true value of the merchandise
and the value shown on the invoice returns to India through the hawala channel.[51] ¶ Counterfeiters
have enabled
LeT to raise money by integrating the genuine money being brought across the
border into Kashmir with counterfeit money.[52] Extortion of money from the local population is also
common with corrupt officials in the Jammu and Kashmir region.[53] There are limited reports of LeT direct
involvement in drug trafficking. However, given LeT's geographic location, the group is almost certainly tempted to be involved in
narcotics smuggling because of the huge profit potential, and because there are fewer restrictions than with money received t hrough
state sponsorship and donations.[54] Some sources say increasing trade in narcotics, in addition to state sponsorship, has enabled Le T to
maintain its terrorism activities.[55] In 2002, there was a huge harvest of opium on the border between Afghanistan and Pakis tan that
was estimated to be 5,000 tons by international agencies.[56] This yield was refined into injectable heroin in laboratories a nd smuggled
by ISI narcotic smugglers; the harvest's estimated worth of $2.5 billion USD is reportedly being used by Pakistan to support the Taliban
and terrorism in J&K.[57]
Saudi DA
 Assurance UQ
The GCC is sufficiently assured to still work with the US---most recent
dialogue
James F. Jeffrey 11/3, Philip Solondz distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute, “The
Manama Dialogue: Searching for Unity in the Face of Chaos,” 11/3/15,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-manama-dialogue-
searching-for-unity-in-the-face-of-chaos
[Jubeir = Saudi foreign minister]
From October 30 to November 1, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) convened its annual Manama
Dialogue, the flagship forum for Middle Eastern defense and security officials and
their foreign partners. This year's dialogue sought to inventory the multiple crises shaking the region and demonstrate unity amid threats
from seemingly all directions. One result was a sense of solidarity , at least among government officials, as well as a

new reluctance to criticize the United States or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries for the unhappy state of affairs. The
main takeaway message was clear: "Things are so serious that we all have to hang together."¶ Indeed, the 2015
dialogue took place in the most dramatic regional security environment since the conferences began over a decade ago. While last year's gathering focused
this year's discussions were held in the shadow of many other stunning
on the critical ISIS threat,

developments -- the Iran nuclear deal, Russia's military engagement in Syria and de facto alliance with Iran, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen,
political crisis in Turkey, potential conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and continued fears of American withdrawal from the region or security
rapprochement with Tehran. In various ways, the conference demonstrated a new sense of unity and
purpose among the United States, its European allies, and the GCC states, four of whose six leaders had voted with their
feet by avoiding the Obama administration's Camp David summit mere months ago in protest of the pending Iran deal. ¶ HIGH ATTENDANCE¶ The

attention that conferences like this generate beyond military officers, defense firm representatives, and GCC officials
typically signals the level of concern among the states involved and the international media. This year's
unusually high attendance by senior officials and journalists suggests deep concern .
Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi opened the proceedings with a keynote speech. Although his remarks were routine -- and perhaps more in line with
The
the worldview of his GCC financiers than with his actual policies back home -- his presence alone demonstrated the appeal of this year's conference.¶

United States also sent a strong delegation led by CENTCOM head Gen. Lloyd Austin and Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken,
while the European officials in attendance included Germany's impressive defense minister Ursula von der Leyen and British foreign secretary Philip
Hammond. Among the usual gaggle of Middle Eastern officials was Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir, who came directly from the Syria talks in Vienna
and was easily the most dynamic presence at the event. ¶ SYRIA, NOT ISIS, IS THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM ¶ The Syrian crisis was the dialogue's most
salient theme, with a prominent role given to Khaled Khoja, president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. On that note,
Jubeir provided a detailed description of the Vienna talks. Although he was upbeat, he made clear that the talks had not achieved any breakthrough, and that
Saudi officials still believe the solution boils down to two ultimatums: "When does Bashar al-Assad go?" and "When do the 'occupying forces' (his definition:
Iran and Russia) leave?" On other Syria issues, he indicated room for compromise. But he insisted on a clear timeline -- up to six months for a new
government without Assad to be formed, and eighteen to twenty-four months for that new government to produce a new constitution and hold elections. He
characterized the Iranian and Russian position at Vienna as follows: Assad will only go if he is voted out in those elections, an argument that Jubeir roundly
rejected.¶ Blinken was also strong on the "Assad must go" theme but remained general on the details. He presented the standard Obama administration line
that the Russians were not succeeding in Syria and would soon find themselves bogged down in high costs and fading rapport with the Arab world. Many in
the audience challenged him here -- when he was accused of "subcontracting" the Syria job to the Russians (i.e., in the belief that combat fatigue would
eventually compel them to compromise on Assad's fate), he cited the supposedly potent indirect effect that new U.S.-trained anti-ISIS fighters would have on
the Assad regime. When pressed, however, he failed to clarify what exactly Washington's policy would be if such fighters were to fight Assad's forces directly.
the Saudi and U.S. positions on major issues at Vienna were very
He and Jubeir both suggested that

close, though other views sourced to Turkish officials suggested that there is more divergence, with Washington taking a softer line on when Assad
should go.¶ EMPHASIZING IRAN'S AGGRESSION, NOT THE NUCLEAR DEAL¶ Despite the specific focus on Syria, the real worry for most attendees was the
threat emanating from Iran's aggressiveness in the wake of the nuclear deal (or, as Jubeir described it, Tehran's "thirty-year record of aggression"). Russia's
intervention garnered heavy criticism in large part because many saw it as a deliberate empowerment of Iran's regional designs. Blinken confirmed that the
United States was ready to counter destabilizing Iranian activity throughout the Middle East, citing numerous examples of cooperation with regional
partners on military, intelligence, and diplomatic matters, including Yemen. ¶ The nuclear deal itself received little attention. Jubeir put the issue at least
temporarily to rest by claiming that the agreement had dealt with the Iranian nuclear threat "for the moment." For his part, Blinken asserted that America's
role in placing nuclear restraints on Iran was further proof of its engagement on regional security. He also asserted that the agreement was solely
transactional and would not engender U.S. reluctance to confront Iran. ¶ AMERICA IS BACK -- MAYBE¶ While skepticism about U.S. intentions and staying
power ran through the audience, Blinken worked hard to emphasize Washington's engagement . His
message was blurred somewhat when he twice invoked the administration shibboleth that those who call for a more active American military role in the
region are essentially longing for a new Iraq quagmire (i.e., when he spoke of "large-scale, open-ended interventions" and "vast unintended consequences").
Jubeir who most
Nevertheless, he and General Austin wasted no opportunity to reinforce America's commitment and presence. ¶ Here again it was

effectively argued the "America is still with us" theme. He rejected arguments that
the temporary withdrawal of the last U.S. aircraft carrier in the region signaled a wider pull-out, and
spent considerable time echoing Blinken's praise for the U.S.-GCC military and
intelligence cooperation that has flowed from the Camp David summit (which King Salman pointedly did not attend). He even asserted
that bilateral cooperation against Iran had reached unprecedented levels. Recent U.S. military moves -- retaking Kunduz, keeping
forces in Afghanistan, having Special Forces participate in a raid in northern Iraq, and the decision to deploy Special Forces on the ground in Syria --
undoubtedly played a role in shaping this mood of solidarity .

Military commitment increasing now---solves assurance

Lara Seligman 11/8, defense reporter for Defense News, “Commander: US Navy Won’t
Back Down From Gulf,” 11/8/15, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-
daily/dubai-air-show/2015/11/08/commander-us-navy-wont-back-down-
gulf/75413122/
As geopolitical tensions reverberate across the Arabian Gulf, the US Navy
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates —

has no plans to back down, a top naval official said Sunday.¶ As the tip of the spear, the Navy has its most
advanced weapons technology ready for use in the Gulf.¶ The 5th Fleet is operating a
powerful laser weapons system, capable of destroying or disabling targets with dazzling accuracy, just off the coast
of Iran, according to Vice Adm. Kevin "Kid" Donegan, commander of Naval Forces Central Command. The new laser, deployed from the Afloat Forward
Staging Base Ponce, is a pivotal asset to defend against ballistic missiles, small attack boats and UAVs. ¶ Donegan told Defense News in a Nov. 8 interview at
the Dubai Air Show that his commanders have permission to use the weapon if a critical situation arises. He would not specify the rules of engagement for
the Navy is
the laser, but indicated the Navy is ready to use the weapon to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. ¶ In addition,

aggressively adding ships to the Gulf region in the next few years. By 2020, the 5th
Fleet will grow from 30 ships to 40 ships, Donegan said.¶ “We are definitely not leaving the region,” he said. “You are not
going to see the Navy leaving this region anytime soon.”¶ Donegan’s comments come at a critical point for US

relations in the region, with critics openly accusing the Pentagon of pulling out of the fight against the Islamic State. ¶ The number of
reported airstrikes by the US in Syria dropped after Russia began flying in the region, going from an average of seven strikes a day in August to less than four
strikes a day in October. The Pentagon has denied that Russia's presence has been the driver for that dip in strikes, instead blaming a series of factors
including an increased focus of US airpower on Iraq and environmental factors.¶ Adding to the perception that the US is drawing down forces in the Gulf,
the Navy currently has no carrier presence in the region . The USS Theodore Roosevelt left the Gulf in October,
marking the first time since 2007 the Navy hasn’t had a carrier deployed to the 5th Fleet's area of operations. The Roosevelt’s relief, the USS Harry S.
Truman, isn’t expected to arrive in the Gulf until this winter, leaving a carrier gap of at least two months. ¶ Some see the Roosevelt’s departure as a blow to
anti-ISIS operations. The Roosevelt carrier strike group carried out 1,812 combat sorties and expended 1,085 precision-guided munitions against ISIS,
the Navy
according to the Navy. Commanders can’t completely replace the capability the carrier and its airwing bring to the fight, Donegan said. ¶ But

is working hard to mitigate the impact of the temporary carrier gap on anti-ISIS
operations, Donegan said. Between US and coalition ships, for instance the French Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, the Navy has
about 30 vessels to 40 vessels in the region , in the US Central Command area of responsibility, he said. This includes
amphibious strike groups — which can deploy fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft — Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, mine-sweeping vessels and 10 coastal
patrol ships.¶ “You can’t completely replace what that kind of ship and airwing bring, not just in firepower but in situational awareness, understanding the
operational picture, but we’ve been able to do a pretty good job mitigating it,” Donegan said.¶ French leaders last week said it would deploy the Charles de
Gaulle carrier and a carrier strike group to boost its operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Donegan said the US has strong cooperation with
the French.¶ "Absolutely we are coordinating with the French. Each country that comes to the region, we work with them because we have some common
interests and where we have common interests we work together," he said. "Their team is very experienced in this region and in fact this will be the second
time in the same year they’ve been back."¶ On whether the de Gaulle's presence will fill the carrier gap, Donegan said the coalition nations are working to
coordinate their schedules. ¶ The two navies also have an agreement to operate their aircraft from each other’s carriers, Donegan said. ¶ "We actually have a
program where we they land on our ships and we land on theirs, so we've been doing that for a while,” Donegan said. “So we have really good
interoperability with the French.” ¶ The US Navy may also look to the UK in future to help protect the region. Speaking at the Dubai Airshow on Nov. 8, Phillip
Dunne, UK defense procurement minister, told reporters that the Gulf will be a focus of the upcoming Strategic Defense and Security Review, and indicated it
will likely contain an emphasis on increased presence in the region, which could eventually involve the UK’s two new aircraft carriers.¶ “I point you again to
the [SDSR], to see what more will be done, not just in this region but elsewhere within areas of NATO operations, for the UK to play a leading role,” Dunne
said. “As you know, we are in the process of building two aircraft carriers, which — when they are operational — will restore a very significant carrier strike
capability to the armed forces, which will give us potentially a full spectrum response.” ¶ Asked whether that means the UK could fill some of the “void” left
by the United States' perceived withdrawal from the region, Dunne was flat in his opinion.¶ “We don’t see the US as having left a void in the region,” he said. ¶
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubair also argued that the Pentagon’s presence in the
region has increased, despite the Roosevelt’s departure.¶ "The strategic agreement with the United States
has not changed. The American presence in the region has in fact increased whether an
aircraft carrier has been withdrawn or not,” Al-Jubair said at the Institute of Strategic Studies' Manama Dialogue earlier this month, adding that the

number of US troops in the region is almost at a record high. "I would say America’s
commitment to Gulf security when we measure it by what the US is doing and
providing and how the GCC states and the US are working , is at an all-time high. I would not
measure it by one aircraft carrier leaving the Gulf.Ӧ The US and Gulf nations are also now implementing

agreements to intensify cooperation in cybersecurity, military cooperation,

intelligence sharing, ballistic missile defense and maritime security, Al-Jubair said.¶ Aleksandar
Jovovic, principal at Avascent, said the optics of the Roosevelt’s withdrawal from the Gulf are “less than optimal,” but the ship’s

departure does not indicate the US is drawing down from the region .¶ “I don’t think the US

government has any intention of disengaging from the region anytime soon ,” he said. “All signs

point to the US wanting to maintain that pressure on ISIL .”

 Prolif Impact
No defense---lack of C&C and poly-nuclear strategic dynamics
Shmuel Bar 13, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel,
February, “The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast,” Hoover Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a military nuclear capability may fail
The likelihood that the current

a “poly-nuclear” Middle East, which may include

has raised debate in academic and strategic communities regarding the implications of

after Iran states such as Saudi Arabia (under the current or a future more-jihadi-oriented regime), Turkey, Egypt (under the Muslim Brotherhood
regime), Syria (or a successor state/states thereof), Iraq (or successor states) and Libya. Some respected strategic

theorists regard the Cold War experience as highly relevant to such a scenario and point at the fears that permeated the
western military establishments of a nuclear China and the fact that a nuclear Indian subcontinent did not result in nuclear war, despite mutual hostility and frequent outbreaks of

crisis. Kenneth Waltz even suggests that the very possession of nuclear weapons tempers military adventurism
and inculcates a degree of strategic responsibility commensurate with the grave consequences that would result from nuclear conflict.1¶ However, two decades after the Cold War, it

it was not only deterrence based on mutually assured destruction (mad) that prevented outbreak of nuclear
is clear that

war between the two superpowers, but also the stringent procedures of command and
control over the nuclear arsenals that reduced the risks of their use in escalation scenarios or unauthorized use. Furthermore, it is clearer today than during the Cold War that
the “culture” of command and control differed considerably in the different nuclear countries

and was influenced by military structure, political culture, and levels of confidence of the political leadership in the military.2 Therefore, even if we assume that the

leaderships of the region will normally wish to avoid nuclear confrontation , it

behooves us to explore the command, control, communication (c3) and Intelligence (c3i) capabilities that may be applied in these
countries. ¶ There are no indications that any Middle Eastern Muslim country — with the
possible exception of Iran — has begun to develop a doctrine for use and command and control of such weapons. In
the veteran nuclear powers, such doctrines and command and control systems developed over the years through constant processes of design, planning and exercises, and

In the types of regimes that exist in the Middle East, on the other hand, it is
involvement of the academic community.

such methodical planning will not take place and doctrine will evolve
reasonable to assume that

through discussions between the leadership and a small circle of trusted advisors. The chosen paradigms of
command and control will, however, be influenced by the cultural, political, and organizational features of these regimes, such as: ¶ Personalized or religiously motivated leaderships.¶
Islamic views regarding the nature and role of nuclear weapons and the moral permissibility of using nuclear weapons.¶ Existing c3 of existing “strategic weapons” (chemical,
biological, ssm) and existing c3 in conventional situations — levels of centralization, culture of delegation of authority, levels of trust in the regular military as opposed to special
regime guards forces.¶ Willingness to incur civilian casualties by deployment of weapons in highly populated areas.¶ Nuclear aspirations in the Middle East have been motivated by a
variety of considerations: deterrence, a need for a weapon of compellence, honor, regional and international stature, and others. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons and the
circumstances through which the state achieves nuclear weapons will influence the development of c3 and the considerations that will guide the operational concept. Some (such as
Iran) may see nuclear weapons as a means to undermine the balance of power in the region. Others may see them as necessary in order to counterbalance the former. In any case,

the strategic environment of a poly-nuclear Middle East will be exceedingly dynamic

and even volatile . It will differ from the stability of the latter part of the Cold War3 — and will probably be more like
the instability of its early years, but with many nuclear players. In such a volatile environment, the paradigms of command and control may

mean the difference between controlled tensions and nuclear confrontation .

It outweighs the case---Middle Eastern prolif is uniquely likely to

escalate---structural checks on other nuclear wars means only we access
extinction
Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long.
It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are
based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to
miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally
considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting
the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.
More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly
steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the
bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike
capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but
survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely
vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight
times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled
to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level
commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation . Moreover, if early
warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would
increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might
be unattributable or attributed incorrectly . That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a
first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined
with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against
the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war .
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons
from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive
action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging
nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant
risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that
nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear
arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave th eir weapons
vulnerable to attack or theft.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar
nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military
technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling
or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance
systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a
fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be
highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with
a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and there by increase its
ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclea r powers and other technically advanced
military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictab le
consequences.

The Middle East is on the proliferation brink---cascade is extremely

likely
James A. Russell 14, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Department of
National Security Affairs, “Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East,” chapter 8 of
Handbook of US-Middle East Relations, ed. Robert Looney, 2014, Google Books, p9. 92-93
The Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East today sit precariously perched on an
uncertain nuclear threshold that may cause a variety of regional states to reconsider
their nuclear status. A variety of issues frame the nuclear decision-making calculus for the region's governing elites. Iran's
continued standoff with the international community over its refusal to honor its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferat ion Treaty
forms an overriding component of the strategic framework around which states arc viewing the security environment. Another clement
is Israel's nuclear program and its policy of preventing any regional state from threatening the Jewish state with nuclear we apons.
Israel's October 2007 strike against an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor provided only the latest reminder of Israel's commitment to
maintaining its regional nuclear monopoly. Another complicating element in the strategic framework is a resurgent interest in nuclear
energy. During 2006 and 2007, thirteen states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region unexpectedly announced plans to
pursue nuclear energy. Some of these plans admittedly represent a minimal proliferation threat. Various regional states such as Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have all indicated that their programs would not include an indigenous uranium
enrichment capability—a critical building block for a weapons program. Despite
assurances by Middle Eastern
regional leaders that their programs will represent "models" for other states seeking
peaceful nuclear pro- grams, 4 however, many fear that these programs create opportunities for
clandestine nuclear programs and a new and destabilizing nuclear arms race.5 Last is the
uncertain status of the security guarantees associated with the US strategic nuclear umbrella, which, while clearly extended t o Israel, are
on more uncertain rooting relative to America's Gulf and Middle Eastern partners.

What is the security policy community to make or these dynamics in which proliferation, deterrence, extended deterrence, and conflict
escalation are all interacting in a complex inter-state bargaining framework? When the region's resurgent interest in nuclear power
comes amidst an unstable strategic environment, policy makers should be justifiably concerned. When
it is not
Iranian, US, and Israeli nuclear saber rattling is combined with the potential for a series of new regional nuclear programs,
so difficult for policy makers to imagine conditions leading to a cascading series of
destabilizing steps as the region slips into an uncertain nuclear future. It should be
emphasized that developments in the region come amid broader concerns that global
efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons have failed and that the international regime to
control the spread of nuclear weapons—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is in danger of becoming
irrelevant. Reflecting this fear, some believe that the inter- national system today sits precariously
perched at a nuclear "tipping point" where states will abandon normative restraints
against developing nuclear weapons, resulting in a "proliferation epidemic" and a world of many
nuclear powers. 7 The Middle East could today be at that tipping point.

Middle East prolif causes terrorist diversion---turns Pakistan

Shmuel Bar 13, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel,
February 2013, “The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast,” Hoover Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
Having acquired nuclear weapons in contravention to their npt obligations, Middle Eastern
regimes will probably be extremely sensitive regarding the possibility of further
unauthorized transfer — from ideological or material motives — of nuclear materials,
expertise, hardware, components, or weapons from themselves to adversaries. This is a
critical issue already today in the Pakistani context. The r&d organizations in the Middle
East — unlike their Cold War predecessors — may be more likely to emulate A.Q.
Khan in Pakistan, not only maintaining a role in the decision-making processes after
completing development of the weapons, but also becoming “back doors” to the
weapons they devised, particularly in scenarios of breakdown of the states. Unlike
the scientific institutions of the Soviet Union, which had little or no prior interaction with
potential customers for their know-how, and whose efforts to capitalize on their access
could be relatively easily monitored and disrupted by the successor state (Russia) and the
West, these elements have wide access to potential clients.
Pakistan Adv
 Leverage Turn
The advantage is backwards---presence is our most important source of
leverage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia---the plan surrenders it
Hal Brands 15, Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, PhD in History
from Yale, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, “Retrenchment Chic:
The Dangers of Offshore Balancing,” 2 Sep 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=193305
First, the stationing of U.S. troops in Muslim countries is only one of many causes of anti-American terrorism. Others include anger at U.S. support for authoritarian Middle Eastern

U.S. military withdrawal from the

regimes, Washington’s relationship with Israel, and Western “cultural imperialism” in the Middle East.

Middle East would not ameliorate these other grievances, and it might actually inflame them further.
For if the United States embraced offshore balancing, it would presumably become more reliant on friendly Arab
dictators—as well as Israel—as bulwarks of stability in a volatile region.¶ Second, offshore might undercut counter-
terrorism in other ways, as well. Forsaking U.S. forward presence would deprive the country of the

overseas bases and contingents that American forces have repeatedly used in counter-terrorism
operations over the past 30 years. It would also deprive the country of crucial diplomatic and intelligence

leverage. U.S. forward deployments and commitments have long provided influence
that Washington has used to evoke greater cooperation on what Robert Art calls the “quieter phase of fighting
terrorism”—intelligence-sharing, diplomatic partnerships, and other behind-the-scenes measures that are crucial to fighting terrorist groups.[8] Were America to

slash its security posture, this influence would presumably shrink, as well. Offshore balancing, then, is no
panacea when it comes to counter-terrorism. It holds some advantages, but significant dangers lurk just below the surface.¶ The same is true of proliferation. Offshore balancers are
right that U.S. policy can appear threatening to its adversaries, and that some countries—China during the Cold War, Iran and North Korea since the 1990s—have sought to develop
nuclear weapons in part as a way of countering American pressure and coercion. The trouble, however, is that shifting to offshore balancing would hardly rectify the situation. After
all, academic research indicates that there are numerous reasons why “rogue states” seek nuclear weapons, from desires for international or domestic prestige to desires to wield the
bomb as a tool of offensive or coercive leverage.[9] The causes of proliferation, like the causes of terrorism, are quite complex, and so altering U.S. policy would touch only one piece of
the problem.¶ In fact, it would probably make that problem far worse. What offshore balancers frequently forget is that, far from being an overall stimulant to proliferation, U.S. force
presence and security commitments have, on aggregate, massively impeded that phenomenon. U.S. security guarantees have reduced the perceived need for America’s allies to seek
nuclear weapons, while giving Washington powerful influence that it can use to dissuade prospective proliferators. In numerous cases since the 1950s—from Germany and Italy, to
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—these aspects of U.S. policy have proven central to limiting the spread of nuclear arms. Were the United States now to terminate or dramatically
reduce its overseas commitments, it stands to reason that it would also lose this non-proliferation leverage. Offshore balancing would therefore likely result in a more proliferated, and
more dangerous, world.¶ Less Influence, More Instability¶ These issues touch on a broader problem of offshore balancing—that contrary to what its proponents claim, it is likely to
cause greater international instability and reduced U.S. global influence. The reason for this is quite simply that both international stability and U.S. influence have long been
thoroughly interlinked with America’s forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has also given the United States great sway over
those allies’ policies, just as American-led alliances have served as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas across key regions and relationships. Regarding
stability, the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the competitive geopolitical dynamics that can so easily foster conflict and violence. U.S. presence has limited arms races
and counter-productive competitions by providing security in regions like Europe and East Asia; it has also soothed historical rivalries and provided a climate of reassurance more
conductive to multilateral cooperation in these areas. Overall, American presence has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and checking
other types of destabilizing behavior. As even John Mearsheimer has acknowledged, Washington “acts as a night watchman,” giving order to an otherwise anarchical

The United States would

environment.[10]¶ If Washington abandoned this role, the most likely byproduct is that U.S. influence and global stability alike would suffer.

effectively be surrendering its most powerful source of leverage vis-à-vis friends and
allies, and jeopardizing its position of leadership in key regions. It would also be courting pronounced turmoil in those areas. Long-dormant security
competitions might revive as countries felt forced to arm themselves more
vigorously; historical rivalries between old enemies might resurge absent U.S.
protection and the reassurance it offers. Even more dangerously, countries that aim to challenge existing
regional orders—think Russia in Europe, or Iran in the Middle East—might feel more empowered
to assert their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, one scholar notes, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely
to be big trouble.”[11]
1970s prove---the US will increase support for the Saudi regime and lose
its leverage
Hal Brands 15, Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, PhD in History
from Yale, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, “The Limits of
Offshore Balancing,” September 24, 2015,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1291
A strategy that ruled
By truly adopting offshore balancing, in fact, Washington would merely inflame some of those grievances all the more.

out stationing American forces in the region would unavoidably make the United States
more dependent on its authoritarian Arab allies—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the
smaller Gulf sheikdoms—as providers of security and stability. During the 1970s, for
instance, America poured arms into the Persian Gulf autocracies, particularly Saudi

Arabia and the Shah’s Iran, at a time when it had only a skeletal military presence of
its own in the area.67 Retrenchment today would similarly imply increased American
military sales, intelligence cooperation, and other forms of support for local allies, and a general
accentuation of the “friendly dictators” approach that has so incensed Muslim radicals. By the same token, even though
many advocates of offshore balancing argue that Washington should sharply curtail its security ties to Israel, commentators like Marc Lynch and Colin Kahl
have correctly observed that retrenchment would undoubtedly heighten American reliance on that country as the strongest, most pro-U.S. partner in an
endemically unstable region. “While some advocates of offshore balancing are highly critical of America’s special relationship with Israel,” they write, “it is
worth noting that, in practice, the approach would have to rely on and work indirectly through allies such as Israel to help uphold a regional balance of
redoubling certain U.S. policies that
power favorable to U.S. interests.”68 In these respects, offshore balancing would actually mean

have long provoked terrorist attacks. ¶ Offshore balancing has troubling implications for counterterrorism in other respects, too. Terrorist
groups like al-Qaeda prosper amid instability and security vacuums; such instability and vacuums, in turn, unwittingly can

be encouraged by the premature withdrawal of U.S. military power from troubled areas. One
illustration of this phenomenon would be the U.S. drawdown in Iraq in 2011, which demonstrated that the removal of American forces from a still unstable
context could undercut previous counterterrorism gains and facilitate the insecurity in which jihadist organizations thrive. Although that move was
generally consistent with offshore balancers’ desire for reduced American military exposure in the Gulf, it ended up facilitating the renewed destabilization
of large swaths of Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as a potent force in that area. “Had a residual U.S. force stayed in Iraq after 2011,” one
senior adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq has written:¶ the United States would have had far greater insight into the growing threat posed by ISIS [the Islamic
States in Iraq and Syria] and could have helped the Iraqis stop the group from taking so much territory. Instead, ISIS’ march across northern Iraq took
Washington almost completely by surprise.69¶ Withdrawal, in other words, does not always lead to a reduced terrorist threat—its effects can sometimes cut
in the opposite direction.¶ Finally, offshore balancing would simultaneously make it more difficult to respond effectively to largescale terrorism by corroding
the infrastructure and partnerships that America has long employed to do so. As Robert Art observes, the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in
Afghanistan after 9/11 depended extensively on just those overseas bases and units that would likely be reduced or eliminated as Washington slashed its
forward presence. (Since 2014, U.S. military operations against the IS have utilized many of these same assets.) In an offshore balancing scenario, by
contrast, America “would have to start from scratch to build alliances and gain access to bases, a difficult and problematic process” that would likely
U.S. forward deploy-ments and security
lengthen the timeline and reduce the impact of U.S. response. In the same vein,

commitments have long fostered the relationships and leverage that American
officials can use to obtain greater cooperation in the “quieter phase of fighting terrorism”—the diplomatic
collaboration, intelligence liaison, and other largely out-ofsight measures that are crucial to
defeating jihadist organizations.70 Were America significantly to retract its security posture, one could

reasonably surmise that the relationships and leverage would erode as well.
 UQ
Recent assassinations CHANGE THE GAME for LeJ
Jon Boone 15, writer for The Guardian based in Islamabad, “Pakistan terrorist leader killed
in police shootout,” July 29, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/29/pakistan-
terrorist-leader-maliq-ishaq-killed-police-shootout
Leaders of Pakistan’s most infamous sectarian terrorist group, including its founder
Malik Ishaq, were killed in a gun battle with police on Wednesday that many suspect may have been deliberately staged.
Ishaq and 13 other militants from the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) – including two of his sons and a
top official – died after gunmen attempted to free them from custody in a pre-dawn operation, police claimed.
The al-Qaida-linked group, which Ishaq co-founded in 1996, is notorious for its attacks against Shias, as well other minority groups including Christians and
Ahmedis.

Rai Muhammad Tahir, the head of Punjab’s counter-terrorism department, said Ishaq had offered to take police to an arms dump after he was arrested on
Saturday.

“A special team was organised to visit the area with Malik Ishaq, his two sons and colleague Ghulam Rasool to recover explosives from a house situated in
Shah Wali area of Muzaffargarh,” Tahir said.

“The moment the special team arrived at the place, some 20 militants attacked and tried to free Malik Ishaq and others. In a direct exchange of heavy fire,
Malik Ishaq, his two sons and colleague Ghulam Rasool were killed along with 11 others,” he said.

The haul of weapons recovered from the house included 40kg of explosives, suicide bomb vests and guns, Tahir said.

The account raised immediate suspicions among some observers that the battle may have been an “encounter” – the name Pakistanis give to contrived
killings of troublesome terror suspects whom the courts have been unable to convict.

Tahir was unable to explain why police had required so many senior LeJ leaders to attend to the identification of the weapons cache. Asad Munir, a retired
officer of the inter-services intelligence directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s top spy agency, said “an encounter cannot be ruled out”.

Ishaq’s killing proved that Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a major push against militant groups launched by the army last year, was being “conducted across the
board”.

“We have seen throughout this operation that no one is being spared,” Munir said.

Whether or not the killings were staged, the death of Ishaq marks a striking change in fortunes for LeJ,
which has long dodged government attempts to crack down on its activities.

Despite being the head of an organisation linked to al-Qaida and designated by the US in 2014 as a “specially designated global terrorist”, Ishaq had never
been successfully convicted by a court system where witnesses, judges and prosecutors are easily intimidated.

In one case in 2011, Ishaq made sure the trial judge was aware of the risk he was running by reading out the names of his children.

Ishaq had been implicated in dozens of lethal attacks on Shia religious processions and mosques and in a local
newspaper interview in 1997 even admitted to having been involved in the killing of more than 100 people. Instead, public order laws were used to hold him
for long stretches in police custody or house arrest.
Iran
 Impact D
US won’t strike Iran
Danielle Pletka 13, VP for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, “Will Obama Bomb Iran?”
http://www.realclearworld.com/lists/will_obama_bomb_iran/danielle_pletka.html?state=
stop
I believe there's little to no chance President Obama will order a military strike on Iran's
nuclear weapons facilities before the end of his term . First, the president is clearly loath
to engage in "another" military intervention in the Middle East . Second, it is clear that
the administration is waiting until it is completely certain Iran has an actual weapon
(rather than simply the means to assemble one in short order), and once Iran has an actual weapon, the calculus
and danger of a strike grow substantially. In my view, Barack Obama wishes to leave office as
the man who dramatically altered the domestic economic landscape, not as the man who
bombed Iran.
 Deterrence Works
Iran backs down in response to pressure---thirty years of empirics prove
Michael Eisenstadt 13, Kahn Fellow and director of the Military & Security Studies
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Not by Sanctions Alone: Using
Military and Other Means to Bolster Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” July 2013,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport13_Eisen
stadt2.pdf
Conventional wisdom says that Tehran
does not yield to pressure—it yields only to overwhelming
pressure.1 In fact, three decades of experience show that while the regime’s doctrine of
resistance (moqavemat) places a premium on not yielding to pressure, Tehran has made
major policy adjustments, even abandoning longstanding policies, when the expediency of the regime (maslahat) or
the national interest has required it to do so.2 For instance:
ƒ Iran
backed off after warning the United States in December 2011 that it would close the Strait
of Hormuz in response to new sanctions, after senior U.S. officials
intimated that such a move would
prompt a military response. And in January 2012, after warning the United States that it should not return an aircraft
carrier to the Persian Gulf, Iran backed down after Washington did so.

ƒ Iranian-supported Iraqi Special

Groups ceased rocket attacks on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in April 2008
after Iran was warned by the United States that continued attacks would provoke a
strong U.S. response. Likewise, Iranian-supported Iraqi Special Groups ceased rocket attacks on U.S. forward-operating bases
in Iraq that had killed fifteen U.S. soldiers in June 2011, after the United States passed on warnings to Tehran.3

ƒ Fearing
a U.S. invasion after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the Islamic Republic apparently
abandoned its nuclear weaponization efforts— presumably to avoid giving the United States a pretext for
invasion— though some weapons-related R&D activities have purportedly continued since then.4

ƒ After the 1992 assassination of a prominent Iranian Kurdish leader in a Berlin restaurant caused a number of European Union s tates to
suspend diplomatic ties with Tehran and censure the Islamic Republic, Iran ceased terrorist operations in Europe—apparently because it
considered its ties to Europe too important to be jeopardized by continued attacks.

ƒ After years of promising “war, war until victory,” Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
agreed to “drink from the poisoned chalice”
and end the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 when he concluded that Iran faced defeat at the
front, the use of Iraqi chemical weapons against Iranian cities, and open U.S. military intervention (which is how
he interpreted the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner over the Gulf in July 1988).

ƒ Iran initially attempted to counter U.S.-led convoy operations during the latter phases of
the Iran-Iraq War by indirect means—mining the waters of the Gulf, using Silkworm missiles against ships inside
Kuwaiti territorial waters, and conducting small-boat attacks against unescorted shipping—until a major clash between
U.S. and Iranian naval forces in April 1988, which inflicted heavy losses on the latter, caused
Iran to cease mining operations, halt Silkworm strikes, and dramatically reduce attacks on unescorted convoys.5

The question now is whether, under current circumstances, the United States can replicate the kinds of conditions that led Ir an in the
past to alter or abandon policies in which it had invested significant resources, prestige, and political capital. Might
Tehran be
willing to pay any price that the United States is likely to impose in order to achieve its
nuclear ambitions—much as Pakistan was willing to “eat grass” if necessary in order to obtain the bomb?6 Might the moral
victory represented by adhering to its principles and resisting the forces of “global arrogance,” regardless of cost, trump t he interests of
the regime? Past experience would seem to indicate that the answer is: not likely. On the field of battle and in the diplomatic arena,
tactical adjustments have been permitted when they served the interests of the Islamic
Republic or the Iranian nation.7 The election as president of Hassan Rowhani, a pragmatic conservative, makes it
likely that Iran will continue with such an approach.

This applies even to proxy wars---Iran tries to avoid conflict when

deterrence is strong
Kenneth M. Pollack 15, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings Institution, “U.S. policy toward the Middle East after the Iranian nuclear
agreement,” 8/5/15, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/08/05-us-
policy-iran-nuclear-deal-pollack
Two points stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that while
Iranian
strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive, and expansionist, Iran is not
reckless and is typically quite wary of American power. When the United States exerts
itself, the Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the
Iranians did not back down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those
militias crushed and driven from Iraq during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American
campaigns along the lower Tigris. As we see in Iraq today, the Iranians apparently recognize that
they misjudged both America’s will and its capacity to act then, and are once again
content to battle Washington for political influence in Baghdad but unwilling to challenge
U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.
 A2 Light Footprint Solves
Only heavy local presence solves deterrence---their “forces on the
border” arguments flip neg
Kenneth M. Pollack 10, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran: The Devil in the Details,” May 2010,
http://www.cfr.org/iran/deterring-nuclear-iran/p22292
In previous American containment regimes—particularly against the USSR, Iraq, and North Korea—the
deployment of American military forces on the borders of those countries was critical to
deterrence. There is a rationale for doing the same toward a nuclear Iran. Deployed U.S.
conventional forces could deter some conventional aggression by the target country and
serve as an unmistakable guarantor of U.S. red lines. A country that might convince itself that the United
States would not employ nuclear weapons in response to its occupation of a third country’s land has to make a very different calculation
if U.S. soldiers are likely to be killed in the process.

Moreover, scholarly work on extended deterrence has consistently found that would-be
aggressors tend to only pay attention to the local balance of forces, discounting or ignoring
the global balance. As when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, aggressors may recognize that the United
States could ultimately defeat them, but may assume that if they can grab their prize
quickly before the United States is ready, Washington will not summon the will to roll back a fait
accompli (or will be blocked by other forces from doing so). Thus, preventing aggression against a third country in
the first place (the definition of extended deterrence) is best served by a strong local military
presence so that the would-be aggressor never believes that it can get create such a fait accompli. This, too, argues for
strong American conventional forces deployed along Iran’s borders.
 Domestic Motivations
Overwhelms the plan---cultural influence is seen as a much more urgent
threat to regime survival than troops
Shahram Chubin 14, Non-resident Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, taught at various universities including the Graduate School of
International Studies in Geneva and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, “Is Iran a Military Threat?” Survival, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2014, p. 65-88
Iran does not see the major threat to the regime as stemming from external
I have argued that

military power. Iranian leaders feel that they have neutralised this danger. Where they are especially sensitive
is in the domestic sphere. The Great Satan was always a greater threat as a corrupter
of the youth and ‘religious values’ than as a military aggressor, which could be
resisted. The leadership has constantly talked of ‘soft threats’, such as velvet
revolutions, especially since 2009. In 2009 Khamenei said: ‘today, the main priority of the country is to
confront [the enemy's] soft warfare which is aimed at creating doubt, discord and pessimism among the masses of the
people.’50 In 2013, before endorsing discussions on the nuclear programme, Khamenei said that the US ‘should show it does not interfere in the affairs of the
Iranian nation as they did in the 1388 [2009] sedition. They supported the seditionists. They put social networks at the service of the seditionists.’51
 Hardliners Inev
Hardline influence in foreign policy is locked in---means try or die for
deterrence
Sven-Eric Fikenscher 10/1, Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard
University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Why Iran’s Bellicose
Foreign Policy Is Unlikely to Change,” 10/1/15,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran%E2%80%99s-bellicose-foreign-
policy-unlikely-change-13976
the
As the deadline for Congressional action against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran has passed on September 17,
agreement is finally about to be implemented. Some supporters of the deal have argued that
in the absence of a stalemate over Tehran’s nuclear activities, the West can now
engage Iran to stabilize the Middle East, most notably with regards to rolling back the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). John Kerry fueled these hopes when he said that Iranian foreign minister Zarif had told him that thanks to the deal he
would be “empowered to work with and talk to you about regional issues.” Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, even voiced
hope that time might be ripe for an entirely new
“regional framework […] based on cooperation rather than confrontation.”
This optimism, however, underestimates the anti-American agenda and the influence of
Iran’s self-declared guardians of the revolution. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the key figure in the Iranian
political system, is a case in point. While President Hassan Rouhani has been very committed to concluding the nuclear deal,
Khamenei was the one who has always expressed reservations about engaging the United
States. He once compared his attitude to the negotiations to the behavior of a wrestler who sometimes “shows flexibility [for] technical
reasons,” but “should not forget who his opponent and enemy is.” From his perspective, the compromise on
the nuclear issue was a tacit concession to get much-needed sanctions relief and by
no means a blueprint for reconciliation . After Rouhani cautiously expressed his interest in
expanding Iran’s cooperation with “various countries,” the Supreme Leader
immediately pushed back and told his fellow citizens to “prepare for the
continuation of the fight against America.”
Some analysts have dismissed such statements as empty words to appease radical groups within Iran. Unlike the Supreme Leader’ s red
lines regarding the nuclear negotiations, this kind of rhetoric is, however, backed up by action. Iran’s Qods
Force––the wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is running the IRGC’s external operations and was
instrumental in supporting radical Shiite militias during the insurgency in Iraq––has reportedly plotted terrorist
acts against targets from Israel and the Gulf states , the key U.S. allies in the Middle East. Most notably, the
Qods Force was behind the attempt to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil in 2011. Apart from plotting its
own attacks, the Qods Force has also encouraged and supported Hezbollah in its endeavor to follow suit.

The Qods Force––and not the comparatively moderate forces that negotiated the nuclear deal––is
also in charge of coordinating Iran’s current military and diplomatic engagement
with respect to the region’s hot spots , such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In its capacity as primary
Iranian stakeholder in regional affairs, the Qods Force has dramatically stepped up
its activities and undermined regional stability in recent years. When the Assad regime was under
increasing pressure from the Syrian insurgents, the Qods Force teamed up with its long-standing proxy Hezbollah to keep the regime
from falling. To this day, Hezbollah militants and IRGC forces fight alongside Assad’s army. As a result, the Syrian regime has continued
its brutal attempts to suppress the popular revolt and thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Syria to join Sunni insurgents,
including terrorist groups. In addition, the Qods Force has doubled down on its support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who d rove
American forces out of the country a couple of months ago.

It is particularly noteworthy that the Qods Force increased its involvement in Syria and Yemen ,
although the United States and Iran simultaneously narrowed their differences on the nuclear
issue. In other words, the idea that a compromise on the nuclear file can undo the severe conflicts between the United Sta tes and Iran
on other issues has so far been powerfully disproven. The odds that Iran is going to change its behavior in
the future are quite low. Things are rather likely to get even worse. In a recent speech, the Supreme Leader
vowed to keep up the support for the “oppressed people” of Yemen and––mentioning another
potential trouble spot––Bahrain. The continuation of the alliance between Iran and its only governmental partner in the region, the
Assad regime, is also pretty much a given.

It is true that Iran and the United States have demonstrated that they can find common ground, if both countries deem collaboration to
be in their interests. Supporters of deeper engagement with Iran are right to point out that efforts to roll back ISIL fall i nto that category,
but that should not overshadow the strikingly discrepant goals, values and interests both sides have. The
United States should
not act under the assumption that a long-standing foe, who has turned out to pursue
an extremely aggressive agenda that runs counter to its own, can be flipped into a friend. Instead, it
should now focus its efforts on containing Iran’s regional ambitions and preventing Iranian-inspired
terrorist attacks. In both cases, it will be crucial to seek new international allies to isolate and weaken the Qods Force.
 GCC Turn---Solves The Aff
Only US presence solves Saudi détente---it’s the only way to create
accommodation between Iran and Saudi Arabia---the plan shatters any
shot at cooperation
Dalia Dassa Kaye 14, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, Senior Political
Scientist, RAND, “The Days After a Deal with Iran: Regional Responses to a Final Nuclear
Agreement,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE122/RAND_PE12
2.pdf
Even if Saudi Arabia opposes the type of final agreement laid out in the beginning of this report, Riyadh does not have the c apability to
scuttle its implementation. The Saudi regime is unlikely to adopt its most destructive counter—pursuing a nuclear weapons capability—
and its more likely counter—pressing Iran in other arenas—may not be sufficient to dissuade Iran from implementing the agreement.
What the United States should guard against however, is Riyadh complicating the chance a
nuclear deal will translate into positive spillover on other regional issues. For a
détente to emerge, Saudi Arabia would have to be open to the type of engagement it pursued
with Iran during the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies of the 1990s and early 2000s.58 But at that time, the roles were
reversed. Saudi Arabia and Iran were flirting with one another, while the United States worried about the defection of Arab s tates to its
adversary. Today, Washington
and Tehran are trying to bridge divides while regional
partners worry about whether détente would come at the expense of their interests.
The traditional assurance toolkit will need to be part of the prescription for
assuaging Saudi concerns; it can help Riyadh feel comfortable enough to engage in
limited forms of cooperation with Iran should the opportunity arise in a post-deal
environment. The United States has already done much on this front, including upgrades to the
GCC states’ ballistic missile defense, joint exercises, an enduring U.S. carrier presence in the Gulf, and the
more than 35,000 American forces operating at bases within the GCC states.59 But there
are ways to increase this cooperation further; for example, the United States could make explicit security guarantees that fo rmally bring
the GCC states under the U.S. nuclear umbrella— as is the case with Japan and South Korea—although some of the Arab Gulf states may
not want to be singled out in U.S. declaratory policy due to the sensitivity of tying themselves too close to Washington (and it is also not
clear whether Washington can or would want to credibly make such a commitment). Another approach could be for Washington to lend
diplomatic support to Saudi initiatives on other priority issues, such as the Middle East peace process. In addition, the Uni ted States will
have to clearly communicate the objectives that motivate shifts in its military posture—like the “rebalance” to Asia—so as to avoid any
misperception that the United States is less committed to Gulf security.
 GCC Turn
The plan causes GCC aggression---makes regionalism and cooperation
with Iran impossible
Col. Richard C. Taylor 14, British Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Has President
Obama Chosen The Right Strategic Approach To Iran With The 2013 ‘Dual Track’ Policy Of
Diplomacy And Sanctions?” May 2014, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA612208
the United
A U.S. vision for regional security in the Middle East is an essential component of a Middle East narrative. Throughout,
States will need to reassure the GCC nations of its commitment to deter Iranian
aggression. If the Geneva talks are successful and the Iranian economy revives, Iran will have to abandon its anti-American
identity, and will lose the logic of its victimhood narrative. Iran tried to offer a mutual defense pact with the GCC nations on the condition
of U.S. military withdrawal from the region. At the International Institution for Strategic Studies at Manama in December 200 5 Iran’s
deputy foreign minister, Muhammad-Reza Baqeri, agreed to regional security cooperation in the Gulf with “the caveat that there should
be a timetable for the
withdrawal of foreign military [implying the United States] from the
region.”260 However this is unacceptable to the GCC nations, as they will never have the
cohesion to form a security block such as NATO. Therefore a U.S. presence is essential Commented [CO5]:
in the Gulf to protect freedom of commerce and the flow of hydrocarbons. One option to defuse tension, reassure GCC allies and counter
Iran’s victimhood narrative is to invite Iran to take a more coordinated joint role in the security of the Gulf waters. There is already
cooperation between Oman and Iran in the Straits of Hormuz: part of the U.S.-Iran engagement could therefore include an invitation to
Iran to observe or participate in joint exercises or patrolling. If Iran does genuinely give up nuclear weapons, sponsorship of terrorism
and asymmetric destabilization activities in the Gulf States, it will expect an offer of some means of guarantee for the secu rity of its
homeland and its regime. However the talks tackle this request, it will need to be carefully balanced against American support for its
allies in the region.261 Although the United States has very potent strategic ways and means to persuade Iran to negotiate, i t needs to
improve its strategic communications with a convincing regional narrative in order to conclude the negotiations.

The final recommendation is to use all levers of state in a multi-track policy to persuade Iran to cease its malign influence in the region
and to reassure allies in order to promote regional stability and prosperity. Greater use of U.S. soft power may be needed to allow Iran to
compromise. Soft power could include support from transnational institutions such as the World Bank or International Moneta ry Fund
(IMF); development assistance for Iranian agriculture, infrastructure, education, energy, and environmental modernization; ex panded
international trade and investment in the modernization of Iranian oil infrastructure; and lifting unilateral Americ an sanctions and
financial restrictions. Privately, both sides also know that for economic development to be effective enough to revive the Iranian
economy, it must be accompanied by political development.262 No matter how simplistically President Obama wishes to fix negotiations
to the nuclear program, the reality is that Iran cannot agree any compromise that does not include American soft power interv ention to
revive the Iranian economy. Culturally, Iran has the strategic patience to hold out for this: the difficulty for the United States is how to sell
the compromise necessary for this ‘grand bargain’. Whilst the wider international community will see it as pragmatic realpoli tik to
maintain the momentum of engagement, America’s regional allies will see it as a sign of weakness.

In parallel with soft power and diplomacy, the

United States will have to make clever and directed use of
its conventional and unconventional military power to reassure its regional allies and deter Iranian
malign influence and proxy activity. Israel wishes to see the international community’s focus remain on Iran rather than the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. It is also keen to avoid the quest for a Middle East nuclear-free zone returning to the UN agenda, as it would
jeopardize Israel’s regional arms hegemony.263 KSA enjoys the geopolitical influence that an isolated Iran provides, and is
wary
that an American departure from the Gulf will leave it exposed. The use of America’s
conventional and unconventional military power in the Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and reassure
regional allies is an essential integral part of any American approach to U.S.-Iran
negotiations. If the United States fails to convince its regional allies that its conventional
military deterrent will continue to overmatch the Iranian asymmetric threat, they will
interpret American reticence as withdrawal and seek security through other means
and partners. Some, like Saudi Arabia, will increase their military spending and accelerate their
proxy war with Iran. The smaller GCC nations are likely to hedge, and seek closer ties
with Tehran. Others have already sought more reliable help from Moscow, a trend that began after the Syrian chemical weapons
deal in late 2013.264 A regional strategy that is coordinated and communicated with America’s regional allies is the only means of
reversing America’s declining influence in the Middle East and the consequent threat to regional security and global economic stability.
1NR
Deal CP
 Ov
It causes rapid nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the
Atlantic, January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-
armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are ma dmen
who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Isr ael) and so are building nuclear
weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. ¶ It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about
the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on
absolute power.¶ Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons
against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and
sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the
destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities. ¶ The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may
not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the
chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with
Israel.¶ Warp-Speed Escalation¶ The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East
in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and
prone to warp-speed escalation.¶ Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s
Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets.
Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense
of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. ¶
Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes
Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is
to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening
Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of
August’ on steroids.”¶ Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile
launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or
imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons
to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? ¶ Bruce Blair, the co-
founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a
sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards,
making an accidental exchange more likely.¶ “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed
states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces --
mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “ Missiles put on hair-trigger
alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false
indications that the other side has initiated an attack.Ӧ Then comes the problem of misinterpreted
data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has
decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.”¶ ‘Cognitive Bias’¶ Blair notes that in a crisis it
isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader
will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that
increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.¶
Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two
countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far -fetched --
make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t
have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we
nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.Ӧ The
answer to this predicament is to deny Iran
nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of
preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped
before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”
 A2 Perm
Robust presence is key to the threat of force---empirically succeeds at
deterring prolif in the Middle East
James Phillips 10/2, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage
Foundation, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the Next President Should Do,” 10/2/15,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-the-
next-president-should-do
2. Strengthen U.S. military forces to provide greater deterrence against an Iranian
nuclear breakout. Ultimately, no piece of paper will block an Iranian nuclear breakout. The
chief deterrent to Iran’s attaining a nuclear capability is the prospect of a U.S. preventive
military attack. It is no coincidence that Iran halted many aspects of its nuclear weapons program in
2003 after the U.S. invasion of and overthrow of hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Libyan dictator
Muammar Qadhafi, motivated by a similar apprehension about the Bush Administration, also chose to give up his
chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

To strengthen this deterrence, it is necessary to rebuild U.S. military strength, which has
been sapped in recent years by devastating budget cuts. The Obama Administration’s failure to provide for the national defense
will shortly result in the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf region for the
first time since 2007. Such signs of declining U.S. military capabilities will exacerbate the risks
posed by the nuclear deal.

Forward-deployed presence is key to deterrence---sends critical signals

and deters
war

Bilal Y. Saab 15, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, “The New Containment: Changing
America’s Approach to Middle East Security,” July 2015,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_New_Containment.pdf
It is always hard to measure deterrence success, because the absence of war does not necessarily prove that deterrence worked (a host
of other factors could have led to the preservation of peace). However, it is assumed that the
United States’ preponderant
military presence in the Gulf, its ability to effectively project military power and quickly transfer military assets from
other regions, and its willingness to use force help deter the occurrence of large-scale interstate
war in the Middle East. Such forward-deployed US military presence in the region will
continue to serve as a key factor contributing to deterring major war in that part of the
world.
Since the risk of major Arab-Israeli war is much reduced in today’s regional environment, the
more likely scenario of
interstate war in the Middle East is currently one in which Iran and its allies go to arms with
its adversaries—be it Egypt, Israel, or some Arab Gulf states. Many have argued that Obama damaged US credibility when he
decided not to take military action against Syrian leader Bashar Assad, despite drawing a “red line” against the use of chemical weapons.
Credibility is essential to deterrence effectiveness, and US deterrence did take a hit
following the Syrian episode, but one should not exaggerate its significance or conclude
that it caused Iran to feel that it now has license to attack its neighbors.
A rational actor more often than not, Iran understands the language of deterrence
and knows better than to provoke the United States—the most powerful military on earth.
In short, aside from more effective diplomacy, there is little the United States can add to its conventional military deterre nt posture in the
Middle East to make it more robust. But as argued below, there is more it should do, along with its regional partners, to enhance its
unconventional capabilities in the region to deter Iran from indirectly destabilizing other countries.
 Iran Cheats
Iran shapes their decision-making based on the likelihood of a military
strike

Michael Eisenstadt 15, Kahn Fellow, Director, Military & Security Studies Program,
Washington Institute, “How the Iran Deal Could Complicate U.S. Efforts to Prevent a
Nuclear Breakout,” 8/31/15, http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/how-the-iran-deal-
could-complicate-u-s-efforts-to-prevent-a-nuclear-breakout/
This could influence Iran’s future proliferation calculus. The nuclear deal, if implemented
fully, could place major constraints on Iran’s ability to undertake a breakout from declared,
or possible covert, facilities for 10 to 15 years. But as these constraints are lifted (or circumvented before then
by Iran), the temptation to pursue a breakout could be strengthened. Several factors
will influence Iran’s decision-making on this matter; foremost among these is Iran’s
assessment of the risk of attempting a breakout.
Because itis unclear how the sanctions “snapback” mechanism might work in practice, it
is especially important that the nuclear deal be backstopped with a threat of force if
it is to be viable. Iranian doubts about the credibility and efficacy of the U.S. military
option could, however, undermine the long-term sustainability of the agreement. So what
impact will the deal have on this option?
China DA
 Oil Blockade Key---2NC
Credible embargo options prevent China from militarizing a Taiwan
dispute in the first place
J. Michael Cole 15, senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of
Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on
Contemporary China, 5/7/15, “If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to
China over Taiwan,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-
america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show
Another flaw in White’s argument is that it only provides binary options—capitulation, or
the descent into major (perhaps nuclear) war and the collapse of the global economy. He
leaves no room for other (and in my opinion, far more plausible) scenarios. The key to the
continued existence of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as a free, democratic and
independent state lies not in the ability of the island and its security guarantors to
defeat China in a major war, but rather in the strength of its deterrent, a concept that
is inexplicably ignored by White. Everybody agrees that major war in the Taiwan Strait,
especially one that drags the United States and perhaps Japan into hostilities, would be
as devastating as it is undesirable. But the answer to that reality isn’t the abandonment
of one’s principles (not to mention that of 23 million people), but instead a firm
commitment to war avoidance. As I argued in a previous article, a multifaceted
deterrent strategy involving both military and nonmilitary components (sanctions,
naval embargo and so on), combined with clear red lines based upon international law,
would lower the risk that China—export reliant and beholden to foreign energy
sources—would miscalculate and choose the military option to resolve the Taiwan
“issue” once and for all.
 Oil = Deterrence
Oil calculations directly shape Chinese foreign policy
Rosemary A. Kelanic 13, associate director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies
at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, “Oil Security
and Conventional War: Lessons from a China-Taiwan Air Scenario,” October 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/china/oil-security-conventional-war-lessons-china-taiwan-air-war-
scenario/p31578
[Edited for ableist language]
In the past, conventional militaries were plagued by wartime oil shortages that severely
undermined their battlefield effectiveness. Both Germany and Japan in World War II found
themselves crippled [limited] by skyrocketing military fuel requirements that their naturally petroleum-
poor territories had no hope of meeting. Fuel supply limitations forced the German army to rely
heavily on horse-drawn transportation, resulting in military disaster when the Wehrmacht
encountered the highly mechanized Red Army on the eastern front.1 By 1945, Allied attacks on Japanese oil tankers had so deva stated
military fuel stockpiles that the Japanese navy retrofitted its fleet to run on coal. Meanwhile, kamikaze attacks were increasingly used as
a means of conserving oil because “suicide flight[s]…required fuel for one way only.”2

Could oil shortages threaten military effectiveness in a large-scale conventional

conflict today or in the future? Or are troubles of the kind faced by Germany and Japan things of the past? The answer matters for
more than understanding the roots of battlefield performance. As recent research shows, expectations about military
and essential civilian fuel needs in wartime influence countries’ strategic calculations , and thus
their foreign policies.3 Beyond contributing to Germany and Japan’s military defeat in World War II, oil deficiency also
profoundly shaped each country’s behavior prior to and throughout the conflict.
Anticipating wartime oil shortages, Germany invested heavily in alternative fuels and pursued economic alliances with Europe’ s two
largest producers, Romania and Russia. Japan took a more drastic step: it invaded the oil-rich Dutch East Indies and destroyed the U.S.
Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor to eliminate the American naval threat to petroleum shipping. As these cases illustrate, unders tanding a
country’s military fuel situation can provide insight into its current and future geopolitical behavior.

Yet wartime fuel requirements are poorly understood. Observers commonly assume that the amount of oil consumed today for mili tary
purposes is small compared to production and civilian demand, and thus that wartime shortages are unlikely. But, this assumption has
not been subject to rigorous evaluation in the unclassified literature. Closer scrutiny reveals it to be flawed.

This paper analyzes a specific conflict scenario—an air war between the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China or ROC)—to enhance broader knowledge
about fuel requirements in wartime. (Examining an air war scenario is especially significant because China would have to
establish air superiority over Taiwan before any plausible amphibious invasion attempt.) Insight gained from modeling such a conflict
makes it possible to provide a rough estimate of potential fuel requirements and assess whether military demand could strain countries’
supplies in the present, as it did in the past. If it can, this suggests that oil-deficient
countries are likely to
pursue foreign policies with an eye toward preserving petroleum access in the event
of a crisis or emergency. In addition to the broad implications, modeling fuel requirements in a PRC-ROC war has inherent
value because the dispute is one of few flash points that could conceivably draw China into
conflict with the United States.4 The results confirm that oil and fuel supplies could become significant
constraints on China and Taiwan in the event of war.
 Yes Taiwan War
Taiwan crisis likely
Repurt Hammond-Chambers 10-18, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council and a
managing director at Bower Group Asia, Taiwan’s Election Drama Is a Message to Beijing,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-election-drama-is-a-message-to-beijing-
1445190293
In an emergency congress convened on Friday, Taiwan’s ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) ousted Hung
Hsiu-chu from its presidential ticket and formally endorsed Party Chairman Eric Chu for January’s
presidential election.¶ Ms. Hung, vice president of the legislature, suffered from low opinion polls and an ever-widening gap
with the opposition candidate Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who was ahead by nearly
30 percentage points in September. Ms. Hung’s strongly China-leaning policy turned
off voters and risked undermining the KMT effort to retain control of the legislature,
which the party has held for more than a decade. ¶ Mr. Chu, a popular centrist figure, should improve the fortunes of the KMT’s legislative
candidates. At 54 he is relatively young, with a reputation for clean government and focusing on economic development. He is currently
the mayor of New Taipei City, which he was re-elected to last year in a tight race.¶ Yet the
messy and public effort to
force out Ms. Hung has angered many of her vocal supporters, who are vowing not to
vote at all. The candidate switch reveals a party with deep internal rifts , and it
remains to be seen whether Mr. Chu can reshape the KMT campaign and solicit
mainstream support.¶ His candidacy will now increase pressure on the DPP, which has widened its goals
to include winning the legislature. Mr. Chu said Saturday that it would be a disaster for the
KMT to lose its majority, which would require dropping to 57 seats from 65 today. He even suggested the
KMT could hold only one-third of the legislative seats, a sign of how acute the party’s
troubles have become.¶ Many voters seem ambivalent about the change or critical of the procedures adopted to force out
Ms. Hung. It all plays into a common view that the KMT retains certain authoritarian characteristics. ¶ Mr. Chu’s campaign will now
emphasize the KMT line that it is the only party that can foster peaceful relations with China and therefore bring prosperity to Taiwan.
He hasn’t said much about economic policies but will likely continue to push current President Ma Ying-jeou’s agenda of economic
cooperation with China. He will seek to join regional trade pacts, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership. During his meeting with China’s
President Xi Jinping in May, Mr. Chu also said Taiwan is interested in participating in China’s Asian Infrastructure Investme nt Bank, “One
Belt, One Road” initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade pact. ¶ Ms.
Hung’s ouster has
broad significance for the future of cross-Strait relations. As a candidate she
espoused a policy of “One China, Same Interpretation,” which called on Beijing to
recognize the existence of Taiwan’s government but not the existence of the Republic of China
(Taiwan) as a country—a policy that is rejected by a majority of Taiwan citizens. Polling
consistently shows that more than 80% of Taiwan voters support the status quo, or de facto
independence, and Ms. Hung found support from less than 20% of voters.¶ Now the KMT has repudiated her
China policy. This signals to Beijing where the political boundaries for closer ties lie,
suggesting limits to China’s economic and cultural engagement policies as a path to
unification.¶ This intraparty putsch is thus likely to fuel concerns that China will take
a hard line with a DPP government, raising cross-Strait tensions and also straining
ties with the U.S., Taiwan’s principal partner. Seven years of cross-Strait quiet are
coming to an end fast.
The timeframe is months --- economic integration can’t check
Denny Roy 15 is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. He specializes in
Asia-Pacific security issues. “Collision Course: The Looming U.S.-China Showdown Over
Taiwan,” 2/21, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/collision-course-
the-looming-us-china-showdown-over-taiwan-12293
*Note: The article contains a typo that incorrectly states that the Taiwanese election will
occur in May 2016. This election is in January 2016, not May. A Google search will reveal
this is factually the case.
A new crisis in relations between China and Taiwan is likely in the coming months, one
that will pose more acute difficulties than in the past for Taiwan’s benefactor, the United States. China is
relatively stronger than Taiwan, less inhibited from behaving assertively, and more
insistent on attaining its objectives—which include ruling Taiwan. The people of Taiwan, however,
are showing signs of evolving toward permanent opposition to political unification with China. Reaffirming U.S. willingness to protect Taiwan from forced
unification would put at risk America’s relationship with the world’s second most important country. Abandoning Taiwan to involuntary absorption,
however, would signal to the region the end of Pax Americana.

The rapid increase in Cross-Strait economic ties following Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s election in 2008 initially had a pacifying effect on China-
Taiwan relations because it gave Beijing confidence in a natural, peaceful progression toward unification. It now appears possible, however, that the
pacification returns from economic integration might diminish rather than grow over time. On the Taiwanese side, deeper economic dependence on China is
leading to proportionately stronger opposition from the Taiwan public towards China. On the Chinese side, stronger economic ties increase the disparity
between economic ties on the one hand, and demands for political integration on the other. This raises the temperature of simmering Chinese frustration.

For several years, some Chinese analysts have worried that Taiwan intended to take advantage of the generous economic terms offered by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) while putting off political negotiations indefinitely. Their skepticism was justified. Economic integration and increased movement of
people across the Strait will not necessarily lead to political integration. Taiwanese people may not prioritize an improved material standard of living over
Even if the sole concern is economic benefit, Taiwan arguably has
maintaining their civil liberties.

an interest in delaying unification so as to wait for a point in time where China takes
an economic loss and Taiwan profits disproportionately from their bilateral trade.
Chinese magnanimity would likely decline after unification.
(Recommended: Say Goodbye to Taiwan)

The likelihood of Taiwan voluntarily choosing unification with China is waning.

Opinion polls show that Taiwan’s sense of a separate national identity from
mainland China is increasing. While a great majority have long favored the status
quo of de facto independence over immediate unification, a majority now oppose
even eventual unification.
progress toward
With the Chinese government already disappointed in the lack of movement towards resolving Taiwan-PRC political issues,

cross-Strait economic integration stalled in the spring of 2014. As Taipei and Beijing moved toward
enacting a Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement, a series of protests by students and other activists known as the Sunflower Movement not only blocked
the agreement but ensured that future economic negotiations with China would be slower.

(Recommended: Can China Rise Peacefully?)

Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections in 2016. In this newly charged atmosphere, even
candidates from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang Party will need to commit to moving cautiously in making future economic agreements with China. That means slower

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),

progress on an area that Chinese see as only preliminary to their real objective: political negotiations.

fresh off gains in the municipal-level elections of November 2014, has a good chance
of capturing the presidency in May [see note above card] 2016. Beijing would see such a government as
“separatist,” instantly intensifying Chinese fears that Taiwan is slipping away and
that dramatic PRC counteraction is necessary.
 SQ Solves Pivot---1NC
Squo solves---shifting military forces to Asia now---makes the pivot
sustainable
Benjamin Schreer 13, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Why the
US ‘pivot’ to Asia is sustainable,” 3/14/13, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-us-
pivot-to-asia-is-sustainable/
One of the key questions US allies and partners have been asking is whether America will actually be able to pull off the Asia–Pacific
‘pivot’. More than twelve months after the announcement there are doubts persist all around; whether the US as a global power can
afford to shift more military assets from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific, whether growing pressure on the US defence budget might
render the ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalance’) unsustainable anyway, or even if the political will exists to persist in the face of risi ng Chinese power.
However, a good case can be made that the ‘rebalance’ is not only in full swing but will also be
sustainable in the long-run.
First, ashift of military assets away from other regions towards the Asia Pacific is
already underway. US ongoing strategic interests in the Middle East and elsewhere don’t require a massive military footprint.
As the Pentagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance made clear, major US land wars are a thing of the past .
Deterring potential Iranian attempts to overthrow the regional status quo does not necessarily depend on the forward deployment of
strategic assets such as aircraft carriers. In fact, provided US aerospace forces in the Gulf are reinforced, US deterrence v is-à-vis Iran
could be more credible without high-value targets such as carriers. Moreover, counterterrorism operations in
Africa and South America will be conducted by a mix of special forces and CIA
operatives. And European NATO allies such as France and the United Kingdom have stepped up their leadership in military
operations in Northern Africa and the Levant.

As a result, the US has already reduced its presence in the Middle East by one aircraft carrier and some destroyers. The chie f of naval
operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert also recently told US Congress of plans to withdraw two
amphibious warships and two frigates from the waters off Africa, and to reduce the
numbers of ships in the US Southern Command to zero. At the same time, US forces redeploy towards
our region. The new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are on their way to be forward deployed in
Singapore. There have also been moves to further strengthen the American presence
in Japan and South Korea. Joint war games and training exercises in East Asia and elsewhere will go ahead as scheduled. Commented [EM6]:
And USPACOM Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear testified that his permanently-assigned ground forces are
‘resetting their focus in the Indo-Asia-Pacific’, while the III US Marine Expeditionary Force had ended its
world-wide service rotations, allowing them to ‘once again concentrate on Pacific theater missions.’ The US seems indeed
willing to systematically prioritise capabilities required for the Asia–Pacific theatre.
Moreover, the doom and gloom in the Pentagon and among some US policymakers about the budget cuts
irreversibly crippling America’s military are vastly overblown. True, money will be tighter in the coming years. But as a new
study by The Hamilton Project argues, the real crisis for US defence spending is ‘not downward pressure on the defense budget , but
rather problems from within that budget’. These problems can be fixed by systematically redesigning forces for the new security
challenges and by creating a more effective and efficient defence acquisition system—admittedly easier said than done. But, even if the
much discussed ‘sequester’ takes effect in the medium to longer term, the US is set to outspend any other
power, including China, by a wide margin.
The Hamilton Project authors also state that militarily
America is ‘not about to be overwhelmed nor
have we fallen behind potential challengers’ (read: China). Yes, the US Pacific Navy will probably not be able
to arrest its long term decline and dramatically increase its fleet beyond today’s 290 major combatants. But it doesn’t have to; its
combined agility, firepower and operational reach allow it to dominate large parts of the Western Pacific and at least deny Chinese fo rces
from establishing sea control in contested maritime spaces. And America’s new ‘AirSea Battle’ operational concept signals to China that it
won’t be deterred from accessing some future East Asian crisis, based on an emerging US Navy paradigm of ‘the many, the cheap(er), and
the unmanned’. A
combination of forward deployed troops and ‘offshore balancing’ (eg the
ability to strike from safe distances) will
allow the US to sustain a powerful presence in Asia to
deter major power war.
Moreover, the
‘pivot’ is scalable. That’s to say, it can be adapted to changing strategic
circumstances. At this point of time, a modest strengthening of the US presence in Asia is just
about right. Anything else would smack of a disproportionate response to China’s military rise. Washington is not containing
Beijing. Indeed, as ASPI visiting scholar Ross Terrill argued recently on this blog , America’s view of China is still very much predicated on
the hope that China will become a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Should China ever turn into a truly revisionist power, America certainly has
the capacity to enter into an Asian ‘Cold War’. But until then, the
pivot’s true significance is not a rapid
increase of US military capabilities in Asia but in the political message it sends: the
US will remain engaged in this region for a very long time. Finally, the US would want to avoid the impression among some
allies, including Australia that it will continue to shoulder most of the burden.
 Not Zero Sum---1NC
Not zero sum with the ASPG
Kurt M. Campbell 14, Chair and CEO of the Asia Group, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should
Focus on Asia,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-04-18/far-eastern-promises
A second critique stems from the argument that it would be unwise or unrealistic to shift Washington’s focus from the Middle East to
Asia given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the instability in Egypt and Iraq, and the long-running confrontation between Iran and
According to this view, the
the Western powers. But this criticism relies on a caricature of the rebalancing strategy.
Middle East and South Asia have sapped U.S. power and prestige and the pivot is really an
attempt to cut and run by turning to the more peaceful and profitable shores of the Asia-Pacific. It is certainly true that the
Obama administration has tried to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. But even though resources are finite,
foreign policy is not a zero-sum game, and the criticism that paying more attention to
Asia is somehow an admission of strategic defeat in the Middle East misses a crucial reality :
during the past decade, the very Asian countries to which Washington wants to pay more attention have
quietly built a substantial stake in the furtherance of peace and stability across the Middle
East and South Asia and very much want the United States to preserve its influence in those regions.
Not long ago, most Asian nations were predominantly concerned with developments in their backyards and tended to see problems
elsewhere as someone else’s responsibility. One of the most important successes of President George W. Bush’s Asia policy was to
encourage the region’s rising powers to contribute more in other parts of the world. Partly in response, during the Bush years, for the
first time, many
East Asian governments developed an “out of area” perspective and
engaged more in diplomacy, development, and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Japan has
become a leading supporter of civil society development in Afghanistan , funding schools and
civil service organizations and training Afghans in criminal justice, education, health care, and agriculture. In the wake of the Arab Spring,
South Korea began supporting development across the Middle East. Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand have provided material assistance to training programs for doctors, police officers, and teachers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
Australia and New Zealand have sent special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has been more active in the behind-the-scenes
diplomacy aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, addressing piracy on the high seas, and shaping Afghanistan’s futur e.

Of course, encouragement from Washington is only one factor behind Asian countries’ growing involvement in the Middle East; another
undeniable element is their increasing thirst for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day,
more than twice the amount that the EU does. Asian
governments know that a hasty U.S. retreat from
the Middle East would carry with it unacceptable risks to their countries’ energy security and Commented [EM7]:
economic growth. As a result, they have invested substantial political and financial capital in, and in
some cases sent military forces to, the Middle East over the course of more than a decade to supplement,
not supplant, the stabilizing role of the United States. Put simply, Washington’s Asian partners support
the pivot but would hardly cheer the prospect of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East --
and crucially, they do not seem to see any contradiction between these two positions .
 ASB Bad
ASB calls for preemptive strikes on Chinese C4ISR and conventional
missiles in a crises --- that threatens nuclear escalation
Amitai Etzioni 14, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George
Washington University, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘concept’: A critique,” International Politics
(2014) 51, 577-596, http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n5/full/ip201427a.html
Origins of ASB¶ The thesis that the United States needs an innovative strategy and new weapons capabilities to counter China first took
root during the ‘revolution in military affairs’ of the early 1990s (ibid., p. 10).1 Following the first Gulf War, the Office of Net Assessment
(an internal Pentagon ‘think tank’) was charged with identifying future threats and ways the military should prepare for them . The ONA
produced three assessments between 1992 and 1996 that concluded that the rise of A2/AD developments would pose a significant threat
to the US’ forward deployed troops and assets and would radically alter the military landscape in the decades to come (Krepin evich,
2010, pp. 8–9). The first of these reports was authored by Andrew Krepinevich Jr, who subsequently left the ONA to serve as president of
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (an independent think tank but one that, according to the Washingto n Post,
receives about 40 per cent of its budget from the ONA) (Jaffe, 2012). In 2007, Krepinevich (2012a) testified before Congress that the PLA
posed a ‘pacing threat’ to the United States and that the military needed to develop the type of programming and strategy coh erence that
characterized AirLand Battle – the Cold War concept used to deter the Soviet Union in Europe – in order to maintain security in the
Western Pacific in the face of increasingly aggressive China. ¶ In the years that followed, ASB was ‘forged in a collaborative effort of Pacific
Air Forces, the CSBA and the Pentagon’s influential Office of Net Assessment’ (Halloran, 2010). The architects sent their findings an d
recommendations, the result of numerous war games, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who signed a
classified memorandum of agreement in 2009 to initiate the official inter-service effort to develop the ASB ‘concept’ (Halloran, 2010). ¶
ASB gained the endorsement of the then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review and was officially approved by his successor former Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta in 2011 (Dupree and Thomas, 2012). At the time, Krepinevich wrote that ‘the Pentagon has been
working for more than a year to develop a new military concept – ASB – whose principal purpose is to preserve regional stability. It
focuses on removing the temptation for Beijing to pursue its security objectives through aggression or coercion by maintaining a credible
United States and allied capability to successfully resist such actions’ (Krepinevich, 2011). At a background briefing on the concept in
November 2011, a senior Obama administration official told reporters, ‘Air Sea Battle is to
China what the [US Navy’s mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union. It is
a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be punished. We will
initiate’ (Gertz, 2011).¶ A hypothetical ASB war¶ Much of ASB remains highly classified and the Pentagon’s public statements on it
have been ‘intentionally vague’ (Hammes, 2012a, p. 2). However, Krepinevich and the CSBA filled in a fair number of the blanks in ‘Air
Sea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept’, a report that provides a detailed account of how an ASB-style war with China
would unfold and specific steps the United States should take to prepare for it. The
operation begins with a
‘blinding campaign’ by the United States that takes out China’s surveillance and targeting
systems in order to allow the United States to operate within the first island chain (which
stretches from Japan to Taiwan and through the Philippines) (Van Tol et al, 2010, p.
56). This campaign would ‘include cyber attacks, PLA space assets would be targeted, electronic warfare aircraft would spoof PLA
radars and sensors and seaborne pickets would be targeted’ (DefenseTech, 2010). Next, the military would carry out
a missile suppression campaign against air-defense networks, targeting land-based
and mobile missile launchers. These early operations would require penetrating
strikes against the Chinese mainland where essential surveillance systems and long-
range missile launchers are located. After ‘the reduction and eventual elimination of the PLA submarine threat’,
follow-up operations may include ‘neutraliz[ing] PLA bases outside the Western Pacific’ and implementing a ‘distant blockade’ to
strangle China’s economy (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 73). ¶ ‘Walking back’¶ Many found descriptions of ASB, like that summarized above, as
highly provocative and worried that the concept may mobilize China to accelerate its military buildup (Global Security Newswire, 2012).
the Pentagon has
As a result, to use the term included in an article by Hammes (2012b) of the National Defense University,
‘walked back’ ASB, stressing that it was not conceived with China or any other
particular adversary in mind and is merely the work of a small office charged with
enhancing inter-service coordination.¶ In May 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert and General Mark Welsh, two of
the military leaders behind ASB, wrote an article in Foreign Policy, repeating the official refrain that ASB ‘is not focused on one specific
adversary’ and ‘isn’t a plan’. However,
they proceed to describe ASB in terms strikingly similar
to those used by the CSBA.¶ ‘Air-Sea Battle defeats threats to access by, first, disrupting an adversary’s command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying adversary weapons
launchers (including aircraft, ships and missile sites); and finally, defeating the weapons an adversary launches’ (Greenert and Welsh,
2013).¶ The publication of this article coincided with the ASB Office’s release of an unclassified summary of the ASB, the most detailed
official description of the concept to date. ‘ASB: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges’ describes how
technological advances and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities undermine ‘the United States and allied expeditionary warfare model of
power projection and maneuver’.2 ASB will, according to the document, allow the United States to regain the military advantage in anti-
access environments by disrupting an aggressor’s command and control systems, neutralizing A2/AD missile launch platforms, and
defeating deployed weapons and formations. Again, no specific adversary is mentioned. However, there
are only two
nations with developed A2/AD systems, and China is the strongest challenger. Iran
comes in a remote second place, but, as the CBSA readily acknowledged, it ‘cannot
hope to match China when it comes to developing an advanced A2/AD network’
(Krepinevich, 2010, p. 27). During a 2011 visit to Beijing, the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters, ‘[t]he y [China]
clearly have potential to put some of our capabilities at risk. We have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with
our own programs’ (Bumiller, 2011). Hence,
it seems fairly obvious that any US program whose
central goal, indeed raison d’être, is to counter these weapon systems, has China in
its sights (with Iran in the periphery).¶ Pentagon officials repeat that it is not a ‘strategy for a specific region or
adversary’, and when reporters inevitably ask about ASB’s connection to China, they respond that ‘the inclination to narrow d own on a
particular scenario is unhelpful’ (Lagrone, 2012). Note: Not false or misleading but – unhelpful to the military’s desired message. ¶
Thus, despite the Pentagon’s repeated denials, it should come as no surprise that a
Navy official flatly stated that ‘ASB is all about convincing the Chinese that we will
win this competition’ (Jaffe, 2012). James Steinberg, a leading scholar of international relations who served as
the Under Secretary of State during the first years of the Obama Administration, and O’Hanlon, a highly regard military analyst,
say that the Pentagon’s denials that concerns about China factor in to its strategy
‘lack credibility and feed distrust’ (O’Hanlon and Steinberg, 2012).¶ Just a concept?¶ Pentagon officials
also insist ASB is not a plan but merely a concept, the work of a small office with only 17 personnel, none of
higher rank that colonel or Navy captain, who are ‘deluged by the near-term nitty gritty of getting existing organizations and weapons
programs to work together in a future war’, leaving them ‘little time to think through the often scary strategic implications of how the
next war will be waged’ (Freedberg, 2013). However, changes in acquisitions and force restructuring suggest that ASB involves more
than a concept or the kind of contingency file the military has for many unlikely conflicts. These developments are difficult to assess in
part because the details are classified, and in part because many of changes could also serve goals besides those of ASB. Wha t follows
should hence be taken with these important qualifications in mind. ¶ Acquisitions: The non-partisan and highly regarded Congressional
Research Service notes that ‘the Air-Sea Battle concept has prompted Navy officials to make significant shifts in the service’s FY2014–
FY2018 budget plan’ toward exactly the sorts of electronic, cyber and anti-submarine weapons systems that the war plan for China calls
for (O’Rourke, 2013, p. 55). In his remarks on ASB at the Brookings Institution in May 2012, Adm. Greenert (2012a) stated that the ASB
Office has more ‘than 200 initiatives’ in progress and that the 2011 and 2012 Presidential Budgets contain related investment s in ‘anti-
submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing’ and that the 2013 budget ‘sustains these
investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments’ in line with the dictates of ASB. It seems, according to th ese sources,
that this ‘concept’ has very tangible consequences. ¶ Force restructuring: When ASB was first endorsed it was seen by some in the
Pentagon as a power grab by the Air Force and Navy, an excuse to take lines of the budget and missions from the Army, which p layed the
lead in the over decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wheeler, 2013). According to one report, the Army and Marine Corps ‘mounted
offensives against the concept, which could lead to less spending on ground combat’ (Barnett, 2012). ASB was subsequently rev ised to
give a role to the Army and Marines (Wong, 2012). Nevertheless, ASB does entail some reallocation of budget and force concentration
from the Army to the Air Force and Navy (Greenert, 2012b). ¶ Criticism of ASB¶ There are two major criticisms raised against ASB. Some
see it as an aggressive and risky military strategy and suggest that the same goals can be obtained with other much less costly and
escalatory military means. This line of criticism is briefly reviewed next. The article then explores the second line – which argues that
ASB is not consistent with overall US foreign policy.¶ Mainland strikes and nuclear escalation ¶ Several military analysts warn that ASB
is inherently escalatory. Even chief proponents of ASB at the CSBA recognize that
‘[t]he scope and intensity of US stand-off and penetrating strikes against targets in
mainland China clearly has escalation implications’ (Van Tol et al, 2010, p. 66). Williams (2011), a retired
Marine Corps officer, writes that ‘[s]urely, given the nuclear weapons China possesses and its
growing irregular warfare and economic assets, we should question very seriously
any operational concept that requires extensive strikes on the Chinese mainland’. ¶
Defense analyst Heinrichs (2011) warns that ‘conventional deep strikes against Chinese C4ISR assets
[Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance] in a conflict could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at
preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. Under intense
pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict, including,
in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold’. Rovner (2012) of the US Naval War
College agrees that the early and deep inland strikes on enemy territory envisioned by the
concept could be mistakenly perceived by the Chinese as preemptive attempts to
take out its nuclear weapons, thus cornering them into ‘a terrible use-it-or-lose-it
dilemma’.¶ China is likely to respond to what is effectively a major direct attack on its
mainland with all the military means at its disposal – including its stockpile of
nuclear arms. While the concept as originally written did not address nuclear weapons, its architects have since, in one officer’s
words, ‘realized, “hey, we do need to deal with nuclear operations” ’ – precisely because ‘the more effective such conventional [ASB]
operations become, the more likely a hard-pressed adversary is to resort to nuclear weapons in response’ (Freedberg, 2013).¶ Arms
race¶ Evenif ASB does not lead to full-blown or nuclear war, it is likely to spur a costly
arms race. Leading Australian military strategist White (2012) warns threatened with ASB, ‘[w]e can be sure that
China will place a very high priority indeed on maintaining its capacity to strike the
United States, and that it will succeed in this’ (p. 78). A Chinese military official
explained to an American audience in that, ‘[i]f the US military develops Air-Sea
Battle to deal with the [People’s Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop
anti-Air-Sea Battle’ (Jaffe, 2012). ASB is likely to lead two major powers, each best
served by focusing on problems at home, to get caught up in preparations for war
that may well end up in an all-out military conflagration.
 ASB – Not Credible
ASB deterrence fails – China thinks it can win
T. X. Hammes 13, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies @ National
Defense University, “Sorry, AirSea Battle Is No Strategy,” August 7, 2013,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/sorry-airsea-battle-no-strategy-8846
AirSea Battle fails to deter, assure, or guide¶ Deterrence is based on the other side believing
you can deny its goals as well as punish it for trying. While we have no unclassified statement of the
AirSea Battle concept, it does seem to rely heavily on a “networked, integrated force” that
can strike deep. This implies heavy use of digital networks as well as comprehensive
surveillance of major portions of the Chinese mainland. China has clearly been
working to defeat these capabilities. On January 11, 2007, China destroyed a satellite in Low Earth Orbit. From
2006 to the present, they have repeatedly used lasers to dazzle U.S. satellites in Low Earth Orbit. From
TITAN RAIN to BYZANTINE ANCHOR, China has also demonstrated the ability to penetrate U.S.
cyber systems—even classified systems. If China believes it can defeat ASB through action
against U.S. space and cyber systems, then ASB loses much of its deterrent effect.¶ In
fact, the very existence of a serious AirSea Battle capability is escalatory. In a recent article in Foreign
Policy, David Gompert and Terrence Kelly note that ASB pushes China to a first strike. ¶ Given that, to be most effective, AirSea Battle
would need to take down Chinese targeting and strike capabilities before they could cause significant damage to U.S. forces a nd bases. It
follows, and the Chinese fear, that such U.S. capabilities are best used early and first—if not
preemptively, then in preparation for further U.S. offensive action . After all, such U.S. strikes have
been used to initiate conflict twice in Iraq. This perception will, in turn, increase the incentive for the
PLA to attack preemptively, before AirSea Battle has degraded its ability to neutralize Commented [EM8]:
the U.S. strike threat. It could give the Chinese cause to launch large-scale preemptive
cyber- and anti-satellite attacks on our AirSea Battle assets. Indeed, they might feel a need, out of
self-defense, to launch such attacks even if they had not planned to start a war. It is a
dangerous situation when both sides put a premium on early action.
In contrast, Offshore Control moves into place deliberately—and since it can be executed without full space or cyber capabilities, the
incentive for first strike is reduced. Equally important, we don’t have to attack their warning systems, and differentiate be tween their
tactical networks and their strategic warning systems. Inadvertently
blinding the assets used to direct
their strategic-response systems could be the trigger to a first use. We do not have much
historical evidence for evaluating conflict between nuclear-armed powers. In the US-USSR Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR-Chinese
Zhenbao Island Incident, and the India-Pakistan Kargil Crisis, the leaders on each side sought to slow and contain the crisis. Do
we
really want to select a military strategy that puts the President in the position of
conceding great advantage if he fails to strike preemptively? Given that Truman and Johnson
refused to strike China when hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops were in combat, are we sure a future President will authori ze an
extensive strike campaign into China? Even worse, do
we want to select an approach that convinces
Chinese leaders they must strike first to protect their homeland?
Doubles
1NC
Off
 1
Topicality

Definitions:

Military presence refers to the number of military personnel in the

region
Jessie P.H. Poon 6, Professor in the Department of Geography, University at Buffalo-SUNY,
Suksawat Sajarattanachote, and Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen, “The role of US defense exports in
Asia Pacific regionalism,” Political Geography Volume 25, Issue 7, September 2006, Pages
715–734, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629806000825
The major source of defense trade data comes from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) where 1989 forms the earliest year that the data are available and 2004
the most recent (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp). From this database, current and historical records may be searched for U.S. exports to Asia Pacific countries with the
end use category “defense.” This ensured that dual use products were excluded from the search. Seven sectors may be identified for defense trade including military aircrafts, aircraft
launching gear/parachutes, etc., engines/turbines for military aircraft, military trucks/armored vehicles, etc., military ships/boats, tanks/artillery/
missiles/rockets/guns/ammunition, and parts/special goods, etc. Not all of the sectors will be analyzed because many countries contain only very sparse data. Approximately thirty
Asia Pacific countries are identified to be engaged in defense trade with the US although this number varies from sector to sector. The countries include all members of APEC and the
ARF but also extend to other countries that have been excluded from these arrangements such as Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Oceania. Defense exports are

US military presence is measured

supplemented by two other sources of data, that is, US military presence and countries' military expenditure.

by the number and shares of active military personnel in the region. This
information is compiled by the US Department of Defense (http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm).
Statistics on military expenditures may be obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri.org). In addition, contextual information is also collected
from research monographs on US military strategies. These reports are compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and CRS constitutes the public
policy research arm of the US Congress. Many of these reports include testimonials to the Congress regarding defense and strategic events in the Asia Pacific, and provide important
documentation as well as evidence of US geopolitical interests, policies and developments in the region.

Significant reduction is at least half – anything short is a confusing token

gesture
Senator Tom Hayden 11, the Nation Institute's Carey McWilliams Fellow, has played an
active role in American politics and history for over three decades (Tom, The Nation,
“Obama's Decisions on Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan Will Determine Re-Election Chances”
4/26, http://www.thenation.com/article/160194/obamas-decisions-afghanistan-iraq-
pakistan-will-determine-re-election-chances
On Afghanistan, Obama
told the Associated Press last Friday that his coming July announcement of troop withdrawals
would be “significant…not a token gesture.”
Though the president offered no specific numbers, the phrasing was an important signal, delivered in White House –speak. According to
Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars, the internal debate between the White House and Pentagon over Afghanistan has been intense.
When the president announced in a December 2009 West Point speech that he was sending 30-33,000 more American troops in a
military surge to Afghanistan, it appeared that the Pentagon and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had won the argument. But Obama
slipped a hedge into the West Point speech pledging that he would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in Jul y 2011.”

What did it mean to “begin” a transfer? When would it end? Would it be based on conditions on the ground, as demanded by the military,
or a firm deadline, which Obama expected would come from the Hill? Peace groups, opposed to Obama’s troop surge of 33,000, weren’t
impressed by vague talk of simply beginning something that had no end. The cynicism deepened when Obama announced in November
2010 that American combat operations would end by 2014, and that counterterrorism capabilities would remain beyond that date.
Pentagon officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. David Petraeus, have publicly advocated the most minimal
version of an initial withdrawal. In a recent speech to NATO recently, Gates chastised the Europeans for “too much talk about exit and not
enough about continuing the fight.” He added that “we will not sacrifice the significant gains made to date, or the lives lost, for a political
gesture.” Woodward’s book quoted Petraeus saying “I don’t think you win this war. I think you keep fighting.”

Obama’s concern was being dragged into an unpopular, unaffordable quagmire by generals with competing agendas. As Woodward
quoted him, “I can’t lose all the Democratic Party.”

But that is what’s happened. Peace sentiment, expressed openly in the streets during the Bush years, became a silent but expanding
presence inside the Democratic Party as Obama escalated the war. Recent polls indicate that a majority of Americans, includin g 86
percent of Democratic voters, favor speeding up the withdrawal of American troops.

In February, the Barbara Lee, the sole Congressional opponent of the open-ended authorization to go to war a decade ago, found herself
in the mainstream of her party in opposing Afghanistan. Lee submitted a resolution to the Democratic National Committee calling on
Obama to announce a “significant” and “substantial” withdrawal by July, a rapid pullout over the next two years and the transfer of the
savings to job creation at home.

Since Obama is the leader of the DNC, all resolutions are vetted by the White House. At first, the Lee language was rejected by the staffers
who monitor the doings of the party. Then something happened. White House objections disappeared. Centrist party leaders like Donna
Brazille and Alice Germond signed on as co-authors of the Lee resolution, which passed without dissent.

Was the White House sending a signal that a strong peace statement from the party would be useful political cover? No one kno ws. Then
came last week’s announcement by Obama echoing the DNC resolution’s call for a swift, sizeable and significant reduction.

So whatwould those terms mean in raw numbers? At the low end of “significant,” Obama
could announce a withdrawal of 33,000 beginning in July and carrying through 2012, enabling him to claim
he ended the surge he promised his military. That still would leave many Americans in
confusion, wondering how a 2009 level of US combat would mean a step towards peace.
A more robust definition of “significant” would be a decrease of 32,000 troops by October of this year,
followed by another decrease of 35,000 by July 2012, a reduction of more than half of America’s forces
through the 2012 presidential campaign. These numbers are proposed by national security experts at
the Washington, DC–based Afghanistan Study Group. The ASG estimates $60-80 billion in savings to American taxpayers per year.

There are 80 thousand US troops in Northeast Asia

Janine Davidson 15, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at CFR, and Lauren Dickey, research
associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “How Serious Is the
Rebalance? U.S. Military Record Tells (Part of) the Story,” Apr 16 2015,
http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/04/16/how-serious-is-the-rebalance-u-s-military-
record-tells-part-of-the-story/
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s travels to Japan and South Korea last week—designed no doubt to highlight the continued U.S. commitment to the region—
instead resurfaced concerns that the rebalance to Asia is no longer a priority for Washington. Skeptics worry that world events from Russian aggression in Ukraine, to the continued
conflagrations across the Middle East, and negotiations with Iran will continue to challenge Washington’s ability to deploy what Carter referred to as the “next phase of our rebalance.”
Debates over the defense budget back in Washington further stoke worries that the military side of the rebalance will remain more talk that action. While there may be other valid
concerns about the rebalance (Is it focused sufficiently on Southeast Asia? Overly provocative toward China? Likely to be derailed entirely without the TPP?), concerns that the United
States has not prioritized the rebalance do not stand up to the facts. A survey of actual U.S. military activity in the region helps differentiate facts from opinion.¶ That Secretary Carter

Between them, these two countries host

visited Tokyo and Seoul so soon after stepping into the job reflects the priority the Pentagon places on the region.

over 80,000 U.S. military personnel and the majority of forward deployed assets in the Western Pacific (note: there are 65,000 U.S. troops
stationed in Europe and roughly 35,000 currently deployed to the Middle East). In Tokyo, Secretary Carter’s visit was timed to coincide with the final revisions to the U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation Guidelines, a bilateral priority given the dramatic regional geopolitical shifts since the guidelines were last revised in the late 1990s. His discussions with
counterparts in Seoul did tiptoe around the U.S. proposed introduction of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, but highlighted the solidarity of the
U.S.-ROK alliance.
Violation---they remove 5,000 at most

Vote neg
a) Limits---they allow an unmanageable series of minor adjustment
affs because there are too many tiny units in topic regions for the
neg to keep up---hurts topic education by rewarding obscurity and
preventing clash
b) Ground---deterrence and allied cred DAs all assume a notable
reduction in troop presence---they dodge core questions of
forward presence and perception because the aff can say nobody
even notices the plan
 2
Assurance

The plan destroys U.S. assurance to allies---they want ASB to be the U.S.
response to China
Caitlin Talmadge 15, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at
the George Washington University, May 2015, “Preventing Nuclear Escalation in
Conventional Conflict: The Case of the United States and China,”
https://nuclearconference2015.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/talmadge-nsri-draft.pdf
Alliance Politics: Alliance politics on the U.S. side likely would further exacerbate this problem. The
Pacific Ocean may
insulate the United States from much of China's striking power, but U.S. allies,
particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more exposed militarily (and economically) in
the event of a U.S.—China war. Even if the United States believes it could achieve security through
more defensive military approaches, U.S. allies do not appear to share this conviction.76
Already in peacetime, U.S. relationships with its Asian allies involve a constant process of
reassurance, with the United States engaging in extensive dialogues and consultations to
convince allies of the strength of U.S. commitments.77 These allies—and their supporters in the
United States—attach tremendous symbolic importance to U.S. decisions about basing, arms
sales, and forward deployment, even in cases where these choices likely would have
little real military impact on U.S. or allied abilities to prevail in a conflict versus
China.78
In the event of conflict with China, these same U.S. allies likely would prefer that the United States
pursue robust, offensive operations. Indeed, allied officials embraced the promulgation of Air-Sea
Battle precisely because it seemed to indicate U.S. willingness to fight a war with China
and to fight it aggressively. Interviews with allied diplomats and military officers
suggest little recognition of the prospect that this sort of conventional military approach might
create inadvertent nuclear pressures on China. In their view, war will have broken out
because of Chinese aggression, so further efforts at intra-war deterrence are moot.
Perhaps because these allies have been discouraged from seeking their own nuclear weapons, the security elite tend to be less sensitized
to the potential connections between conventional and nuclear uses of force. Most
see the full application of U.S.
conventional military power as an unalloyed good and profess little interest in calibrating the use of that
power to decrease the chances of nuclear use by China.79

***TO FOOTNOTE 79***

79 Interviews conducted by the author in Tokyo, December 2014

***END FOOTNOTES***

These attitudes are particularly perplexing given that Chinese nuclear use probably would endanger U.S. allies more than the United
States. It may be possible to impress upon them these realities through dialogue over time. Nevertheless, U.S. allies currently seem more
likely to contribute to rather than reduce escalatory pressures in a war with China.
That triggers wildfire proliferation by allies
Elbridge Colby 15, Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for a New American Security,
4/1/15, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States,”
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Prepared%20Testimony%20for%20Formatting%20FINAL%20FORMATTED%20(1).p
df
This course will seem unappealing to many, not least in the United States, given the risks it will entail for Americans. But this disquiet
points to another potential implication should China gain military primacy in the Western Pacific: the prospect of further nu clear
proliferation in the region. If,
as China grows stronger and more assertive, its conventional military
power begins to outweigh that of the United States in maritime Asia, and that shift is not
met by a greater U.S. reliance on its nuclear forces or some other effective countervailing steps,
then those countries of Asia traditionally allied to or reliant upon Washington—countries that
cannot hope to match China’s strength at the conventional level—may ultimately see getting their own nuclear
weapons as essential to deterring China’s exploitation of its growing strength .
It is worth emphasizing that this will particularly be the case if these nations view a weaker
United States as lacking the resolve or the ability to use its nuclear weapons on behalf of
its allies, since in such a case they will be exposed to Chinese coercion. This is no fantasy; polls in South Korea
already show substantial support for an indigenous nuclear-weapons program, and
South Korea, Japan, Australia and Taiwan have pursued or seriously contemplated pursuing their
own nuclear arsenals in the past and might do so again. In other words, in such a scenario a
cruel dynamic will take hold in which diminishing U.S. conventional advantages will lead to
pressure for greater emphasis on nuclear forces, but, in light of China’s own advancing nuclear
capabilities, such reliance itself will be decidedly less attractive .

Asian prolif causes nuclear war

Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State
University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy,
2015, pp. 59-63
the
Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow,

possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional

war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the post-
Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as
the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an

unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink
despite their shared interest in avoiding war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military
capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during
peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible
inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking
relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately,

and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis.
Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces , from

the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or

from guesswork based on past experience.¶ For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications
exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence
officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and
a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared
among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an
attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred
during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared
to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet
Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union,
but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic
assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in
January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory
resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected
the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general
staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with
nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The
operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the
Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign
ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶
If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the
Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America
and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with
newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets
(and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military

operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another
consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a
commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may
be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social
predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable
manipulation during a crisis.¶ The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the
Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this

regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and
command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social
and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear
powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile

alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present

century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold
War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in
Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect. 20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other
nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible

adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about
territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range
to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with
potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan
and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or
means that very little time will be available for warning and
military forces of contiguous states

attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be

mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear
weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims

of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-
control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken,
retaliation.¶ This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about
nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United
States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift

the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle
Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the

effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé , on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”
and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or
coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and
ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
 3
Counterplan

The United States should:

-- establish new operational concepts for the employment of Carrier Strike Groups
as parts of a Joint Force system to meet emerging threats
-- pursue a suite of capability improvements to aircraft carriers, carrier air wings,
supporting ships in Carrier Strike Groups, and carrier infrastructure, including
accelerated development of unmanned combat aerial vehicles, increasing carrier air
wing strike range and developing sea control aircraft, increasing organic ISR ability
of surface combatants in Carrier Strike Groups
-- increase its inventory of conventional missiles deployed on guided missile
submarines
-- cancel the Joint Strike Fighter program, extend production of the F/A-18 Hornet,
and accelerate the development of the Long-Range Strike Bomber
-- cease construction of additional aircraft carriers

-- fully fund development and deployment of next-generation ballistic

missile submarines.
-- make long-term investments in combat credibility, such as exercising
and validating emerging technology and its associated doctrine
-- fully fund and deploy six icebreakers to the Arctic.
-- establish, with NATO, a regular military exercise program in the Arctic.
The United States should adopt and publicly declare a doctrine of
restraint on conventional attacks against peer or near-peer competitor
adversaries, including the withholding of highly destructive weapons,
limiting the size of an attack, and avoiding strategic C2, nuclear force,
and leadership targets. The United States should clarify that this set of
limited objectives is contingent upon adversaries willingness to forgo
the threat of use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, and should clarify that
counter-space and cyber attacks would be legitimate options in an
outright conventional war, but disproportionate in conflicts short of
outright war.

Solvency for the first set of planks:

The CP pursues a wide range of operational concepts and capability

improvements that resolves carrier vulnerability and ensures continued
effectiveness for carrier strike groups
Seth Cropsey 15, Director of the Center for American Seapower; Bryan G. McGrath, the
Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower and the Managing Director of the
Ferrybridge Group; Timothy A. Walton, principal of the Alios Consulting Group, October
2015, “Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict,”
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/201510SharpeningtheS
pearTheCarriertheJointForceandHighEndConflict.pdf
Independent of cost considerations, concerns regarding the operational vulnerability
of the carrier are mounting. As adversaries continue to advance the capability to target
and attack the aircraft carrier and other surface forces at greater ranges, the current
historically modest range of the carrier’s striking force places it well-within the
effective range of these modern A2/AD weapons and sensors. If then, the carrier is out-
ranged by adversary systems, the risks of employing its air wing may outweigh the
benefits conferred by its capabilities, and the wisdom of continuing to acquire them may
be dubious.
The CSG faces major constraints and vulnerabilities that reduce its campaign utility to the
Joint Force in high-threat scenarios. Although this analysis identifies a number of
carrier weaknesses and vulnerabilities, many of these same weaknesses and
vulnerabilities apply to other elements of the Joint Force— especially land-based systems.
Nonetheless, assessment of current and projected scenarios portend a growing
demand for the sea-based aviation that carriers provide.
In order to ensure the Joint Force is prepared to deter and defeat aggression, major
changes to the CSG are needed. The Navy must develop new concepts and capabilities for
the employment of CSGs in a systemic manner, and this study makes recommendations as
to how to improve the elements of that system to face current and future challenges.6
EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
The Navy needs to examine new operational concepts for the employment of the
carrier as part of a system. New operational concepts will allow the Navy and Joint Force
to more effectively use existing systems and to develop new capabilities to meet emerging
threats.
Power Pulse: The Navy should adopt new operational concepts for CSGs that seek to
pulse combat power, instead of providing steady-state support.
Integrated Multi-CSG Operations: The Navy should develop doctrine, and exercise as
possible, the capability to conduct fully integrated multiple carrier CSG operations
that maximize the full potential of carrier airpower, rather than conducting single or
aggregated CSG operations.
Renew CSG Emphasis on Sea Control: Although not an operational concept, the Navy
should critically examine the burgeoning future requirements for sea control and
adequately adjust its programmatic portfolio to meet those threats.
Develop Single Naval Battle: Consistent with the aims of Single Naval Battle,
Navy/Marine Corps integration to achieve operational objectives should improve,
especially the employment of Marine Corps aviation and amphibious forces to
address sea control requirements.
Distributed Basing Dynamics: The Navy, along with the other services, should develop
the capability to operate from fixed and mobile advanced and intermediate staging
bases.
Air Force-Navy Theater Strike: The Air Force and the Navy should continue to
develop concepts and capabilities for using complementary capabilities (such as
pairing Air Force bombers with Navy carrier fighter wings) to conduct integrated
operations, including strike, against mature A2/AD threats.
CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENTS
To fully address emerging gaps in high-end conflict, the development of new concepts
must be complemented by the development of new capabilities. These capabilities can
be categorized as improvements to the carrier itself, carrier air wing, other ships in a CSG,
and carrier infrastructure and supplies.
The Aircraft Carrier: As technology (such as friendly and enemy weapons and aircraft
planform design changes), concepts, and requirements change, the role of carriers and the
appropriate design should be periodically examined. In the near term, the ability of CSGs to
operate with extensive Emissions Controls (EMCON) should improve. Additionally,
improvements to the carrier’s passive and active systems and measures that
frustrate detection and provide protection should continue, these include decoys,
jammers, the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) program, and potentially lasers and
high-powered microwaves. Lastly, improving the recoverability (operating in a degraded
condition) of a carrier in spite of damage to its flight decks or damage associated with
electronic warfare should improve.
Carrier Air Wing: The Navy should address the existing and projected capability gaps
in the carrier air wing. In general, this requires the Navy to increase air wing striking
range, develop sea control aircraft, and develop new weapons. Lastly, the Department
of Defense (DoD) and Congress should critically evaluate the naval aviation portfolio,
including potential portfolio trades between land-based, permissive environment aircraft
and sea-based, contested environment aircraft.
Other Ships in the CSG: Significant weaknesses in the combat and logistical
capability of cruisers, destroyers, and the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) should be
addressed. The organic ISR ability of surface combatants should improve.
Additionally, the Navy should rapidly develop, test, and deploy a Vertical Launch
System (VLS) reload capability. The current CLF is too small and vulnerable for contested
operations in the vast Pacific. The Navy needs additional, more resilient, and potentially
differently designed CLF and supporting logistics ships and infrastructure.
Industrial Infrastructure and Suppliers: The Navy should carefully examine the industrial
base involved in the construction of carriers, their accompanying ships, and aircraft.
Moreover, the Navy should improve efforts to protect key component fabrication and
shipyard centers during heightened states of tension or conflict.
In summary, this analysis validates the ongoing Joint Force requirement for naval
aviation provided by aircraft carriers, and concludes that the large-deck, nuclear
powered carrier is the most combat effective and cost-efficient means of providing it.
Implementing the aforementioned recommendations will be necessary to improve
the combat potential of CSGs and the entire Joint Force in view of mounting threats
designed to undercut the effectiveness of the CSG. Some of these changes will be
disruptive to existing plans, programs, and paradigms; however, the alternative is a
rapidly weakening force that incurs greater operational risk not only for itself but also
for other components of the Joint Force. Only by altering course can the Navy ensure
that the CSG’s contribution to the Joint Force remains relevant to the nation’s needs
and future warfighting requirements.
The CP’s capabilities lock in short- and long-term carrier power
projection---makes U.S. naval power effective against A2AD
Henry Hendrix 13, Force Structure Analyst and Strategist in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, MAs in National Security Affairs from the Naval
Postgraduate School and History from Harvard University, Ph.D. in War Studies from Kings
College London, March 2013, “At What Cost A Carrier?,”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Carrier_Hendrix_FINAL.pdf
The U.S. Navy must be ready to support the nation’s interests. It must commit itself to developing the reliable
means to conduct precise, limited strikes on strategic targets such as leadership facilities, power
relay stations or water treatment plants. After 100 years, the carrier is rapidly approaching the end of its
useful strategic life. As arrows shot by English longbowmen at Agincourt supplanted knights in armor on the battlefields of
Europe and were in turn overtaken by muskets and cannon, the one constant in warfare is change. To continue to invest in
aircraft carriers at this stage , to believe that the USS Ford, with a service life of 50 years, can see the carrier through to a
150-year life unchallenged upon the high seas smells of hubris. Advancements in surveillance, reconnaissance, global
positioning, missiles and precision strike all signal a sea change in not only naval warfare, but all forms of warfare.

The United States, always an innovating nation, must break out of its ossified force structure and not
only get ahead of the strategic curve, but actively seek to redefine the curve. The nation must plan a
graceful transition that stops building carriers, plans a path for those already built to
see them through their service life and creates new means of operational
effectiveness in the future.
The Way Forward

All these factors indicate that a turn toward UCAVs is long overdue. The advent of A2/AD
technologies is pushing U.S. carrier strike groups farther from their targets, and the combat radius
of the F-35, or Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is simply not going to solve that problem (see Figure 1). One solution would be to
cancel the always-troubled JSF now while simultaneously extending production of the lower-cost
Hornets. That would allow the Navy to invest the nearly $70 million cost differential between the JSF and the F/A-18 in
accelerating the development and production of a UCAV that could operate both from
large carriers and from smaller, less expensive, light amphibious carriers. New
Hornets operating from the legacy large carriers would allow the United States to meet
its obligations in the near term while investment in UCAVs would begin the Navy's
pivot toward the new strategic environment.
The new UCAVs would be flown only when operationally needed. UCAV pilots would maintain their currency
in simulators, reducing personnel and operational costs and extending their airframes’ lives by
decades. This posture would allow the slowly declining number of carriers that would
remain in the inventory until the USS Ford retires in 2065 to remain effective. Designing
the still-evolving UCAV to operate from the decks of light amphibious carriers as well as carriers
would give the United States flexibility. Once on station, the UCAV s range and endurance would be limited only by the
availability of tankers to refuel it and the need to change the lubricating fluids periodically. The UCAV would not be a
low-performance drone. On approaching enemy air defenses the UCAV would be able to execute
microsecond-timed maneuvers at G-levels that would exceed human performance
parameters in order to successfully reach its target .

It is not clear how quickly the Navy will develop an operational UCAV. While the experimental X-47B platform shows promise, the Navy
appears to be concerned that operational units built from an evolution of this design, which is extremely stealthy, will be plagued by high
cost, limited endurance and low payload capacity. Other advocates have pushed for adapting currently weaponized unmanned aeri al
vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator for maritime use. That would keep costs low but would come up short in terms of range and
weapons-carrying capacity. There must be some middle ground that emphasizes moderate stealth, carrying capacity and cost with long
range in order to address the A2/AD challenge. So far, naval aviation seems to be stressing the need to rapidly develop a manned F/A-XX
platform to follow the JSF.24 It
would be far better to develop a reliable UCAV platform capable
of operating off both large and amphibious carrier flight decks .25 Given the increasing
lethality of anti-air and A2/AD technologies, the U.S. Navy must accelerate its movement toward
UCAVs, or it will surely regret its hesitance.
A parallel path forward should include the maturation and extension of the U.S.
inventory of conventional missiles. The current Tomahawk missiles are deployed on Navy cruisers, destroyers, fast-
attack submarines and, more recently, on four modified Ohio-class submarines. These guided-missile submarines,
known as SSGNs and each carrying up to 155 Tomahawks, represent the most effective path forward in
strike warfare. Super quiet, the Ohio SSGNs can penetrate enemy waters unseen, positioning
themselves to unleash massive waves of precision strike weapons to take down critical nodes of
enemy infrastructure, weakening resolve and resistance from the strategic center outward.
Stealthy submarines, loaded with low-cost precision cruise and ballistic strike
missiles capped with conventional warheads, provide the United States with an elegant "one
target + one missile = one kill" solution.

By pursuing the combination of paths described above - slowly divesting from carriers;
building a transition bridge with UCAVs that can carry weapons, sensors and
airborne electronic warfare systems while operating from large carriers and light
amphibious carriers; and creating a smooth expansion of undersea precision strike
capacity -the United States would be able to invest in larger numbers of less exquisite
“influence squadrons” to maintain naval presence in regions of interest .26 These
organized squadrons of amphibious ships, littoral patrol corvettes, coastal patrol boats and riverine squadrons would
provide utility across the spectrum of engagement by emphasizing payloads over platforms while
allowing the Navy to operate forward dynamically.27
An innovative culture has characterized the US. Navy throughout its history. The carrier had its day, but continuing to adher e to 100
years of aviation tradition, even in the face of a direct challenge, signals a failure of imagination and foreshadows decline. Money is tight,
and as the nautical saying goes, the enemy has found our range. It is time to change course .

The CP creates a dissuasion strategy that shapes PLA procurement away

from offensive modernization---that contains the impacts to the entire
case
Eric Sayers 10, M.S. Candidate in the S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies at
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 3rd quarter 2010, “Military Dissuasion: A
Framework for Influencing PLA Procurement Trends,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 58, p.
89-93
Military Procurement and Investment Decisions. America’s military modernization
(research and development and procurement) decisions offer a number of ways for
influencing the PLA’s own investment and procurement choices. For instance, the U.S.
military’s reliance on satellites has created a vulnerability that the PLA has sought to
exploit by developing kinetic and nonkinetic antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. A dissuasion
framework would suggest dealing with this problem by reducing the PLA’s perceived
effectiveness of investing in these weapons. This would mean developing
miniaturized and fractional (a series of miniature satellite subsystems that exist
independently as part of a network) satellites that can be dispersed in larger
constellations in space or put on standby on the ground to surge capacity in the event
of an emergency. This would both enhance their survivability and diminish the value
accrued by targeting them. Constructing a more resilient network by complementing
its space-based assets with air-breathing or terrestrial alternatives, as Air Force Chief
of Staff General Norton Schwartz has recently suggested, would also be a means to
diminishing the utility of ASAT weapons in the eyes of the PLA.9
Similarly, the United States could reduce the anticipated advantage SRBMs and LACMs
offer for holding its fighters and bombers at risk by investing in passive and active
defensive measures at its bases in the region. This would require hardening bunkers
and runways to protect and preserve the operational capability of U.S. and allied aircraft,
the hardening of other mission-critical facilities like fuel depots, maintaining the
capacity to promptly repair damaged runway surfaces, and deploying air and missile
defense systems.10 It would also be prudent to consider expanding the number of
access points that America has in the Pacific, preferably with less obtrusive forward
operating sites or cooperative security locations, to places such as Tinian, Micronesia,
the Marshall Islands, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and the Kwajelin islands to help diffuse
its air assets.11
The development of carrier-based long-range strike platforms that would allow
carrier strike groups to operate farther out to sea could also reduce the perceived
operational and psychological advantages offered by Beijing’s growing antiship
ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. This would help to lower potential political
costs in Washington while preserving a greater range of freedom for decisionmakers
to effectively harness the utility of coercive naval diplomacy, as it was able to do
effectively during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.12 The development of a long-range
strike platform might have the added benefit of compelling the PLA to expend its
limited resources to upgrade and expand expensive, nonthreatening air defense
systems.
Solvency for the second set of planks:

The CP’s escalation controls solve the risks of Air-Sea Battle---full-scale

repeal makes war more likely
Elbridge Colby 13, principal analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, focuses on strategic
and deterrence; previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense working on
nuclear-weapons policy and arms control, 7/31/13, “Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle,”
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show
Now, obviously if the United States launched a massive conventional (let alone
conventional and nuclear) attack aimed at decapitating the Chinese regime or ejecting
the Communist Party from power, then Hammes and Co.’s fears would be far more
justified. But, given what we know, that is definitively not the AirSea Battle approach.
Rather, it focuses on employing conventional forces against an adversary’s
conventional forces in ways designed to maintain or achieve the upper hand in a
conflict. Left to its own devices, of course, such an approach could inadvertently go
about its business in ways that could well raise the chances of nuclear war—for
instance by targeting military capabilities that are important not only for conventional
purposes but also for the survivability of China’s nuclear forces.
But this is not a reason for dumping the project, but rather a reason why it is
essential that serious thinking about China and its way of war and about the
dynamics of nuclear strategy and escalation go into shaping the evolving AirSea
Battle concept and its related approaches. Great care must be taken to minimize the
chances of inadvertently elevating such a conflict to the nuclear level. Logical steps
include observing geographic boundaries for such a fight, cordoning off certain kinds
of targets, and clearly and credibly communicating efforts at limitation to an
adversary. But these are not things that can be done well at the last minute or improvised
in the moment. Rather, such efforts at limitation must be integrated into plans well
before the onset of conflict, and, more broadly, U.S. and allied militaries must be made
accustomed to preparing for war with China with the full knowledge that such
limitations would be an integral part of it.
Needless to say, even with such cautionary steps the chances of escalation, including to the
nuclear level, would remain entirely and frighteningly real. At best, embarking upon a
Sino-American war would be immensely risky and almost certainly destructive for
both sides; at worst, issues of national honor could become central and things could get
truly out of control, leading to a worst-case outcome of nuclear war. Both sides should
therefore make every reasonable effort to mitigate tensions and avoid war if at all
possible. War should only be contemplated as a genuine option if the most serious
interests are threatened and cannot be adequately protected in other ways.
But a too great focus on avoiding war at the expense of preparing for it would be to
make conflagration more likely, and would surely imperil U.S. and allied interests in
the region and beyond by inviting China (and other potential opponents) to capitalize
on American reluctance to risk conflict. Countries pursue advantage and interest even in
a world shadowed by nuclear weapons, and so there is no escape from the politics and
strategy of seeking to strike the right but always-changing balance between effective
deterrence, which rests on the credible threat to go to war, with the sacred desire for
peace. That means that the old saw remains true, that the best way to avoid war is to
prepare for it. AirSea Battle and its cognate approaches reflect this enduring truth, and
should be commended, encouraged, and funded—even as they are zealously watched
to ensure that they do not lead us to Armageddon.
Solvency
 Turn
Offshore control

The most likely replacement for current U.S. strategy is a distant

blockade, aka offshore control
Elbridge Colby 13, principal analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, focuses on strategic
and deterrence; previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense working on
nuclear-weapons policy and arms control, 7/31/13, “Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle,”
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show
But there are those who think we must prepare for war to avoid it and who are willing to
spend the money—but still think AirSea Battle and its kin are a bad idea. They worry that
preparing for a war with China would exacerbate Sino-American arms competition
and really worry that, in the event of war, the actions the United States would need to
take to beat China would be so threatening or insulting to Beijing that they could very
well lead to unrestrained and ultimately nuclear war. Amitai Etzioni, a respected
scholar and leading critic of AirSea Battle, recently summarized this view: “Critics of Air-
Sea Battle warn that it is inherently escalatory and could even precipitate a nuclear war.”
This set of opponents of AirSea Battle think we should go another way. Retired Marine
colonel T.X. Hammes of the National Defense University, a highly regarded strategist and
perhaps the leading member of this school, argues, “[T]he United States must accept
that China’s nuclear arsenal imposes restrictions on the way American forces might attack
Chinese assets. The United States must select ways that minimize the probability of
escalation to nuclear conflict.” To Hammes, this means, for instance, “[n]o operations
should penetrate Chinese airspace. Prohibiting penetration is intended to reduce the
possibility of nuclear escalation and to make war termination easier.” Hammes proposes
an alternative strategy of “Offshore Control” that relies on a “distant blockade” of
China to bring it to heel. And Hammes is not alone—this point of view has an
influential following, including in Congress.

That increases the risk of nuclear escalation

Brian McGrath 12, founding Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC (FBG), a
niche consultancy specializing in Naval and national security issues, founded a national
security consulting line of business for Delex Systems, retired Naval Officer, spent 21 years
on active duty including a tour in command of USS Bulkeley, 5/16/12, “Asia and the Future
of American Strategy,” http://cnponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/5-16-2012-
Asia-and-the-Future-of-American-Strategy-Transcript.pdf
I have seven objections to offshore control. First is, I believe offshore
control lacks flexibility and the virtue
of reversibility. Specifically, if you implemented my strategy, you could carry out T.X.’s lines of operations if you chose to. If
you implement T.X.’s strategy, you couldn’t carry out air-sea battle. They’re mutually
exclusive. So that’s one objection.
The second is offshore control assumes that our current economic condition will continue infinitely and it ignores the extent to which
defense spending is a choice, right? I mean, how much we spend really on defense as a choice? We don’t have to continue to spend $500
billion and we don’t have to continue to spend $500 billion in the way that we spend it now. So if the concern is the expense associated or
expected of air-sea battle, we could spend more. I’m not saying it’s necessarily wise or likely, but I think strategically you have to at least
consider that that’s a possibility.

I don’t believe offshore control either deters war ashore. In fact, I think it may even increase
instability. Here’s why. When I look at the inside the first island chain, during peacetime,
we had effectively seeded any claim we have to operate in there with surface and air
forces in a large way. It’s international water, but we’ve pulled back.
And what we’ve done, if I read offshore control correctly, is declare this a maritime exclusion zone.
What do you do in the build up to war, while it’s still just talk-talk and jaw-jaw? You know, it seems to me that
we’re left without flexible deterrent options. We’re left without much to do if the
locus of the conflict is in the South China Sea. It’s hard. It’s hard to be deterrent and to separate forces and to calm or
whatever if you’re not there, if all you’ve got are submarines. Submarines are wonderful once the shooting starts. But my strategy is
about keeping the shooting from starting.

The other thing is – is air-sea battle – it’s

cartoonish to think about air-sea battle as simply a way to
fight someone. It’s also a way to put in the potential opponent’s mind a sense that you
can fight them and to cause them to think twice about fighting you.
Fourth, I think offshore control is obsessed with nuclear war. It’s probably a good thing to be obsessed about, don’t get me wrong, but
you have to give conventional war planners the ability to think about how a conventional war could be prosecuted without the
intellectually stifling bugaboo of whether it’s going to nuke us. You have to at least allow that to play out.

This happened quite successfully in the maritime strategy of the 1980s, where anybody associated with that will tell you that we were
told, hey, don’t worry about nuclear war. Think about this in conventional terms. If it goes nuclear, all bets are off and th ose guys in the
next room are thinking about that.

So it gives you the space to think about a conventional conflict.

Secondly, as I said earlier, I think offshore

control has – would have a tendency to be destabilizing
and if it were destabilizing and your fear is nuclear war, it would have a greater capacity to
bring on that nuclear because it would bring on a conventional war . Follow my logic. I’m trying to
keep the conventional war from starting.
A2
 1NC Adv 2
Status quo solves naval overstretch---the Persian Gulf carrier gap
restored it
Cmdr. Ryan Tewell 10/5, naval officer and Federal Executive Fellow at the Washington
Institute, has completed multiple carrier deployments to the Gulf, “Assessing the U.S.
Aircraft Carrier Gap in the Gulf,” 10/5/15, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/assessing-the-u.s.-aircraft-carrier-gap-in-the-gulf
For the first time since 2007, the United States will have no carrier presence in the Persian Gulf region,
an absence that will span a few months over the next year. The USS Theodore Roosevelt, currently striking ISIS targets in Iraq
and Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, is scheduled to soon sail home after completing a lengthy deployment, and the USS Harry S.

Truman will not arrive in the region until early winter. Although the Middle East is rarely quiet, it is difficult to imagine a more
uncertain time than now, considering the complex conflicts in Syria -- and the Russian intervention there -- Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, along with concerns
about U.S. resolve following the nuclear deal with Iran. This begs the question, why now? ¶ In recommending the removal of the nation's capital seagoing
this so-called carrier gap will be
asset, the U.S. Navy is making a serious statement about the degraded readiness of its carrier force. While

should alert policymakers of the need to

partially mitigated by other U.S. and allied military forces in the region, its occurrence

consider carefully the strategic value of a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Gulf, namely as a diplomatic
tool to provide stability, reassure allies, deter threats, and launch strikes, if necessary without the approval of
regional partners or allies. ¶ Despite the evident risks, removing the Middle East carrier presence now will allow for

recovery from years of overextension, exploit the near-term reduced risk of nuclear tension
provided by the Iran deal, and yield a stronger carrier presence in coming years , when it
may have an even greater strategic value.¶ WHY THE GAP? ¶ While some may see the Roosevelt's return to home port as a subtle
signal to Iran's leadership aimed at building bilateral trust following the nuclear deal, or another indication of U.S. intentions to gradually extricate itself
aircraft carriers must undergo
from the Middle East, a much simpler reason exists: the navy's current force of ten

maintenance after heavy use in recent years. ¶ Indeed, these national assets have routinely left early for
deployments and then extended their stay to engage in important missions aimed at projecting power against adversaries,
conducting international exercises with partner nations, ensuring sea access, as well as conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in
Japan, Nepal, Haiti, and the Philippines. For example, from 2010 to 2013, strikes on inland Islamic extremist targets in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and
Southwest Asia required two carriers stationed in the region. ¶ As a result, while carrier deployments from fiscal year 2008/09 to fiscal year 2011/12
these contingency extensions compressed
averaged only 6.5 months, deployments since then have averaged 8.2 months. All

the time available to conduct carrier maintenance and training for the six-thousand-plus sailors who man the carrier
and supporting ships. Unfortunately, more costly and lengthy maintenance is now required owing to the ships'
extended stays away.¶ To keep a carrier operational for its customary half-century, the maintenance period after extended deployments must last about
fourteen months. These periods include, among many other items, resurfacing the thousand-foot-long flight deck, replacing miles of electrical and fiber-optic
cabling, overhauling electrical generators, upgrading outdated command-and-control hardware and software, and, of course, removing the rust that
accumulates on every seagoing vessel. ¶ Thus, following back-to-back deployments in 2012 and 2013, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower left port August 28
after a maintenance period lasting twenty-three months, almost 65 percent longer than planned. Further complicating matters was the enactment of Budget
Control Act caps (a.k.a. sequestration), which delayed the maintenance effort for the Eisenhower and other ships. Such maintenance delays have inevitably
had a domino effect on the remaining carriers' deployments. ¶ All these delays have forced the navy to make difficult choices. Given increasing deployment
lengths and maintenance periods, the predeployment training period has been cut by more than 70 percent, according to Chief of Naval Air Forces Vice Adm.
Mike Shoemaker. This is the bare minimum needed for carrier strike group personnel to safely and effectively operate their ships and aircraft. ¶ With these
increased carrier availability will begin later in 2016.
variables in mind, the navy has developed a schedule whereby

An eleventh carrier now under construction, the USS Gerald Ford, should improve the situation
significantly upon entering the rotation in 2019. Considering these developments, the navy should be able to
reach its long-term goal of having two continuously deployed carriers, with another three
ready to surge worldwide, around FY 20/21.¶ Should the navy again take a "bandage" approach by extending the Roosevelt for two
months, it will only postpone even greater maintenance needs, further disrupting the schedule and reducing both the future predictability and availability of
the carrier force.¶ REGIONAL IMPACT OF A CARRIER ¶ The autumn absence of the Roosevelt's 44 F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft will be offset by several
other assets capable of attacking ISIS. The French carrier Charles de Gaulle, which struck ISIS targets this spring before conducting exercises in the Indian
Ocean, will soon have another opportunity. This smaller French warship possesses twelve Rafale and nine Super Etendard aircraft; these are very capable
but amount to only half the strikers on the U.S. flattop. ¶ A U.S. Amphibious Ready Group will also be in the region, comprising three amphibious warships,
led by the mini-carrier USS Essex, and their complement of six AV-8B Harriers, twelve attack and assault support helicopters, four MV-22 Ospreys, and the
1,100 Marines of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. ¶ Finally, land-based manned and unmanned air force strike aircraft -- including six F-16s recently
deployed to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey -- as well as navy maritime patrol/reconnaissance aircraft will remain deployed to the region. In terms of raw combat
power against ISIS, these assets adequately fill the loss in capability created by the Roosevelt's departure, and airstrikes in support of Operation Inherent
Resolve will continue without pause. ¶ But the impact of a carrier strike group in the Middle East is also
psychological and political: as a diplomatic tool to deter Iran, to reassure our regional allies of our
commitment, and to provide the president with decision space during regional contingencies. Carriers

symbolize U.S. diplomacy while projecting a hard power image and capability. While they can
effectively strike targets day or night, they can also convey strong messages rapidly without force. ¶ Carriers are also hard to miss, unlike
stealthy or long-range platforms from which other equally capable U.S. strike weapons are fired (e.g., B-2 bombers, submarine-launched cruise missiles).
Earlier this year, the Roosevelt sailed into the Arabian Sea to stop a merchant ship, escorted by several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warships, from
The mere presence of the carrier caused the Iranian flotilla to
allegedly ferrying arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen.

turn around and return to port. Arguably, the carrier's absence might embolden Iran to further deepen its involvement in the
regional conflicts in which it is now engaged. Likewise, it could embolden Russia to intensify its effort to bolster the Assad regime and gain regional
a carrier strike group provides reassurance to
influence. ¶ Additionally -- and probably more important in this case --

regional allies questioning U.S. intentions. Removing a carrier following the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq, and the decision not to support the Syrian opposition more strongly may exacerbate a growing concern

among regional allies that the United States is implementing its long-advertised "rebalance to Asia," stoking
fears about a broader-scale U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East. Finally, while a French carrier and the use of a Turkish air base allow for significant
combat power, they also will limit the decision space the president enjoys with a U.S. carrier. According to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, "The Navy
demonstrated the significance of [the carrier] capability when the only strikes for the first fifty-four days of the air campaign against Islamic State militants
in Iraq and Syria came from Navy F/A-18 Hornets off the USS George H. W. Bush in the Arabian Gulf. Land-based fighters could not participate until host
nations approved."¶ No doubt, a decision to use force in the Middle East is difficult enough without additional coordination with allies, however friendly. For
example, should efforts to deconflict airspace with the Russian aircraft in Syria fail, a president's options to push back against Moscow will be far more
limited without a carrier strike group. ¶ IMPACTS OF THE NUCLEAR DEAL ¶ The Iran nuclear deal constitutes a major consideration affecting current
regional stability. Because sanctions will not be lifted until the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies the key nuclear actions, Iran has incentive to
behave well at least until next spring or summer, when it will receive long-awaited access to international markets and billions of dollars in frozen assets.
Viewed through this lens, the nuclear deal offers a window of opportunity during which the carrier's absence might hold less risk. If Iran cheats, as many
predict it will, this will most likely happen after it has reaped the promised economic benefits from the deal. At that point, a carrier will likely be back in the
The United States should take
region, and the president will have better options to deter and counter destabilizing activities. ¶

advantage of the temporary absence of a carrier to revise its emphasis toward maneuver,
rather than mere static presence; this change should be communicated to allies and potential foes alike. If a carrier
always remains in the same place, it is no longer exploiting the concept of maneuver, which is its principal advantage
over other types of power projection and contributes to its survivability. Unpredictability also complicates an adversary's

diplomatic and military decision calculus. This is even more important when dealing with competitors possessing advanced anti-access/area

denial capabilities, such as over-the-horizon radar and advanced antiship missiles. Likewise, the commitment of a carrier to

support allies is more encouraging than a continual presence, which provides diminishing reassurance over
time. If, as the navy says, presence is about being "where it matters, when it matters ," the operational
construct for employing carriers should be based on maneuver. ¶ Because carriers are such flexible, strategic assets, there is never a good time to remove
At this particular moment in the Middle East, having a carrier
them from the commander-in-chief's range of options.

strike group would unquestionably be preferable, given its value for deterrence,
reassurance, and decision space. However, future carrier availability will only continue to decrease
unless the force can be maintained and revitalized. Precisely because carriers are such valuable instruments of national
power, decisionmakers should resist the temptation to order another deployment extension. They should take advantage of the temporarily reduced risk
provided by the Iran nuclear deal to prepare the carrier fleet for even greater future threats.

Arctic conflict is unlikely and overhyped- stability is a mutual interest

and diplomacy controls escalation
Andreas Østhagen 15, currently working as a program coordinator/fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in
Oslo orked on Arctic and security issues at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., as well as the
Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation in Toronto, while also taking part in the Arctic research programme 'Geopolitics in the High North'
through his affiliation with the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), “Arctic Security: Hype, Nuances and Dilemmas” , 5/27/15,
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2015/05/052715-Arctic-Security-Hype-Nuances-Dilemmas-Russia.html

Outright conflict
over the Arctic, however, seems unlikely. At worst, claims over the North Pole’s seabed will
lead to a diplomatic struggle. The potential for conflict over offshore resources is also vastly
exaggerated. Yet, to contend, like some have, that the Arctic is ‘completely uninteresting geopolitically’, neglects the role that the
region plays in the security considerations of some Arctic states, Russia in particular.

A Looming Conflict

Military activity in the Arctic is at its highest point since the Cold War. Russian bombers flying along the North
Norwegian coast or across the North Pole from the Kola Peninsula continue at high numbers and with increasing complexity. Russian
investment in military infrastructure in the Arctic is growing. Moreover, controversial statements by Russian deputy
Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin implying that Crimea and the Arctic are “all about the same”, do
not help cool down Arctic
rhetoric.
These trends have prompted debates in the other Arctic states over the need to invest in northern capabilities and presence. The
Western media’s rhetoric and concern over Russian activity in the Arctic is also taking on increasingly harsh language, with headlines
such as ‘Cold War Echoes Under the Arctic Ice’ (Wall Street Journal, March 25 2014) and ‘Russia prepares for ice -cold war with show of
military force in the Arctic’ (The Guardian, October 21 2014).

Conflict over the Arctic?

Increased military activity does not, however, imply that an Arctic standoff is imminent. The
prevailing argument for why there would be a conflict over the Arctic is the region’s energy and mineral resources. Yet, when
examining the location and accessibility of these resources, it becomes apparent that they
are predominantly located in what are already the economic zones of the Arctic coastal
states. With the largest maritime border dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea settled in
2010, Arctic riches are more or less already divided.
Furthermore, the Arctic states are struggling to exploit their own riches, with limited or no petroleum and mineral activity commencing.
Instead of inspiring a so-called scramble for the north, the Arctic states are actually mutually dependent on a
stable political environment to develop the potential of their northern riches. As Rolf Tamnes and
Kristine Offerdal argue in their seminal 2014 book ‘Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic’: “ There is little to suggest today
that the Arctic states see resources and territory in a more accessible Arctic as likely to
trigger armed conflict”. With the marked drop in oil and gas prices, these conclusions have
only become more relevant.
The oft-cited dispute between Canada, Denmark/Greenland and Russia over who can claim the North Pole seabed is also unlikely to
become anything but a diplomatic struggle, at worst. As argued by Michael Byers, the
North Pole is a distraction. The
Arctic states have neither the economic or strategic incentive to undertake any significant
operation to further claim the seabed of the North Pole. Symbolism is undoubtedly of great value, but the
cost of North Pole operations does not match the Pole’s perceived gains.

Plan not key---our fleet can take anyone’s—no challengers

Robert O. Work 12, United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies
@ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "The Coming Naval Century," May,
Proceedings Magazine - Vol. 138/5/1311, US Naval Institute,
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/coming-naval-century
For those in the military concerned about the impact of such cuts, I would simply say four things:¶ • Any
grand strategy starts with an assumption that all resources are scarce, requiring a balancing of commitments and resources. As political
commentator Walter Lippmann wrote: “The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its
means, and its means equal to its purposes.”¶ • The
upcoming defense drawdown will be less severe than
past post–World War II drawdowns. Accommodating cuts will be hard, but manageable.¶ • At the
end of the drawdown, the United States will still have the best and most capable armed forces in
the world. The President well appreciates the importance of a world-class military. “The United States remains the only nation able
to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances,” he said. “We maintain superior capabilities to deter and
defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global se curity. In
this way our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security
and leadership is reinforced.”¶ • Most important, as
the nation prioritizes what is most essential and brings
into better balance its commitments and its elements of national power, we will see the
beginning of a Naval Century—a new golden age of American sea power.¶ The Navy Is More Than
Ships¶ Those who judge U.S. naval power solely by the number of vessels in the Navy’s battle
force are not seeing the bigger picture. Our battle force is just one component—albeit an essential
one—of a powerful National Fleet that includes the broad range of capabilities, capacities,
and enablers resident in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It encompasses our special-mission,
prepositioning, and surge-sealift fleets; the ready reserve force; naval aviation, including the maritime-patrol and reconnaissance force;
Navy and Marine special operations and cyber forces; and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Moreover, it is crewed and operated by the finest
sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilian mariners, and government civilians in our history, and supported by a talented and innovative
national industrial base.¶ If this were not enough, the
heart of the National Fleet is a Navy–Marine Corps
team that is transforming itself from an organization focused on platforms to a total-force
battle network that interconnects sensors, manned and unmanned platforms with modular
payloads, combat systems, and network-enabled weapons, as well as tech-savvy, combat-
tested people into a cohesive fighting force. This Fleet and its network would make short
work of any past U.S. Fleet—and of any potential contemporary naval adversary.
China Advantage
 Offense
Deterrence
U.S. carrier presence deters and defeats Chinese adventurism over
Taiwan, the Senkakus and the SCS---forward deployment and presence
early in a crisis are key
Seth Cropsey 15, Director of the Center for American Seapower; Bryan G. McGrath, the
Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower and the Managing Director of the
Ferrybridge Group; Timothy A. Walton, principal of the Alios Consulting Group, October
2015, “Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict,”
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/201510SharpeningtheS
pearTheCarriertheJointForceandHighEndConflict.pdf
While multiple planning scenarios with maritime and land components involving China merit examination and may reveal distinct
even if conflict in
operational needs, the defense of Taiwan rises to the top in terms of its utility in force planning. First,
Taiwan never takes place, it is perceived as a major conflict potentially involving the
United States, and the perceived capability of the United States to deter and defeat aggression
underpins U.S. alliance relationships. Additionally, in the defense of Taiwan, the United States has a crucial
intersection of interests, objectives, and capabilities that result in a critical planning scenario.

Operationally, to a greater degree than other possible scenarios involving China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can
leverage short range and interior lines of communication to employ an enormous capacity of forces against
Taiwanese, U.S., and other partner and allied forces to achieve their objectives of either
invading and occupying Taiwan or wielding force to compel capitulation. Additionally, the United States may
receive little indication and warning of an impending Chinese attack, further complicating the
United States’ ability to support the defense of Taiwan. In light of this challenging situation, prudence demands the United States employ
it as a planning scenario.

Other relevant scenarios that may reveal critical operational needs include those involving conflict in the South China Sea or the Senkaku
Islands. Additionally, a focus
on Taiwan (or even the South China Sea) is not to say a potential
conflict with China would likely remain localized to the Western Pacific. On the contrary, it could
involve overt and covert conflict across the globe.
This analysis utilizes a notional 2020-2025 Defense of Taiwan scenario, and seeks to capture at a general-level, expectations regarding
how forces might be employed. An overall Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the defense of Taiwan might seek first to deter PRC
aggression via communication of the general costs of conflict, specifically that a disruption to the peace and stability of the region could
threaten the entire international order. Other elements of a conventional deterrence campaign might also be employed if time permitted,
such as the movement of key enabling forces to readying positions, arraying combat forces in the region in a more resilient posture, and
increasing surveillance flights and patrols.

Then, if
conventional deterrence fails, U.S. forces would employ geographically
distributed units to prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan, to counter compellent forces, to support
Taiwanese survival, and to apply direct pressure against PRC power projection forces and indirect pressure via extended blockade and
other elements of U.S. national capability.73 Specifically, operational lines of effort may include:
disrupting, deceiving, and destroying PRC OTH Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities; defeating PRC amphibious invasion ; constraining and eventually defeating the PRC
naval fleet; defending allies and partners as possible with a focus on protecting power projection nodes; dislocating the PRC from
the international economy by interdicting trade and reorganizing trading structures; and resupplying Taiwan as possible.
Overall, the
scenario would likely feature a U.S. commitment to counter PRC aggression
backed by the commitment to conduct a prolonged, global compellent campaign as
necessary. It is possible that in a defense of Taiwan scenario, U.S. forces would employ in a manner that to some extent levi es lower
requirements on power projection forces, while relying more heavily on more indirect approaches such as an extended blockade.
However, more directly responsive operational alternatives must be examined, as their inclusion in a menu of response options for
national leadership represents the minimum acceptable level of military planning.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FUTURE FORCE

Assessments of the performance of the programmed Joint Force reveal significant challenges as a confluence of three factors that will
exacerbate existing deficiencies. First, sophisticated A2/AD systems will likely proliferate to a larger number of countries than currently
field them. Second, A2/AD systems will mature and improve in sophistication and coverage, and will feature improved sensors,
networks, and weapons, thus producing adversary battle networks with regional and global surveillance capabilities. Third, China
will continue to develop capabilities, posture, and forces more suited to global power
projection, moving beyond current estimates of mere regional hegemony. This “AntiAccess Enabled Power
Projection Force” has the potential of not only posing major challenges for the United States
in East Asia, but also in other regions of the world through the extended range of
mainland China-based weapons and sensors, the global mobility of other anti-access systems, and the
development of global power projection and sea control forces, such as Surface Action Groups, Amphibious and Carrier Battle Groups,
nuclear-powered attack and guided missile submarines, and long-range tanking and strike aircraft.74

China’s 2015 Defense Strategy confirmed this shift to a force capable of enhanced power projection. The
document called for China “to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and
development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and
overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building it self into a
maritime power.”75

High-end scenarios involving countries such as China or Russia are greatly challenging for U.S. forces and entail the assumption of high
levels of risk relative to lesser threats. Both traditional and alternative CONOPS that could be employed are relatively brit tle and
vulnerable to enemy disruption and deception.

Additionally, current CONOPS are highly dependent on air forces, which face the dual threats of structured attacks of offensi ve missiles
and aircraft, and advanced IADS. Consequently, with regard to a scenario involving China, threats against U.S. and Allied airpower in the
First and Second Island Chains are resulting in a greatly decreased number of forces that could be generated and sustained ag ainst
targets at extended range.76 This threat particularly affects land-based airpower based within the First Island Chain, reducing the
number of tactical aircraft, tankers, ISR platforms, and ASW aircraft that could be employed.

Additionally, perceived U.S. advantages in military competitions, such as Undersea

Warfare, Air Superiority, and Secure C4ISR, are eroding due to symmetric and asymmetric
counters adopted by U.S. adversaries. Moreover, the geographic and environmental
conditions of the Near Seas facilitate PLA defensive concepts and complicate the
ability of the United States to employ certain assets, such as Attack Submarines, in particular concepts of
employment.77 In other areas, such as Surface Warfare (SUW) and IAMD, the United States faces marked deficiencies versus Chin ese and
Russian threats.78

This paper asserts that in

order to counter China’s growing capability, the Joint Force will
require carriers to execute power projection, surveillance, and sea control missions.
However, several decades of a low blue-water threat have conditioned U.S. naval forces to a heavy emphasis on power projection, while
against an opponent like China, sea control requirements are likely to expand. The development of Chinese and Russian longran ge
regional and global power projection capabilities will constitute formidable threats that the United State s must counter in order to
achieve its national security goals. Faced with continuing threats to short-range air and naval capabilities, as well as the mounting
longrange sea control threats, the
Joint Force will depend on naval forces to protect Sea and Air
Lines of Communication and deny sea control to enemy forces , while exercising sea control locally
where desired (and necessary). These mounting sea control threats would be coupled by an increase in the range of landbased t hreats,
such as land-launched boostglide missiles ranging beyond 1,500 NM or hypersonic cruise missiles launched from low observable
bombers far from land.
Across the Joint Force, capabilities, concepts, postures and forces must be developed to meet these mounting threats. These
requirements will stress all of the Armed Forces, not just the Navy and its CSGs. That said, there
are a significant
number of critical warfighting requirements that would go unmet or at least be dramatically
under-resourced without aircraft carriers. There is no other element of the Joint Force that
can provide the unique contributions of the CSG to Joint warfighting, to include broad
area AAW, SUW, ISR, and ASW capabilities, that other elements of the Joint Force would
be challenged to provide given their reliance on fixed land bases that would almost
certainly be targeted in the scenarios under consideration.
In a conflict with China, the importance of carrier-based naval air forces would
increase. There would be numerous capabilities required from all elements of the Joint Force, yet carrier-based naval
air forces would be required not only to perform power projection and sea control
missions, but also to assume greater responsibility for missions now largely conducted
by land-based air forces— especially early in a conflict.
In the case of a scenario involving China, carrier air would play an important role in AAW. It would
conduct independent Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) missions, provide escort support of
Air Force units (such as bombers), provide supporting OCA missions to dislocate enemy SUW and
ASW operations, and it would provide selective Defensive CounterAir (DCA) for Second
Island Chain bases. In terms of strike, CSGs would play an important role finding
enemy fleets, providing air support to SAGs, other naval forces, and supply forces,
providing strike to engage enemy naval forces, and providing limited strikes against
land-based operational nodes. In terms of ISR, carrier aircraft would play a critical
role surveilling enemy forces at sea, in the air, and on land. The likely degradation of U.S. and
allied land-based broad-area ISR and ASW capabilities (due to attacks against undersea infrastructure, satellites, air
bases, and long-range interceptor aircraft in the air) coupled with PLAN development of larger numbers
of quiet nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and diesel-powered submarines (SSK) would contribute to
the requirement for carrier-based, organic area ISR and ASW capabilities. Improved surveillance
and targeting capabilities would not only facilitate organic CSG strike, but would also allow other elements of the Joint Force the ability to
conduct long range strikes.

Joint Force requirements for CSGs to contribute to sea control missions, especially at the earlier stages of a conflict, would likely limit its
early contribution to power projection missions. Nonetheless, the
ability of CSGs to conduct long-range
strike operations against both enemy fleets and land bases provides significant
operational flexibility to the commander, especially as gains are made against the adversary ISR complex.
American submarines would play a considerable role in any conflict with China, although the physical limitations of submarines
(especially related to speed and sensor range) and their high-priority demand by the Joint Force to conduct other missions (such as ISR,
strike, and the monitoring of China’s ballistic missile submarines) will limit their full employment as sea control assets.

To summarize, in
a high-end conflict with China, the CSG will face a considerably higher
demand for its traditional naval duties such as sea control and scouting, as current land-based
elements of the Joint and naval force architecture envisioned to contribute to these
missions are almost certainly to be under attack by weapons that will have a higher
probability of arrival than those available for striking moving targets (such as the
carrier). At least as important though, will be the requirement for the CSG to enable
other elements of the Joint Force to operate forward within an acceptable level of
risk in an environment where First Island Chain land-based air would almost
certainly have been targeted. These missions would include air support to forcible entry operations, escort of long
range bombers and strikers to their launch positions, and protection of airborne high value units performing crucial missions such as
ISR, command and control, refueling, and communications relay. As
the campaign matures, the power
projection and strike capabilities of the CSG will rise in importance as elements of
the Chinese targeting complex are effectively neutralized.
 No Vulnerability

Current carrier assets have significant strike capabilities, even with the
threat of Chinese missiles
Seth Cropsey 15, Director of the Center for American Seapower; Bryan G. McGrath, the
Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower and the Managing Director of the
Ferrybridge Group; Timothy A. Walton, principal of the Alios Consulting Group, October
2015, “Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict,”
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/201510SharpeningtheS
pearTheCarriertheJointForceandHighEndConflict.pdf
Strike: During
a conflict, the CSG’s strike capability would be called upon to target both
naval assets and land-based systems. These strikes would seek to dislocate enemy
operations and attrite enemy systems to achieve operational-level objectives. The CSG’s
strike capability would largely stem from missiles carried in the VLS of its surface combatants and the capacity of its carrier aircraft.

Faced with a potent A2/AD threat, CSGs would be forced to exercise restraint ,
conducting flight operations outside the range envelope of significant systems such
as the DF-21D and DF-26 or incur risk by “standing-in” or operating within that range.
Additionally, CSGs would likely be tasked with providing air cover for Surface Action Groups conducting Tomahawk strikes further inside
the enemy threat envelope. Overall, the increased threats facing CSGs would likely force a decrease in the force gradient ava ilable for
strike. Or put another way, after 25 years of relatively unmolested capability to strike targets ashore from our ships and aircraft,
increased threats to the force will require a greater degree of time, attention, and resources (to include sorties) to create operationally
relevant space.

The carrier’s current and projected short-tomedium range air wing exacerbates this problem by limiting options available to CSG
commanders. The F-35C’s approximately 610 NM combat radius improves air wing performance over the Super Hornet’s 390 NM combat
radius; however, the small size of the planned F-35C procurement (and thus continued reliance on F/A-18E/F aircraft) and the need for
strike packages against advanced enemies to employ EA-18G electronic attack support results in a relatively consistent strike radius.86
Additionally, the F- 35C’s lack of all-aspect, broadband radar cross section reduction measures results in an aircraft significantly more
stealthy than the F/A-18E/F, yet significantly less stealthy than the Air Force F22. 87 The introduction of the F35C does, however, offer
additional air warfare opportunities as its increased range, sensor, and network capabilities can enable new employment conce pts.

Moreover, the Navy’s retirement of its dedicated tanking force, the KA-6D in 1996, and the S-3B in 2009, has decreased the proportion of
the air wing available for air warfare and strike missions (as strike aircraft must now be assigned limited tanking roles kno wn as “buddy”
tanking) and increases the carrier’s reliance on land-based Air Force tanking (which may be limited or even unavailable in light of strikes
against air bases).88

Additionally, a sub-optimal strike weapons mix within carrier air wings forces commanders to either rely on long-range stand-off
weapons, such as AGM-158 JASSM (and in the future the JASSM-ER derivative Long Range AntiShip Missile, LRASM), or short-range, low
probability of arrival standoff weapons, such as AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) or guided bombs to strike fixed or mobile
targets. Furthermore, enemy development of effective integrated air and missile defenses has enormously complicated strikes. Offensive
counter-air sweeps by advanced fourth and fifth generation fighters serve to push back the operational range of key assets, such as A ir
Force tankers and airborne early warning aircraft. Coupled with threats against air bases, this enemy threat against tanker o rbits limits
the effectiveness of carrier aviation by requiring a higher proportion of a carrier’s air wing to be dedicated to budd y-tanking. Closer-in,
effective Defensive Counter-Air sorties threaten to intercept non-stealthy aircraft. Finally, a dense network of land and shipbased, kinetic
and non-kinetic, air and missile defense systems can intercept aircraft and munitions.

In spite of these threats and limitations, current carrier air wing strike capability is
significant, even at extended ranges. Operating alone, a single carrier air wing
could—using organic tanking alone— generate five F/A-18E/F fighters that could drop two 1,000-
pound class weapons (e.g., AGM-154 JSOW) after 1,500 NM of flight in an uncontested
environment.89 If the aircraft must only fly 1,000 NM, the number of striking fighters increases to 17. The support of
Air Force tanking increases the number of fighters to approximately 35 at both 1,500 NM and
1,000 NM. Additionally, effective strike range could be extended through the employment of
stand-off munitions. For instance, JASSM-ER has a range of over 500 NM, and JSOW-ER has a range of over 250 NM.90 The
use of stand-off munitions would decrease the level of carrier “stand-in” potentially
desired for large strikes and increase the proportion of the air wing dedicated to
strike or escort, as opposed to buddy-tanking.
Operating as part of multi-carrier operations, the capability of the carrier further
increases. The combination of multiple carrier air wings facilitates meeting baseline air and sea
defense requirements and allows the allocation of a higher proportion of the air wing to
offensive missions. Three carrier air wings could organically deliver 112,000 pounds of ordnance per strike at 1,000 NM, and
six carrier air wings could organically deliver 224,000 pounds of ordnance per strike at 1,000 NM. If supported by Air Force tanking, six
carrier air wings could organically deliver 448,000 pounds of ordnance per strike. Over the course of a week, the
amount of
ordnance delivered by an air wing—even at long range—could be significant.
This analysis demonstrates how the
combat power generated by multiple CSGs significantly
increases in a nonlinear fashion . Accordingly, an operational commander may need to effectively balance
contributing to operations that quickly deny compellence aims while carefully husbanding forces in order to create naval grou ps with
multiple carriers.
 No Chinese Carrier Strike
China would never attack a U.S. carrier---the presence of both sides’
carriers induces mutual restraint
Vasilis Trigkas 14, visiting research fellow at the institute for Sino-EU relations at
Tsinghua University & a non-resident WSD Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, 12/29/14,
“Aircraft Carriers in the Taiwan Strait,” http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/aircraft-
carriers-in-the-taiwan-strait/
While China’s 20-year-old aircraft carrier has been ridiculed as an outdated vessel that
would easily succumb to U.S. technological and tactical superiority, its significance is not
tactical or operational, but rather strategic. As a respected Chinese professor argued in
Tsinghua’s “Beyond Geopolitics Summit” in 2013, the presence of the Chinese carrier
would equalize the strategic balance between the two powers in the Taiwanese strait.
Xin Qiang notes that it is strategic suicide for a nuclear power to attack the aircraft
carrier of another nuclear power and obliterate 5,000 elite pilots, engineers, officers
and navy men. As Professor Robert Pape put it, such an attack would lead to
“predictable unpredictability,” with a much greater risk of the crisis escalating to a
limited tactical nuclear war and, ultimately, to a nuclear holocaust. The destruction of a
carrier would trigger a chain reaction and military escalation that neither side could
control. According to Pape and Qiang, for this reason alone rational nuclear powers
would not even dare to engage in a prolonged face-off of aircraft carriers and would
instead seek to deescalate a nautical crisis.
2NC
T
 A2 Quantitative Bad
Quantitative definitions are key to track whether the bar of a significant
reduction actually gets met
MPCA 99, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, March 1999, “Report on the Mercury
Contamination Reduction Initiative Advisory Council’s Results and Recommendations,”
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=316
In the process of narrowing the list of recommended strategies, the Screening and Evaluation
Committee found it necessary to define “significant reduction” as a quantifiable goal
so that progress could be more clearly tracked. The recommended reduction schedule is similar to the goals
established by the Lake Superior Binational Program, which in part calls for a 60% reduction by 2000 and an 80% reduction by 2010 from 1990 baseline
levels for releases of manmade mercury from sources within the Lake Superior basin. See Figure 3 below for a comparison of the recommended reduction
goals relative to estimated and projected emissions.
CP
 Solves Adv 2
Their ev only assumes forced budget tradeoffs from austerity – CP funds
all the programs they say carriers are preventing, like funding
submarines and tech innovation
Melbourne 15
[Lieutenant Commander Wolf Melbourne, intelligence officer currently assigned to the U.S.
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. “Operating in an Age of Austerity,” First Prize, General
Prize Essay Contest. Proceedings Magazine - April 2015 Vol. 141/4,
http://www.usni.org/print/61944 // wyo-cjh]
The U.S.
George Washington once said that “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” That is as true today as when he coined it.

Navy’s current operating orders, Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC10), is the latest iteration of a decades-old concept originally implemented
to counter the large dispersed Soviet navy of the Cold War. Like its predecessors, NOC10 maintains forward presence, predominantly

through a rotation of carrier strike groups (CSGs) in regional hubs to “prevent conflict and prevail in war.” 1 This construct has served
the U.S. Navy well. It played an instrumental role in deterring major-power war with the Soviet Union and has largely kept the maritime peace in the post-Cold War era. These

Requiring a Fleet large enough to be dispersed around the

successes, however, came at a substantial price.

world for deterrence purposes and possessing sufficient force in reserve to surge in the
event deterrence fails is extremely expensive. That cost was necessary to counter the Soviet Union. However, in an age of
austerity where declining defense budgets are driving the Fleet smaller, the U.S. Navy can no

longer afford an operating concept designed for the resources of the Cold War. Unfortunately, that is exactly
what the service is trying to do. Maintaining forward presence in regional hubs with a shrinking Fleet

has led to an erosion in surge capacity and experimentation that is undermining the
credible combat capability required to deter adversaries and win the nation’s wars at sea. The Navy is entering this
age of austerity with an out-of-date operating concept that is mortgaging the future to meet the day-to-day operational requirements of the

present. What had been an effective operational concept for an era with greater resources is now unacceptably risky and must be

replaced. An examination of the last age of austerity between World Wars I and II reveals an operating concept that is an excellent candidate for adoption today.
Constrained by arms treaties and economic depression, the Navy of the interwar period employed a hybrid surge-and-experimentation model that maintained combat credibility in
the present and sustained it for the future. In that age of limited resources, emerging disruptive technology, and untested doctrine and war plans, the interwar Navy produced and
sustained not just a combat-credible Fleet, it produced a Fleet in World War II that was victorious in the greatest naval conflict ever fought. Bureaucracies such as the U.S. Navy are
designed “by their very nature” to resist change. 2 Adopting a new operating concept will be an arduous task that carries risk. However, failing to adapt to today’s age of austerity is far
riskier. The U.S. Navy successfully faced similar austerity challenges during the interwar period and demonstrated its adaptability by taking bold, difficult, and ultimately successful
actions. Today’s Navy can and must do so as well. An Unsustainable Concept Since 2001 Fleet size has decreased by nearly one fifth. 3 Instead of any commensurate decrease in
operations, the Navy remains doggedly committed to the regional-hub operating concept by maintaining roughly the same number of ships forward deployed over the time period. 4
While rationalized through guiding principles such as “warfighting first” and “operate forward,” the reality is that the U.S. Navy’s operating concept has become an unsustainable

over the past decade, the Navy’s operating concept

façade for “doing more with less.” Several recent studies conclude that

has resulted in a range of harmful effects, from allowing material readiness to be “well below acceptable levels to support reliable, sustained operations at sea” to a
hollow Fleet able to do “all things, but none of them well.” 5 While doing more with less has
allowed the Navy to fulfill the daily forward-presence commitments of NOC10, it is taking great risks with credible combat

power should a major-power conflict arise today as well as how it is sustained for the
future. Degraded Surge Capacity In the event of a major war at sea, NOC10 advertises a surge capacity of five aircraft carriers being in the battle space within 30 days and an
additional carrier arriving within 90 days. 6 It is this high level of credible combat power being brought to bear in a relatively short time frame that produces a deterrent effect. This

surge capacity, however, was originally predicated on a 12-carrier Fleet. In 2007

operational aircraft carriers were reduced to 11 and then down to 10 in 2013 when the USS
Enterprise (formerly CVN-65) retired before the commissioning of her replacement in 2016. While the Navy expects to increase

carrier levels back to 11, it is hardly a certainty. The downward pressure on Fleet size, aircraft
carriers in particular, may not be reversed. In fact, it may get worse. A recent “budget wargame” by four major defense think tanks led to a consensus
 With increasing pressure to reduce
that cutting aircraft carriers offered the “least unacceptable option” to survive expected defense cuts. 7

costs as part of budget reductions and fiscal competition with other programs such
as the next generation of ballistic-missile submarines, it is not unrealistic to project
further reductions to the expensive carrier fleet. The reality of what such reductions mean to surge capacity was exposed
with the 2013 sequestration cuts to the defense budget. That year Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert warned that only three
carriers were available to respond to a major crisis. 8 This is a critical point as it explicitly exposes the negative consequences of maintaining the current operating concept at a time

the Fleet could only maintain scheduled forward-presence

when austerity is taking hold. The CNO essentially said

operations and was incapable of meeting the surge requirements needed in wartime.
The deleterious effect that reducing 30-day surge capacity from five to three has on
deterrence and combat-credible power should be a wake-up call to make a change in operating concepts.
The reason the Navy remains wedded to the costly regional-hub concept remains unclear. Judging by the most recent shipbuilding plan, it may be a belief this new age of austerity is
temporary or can be outlasted. In its latest report on the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding plan, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cited the service’s overly optimistic estimates for budgets
and costs for new ship construction. 9 This occurred despite previous CBO reports that forecast consistent declines in defense spending through 2024. 10 Naval leaders may also think
they can work through smaller budgets by tinkering on the margins of deployment and maintenance cycles. However, recent efforts to optimize and stabilize those cycles will do little

The U.S. Navy

to stem the downward pressure on Fleet size and thus will not measurably improve surge capacity to the levels needed for major wars at sea.

needs an operating concept that addresses this glaring shortfall and reflects the
reality of smaller budgets and Fleet size. Insufficient Experimentation Less visible than what a shrinking Fleet has
done to surge capacity is how it is also impacting its ability to invest in the future with effective

experimentation. Doing more with less means a growing portion of the Fleet is forward deployed and
preoccupied with the requirements of current operations, while a smaller part is available in port for long-term

investments in combat credibility, such as exercising and validating emerging

technology and its associated doctrine. 11 With less and less of the Fleet in homeport, this myopia with current operations is
threatening the experimentation that spurs innovation and prepares the Fleet for
future conflict. In their study of military innovation during the interwar period, professors Williamson Murray and Allan Millett identified a number of areas where
today’s militaries can encourage innovation. Among their recommendations is the need to critically examine operational tempo in relation to exercises to move beyond the rote
validation of current doctrine and processes. 12 Today’s operating concept flies in the face of this advice, as operational tempo increases and effective exercises decrease. At a time

technology is rapidly evolving and doctrinal concepts such as Joint Operational Access and the Air-
when

Sea Battle have yet to mature, it is well past time the Navy truly commits to effective
experimentation and innovation to properly integrate these new ideas, concepts, and
technology. Failing to do so risks the future combat credibility of the Fleet. An operating concept must be developed that can both provide combat credibility today and
sustain it for the future. A Sustainable Concept . . . for Today and Tomorrow The difficulties faced by the U.S. Navy today are not unique to its history. During the interwar period, the
Navy faced similar, and arguably tougher, resource challenges from arms-limitation treaties and economic depression. This was also a period of evolving technology and doctrine in
areas such as aviation and amphibious operations that challenged strongly held habits about how to properly employ the naval force. Like today, threats emanating from the Western
Pacific dominated operational planning and thought. A similarity with the past, however, is not enough on its own to make a case for adoption. It is what the interwar period’s
operating concept was able to accomplish when faced with these similar challenges that demonstrates why it is the best fit for today. The Navy prepared the Fleet for the defeat of
Japan in an era of austerity by combining two distinct models—a surge model that provided a cost-effective method for maintaining combat credibility in the present and
experimentation that produced innovation the Fleet needed to sustain that combat credibility until it was called on. The combination of these two models provided a mutually
supportive interaction that successfully maintained and sustained combat credibility through the austerity of the interwar period. The Surge Fleet Model With a smaller Fleet and
reduced budgets, the interwar Navy needed to find cost-effective ways to maintain combat credibility. In 1922 the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were combined into a unified Battle Fleet.
Kept largely in home waters with relatively short underway periods, this unified fleet significantly reduced operational and maintenance costs. Even though it cost less, it remained
combat-credible because it was organized into a concentrated force that aligned with its most likely scenario for war—a large-scale naval battle with Japan in the Pacific Ocean. The

a surge fleet freed from the

benefits of a unified fleet are applicable to today. In addition to the savings from reduced operations and maintenance costs,

requirements to maintain a rotation of CSGs in regional hubs would be able to

operate with fewer carriers. With new aircraft carriers costing $13 billion and annual
expenses of $300 million per platform, a reduction of the carrier fleet would provide
sufficient savings to properly account for today’s budgetary environment and provide fiscal space for other
programs. 13 Counterintuitively, even with the overall number of aircraft carriers reduced, a
unified fleet would increase combat credibility, because it would properly align with
the potential threats faced today. The father of the regional hub-operating concept, Samuel Huntington, argued that in the Cold War, the Fleet did
not need to concentrate because the Soviet navy was dispersed and would not seek a decisive fleet action. 14 As such, the more effective operating concept for that period was one that

The
disaggregated the Fleet and allowed the Navy to bottle up the Soviet fleet in multiple regions while concurrently providing the force required to project power ashore. 15

United States no longer faces the threat of the globally dispersed Soviet fleet. Instead, it
faces regionally concentrated threats in the form of China, Iran, and North Korea. A
unified Fleet capable of quickly surging to conflicts in these regions would provide far

more combat credibility than the current disaggregated one that lacks the surge capacity needed to effectively
concentrate. The Experimentation Model Between 1922 and 1940 the U.S. Navy conducted a series of experimental Fleet maneuvers, known as the Fleet Problems, that according to
Murray and Millett were “literally the sine qua non of successful military innovation in peacetime.” 16 The Fleet Problems provided a realistic warlike environment for the training,
testing, and studying of technology, doctrine, and war plans. 17 Operating over the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, the Fleet was divided into two sides that
would go to “war” against each other in scenarios largely derived from existing war plans and using the emerging technology of the era. As the two sides operated against each other,
new technology, doctrine, and plans were exposed to the realities of war. Important lessons were learned and became a part of subsequent iterations. This rigorous experimentation
resulted in better technology, better doctrine, and better war plans. The Fleet Problems’ high levels of experimentation provided a way for the Navy to properly integrate emerging
technology, such as carrier aviation, and determine the most effective ways to doctrinally employ it. Carriers moved from being merely a scouting element for the battleship to the
central component of an autonomous task force, capable of delivering extraordinary levels of combat power. 18 Similar advances in amphibious technology and doctrine were also

Experimenting with
produced from the Fleet Problems. This “dialectic” between emerging technology and updated doctrine was enormously successful. 19

and validating emerging technology and doctrine such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Air-Sea Battle,
and cyber-warfare in such a rigorous manner is just as necessary today. In the interwar period it
took the warlike conditions of the Fleet Problems to illuminate the benefits of one operational plan to defeat Japan over the other. 20 Without the Fleet Problems those lessons would
more likely have been learned in the subsequent war with greater risk to success and almost assuredly greater casualties. Today’s war plans could also take advantage of a renewed
set of Fleet Problems. Too often plans today are exercised with only a token portion of the Fleet, with notional forces making up the difference. Very rarely are genuine force-on-force-
type exercises conducted that can accurately reveal the strengths and weaknesses of a plan. Facing a living, breathing and, more important, a thinking opponent in a renewed series of
Fleet Problems will provide an arena whereby commanders can rigorously test decision-making and emerging doctrine, while gaining a level of experience that cannot be replicated

The hybrid surge-

outside actual combat. This type of experimentation could become the catalyst for sustaining the Fleet’s combat credibility.

experimentation operating concept creates a mutually supportive interaction. The large

unified Fleet, while providing a combat-credible deterrent force capable of quickly surging to a

conflict, also provides the means by which effective experimentation can occur. This
creates and sustains the Fleet’s combat credibility over time. Even in an age of austerity this cost-effective and self-

sustaining cycle can provide the continuous innovation necessary to maintain

combat credibility in the present and sustain it for the future. Counterarguments to Change Implementing
the interwar operating concept would mean significantly reducing the U.S. Navy’s
persistent forward presence in multiple regions of the world. It can be argued that doing so would mean
abandoning forward presence and the deterrent capability that it produces. However, converting to the interwar operating concept

does not mean the Navy abandons forward presence altogether. Unifying the Fleet would only mean
ending the institutional habit of principally using CSGs for that mission. Freed from this obligation,
other portions of the Fleet, namely the amphibious force, submarines, and surface action groups, can be relied
on to meet forward-presence requirements. Additionally, the U.S. Navy should begin
to rely on the navies of allies and partners, on which it has already spent an enormous
amount of time and resources building capacity, to assume part of the forward-
presence mission. Some risk is involved in reducing the number of persistently forward-deployed forces. Moving to a surge Fleet would mean forgoing some
ability to deter and influence events around the world in a timely manner. Expanding the forward-deployed naval force in those areas where the risk of conflict is great, such as the
Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean, could mitigate some of this risk. Adding to an already strong forward presence in Japan, the basing in the Pacific of a large and powerful unified
fleet consisting of multiple carriers will provide substantial risk mitigation as well as an altogether new kind of deterrence against potential adversaries in that region. The argument
over forward presence and deterrent loss obfuscates the larger problem of diminishing combat credibility and the growing risk from reduced surge capacity. While a unified Fleet may

It is better to
incur some reduction in deterrent capability, far more risk is currently being taken with surge capacity should deterrence fail and a major conflict arise.

have a smaller, more combat-credible Fleet than a large one with a dubious level of
combat credibility. Another counterargument to moving to the interwar operating concept is that the wars the Navy will most likely face will look more like
those fought over the past decade rather than the large-scale wars at sea requiring a large concentrated force. While it is naïve to suggest the Navy

will avoid involvement in these predominantly ground-centric conflicts, it is not unrealistic to suggest
the Navy can forgo the heavy use of CSGs when they arise. Rarely, if at all, do CSGs provide
a combat capability that makes the decisive difference in these conflicts. The air power required in these
instances is more efficiently provided by ground-based aircraft. Strike missions and local

sea-control missions can easily be conducted with carrier-less surface action groups.
Should an operational requirement arise necessitating the use of sea-based air
power, one-off uses of CSGs can be employed, provided they do not turn into long-
term requirements. It should be noted that this counterargument neglects the natural order of naval objectives. While supporting ground forces in a land fight
may be the ultimate mission, it can only be met once the Fleet is able to control the sea. To suggest the primacy of support to ground forces at the expense of the means to effectively

This discussion does not argue the

obtain sea control is shortsighted and irresponsibly risks both forces at sea and on the ground.

transition from a regional hub to a surge-experimentation operating concept will be

risk-free. It does argue that not adapting to austerity is far riskier. The words of President George
Washington in his first inaugural address are as true today as they were in 1789—to be prepared for war is the best way to prevent its occurrence. Even in an age of austerity,

Instead of preparing and

sustaining the combat credibility of the Fleet must remain a paramount concern in an effective operating concept.

adapting to this new age of austerity, the current operating concept is ignoring its
realities and taking great risk with the Fleet. An age of austerity need not be one of
stagnation or decay. Austerity, counterintuitively, spurred the creativity and
innovation that produced the Fleet needed to be victorious in World War II. 21 Such an
environment committed the U.S. Navy to the Fleet concentration in peacetime that
was necessary for the rigorous experimentation that sustained combat credibility
for wartime. The interwar Navy successfully produced a flexible Fleet prepared for war. 22 Facing a new age of austerity, it is
imperative that today’s Navy do so as well.
 UCAVs Solve Vulnerability---2NC
UCAVs will revolutionize the carrier---current prototypes successfully
combine stealth and strike capabilities---delays and failures now are due
to Naval inattention, which the CP fiats through---this beats basically all
their answers
Robert Martinage 15, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, and Shawn Brimley is Executive Vice President at the Center for a New
American Security, 4/28/15, “THE NAVY’S NEW MUSEUM DRONE AND STRATEGIC
MALPRACTICE,” http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-navys-new-museum-drone-
and-strategic-malpractice/
The need to take advantage of unmanned and increasingly autonomous systems to preserve the
aircraft carrier’s operational relevance in anticipated threat environments is obvious. America’s potential
adversaries are rapidly investing in capabilities designed to limit the ability of U.S. military forces to gain access to, and operate within,
vast areas of the air and maritime domains.

For instance, a recent report from the Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the
21st Century (discussed in this War on the Rocks article) ably details China’s development and fielding of
modern missile-armed strike aircraft and surface combatants, quieter submarines armed with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and
torpedoes, and land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D. And Moscow’s recent decision to supply Iran
with the S-300 surface-to-air missile system is illustrative of the broader proliferation of increasingly capable integrated air defense
systems that threaten to outmatch not only the F/A-18E/F but also the as-yet deployed F-35C.

Cognizant of these emerging threats , as far back as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Pentagon
leaders directed the Navy to “develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based
aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase
naval reach and persistence.”

Last week’s demonstration of automated aerial refueling by an unmanned air system (UAS) was a critical
component of proving that unmanned naval surveillance and strike operations are
possible. While aviation buffs will emphasize its historical significance, astute strategists will zero in on the fact that the UAS
in question — the Navy X-47B — is a prototype of a carrier-based, long-range
surveillance-strike aircraft with the “broad-band/all-aspect” stealth design required
for operating within air space defended by advanced integrated air defense systems. In combination, the X-47B’s successful
carrier launch/recovery demonstration in 2013 and last week’s automated aerial refueling
effectively prove that the system the Navy needs is technically feasible and within reach.

With aerial refueling, carrier-based UAS will be capable of conducting missions measured not in hours, but in days. For the first time in
history, this
would allow carrier-based aircraft to operate at intercontinental distances,
enabling both rapid global responsiveness and the ability to stage persistent surveillance-strike
operations from well outside most threats to the carrier.
While additional technology maturation and experimentation is surely needed before an advanced UAS can be fully integrated in to
carrier air wings, the
Navy is at a strategic “tipping point” where a truly game-changing
capability is within their grasp. The submarine-launched ballistic missile — which turned the Air Force’s nuclear
“dyad” into the iconic Air Force-Navy triad that deterred the Soviets during the Cold War — is an apt analogue. Absent the submarine-
launched ballistic missile, the Navy would have effectively ceded the critical strategic deterrence mission to the Air Force. Today is no
different. Absent
stealthy, air-refuelable, surveillance-strike UAS aboard its carriers, the
Navy will invariably cede power projection — and thus the conventional deterrence mission — to the Air
Force, which is developing a new stealth bomber and moving more aggressively on the UAS front.

Inexplicably, however, the Navy plans to end the Unmanned Combat Air System
Demonstration (UCAS-D) and permanently deactivate the two X-47B aircraft by sending them to museums — doing irreversible
damage to them in the process — despite having utilized only a small fraction of their available flight hours. Owing to repeated Navy “de-
scoping” of the UCAS-D program over the past several years, much work remains before the Navy is ready to acquire carrier -based UAS
at acceptable technical risk. Given the roughly $1.5B invested in UCAS-D to date, and that more technology maturation and
experimentation is clearly required, the obvious question is: Why stop now?

The answer from the Navy, and from the naval aviation enterprise in particular, has been that there are no cost effective sol utions for
continued UCLASS risk mitigation with UCAS-D, and that a penetrating, air-refuelable, surveillance-strike unmanned aircraft would be
too expensive. Both arguments are fundamentally flawed.

First, there
are, in fact, myriad executable options for continued work on UCAS-D that
would not only mitigate technical risk for UCLASS, but also substantially enhance the
Navy’s readiness to integrate an operational UAS into the carrier air wing. Key areas for
future UCAS-D enabled risk reduction include carrier control-area operations, deck handling, aerial refueling, command and control,
sensor and weapon integration, survivability, and fleet experimentation. The simple truth is that UCAS -D has only scratched the surface.
While some have argued that continuing UCAS-D would create an un-level competitive playing field for UCLASS, it is hard to understand
how requirements for “carrier suitability” set by the government in 2007 after a fair and open competition, and defined in de tail in 2011,
are now anti-competitive — especially when data collected during the program would be available to all contractors competing on
UCLASS.

Under current Navy plans, moreover, the UCLASS program is merely a Technology Demonstration effort slated to begin in roughly FY17,
with first flight of the “UCLASS-D” aircraft planned for no earlier than FY20. To state the obvious, it would be much less costly and risky
to utilize a flight-proven system during the technology and risk reduction phase of the procurement process rather than develop an
entirely new demonstration aircraft. This is true even if continued utilization of the X-47B air vehicles required sustained, low-level
investment in hardware and software modifications necessary to address different aspects of yet-to-be-finalized UCLASS requirements.
Conversely, the five-year gap in carrier-based UAS flight-testing, demonstration, and experimentation inherent in the Navy’s current
approach would likely delay the fielding of an operational aircraft. In other words, the Navy’s current path to carrier -based UAS
acquisition is guaranteed not only to cost more and take longer, but also to introduce an unnecessary level of risk in both cost and
schedule.

Which brings us to the last argument that proponents of the current flawed approach are making inside the Pentagon: that a pe netrating,
air-refuelable, counter-anti-access/area denial UAS would be dramatically more expensive than the surveillance-focused “spotter” that
the Navy currently prefers. For the latter, the Navy has specified a requirement of 14 hours of unrefueled endurance while ca rrying a
sensor suite and at least 1,000 pounds of weapons internally in low-to-medium threat environments. Meeting that objective would
require a large-wingspan aircraft with a roughly 45,000 to 65,000-pound gross takeoff weight. A carrier-based surveillance-strike
aircraft with somewhat less unrefueled endurance (8-10 hours — still three to four times that of the F/A-18E/F), a higher cruise speed,
significantly increased internal weapons payload (~4,000 pounds), and enhanced survivability (i.e., broadband, all -aspect radar cross
section reduction) would likely be in the middle of that gross takeoff weight range. With unit cost correlating closely with gross takeoff
weight, both aircraft would likely fall within a similar range for overall cost.

Ironically, affordability
in the age of austerity is perhaps the strongest argument for
acquiring a stealthy, air-refuelable, surveillance-strike UAS. Whereas the “spotter” UAS — designed
expressly to support manned fighters — would represent a purely additive air wing cost, a surveillance-strike UAS could replace the F/A-
18E/F in lieu of a manned “F/A-XX” in the late 2020s. The potential
cost savings are staggering. Owing to
the elimination of pilot training as a driver of carrier-based aircraft force size and
flight hours, if the Navy acquired a UAS instead of another manned aircraft to replace the
Super Hornet, it could procure roughly half the number of aircraft (or less) and fly them
fewer hours per year. Based on in-depth analysis of historical carrier-based aircraft life-cycle cost data, a forthcoming report
by the Center for a New American Security projects a 25-year savings mounting into the tens of billions. This is a strategic-level cost
offset that would allow the Navy to invest in additional aircraft, ships, and submarines.
 a
At a time when DoD needs to squeeze more capability out of reduced investment budgets to meet acute security challenges,
carrier-based UAS that transforms the carrier into a frontline global attack arm
while dramatically reducing the overall cost of the air wing represents a historic
opportunity. For the Navy to prematurely destroy the X-47B planes and forfeit the
opportunity to reduce risk, experiment, and learn for the next five years constitutes
strategic malpractice of the highest order.
At least Congress has taken notice, with Senator John McCain, Congressman Randy Forbes, and others urging the Navy to right i ts course
We recommend
and ensure America’s aircraft carriers and their air wings can deter and defeat future adversaries.
Congress add funding to the FY2016 budget to keep the UCAS-D air vehicles flying while the
Pentagon completes its reevaluation of final requirements for a future carrier-based UAS and it enters into development.

With Congressional leaders acting, it’s time for leaders in the Pentagon to do the same. Last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
forestalled the Navy’s release of a flawed UCLASS request for proposals and launched a review to study UCLASS requirements in the
context of the joint family of airborne surveillance and strike platforms. With the fate of UCAS-D in the balance, it is again time for the
Pentagon’s civilian leaders to weigh in to keep the promise of carrier-based UAS operations alive. Secretary Carter, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Robert Work, and Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus need to act before a historic opportunity is squandered. Pentagon officials
like to talk about innovation, experimentation, and halting the erosion of America’s military-technological edge. It’s time for their
rhetoric to translate into action.
 Solves escalation
That builds in off-ramps during crises that improve escalation control---
but retaining capacity to conduct high end conflict is key
Jerry Meyerle 14, Ph.D., senior research scientist in CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies,
12/9/14, “THE U.S. NEEDS A MORE TAILORED & DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE REGIME,”
http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/the-u-s-military-will-need-more-low-end-strike-
options-in-the-second-nuclear-age/
Challenges to American primacy from a newly aggressive Russia and a militarily
growing China suggest that the United States needs a robust nuclear deterrent now more than ever. Today’s threats
also call for high-end conventional capabilities that promise to protect U.S. military
dominance and enable rapid victory in any major conflict. If the United States is to remain the world’s number one
superpower, it cannot afford to fall behind.

At the same time, it is unlikely that the United States will fight a major war with a serious military
power such as Russia or China, least of all use nuclear weapons. The conflicts that the the United States is most likely to
become embroiled in will remain at the lower bounds of the warfare spectrum, where wars
can be fought without large-scale destruction. Any major power that seeks to challenge American primacy
would be unwise to do so by fighting a major war or threatening to use nuclear weapons. Challenges are more likely to
come through small-scale attacks and repeated confrontations that promise to gradually chip away at U.S. authority.
U.S. forces need to be able to respond to these challenges in ways that signal strength
and resolve.
This is where the United States is least prepared.

Despite all the talk about the United States maintaining its military technological edge and the search for a new offset strategy, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as the spread of other high-end military technologies, threaten to restrict
U.S. options in future conflicts. It may be increasingly difficult for the United States to take military action without escalation toward a
major conventional war or even a nuclear war. The costs and risks of such an outcome are too high to fathom.

Because nuclear weapons appear to take major war and regime change off the table, they promise greater space for smaller powers to
conduct proxy warfare, violent provocations, and even limited military operations at lower levels of escalation. These develo pments pose
a dilemma for the United States and other status quo powers: responding militarily could lead to escalation and the risk of nuclear war,
but failing to do so could lead to a cascade of low-level coercion in the future

Salami-slicing tactics by Russia in Ukraine and China in the western Pacific pose a
serious threat to American primacy . Russia under Vladimir Putin is challenging the United States and NATO not by
massing forces or threatening nuclear attack, but by waging a semi-covert proxy war against the West. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are
part of an incremental campaign of escalation meant to test the limits of what the United States is willing accept and its resolve to take
military action against another nuclear power. In this battle of wills, Russia so far appears to have the upper hand.

China
China’s actions in the western Pacific pale in comparison to the blatant aggression evinced by Russia in Ukraine. Nonetheless,
has for years been gradually chipping away at American primacy in the Pacific through
repeated confrontations with the naval vessels and aircraft of the United States and its
allies. Patrick Cronin has coined the term “tailored coercion” to refer to low-level aggression by China against Japan and several
Southeast Asian countries, as well as U.S. naval forces, in pursuit of disputed maritime claims.

Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals serve as a shield behind which to poke and prod the United States and its allies. Some e xperts have
argued that Russia has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons in recent years as a means to counter advances in U.S. precision
strike capabilities, and may even be seeking nuclear superiority as the U.S. continues to reduce its nuclear arsenal. China i s also in the
process of modernizing its nuclear capabilities.
Second-tier powers, such as North Korea and Pakistan, are also growing their nuclear capabilities. Iran, it appears, is pursuing a nuclear
capability of its own. Since acquiring nuclear weapons, North Korea and Pakistan have engaged in coercive and violent provoca tions,
calculating that their larger rivals would concede rather than risk escalation that could lead to nuclear use. These include torpedo and
artillery strikes on South Korean forces in 2010, and limited ground incursions and terrorist attacks against India in 1999 a nd 2001 that
were attributed to Pakistan. These actions threaten to destabilize key regions unless measures can be devised to deter acts o f coercion at
the lower bounds of the warfare spectrum.

The United States will need a more tailored and discriminate deterrent to address these
threats. Policymakers will need options that promise to deter adversaries at the low-
end as well as the high end, in order to dissuade potential adversaries from attempting to
coerce the United States and its allies. At the same time, U.S. leaders will need tools – military and
diplomatic – aimed at controlling escalation and minimizing the risk of nuclear use. This
will be important for extended deterrence as well, because allies and partners are
the more likely victims of low-level coercion. Defending them against coercive
pressure will be important for continued U.S. influence in Asia.
Forward-deployed conventional forces capable of calibrated responses to low-level
attacks are likely to play a central role. Nuclear threats are not likely to be credible against anything short of a
major act of war. U.S. commanders will need a variety of military options below the threshold of major combat operations, aimed at
sending a message rather than disarming an adversary. These
options will need to be proportionate,
timely, precise, and calculated to signal both resolve and restraint.
Capabilities that might enable such responses include tactically oriented unmanned
platforms, conventional cruise missiles, special operations forces, and non-kinetic
options such as cyber and electronic attack. Employing ground forces may not be advisable, given the risks of
becoming tied down in a protracted conflict.

Attempts to deter small-scale attacks through limited military operations could involve considerable risk of escalation. Escalation
control measures must be integrated into war plans and concepts of operation. The
United States may need to allow adversary leaders a way out in a crisis in order to avoid
trapping them in an escalatory spiral. In the event of a strike that could be perceived
as a strategic threat, it may be advisable to signal that the attack is limited , through public
statements, discreet diplomatic and military channels, and careful choice of targets, weapons, and flight paths.

Recent exploits by Russia in Ukraine and China in the western Pacific threaten to
chip away at U.S. power and influence unless effective responses can be developed.
Policymakers will need strong but proportionate military options designed to
counter and deter offensive actions at lower levels of conflict while controlling
follow-on escalation. This may require a more diverse array of usable conventional
capabilities that pose less risk of escalation, as well as greater attention to escalation
control in military planning and concepts of operation.
Navy Adv
 A2 IndoPak A/O
No nuclear escalation even if they win a high-magnitude internal link
Sumit Ganguly 14, professor of Political Science at the Indiana University, Bloomington
where he holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations and
directs the Center on American and Global Security, interviewed by DW, Deutsche Welle,
Germany’s international broadcast network, 10/9/14, “Analyst: 'Pakistan is likely testing
Modi's resolve',” http://www.dw.de/analyst-pakistan-is-likely-testing-modis-resolve/a-
17982537
Indian and Pakistani troops continued to exchange heavy fire over their border in the
divided Himalayan region of Kashmir on Wednesday, October 8, leading to the death of five more civilians. The area, claimed in its entirety by the nuclear-
armed neighbors, has been the scene of some of the most intense fighting between the two countries in years, with both sides trading accusations of
targeting civilians and violating a border truce. A total of nine Pakistani and eight Indian civilians have been killed since fighting erupted more than week
ago, according to media reports. India and Pakistan have fought two wars over the territory which is
currently divided along a disputed border, known as the Line of Control (LoC). The latest outbreak of hostilities comes after New Delhi called off peace talks
Ganguly, India expert and
with Islamabad last month following Pakistan's consultation with Indian Kashmiri separatist leaders. Sumit

professor of Political Science at the Indiana University Bloomington says in a DW interview that while
the current escalation is a reflection of the current state of bilateral ties, it is unlikely that

the cross-border shelling will escalate into a major conflict as both sides seem aware

of the enormous human and material cost this would have. DW: Who do you believe is responsible for the
latest flare-up of violence along the border? Sumit Ganguly: It is hard to apportion blame. However, I suspect that it stems from the recent breakdown in

Pakistani and Indian troops are said to regularly exchange fire along
talks between the two countries.

the disputed border. What are the main reasons behind this? Simply stated because a cease-fire agreement has long expired, Pakistan's
military is probably ramping up for renewed hostilities as it turns its gaze eastwards given the impending withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. It
is also, in all likelihood, testing the resolve of the Modi government. What impact will the latest ceasefire violations have on the ties between the two

countries? Not much. Relations are already at fairly low ebb. There were hopes of a thawing in ties following Modi's
the peace talks between the two
invitation to Sharif to attend his inauguration as prime minister in May. But after that

countries were canceled as Abdul Basit, the Pakistani ambassador to India, chose to invite Kashmiri separatists on the eve of the talks
despite a clear injunction from New Delhi not to do so. What are the chances of such violations escalating into a major conflict? I doubt that it

will escalate as both sides are well aware of the costs thereof. The costs would be both
human and material and would be worse for Pakistan given the dire state of its
economy, its internal disorder and its lack of substantial external supporters barring China
and Saudi Arabia. Even the Chinese may have second thoughts about supporting Islamabad.
 2NC Navy Power D
Naval power resilient
Greg Grant 9, military.com associate editor, 2-20, “CSBA’s $20 billion a Year
Shipbuilding Plan,” DoD Buzz, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/02/20/csbas-20-
billion-a-year-shipbuilding-plan/
the U.S. Navy is in far better condition than many believe. Alarmists who say
To begin with, Work says,

U.S. naval power is in serious decline perform a rather dishonest counting of the current number of
ships and compare that to the 1980s “600 ship Navy” standard. A more honest net assessment compares the size and combat power of the Navy to potential
contemporary competitors, which paints a very different picture. Counting those ships that can “perform naval fire and maneuver,” including submarines
the U.S. has close to
and aviation platforms, the Navy has 203 warships. The Russian and Chinese navies combined operate 215 warships, so

the “two navy standard” the Royal Navy aimed to maintain in its heyday. Measuring fleet tonnage displacement, the best proxy for
measuring a fleet’s overall combat capability, the U.S. Navy enjoys a “13-Navy standard” over the world’s next biggest navies. Because the U.S. Navy early on
shifted to vertical launch magazines, it carries far more missiles, 7,804 in 75 warships, than any other navy, adding up to a “twenty-navy firepower
The Navy enjoys a very high operational tempo that is unmatched by any other
standard.”

nation. The fleet is transforming to a “collaborative battle network” force that will integrate aerial and sea drones, satellites, seabed sensors into an
unmatched command and control system. The Navy can also count on the naval power of its closest ally: the U.S. Coast Guard, with 160 cutters and 800 small
craft, a force ideally suited for engaging partner navies. Then there are the 10 carrier air wings, naval special warfare units, P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission
aircraft, aerial drones and 569 MH-60 helicopters. The MH-60s are the “small craft” of the U.S. Navy, faster than any ship, able to patrol vast areas and armed
The Navy doesn’t need to worry about losing global maritime
with torpedoes or Hellfire missiles.

supremacy anytime soon, so Work says, the focus should be less about ship numbers and more on how the Navy fits into the national
strategy and how to maintain naval dominance going forward in the face of technological advances in precision weapons and targeting. The biggest challenge
the fleet will face in the future isn’t that some nation (China) might build a blue water fleet to challenge the Navy on the open ocean, as that would play to our
naval and air strengths. Rather, its what Work calls “land based maritime reconnaissance-strike complexes,” land based anti-ship missiles of ever greater
range, accuracy, maneuverability and number. The idea of parking carriers offshore and launching sustained air strikes is no longer valid, or at least won’t be
very soon. The key parameter in future wars, conducted both from the air and sea, will be range, Work says. The Navy must fight outside the range of an
enemy’s anti-air and anti ships missiles, or at least outside the missile salvo fire range. Another evolving challenge is ever more sophisticated undersea
combat systems, drones, sonar systems and advanced submarines.
 AT: Conway

The second is Iran war---that won’t happen

Kenneth M. Pollack 15, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings Institution, “U.S. policy toward the Middle East after the Iranian nuclear
agreement,” 8/5/15, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/08/05-us-
policy-iran-nuclear-deal-pollack
Two points stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that while
Iranian
strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive, and expansionist, Iran is not
reckless and is typically quite wary of American power. When the United States exerts itself,
the Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the Iranians did
not back down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those militias crushed
and driven from Iraq during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American campaigns along the lower
Tigris. As we see in Iraq today, the Iranians apparently recognize that they misjudged both
America’s will and its capacity to act then, and are once again content to battle Washington
for political influence in Baghdad but unwilling to challenge U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.

The third is North Korea---that also won’t happen

Van Jackson 15, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, 8/24/15, “Preparing for the Next Korean
War,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/preparing-for-the-next-korean-war/
How do you fight and win with one hand tied behind your back? U.S. and South Korean officials would do well to figure out, q uickly. A
dark cloud descended over the Korean Peninsula last
week as a series of North Korean actions along the DMZ
escalated tensions to the highest level since 2010. Despite ongoing talks between the two sides, tensions remain
high. The prospect of limited war on the Korean Peninsula is all too real, and the alliance must reorient its preparations a ccordingly.

I’ve spent most of my tenure since leaving government warning about limited war in Korea—a conflict in which both sides avoid nuclear
exchanges, no invasion of Pyongyang occurs, and both sides limit their objectives and the means of attaining them to eschew conquest.
we’ve become
In limited war, a return to the status quo may count as a victory. If that sounds perverse, it’s because
accustomed to an image of war as an all-or-nothing affair; no goal short of total enemy surrender will do.
Not so in a world of limited wars.

I raised this issue in congressional testimony earlier this year. I noted it in subsequent op-eds, and in a Center for a New American
Security report for Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. I’ve discussed it before the media, and at conferences. And in a forthcoming report
for the U.S.-Korea Institute, I attempt to sketch how the
alliance might adjust to a future of limited wars. The
most recent mini-crisis brings the point home in disturbingly clear fashion: the risk of limited war on the Korean
Peninsula is increasing with time.

I’ve identified a number of mutually reinforcing reasons why this is so, and why the reality of limited war actually gets mor e likely with
time.

Nobody Wants Nuclear War—Not Even Kim Jong-un

Every Korea expert I’ve ever met believes North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival. Yet most of
these same experts believe that Kim Jong-un is capable of anything and there’s no telling what he might do. To put it
politely, that’s cognitive dissonance. If we know North Korea seeks regime survival, then we
know something about what it’s keen to avoid. Even Kim Jong-un must know there are certain
actions that would end him and his regime—nuclear attacks, the destruction of Seoul, or a mass
invasion of South Korea. Kim Jong-un isn’t a Millenarian or a Jihadi; his goal isn’t suicide. So unless we want to
shrug our shoulders and say “anything could happen,” we should have some modest confidence
that Kim won’t pursue the extreme actions that North Korean media routinely threaten.

South of the DMZ, the incentives to avoid a nuclear conflict are just as strong . For starters, 60
years of “restraint” when faced with North Korean violence suggests that, in the United States especially, there is a strong
desire to avoid the risks of escalation and conflict in general. Plus, no sitting president—American or
South Korean—wants to go down in history as the first president to usher in the era of nuclear warfighting. The
cost in lives would be abhorrent, and there’s a high risk that such a situation would rapidly erode the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

North Korea Can’t Invade the South

In June 1950, North Korea launched a large-scale invasion of a South Korea with only a token ability to resist and no meaningful U.S.
military presence. This is the classic scenario that experts and military planners often imagine when they think of another Korean War.
Yet there’s now a heavily armed DMZ—replete with a large minefield, no less—separating the
North and South, and the South Korean military is better trained and equipped than any force North Korea could muster.
North Korea’s air force and navy services are vastly inferior to the technologically advanced South Korean
military. And the U.S. military presence in and commitment to South Korea is far more than
symbolic.
The point is that no
military leader would look at the military balance on the Korean
Peninsula—especially not a leader in the North Korean People’s Army (KPA)—and think that it makes sense for
North Korea to invade South Korea. The former might have cause for conflict, but waged asymmetrically, not as a head-
on frontal assault. Invasion of the South is militarily impossible. This North-South military imbalance is worsened by a KPA that lacks
the logistics and sustainment capacity required of an invasion; the KPA is numerically large, but regularly diverted from military tasks to
perform agricultural and industrial labor functions to support a moribund economy. The KPA isn’t a force that’s capable of a long
duration military campaign.
1NR
Deterrence
 Link OV
Positioning the carrier near China at the beginning of a conflict is key to
prevent escalation---enables strikes to be precise and small-scale, and
allows China to signal restraint by not striking the carrier
Vincent A. Manzo 15, Fellow in the Defense and National Security Group of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Intergovernmental Personnel Act Fellow in the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2nd quarter 2015, “After the First Shots:
Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia,” Joint Force Quarterly,
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/581877/jfq
-77-after-the-first-shots-managing-escalation-in-northeast-asia.aspx
The United States could also develop conventional options for striking Chinese
territory that would be tailored to managing escalation. Such options would employ
a small number of U.S. assets in a short-duration strike. Importantly, U.S. officials
would need to select potential military targets that meet three criteria:
The targets would be in range of standoff weapons, so that attacking them would not
require large suppression operations against Chinese air defenses; this would be
essential to keep the operation small and quick.
The targets would not be part of China’s nuclear posture. This would require detailed
analysis during peacetime to determine, as examples, air defense nodes, antisatellite
weapons, conventional missiles, naval bases, or sensors that do not have nuclear functions.
The targets would not be part of the regime’s political leadership.
The United States could develop a spectrum of strike packages tailored to managing
escalation, from an attack on a single target to larger attacks against multiple targets
that satisfy these criteria. The goal of this employment option would be to escalate by
crossing a profound geographic and symbolic threshold while minimizing the
chances that China would react rashly for fear of losing key strategic capabilities. U.S.
officials could also follow up the operation with a ceasefire offer. Every aspect of the
response would highlight the willingness to do something dangerous and the
promise of reciprocal restraint. Of course, this option would entail a tradeoff with
mounting an operation to dramatically degrade Chinese capabilities. Yet it may be more
prudent than authorizing a larger, messier campaign for limited U.S. goals. At the
least, it is an option that the President may want to consider.
This concept would probably not work after China launched a large-scale missile
salvo on a U.S. base, struck an aircraft carrier, or unleashed unrelenting attacks in
space and cyberspace. As a conflict progresses, the United States might need to launch
large-scale conventional attacks on Chinese ISR, C2, and missiles on the mainland.
The inescapable nuclear shadow means that managing escalation would remain a U.S.
objective even in a high-end conventional conflict, but other military objectives would
also come to the fore if U.S. and allied forces were under sustained attack.
The prospects for mutual restraint early in a conflict are most promising if the United
States and China both understand the perils of inadvertent escalation. As a RAND
study observes, “to reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, the adversary . . . must first
be enlightened, after which deterrence may or may not still be required.”38 China has
thus far been suspicious of U.S. efforts to explore how a conflict between the two might
spiral out of control and how they might cooperate to manage escalation, although
constructive dialogues on these and other strategic issues at the unofficial level continue.39
The escalatory danger of counterspace and cyber attacks, blurred nuclear
thresholds, and nuclear signaling all merit continued discussion in these venues.
China might balk, but persistent efforts to raise these issues and explain U.S.
concerns would be worthwhile.

Forward-stationing carriers is key to make every other aspect of U.S.

power effective in a war with China---the plan means they can destroy
land-based aircraft and by the time the carrier gets to the crisis there’ll
be nothing left for it to assist
Sydney J. Freedberg 10-8, Deputy Editor, Breaking Defense, 10/8/15, “Carriers Crucial In
War With China – But Air Wing Is All Wrong: Hudson,”
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/carriers-crucial-in-war-with-china-but-air-wing-is-
all-wrong-hudson/
Nuclear-powered super-carriers are irreplaceable, co-author Bryan McGrath told me, and the Ford is a
good design. But, he said, “the air wing will have to be completely rethought…to win and deter
the war we cannot lose.”
That’s also the war we often dare not name: a war with China. “What bothered me was the degree to which there was a self-
evident, high-end argument that was not getting made by the Navy,” McGrath said. “So I, with my partners at Hudson, said, ‘we’re going to
have to do this for them.'”

Rep. Randy Forbes, the House Seapower chairman who’ll headline tomorrow’s roll-out, has frequently criticized the executive branch for
pussyfooting around the Chinese threat. While a strongly partisan Republican, Forbes takes congressional oversight seriously and once
hammered a Bush administration official for 22 minutes just to get him to admit Chinese espionage was a problem.

One of Forbes’s favorite stories about such self-censorship concerns “a very good personal friend” he otherwise much admires, former
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert. “When they were at the War College, they had a young officer stand up and a sk them
in a very, very sincere way, how do we talk about Chinese competition?” Forbes recounted Tuesday at the Heritage Foundation. “The
admiral said to even talk about China as a competitor goes across the line and goes too far.”

The Navy’s current case for carriers is the Islamic State. For 54 days until allies okayed the use of land bases, only carrier-based aircraft
could strike targets in Iraq and Syria. But you don’t need the Ford for that, McGrath said.

“If all you wanted to do was sit off some Third World nation and plink targets 12 hours a day, you wouldn’t need a
$12.9 billion
aircraft carrier,” said McGrath. “In order to really talk about why $12.9 billion is worthwhile… the opponent that
makes that investment most worthwhile is China.”
That argument’s pretty counterintuitive in national security circles. The conventional
wisdom is that carriers
are great for projecting American airpower around the world, just as long as nobody can
shoot you down or sink you. If the enemy has long-range, precision-guided anti-ship and anti-aircraft
weapons, plus the sensors and networks to target them — what’s often called “anti-access/area denial” or A2/AD — you can
kiss your carriers goodbye.
That’s precisely wrong, McGrath argued. The A2/AD threat makes the carrier more
relevant. “If you think that the aircraft carrier is vulnerable,” he said, “what is the word
you use to describe First Island Chain airbases” — i.e. islands within range of China — “that don’t
move at 40 miles an hour?” Land-based aircraft, like Air Force fighters, are going to be
bombed out of their bases in short order by salvoes of long-range missiles. So, he said, “if you hope to
have tactical air power to do all the things the joint force needs ” — defeat enemy
fighters, escort friendly bombers flying from intact, distant bases, and so on — “the only way you’re
going to have it available is from the aircraft carrier.”
(The implicit criticism of the Air Force here, McGrath acknowledged, is another reason why the Navy can’t make such arguments in
public).

That said, the report hardly recommends sailing aircraft carriers into the East China Sea on day one of a war. To the contrar y, “just
after the shooting starts…aircraft carriers and surface ships are likely to be brought back
beyond the range of the hardest of the A2/AD weapons,” McGrath told me. “The submarines
will then go in, and [Air Force] long-range bombers with long range weapons, and they will do
the business of creating opportunity by taking out ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability, creating
pockets of reduced risk to operate.”
Note that word, “pockets.” You
don’t try to bring the whole A2/AD defense down so the carriers
can return to their standard offshore circling , launching a steady stream of airstrikes. Instead, the
report advocates “pulse” tactics. Once other forces tear a hole in the A2/AD defense,
several carriers and their escorts race into it, launch a few huge raids, and then get out. Essentially,
the report acknowledges, this is a massive hit and run attack.
 Impact
Failure of U.S. crisis control over Taiwan causes nuclear escalation
Charles L. Glaser 11 is Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the
Department of Political Science, and Director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security
and Conflict Studies @ George Washington University, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?”
Foreign Affairs; Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90 Issue 2, p80-91, 12p EBSCO
THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in
China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that
Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese
Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and
unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if
Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated
to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to
intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally
agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and
challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.
A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the
way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability
that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Neve rtheless,
the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no
matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and
the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which
the United States found itself following events rather than leading them .
Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military
capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its
improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their
ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to
destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's
nuclear modernization might
remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises
than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and
nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be in terpreted by
China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.
 AT: Not Revisionist
Current Chinese regional policy is aggressive and revisionist---only
forward presence deters them and guarantees stability
Michael Auslin 9-23, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/23/15, “Time
For Realism In U.S.-China Relations,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-realism-us-
china-relations-13915?page=show
“The United States welcomes a rising China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in
global affairs.”

So asserted Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama, during a speech yesterday at George Washington
University on the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington. In an address designed to tout the “arc of progress” in
Sino-U.S. relations, Rice chastised the “lazy rhetoric that says conflict between the U.S. and China is inevitable.”

Rice may have set up her straw person, but no serious Asia watcher either predicts or desires a clash with China. However, ev en by the
measuring stick of her own aspirations noted above, China
today is falling far short of the mark, raising
serious questions about the future of its relationship with the United States.
To begin with, few of China’s neighbors feel that Beijing is altogether peaceful these days. Its
coercion over disputed maritime territory in the East and South China Seas continues unabated, and it has
now built islands in contested waters and is beginning to militarize them. Its military might, showcased this month at a major
parade, was a clear message of China’s strength and a warning to those who would
oppose it.
Secondly, longtime observers of China are increasingly concerned about its stability. Xi Jinping has instituted a social crackdown that
belies the regime’s concern over its safety. Xi has arrested potential threats to his own power in the Communist Party, tight ened control
over the military, jailed lawyers and dissidents, and maintained oppression of Tibetan and Uighur minorities. Ev en established academics
like George Washington University’s David Shambaugh are beginning to say that the Communist Party is entering its endgame, wi th
unknown effects on social stability.

Americans are willing to overlook these failings as long as China remained the goose that laid the golden egg. Yet this summer showed
that Chinese prosperity, the third of Rice’s goals, can be taken for granted. The stock market collapse over the past few mon ths is a sign of
much deeper problems in the broader economy. The official growth rate has been knocked down to 7 percent, but few economists
believe the figure, and it is entirely likely that China is already in stagnation. That means, as trade figures showed, dropp ing industrial
production and shrinking imports. When the slowdown hits the pocketbooks of China’s nouveaux middle class, then social stability will
be even more at risk.

A China suffering from economic stagnation and turmoil at home is unlikely to be a

‘responsible player in global affairs.’ In fact, it already isn’t, despite Rice’s desire. Just days before Xi’s
visit to Obama, his government has formally arrested an American citizen on charges of
spying. This sends a clear message to Obama about Beijing’s regard for diplomatic
niceties. Far more serious, of course, is the unprecedented cyber espionage conducted by Chinese
hackers, undoubtedly controlled or supported by the government, against U.S. citizens and businesses. The hack of the Office of
Personnel Management compromised the sensitive data of tens of millions of Americans. In response, Washington is toying with signing
a cybersecurity pact with Beijing that will do nothing to stop such aggression. Add
on Beijing’s claims over the South
China Sea and its attempt to dominate contested waters, its refusal to pressure North
Korea, and its campaign to seek out Chinese expats in America and coerce them to
return home, and the picture of bonhomie between America and China is itself a
product of the kind of ‘reductive reasoning and lazy rhetoric’ denounced by Rice.
The question is, what to do about all this? How can the United States effectively pressure its largest import partner and
the world’s second-largest economy? Must
the arc of progress championed by Rice always bend in China’s
favor?
It is time for a new realism in U.S.-China relations. Such realism begins with an official
acceptance that we are locked in a competition with China that is of Beijing’s
choosing. Our economies may be increasingly interconnected, but no longer can U.S. officials quail at responding to Beijing’s
provocations out of fear that trade relations will be harmed. It is time for high-level U.S.-China dialogues to be reset, to use a term once in
favor in the Obama Administration, and conducted not as an unearned gift to Beijing, but only when there are concrete goals to be
achieved. A
state that acts increasingly in violation of global norms of behavior is not one
that should be rewarded with pomp and circumstance by U.S. leaders.
In addition, it
is past time for the U.S. to act as the guarantor of regional stability that it
claims to be. That means sending U.S. ships and planes right up to the edges of
China’s manmade islands in the South China Sea, something that Obama Administration admitted in Senate
testimony last week that it was not doing. By not challenging China’s territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and sending a
message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A
China that knows we will employ our military
strength where it is most in question will be far more circumspect in its attempts to
undermine the rules of international behavior.
As for cyber, it is Beijing that has caused this crisis, and no U.S. administration should be negotiating a pact with the wol f in the sheep
pen. First, we should be thinking of financial sanctions and diplomatic freezes as punishment for aggression already committed and that
to come.

It also is past time to throw some cyber elbows to show we won’t simply sit and take whatever fouls China decides to commit. There is no
question that the U.S. is probably more vulnerable that China on the cyber front, but we are steadily being led down the path towards a
real cyber Pearl Harbor (such as the shutting down of our energy grid) by our unwillingness to show that we can play the same game. It’s
a discomfiting thought, but that is the world we have let ourselves be trapped into.

The point of the new realism is not to force a conflict with China. It is to avoid one.
Only steady strength, a firm response, and a willingness to speak the truth will show
Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders that America is no better friend and no worse adversary. The
choice lies entirely with the Chinese leadership. So far, they have ignored Susan Rice’s earnest
exhortations, and instead shown a dangerous willingness to undermine the very peace that has
allowed their country to grow so much. By acting in our best interests, we will also help
deflect China from a path that increasingly looks like one that will result in far greater risks to
stability, prosperity, and peace.
 Link---AT: Surge Carrier in a Crisis---2NC
Stationing the carrier outside the region is destabilizing and crushes
deterrence, regardless of the capability to surge it in a crisis
Michael D. Swaine 15, Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment,
4/20/15, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable
U.S.-China Balance of Power,” http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-
american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power
Of course, a continuing U.S. capacity to shift military assets from other parts of the
globe to Asia in a crisis or conflict could conceivably correct America’s relative
military decline in the Western Pacific. But such a surge-based “solution” would
require considerable time to implement, while any future threatening Chinese
military action, for example, with regard to Taiwan or maritime disputes near its
border, would almost certainly involve a very rapid strike aimed at establishing a fait
accompli that could prove extremely difficult and costly to undo. Equally important, a
growing day-to-day Chinese capability and presence along the Asian littoral and a
perceived relative U.S. military decline in daily presence would inevitably affect the
security calculations of other Asian states, especially American allies and friends,
regardless of the overall ramp-up capacity of the U.S. military in any confrontation. In
the current, increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship, a clear relative shift in day-
to-day regional power toward China would likely cause such states to hedge more
deliberately against a U.S. failure to prevail in a crisis or conflict by developing
stronger, more independent, and potentially destabilizing military capabilities
and/or by accommodating Chinese interests, possibly at the expense of the United
States, for example, by spurning past or future security arrangements with
Washington.
 AT: Leave Wing
Here’s a chart – the F-16 and F-22 can’t reach contingencies like Taiwan
without the carrier
Eric Stephen Gons 11, former RAND-U.S. Air Force Academy Superintendent's Fellow,
current consultant at the Boston Consulting Group, Access Challenges and Implications for
Airpower in the Western Pacific,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.
pdf
 AT: Carrier Use/Lose
Carrier standoff would end with de-escalation
Vasilis Trigkas 14, visiting research fellow at the institute for Sino-EU relations at
Tsinghua University & a non-resident WSD Handa fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, 12/29/14,
“Aircraft Carriers in the Taiwan Strait,” http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/aircraft-
carriers-in-the-taiwan-strait/
In the 1996 crisis, the U.S. “carrier monopoly” neutralized the Chinese tactical advantage
over Taiwan by highlighting the U.S. strategic dominance. China’s leadership saw the
potential destruction that an attack against U.S. carriers would unleash. However, in a
renewed Taiwanese crisis today, China could pass the ball to the U.S. side. Its single
carrier has delivered strategic risk parity in the straits. As the Chinese carrier would
face-off against the U.S. carriers, a war of nerves would begin. The longer the confrontation
and the maneuvering, the greater the possibility for a mistake that would lead to a strike on
a carrier with perhaps irreversible consequences for the relationship between the two
superpowers and for world stability. As China would enjoy the advantage of playing on its
own doorstep with Chinese public opinion fiercely opposing any retreat, and is it would be
willing to dance with the U.S. closer to the edge, the U.S. would have to deescalate and take
the conflict to the UN or risk a nuclear confrontation. Thus the “predictable
unpredictability” of escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction ensures, according to
experts, that a U.S.-China aircraft carrier face-off would not be a prolonged
confrontation and, most importantly, that it would end peacefully as both sides’
rational strategy would follow the norms of nuclear deterrence.
 Defense---General
No escalation impact---Chinese perception is decisively neg
M. Taylor Fravel 15, Associate Professor Department of Political Science Security Studies
Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Fiona Cunningham, PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 5/3/15, “Capabilities and Crises: The Future of U.S.-China Strategic Stability,”
https://nuclearconference2015.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/cunningham_fravel_nsri_20
15.pdf
U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy is not the only current trend that could affect U.S.- China crisis stability in the future. The
U.S.
policy community is concerned that the AirSea Battle Concept will increase the
likelihood of nuclear escalation. The AirSea Battle Concept purportedly includes a “blinding”
phase during which the United States would disable or destroy China’s ISR capabilities used to
target Chinese conventional missile and space capabilities.155 It is feared that U.S. strikes could damage
nuclear missiles or infrastructure associated with Chinese nuclear forces that are co-located with Chinese
conventional missiles and offensive space capabilities. China could then mistake the limited
conventional aims of defeating its A2/AD capabilities for a preemptive strike on
Chinese nuclear forces.156
China’s strategic community does not share U.S. concerns about nuclear escalation
from the implementation of the AirSea Battle Concept. The Chinese strategic community
understands the aim of the AirSea Battle Concept is to defeat Chinese “anti-access”
capabilities and involves a blinding campaign,157 but most sources consulted for this paper
did not believe that the Concept was relevant to Chinese nuclear weapons even though
the Chinese strategic community is aware of the U.S. debate over the escalation risks
posed by the Concept. 158

The Chinese strategic community generally believes that if the United States implemented the
AirSea Battle Concept in a conflict with China, the risk of escalation to the nuclear level would be
low.159 Most written sources examining the AirSea Battle Concept are silent on the implications of the Concept for China’s nucle ar
posture. Our interlocutors’ assessments imply that this is because Chinese analysts generally do not connect the
AirSea Battle Concept with nuclear weapons, Chinese or American . One AMS scholar acknowledged that the
United States intended to use a “new type of forces,” such as UAVs, CPGS, space and cyber capabilities, to reduce the firepow er it would
need to conduct deep strikes to implement AirSea Battle. But he judged that the reduction in firepower required to execute deep st rikes
with these new forces were probably still insufficient to prevent escalation. He does not specify whether he is concerned abo ut nuclear or
conventional escalation. The scholar commented, however, that “ China
has extremely limited options, it is
very difficult to adopt symmetrical steps to counterattack, yet it is also very hard to make
the decision to take the initiative to asymmetrically escalate the war.”160 This rare assessment
of China’s options, in the event that the United States implements the AirSea Battle concept,
suggests that China is wary of escalating a conflict, even in the event of deep strikes.161
 AT: ASATs---No Escalation
ASAT won’t lead to nuclear escalation or first use- doesn’t influence
countries strategic calculations
Wu Chunsi 15, director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies, “The antisatellite smoke screen”, 5/28/15,
http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges/antisatellite-smoke-
screen
Is it correct to argue that antisatellite weapons increase the risk of nuclear war? No.
No nation would launch a nuclear attack because an adversary possessed
antisatellite weapons. Rather, it would launch an attack because an adversary evidently intended to stage a massive,
strategic attack of its own. In the early stages of a nuclear attack, of course, antisatellite weapons might be used to
destroy the other side's systems for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Even so,
antisatellite weapons would be tools in a nuclear exchange—not the "reason" for the
exchange. (The same is true of nuclear weapons themselves.) The most that can be said about antisatellite weapons and the risk of
nuclear war is that, in a crisis, these weapons could complicate the calculations of nuclear weapon states, or figure into a nation's
decision to take preemptive nuclear action. But again, antisatellite weapons would not be the "reason" for
preemptive action.
For nuclear weapon states that maintain a no-first-use policy—including China—
antisatellite weapons could not, by definition, provoke a nuclear attack. If antisatellite
weapons were actually used in a crisis, but all countries involved were committed to a no-first-use policy, conflict could still
be contained within the conventional arena, without escalation to nuclear war. Commented [EM9]:
Nuclear risk increases only if states that contemplate the first use of nuclear
weapons are involved. Therefore, what is really dangerous in a crisis is a policy that
allows the first use of nuclear weapons—not the existence (or non-existence) of antisatellite
weapons.
Furthermore, antisatellite
weapons are not even a key element in countries' decisions to
adopt policies allowing the first use of nuclear weapons . My point may be clearer if I express it this
way: In a world without antisatellite weapons, could all nuclear weapon states be expected to adopt no-first-use policies? The probable
answer is no. Whether
a nuclear weapon state takes preemptive action in a crisis is
determined by the country’s political willingness to use nuclear weapons and its
overall military doctrine—not by antisatellite weapons. Thus, to focus on antisatellite
weapons is to misunderstand the fundamental problem endangering the world in
the nuclear age.
Octas
1NC
Offcase
 1
The US is combining hedging and reassurance in the Gulf now---
increased presence and military cooperation are reassuring allies
Lynn E. Davis 14, Senior Political Science, RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and M.A. in political
science, Columbia University, “The Days after a Deal with Iran: U.S. Policies of Hedging and
Engaging,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE125/RAND_PE12
5.pdf
A U.S. Approach Is Emerging That Emphasizes Hedging and Reassurance
From Obama administration statements and a growing consensus among U.S. regional experts, a set of U.S. policies and assumptions
seems to be emerging as to what policies the United States should pursue in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement with Iran.3

• Thenuclear agreement will offer Iran incentives in the form of graduated sanctions relief for
forgoing its pursuit of capabilities associated with nuclear weapons and for maintaining limits on its
nuclear infrastructure. Any further incentives, as well as all but minimal engagement, need to wait in
order to test Iran’s compliance with the agreement and its behavior elsewhere in the
region. The rationale for this narrow focus lies in the uncertainties as to the Iranian domestic situation and what future Iranian
behavior will be in the region. In this view, a nuclear agreement with Iran will not change the fact that the Iranian regime, especially
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservative establishment, view the United States as the chief source of globa l
“oppression.” President Hassan Rouhani and other pragmatic Iranians may aspire to more normal ties with the United States but the
Islamic Republic remains a revolutionary state guided not only by its interests of regime survival and maintaining territoria l sovereignty,
but also expanding its regional influence.4

• The consequences of potential Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement will be made explicit, including the threat of and clear plan
for a rapid reimposition of sanctions and of a potential military response against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

• U.S. engagement (both diplomatic and military) with its partners in the region will intensify and
include additional military cooperation with Israel and the GCC countries, military
sales, the integration of GCC air and missile defenses, and expanded maritime and air
exercises. U.S. presence in the Gulf will remain robust and retain capabilities for rapid strikes on the
Iranian nuclear infrastructure. These steps will be primarily to respond to concerns of partners over Iran
and provide reassurance, but also to reinforce the threat to Iran as to the
consequences of violating the agreement .5
This emerging U.S. approach is heavily informed by practical limitations. First, there is recognition among U.S. policymakers that things
are very uncertain as to what an agreement will mean for Iranian compliance, its intentions with respect to the nuclear program, and the
relationship of an agreement to its other regional policies. So, any real change in U.S. policies toward Iran, partners, and
military posture, or any opening or relaxation of pressure, needs to wait until Iran demonstrates its
willingness to implement the agreement—and perhaps even until changes occur in Iran’s regional behavior.
Second, U.S. domestic politics will constrain policymakers in the sense that even if decisionmakers see an opportunity for an emerging
détente with Iran, cooperation or normalization of relations with Tehran may not be possible in the current U.S. political cl imate. Third,
the anxieties
of U.S. regional partners reinforce the need for the United States to move
very slowly in any engagement with Iran lest these partners interpret actions as the
United States abandoning their interests . Finally, these policies are consistent with a
view that to influence Iran, one needs to show a willingness to make the costs
outweigh any gains, in terms of its future implementation of the nuclear agreement and regional behavior.6
Withdrawal causes fast and immediate Saudi prolif---presence is the key
determinant of the US security guarantee
Christopher Clary 12, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for International and
Public Affairs at Brown University, PhD, Political Science, MIT, M.A. in National Security
Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to Stop It,” The
American Interest, Volume 7, Number 6, 6/10/12, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2012/06/10/the-pak-saudi-nuke-and-how-to-stop-it/
The debate about military options on Iran has focused on the extent to which Tehran can be deterred, but it’s just as importa nt to
consider the knock-on proliferation consequences of an Iranian bomb. The
path for Saudi nuclearization is
readily apparent and could occur rapidly—within months or years, not decades. Analyses that perceive
Iranian nuclearization as manageable typically discount the possibility of quick Saudi acquisition of
nuclear weapons. In this vein, at least 11 other Middle Eastern states have developed varying levels of interest in nuclear
technology over the past decade or so.37 Few, however, could move as quickly as Saudi Arabia.

Robust U.S. security guarantees

Stopping a proliferation chain reaction need not require preventive military strikes.
to Saudi Arabia might dampen Saudi demand for a nuclear deterrent. But making these
guarantees credible could prove challenging. Extended deterrence is inherently difficult. A state is attempting
to guarantee that it will endanger its most vital interests (risk nuclear attacks on its homeland) in order to protect more p eripheral
interests (prevent conventional or nuclear attacks on a third-party state). In
the Cold War, the United States relied on
overseas basing to demonstrate its commitment . By placing U.S. forces in harm’s way,
it not only increased military options in the region, but also made the U.S. commitment more credible. As
Thomas Schelling famously argued, “What can 7,000 American troops do [in Berlin], or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die.”38 In
the Saudi case, however, the experience of the 1990s and 2000s suggests that a substantial U.S. military presenc e may generate a great
deal of popular resentment and thus prove unsustainable. Indeed, the United States may have more options basing
U.S. troops on the Saudi Arabian periphery. To some extent, it already does in Bahrain (home of
the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet) and Qatar (location of Al Udeid airbase). The United States clearly hopes the newly inaugurated U.S.-GCC
Strategic Cooperation Forum will provide another way to demonstrate “the rock-solid commitment of the United States to the people and
nations of the Gulf.”39

It remains possible that the Obama Administration’s emphasis on ever-stronger economic sanctions, perhaps combined with covert
action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and scientists, might prevent Iranian nuclearization. If it doesn’t, however, then analysts and
policymakers must incorporate the risk of rapid Saudi nuclearization into their calculus regarding Iran. Moreover, given Paki stan’s
intrinsic importance as a large, Muslim, nuclear-armed state, U.S. policymakers should be wary of backing Islamabad into a corner in
which its elites see risky behavior as necessary. As frustrating and provocative as Pakistan is to the United States, isolati ng it could easily
backfire. Moreover, the desirability of curtailing U.S. support for Pakistan is not solely a function of that nation’s support for the U.S.
presence in Afghanistan or counter-terror efforts in Pakistan, but may instead be a function of proliferation fears for the indefinite future.
For that reason, too, the
United States should exercise great caution in substantially reducing its
regional presence, lest it set loose a set of interlocking responses from regional
actors that would be extremely dangerous for all concerned.

Saudi capability is inevitable---motivation is key

Jeffrey Lewis 15, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any
Damn Time It Wants To,” 6/12/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-
saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/
[Table omitted]
 it is deeply misguided to conclude
While I don’t think it is terribly likely that Saudi Arabia will choose to build nuclear weapons, I think

that Saudi Arabia (or pretty much any state) cannot do so. Simply put, Zakaria is wrong — and it’s not all that hard to demonstrate why.¶ Zakaria
isn’t explicit about what he believes to be the technical requirements for building a nuclear weapon, but he clearly thinks it is hard. Which was probably true in 1945 when the United

the technologies associated with producing

States demonstrated two different routes to atomic weapons. Since then, however,

plutonium and highly enriched uranium have been developed, put to civilian use,
and spread around the globe. The fact that most states don’t build nuclear weapons
has a lot more to do with restraint than not being able to figure it out .¶ Zakaria’s argument that Saudi
Arabia can’t build nuclear weapons is pretty shallow and relies largely on two assertions: a flip comment about Saudi Arabia lacking even a domestic automotive industry, and a
superficially data-driven claim about Saudi Arabia’s “abysmal” math and science ranking.¶ First, automobile production is a terrible indicator of whether a state can build a nuclear
weapon. The technologies are really not at all similar — or at least they don’t have to be. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all succeeded in building nuclear weapons despite not having
much of an auto industry at home. And the Soviets were really good at building nuclear weapons, even though their cars famously sucked. ¶ And, anyway, Saudi Arabia is investing in a

Saudi Arabia
domestic auto industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is hoping the Meeya will be on the market by 2017. So, there’s that.¶ More importantly,

is investing in a civil nuclear industry. “Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program?” Zakaria wonders. Oh,
I don’t know, how about the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy? Somehow Zakaria never mentions that Saudi Arabia is building a

dedicated city for training nuclear scientists. I can’t predict whether this investment will pay off, but then again neither can Zakaria
— if he even knows it exists. ¶ Zakaria is also skeptical because, he writes, Saudi Arabia “ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and science education, according to the World Economic
Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita GDP, fares far better at 44.” ¶ Abysmally low for a rich country? Perhaps.
But for a nuclear weapons state? Not nearly. Let’s do what he should have done and make a little table using his own data. Here is a list of selected countries — in bold if they currently

Saudi Arabia
possess nuclear weapons — by “Quality of Math and Science Education.” (Again, this is his data. Don’t blame me!)¶ Using Zakaria’s own measure,

would hardly be the least nerdy country to acquire a nuclear weapon. Now, obviously I’d prefer to have
historical data. But I strongly suspect that China’s and India’s rankings weren’t nearly so high in 1964 and 1974 when

they conducted their first nuclear tests. The point is this: You don’t need to be a rich country, or have a great
education system, to build a bomb.¶ This should be no surprise. Did I mention that we just celebrated the 70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, Trinity?
Seventy years. What other 70-year-old technology do we believe remains impossible for non-European countries to acquire, even after several have done so? You know what else was
invented in the 1940s? Microwave ovens, solid-body electric guitars, and the Slinky.¶ I don’t mean “acquire” in terms of buying a nuclear weapon off the shelf — I agree with Zakaria
that is a nutty idea. And I don’t mean purchasing a turn-key infrastructure to produce plutonium, as Syria did from North Korea, or highly enriched uranium as Libya did from

The fancy machine tools, materials, and components that

Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan. No, I mean building a bomb from scratch.

were good enough to build the nuclear weapons of the 1970s are widely available now.
My favorite example is that one of the machine tools linked to the A.Q. Khan network was a used Denn machine tool. If you go to the Denn website, they tell you what their machine
tools can be used for: everything from armaments to kitchenware. And, be still Fareed Zakaria’s fluttering heart, auto parts. (Flow forming machines make sweet rims.) Talk about dual
use!¶ The United States was deeply skeptical that Pakistan could build centrifuges in the 1970s because of the country’s limited industrial base. What U.S. analysts didn’t grasp was
that Pakistan’s industrial base — and that of every other proliferator — was the entire world. There is no reason to think this problem went away with A.Q. Khan. Take a spin around

a proliferator doesn’t have to try to acquire the

Alibaba, the big Chinese online B2B procurement site sometime.¶ Moreover,

most modern centrifuges. When U.N. inspectors were stumbling across the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s, they made a
surprising discovery: Calutrons. These were an obsolete uranium enrichment technology (electromagnetic isotope separation) from the 1940s that fell out of favor after World War II.

we’re lucky that

Inefficient, sure, but good enough to make the highly enriched uranium for the Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.¶ Frankly,

nuclear weapons have not spread as quickly as the technology to make them . Some of the
success in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is down to sanctions, export controls, and the occasional air strike. Most of the success, however, goes to the regime that discourages
states that could build nuclear weapons from doing so in the first place. ¶ If you ask a policy wonk whether the nonproliferation regime has been successful or not, the chances are
better than even that you’ll hear about President John F. Kennedy’s famous warning that “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world
in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” (It’s kind of a standard talking point we all learn early on.)¶ That didn’t happen — and credit usually goes to the 1970
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To see why, look at the countries that were in Kennedy’s list of 15, 20, or 25 nuclear-armed states. Kennedy’s estimate came from a 1963
briefing paper provided by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that is now declassified. Here is McNamara’s chart: ¶ Look at those names. They aren’t rogue states, but rather a list
of the world’s relatively industrialized countries, along with a few developing regional powers like China and the UAR (The United Arab Republic was a brief political union of Egypt
and Syria). The working assumption behind Kennedy’s estimate was that any state that could build nuclear weapons probably would. That’s because, before the NPT, nuclear weapons
were seen by many people as just another weapon, part of any modern military’s future arsenal. In fact, virtually all the non-Warsaw Pact countries on this list seriously considered a
nuclear weapons program. Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland all had active nuclear weapons programs.¶ The NPT helped changed that. (In the case of Australia, Jim Walsh has
written a particularly compelling account of the role played by the NPT in constraining Canberra’s nuclear aspirations.) Treaties are absolutely necessary. It is simply not possible to
sustain a nearly universal regime through technology denial and military action. The regime depends on the vast majority of states choosing compliance, allowing the international
community to focus its enforcement efforts on a small number of hard cases like North Korea and Iran.¶ ¶ The nonproliferation regime can only function with the support of those

The Saudis are clearly alarmed by the

states that can build nuclear weapons, but choose not to — states like Saudi Arabia.

possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While I suspect that a lot of the talk about acquiring nuclear weapons is intended to make the
United States focus on Saudi security concerns, it doesn’t help to dismiss Riyadh’s anxieties by mocking their educational system and ability to go nuclear.¶ Rather, we need to focus on

That means closer consultations on regional defense issues, expanded

making sure the nonproliferation regime works for Saudi Arabia and other states.

security arrangements, and crucially an attempt to head off an Iranian bomb with a negotiated settlement. Fareed Zakaria may well win his bet that the
Saudis will not have a bomb in 10 years, but it’s not because they can’t have one. If he wins — and I hope he does
— it’s because the United States and other powers have successfully addressed Iran’s nuclear
program and the regional security issues that would push Riyadh toward a bomb. And
who knows, maybe in 10 years we’ll all be driving Meeyas.

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war---it’s fast and destabilizing

Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi
Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia
have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed
Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim
world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which
could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist
that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan.
During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the
region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to
sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or secur ity
guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the
infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves
within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is
currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a
second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might
accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.

Alternatively, Pakistan
might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and
deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the
United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear
weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim
forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan,
for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth
against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being
how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with
its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition
influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of
India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by
whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other
nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their
ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that
acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather
than violates, the NPT.
 2
The United States should:
 Significantly increase its military coordination with the Arab States
of the Persian Gulf and military presence in the Arab States of the
Persian Gulf, including synchronized deployments, pooled base
access, and training and joint exercises
 Propose multilateral policy coordination between the United
States, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and the Islamic Republic
of Iran, including against the Islamic State
 Propose the creation of a new multilateral regional security forum
including the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the Islamic
Republic of Iran
The counterplan intervenes in the security dilemma and integrates Iran
into the regional security order---removes the need for withdrawal
Frederic Wehrey 10/14, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Imagining a New Security Order in the Persian Gulf,” 10/14/15,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/14/imagining-new-security-order-in-persian-
gulf/ij3p
At the heart of the current dilemma is a clash of visions between the two sides of the Gulf littoral:
Iran seeks the departure of U.S. forces so it can exert what it regards as its rightful authority over the region
(which it believes is self-evident in the area’s geographic name). Meanwhile, the Gulf Arab states desire a
continued American presence to balance what they see as Iran’s historical ambition of hegemony.¶ A new
window of opportunity may be opening to resolve this dilemma. The nuclear agreement
between Iran and the P5+1—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany—raises the
possibility, albeit a distant one, of creating a new security order in the Gulf, one that could
improve relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab states and help reduce the American military commitment. This has been
accompanied by the concurrent rise of a more militarily capable bloc of Gulf Arab states who—while still falling short of real self-
sufficiency and, in the case of Yemen, using their capability irresponsibly—could presage a new era of confidence among these
historically jittery kingdoms.¶ Opponents and supporters of the Iranian nuclear agreement have offered a dichotomy between a strategy
of rolling
back Iran or integrating the country into the global order. But this is not a
binary choice. The nuclear agreement will empower Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, which executes Iran’s regional policies. But it could also create greater space for increased
bilateral engagement between the United States and Iran. The United States should, therefore, try to
foster Iranian integration in regional structures to encourage more responsible Iranian
behavior while imposing costs if Tehran continues to make mischief in a way that threatens
core U.S. interests.¶ Managing this balance between reconciling with and constraining Iran will be a difficult diplomatic and political
challenge. One immediate test for the strategy will be whether the United States and its Gulf Arab partners can agree to crea te a more
inclusive forum for multilateral discussion of Gulf security issues as a first step toward eventually building a rules-based security
architecture for the region.¶ This idea is not without precedent . In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, regional security
organizations have emerged with the goals of lowering tensions, resolving disputes, managing crises, and preventing conflicts. Yet, the
record of these organizations has been inconsistent. ¶ In the Middle East, the failure has been especially stark. The League of Arab States,
encompassing countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, is bereft of real conflict prevention capability.¶ In
the Persian
Gulf, the region’s only multilateral security forum—the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—suffers from a number of shortcomings. First,
as currently configured, the GCC is little more than a de facto collective defense alliance
directed against Iran. It excludes Iran, Iraq, and outside powers with a strong stake in the security of the region, such as
China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Second, the GCC provides no multilateral
venue for crisis management, conflict resolution, or implementation of measures to
strengthen stability. In addition, it does not offer a mechanism for countries in the Gulf to candidly discuss threats and
security needs.2 This is particularly problematic because GCC countries face multiple, cross-border challenges that require greater
multinational cooperation.¶ Opening
a new multilateral framework to Iran could be one
additional tool in a broader U.S. strategy of incentives and pressures to help influence
Iranian behavior. But the immediate benefits of this opening should not be overstated. The modest gains afforded Iran by this
structure would not outweigh the deeply entrenched drivers of Tehran’s policies. Iran’s dangerous meddling in the region appears to be
driven by a mix of ideological fervor, strategic deterrence, domestic factionalism, and a deeply held belief among senior lead ers that the
Islamic Republic is and should remain the region’s indispensable nation. That said, low-level
dialogue between the
Gulf states and Iran could be an important first step in reducing tension and
influencing Iran’s outlook. Further, this new multilateral forum could expand to a more
regularized dialogue on Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.¶ Thus, a new regional security forum
should be an integral element of the United States’ long-term vision of a rules-based and
more stable and predictable security order in the Gulf. Without such an order, the United States
will likely remain stuck in the role of the region’s fire brigade, forced to take greater
ownership of problems that countries in the region must solve for themselves , often with
the United States in a supporting role. The aftermath of the nuclear agreement with Iran, which
imposes the dual requirements of containing and engaging the country, provides both an
opportune time and context to construct these arrangements. Embedding the United States in a more robust
regional security institution will also allay the fears of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states that it is withdrawing from the region.
 3
The United States federal government should increase its military
presence, including joint exercises and training, in the Arab States of the
Persian Gulf.
The President of the United States should publicly articulate a threat of
military force against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the event of Iranian
violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Iran will cheat on the deal---only a credible threat of force backed up by
robust presence stops prolif---the plan makes the threat of force
impossible which causes nuclear war
Michael Mandelbaum 15, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb:
The Case for Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/how-prevent-iranian-bomb
The American political conflict will come to a head in September, when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval o f the
accord—although the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it passes and has enough support among Democrats to
uphold the veto and perhaps even to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place. Still, however the domestic polit ics play out,
both the deal’s supporters and its critics agree that the U nited States should prevent Iran
from getting a bomb. This raises the question of how to do so—whether without the deal,
after the deal expires, or if the Iranians decide to cheat. Stopping Iranian nuclear
proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to update and adapt its Cold
War policy of deterrence, making Tehran understand clearly in advance that the United States is determined to prevent, by
force if necessary, Iranian nuclearization. ¶ A CREDIBLE THREAT¶ The English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan
that “covenants, without the sword, are but words.” Any agreement requires a
mechanism for enforcing it, and the Iranian agreement does include such a mechanism: in theory, if Iran
violates the agreement’s terms, the economic sanctions that the accord removes will “snap back” into
place. By itself, however, this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating. The procedures
for reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable; even if imposed, the renewed sanctions
would not cancel contracts already signed; and even as the sanctions have been in place, Iran’s progress toward
a bomb has continued. To keep nuclear weapons out of Tehran’s hands will thus require something
stronger—namely, a credible threat by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using
force to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. ¶ The term for an effort to prevent something by threatening
forceful punishment in response is “ deterrence.” It is hardly a novel policy for Washington : deterring a
Soviet attack on the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War. Deterring Iran’s acqui sition of
nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some similarities to that earlier task, but one difference is obvious: Cold War deterrence
deterrence
was aimed at preventing the use of the adversary’s arsenal, including nuclear weapons, while in the case of Iran,
would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those weapons. With the arguable exception of
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States has not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear, including the Soviet Union, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Does the Iranian case differ from
previous ones in ways that justify threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club? ¶ It does. An Iranian bomb would be more
dangerous, and stopping it is more feasible. The Soviet Union and China were continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear
threshold before the U.S. military had the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with minimal
collateral damage. Israel and India, like the United Kingdom and France before them, were friendly democracies whose possession of
nuclear armaments did not threaten American interests. Pakistan is occasionally friendly, is a putative democracy, and crosse d the
nuclear threshold in direct response to India’s having done so. The United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal,
but the greatest danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval, it could fall into the hands of religious extremists—
precisely the kind of people who control Iran now.¶ North Korea presents the closest parallel. In the early 1990s, the Clinton
administration was ready to go to war to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, before signing an agreement that the
administration said would guarantee that the communist regime would dismantle its nuclear program. North Korea continued its nuclear
efforts, however, and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of George W. Bush. Since then, N orth Korea
has continued to work on miniaturizing its bombs and improving its missiles, presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to threaten
attacks on North America. It is worth noting that in 2006, two experienced national security officials wrote in The Washingto n Post that if
Pyongyang were ever to achieve such a capability, Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it. One of the authors was
William Perry, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration; the other was Ashton Carter, who holds that position
today.¶ Bad as the North Korean bomb is, an Iranian one would be even worse. For in the
case of North Korea, a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it
acquired nuclear weapons, with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953. For this reason, in the
years since Pyongyang got the bomb, its neighbors have not felt an urgent need to
acquire nuclear armaments of their own—something that would be likely in the case of Iranian proliferation. ¶
Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States a nd the
Soviet Union. A
Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states, all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals, would be dangerously unstable. In a crisis, each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors. Accordingly, the chances of a nuclear war in
the region would skyrocket. Such a war would likely kill millions of people and could deal a devastating blow to the
global economy by interrupting the flow of crucial supplies of oil from the region. ¶ But if an Iranian bomb would be even worse than a
North Korean bomb, preventing its emergence would be easier. A U.S. military strike against North Korea would probably trigge r a
devastating war on the Korean Peninsula, one in which the South would suffer greatly. (South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is located within
reach of North Korean artillery.) This is one of the reasons the South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike , and the
United States has felt compelled, so far, to honor South Korea’s wishes. In the Middle East, by contrast, the
countries that
would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a U.S. counterproliferation
strike—Saudi Arabia and Israel, in particular—have made it clear that, although they are hardly eager for war with Iran, they
would not stand in the way of such a strike .¶ A LIMITED AIM¶ Deterring Iran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is justified,
feasible, and indeed crucial to protect vital U.S. interests. To be effective, a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with the Iranian regime knowing just what acts
will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will follow through
on its threats.¶ During the Cold War, the United States was successful in deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in
preventing a broader range of communist initiatives. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower administration announced a policy o f massive
retaliation designed to deter communist provocations, including costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea, by promising an
overpowering response. But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective, and a decade later, the United States found itself
embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam.¶ In the case of Iran, the
aim of deterrence would be specific and
limited: preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. O ne is
the likelihood of Iranian “salami tactics”—small violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic Republic closer to a bomb
without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting
such violations. The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on Western Europe, but Iran
is all too
likely to try to develop the technology needed for nuclear weapons clandestinely (the
United States believes it has an extensive history of doing so), and the loopholes in the
agreement’s inspection provisions suggest that keeping track of all of Iran’s bomb-related
activities will be difficult.¶ As for credibility—that is, persuading the target that force really will be used in the
event of a violation—this posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War. It was certainly
credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on North America, but the United States also sought to de ter an attack
on allies thousands of miles away, even though in that case, retaliation would have risked provoking a Soviet strike on the American
homeland. Even some American allies, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, expressed skepticism that the United States would go
to war to defend Europe. The American government therefore went to considerable lengths to
ensure that North America and Western Europe were “coupled” in both Soviet and Western European eyes,
repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and stationing both troops and nuclear
weapons there to trigger U.S. involvement in any European conflict.¶ In some ways, credibly
threatening to carry out a strike against Iran now would be easier. Iran may have duplicated,
dispersed, and hidden the various parts of its nuclear program, and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems, but the
U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause enough
damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years, even without the use
of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy,
Hezbollah), or attack American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism. But such responses could do only limited
damage and would risk further punishment. ¶ The problems with deterring Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons are not practical but rather political and psychological. Having watched
American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an Iranian bomb over the years, and then observed the Obama
administration’s avid pursuit of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program, Iran’s ruling clerics may well
doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian
cheating. U.S. President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position that Iran should not be permitted to
have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale, then abandoned it. He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He made it the core argument in favor of the JCPOA that the alternat ive to it is
war, implying that American military action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover, neither he nor
his predecessor responded to Iran’s meddling in Iraq over the past decade, even though Tehran’s support for Shiite militias t here helped
kill hundreds of U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States, particularly during this presidency, to be a serial
bluffer.¶ DOUBT NOT¶ All of this suggests that in order to keep Iran from going nuclear, the
JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an explicit, credible threat of military action. To be
credible, such a threat must be publicly articulated and resolutely communicated. The
Obama administration should declare such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should
enshrine such a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration should
reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval
and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency of military
exercises there in conjunction with its allies. As in Europe during the Cold War, the goal of U.S. policy
should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that the United States will uphold its
commitments.¶ The debate about the Iran nuclear deal has become politically polarized, but a policy of deterrence should not be
controversial, since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian bomb. In addition, a robust policy
of deterrence would help address some of the shortcomings of the JCPOA without
sacrificing or undermining its useful elements . And since the deterrence policy could and
should be open ended, it would help ease worries about the provisions of the accord that
expire after ten or 15 years. As during the Cold War, the policy should end only when it becomes obsolete—that is, when
Iran no longer poses a threat to the international community. Should the Islamic Republic evolve or fall, eliminating the nee d for vigilant
concern about its capabilities and intentions, the United States could revisit the policy. Until then, deterrence is the policy
to adopt.
Free Riding
 Reform Link Turn
The plan is worse for free-riding---forces us to support dictatorships
which link turns the whole advantage
Colin H. Kahl 13, Associate Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at
Georgetown and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, with Marc
Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science at George Washington University, Non-
Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “U.S. Strategy after the
Arab Uprisings: Toward Progressive Engagement,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 36,
Issue 2, 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Spring_Kahl-Lynch.pdf
This critique is the starting point for an alternative realpolitik approach: ‘‘offshore balancing.’’ Offshore balancers have a narrower definition of U.S. interests
and favor retrenchment to address the military and economic causes of American decline. Instead of maintaining a robust
military presence in the region, this approach would reduce U.S. strategic
commitments and conserve resources for the rare instances when vital national interests were at stake (like the threatening of regional oil
supplies). The United States would not seek to dominate the region, but rather work

indirectly by, with, and through U.S. allies and partners to maintain a balance of
power favorable to American interests. Moreover, by pulling back, offshore balancing would aim to prevent regional states from free-riding on the
United States, forcing them to take on more of the regional security burden.29 ¶ Needless to say, this strategy would avoid

ambitious efforts to transform the nature of regimes in the region or an active role in new military
interventions in places such as Syria. Because this approach requires working through partner states

to advance hard U.S. security interests in the region, it would also by necessity take a much lighter touch in

pushing controversial reforms which could alienate partners and complicate

security cooperation. As such, even if political reform was a priority, Washington would
have difficulty promoting it. Moreover, while some advocates of offshore balancing are highly critical of America’s special
relationship with Israel,30 it is worth noting that, in practice, the approach would have to rely on and work indirectly through allies such as Israel to help
uphold a regional balance of power favorable to U.S. interests. This would make it more difficult for Washington to press Israel to accommodate Palestinian
concerns.
 Offense---1NC
The Middle East won’t just magically stabilize itself---the aff makes every
metric of regional stability and cooperation worse---causes nuclear war
George P. Schultz 15, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover
Institution, former secretary of state, with Henry Kissinger, “No Sign of Restraint,” Hoover
Digest, 2015, No. 3, Summer, http://www.hoover.org/research/no-sign-restraint
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of
Iran’s three and a half decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an
opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East . Having both served in
government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle
East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce nation al identity, and
a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.

But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposescongruent
definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the United States
are remotely near such an under-standing. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has
declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its supreme leader) continue to
profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some
senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means .
The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and
entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in
multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlef ield, Tehran
occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless
political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemoni c efforts.

Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic
transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than
Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s, or Libya’s?

Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies
will conclude that the United States has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence
to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if
necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends
toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse, and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an
irremediable aspect of the regional balance?

Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from
Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current
administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East
will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of
Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance-of-power theory suggests the need to bolster
the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic con-sequences. Nuclear arms must
not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel
deepening American involvement.
If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the United States must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability
requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international
community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the
Middle East and challenge the broader international order.
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the pro- jected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the
world’s challenges in the region. Rather
than enabling US disengagement from the Middle East, the
nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on
complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.
 1NC Domestic Motives Alt Cause/Turn
Try or die for deterrence---Khamenei has inevitable domestic
motivations for sponsoring proxy wars, it’s only a question of whether
credible American power can deter escalation
Kenneth M. Pollack 14, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Ray
Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, “Near
Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-
north-africa/near-eastern-promises/p32891
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also worries about the potential effects of a nuclear deal,
although for different reasons. He has long agonized over the seductive influence of American
culture and fears that a constructive relationship between the United States and Iran
would subvert the theocratic state and taint Iran's revolutionary image in the
Muslim world. He has found more value in leading the rejectionist pack than in joining the global
order. Even if a nuclear deal emerged that interested him, he might feel that the only way to placate the hard-

liners he relies on would be to assure them that the agreement would not otherwise moderate Iranian foreign policy. He might even
try to secure their grudging acceptance of such a deal by promising them a freer hand to make mischief

abroad.¶ Consequently, it seems premature to assume that a nuclear accord with Iran will mean the end of Iranian regional aggression . But the
history of the region strongly suggests that the United States is the state best able to limit
Iran's aggressive efforts to overturn the regional status quo. Claims of Iranian
irrationality notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has always demonstrated an
unmistakable respect for American power. The Iranians are generally careful not to
cross explicit American redlines. They sometimes challenge and probe U.S. prohibitions, but when they meet
resistance, they usually step back, fearful of how Washington might react. Iran, for
example, has never kicked out the UN inspectors who monitor its nuclear program, and it

has never shipped its most lethal weapons to Iraqi Shiite militias or Hezbollah. There are a
small number of exceptions to this pattern, but they have typically proved the rule: the Iranians have crossed

American redlines only when they have misjudged their exact position or perceived
correctly that they were not truly red.¶ Tehran has no such respect for its regional
adversaries, whom the Iranians regard with contempt. The feelings are mutual, and thus without the United States there to
deter Iran and intercede on behalf of U.S. allies, there is a high probability of regional
crises that could escalate in unpredictable ways and threaten American interests, especially the price of oil.
 No Iran War
No chance of Iran war---deterrence stops aggression and escalation
Kenneth M. Pollack 15, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings Institution, “U.S. policy toward the Middle East after the Iranian nuclear
agreement,” 8/5/15, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/08/05-us-
policy-iran-nuclear-deal-pollack
while Iranian
Two points stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that
strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive, and expansionist, Iran is not
reckless and is typically quite wary of American power. When the United States exerts
itself, the Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the
Iranians did not back down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those
militias crushed and driven from Iraq during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American
campaigns along the lower Tigris. As we see in Iraq today, the Iranians apparently recognize that
they misjudged both America’s will and its capacity to act then, and are once again
content to battle Washington for political influence in Baghdad but unwilling to challenge
U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.
 SQ S and Turn
Retaking Ramadi turns the tide against ISIS---the U.S. and Iraq are
winning now but continued engagement’s key
Zalmay Khalilzad 1-1, former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense,
was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 1/1/16, “The War
Against ISIS After Ramadi,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-ramadi-iraqs-war-
against-isis-14774
These caveats aside, the recent success in Ramadi is significant, and may mark a turning point
in the war against ISIS. After the Iraqi army’s collapse in Mosul, Iraqi security forces—especially its special
forces—have largely recovered in terms of their reorganization, professionalism and willingness
to fight. Although the operation took a long time, Iraqi Special Forces backed by the regular army, U.S.
airpower and newly trained Sunni tribal forces performed well against a talented enemy in a
difficult urban environment. Whereas previous successes against ISIS, such as in the Sunni Arab city of Tikrit, were
spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shiite militias, it was the Iraqi security forces that took the lead in pushing
ISIS out of the heart of Ramadi. By all account, the Shiite militias played a minimal role.
Encouraging, too, was the role that recently trained Sunni Arab fighters played in the
liberation of Ramadi. The Sunni Arab role in the fight against ISIS is vital. ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in
Iraq, had largely been defeated in 2006 and 2007. The growing sectarianism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, however, radicalized
sizable elements of the Sunni Arab community. ISIS emerged in Syrian sanctuaries, expanded into the Sunni parts of Iraq and e ventually
became a voice for Sunni Arab disenchantment. More recently in Tikrit, where Shiite militias took over Sunni cities , the short-term
success against ISIS led to a wave of sectarian abuses against the local population. The resulting Sunni Arab alienation gave ISIS a
strategic victory amid the tactical defeat.

The liberation
of Ramadi provides the Iraqi government with another opportunity to
win over disenchanted Sunni Arabs and defeat ISIS. Three steps are now necessary:
First, remaining ISIS pockets in Ramadi must be defeated and the city and its suburbs must be cleared. The army and local Sun ni forces
should carry out this mission with coalition air and intelligence support. Avoiding collateral damage and abuses of the civilian population
to the absolute extent possible will help ensure that Sunni Arabs rally against ISIS.

Second, the Baghdad government and anti-ISIS Sunnis should move quickly to address the needs of the local population in terms of
security, good governance and services. A sizable reconstruction effort is needed to gain the confidence of the local population. Recent
surveys suggest that severe dissatisfaction with both Iraq’s central government and local politicians among Iraqi Sunnis played a central
role in the rise of ISIS.

Third, Iraqi leaders must expedite negotiations on the issue of Sunni self-rule in Anbar and other Sunni areas. Many Sunnis who opposed
the federalization of Iraq when the national constitution was ratified in 2005 now favor the type of autonomy that the Kurds enjoy. The
Iraqi constitution guarantees to provinces the right to pursue self-rule on local issues. Maliki’s decision to violate the constitution and
move against Sunni provinces pursuing the federal option was a major grievance in the Sunni Arab community.

Equally important, the Iraqi government will need to reach agreement on a scheme for power and resource sharing between the central
and local governments. Provincial guard forces should be given responsibility for maintaining local security to the maximum extent
possible.

Achieving these objectives will not be easy especially in the current circumstances when oil prices are low and the government faces
serious financial problems. On
the positive side, though, Prime Minister Abadi appears more willing than
his predecessor to address legitimate Sunni grievances. Opposition from Shiite hardliners will remain a
factor; Abadi’s recent decision to refuse the U.S. offer to deploy American attack helicopters, for example, was driven in large part by t he
resistance of Iran-backed militias. Growing
cross-sectarian confidence in the Iraqi government
will give Abadi the political capital to resist hardline Shiite pressure.
Ramadi is an important test case, particularly because of the coming battles for Fallujah
and for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. If the coalition and Iraqi government can develop a
coordinated strategy to consolidate victory and make visible progress on political
and economic reconstruction, the playbook in Ramadi could serve as a model for how to
move against ISIS in Mosul and in Syria. In fact, Ramadi could very well become a
turning point if progress in the city catalyzes a shift in the Sunni Arab community
away from ISIS and toward the Iraqi government.
The United States has limited influence, but active engagement by Washington could tip
the scales, transforming a temporary tactical advance in Ramadi into an enduring
strategic victory against the forces of instability and terror in Iraq.
 Impact D
ISIS can’t get WMDs
Matthew Cottee 14, research analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; and Dina Esfandiary,
research associate with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/15/14, “The very small Islamic State WMD
threat,” http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-threat7729
In short,ISIS does seem interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons,
butambitions do not necessarily equate with reality. The complexities of such
weapons, combined with the difficulties involved in obtaining and handling the necessary
material, make the likelihood of its use remote. Let’s not exaggerate the threat.

Doesn’t cause great power war

Joel B. Pollak 14, Senior Editor-at-Large and in-house counsel at Breitbart News, J.D.,
Harvard Law, 9/5/14, “ISIS LAUNCHES WORLD WAR THAT COULD UNITE RIVAL
POWERS,” http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/09/05/ISIS-Launches-World-War-
That-Could-Unite-Rival-Powers
ISIS, or ISIL) have taken their fight beyond their initial enemies--the U.S. and their Arab/Muslim rivals--and have
The terrorists of the Islamic State (

declared their intent to challenge powers far beyond, including Russia . The notion of
a global conflict might satisfy the Islamic State's ideological vision of a Muslim caliphate, but it
may also unite the fractured Great Powers to crush ISIS in a war that could spread across several continents.
ISIS issued a threat to Russian president Vladimir Putin earlier this week, after the group seized control of a Syrian airfield with
Russian jets and equipment supplied to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The message from ISIS included a warning that the aircraft would be used against
Russia, and a call for Chechnya to be "liberated" from Russia--a long-standing wish of Islamists in the region, well before ISIS began fighting in Syria and Iraq.
In addition, ISIS has turned up in Israel, holding a rally earlier this week on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem's Muslim Quarter. While just a few months ago
ISIS is reported to
ISIS downplayed its ambitions towards Israel, its military success has emboldened Islamists throughout the Middle East.

be recruiting more supporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan , as Al Qaeda scrambles to compete with its new
rival on the subcontinent. Some analysts, notably Charles Krauthammer, believe that ISIS is more dangerous than Al Qaeda because it is more focused on
state-building than on expanding its global presence. Yet there is no reason ISIS cannot do both--or take over Al Qaeda operations, much like a corporate
merger. The black flag ISIS has adopted has already featured at anti-U.S. demonstrations elsewhere for years, including at the Cairo embassy in 2012. Indeed,
ISIS may hope to take its fight to the borders of Islamic influence--and beyond. In addition
to recruiting fighters from Europe and North America--and possibly sending them back to carry out attacks--ISIS has also reportedly begun drawing
volunteers from China. Two months ago, the Islamic State released a map outlining its global ambitions--and the group apparently plans to expand the

Islamic empire beyond its historic reach.The result is that ISIS may prod the world's leading nations --at
odds for over fifteen years over Kosovo, Iraq, and Ukraine, among other issues-- to cooperate
against a common threat . The five veto-wielding nations of the UN Security Council,
representing the allies of World War II, may once again revive that alliance, setting aside other

grievances. It may be a unique opportunity for the world to wrest some order from
the ongoing chaos .
Pivot
 Turn
Reduced presence means Gulf states switch allegiances to China---
crushes U.S. leverage vs China---base access and the political relations
sustained by a large presence are vital
Eduardo A. Abisellan 12, the U.S. Marine Corps Federal Executive Fellow in the Brookings
21st Century Defense Initiative, 6/28/12, “CENTCOM’s China Challenge: Anti-Access and
Area Denial in the Middle East,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/28%20centcom%20
china%20abisellan/28%20centcom%20china%20abisellan
First, it is important to establish just how critical the Middle East is to China . The significance of
the Middle East in fueling the global economy cannot be overstated: five of the top ten countries with proven oil reserves are in the
Persian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia alone possesses one fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves. Iran has 137 billion barrels (bbls); Iraq, 115
bbls; Kuwait, 104 bbls; and the United Arab Emirates possesses 98 bbls of proven oil reserves.1

China, out of sheer economic necessity, has developed closer ties with these Persian Gulf
States in order to satisfy its voracious energy appetite. The World Energy Outlook 2011 report predicts that
the Chinese economy, notwithstanding a global economic downturn, will continue to grow at a rate of 8.1 percent per year through
2020.2 Therefore, China’s quest for energy is a critical factor in sustaining its impressive economic growth.

In 2010, China imported nearly 4.8 million barrels of crude oil per day (bbl/d), of which over 2.2 million (47 percent), came from the
Middle East. By comparison, 1.5 million bbl/d (30 percent) came from Africa, 176,000 bbl/d (4 percent) from the AsiaPacific region, and
938,000 bbl/d (20 percent) came from other countries.”3 By 2020, China is anticipated to overtake the United States in terms of oil
imports, and by 2030 it will become the largest oil consumer in the world, consuming 15 million bbl/d- nearly double 2009 levels.4

China purchases oil from all parties regardless of their domestic political system; its primary concern has been and remains to fuel its
growing economy and ensure sufficient markets are available to sustain future energy demands and economic growth. A secondary effect
of increased Chinese dependency on Middle Eastern oil has been the significant rise in the amount of trade between China and the Middle
East. According to a recent article by James Chen, “The Emergence of China in the Middle East,” “from 2005 to 2009, the total trade
volume between China and the Middle East rose 87 percent to $100 billion, and Middle East’s exports to China grew by 25 perce nt. China
is also the top source of the region’s imports, most of them being low-cost household goods.”5

Increased trade and infrastructure investments by Chinese firms in the Middle East and by Middle Eastern firms in China have
significantly brought the Middle East and Far East closer together. The relationships between C hina and the Middle East may have
started as the result of basic supply and demand economics, but just as
China’s energy needs are projected to
grow, so is its relationship with key oil producing states within the Persian Gulf .
Moreover, “Beijing’s calculations regarding a possible war with the United States over Taiwan
increases the importance of having powerful and independent minded oil producing
friends in the Middle East that will be willing to supply oil in a contingency.”6
A more benign conclusion is that the Chinese have thus far remained ambivalent to regional issues. But this ambivalence (or rather strategy of non-intereferenence in domestic
matters) has come with political gains to Chinese compared to the US position with several key regimes. The Chinese do not challenge the local regimes and ruling monarchies on
issues such as democracy or human rights. It is both a friend and ally to competing nations in the region, the Gulf monarchs on one side of the Persian Gulf and Iran on the other. This
relationship has benefited both China and the region. Bilateral trade between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar, “topped $70 billion in 2008; according to some estimates, the Sino-GCC trade volume will reach between $350 and $500 billion by 2020.”7

Opposite the GCC, “China has become Iran’s largest trade partner since the United States began its attempt to negotiate with Iran and sanction simultaneously.”8 China has taken
advantage of the international sanctions against Iran to maximize and diversify its energy security position, “with bilateral exchanges worth $21.2 billion compared to $14.4 billion
three years earlier. Western sanctions have also paved the way for Chinese companies, which last year directly supplied Iran with 13% of its imports ($7.9 billion).”9

Despite the obvious dangers of courting opposing countries, China

provides the next best alternative to the
U.S. in the region. It is an alternative that comes without preexisting conditions for
friendship. The Chinese do not expound governmental or political system reform as conditions for doing business. China leans
towards authoritarian regimes without upsetting the status quo; the U.S. engages nondemocratic regimes with an eye towards reform
and promoting democracy, but this process is of course often messy and rife with tension as the US tries to balance competing demands.
In the end, the Chinese through trade, investment, and nonintrusive policies stand to be looked at as a better friend, ally, and benefactor
than the U.S., at least under the current governmental structures in the region.

The recent popular uprisings (Arab Spring) in North Africa, and the manner in which the U.S. abruptly abandoned a 30-year ally in President Mubarak of Egypt, further complicated
the US position. While the shift was likely on the right side of history, it has no doubt changed the perception of U.S. loyalty to its other regime allies. Gulf monarchs began asking
themselves how the U.S. would react in the event of similar popular uprising within their states. Would the U.S. stand beside them or abandon them? Most interpreted the latter would
be the case.

The U.S. and China walk a fine line between friendship with the established ruling class and the population represented by its authoritarian rulers. The rise of popular democratic
movements may benefit the U.S. more than China, but the true outcome of revolutions will not likely be known for years to come. The challenge for the U.S. will remain its ability to
balance its national interests and democratic ideology with the less intrusive Chinese view of the world. In this regard, the Chinese have a clear advantage: they are not going to upset
the status quo, nor do they come with some of the historical baggage from 50 years of involvement in the region that makes US relations even with dissidents or popular democratic
movements difficult.

Adding to these trends are calls from within the U.S. to wean America from foreign oil dependency. Public statements along these lines further reinforce the perceived need in the Gulf
States to seek new alliances and focus their efforts on where the demand for energy is projected to be the strongest- the Asia-Pacific region. The 2011 World Energy Report predicts
that Asian countries that lie outside the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will have the largest demand for oil, with China and India topping the list,
whereas OECD consumption rates will level off, if not decline.

Moreover, with new shale oil and gas discoveries in the United States and oil sands from Canada, many believe that “the U.S. is at the forefront of the unconventional revolution.”10
According to PFC Energy, a Washington-based consultancy: By 2020, shale sources will make up about a third of total U.S. oil and gas production, by that time the U.S. will be the top
global oil and gas producer, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia… That could have far-reaching ramifications for the politics of oil, potentially shifting power away from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries toward the Western hemisphere. With more crude being produced in North America, there's less likelihood of Middle Eastern politics
causing supply shocks that drive up gasoline prices. Consumers could also benefit from lower electricity prices, as power plants switch from coal to cheap and plentiful natural gas.11

This obviously could be of great benefit to the U.S. However, the shift to actual energy self-reliance is not readily apparent. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
the U.S. currently leads the world in oil consumption and imports about 45 percent of its oil needs. In 2011, the U.S. consumed 18.8 million barrels per day (MMbd) of petroleum
products and imported 11.4 MMbd. 52 percent of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products imports came from the Western Hemisphere (North, South and Central America, and the
Caribbean including U.S. territories). About 22 percent of U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products come from the Persian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The largest sources of crude oil and petroleum products imports came from Canada (29 percent) and Saudi Arabia (14 percent). Other sources of
U.S. Net Crude Oil and Petroleum Products imports are: Nigeria (11 percent); Venezuela (10 percent); and Mexico (8 percent).12

Many will see the potential for increased domestic oil and gas production as a means to wean America off the Middle Eastern (Persian Gulf) oil spigot, retrench, and save costs abroad.
On the surface, the potential for domestic oil production to offset foreign imports alleviates the problem associated with dependency on Middle Eastern oil, such as the fluctuation in
prices due to instability, or in the worst case, the disruption of supplies due to regional conflict. Moreover, due to the fungible nature of oil; the fluctuation in prices due to instability or
conflict has the potential to impact the price of oil worldwide and thus impact global economies directly. Therefore, supplanting oil imports from volatile and/or unstable regions with
domestic production insulates the nation against potential supply disruptions and price hikes.

However, it is strategically shortsighted to believe that weaning the U.S. off Middle Eastern oil supplies will solve America’s national
security issues in this volatile region. The geopolitical and strategic implications of continued U.S.
presence and involvement in the Middle East (Persian Gulf) transcend the basic need for
oil imports from the region. The scope is much broader and inextricably connected to the
larger global economy and the role the U.S. plays in exercising global leadership to
confront emerging threats, deter aggression, and assure allies around the world—many of whom
are heavily reliant on the free trade in energy (and goods) to fuel their economies. If the U.S. is not the guarantor of
the free flow of trade throughout the global commons, who will be?
Yet, a war- and deficit-weary U.S. government and a sluggish domestic economy, when coupled with the
rebalancing of U.S. interests to the Asia-Pacific region, could easily cloud the larger strategic picture. The
strategic issue is not whether the U.S. can or should become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil and less embroiled in the
region, but whether energy self reliance and a rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will cause the U.S. to
scale back its efforts from the Middle East altogether. The latter would be a strategic
mistake.
In short, U.S. willingness to support popular democratic uprisings, the expressed desire to
wean the nation off Middle Eastern oil, and growing oil demand and consumption in the Far
East are all conditions that could significantly influence, if not alter, the geostrategic and
political landscape of the Middle East in the 21st century. This set of circumstances will
reinforce Persian Gulf states’ incentives to distance themselves from the U.S. and to
develop even stronger partnerships with nations such as China.
The impact of this of US needs in a crisis situation in the Asia Pacific may be more
noteworthy than often understood. The disruption of Chinese oil supplies would likely
be a prime U.S. objective during a crisis situation involving a potential dispute with
China over Taiwan, or another contingency scenario. But the aforementioned factors may
be reasons why Gulf States may not support U.S. actions during a crisis between the U.S.
and China: why bite the hand that increasingly feeds you?
However, the U.S. is dependent on regional military bases, such as the U.S. Navy’s Fifth
Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, the U.S. Air Force’s Combined Air Operations Center
in Qatar, and other military capabilities based throughout the Arabian Peninsula, to
exercise its military options. Without the assistance of regional partners or access to
bases from which to operate, military action would be difficult to initiate and sustain.
Constraints placed against the U.S. may range from Persian Gulf states continuing to
supply oil to China despite a conflict with the U.S. Or they could deny the U.S. the
ability to launch military actions against China from their territory, thus making it
more difficult for the U.S. to pursue a comprehensive military campaign to interdict
Chinese oil supplies.
 SQ S
The status quo solves their impact---the level of Chinese provocation is
qualitatively lower than in the past---US presence is the reason
Shaohan Lin 15, MA student in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada,
Graduate Research Assistant at Calian, “After the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Now what?”
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, VOLUME 16, ISSUE 2, 2015,
http://w.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/597/577
Soft military procedures did not prevent China from retaliating in its own ways. When the US navy increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific and took sides in the South China Sea disputes, China responded with a
rapprochement with North Korea. Not only did China abandon all efforts in persuading North Korea to denuclearize, it also improved aid and trade relations with it. 58 China stymied US denuclearization efforts on
another occasion; in 2012, just as the US and other states sanctioned Iran for its illicit nuclear program, China reached an arrangement with Iran to purchase oil.59 Both the North Korea and Iran cases are definite
responses to the pivot as China worked alongside the US before the latter’s increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Syria is yet another additional area of contention where China challenged the US. In spring 2014,
China, along with Russia, vetoed a resolution backed by more than sixty-five countries to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for its numerous instances of human rights violations. This veto was in fact the
fourth time China foiled Western resolutions regarding Syria.60 Admittedly, it is unsure whether these sabotages were done out of spite or quite independently of the US pivot. What these examples of reprisals show is

that China avoids directly compromising the security of the Asia-Pacific. It has not
answered the US military presence by increasing its own military presence, at least
not in a fashion that menaces the US. Granted, China did voice its discontentment
towards American territorial “infringement” in the South China Sea, but contrarily media and some scholarly claims, China has
not escalated tensions because of the pivot; it may have very well done so without
American interference in the region. As claimants challenge a rising China, it should be expected for the latter to make full use of its leverages, especially without
the scrutinizing gaze of the Americans. It is not folly to believe that security conditions would be worse

without displays of US commitment and force that serve as a check to Chinese

aggression. The harassments of Vietnamese and Philippine survey vessels by Chinese
patrol boats in 2011, 2012 and 2014 are often cited as proof of Chinese behaviour
aggravated by US showboating. But in 2005, when US presence in the Asia-Pacific
was minimal, Chinese ships fired at Vietnamese boats, killing nine people.61 Assuming that the US Navy has an
impact on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, then it would be beneficial as cable-cutting and collisions, the

primary mechanisms of violence today, are considerably milder than firing with the
intent to kill. Thus far, the deterrence element of the pivot has succeeded in restraining
real Chinese aggression and has not shifted the status quo in the region.
 Impact D
No Korea war --- neither side will risk it
Steven Denney 15, a doctoral student in the department of political science at the
University of Toronto. He is the managing editor of the research site Sino-NK and holds an
MA in Global Affairs and Policy from Yonsei University, “Relax, the Korean Peninsula Is Not
on the Brink of War”, 8/22/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/relax-the-korean-
peninsula-is-not-on-the-brink-of-war/
For any Koreanists or casual Korea watcher even partially connected to the mediascape, it
is hard (if not impossible) to avoid
getting swept away in the frenzied discourse on North Korea’s “preparation for
military action.” South Korea’s resumption of propaganda audio blasts across the DMZ, a modest response to the maiming of
two ROK soldiers who stepped on a land mine likely planted by the North Koreans, has precipitated the latest round of threats from
Pyongyang (and even some artillery shells).

Contingency and miscalculation are ever-present, but as Roger Cavazos, retired defense analyst for the U.S. Army and current Nautilus
Institute consultant, lays out in a series of tweets (read his tweets for August 21) the
chances are low – very low –
that something devastating, like war, happens. His bottom line: This is an old game, and
we’ve been here before; act like it.
There are some more interesting questions that can be asked regarding the regularity of threat exchanges between North and So uth
Korea. One is: How might brinkmanship and occasional conflagrations change South Korea’s perception of North Korea as a threat? This
is an issue that has been taken up by recent public opinion studies in South Korea, most notably by the Asan Institute for Po licy Studies.

In a February 2015 report entitled “South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification,” Asan finds that, among age cohorts,
“Those in their twenties feel more distant toward North Korea than any other cohort.” Using the same data cited in the report , I co-
authored a piece for CSIS PacNet with then-Asan program officer and polling analyst Karl Friedhoff (now of the Chicago Council) that
those in
explored the identity and attitudes of young South Koreans. We found, with regards to “perceptions of North Korea,” that
their 20s were less likely to see the North as “one of us” and more likely to see it as
an “enemy.”
There is a
The reasons for those are manifold and not all are related to a perception of threat (no one feels close to an “enemy”).
clear and increasingly expanding values and identity gap between North and South
Koreans. Those in the South, especially younger South Koreans, have no memory of a unified Korea, nor do they share a sense of
solidarity with the minjung or student movements of the 1980s and 1990s, which sought to cultivate ethnic (read: national) ties with
fellow Koreans in the North. Younger South Koreans embody a more distinctive South Korean national identity.

This distinct South Korean national identity matters, because those coming of age in a
post-minjung democratic society are going to interpret North Korean bellicosity in a different
way. Rather than cause something like “south-south conflict” (discord within South Korea itself on how to approach the North), as
happened so often in the past, North Korean belligerence is likely to generate either indifference
or frustration today. The latter is somewhat worrisome and might be the sort of sentiment that Park Geun-hye is tapping into
with her “’disproportional response’ theory of deterrence,” the post-Yeonpyong doctrine discussed by Professor John Delury.

Hopefully, South
Korea’s newfound nationalism is, as Joshua Stanton once described it, “sober,
pragmatic, and grouchy.” Grouchy pragmatists don’t support unnecessary wars.
Best data concludes no impact to heg
Benjamin H. Friedman et al 13, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies;
Brendan Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and
Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at
the Cato Institute Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future
of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199
Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a
more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying
reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of

power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There are three reasons to reject this logic : security
competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have
difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the
United States.¶ an increasingly peaceful world. An array of research , some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that
factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security
competition .2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3¶ A major reason for peace is that
conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.4
Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”: its maritime and mountainous
regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5¶ Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past .
Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid
nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the
returns from their forcible opening.7¶ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate
these trends . That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international
system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the
costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression
through socialization.8¶ managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They
worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its
costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-
37).9¶ These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint .

Offensive realist security paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions;
such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to

comfort or deter them .10 Nonsecurity preferences are, by definition, resistant to the
security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are
unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly credible. ¶ The literature that Brooks

et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist and prestige-

oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power . These
studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending
nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power
domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state
the cases where it would be most important to
has only moderately dovish interests.14 ¶ In other words,

restrain U.S. allies are those in which Washington's efforts at restraint would be least
effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the
credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will
be defending secondary interests, which will create domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In
short, if states are insensitive to the factors incentivizing peace, then the U nited States'
ability to manage global security will be doubtful. Third-party security competition
will likely ensue anyway. ¶ costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little
risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity,
safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western
Brooks et al. argue that "China's
Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today. ¶

rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table , at least in the medium to
long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote , even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional

hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional
powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to
quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have
ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast
ambitions.

No Senkaku impact escalates even if skirmishes occur

Paul Dibb 14, emeritus professor of strategic studies @ The Australian National University,
“Why A Major War In Asia Is Unlikely,” March 31, East Asia Forum, Economy Watch,
http://www.economywatch.com/features/why-a-major-war-in-asia-is-unlikely.31-03.html
The rising tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has led some experts
to draw parallels with the Sarajevo incident, which sparked off World War I in Europe. Yet while is a significant risk
that the conflict will result in a military confrontation, an all-out war is unlikely given economic reasons. The Jeremiah
prophets are coming out of the woodwork to predict that there will be an outbreak of war between the major powers in Asia, just like in
Europe 100 years ago. The idea is that a rising China will inevitably go to war with the United States, either directly or th rough conflict
with Japan. Some commentators are even suggesting that the Sarajevo incident that provoked World War I will be replicated between
China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has likene d this
situation to what he calls ‘a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago — a tinderbox on water’. My colleague Hugh White
recently proclaimed that the risk of war between China and Japan is now very real. There
is undoubtedly a significant risk that
China’s increasing aggressiveness in the East China Sea and the South China Sea over its
territorial claims will result in a military confrontation , either by miscalculation or design. But a sunk
warship or military aircraft collision is a long way from all-out war. These sorts of
incidents have occurred in the past and have not escalated — for example, the North Korean
sinking in 2010 of a South Korean warship, and the collision in 2001 by a Chinese fighter
plane with a US reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, however, a military incident between China and Japan
might be more serious.
 Not Zero Sum
Not zero sum with the ASPG
Kurt M. Campbell 14, Chair and CEO of the Asia Group, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should
Focus on Asia,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-04-18/far-eastern-promises
A second critique stems from the argument that it would be unwise or unrealistic to shift Washington’s focus from the Middle East to
Asia given the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, the instability in Egypt and Iraq, and the long-running confrontation between Iran and
According to this view, the
the Western powers. But this criticism relies on a caricature of the rebalancing strategy.
Middle East and South Asia have sapped U.S. power and prestige and the pivot is really an
attempt to cut and run by turning to the more peaceful and profitable shores of the Asia-Pacific. It is certainly true that the
Obama administration has tried to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. But even though resources are finite,
foreign policy is not a zero-sum game, and the criticism that paying more attention to
Asia is somehow an admission of strategic defeat in the Middle East misses a crucial reality :
during the past decade, the very Asian countries to which Washington wants to pay more attention have
quietly built a substantial stake in the furtherance of peace and stability across the Middle
East and South Asia and very much want the United States to preserve its influence in those regions.
Not long ago, most Asian nations were predominantly concerned with developments in their backyards and tended to see problems
elsewhere as someone else’s responsibility. One of the most important successes of President George W. Bush’s Asia policy was to
encourage the region’s rising powers to contribute more in other parts of the world. Partly in response, during the Bush years, for the
first time, many
East Asian governments developed an “out of area” perspective and
engaged more in diplomacy, development, and security in the Middle East and South Asia. Japan has
become a leading supporter of civil society development in Afghanistan , funding schools and
civil service organizations and training Afghans in criminal justice, education, health care, and agriculture. In the wake of the Arab Spring,
South Korea began supporting development across the Middle East . Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand have provided material assistance to training programs for doctors, police officers, and teachers in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
Australia and New Zealand have sent special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has been more active in the behind-the-scenes
diplomacy aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, addressing piracy on the high seas, and shaping Afghanistan’s futur e.

Of course, encouragement from Washington is only one factor behind Asian countries’ growing involvement in the Middle East; another
undeniable element is their increasing thirst for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. Asia consumes some 30 million barrels of oil every day,
more than twice the amount that the EU does. Asian
governments know that a hasty U.S. retreat from
the Middle East would carry with it unacceptable risks to their countries’ energy security and
economic growth. As a result, they have invested substantial political and financial capital in, and in
some cases sent military forces to, the Middle East over the course of more than a decade to supplement,
not supplant, the stabilizing role of the United States. Put simply, Washington’s Asian partners support
the pivot but would hardly cheer the prospect of U.S. disengagement from the Middle East --
and crucially, they do not seem to see any contradiction between these two positions .
 Plan Links
Draw-down in the Middle East decks Asian allied assurance and
deterrence
Seth Cropsey 14, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson Institute, former
Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and Bush administrations, “The
Rebalance to Asia: What Are Its Security Aims and What Is Required of U.S. Policy?” June
2014,
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1411/cropsey_rebala
nce_to_asia_corrected.pdf
But this statement goes far beyond the Asia-Pacific and the fashion in which the administration intends to shift attention toward Asia.
The over $1 trillion cuts to the defense budget that the Obama administration has already planned, accelerated by sequestrati on, will
hollow out the entire U.S. military. If military forces are to be substantially increased in one area,
they must be decreased in another or else placed in hangars, tied up at piers, or idled, thus saving the cost of paying
salaries, conducting training, repairing equipment, and performing needed maintenance. If, for example, the U.S. fleet is recalled
to home waters and significantly cut in other parts of the world in order to increase presence
in Asia, American global reach, influence, and power all wane. Waning power is a
global effect, and a greater presence in Asia will not stem the larger perception of an
America in strategic withdrawal from its post-WWII dominance. This offers Asians who
look to the U.S. for defense against an increasingly aggressive China little assurance that an effective rebalance
would provide them with security.
2NC
Pivot
 China DA---Links
U.S. presence is stable and durable now---switching to an over-the-
horizon strategy is sufficient to cause GCC states to seek security
guarantees from China---triggers global instability
Sarah A. Emerson 14, President of Energy Security Analysis and a Principal at ESAI Energy,
an energy research and forecasting firm; and Andrew C. Winner, Professor of Strategic
Studies and the Chair of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College,
Spring 2014, “The Myth of Petroleum Independence and Foreign Policy Isolation,” The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 21-34
Despite the shifts in oil flows, non-energy interests and the stickiness of
commitments will keep the United States engaged in the region. The United States
remains committed to the safety and security of the Gulf Arab states, and has an even
stronger commitment to the security of Israel. Even if the United States remains fully
engaged in the security of the region, there will be questions about its staying power.
Changes in military technology may exacerbate concerns about U.S. commitment.
Specifically, increased and improved anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities will
likely cause the United States to base and operate differently in the region than it has in the
past, including perhaps deploying forces in over-the-horizon configurations.22 While
logical militarily, states may view such changes in deployment and/or operating
patterns as evidence of decreased commitment.
To counter this perceived drop in U.S. staying power, regional states may accelerate
their own efforts to secure the area. In the case of the Gulf Arab states, they would have
a number of options. One is to increase cooperation with one another, an option that
historically has been pursued only at the margins. Another would be to engage in self-
help strategies, something limited more by small populations than by finances. If regional
states were to include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic
missiles in this self-help rubric, it could be highly destabilizing.23 A last option would
be to seek one or more outside additional security guarantors such as China. If Beijing
were both able and willing to overcome the limitations discussed above, its involvement
would generate instability on a more global scale. Other Asian states dependent on Persian
Gulf flows would likely see a significant Chinese role in the Gulf as adding uncertainty,
rather than diminishing it.

China is willing and able to fill in for the US militarily in the Gulf---the
only question is whether we draw down forces and give them an opening
Yuriko Koike 13, Japan's former defense minister and national security adviser, former
Chairwoman of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party's General Council, “Asia and a Post-
American Middle East,” Mar 18 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-
disengagement-and-the-middle-east-s-future-by-yuriko-koike
But, whatever new terms are struck, the degree of US disengagement from the Middle East will depend on how two key questions are answered. First,
would even a partial withdrawal of military force create a security vacuum that
could be filled by a rival – say, China or Iran? And, second, would any diminution of America’s commitment to the region incite the kind
of instability that breeds failed states and terrorist havens? ¶ President Barack Obama’s current security strategy in Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere
suggests that the US will seek to mitigate the latter risk by continuing its covert interventions – particularly its use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Preventing
rivals from gaining overweening influence in the region, however, will require a very different type of response – one that will require the backing of old
China’s dependence on Middle East energy
allies, such as Japan, and new friends, like India.¶ The reason for this is clear:

imports means that it is almost certain to seek to fill any regional security vacuum.
Indeed, China appears to have long anticipated the coming changes in the region’s security

structure, and already seems prepared to take advantage of them if permitted to do

so. Its “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean – a series of potential naval stations
connecting China to the Middle East and Africa – would support a Chinese blue-water navy
able to patrol the sea-lanes of the Persian Gulf.
 China DA---UQ
China is attempting to expand their relations with the GCC now, but
they’re limited by US security assurances
Lars Erslev Andersen 14, senior researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies, “Oil,
Security, and Politics: Is China Challenging the US in the Persian Gulf?” 2014,
http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/79420/DIIS_Report_29_WEB.pdf
The GCC in particular is a target of China’s charm offensive. China has for some time made
it clear that it considers the GCC, as an organisation, to be one of its top priorities in
diplomacy, in addition to its interest in GCC member states individually. With its keen advocacy of Third World capabilities, it
considers the GCC an effective regional organisation composed of and run by developing nations like
China itself. Former President Hu Jintao twice made that point during his visits to Saudi Arabia, to express his support and interest in the
organisation.43 Apart from the FTA negotiations mentioned earlier, China
and the GCC established a ministerial-
level Strategic Dialogue with the GCC in June 2010. The first meeting not only highlighted growing bilateral
ties, but also produced a statement denouncing Israel’s attack against the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in May 2010 and a call for t he lifting of
Israel’s blockade against Gaza.

a fully-fledged
Partly due to disagreement over Syria and partly because of the transition in the Chinese leadership,
Strategic Dialogue meeting had been postponed for over two years. The new Chinese
government therefore made great efforts to make the third one happen because of the
importance it attaches to its Gulf ties. At their third Strategic Dialogue meeting in January 2014, the two sides
agreed to work towards a Strategic Partnership, the highest label China attaches to its diplomatic relations, as w ell as to rely on
diplomatic means for resolving the Syria conflict, a hot regional issue at the moment.

The question is how close the political and strategic relationship between China and GCC
countries can get, as each of the GCC members is covered by a strategic alliance with the
US. Take, for example, the leader of the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia is rich in oil reserves, it is militarily
weak and needs security guarantees, which can only be provided by the US for the time
being. China lacks the ability to provide such a security guarantee, and is not sure how far its relationship
can go with pro-US Gulf countries.44 A subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise Aluminum Corporation of
China Limited (Chinalco) is interested in developing an aluminum plant in Saudi Arabia. The process of negotiation, however, has not
been completely smooth. Sources from Chinalco said that the reasons for this were domestic opposition based on environmentalism and
resource nationalism, as well as the Saudi monarchy’s preference to provide aluminum to the US.
 SQ S China
China perceives the US commitment to Asia as credible now
Janine Davidson 15, senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations,
and Lauren Dickey, research associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations, “America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: On Track,” Apr 1 2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/americas-rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific-on-course-on-
speed/
Since the United States’ rebalance to Asia was first codified in policy some four years
ago, there has been no shortage of criticism and debate surrounding Washington’s diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives in
the region. American “hawks” claim the administration of President Barack Obama has not matched its verbal

commitments to the region with substantive diplomatic action, trade deals, and – most particularly – defense posture and
investments. “Doves,” meanwhile, fret that the rebalance flexes too much American military might in the region, running the risk of provoking China. Both
arguments are wrong, and their follow-on debates entirely miss the reality of the U.S. role in Asia.
While the rebalance is not, and was not meant to be, a purely military strategy focused on China, it is still real. The United States has

no plans to leave Asia.¶ Grounding 21st-century American foreign policy in Asia has long made eminent sense. Indeed, even in America’s fraught political
climate, there remains strong bipartisan consensus on the importance of Asia to U.S.

national interests. Maintaining peace and stability in Asia remains vitally central to
American prosperity – Asia represents the United States’ largest economic trade partner (outside North America) and is home to six collective defense treaty
allies and numerous other important strategic partnerships. Dramatic economic growth across the region, along with a rising and increasingly assertive China, has marked a shift in

The rebalance is an
the regional distribution of power. With these changing economic and geopolitical dynamics also come new opportunities.

acknowledgement that the time is right for Washington to redefine and strengthen
U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific, allowing it to play a large and persistent role in
shaping the region and its future.¶ On the security side, the rebalance is meant to addresses a laundry list of existing issues: the threat of North
Korea and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and piracy; the grave costs of natural disasters to regional and global stability; and the guarantee of continuing

peace through the promotion of the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Althoughtangible evidence does exist to demonstrate
Washington’s resolve, the clearest litmus test for the rebalance lies with those
countries that stand to be most directly affected. Do the actors and nation states directly affected by the rebalance see the
results of Washington’s renewed focus? And do their perceptions match the reality?¶ Ironically, it seems that China is the country most

convinced of the reality of the rebalance, largely because of the perception that Washington is out to counter or contain Chinese
strength.

Reject ev from conservatives like Klingner---they have a built-in

incentive to criticize it because they oppose Obama reflexively
Scott W. Harold 15, Full Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Adjunct Assistant
Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, Winter 2015, “Is the Pivot
Doomed? The Resilience of America’s ‘Strategic Rebalance,’” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 85-99
Separately, those who oppose the rebalance often mischaracterize it for a variety of reasons, often
apparently related primarily to their dislike of the authoring administration or to their focus
exclusively on its military dimensions (or both). Political opponents of the Obama administration within
the more hawkish wing of the Republican Party have criticized the administration for “under-
resourcing” the military dimensions of the pivot. Conservative think-tank analysts have
sought to paint the administration as pursuing a “pivot in name only,” while others
describe the policy as more “divot” than “pivot” due to a purported mismatch in resources and aims.2
Usually left unspoken in such analyses is the fact that much of the reduction in overall U.S. defense expenditures is driven by Tea Party
The Obama
Republicans’ pressure on reducing government spending as a strategy to cut the national debt.
administration has striven to protect the rebalance from the impact of sequestration
to as great an extent as possible, with the President's Defense Strategic Guidance 2012
laying clear priority on continuing to rebalance to the Asia–Pacific so as to be able to “deter
and defeat aggression” and “project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges.”3
Separately, U.S. allies and security partners in Europe and the Middle East have voiced fears that, by shifting attention to Asia, the
‘rebalance’ will result in reductions in U.S. attention and resource commitments to their regions. By contrast, China an d North Korea—
both of which oppose the pivot—have criticized the strategy as threatening or being overly militarized, describing it as fueling regional
tensions.4 Some analysts have pushed this line of thought, believing the United States should cede more influence in the Asia–Pacific to
China as a strategy to avoid conflict, promoting a 19th-century-style ‘spheres of influence’ approach.5

Yet, even
in the face of the criticisms, denigrations, and hand-wringing of the strategy's opponents,
rebalancing has not only continued to unfold, it has grown stronger over time, both taking
on more substance and demonstrating more staying power . Why?
 SQ S NK
Korea deterrence is great now
Van Jackson 15, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, 8/24/15, “Preparing for the Next Korean
War,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/preparing-for-the-next-korean-war/
How do you fight and win with one hand tied behind your back? U.S. and South Korean officials would do well to figure out, quickly. A
dark cloud descended over the Korean Peninsula last
week as a series of North Korean actions along the DMZ
escalated tensions to the highest level since 2010. Despite ongoing talks between the two sides, tensions remain
high. The prospect of limited war on the Korean Peninsula is all too real, and the alliance must reorient its preparations a ccordingly.

I’ve spent most of my tenure since leaving government warning about limited war in Korea—a conflict in which both sides avoid nuclear
exchanges, no invasion of Pyongyang occurs, and both sides limit their objectives and the means of attaining them to eschew conquest.
In limited war, a return to the status quo may count as a victory. If that sounds perverse, it’s because we’ve
become
accustomed to an image of war as an all-or-nothing affair; no goal short of total enemy surrender will do.
Not so in a world of limited wars.

I raised this issue in congressional testimony earlier this year. I noted it in subsequent op-eds, and in a Center for a New American
Security report for Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. I’ve discussed it before the media, and at conferences. And in a forth coming report
for the U.S.-Korea Institute, I attempt to sketch how the
alliance might adjust to a future of limited wars. The
most recent mini-crisis brings the point home in disturbingly clear fashion: the risk of limited war on the Korean
Peninsula is increasing with time.

I’ve identified a number of mutually reinforcing reasons why this is so, and why the reality of limited war actually gets more likely with
time.

Nobody Wants Nuclear War—Not Even Kim Jong-un

Every Korea expert I’ve ever met believes North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival. Yet most of
these same experts believe that Kim Jong-un is capable of anything and there’s no telling what he might do. To put it
politely, that’s cognitive dissonance. If we know North Korea seeks regime survival, then we
know something about what it’s keen to avoid. Even Kim Jong-un must know there are certain
actions that would end him and his regime—nuclear attacks, the destruction of Seoul, or a mass
invasion of South Korea. Kim Jong-un isn’t a Millenarian or a Jihadi; his goal isn’t suicide. So unless we want to
shrug our shoulders and say “anything could happen,” we should have some modest confidence
that Kim won’t pursue the extreme actions that North Korean media routinely threaten.

South of the DMZ, the incentives to avoid a nuclear conflict are just as strong . For starters, 60
years of “restraint” when faced with North Korean violence suggests that, in the United States especially, there is a strong
desire to avoid the risks of escalation and conflict in general. Plus, no sitting president—American or
South Korean—wants to go down in history as the first president to usher in the era of nuclear warfighting. The
cost in lives would be abhorrent, and there’s a high risk that such a situation would rapidly erode the nuclear nonproliferat ion regime.

North Korea Can’t Invade the South

In June 1950, North Korea launched a large-scale invasion of a South Korea with only a token ability to resist and no meaningful U.S.
military presence. This is the classic scenario that experts and military planners often imagine when they think of another Korean War.
Yet there’s
now a heavily armed DMZ—replete with a large minefield, no less—separating the
North and South, and the South Korean military is better trained and equipped than any force North Korea could muster.
North Korea’s air force and navy services are vastly inferior to the technologically advanced South Korean
military. And the U.S. military presence in and commitment to South Korea is far more than
symbolic.
The point is that no
military leader would look at the military balance on the Korean
Peninsula—especially not a leader in the North Korean People’s Army (KPA)—and think that it makes sense for
North Korea to invade South Korea. The former might have cause for conflict, but waged asymmetrically, not as a head-
on frontal assault. Invasion of the South is militarily impossible. This North-South military imbalance is worsened by a KPA that lacks
the logistics and sustainment capacity required of an invasion; the KPA is numerically large, but regularly diverted from mil itary tasks to
perform agricultural and industrial labor functions to support a moribund economy. The KPA isn’t a force that’s capable of a long
duration military campaign.

The best, most comprehensive read of Kim Jong-Un concludes

deterrence is working now and risk of escalation is limited---also
predictive
Ken E. Gause 15, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program of the Center for
Strategic Studies, CNA Corporation, August 2015, “North Korea’s Provocation and
Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime,”
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf
Any discussion of deterrence should be tied to considerations of escalation. In the case of
North Korea, these discussions should also be tied to the Supreme Leader’s drivers and
boundaries. Carrying out random strategic messaging without understanding how those messages will resonate with Kim Jong-un
is only a selfsatisfying act of wishful thinking. In the end, North Korea’s calculus is tied largely to the personality and p redilections of an
individual. It is his fears and aspirations that need to be manipulated to deter, dissuade, or, if all else fails, mitigate.

Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s brinksmanship strategy used a framework with three stages: Provocation, Marking the Position, and
Maintenance and Recognition. On the international level, this strategy was tied to missile and nuclear tests. Within the inte r-Korea
context, it was linked to naval (and later cyber) provocations. In both of these arenas, Kim Jong-il’s planning revolved around securing
these three stages, ultimately achieving international recognition of the North Korean point of view. His tolerance for escalation was
informed by decades of observation of South Korean and U.S. responses. De-escalation off-ramps were part of each provocational
engagement.

An early assessment of Kim Jong-un portrayed him as a leader who was growing in self-
confidence and would likely see provocations as a policy tool. This assessment also portrayed
Kim as someone who was bolstered by the outcome of the 2013 crisis and, therefore, less willing to
forgo confrontation, confident that his will would win out in the end. Not endowed with his father’s deep knowledge of
escalation dynamics on the peninsula, this assessment continued, Kim Jong-un was more prone to
miscalculation. His growing self-assurance would deter his advisers from providing advice that contradicted his worldview. The
events of the last couple of years suggest that this assessment may not be entirely correct.
It is most likely applicable to intercrisis periods, as opposed to the period leading up to a provocation. In other words, during periods
of increasing tension on the peninsula, Kim Jong-un may be willing to push strategies that
appear bold and aggressive. But during this period, his decisionmaking is still informed
by advisers and calibrated depending on external stimuli. After a provocation occurs and the escalatory
ladder is engaged (if the 2013 crisis is any indication) his decision-making changes. Decisions are heavily weighted toward the
implications for his own position and legitimacy within the wider leadership. His self-perceived ability to de-escalate (and risk showing
weakness) is diminished. How far he is willing to move up the escalatory ladder is unknown.
If this model of a leader (and by extension, a regime) going through a power consolidation is placed in the context of decision-making on
future provocations, certain
assumptions can be made that comport with how North Korea has
acted since Kim Jong-un took over. It is a regime that will engage in non-violent
demonstrations where escalation can be managed. On one hand, even in the face of warnings from the United
States, South Korea, and China, North Korea conducted two missile tests in 2012 and a nuclear test in 2013 . Such demonstrations feed
the requirements for Kim’s power consolidation process. But, on the other hand, as
international pressure has grown
and the Sino-North Korean relationship has become more strained, Pyongyang has not
engaged in another demonstration—although it has apparently engaged in a high profile (yet covert) cyber-attack.
According to some sources, the economic pressures on the regime (especially from China) may not have deterred other
tests, but may have slowed the pace of testing. If true, it suggests that Kim Jong-un, while eager to move forward
with these programs, has been influenced by external pressure and has likely listened to those
within the regime who caution against moving too quickly.
Despite its aggressive rhetoric, which has reached a new level of animosity under Kim Jong-un, the regime has
not yet engaged in violent provocation. Even during the Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in
2013, 2014, and 2015 when the regime could have justified aggressive actions as a way of bolstering its own deterrent and responding to
the aggressive actions of the United States and South Korea, it
chose to confine its actions to rhetorical
fusillades and Scud launches into the Sea of Japan. It made no attacks on South Korean territory or
ships at sea. This suggests that the cost somehow outweighed the benefits that could have been gained from
undertaking such actions. According to some reports, the pressure from China and the threats of retaliation
from the Blue House and the South Korean Joint Staff, including decapitation strikes, may have figured into the
North Korean calculus. The U.S. decision to forgo the testing of the Minuteman missile in 2013, as well as the U.S.-South
Korean decision to downplay the 2014 and 2015 exercises, may have also provided needed off-ramps and a more deliberative decision-
making process to occur inside Pyongyang. Contrary
to the portrait of an impetuous leader who makes
emotional decisions and lashes out at perceived threats, to date, Kim Jong-un has proven to be
a pragmatic decision-maker—someone who may be able to be deterred at the upper end of
the escalation scale.
 Impact D
The CCP sees war as a threat to its regime---prevents conflict
Twining 13—Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. PhD
in IR from Oxford (5/3/13, Dan, The dangerous domestic politics of U.S.-China relations,
shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/03/the_dangerous_domestic_politics_of_us_chi
na_relations)
There are, however, powerful countervailing factors that mitigate the likelihood of all-out
conflict. These include the deep interdependence of the American and Chinese
economies. Given its export dependency, shallow financial markets, and questionable
domestic resiliency, any conflict would likely bankrupt China first. ¶ Indeed, we have seen in
China's own history how external conflicts have often led to internal rebellion and even
revolution-- a prospect its rulers fear more than any other. Any actual decision by
China's leaders to engage in direct military conflict with the United States would be very likely to lead to the
downfall of the Communist regime that has governed the country since 1949. This link between the
regime's external and internal insecurities is an Achilles' heel that gives the United States and
other democracies facing military pressure from China -- Japan over the Senkakus, India over parts of Ladakh and
Arunachal Pradesh -- a potentially decisive strategic advantage.
Free Riding
 Deterrence Solves
Iran backs down in response to pressure---thirty years of empirics prove
Michael Eisenstadt 13, Kahn Fellow and director of the Military & Security Studies
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Not by Sanctions Alone: Using
Military and Other Means to Bolster Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” July 2013,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport13_Eisen
stadt2.pdf
Conventional wisdom says that Tehran
does not yield to pressure—it yields only to overwhelming
pressure.1 In fact, three decades of experience show that while the regime’s doctrine of
resistance (moqavemat) places a premium on not yielding to pressure, Tehran has made
major policy adjustments, even abandoning longstanding policies, when the expediency of the regime (maslahat) or
the national interest has required it to do so.2 For instance:
ƒ Iran
backed off after warning the United States in December 2011 that it would close the Strait
of Hormuz in response to new sanctions, after senior U.S. officials
intimated that such a move would
prompt a military response. And in January 2012, after warning the United States that it should not return an aircraft
carrier to the Persian Gulf, Iran backed down after Washington did so.

ƒ Iranian-supported Iraqi Special

Groups ceased rocket attacks on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in April 2008
after Iran was warned by the United States that continued attacks would provoke a
strong U.S. response. Likewise, Iranian-supported Iraqi Special Groups ceased rocket attacks on U.S. forward-operating bases
in Iraq that had killed fifteen U.S. soldiers in June 2011, after the United States passed on warnings to Tehran.3

ƒ Fearing
a U.S. invasion after the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the Islamic Republic apparently
abandoned its nuclear weaponization efforts— presumably to avoid giving the United States a pretext for
invasion— though some weapons-related R&D activities have purportedly continued since then.4

ƒ After the 1992 assassination of a prominent Iranian Kurdish leader in a Berlin restaurant caused a number of European Union states to
suspend diplomatic ties with Tehran and censure the Islamic Republic, Iran ceased terrorist operations in Europe—apparently because it
considered its ties to Europe too important to be jeopardized by continued attacks.

ƒ After years of promising “war, war until victory,” Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
agreed to “drink from the poisoned chalice”
and end the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 when he concluded that Iran faced defeat at the
front, the use of Iraqi chemical weapons against Iranian cities, and open U.S. military intervention (which is how
he interpreted the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner over the Gulf in July 1988).

ƒ Iran initially attempted to counter U.S.-led convoy operations during the latter phases of
the Iran-Iraq War by indirect means—mining the waters of the Gulf, using Silkworm missiles against ships inside
Kuwaiti territorial waters, and conducting small-boat attacks against unescorted shipping—until a major clash between
U.S. and Iranian naval forces in April 1988, which inflicted heavy losses on the latter, caused
Iran to cease mining operations, halt Silkworm strikes, and dramatically reduce attacks on unescorted convoys.5

The question now is whether, under current circumstances, the United States can replicate the kinds of conditions that led Iran in the
Might Tehran be
past to alter or abandon policies in which it had invested significant resources, prestige, and political capital.
willing to pay any price that the United States is likely to impose in order to achieve its
nuclear ambitions—much as Pakistan was willing to “eat grass” if necessary in order to obtain the bomb?6 Might the moral
victory represented by adhering to its principles and resisting the forces of “global arrogance,” regardless of cost, trump the interests of
the regime? Past experience would seem to indicate that the answer is: not likely. On the field of battle and in the diplomatic arena,
tactical adjustments have been permitted when they served the interests of the Islamic
Republic or the Iranian nation.7 The election as president of Hassan Rowhani, a pragmatic conservative, makes it
likely that Iran will continue with such an approach.
 A2 Light Footprint Solves
Only heavy local presence solves deterrence---their “forces on the
border” arguments flip neg
Kenneth M. Pollack 10, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran: The Devil in the Details,” May 2010,
http://www.cfr.org/iran/deterring-nuclear-iran/p22292
In previous American containment regimes—particularly against the USSR, Iraq, and North Korea—the
deployment of American military forces on the borders of those countries was critical to
deterrence. There is a rationale for doing the same toward a nuclear Iran. Deployed U.S.
conventional forces could deter some conventional aggression by the target country and
serve as an unmistakable guarantor of U.S. red lines. A country that might convince itself that the United
States would not employ nuclear weapons in response to its occupation of a third country’s land has to make a very different calculati on
if U.S. soldiers are likely to be killed in the process.

Moreover, scholarly work on extended deterrence has consistently found that would-be
aggressors tend to only pay attention to the local balance of forces, discounting or ignoring
the global balance. As when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, aggressors may recognize that the United
States could ultimately defeat them, but may assume that if they can grab their prize
quickly before the United States is ready, Washington will not summon the will to roll back a fait
accompli (or will be blocked by other forces from doing so). Thus, preventing aggression against a third country in
the first place (the definition of extended deterrence) is best served by a strong local military
presence so that the would-be aggressor never believes that it can get create such a fait accompli. This, too, argues for
strong American conventional forces deployed along Iran’s borders.
 Domestic Motivations
Overwhelms the plan---cultural influence is seen as a much more urgent
threat to regime survival than troops
Shahram Chubin 14, Non-resident Senior Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, taught at various universities including the Graduate School of
International Studies in Geneva and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, “Is Iran a Military Threat?” Survival, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2014, p. 65-88
Iran does not see the major threat to the regime as stemming from external
I have argued that

military power. Iranian leaders feel that they have neutralised this danger. Where they are especially sensitive
is in the domestic sphere. The Great Satan was always a greater threat as a corrupter
of the youth and ‘religious values’ than as a military aggressor, which could be
resisted. The leadership has constantly talked of ‘soft threats’, such as velvet
revolutions, especially since 2009. In 2009 Khamenei said: ‘today, the main priority of the country is to
confront [the enemy's] soft warfare which is aimed at creating doubt, discord and pessimism among the masses of the
people.’50 In 2013, before endorsing discussions on the nuclear programme, Khamenei said that the US ‘should show it does not interfere in the affairs of the
Iranian nation as they did in the 1388 [2009] sedition. They supported the seditionists. They put social networks at the service of the seditionists.’51
 Hardliners Inev
Congressional provocations inevitable---empowers Iranian hardliners
Mahmoud Pargoo 12/28, PhD candidate at Australian Catholic University in Sydney, “Is
Congress empowering Iranian hard-liners?” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iran-hardliners-gain-visa-waiver-program-
changes.html
Hassan Rouhani, who sternly criticized Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies, won the election and appointed Mohammad Javad Zarif as foreign minister. Consequently, and as a result of the
softening of the rhetoric and engagement in talks with the United States, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed between Iran and six world powers in July. The

Khamenei
agreement was seen as evidence that if Iran engages in serious talks with the United States, issues can be gradually solved. Even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali

pointed to the likelihood of extending negotiations to other non-nuclear issues if the

United States proves to be trustworthy.¶ This line of thinking, however, is changing with
the recent series of US measures — including the recent congressional vote to
restrict visa-free travel to the United States for those who have visited Iran in the past five
years. Indeed, many in Iran are coming to the conclusion that no matter what rhetoric or
action the Islamic Republic may assume, the United States will continue its enmity with
Iran. Thus, a new consensus is being formed — but this time, against the United States. People from almost all
political orientations have interpreted the new Visa Waiver Program (VWP) changes as running
counter to the JCPOA. Ali Larijani, the parliament speaker and a powerful conservative supporter of the nuclear negotiations, has criticized the law, while many
Reformist politicians have also condemned it as being against Iranian goodwill in engaging with the United States. Zarif, the foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, has

an alarming sign that

additionally said that the new law breaches the JCPOA.¶ When seen in the light of historical parallels, the recent developments could be

certain elements in the US foreign policy establishment are seeking to paralyze

[undermine] any effort to normalize relations with Iran.¶ Indeed, the reality is that previous efforts on the part of Iran
to engage in strategic dialogue with the United States have been to no avail. In 2001, two weeks after the fall of Kabul, an Iranian delegation attended the Bonn Conference, where it
engaged in talks with the United States over the future of Afghanistan. Describing the Iranian delegation’s cooperation at that time, James Dobbins, who was then the White House’s
special envoy for Afghanistan, said, “All these delegations proved helpful. None was more so than the Iranians.”¶ Iran was hoping that those talks would extend to a broader range of
issues, as former National Security Council, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency official Flynt Leverett has said, but “that channel was effectively foreclosed when
President [George W.] Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address labeled Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil.'” Indeed, that metaphor was utilized by hard-liners in Tehran to torpedo
Reformists who were in favor of engagement with the West.¶ Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham have studied the impact of the “axis of evil” discourse on the internal politics
of Iran, concluding that it “strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives vis-a-vis reformers.” The main problem with the metaphor was that it targeted “entire countries” —
including their peoples — rather than problematic policies, or even political leaders. Hence, “the metaphor mobilized the entire country — including ‘friends’ of the US.” Reflecting on
the ultimate effect of the “axis of evil” discourse, Heradstveit and Bonham concluded that it had “become a powerful rhetorical tool for mobilizing the ultra-conservative and anti-

the congressional vote to revise the VWP is a godsend for Iranian

democratic forces in Iran.Ӧ Similarly,

conservatives — especially as the country is about to hold important parliamentary

elections in February. For hard-liners, and many others in Iran, the recent
congressional measures are evidence of that the United States will not cease its enmity with
Iranians. In this vein, the argument is that moderates and Reformists are wrong about that the United States’ enmity is at least partly because of the anti-American rhetoric of
conservatives, but rather as Ayatollah Khamenei stated in May 2014, “The enmity of our enemies is rooted in the resistance of the Islamic Republic against global arrogance and
against the hideous habit of dividing the world into the oppressor and the oppressed. Other issues are excuses. Today, their excuse is the nuclear issue. One day, their excuse is human
rights and another day, their excuse is something else.Ӧ History has shown that US Republicans prefer Iranian hard-liners over moderates and Reformists when it comes to foreign
policy. This has never been more evident than when 47 Republican senators wrote a letter to Iranian lawmakers in March. US President Barack Obama did not exaggerate when he
said, “They [Iranian hard-liners] do have much more in common with the [US] hard-liners.”¶ More than ever before, the de facto alignment of Iranian and American hard-liners came
into focus during the nuclear negotiations. Former Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi, who now serves as an adviser to Rouhani, talked about the shared interests of Iranian extremists
with those of US and Israeli extremists. “Today, the approach of extremists of Iran is the same as the extremists like Netanyahu, the GOP and the American Congress,” Younesi said.¶
Today, moderates are at a historical crossroads in Iran: Their nuclear initiative — the biggest foreign policy issue after the 1979 Islamic Revolution — has been proven to be a success.
Rouhani has curbed inflation from 34.7% in 2013 to almost single digits. Economic growth is also predicted to increase to 5% by next year, as sanctions are set to be lifted under the

hard-liners have also

JCPOA. Almost all grounds for a stunning moderate and Reformist victory in the coming parliamentary elections are in place. Yet,

started a counteroffensive to recapture ground that has been lost to Reformists and
moderates. Nothing could have helped hard-liners in Tehran more than the VWP
changes. Once again, Republicans in the United States betray Reformists and moderates in Iran.
 Leverage
The advantage is backwards---presence is our most important source of
leverage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia---the plan surrenders it
Hal Brands 15, Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, PhD in History
from Yale, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, “Retrenchment Chic:
The Dangers of Offshore Balancing,” 2 Sep 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=193305
First, the stationing of U.S. troops in Muslim countries is only one of many causes of anti-American terrorism. Others include anger at U.S. support for authoritarian Middle Eastern

U.S. military withdrawal from the

regimes, Washington’s relationship with Israel, and Western “cultural imperialism” in the Middle East.

Middle East would not ameliorate these other grievances, and it might actually inflame them further.
For if the United States embraced offshore balancing, it would presumably become more reliant on friendly Arab
dictators—as well as Israel—as bulwarks of stability in a volatile region.¶ Second, offshore might undercut counter-
terrorism in other ways, as well. Forsaking U.S. forward presence would deprive the country of the

overseas bases and contingents that American forces have repeatedly used in counter-terrorism
operations over the past 30 years. It would also deprive the country of crucial diplomatic and intelligence

leverage. U.S. forward deployments and commitments have long provided influence
that Washington has used to evoke greater cooperation on what Robert Art calls the “quieter phase of fighting
terrorism”—intelligence-sharing, diplomatic partnerships, and other behind-the-scenes measures that are crucial to fighting terrorist groups.[8] Were America to

slash its security posture, this influence would presumably shrink, as well. Offshore balancing, then, is no
panacea when it comes to counter-terrorism. It holds some advantages, but significant dangers lurk just below the surface.¶ The same is true of proliferation. Offshore balancers are
right that U.S. policy can appear threatening to its adversaries, and that some countries—China during the Cold War, Iran and North Korea since the 1990s—have sought to develop
nuclear weapons in part as a way of countering American pressure and coercion. The trouble, however, is that shifting to offshore balancing would hardly rectify the situation. After
all, academic research indicates that there are numerous reasons why “rogue states” seek nuclear weapons, from desires for international or domestic prestige to desires to wield the
bomb as a tool of offensive or coercive leverage.[9] The causes of proliferation, like the causes of terrorism, are quite complex, and so altering U.S. policy would touch only one piece of
the problem.¶ In fact, it would probably make that problem far worse. What offshore balancers frequently forget is that, far from being an overall stimulant to proliferation, U.S. force
presence and security commitments have, on aggregate, massively impeded that phenomenon. U.S. security guarantees have reduced the perceived need for America’s allies to seek
nuclear weapons, while giving Washington powerful influence that it can use to dissuade prospective proliferators. In numerous cases since the 1950s—from Germany and Italy, to
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—these aspects of U.S. policy have proven central to limiting the spread of nuclear arms. Were the United States now to terminate or dramatically
reduce its overseas commitments, it stands to reason that it would also lose this non-proliferation leverage. Offshore balancing would therefore likely result in a more proliferated, and
more dangerous, world.¶ Less Influence, More Instability¶ These issues touch on a broader problem of offshore balancing—that contrary to what its proponents claim, it is likely to
cause greater international instability and reduced U.S. global influence. The reason for this is quite simply that both international stability and U.S. influence have long been
thoroughly interlinked with America’s forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has also given the United States great sway over
those allies’ policies, just as American-led alliances have served as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas across key regions and relationships. Regarding
stability, the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the competitive geopolitical dynamics that can so easily foster conflict and violence. U.S. presence has limited arms races
and counter-productive competitions by providing security in regions like Europe and East Asia; it has also soothed historical rivalries and provided a climate of reassurance more
conductive to multilateral cooperation in these areas. Overall, American presence has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and checking
other types of destabilizing behavior. As even John Mearsheimer has acknowledged, Washington “acts as a night watchman,” giving order to an otherwise anarchical

The United States would

environment.[10]¶ If Washington abandoned this role, the most likely byproduct is that U.S. influence and global stability alike would suffer.

effectively be surrendering its most powerful source of leverage vis-à-vis friends and
allies, and jeopardizing its position of leadership in key regions. It would also be courting pronounced turmoil in those areas. Long-dormant security
competitions might revive as countries felt forced to arm themselves more
vigorously; historical rivalries between old enemies might resurge absent U.S.
protection and the reassurance it offers. Even more dangerously, countries that aim to challenge existing
regional orders—think Russia in Europe, or Iran in the Middle East—might feel more empowered
to assert their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, one scholar notes, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely
to be big trouble.”[11]
1NR
Saudi DA
 Link
Even small drawdown is sufficient to freak out Saudi
Naser al-Tamimi 13, UK-based Middle East analyst, PhD in International Relations, “Will
Riyadh Get the Bomb? Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume 20,
Number 2, Spring 2013, http://www.meforum.org/3509/saudi-arabia-nuclear-bomb
A major deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations—especially if Washington fails to stop Tehran's nuclear
program or decides to scale back its military presence in the Middle East due to its recent energy
discoveries—could force Riyadh to reconsider nuclear weapon acquisition to avoid having to
face foreign aggression without U.S. security assurances. However, the relationship between
Riyadh and Washington has thus far provided the Saudis with an unprecedented level of
protection. From Washington's perspective, conventional wisdom holds that U.S. security commitments can keep Iran in check,
prevent U.S. allies in the Middle East from submitting to Tehran's demands, and dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet
both the willingness and the ability of the U.S. government to defend its partners in the region
against a nuclear-armed Iran have been questioned.[4] As an Israeli observer argued recently:

The lack of American will to confront the ayatollahs and stop them in their tracks has given various Arab leaders plenty of incentive, as
well as a good excuse, to proceed down the nuclear trail ... If the Iranians aren't stopped, and soon, we may wake up a few years from now
to discover that Saudi Arabia and other unfriendly regimes have decided to upgrade their "civilian" nuclear programs into wea pons-
making industries.[5]

Additionally, the
Saudis are increasingly nervous about the strength of any U.S.
commitment in light of the Obama administration's abandonment of such a long-standing regional ally as
Egypt's Hosni Mubarak.[6]

Deterrence requires a massive force in the Gulf---light footprint doesn’t

solve
Matthew Kroenig 12, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
“Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-01-
01/time-attack-iran
These security threats would require Washington to contain Tehran. Yet deterrence would come at a heavy
price. To keep the Iranian threat at bay, the United States would need to deploy naval and ground units
and potentially nuclear weapons across the Middle East, keeping a large force in the area for decades to
come. Alongside those troops, the United States would have to permanently deploy significant
intelligence assets to monitor any attempts by Iran to transfer its nuclear technology. And it would also need to devote
perhaps billions of dollars to improving its allies’ capability to defend themselves. This might include helping Israel const ruct submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and hardened ballistic missile silos to ensure that it can maintain a secure second-strike capability. Most of all,
to make containment credible, the United States would need to extend its nuclear umbrella to its partners in the region, pled ging to
defend them with military force should Iran launch an attack.

In other words, to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would need to make a substantial investment
of political and military capital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis and at a time when it is
attempting to shift its forces out of the region. Deterrence would come with enormous economic and geopolitical
costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained hostile to U.S. interests, which could mean decades or longer. Given
the instability of the region, this effort might still fail, resulting in a war far more costly and destructive than the one that critics of a
preemptive strike on Iran now hope to avoid.
 A2 Can’t Prolif
They have the tech and expertise
Nawaf Obaid 15, visiting fellow and associate instructor at Harvard University's Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, “Actually, Saudi Arabia could get a nuclear
weapon,” 6/19/15, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/middleeast/obaid-saudi-nuclear-
weapon/
Now that the Obama administration has largely given up its resistance to Iran's development of some kind of nuclear program, the
Middle East is poised to see a change in the balance of power. As the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom recently stated, should
Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, "all options" could be on the table when it comes to the Saudi response. That could include an indigenous
nuclear program. And although some
commentators remain skeptical about the Kingdom's
ability to produce nuclear weapons, I would argue that it actually has the will and the ability
to do so.
There are six core components that a country must possess in order to create a nuclear program
capable of being weaponized: 1) an adequate educational system, 2) skilled scientists, 3) financial means, 4) technological infrastructure,
5) belief there is a pressing security threat, and 6) the national will and leadership to do so. Saudi Arabia possesses each
of these.
For a start, the Saudi educational system, especially in the sciences, has improved in recent years, and
is undergoing changes that should see even greater progress. Meanwhile, the Kingdom's education budget has
more than doubled since 2005, with more than $350 billion spent on education since then. Indeed, in 2014, spending on
education and training represented about a quarter of the governmental budget, and the Saudi leadership has funded
a massive foreign scholarship program that has seen more than 200,000 Saudis studying abroad. As a result,
Saudi Arabia is the third largest student "exporter" after China and India.

In addition, Saudi Arabia

has had nuclear physicists with PhD's from Harvard, MIT, Stanford
and other top U.S. universities conducting advanced research in nuclear physics at the
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) for decades before the King Abdullah Atomic Energy City (KACARE) was created
a select
and took over all nuclear matter. As detailed in a 2011 KACARE white paper on the government's civil nuclear strategy,
committee of Saudi nuclear scientists has already conducted groundbreaking
research on an elaborate civil nuclear program. With this in mind, as a Washington Institute for Near East
Policy policy brief notes, plans are in place for the "construction of sixteen nuclear power reactors
over the next twenty years at a cost of about $80 billion." King Salman is expected to give his final blessing before the end
of this year.

Depending on how the Iranian negotiations conclude, the Saudi leadership will form a similar select committee to draft a white paper on
a weaponized nuclear program. One of the underlying fundamentals of Saudi nuclear strategy has been to
have a program based on indigenous technology to ensure that the entire fuel cycle remains
under Saudi control. In short, the country doesn't want to buy nuclear weapons from countries like Pakistan.
The current Saudi nuclear scientific community is perfectly capable of mastering the
complexities of such a program. Since the end of World War II, the technology associated with
producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium has become more efficient and has served
as the cornerstone of most civilian nuclear programs around the world.
 A2 No Cascade
Yes cascade---follow-on prolif is likely and Iran will transfer nuclear
materials
Matthew Kroenig 14, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security at The Atlantic Council, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian
Nuclear Threat, 2014, Adobe Digital Editions ebook, pp. 93-97
Nuclear weapons in Iran would have a number of negative consequences for US national security. It would lead to the
spread of nuclear weapons around the world, constrained US freedom of action, weakened US credibility,
accommodation by regional states, the locking of the current theocratic regime in power for years to come, an emboldened and more dangerous Iran, spikes
and an increased risk of nuclear war. This section will consider each of those
in oil prices that damage the global economy,

A nuclear-armed Iran would cause the spread of nuclear

threats in turn.¶ Further Proliferation ¶

weapons in the Middle East and around the world and a weakening of the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Many analysts have predicted a "cascade" or "chain reaction" of nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East if Iran gets the bomb. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are
among the states that will be more likely to go nuclear if Tehran joins the atomic club. In addition,

nearly a dozen other countries in the region , including Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have
expressed interest in a nuclear power program and might one day seek to join the ranks of the nuclear

powers.10 Officials in Riyadh are already talking openly about their plans to develop nuclear weapons to 11 counter the Iranian nuclear threat. As
President Obama has said clearly, if Iran develops nuclear weapons, "It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their
own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world."12 ¶ The future is, of course,
unknowable, and some analysts dispute this widely held view . Philipp Bleek, my first PhD student at Georgetown
University and now a professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, for example, argues that predictions of nuclear dominoes falling in the
Middle East are greatly exaggerated. 13 Bleek and other experts claim that many of the supply-side and demand-side factors associated with nuclear
proliferation are simply absent in many of these Middle Eastern cases. First, on the supply side, they point out that none of these countries possess an
advanced nuclear program at present. Therefore, they argue, these countries could not simply snap their fingers and build the bomb. Rather, they would
need outside help and/ or a lot of time. Second, on the demand side, they argue that these countries might not even want independent nuclear arsenals. To
be sure, they would be threatened by Iran's nuclear weapons, but Bleek and others argue that these countries might still deci de not to build nuclear weapons
and will look for other ways to protect themselves against Iran's bombs. Turkey, a formal NATO ally, might prefer to lounge in the shade of America's
massive nuclear umbrella rather than risk building its own nuclear weapons. Similarly, even states that lack a formal alliance with the United States but still
value highly their relationship with Washington, like Saudi Arabia, might not want to undermine their close relationship with the United States by building a
bomb despite warnings from Washington. After all, the United States has always opposed the spread of nuclear weapons and would certainly try to stop
nuclear proliferation to Iran's neighbors. ¶ Those skeptical of a coming nuclear arms race in the Middle East also point out that history has something to
teach us. They argue that US-based analysts have vastly overpredicted the rate of reactive nuclear proliferation in the past. For example, when China was
pursuing nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, many American policymakers argued that this would set off a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in East
Asia. They argued that Japan, Taiwan, India, and Pakistan would automatically acquire nuclear weapons in response. 14 With the benefit of hindsight,
however, we know that not all of these countries went nuclear. ¶ In sum, Bleek and other nuclear-cascade skeptics argue that predictions of a half dozen
Middle Eastern states going nuclear in response to a nuclear-armed Iran are probably overblown. ¶ These skeptics do a service by reining in the worst-case
they risk going too far. It would be a mistake
scenarios of a tidal wave of nuclear bombs rolling across the region, but

to argue that reactive nuclear proliferation is not a serious problem. After all, nuclear dominoes
do sometimes fall and proliferation to even one additional state is a real problem. ¶ To understand why, lees take another look at the history
of reactive proliferation. Skeptics are correct that not all of the identified countries proliferated in response to China's bomb. We must not forget, however,
India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons as part of a process set off by
that some did.

the bomb in Beijing. Moreover, world history has not yet stopped. It is still possible that Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and other countries in Asia will one day build nuclear weapons, and, if they do, it is likely that China's nuclear arsenal will be a contributing cause. ¶
it is unlikely that all of the countries we identify as potential reactive proliferators in the Middle
Applying this lesson to the present,

will build nuclear weapons, but it is likely that at least some will. So perhaps Egypt will steer
East

clear of the bomb while Turkey and Saudi Arabia decide to go nuclear. In such a scenario, Cairo's nuclear restraint
will be cold comfort when we are in the midst of a future Turkish-Iranian-Saudi- Israeli nuclear crisis. ¶ Next, let’s turn to the skeptics' point about the most
at-risk countries lacking the ability to produce nuclear weapons. This is undoubtedly true at present, but there are two things to keep in mind. First, these
countries might get outside help. Some analysts fear that with its deep pockets and ties to Pakistan, Riyadh might be
 able to simply buy nuclear weapons or pay Islamabad to station its nuclear weapons on
15

Saudi territory.¶ In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan established a formal understanding in which Riyadh agreed to help finance Islamabad
in building the first "Islamic bomb" in exchange for a Pakistani pledge to one day funnel sensitive nuclear technology back to Saudi Arabia. 16 If this nuclear
quid pro quo remains in place, an Iranian sprint to the bomb might mean nuclear weapons materializing in Saudi Arabia overnight. To be sure, this scenario
is unlikely. No country has ever provided a fully functioning nuclear weapon to another state, and it is hard to see what Pakistan could possibly gain from
simply handing over the most powerful weapons on Earth to Saudi Arabia. As I explain in Exporting the Bomb, if Pakistan wanted to help the Saudis' nuclear
program (and this is still a fairly big if), it would be much more likely to transfer sensitive nuclear technology, such as uranium enrichment equipment. So,
the possibility of
again, we are likely looking at a decade or more for Riyadh to join the nuclear club, even with Pakistan's help. Nevertheless,

rapid proliferation due to outside assistance is something that we should keep in

mind.¶ There is, however, a second and more important point about timing: just because nuclear proliferation is slow
doesn't mean that it is not a problem. As even the skeptics point out, while none of these countries could instantly produce
nuclear weapons, any one of them could plausibly have nuclear weapons within a decade or so. This should be a major cause of concern. A Middle

East armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons in 2024 is a frightening prospect. After all, I,
and presumably many of my readers, hope to be alive and kicking in 2024. ¶ In sum, Iran's nuclear acquisition will likely mean one or two additional nuclear-
armed states in the Middle East over the next ten to twenty years. When combined with a region that already contains two nuclear-armed states (Israel and,
in this scenario, Iran), this is the recipe for a poly-nuclear and highly unstable Middle East. ¶ The spread of nuclear weapons would not, however, be confined
Iran would be likely to become
to the region. An Iranian bomb would also lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons around the world. ¶

a nuclear supplier transferring dangerous nuclear technology to countries in other

regions. In Exporting the Bomb, I study the history of sensitive nuclear technology transfer and identify the conditions associated with the export of
uranium enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technology 17 and nuclear weapons design. I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful
weak states can benefit strategically by exporting
states more than weak states and, for this reason,

sensitive nuclear material and technology outside of their own sphere of influence . In
this way, the spread of nuclear weapons in a distant region does not threaten the supplier. It does, however, constrain the supplier's more powerful enemies
that can project power in that region. In addition, nuclear-capable states that have poor relations with the superpowers are also at an increased risk of
Iran is a country that is at risk of becoming a
transferring sensitive nuclear technology. ¶ Applying these insights to Iran, we see that

nuclear supplier. It could transfer uranium enrichment technology, enriched uranium, or a

nuclear weapon design to countries in Asia or Latin America. Since Iran lacks the ability to project power outside of the Middle East, a
nuclear arms race in any of these regions would not directly harm Iran's national security. It would, however, create real problems for the United States.
Tehran might take the opportunity to intentionally
Given the hostility between these two countries, therefore,

impose costs on the United States, constraining America's freedom of action and distracting its strategic attention away from Tehran. ¶
One can easily imagine Iran's president announcing in the coming years that Venezuela is a country in good standing with the NPT and that it therefore has a
right to peaceful nuclear technology. Iran's leaders could argue that, in order to help Venezuela produce fuel rods for its peaceful nuclear program, Iran will
provide Venezuela with uranium enrichment technology. This could all be done—just like Iran's current nuclear program—under the patina of peaceful
nuclear cooperation consistent with the principals of the NPT. ¶ A "peaceful" uranium enrichment program in Venezuela, however, would create terrible
headaches for the United States even if Caracas never acquired nuclear weapons. After all, it would essentially be a replay of the decade-long crisis we are
Iran has
currently experiencing with Iran's nuclear program, but this time in our own backyard. ¶ This scenario is easy to imagine, in part because

already announced its intention to export nuclear technology to Venezuela in a formal

nuclear cooperation agreement. 18 The terms of the deal have not yet been finalized, but it is possible that the framework could eventually facilitate the
transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, including uranium-enrichment capabilities, to Venezuela and, in the future, to other countries in the region.
Deal CP
 Ov
It causes rapid nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the
Atlantic, January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-
armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are madmen
who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are buildi ng nuclear
weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. ¶ It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about
the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hol d on
absolute power.¶ Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons
against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and
sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the
destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities.¶ The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may
not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the
chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with
Israel.¶ Warp-Speed Escalation¶ The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East
in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and
prone to warp-speed escalation.¶ Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s
Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets.
Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense
of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed it s demand.¶
Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes
Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is
to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening
Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of
August’ on steroids.”¶ Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile
launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or
imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons
to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? ¶ Bruce Blair, the co-
founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a
sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards,
making an accidental exchange more likely.¶ “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed
states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces --
mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “ Missiles put on hair-trigger
alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false
indications that the other side has initiated an attack.” ¶ Then comes the problem of misinterpreted
data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has
decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ¶ ‘Cognitive Bias’¶ Blair notes that in a crisis it
isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader
will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that
increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.¶
Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two
countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far -fetched --
make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t
have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we
nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.Ӧ The
answer to this predicament is to deny Iran
nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of
preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped
before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”

It outweighs the case---Middle Eastern prolif is uniquely likely to

escalate---structural checks on other nuclear wars means only we access
extinction
Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran:
The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, NU Libraries
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long.
It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are
based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to
miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally
considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting
the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.
More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly
steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the
bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike
capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but
survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely
vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight
times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled
to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level
commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation . Moreover, if early
warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would
increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might
be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a
first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined
with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against
the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war .
Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons
from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive
action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging
nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant
risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that
nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear
arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons
vulnerable to attack or theft.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States a nd the Soviet
Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar
nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military
technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling
or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance
systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a
fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be
highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with
a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and there by increase its
ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced
military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictab le
consequences.
 A2 PDB
Robust presence is key to the threat of force---empirically succeeds at
deterring prolif in the Middle East
James Phillips 10/2, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage
Foundation, “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the Next President Should Do,” 10/2/15,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/the-iran-nuclear-deal-what-the-
next-president-should-do
2. Strengthen U.S. military forces to provide greater deterrence against an Iranian
nuclear breakout. Ultimately, no piece of paper will block an Iranian nuclear breakout. The
chief deterrent to Iran’s attaining a nuclear capability is the prospect of a U.S. preventive
military attack. It is no coincidence that Iran halted many aspects of its nuclear weapons program in
2003 after the U.S. invasion of and overthrow of hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Libyan dictator
Muammar Qadhafi, motivated by a similar apprehension about the Bush Administration, also chose to give up his
chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

To strengthen this deterrence, it is necessary to rebuild U.S. military strength, which has
been sapped in recent years by devastating budget cuts. The Obama Administration’s failure to provide for the national defense
will shortly result in the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf region for the
first time since 2007. Such signs of declining U.S. military capabilities will exacerbate the risks
posed by the nuclear deal.
 A2 Mamedov
Iran shapes their decision-making based on the likelihood of a military
strike
Michael Eisenstadt 15, Kahn Fellow, Director, Military & Security Studies Program,
Washington Institute, “How the Iran Deal Could Complicate U.S. Efforts to Prevent a
Nuclear Breakout,” 8/31/15, http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/how-the-iran-deal-
could-complicate-u-s-efforts-to-prevent-a-nuclear-breakout/
This could influence Iran’s future proliferation calculus. The nuclear deal, if implemented
fully, could place major constraints on Iran’s ability to undertake a breakout from declared,
or possible covert, facilities for 10 to 15 years. But as these constraints are lifted (or circumvented before then
by Iran), the temptation to pursue a breakout could be strengthened. Several factors
will influence Iran’s decision-making on this matter; foremost among these is Iran’s
assessment of the risk of attempting a breakout.
Because itis unclear how the sanctions “snapback” mechanism might work in practice, it
is especially important that the nuclear deal be backstopped with a threat of force if
it is to be viable. Iranian doubts about the credibility and efficacy of the U.S. military
option could, however, undermine the long-term sustainability of the agreement. So what
impact will the deal have on this option?

Iran’s motives for prolif are internal, not external---their nuclear

program empirically increased as security threats decreased
Julian Bernard 12, Master of Social Science’s Candidate in Political Science, School of
Political Studies, University of Ottawa, “Domestic Politics and Nuclear Proliferation in Iran,”
2012,
https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/23564/1/Bernard_%20Julien_2012_rese
archpaper.pdf
According to realist intuitions, the
These latest dynamics in Iran’s already perplexing nuclear saga deserve particular attention.

states will seek to develop nuclear

long-time reigning theory and model by which to study nuclear weapons proliferation, “

weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through
alternative means.”4 However, the nuclear program’s newfound public face and inflexibility come at a time

when Iran’s security environment has been altered to its advantage. Although far from a faded
memory, Iran’s devastating war with Iraq has long passed, two of Iran’s foremost security

concerns have been resolved with the forced ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the American military footprint in the region is finally winding down , seen most

recently with the withdrawal of the remaining US combat forces from Iraq in late December 2011.

Although much uncertainty in the region remains in spite of these latest developments, no external threats
exist for which Iran would require a nuclear deterrent. In fact, the only possible threat which Iran could face
springs from its uncompromising desire to acquire nuclear weapons-related technology, a desire often compared to a “runaway train with no brakes”8 by
President Ahmadinejad and his hardline colleagues, making the regime’s perceived need for a nuclear weapons capability (of course according to a realist
perspective) a self-fulfilling prophecy9 . Of course and in spite of its enhanced security environment, a “conspirational interpretation of politics”10 is bound
to continue in Iran, this belief that subversive forces, both foreign and domestic, are plotting to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran at every corner (this
paranoia has certainly increased following the United States’ invasion of Iraq and policies of calling for regime change11), however, as some have already
pointed out, “hard-liners will find it increasingly difficult to justify their policies and their retention of power by referring to a hostile, predatory external
environment”.¶ That being said, any analysis of nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran would be hard-pressed to completely disregard Iran’s perceived
vulnerability, as far more than simple power asymmetries enter the threat perception calculus of state leaders, as constructivists rightfully argue. However,
what the above exposé does accomplish is to vindicate the very sound assumption that what security imperatives may have
accounted for the nuclear program’s revival in the mid-1980s may not account for
the program’s continued persistence. Let’s remember, while the nuclear program was reactivated (1986) at the height of the
Iran-Iraq War, largely confirming realist intuitions (reactivated in response to power asymmetries), since then, “the program has been

marked by persistence rather than urgency . As the absence of a crash program would
suggest, the motives for investing in a nuclear option stem more from political than security
imperatives.Ӧ Scholars have long advocated for a more nuanced approach to the study of nuclear weapons proliferation, with this in mind, this Commented [EM10]:
study will attempt to unravel the following question: What principal motivation accounts for Iran’s current hardline administration’s public and determined
Iran’s current
quest for nuclear weapons-related technology? Adopting a domestic politics model of nuclear weapons proliferation, it will be agued that

nuclear policy is designed as a calculated ploy, set forth by the regime’s hardliners, to
undermine and discredit the regime’s internal opponents. As Chubin explains, “The domestic power
struggle over resources and power is still the main issue in Iran. The nuclear issue is one — albeit
critical — aspect of it.”16¶ The domestic politics model of nuclear weapons proliferation offers a unit-level analysis of the causes of nuclear weapons
proliferation, focusing on a specific set of actors which have historically played a determining role in a number of proliferation case-studies. Sagan identifies
these key actors as being:¶ “the state’s nuclear energy establishment (which includes officials in state-run laboratories as well as civilian reactor facilities);
important units within the professional military (often within the air force, though sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion); and
politicians”.17¶ The first variant of this approach holds that powerful interest groups (scientific-military-industrial complex) often develop following a
The scientific and military communities especially have much to
state’s decision to invest in nuclear technology.

gain from the state’s decision to stay the nuclear course for reasons as varied as funding and prestige18 .
These parochial interests drive these actors to build broader coalitions, which for example, can push
the scientific community to inflate the advantages of a nuclear breakthrough or encourage the military to relay skewed threat perceptions to their leaders
increasing the value of a nuclear deterrent.¶ In Iran, there is some evidence suggesting the formation of a nuclear lobby, although pieces of physical evidence
are few and far between. Some authors claim “the head of [Iran’s] AEO [(Atomic Energy Organization)] is among the most vocal proponents of the
program”20 and that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with its growing presence in government, is actively campaigning for a nuclear weapons
capability as it is most likely to “oversee their storage, training, and deployment infrastructure.”21 Others refute these facts altogether22, setting the stage
for this model’s second variant.¶ The second variant of the domestic politics model, the one adopted throughout this paper, focuses on politicians’
Iran has entered a period of
“perceptions of the bomb’s utility and of its symbolism.”23 It must be understood that

revolutionary upheaval, and identity crisis of sorts that pits the forces embracing reform
against those advocating “retrogressive tradition.”24 While the twin pillars of the conservatives’ power base,
notably their material and ideational supremacy over their internal rivals, were strengthened in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, largely the
product of the revolutionary fervor which swept the country and Ayatollah Khomeini’s implicit, although at times wavering support, following the death of
the Father of the Revolution, this superiority was gradually usurped and undermined by two consecutive two-term presidencies. This period in Iranian
history, that of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami’s (1997-2005) tenures as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
according to President Ahmadinejad and many of his hardline colleagues, amounted to an era of great “betrayal of the revolution”25 . This, many argue,
because both Rafsanjani and Khatami threatened their political survival, “directly undermining the hard line conservatives’ prerogatives”.¶ While his
election may have come as a surprise to many, if not all, domestic and international spectators, soon after taking office, there would be little speculation on
how Ahmadinejad would seek define his tenure as president of the Islamic Republic. As Takeyh notes, “Ahmadinejad came into office determined to rekindle
the revolutionary fires that seemed long extinguished” 27 , the same fires which had catapulted the conservative hardliners at the pinnacle of the Iranian
polity nearly three decades earlier. In his quest, President Ahmadinejad has attempted to exploit and manipulate the nuclear issue in two distinct but
interrelated ways. First, President Ahmadinejad has attempted to exploit the nuclear issue in an attempt to foment and manufacture a crisis with the West,
thereby renewing the populace’s long-held feeling of embattlement. As Wehrey et al. explain, President Ahmadinejad has illustrated “the combined utility of
a siege-like mentality and the issue of nuclear power in consolidating internal support for the regime”. ¶ Second,there has been a
concerted effort to craft a concrete link between the nuclear program and Iranian
national identity. Ahmadinejad and those around him have attempted to depict the nuclear program as embodying, at times rather too
perfectly, those core principles that animated the 1979 Revolution: self-reliance, independence and equality30 . As Green et al. explain, the nuclear

program has gained an almost “mythic significance in linking these […] themes.”¶ In closing, it should be remembered that
even “clandestine nuclear programs are taken seriously by the opponents and tacit nuclear deterrence works”32, however, if a nuclear program is to gain
added symbolic meaning, as in a tool for internal political consumption and legitimation which will be argued the case in Iran, nuclear intentions need to be
known. Therefore, what was described in the introductory paragraphs of this section, notably the popularization of the nuclear issue and an unprecedented
belligerent nuclear posture, at the very least gives reason for this study’s hypothesis. As Chubin writes, “Above all, the nuclear issue is
one of symbolism”.
We have the best theoretical defense of how treaty compliance operates-
--credible military deterrence is key to make sanctions effective and
ensure compliance in the event of sanctions failure
Michael Singh 15, managing director and Lane-Swig senior fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, former worker on Middle East issues at the National Security
Council, “This Deal or War? Misadventures in Deterring Iran,” 9/15/15,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/this-iran-deal-or-war-misadventures-in-deterring-
iran/
Paradoxically, even had U.S. military threat been credible, the “this deal or war” formulation would still have been false; i ndeed, it would
have disproved itself. The
United States did not and does not desire a conflict with Iran, but
retains the capacity to prosecute one if necessary. By contrast, the Iranian regime cannot
afford a military clash with the United States. If Iranian leaders felt that the United States
would respond militarily to certain nuclear advances (or other actions), they most likely would be
deterred from taking those actions.
During the final phase of the nuclear talks, the United States sacrificed its leverage by forsaking deterr ence. In any negotiation, each party
must compare the deal on offer with the likely alternatives. By denigrating or dismissing the alternatives to a negotiated ac cord —
whether strengthened sanctions or military action — Western negotiators allowed Iran to hold out for a better deal. Despite U.S.
assertions that officials were ready to walk away from the negotiating table, in reality American rhetoric suggested that we had nowhere
to go.

This might all now be primarily a matter of historical interest were it not for the fact that deterrence
will continue to
play a vital role in enforcing or improving the nuclear accord in the coming years.
States adhere to treaties not because they harbor a sense of fairness or deference to
legal authority, but because they keenly appreciate their national interests. These
commitments are kept out of concern for the consequences of other courses of action
rather than mere fealty to the text. In this sense, treaties tend not to shape reality but
codify it — states often would take the actions pledged in a treaty even in its absence. In such cases, what treaties usefully provide is Commented [EM11]:
enhanced exchange of information. Rather than each side simply guessing about whether the other is taking a particular action , treaties
provide a mechanism for dialogue and verification to provide greater assurance, thereby preventing misunderstandings.

Therefore, Iran must continue to believe it remains in its interest to keep its
commitments as the nuclear deal is implemented. For this to be the case, the consequences of
violating the deal must be serious and credible. These should include renewed sanctions, which are certainly
preferable to military action if they can be made effective. But sanctions work only with the cooperation of
other states, including some (like Russia or China) that are unlikely to be sympathetic
to U.S. concerns regarding Iranian behavior. Even with broad international support, the pressure of sanctions may be
insufficient or take effect too slowly to deter Iran in a scenario where it is
determined to gain nuclear weapons.
For this reason, the United States must retain and project a credible military option in the
event of Iranian violations. This will not only deter Iran, but will also provide a powerful
incentive to other states to urge Iran to keep its commitments. In the event of an Iranian failure to
comply with the deal, a credible U.S. military option will also help convince other states to
join the United States in re-imposing sanctions, even if only to avert an American military
action against Iran that would be damaging to their interests.
 A2 Video Monitoring Solves
Inspections don’t solve---Iran can easily subvert them
Michael Mandelbaum 15, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb:
The Case for Deterrence,” 7/30/15, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/07/30/its-the-deterrence-stupid/
The third dire consequence of permitting Iran to have a full-scale enrichment infrastructure is that
this places
an impossible burden on the program of international inspections to ensure
compliance with the terms of the Vienna agreement. Inspections can work as confidence-building measures, when the country
being inspected has no enrichment facilities, does not intend to build them, and is eager for the rest of the world to know t his. When, as in
the case of Iran, none of these conditions obtains, when inspection is an adversarial rather than a
cooperative exercise, it becomes a game of hide and seek in which the hiders have an
overwhelming advantage. They control the country in question and the inspectors’ access to it.
For this reason much of the debate about the details of the July 14 accord is, in a sense, beside the point. Whatever the
agreement says, the Iranian regime will decide what international inspectors will see and
when they will see it; and “the regime” in this case means not the English speakers with advanced degrees from Western
universities with whom the American and European negotiators have spent long hours in luxury hotels in Europe but rather the m ullahs,
terrorists, and thugs whose chief contact with the United States has been devising ways to kill American soldiers in Iraq. Having achieved
the capacity to enrich uranium, Iran now enjoys, to borrow a metaphor from the world of sports, an overwhelming
home-field advantage.

Tech improvements not sufficient to ensure compliance—10 years prove

Iran will still cheat
David Sanger 15, Awaiting Iran Deal, Nuclear Sleuths Gather Sophisticated Tools, and
WILLIAM J. BROAD, JULY 6, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/world/middleeast/nuclear-inspectors-await-
chance-to-use-modern-tools-in-iran.html?_r=0
Mr. Heinonen, the onetime inspection chief, sounded a note of caution, saying it would
be naïve to expect that the wave of technology could ensure Iran’s compliance with the
nuclear deal. In the past, he said, Tehran has often promised much but delivered little.¶ “Iran
is not going to accept it easily,” he said, referring to the advanced surveillance. “We tried it for 10
years.Ӧ Even if Tehran agrees to high-tech sleuthing, Mr. Heinonen added, that step will be
“important but minor” compared with the intense monitoring that Western
intelligence agencies must mount to see if Iran is racing ahead in covert facilities to
build an atomic bomb.¶ He said that possibility, considered remote but not beyond the pale, “is the biggest challenge.”
Semis
1NC
Off
 1
Transitioning OPCON destroys deterrence against the North---causes
nuclear war
Robert M. Collins 13, 37-year veteran employee of the U.S. Department of the Army and
served 31 years in various positions with the U.S. military in Korea, including several
liaison positions with the Republic of Korea military, 9/3/13, “STRATEGIC RISK VS.
STRATEGIC VISION: OPCON TRANSITION WITHIN THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE,”
http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/strategic-risk-vs-strategic-vision-opcon-transition-
within-the-rok-u-s-alliance/
As these trade dynamics continue to mature, Seoul’s vision of where its national interests will lie beyond the North Korean threat
The North Korean threat has not
remains an issue of great debate within the ROK. But there is a catch-22 in this debate.
gone away and is now a two-edged sword. Not only do North Korean nukes, missiles,
cyber attacks and other asymmetric capabilities present a major risk to Seoul’s security,
but, somewhat paradoxically, North Korea’s instability is a threat also, and not one of small consequence. A
collapse of the Kim regime, which would turn the North into a quagmire of famine, loose nukes, and internal civil war,
would demand a commitment from the ROK that would bring its economy to its knees and
considerably weaken its security posture within the region. China’s outsized influence on both Pyongyang and
Seoul’s economic activity, which will continue to grow, only complicates the security calculus of all parties committed to peace and
security in Northeast Asia.

However, the threat goes beyond that. North Korea’s well-documented proliferation of nuclear and missile technology proves that the
Kim regime will sell anything to anyone. The North Korean proliferation threat to the U.S. is now a major factor in Washington’s
In that the Proliferation Security Initiative has not deterred
calculation of strategic risk to American national security.
the Kim regime’s continuing development of weapons of mass destruction, the ROK-U.S. alliance
may become more important to Washington than ever before. Bluntly stated, the U.S. now needs
forward deployed capabilities to deter North Korean use of nuclear-armed missiles
with the capability to target the U.S. mainland and territories.
So how do security interests in Seoul and Washington square with OPCON transition in
2015? How does America’s sequestration impact U.S. commitment after the transition? Can the ROK really trust that the U.S. can
afford its commitment to the alliance through forward presence? Can the ROK afford a lessened American
presence on the Korean Peninsula? And considering North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, is the U.S. willing to
“sacrifice Los Angeles to save Seoul?”

These issues create considerable angst in a nation-state that historically has had to sacrifice some level of security autonomy in order to
maintain stability. At some point, as the North’s nuclear missile program becomes a reality, it will become obvious in the ROK that the
OPCON transition in 2015 may be a moment of pride for the citizenry
U.S. is not willing to incur infinite risk to protect the ROK.
of South Korea, but it will
forever change the way the U.S. approaches the region and will
shape the potential for unilateral U.S. military responses when North Korean nuclear
missiles are not a potential but a fact. On whom will Seoul rely at that time? A far-ranging vision is necessary to avoid war with
the North.

This all sounds ugly and unrealistic today, but ten years ago it was unimaginable. North-South unification is a distant dream. Does Seoul
have a vision for 2030 and beyond? For starters, who
might be its primary security partner, and at what cost in
This is the fundamental question of how to balance
terms of ROK military, political, and economic autonomy?
future security risks with a vision for ROK domestic and international leadership. Whoever it is,
 If it is the U.S., OPCON transition in its current conception may
Seoul must begin to shape that partnership today.
not be the best shaping tool. But if it is China, OPCON transition is the starting point.
China is arguably becoming the most economically and diplomatically influential foreign power on the entire peninsula, in both the North
It is not difficult to see that an expanded economic influence from China and a
and the South.
decreased military influence from the U.S. could be catastrophic for the ROK should
the North initiate a significant provocation or violate the Demilitarized Zone in a substantive way.
OPCON transition within the ROK-U.S. alliance is much more than a mere change in the military lead in the defense of the ROK.
It means the end of a combined warfighting command that has stood as the bedrock of
deterrence for three and a half decades. The consequences of this fundamental choice for all
regional actors, including Pyongyang and Tokyo, will be unfathomable by today’s limited understanding. At some
point, Seoul’s strategic vision must mitigate strategic risk with an alliance structure not designed
by national pride but equipped to meet the evolving security, political, and economic needs—and risk tolerance—
of the South Korean people.

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globally

Steven Metz 13, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, “Strategic
Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-
unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war
North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S.
Today,

security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while
declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the
press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American
policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be dangerous as
events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. ¶ In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council
recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger,
Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South
Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an
escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He
No American leader wants
might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. ¶

another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre
official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American
policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent
U.S. war began with miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of
their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North
Korea could repeat this pattern. ¶ Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically
to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the

edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of
internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the

recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would
be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime
 The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South
might mean for U.S. security. ¶

Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something
North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons , but even if they didn't, the

United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. ¶ The war itself

would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward
but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist
U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United
States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency
could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and
Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation,
The second Korean War would force military
whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. ¶

mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably
ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure

and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government

spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if
Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would
shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia .
¶ Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to
simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate.
Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. ¶ China would pose the most
pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he
invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second
Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the
world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute
to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. ¶ Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified
Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be,
Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its
the result could easily be heightened hostility
history. ¶ If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly,

between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic
connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily
involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second
Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things
have happened in statecraft.
 2
Military presence requires the physical stationing of armed forces
Degang Sun 13, Ph.D. in International Affairs from Shanghai International Studies
University, senior visiting researcher at Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College,
University of Oxford and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, associate professor of Political
Science and a senior researcher at the Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International
Studies University, “The Strategic Evolution of US Military Presence in Iraq,”
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/184516/ichaptersection_singledocument
/203d394c-0bcc-4350-8b67-c39f73e87668/en/7.pdf
military presence refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign state’s
In this chapter, foreign

where a certain number of armed forces are stationed and which has military activities,
jurisdiction,

organized institutions, and military facilities.7 It is by nature the geographical and functional extension of a country’s
domestic military deployment.

Violation---transitioning OPCON doesn’t reduce U.S. presence---just

shifts the Combined Forces Command into two national commands
Mark E. Manyin 14, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 6/24/14,
“U.S.-South Korea Relations,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf
The United States has agreed to turn over the wartime command of Korean troops to
South Korea, but the two sides will likely postpone this transfer for several years. Under the current command arrangement,
which is a legacy of U.S. involvement in the 1950-1953 Korean War, South Korea’s soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if
there were a war on the peninsula. The plan to transfer wartime operational control was undertaken to recognize South Korea’s
advances in economic and military strength since the Korean War and is seen by many as important for South Korean sovereignty. In
2007, Secretary Rumsfeld accepted a proposal by President Roh Moo-hyun to set up separate South Korean and U.S. military commands
by April 2012. A
U.S.-ROK operational control agreement will dismantle the U.S.-ROK
Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been headed by the U.S. commander in
Korea. Separate U.S. and ROK military commands will be established. In accord with
the plan, a new U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be established. Under the Opcon
agreement, a bilateral Military Cooperation Center will be responsible for planning
military operations, joint military exercises, logistics support, and intelligence
exchanges, and assisting in the operation of the communication, command, control, and computer systems.

Vote neg---
a) Limits---they allow any reshuffling of legal arrangements with host
countries which overstretches neg prep and prevents clash on core
topic debates
b) Ground---transitioning OPCON while maintaining troop presence is
far less change---eliminates our best arguments
Shelley Su 12, MA Candidate, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies, 2012, “The OPCON Transfer Debate,” http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Su_YB2011.pdf
In a 2006 Gallup study, conducted while discussions of the OPCON transition were
ongoing, 71 percent of the public was strongly against US forces leaving South Korea .
Of course, US forces leaving South Korea is a much more extreme action than an OPCON
transition, but ROK sentiment clearly preferred retaining a US presence. The
strength of this preference is even more telling because the polling was done during
a time when South Korea’s public opinion of the United States was at a low point. The Pew
Global Attitudes Project does not specifically show the 2006 percentages for favorable/unfavorable ROK public opinion to ward the
United States, but relatively speaking, the favorability ratings from 2002 to 2007 were low (between 46 and 58 percent) compa red with
79 percent favorability ratings more recently in 2010. Even in the early 2000s, with such low favorability, South Koreans wanted US
forces in their country. Asked in 2006 if they believed that South Korea could handle its own national defense and security, only 27
percent of respondents said yes, while 66 percent said that a US withdrawal would have a large negative impact on the stability of
Northeast Asia.
 3
ROK is building up a blue-water navy now---the plan forces a tradeoff
Doug Bandow 9/2, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Newsflash: the U.S.-South Korea
Military Alliance Isn’t Working,” Sep 2 2015,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/newsflash-us-south-korea-military-
alliance-isnt-working
the South has even surrendered control of its armed forces to the United States. Wartime
Indeed,

OPCON, goes to the American military. Decades have gone by, but the South Koreans say
operational control, or

they still aren’t ready to manage their own troops. Some officials candidly admit that they fear
taking control might encourage Washington to bring home its forces. Thus, dependence has
become a strategy to ensure a continued place on America’s defense dole.¶ It’s obvious why Seoul takes
this approach. Feigning helplessness can be embarrassing, even humiliating. ROK officials occasionally resent American meddling in their defense decisions,
including in how to respond to Pyongyang’s ubiquitous provocations. Many South Koreans dislike the inevitable social impact of so many U.S. troops.¶
Seoul takes the money saved
Nevertheless, most countries would like to have a superpower pick up a big chunk of their defense tabs.

and invests it in export-oriented industries, education and other domestic programs, and even prestige military assets,
such as a blue-water navy designed for use well beyond the Korean peninsula. South
Korea would still be prosperous and influential if it had to cover the full cost of its defense, but it would face a
tougher set of trade-offs—as does the United States.

Blue-water navy buildup is key to cooperation with India on Indian

Ocean security
Mingi Hyun 10, research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Nov 18 2010,
“South Korea's Blue-water Ambitions,” http://thediplomat.com/2010/11/south-koreas-
blue-water-ambitions/?allpages=yes
The ROKN’s ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia have been only the most visible sign that the country is stepping up on the international maritime stage. But

why is South Korea pursuing a blue-water naval

such missions come at an enormous cost, both in terms of time and resources. So

strategy? And what does it plan to do with it?¶ The answer to the former question seems, more than anything, to rest in a desire to boost
South Korea’s international status. Despite being a war-torn, relatively poor country in the 1950s, six decades of rapid
growth have seen it develop into one of the world’s wealthiest nations.¶ This rapid economic growth has been
heavily dependent on maritime access—about 99 percent of its international trade has depended on access to the world’s oceans and waterways. Indeed, with diplomatically isolated
North Korea as the only country with which it shares a land border, South Korea has often felt more like an island.¶ But the country’s rapid economic growth relies in large part on
developing countries, many of whom continue to be plagued by instability. Meanwhile, South Korea had no way of defending its overseas interests, meaning that for years the country
was reaching its arms around the globe without a shield.¶ With such concerns in mind, Admiral An Byoung-Tae, then chief of naval operations, asked President Kim Young-Sam in
1995 to prepare for the construction of a blue-water navy. With Kim’s blessing, the ROKN began expanding and shaping its force structure to accommodate future threats.¶ Almost a
decade later, Admiral An wrote an article that made public his vision for what a blue-water navy could mean. According to An, the ROKN should be capable of extended operations
within East Asia and short-term operations in more distant theatres such as the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz. He said the navy should also be able to operate as a member of
a multinational coalition, which would enable the South Korean government to play a greater role in international efforts and allow it to better shape the political landscape. Although
the ROKN wasn’t envisaged as being as large as Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force or the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), as noted in World Village at the time, An still
wanted the South Korean government to havea louder voice in international affairs.¶ But the development of a more powerful navy isn’t just in South Korea’s interests—it should be
seen as good news for the rest of Asia too. The region is, after all, full of rivalries, internal conflicts and territorial disputes as well as being prone to natural disasters and the effects of
climate change—all potential triggers for unrest and destabilization.¶ The 2004 tsunami underscored the need for organized and capable forces to respond to events in the region, yet
very few Asian navies possess the size and quality necessary to undertake, much less lead, major relief efforts in such an expansive theatre.¶ At present, responsibility for overseas
maritime operations falls largely on the shoulders of Mobile Task Flotilla 7 (jae7 gidongjeondan), an infant version of a planned future power projection-capable fleet whose floated
name has been the Strategic Mobile Fleet (jeollyakgidonghamdae). Established in February, Mobile Task Flotilla 7 is initially composed of the destroyers the ROKN has acquired since
2002—namely the six 4,500-ton KDX-2 and the two 7,500-ton AEGIS-equipped KDX-3 destroyers—as well as a third KDX-3 to be commissioned over the next couple of years.¶ Both
types of ship are multi-role destroyers whose heavy displacement and large hull size allow for the installation of more sophisticated sensors such as the SPY-1D radar on the KDX-3,
and a greater variety (and quantity) of longer-range ordnances, such as the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) anti-air missile, the Harpoon and Sea Star (Haeseong) anti-surface missiles, and
the Red Shark (Hongsangeo) anti-submarine rocket (ASROC). Equally important, the destroyers’ large hulls give them greater fuel capacity and the ability to operate on the high seas
even in the harshest conditions.¶ Outside Mobile Task Flotilla 7, the ROKN possesses other vessels capable of overseas deployments. Foremost among them is the 18,000-ton ROKS
Dokdo, a flat-deck amphibious assault ship and the largest East Asian naval combat vessel. ROKS Dokdo can accommodate, launch and maintain multiple helicopters and should be
capable of doing the same with multiple unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling the ROKN to deploy a respectable contingent of aircraft in state-to-state and non-state operations.¶
Another benefit of the Dokdo is that it can also function as a sea base capable of accommodating and transporting marines and providing a flexible, mobile and politically palatable way
of facilitating South Korea’s growing participation in multilateral peace operations. This ensures that any operations near or along a foreign coastline won’t have to temporarily
‘occupy’ a portion of foreign territory and operate out of stationary land bases, which restricts mobility.¶ But although these large ships can operate anywhere in the world, it’s
important to note that the ROKN’s motivations behind a blue-water navy aren’t entirely ‘outward-looking.’ South Korea’s blue-water aspirations are often represented as being geared
solely toward power projection. But there’s more to it than that.¶ For a start, the flexible deployment of high-end naval assets throughout Korean waters is aimed at allowing South
Korea to neutralize nearby threats, including North Korean forces (and, if need be, those of ally China). In addition, the speedy deployment of major vessels such as destroyers outside
Korean waters allows the country to quickly move to defend national and international interests overseas.¶ The defence potential was underscored by the central role played by the
KDX-2 destroyers during ‘Invincible Spirit,’ the largest-ever United States-South Korea naval exercise, which was held in July in the East Sea. Remaining true to its name, Mobile Task
Flotilla 7 moved quickly between various domestic theatres to undertake highly sophisticated operations. Without these destroyers, the ROKN would have been left to watch the allied
naval exercises from the sidelines, playing only a supplementary role using its smaller corvettes and patrol boats. The same would have been true in the event of an actual war.¶ Since
April 2009, the KDX-2 destroyers have been rotating every few months to allow South Korean vessels to operate continuously along the Somali coast, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean and to conduct successful counter-piracy operations as a member of the multinational Combined Task Force-151 led by the United States Navy. The ROKS Gang Gam-Chan alone
safely escorted a total of 488 commercial ships during its most recent four-month rotation, thwarting all attempted pirate attacks in the process.¶ The destroyers have also
participated in numerous bilateral, trilateral and multinational exercises in distant waters with the navies of Japan, Singapore, India, Turkey and various European countries, including
the Pacific Reach submarine rescue exercise and the Cobra Gold multinational amphibious assault exercise.¶ But it’s not just Mobile Task Flotilla 7 that has been seeing some action. As
reported in Defense Daily, the ROKS Hyangrobong, an amphibious vessel, was dispatched to Indonesia during the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, while Gojunbong class amphibious
vessels set sail between 2001 and 2003 as part of the US-led Global War on Terror, transporting military hardware and humanitarian supplies to Guam, Singapore, the Philippines and
Diego Garcia.¶ So what does the future hold for Korean naval power? Over the coming decades, the ROKN’s strategic objectives will most likely look much like today’s efforts to
straddle threats tothe country’s own territory and its overseas concerns. The former should, of course, remain the ROKN’s priority. As such, the number of ROKN vessels available for

recent South Korean media reports

deployment overseas will depend largely on the stability or otherwise around the Korean Peninsula.¶ That said,

indicate there will be further naval procurement, which would give South Korea greater
breathing room to deploy a larger number of vessels throughout Asia.These planned ships reportedly
include another batch of KDX-2 destroyers, a new class of 4,500-ton amphibious assault ships and at least 10 next-generation KDX-2A destroyers. Should these procurement
programmes be realized, the ROKN will have well over 20 blue-water vessels sometime during the 2020’s.¶ Yet there’s more to developing an effective navy than just sheer number of
vessels—the ROKN will need to devise ways to turn its scattered, ad-hoc overseas initiatives into something more regimented. The solution for this could lay in the US Navy-led Global
Maritime Partnership. Rooted in the ‘1000-ship navy’ concept first introduced in 2005, the Global Maritime Partnership’s primary objective has been to use the combined capabilities
of multinational maritime forces to undertake operations aimed at stabilizing situations across the globe.¶ As the Global Maritime Partnership isn’t a binding agreement, participating
navies may change from operation to operation, while some navies may participate only sporadically depending on the geographic location and political conditions. But

through this continuous wave of multinational operations and exercises, the ROKN could find ample
opportunities for constant and ‘normalized’ overseas participation, while gradually
increasing its contributions. By doing so, it can also develop a greater familiarity and
intimacy with Asia’s key naval actors—Japan, India, Singapore and Australia—which
would further enhance the ROKN’s ability to operate in multinational and multicultural
arrangements.¶ The impressive advances the South Korean Navy has made are already giving it some of the greater recognition it has been seeking. In September, A.K.
Antony became the first Indian defence minister to visit South Korea. A major motivation for his visit was undoubtedly growing concern over a rising China, and India is

said to be keen to enhance naval cooperation with South Korea in the Indian Ocean.¶
Earlier this month, meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto publicly expressed his desire for greater security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, stating that it is
‘very important’ for regional stability that Japan and South Korea form defence ties alongside the US-Japan alliance. Kan’s statement marked the first time in history that a Japanese

But the potential for greater security co-operation

prime minister had officially stated his desire for military ties with South Korea.¶

with Japan and India rests largely on South Korea’s navy—by far the country’s most
able power projection service. Although the kind of co-operation discussed between South Korea and India and Japan won’t always be explicitly
aimed at China, it’s no secret in the region that the PLAN’s build-up is a key driver behind the unprecedented scale of naval modernization programmes taking place across Asia.¶ The
Indian and Japanese overtures then are just part of a bigger picture that's forming in the Asia-Pacific. But it’s already clear that the ROKN’s blue-water development has given the
country at least some of the prestige and influence that Admiral An had envisaged. Fortunately for a region that faces the unwelcome prospect of a deteriorating security climate, the

past 15 years have seen only the beginning of South Korea's blue-water ambitions.

ROK-India coop is key to manage Chinese perceptions of Indian defense

buildups---economic ties with the ROK allow them to check Chinese
aggression in the Indian Ocean without triggering containment fears
Rajaram Panda 11, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “India-
Republic of Korea Military Diplomacy : Past and Future Projections,” Vol 5. No 1. January
2011, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_5_1_rpanda.pdf
India and the ROK should form a military alliance. What is argued is that both countries should
This paper does not suggest that

leverage their commonalities to expand military exchanges and deepen military cooperation.
The bright sign of this aspect of the relationship is that both have already signed an MoU for the National Defence Development Cooperation. The next logical
step is to institutionalise high ranking military officers’ meetings. Cooperation to address transnational threats such as maritime terrorism and piracy also
needs to be strengthened. The Indian government should seriously consider posting a defence attaché in its embassy in Seoul, instead of allocating dual
Enhancing defence and military
charge to its attaché posted in Tokyo. India and the ROK have no conflict of interests.

cooperation can put both countries in a win-win situation and thereby bolster both nations’
standing in regional and international forums.¶ China might feel uncomfortable with the strengthening of ROK-India
 China is already
military cooperation but it would be far less uncomfortable with direct India-US military cooperation. As mentioned earlier,

wary of India getting closer to the US after the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. In view of the growing relations with the US,
India might find it prudent to forge similar ties with the ROK, which is a major US ally in North East Asia. For the US,
it would be strategically convenient to encourage the relationship as it will be another means to expand the US sphere of influence within the Asia Pacific
as the ROK-China economic ties are strong, any military
region. Seen from another perspective-

engagement between the ROK and India will not create any misunderstanding in China
that it is a US-led strategy to keep China under check. On the other hand, a strong India-
ROK military cooperation that also accrues economic dividends will be welcome as it would contribute
towards deepening economic interdependence in the Asian region . Also, a multilateral
security cooperation framework that takes on board India, the ROK, Japan, the US, Russia, Australia and China similar to the OSCE may be
worth-exploring. It will advance peace and stability in the Asian region. Such cooperative strategy by a consortium

of powers can check (not contain) China’s claims over disputed islands in South China Sea and its

maritime expansionism strategy and thereby halt China’s influence in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

That’s key to Indian Ocean stability---only a middle ground between

Indian surrender and containment prevents destabilizing naval
competition
James R. Holmes 8, and Toshi Yoshihara, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval
War College, “CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,”
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/Indian-Ocean-Regional-Studies-
Group/documents/NWCR_Strategic-Triangle-in-IO_HolmesYoshihara.aspx
As a fi rst step in this endeavor, this article examines a key ingredient in the expected emergence of a “strategic triangle”—the prospects of Indian sea power.
While no one has rigorously defi ned this international-relations metaphor, scholars typically use it to convey a strategic interplay of interests among three
nationstates. In this initial foray, we employ the term fairly loosely, using it to describe a pattern of cooperation and competition among the United States,
Indian Ocean stability will hinge largely on how India manages
China, and India. It is our contention that

its maritime rise. On the one hand, if a robust Indian maritime presence were to fail to
materialize, New Delhi would essentially be forced to surrender its interests in regional waters, leaving
a strategic vacuum to the United States and China. On the other hand, if powerful Indian naval
forces were one day to be used for exclusionary purposes, the region would almost certainly become
an arena for naval competition. Either undesirable outcome would be shaped in part by how India views its own maritime
prerogatives and by how Washington and Beijing weigh the probabilities of India’s nautical success or failure in the Indian Ocean. ¶ If all three

parties foresee a muscular Indian naval policy, then, a more martial environment in the
Indian Ocean will likely take shape. But if the three powers view India and each other with
equanimity, the prospects for cooperation will brighten considerably. Capturing the perspectives of the
three powers on India’s maritime ambitions is thus a critical analytical starting point.

That causes nuke war---maritime competition is uniquely likely to

escalate
Sahil Mathur 14, PhD Scholar in the Indian Institute of Technology, “China, Indian Ocean &
the Nuclear Deterrence: The Destabilizing Effect,” Feb 2014, http://www.ipcs.org/issue-
brief/china/china-indian-ocean-the-nuclear-deterrence-the-destabilizing-effect-245.html
As China continues to grow it needs energy steadily, resources to meet the increasing needs of its rising population. A majority of the oil
imported by China passes through the Indian Ocean , especially through the Strait of Malacca. Given its geographical proximity and historical linkages, India, the other
 China believes increasing its own presence in the region as
rising Asian power, has traditionally had an influence over the Region. Hence, , unsurprisingly,

an imperative ¶ The situation becomes grim when one realises that all the
to preserve its national interests. further

major countries in the region are nuclear-equipped . Apart from India, China, and Pakistan actively indulging in nuclear testing, the US too has a naval presence

¶
in the Region. ¶ The prevailing nuclear
What are the implications of Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) vis-a-vis the concerns of India, Pakistan, and the United States (US)?

environment is far from stable, with four nuclear states that have strategic interests in the region.

India is wary of the threat from China.

While Pakistan is building its nuclear stockpile (allegedly with China’s help) to deter India, The successful India-US nuclear deal has raised the possibility of an

India is well within range of China’s land-based

India–US alliance to counter a China–Pakistan alliance in the event of a conflict that could involve nuclear weapons.

nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and worried about China’s is establishment of a ‘string of pearls’ – by constructing ports – in its neighbouring

effort to militarise, and possibly nuclearise the region ¶

countries in an . China claims that this strategy is only to provide it with alternative sea lanes and trade routes
to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint; India doubts it. New Delhi’s launch of the Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in 2009 indicates its desire to nuclearise its navy. India is not as well equipped as China, and Beijing

advancement of efforts to
doesn’t view New Delhi as a serious threat. However, the presence of Chinese naval nuclear power has created an uneasy atmosphere in the Indian Ocean Region.¶ This essay argues that the

realise Chinese interests has the potential to destabilise the region , and that both India and China need to take significant measures to

maintain the current deterrence.¶ I¶ The South Asian Nuclear Dynamic¶ The South Asian nuclear dynamic is complex, and one that is presently facing a diplomatic impasse, with no direct talks or negotiations on nuclear policy. India cites the threat from China, and not
Pakistan, as the primary reason for the development of its own nuclear programme. George Fernandes, former Defence Minister, Government of India, made it explicit in a statement he made following the 1998 Pokhran tests. India held the fear that all of its major cities were
within range of Chinese nuclear missiles, and considered this a legitimate justification for its nuclear initiatives. India enthusiastically went ahead with nuclear weapons testing, arguing that the provision, that only the P5 nations could hold nuclear arsenal, was unfair (Burns,
1998). Naturally, this allegation did not go well with Beijing, that in turn criticised India for making baseless allegations and accused India’s rationale as being ‘totally unreasonable’.¶ To this day, China refuses to engage in nuclear talks with India as it stands by the UN
Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India to stop all further nuclear testing, as well as because India is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Pant, 2010). As a consequence, China does not apply the concept of ‘No-First-Use’ (NFU) – which
is otherwise an essential component of Chinese nuclear doctrine – to India (Cunningham & Medcalf, 2011). Resultantly, India has concerns while dealing with China. ¶ In the midst of this tussle, Islamabad believed (justifiably so) that India’s nuclear weapons programme was
aimed at Pakistan (Rehman, 2012), not China; which it probably was. Given the historical conflict between the two states, and the vulnerability of the major Pakistani power centres owing to geographical proximity to the Indian border, it is not surprising that the Pakistanis
came to such a conclusion. The situation becomes particularly precarious when it comes to the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic. Although India espouses an NFU policy, Pakistan does not. Instead, Pakistan’s India-centric nuclear doctrine has a set of four conditions on the
basis of which it would proceed with a nuclear attack on its eastern neighbour. These conditions are: large-scale penetration by the Indian Armed Forces into Pakistani territory; large-scale destruction of the Pakistan Armed Forces; economic strangulation of Pakistan; and
the political destabilisation by India (Kumar, 2004). ¶ Hypothetically, India may be faced with a situation where a non-nuclear war could escalate into a nuclear war, in which case India would have to concentrate on its second strike capability. This is probably the reason why
India has an assertive nuclear doctrine, assuring second strike wherever there is capability (Cunningham & Medcalf, 2011). The Sino‐Pakistan nuclear relationship has introduced an interesting twist to the aforementioned nuclear dynamic. Historically, China has supported
Pakistan’s nuclear programme; Beijing has even provided Islamabad with essential material for developing nuclear programme. Although China officially claims that its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan falls within International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) norms,
reports from the US intelligence as well as the surfacing of the A. Q. Khan network have indubitably proved that China has had a major hand in equipping Pakistan with nuclear weapons (China's nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan, 1999). ¶ Gurmeet Kanwal (2000)
even takes the extreme position of stating that it is China that is intimidating India using Pakistan as the means. While this is unlikely to be the sole reason for Pakistan’s aggressive policy, one cannot let facts go unnoticed. China’s collaboration with Pakistan also highlights its
double standards when it comes to its stance on adherence to the NPT and UNSC Resolution 1172. Though the resolution was directed at both India and Pakistan, China was hesitant to condemn Pakistan, yet eager to condemn India for its nuclear tests in 1998 (China and the
nuclear tests in South Asia, 1999).¶ Arguments have been made, especially after the success of the India‐US nuclear deal, that the Sino‐Pakistan relationship could be countered by a possible India‐US alliance. In fact, the US desires such an alliance in order to contain the rise
of China as a regional hegemon (Brewster, 2009). However, this balance of (nuclear) power in South Asia is not that easy to achieve. While the Sino‐Pakistan relationship has been called an ‘all‐weather friendship’ (Cunningham, 2011; China‐Pakistan all‐weather friendship
scales new heights, 2012), the India‐US relationship is only a ‘fair‐weather friendship’ (Brewster, 2009). This is because the US realises that it cannot always oppose China, given the larger role Beijing plays in the international system. ¶ A reassessment of the US strategy in
the Indian Ocean Region by Geraghty (2012) recommends that Washington abandon New Delhi as a security partner in the region given ’ndia's extreme strategic independence. In other words, the US cannot rely on India to pursue activities that are in Washington’s national

there is reluctance on the part of

interests.¶ All these factors contribute to the existing mistrust between the powers of South Asia. As much as there is an obvious reluctance to initiate a nuclear war, also

all the powers to initiate nuclear dialogue with the aim of stability . The reasons for this vary from bilateral disputes such as the
India–China border dispute to disproportionate nuclear capabilities, to non‐adherence to international nuclear protocol. Lora Saalman (2012) argues that while the land‐based nuclear warheads serve as deterrence, the sea becomes the arena for showcasing development in

was first used

nuclear and missile technology in the case of India and China. Keeping this in mind, the next part of the paper discusses the maritime nuclear situation in the Indian Ocean. ¶ II A String of Pearls? ¶ The term by a 2004 Booz‐Allen

in trying to describe the elaborate system of ports developed by China in the IOR
report – from Sittwe in

with the alleged aim of a strategic encirclement of the

Myanmar, to Gwadar in Pakistan, with ports in Chittagong, Bangladesh, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka –

whole of India . The map in Figure 1 helps in visually imagining a ‘string of pearls’ hugging the Asian coastline that places China in a very advantageous strategic position. Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal (2000) put forth the idea even before the term

came into existence. He argues that China is aiming to contain the rise of India in the Indian Ocean by forming friendly relationships with all of its maritime neighbours, thereby creating a legible threat from sea. ¶ The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made strides
in its naval nuclear capabilities, deploying three Jin‐class (Type 094) nuclear‐ powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in active service as of 2007 (Kristensen, 2007). This has made the Chinese nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean an immediate possibility. This has
resulted in New Delhi hot on Beijing’s heels, by undertaking sustained efforts to develop the Indian Navy. While India’s INS Chakra, a nuclear‐ powered attack submarine (SSN) leased from Russia is in active service, the Arihant‐class SSBN, launched in 2009, is currently
undergoing sea trials (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). Despite Rehman (2012) and Saalman (2012) arguing that the recent Indian forays into naval nuclear capability are merely demonstrations of technology, it is hard to downplay the importance of these

developments ¶ These pursuits toe the lines of the China’s nuclear doctrine of limited
.

deterrence and India's doctrine of credible minimum deterrence

(Medeiros, 2008) (Kumar, 2004). In the absence of any maritime protocol

the pessimistic scenario could readily turn into an arms race and a
agreement between the two countries,

security dilemma in the Indian Ocean The Pakistan Navy would also be dragged (Rehman, 2012).

into the picture naval nuclear capabilities . Thebuilt with the intention of increasing of the countries, originally

national security, would have the exact opposite effect as a nuclear‐charged IOR would
result in increased insecurity .
 4
OPCON transition causes South Korea to agree to deploy THAAD missile
defense
Clint Work 14, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago’s Committee
on International Relations, 7/9/14, “South Korea: Dependence in the Age of OPCON,”
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-
opcon/?allpages=yes
While OPCON transition gives rise to concerns over the credibility of the U.S. commitment, it also heightens the
possibility of entrapment for Seoul. Which is to say, the necessary steps toward transfer of
control could involve the ROK in U.S.-driven policies that it would rather avoid. This is
evident in the case of missile defense. The ROK is undoubtedly concerned about the DPRK’s
missile program and recently stated that its own Korean Air and Missile Defense system (KAMD) is incapable
of independently intercepting the DPRK’s Rodong-class weapons. While it has various plans to
upgrade its low-tier system, Seoul recently stated that it is open to the potential U.S. deployment of a Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Korean Peninsula. This could signal Seoul harnessing a U.S.
commitment in order to avoid strategic decoupling or abandonment, but it could also lead to
entrapment.

On the one hand, Seoul is open to the THAAD deployment because it offers another layer of defense at no initial cost. Also, the system
could potentially be integrated into KAMD through a later purchase, thus enhancing Seoul’s ability to
more independently deter the threat from Pyongyang. Taking on full operational control
would require as much. At this point, Seoul denies it has plans to purchase such a system.
On the other hand, many U.S. officials and defense analysts view the potential THAAD deployment as another step towards integ rating
the ROK into the larger US-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. In fact, there has been speculation that Washington is pushing
Seoul to join its Missile Defense system as quid pro quo for delaying OPCON transfer. The
U.S. has pressured South
Korea to join its regional system for some time, which the ROK has thus far officially refrained
from doing, due mainly to the negative impact it would have on its increasingly important bilateral
relationship with China. Beijing views the U.S.-led regional system as a counter to its own
assets. While deployment of the THAAD battery would be under USFK command and does not officially indicate Seoul’s entry into the
U.S. BMD system, it is certainly perceived as a step in that direction. This likely explains why ROK Defense Minister Kim Kwa n-jin
stressed the peninsular-nature of the potential THAAD deployment. Assurances and lack of official integration notwithstanding, the
THAAD system’s X-band radar puts China’s key coastal regions well in its sights. Thus, the
ROK could find its efforts to enhance its defense capabilities entrapping it, almost ineluctably, in
a situation where it appears to be taking the U.S. side in the growing U.S.-China divide.

THAAD deployment in South Korea causes Chinese nuclear buildup---

they see it as a crucial threat to their nuclear deterrent
Teng Jianqun 15, Director of the Department for American Studies and a senior research
fellow at the China Institute for International Studies, PhD in international relations from
Peking University, Apr 1 2015, “Why Is China Unhappy with the Deployment of THAAD in
the ROK?” http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-04/01/content_7793314.htm
 during his visit to South Korea, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu
On March 16, 2015 Jianchao in talks with his counterparts reiterated
China’s concern on the possible deployment of US THAAD in South Korea. 1 Taking into account geopolitics and

international relations, why has China taken such a strong position against this program? What are the US reasons for pursuing this program? Can South Korea accept the US invitation to participate? These questions are now puzzling the countries in this region.¶ The Missile
Defense Project is a “Silver Bullet” in the Hands of the United States¶ As everybody knows, missile defense from TMD to NMD has long been a dream for the United States. THAAD is an important part of the current missile defense program. Originally standing for “theater
high altitude area defense,” today it signifies “terminal high altitude area missile defense.” The THAAD missile defense program was first proposed in 1987, and instructions to build this capability were transmitted to industry in 1990. After several rounds of failed tests, in
June and August 1999, the first successful tests were conducted.¶ According to its design, it is to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase by using so called hit-to-kill technology. Renamed from HIGH to TERMINAL, the change in
wording shows the main concerns of this program. Technically speaking, the killing part carries no warhead, which relies on the kinetic energy of the impact to destroy the incoming missile. Such a hit would minimize the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic

What worries
missiles; and nuclear tipped ballistic missiles would not explode upon a kinetic energy hit. Although THAAD was designed to intercept Scuds and similar weapon systems, it also has the capability to intercept ICBMs. ¶

countries most is the radar systems used by THAAD, which include the X-band active
electronically scanned array system —the world’s largest ground/air-transportable system as a forward sensor for ICBM missile defenses. The United States mentioned that such a radar system is to be

with the surveillance

used to scan any missile launched by the DPRK in this region and would do no harm to the strategic balance among the three nuclear weapon states, Russia, China, and the United States; however,

distance of 1300 kilometers, such a ground/sea based radar system, of course, would cover
a large area of China and Russia. ¶ To Already these systems are being deployed in Alaska and Japan, and in 2014, China repeatedly criticized the United States for X-band radar deployment in Kyoto.

some Chinese scholars, such a system is actually a “silver bullet” in the hands of the U nited

S .tates Their argument is based on several reasons: 1) a missile defense system is a bullet-to-bullet game, which still needs time to perfect its capacity in many aspects; 2) as a defense system, it could not be efficient in reacting to an attack from any point in a 360 degree
defense circle; 3) in the planned deployment, while facing Russian and Chinese multiple launches at the same time, THAAD only succeeds in a small percentage of cases. On the one hand, Russians and Chinese would not perceive this system as efficient, since it could not
provide 100 percent protection; on the other hand, the two countries are showing great concern over the strategic impact of it.¶ China Raises Its Voice against the Deployment of a Missile Defense System in Northeast Asia¶ From the late 1980s, experts and officials have
paid great attention to the missile defense program of the United States, first TMD and later NMD. If one looks at the US missile defense deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, one can find a circular chain already in position along the eastern part of China. In a paper published

several experts argued that Washington has appeared determined to surround

on February 22, 2010,

China with its anti-missile systems from Alaska to Taiwan ¶ . According to the US-based Defense News, Taiwan became one of the largest global buyers of the
Patriot missile defense system following Japan, the ROK, the UAE, and Germany. Quite a few Chinese military experts have noted that Washington’s proposed weapons deal with Taiwan is a key part of US strategic encirclement of China, and that the missiles’ footprints extend

Chinese experts consider the US anti-missile system in China’s neighborhood

from Japan to the ROK and Taiwan.¶

to be a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union . The ring encircling China can also be expanded at any time

¶ The U S has
in other directions. Analysts say that China has been closely monitoring US-India missile defense cooperation since any integration of India into the US global missile defense system would profoundly affect China’s security. nited tates

already succeeded in Japan and Taiwan; so the ROK would become a crucial part of this
chain. For at least the past two decades, not only have scholars and experts shown concern over the US missile defense program, but also Chinese officials have raised their voice against it in Northeast Asia, as seen in white papers and speeches. On August 12,

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told

2009, that the missile defense program the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by some countries in the

would do no good to regional peace and stability

Asia-Pacific region , adding that China opposes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. China has joined all related

The
international treaties and mechanisms, put in place a comprehensive system of laws and regulations compatible with the relevant international legal regime, and strictly enforced UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and other non-proliferation resolutions.

practice of seeking absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned. Countries should neither develop missile defense

systems that undermine global strategic stability nor deploy weapons in outer space. His speech gave the world a clear-cut signal that China was not in favor of any kind of missile defense system, which, he explained, would harm the stability in the region.2 ¶ China’s
concerns over the US missile defense program have repeatedly been cited in official publications. The white paper on China National Defense of 2010 said, “International military competition remains fierce. Major powers are stepping up the realignment of their security and
military strategies, accelerating military reform, and vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies. Some powers have worked out strategies for outer space, cyber space and the polar regions, developed means for prompt global strikes, accelerated
development of missile defense systems, enhanced cyber operations capabilities to occupy new strategic commanding heights. Some developing countries maintain the push towards strengthening armed forces, and press on with military modernization. Progress has been
made in international arms control, but prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains complex, there is still much to do to maintain and strengthen the international non-proliferation mechanism.”3¶ China’s senior officials take every opportunity to
express their concerns over the US missile defense program. On April 12, 2012, Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs with the Foreign Ministry, during an online chat hosted by People’s Daily, noted that after the DPRK announced its intention to
launch a satellite, the United States stepped up coordination with Japan and the ROK to prepare to adjust its military deployment in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. He said, “The Chinese government always insists that (countries) should start by maintaining global
strategic stability and promoting strategic mutual trust between major powers to handle the issue of missile defense prudently.”4 According to Reuters, a US defense official said on March 26, 2014 that the United States was seeking to build a missile defense system in Asia

Luo said, “Building a missile

and the Middle East, similar to the one in Europe, to help relevant countries ward off threats from Iran and the DPRK, and prevent possible long-range missile threats against it.¶

defense system in the Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and regional
strategic stability , and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.” He continued that China over decades had clearly demanded through various channels that the United States fully respect and take care of
the security concerns of relevant parties, including China, act prudently on the issue of missile defense, and solve the problem of missile proliferation through political and diplomatic means. “We also urge relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific region to act prudently in
cooperating with the US on missile defense, and not develop or deploy missile defense systems that exceed the needs of its development.” Luo added that China also “firmly objects to providing assistance in missile defense to Taiwan in any way.”5¶ China has taken a very
clear-cut position on the possible deployment of the US THAAD. During a briefing in October 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move damaged peace and stability in the region. She made the comment after media reports said the US military had
delivered X-band radar to the Kyogamisaki military base in Kyoto. The radar to scan for missile launches from the DPRK was expected to start operation within 2014. She said, “Some countries have pushed forward anti-missile system deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to
seek unilateral security, which runs against regional stability and mutual trust as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia…This move causes even more concerns, under the backdrop of complex and sensitive regional situation.” She called on relevant countries to proceed
from the broader picture of regional peace and stability and be committed to maintaining regional security through political and diplomatic means. “Relevant countries should not take their own security concerns as excuses for damaging others’ security interests.”6¶ By the
end of 2014, the discussion over the possible deployment of THAAD in South Korea again preoccupied the media in China and the ROK. In November 2014, Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong warned that if South Korea allows the United States to deploy the THAAD
battery on its soil, it would hurt Seoul-Beijing relations.¶ Why Is China Not Happy with the Possible Deployment of THAAD in the ROK? ¶ We should discuss this issue from a wider scope since the deployment of THAAD has already gone beyond the boundaries of
technological development of missile defense by the United States. It is of geopolitical and strategic significance for international relations in Northeast Asia. Starting from the early 1990s after the Cold War ended and the United States largely abandoned its Star Wars plan
initiated by the Reagan administration, South Korea has been very cautious in responding to invitations from the United States to participate in missile defense programs. There are many reasons to explain its cautious response: 1) the sensitivity of the program—
participation would damage its security environment as North Korea, China, and Russia would make South Korea a target; 2) technology related to missile defense program has been so uncertain that even the United States has doubted its capacity in dealing with the so-called
missile threat from North Korea; and 3) South Korea has its own ambitious KMD plan, which mainly targets the short or medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea, while THAAD mainly targets ballistic missiles over 5000 kilometers in range. ¶ In May 2013, The Wall
Street Journal reported that the US military had already carried out site studies of potential areas in South Korea where the THAAD battery could be deployed. The US government could induce Seoul to agree to deepen its anti-missile cooperation with Washington and Tokyo.
Despite repeated entreaties by the United States, Seoul has refused out of a desire to avoid antagonizing China and historic mistrust of Japan.7 South Korea says its missile defenses are aimed at fending off a tactical missile strike from North Korea. The United States argues
that having an integrated US-South Korea-Japan system would improve response times in the event of a missile attack by Pyongyang. Admiral James Winnefeld, the vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a conference in Washington said that “with the unpredictability
of the North Korean regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this sort of thing in the future elsewhere in the region.”8¶ Why suddenly has South Korea been reconsidering its reluctance to participate in the missile defense program of the United States? There are several
possible explanations: 1) fast development of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile technologies—especially after the third nuclear test by the DPRK, we have witnessed a growing debate in South Korea on the possibility of cooperation with the United States on the missile defense
program; 2) the public’s increasing nervousness about security—under the threat of the DPRK’s artilleries and missiles, the South Koreans will feel much more comfortable when they can see some kind of missile defense program on their territory; and 3) the traditional
alliance between the United States and South Korea, which needs a new driving force to go forward at this moment.¶ The deployment of US THAAD has become, at least to some extent, a hot potato in South Korea. On the one hand, it would provide South Korea new
protection in missile defense though it is not strong enough to give a 100 percent guarantee. On the other hand, South Korea again has to take full consideration of the response from relevant countries. China has already repeatedly reiterated its position on the US missile
defense project in Northeast Asia, expressing great concern not only about THAAD but also about the entire missile defense program. Russia now is facing two fronts in fighting against the US missile defense program, both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Western Europe. The
DPRK, as the major target of the US program, will continue to criticize the deployment of any advanced weapons system in this region. These responses from the relevant countries will exert a strong negative impact on the security situation. Park Geun-hye’s administration
should thoroughly study this before any decision is made related to the US missile defense program. ¶ The opposition to the US deployment of a missile defense system in this region should not only be a technical or security matter. Behind the curtain of competition is the
relationship among the United States, China, and South Korea. The pivot or rebalancing strategy by the Obama administration is a double-edged sword for the regional countries. China has recognized the pressure from the United States on its security. South Korea has also
recognized the pressure from the United States. The enhancement of the traditional alliance has already become one of the most important pillars to rebalance other countries. As we all have witnessed recently in the more than two years since President Xi Jinping and
President Park Geun-hye took office, the relationship between China and South Korea has entered a new stage. China has adjusted its policy toward the DPRK and ROK by trying to have a more balanced relationship with the two. Under such circumstances, the Park

the possible deployment of the US

administration should not be willing to stop such good momentum in cooperation with China. ¶ THAAD Has Become a Tough Choice for US Allies ¶ In conclusion,

THAAD system in South Korea will test relationships among China, South Korea, the
United States, or even Russia. China has raised itsIt is not simply a military project for the sake of South Korean and US security. Other factors are already involved, and

voice against this program. If necessary, China will take some solid measures to counter the
power of the US missile defense program, including updating and increasing the number
of its conventional and nuclear warheads. South Korea has become the most important area for the United States deploying systems such as THAAD. South Korea used to be very
cautious toward the US proposal, but today has become more flexible to the possibility in consideration of geopolitics, the economy, and the security relationship.

Causes arms racing and accidental nuke war

Alexander Kolbin 12, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Coordinator at the PIR
Center, “China and Nuclear Disarmament,” in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical
Necessities, google books [pages not numbered]
In any event,if China were to build up its nuclear arsenal, that would have negative effects for
the entire system of regional security in Asia Pacific. Faced with such a scenario, Japan
and South Korea might try to acquire their own nuclear capability. Such a move by China
could also trigger a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan69 and have a very
adverse impact on Russian- Chinese strategic dialogue. Besides, a rapid increase in the
numbers Of Chinese nuclear weapons would disturb the strategic balance in Asia Pacific,
prompting the United States and its allies to speed up their missile defence deployment in the region. ¶ Finally, a sharp increase in the

size Of the Chinese nuclear arsenal would probably mean that Beijing has abandoned its
current defensive posture, including its no-first-use commitment. At the very least. that
commitment would become more of a propaganda tool than a practical strategy. Such an
increase could signal a transition to the "launch under attack" strategy, whereby Beijing
would try to reduce to a minimum, the time between the enemy'S strike and the launch Of
its own nuclear missiles. That would require advanced and highly reliable early warning
systems which, according to various sources, China either does not have at all or is only
just beginning to deploy. According to some sources, at present China stores nuclear warheads separately from the missiles. A number of
researchers believe this is because China "lacks reliable technical means for preventing unauthorised

use Of nuclear weapons".

 5
The United States should establish a presidential and senior cabinet-
level dialogue with South Korea, China, and Japan on contingency
planning for a North Korean collapse which seeks to clarify roles and
responsibilities for each country. This should also include encouraging
public discussion and debate through foreign policy forums and
professional conferences to inform the policymaking process.
Their author says we only need to clarify roles in dealing with a NK
collapse scenario – doesn’t mention OPCON
Kent Harrington and Bennett Ramberg, 11-1-2014, "The United States and South Korea:
Who Does What if the North Fails?," Washington Quarterly | Elliott School of International
Affairs, http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/united-states-and-south-korea-who-does-what-if-
north-fails
Even in the best of all possible worlds—a regime that falls with a minimum of internal violence and external threats—dealing with North
Korea’s demise will present unanticipated challenges including but not limited to its nuclear arsenal. The details of how Washington and
Seoul plan to respond must be kept secret, although the policies that guide their preparations and the underlying assumptions need not.
Indeed, if a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan teach any lesson about post-conflict
burdens, it is the need to
identify them, think through their costs, and ensure that we can and should bear them before declaring them our
own. Sixty years after the end of the Korean War, the U.S. alliance with South Korea stands as a testimony to the durability of the U.S.
commitment to its ally. The South Korean success story is also part of its fruits, a political as well as economic transition that benefited
from the U.S. role as a guarantor of stability on the peninsula and in the region. Like the changing command roles within the alliance,
Seoul’s capabilities to lead and underwrite the process of reunification need clearer recognition. In 2014, as in the past, t he United States
has a key part in supporting its Korean ally and unique responsibilities, particularly on nuclear issues, if the North collaps es. But the
time has come to clarify historic assumptions as well as build political understanding and consensus on and
off the peninsula about Seoul’s leadership role going forward. Because of the sensitive as well as classified nature of
many of the issues, the task admittedly will not be easy. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia underscoring the region’s critical
importance to U.S. security, however, provides the right umbrella in the Pacific as well as at home. In North Asia, the current picture of
the two leading U.S. allies at loggerheads must be redrawn. Against the backdrop of a failed North Korea, the implications of that
dysfunctional byplay emerge starkly. To move toward substantive trilateral cooperation, a
presidential priority which
assembles senior policymakers to work through how Seoul will lead, what Tokyo can do, and
where the United States will provide its support is the place to begin. Such an effort will
have the added benefit of enabling the allies to put their cooperation on the table
with China—the leadership needs to understand how Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington
together will respond to the challenge of a North Korean collapse. Building a consensus on the U.S. role and
the allied division of labor is no less important in the United States. Congressional hearings can address the issues facing U.S. policy if
North Korea collapses (although the partisan dysfunction in Congress raises obvious concerns about leaks from classified sessions as
well as misrepresentations that could jeopardize cooperation with Seoul and others). Classified hearings, however, are not en ough.
Administration policymakers should reach out publicly before a crisis drives their decision making.
An initiative to discuss U.S. priorities and South Korea’s leadership role would
illuminate the U.S. obligation and what we expect from our allies . Foreign policy
forums abound in the media as well as professional conferences as venues for that
discussion and debate. Given the uncertainties in the North, both Koreans and Americans need to understand what each
partner intends to do as clearly as circumstances allow.
Diplomacy
 Middle Power Link Defense---1NC
The alliance doesn’t undermine South Korean middle power diplomacy,
and they’re not perceived as dependent now
Scott Snyder 15, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of U.S.-Korea policy program
at the Council on Foreign Relations, February 2015, “U.S. Rebalancing Strategy and South
Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy,”
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/2015030618362920.pdf
At the same time that the United States has unveiled its rebalance to Asia, South Korean foreign
policy strategists have been carefully considering how their country can more effectively use
diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities it has accrued as a result of its own rise to
prominence as a G-20 member and top-tier trading economy. The discussion within South Korean foreign
policy circles regarding its future strategy has been animated primarily by the idea that South Korea is a
middle power. Therefore, a deeper understanding and application of attributes of a middle power to South Korea’s situation will
assist South Korean policymakers by providing a constructive blueprint for South Korea’s foreign policy.

For instance, if
South Korea applies the attributes of a middle power to its own diplomacy, then South
Korean strategists must explore how and whether South Korea’s positioning as a facilitator,
manager, and niche player that can provide intellectual leadership on specialized, well-
chosen issues where it has a comparative advantage. In this way, South Korea is developing and
testing the limits of its geographic, behavioral, and normative capacity to be a middle
power actor on the international stage, cognizant of the fact that its capabilities are constrained by its
position at the intersection of interests among great powers that often bring differing
perspectives to the table.
Over the course of the past few years, South
Korea has sought to play this role on a variety of
international issues, most notably as a convener of international meetings and steward of the international agenda on
global financial stability, international development policy, nuclear security and safety, and
climate change and green growth, among others.1 In many cases, South Korean effectiveness as a
convener of international forums has indirectly benefited from the context provided by its
close relationship with the United States as well as its status not only as an emerging middle
power but also as an U.S. ally.2
Thus far, South Korea’s enhanced capabilities and the U.S.-ROK alliance have had positive,
mutually-reinforcing effects. In principle, South Korean middle power aspirations and a
strengthened U.S.-ROK alliance are not opposed to each other and have the potential to
work together as complementary concepts that generate and take advantage of shared American and Korean
foreign policy interests. South Korea’s growing scope of interests and desire to contribute to the
international community have benefited the U.S.-ROK alliance as South Korea has become a partner in a
broader range of functional spheres and the scope of alliance cooperation has broadened both
functionally and geographically. The emergence of a South Korea with capabilities and
attributes of a middle power has enabled the transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance
from a peninsula-focused patron-client security relationship to a comprehensive political
and security. The June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement reflects this broadened scope, showing the impact of both South
Korea’s desires to develop greater capabilities and have a greater impact internationally and the result of the Obama administration’s
desire to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance.3 But an outstanding question is whether strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance might also come
at the expense of South Korea’s interests as a middle power.
 SQ Solves Nuclear Leadership
Squo solves South Korean nuclear leadership---their diplomacy is
successful and they’re not tied to the US---THEIR EV!
Toby Dalton 15, Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Nuclear Governance: South Korea’s Efforts to Strengthen Regimes and
Frameworks for the Safe and Secure Use of Nuclear Energy”, Middle-Power Korea:
Contributions to the Global Agenda, ed. Snyder, pp. 52-54
Despite the assessment that hosting the NSS had little bearing on several of South Korea’s
nuclear priorities, and setting aside the reputational benefit, was South Korea able to put its stamp on the process and
outcomes of the summit itself in ways that demonstrated a role for middle-power diplomacy? Available evidence, detailed in this section,
suggests that the
ROK was able to achieve some modest successes in its diplomacy, to capitalize
on the opportunity of hosting the summit , and to demonstrate that it had standing and
legitimacy in a policy area that tends to be dominated by major powers. That said, South
Korea also encountered some challenges and limitations in its ability to set the agenda for the summit and bridge disparate p erspectives.

It is notable that South Korea mobilized significant internal resources, largely based on human-resource
capacity, in order to implement a successful summit. It placed two seasoned diplomats in charge of the external
diplomacy and negotiation of the summit communiqué, it established a preparatory interagency committee chaired by the prime
minister and a standing secretariat led by the foreign minister, and it mounted a major public diplomacy campaign for partici pating
states and the Korean public.11 It also facilitated in parallel to the main summit an expert
symposium and nuclear industry summit. As will be discussed further, this mobilization has had
some lasting domestic impact on nuclear policy in Korea . The investment of resources and careful
preparation not only ensured a successful summit; it also guaranteed that South Korea would continue to be
viewed as a leader of the nuclear security enterprise well after the Seoul summit concluded.
In the lead-up to the summit, the
ROK championed several substantive priorities that it sought
to place on the agenda. Several of these priorities were perceived to be contrary to U.S.
interests, and some South Korean analysts have argued that Seoul’s successful efforts to raise them demonstrate effective
leadership of the summit process and independence from the United States.12 In particular, South Korea sought to broaden the
discussion of threat beyond fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons to include radioactive sources that are ubiquitous in
industrialized countries and whose theft and use by terrorists poses a more likely if less devastating threat than the potent ial terrorist
use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, in light of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, South Korea supported discussion
of a “nuclear safety-security nexus” during the summit. Inclusion of both issues on the agenda necessarily diluted the narrow focus on
fissile material security, which is how the summit process had been initially framed and promoted by the United States. Without access to
official records, it is difficult to assess the extent to which U.S.-ROK tension over these issues was more perceived than real, as well as
how instrumental South Korean diplomacy was in negotiations over the agenda and summit communiqué. Secondary sources (albeit
mainly from the United States, not the ROK) and background interviews, coupled with a nuanced reading of the communiqués, do yield
some tentative findings.

First, South
Korean diplomats did manage to build international consensus on the
inclusion of radiological source security on the agenda, but the evidence suggests this was less a matter of South
Korean agenda-setting than deft diplomacy. A comparison of the Washington and Seoul summit communiqués is instructive in this
regard. The 2010 Washington communiqué, closely reflecting U.S. framing of the issues, mentions radioactive source security in only one
instance and asserts that mere acknowledgement, rather than development and implementation, of steps to promote nuclear security
would improve the security of radioactive sources. The
2012 communiqué, in comparison, mentions
radioactive source security fifteen times, including in a dedicated paragraph .13 This is
a significant broadening of the agenda beyond Washington’s preferred focus. But
according to secondary source reports, it was Germany, not South Korea, that led the charge on including radioactive source security in
the agenda.14 In this sense, South
Korean diplomats demonstrated adroit diplomacy to manage
divergent views between the founder (the United States) and other states with different
priorities. South Korea further showed creative thinking in announcing a
partnership with Vietnam and the IAEA to develop a radioactive source tracking
system that would be piloted by Vietnam. This showed a commitment beyond diplomacy to
exercise of leadership in the region, a role the ROK might usefully expand in the future.
Second, on the inclusion of nuclear safety in the summit agenda, it seems inconceivable that the Seoul summit, which was held in Asia
just over a year after the Fukushima accident, would not have addressed nuclear safety in some way. ROK officials may have sought a
more expansive nuclear safety discussion than the United States was prepared to support, but gaining consensus on even the narrower
formulation of the safety-security nexus was not a foregone conclusion, and several states apparently objected that nuclear safety was
properly in the domain of other institutions and forums.15 Ultimately, South Korean negotiators (with U.S. support)
succeeded in scheduling a lunch during the summit to discuss the issue and in
securing consensus of the participating governments on language in the communiqué,
calling on states to design and implement nuclear safety and security measures “in a coherent and synergistic manner.” This fairly
anodyne language indicates a minor diplomatic victory, but one that set the stage for more
progressive thinking. Indeed, at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, participating states not
only reaffirmed the need for coherent management of both safety and security, but also stipulated that states need to
develop a nuclear security culture focused on the coordination of safety and security and seek continuous
improvement in both areas.

Aside from these substantive efforts to shape the agenda to reflect the broader interests of the majority of participating st ates, South
Korean experts also highlight two procedural successes of Seoul’s summit leadership. The
first purported success was “the transformation from an American-led initiative to a more
universal-based normative one,” one that is more reflective of global concerns and not
“excessively dominated by U.S. interests.”16 However, this assertion seems at odds with the fact that all of the
sherpa and sous-sherpa meetings were co-chaired by South Korean and U.S. officials, who cooperated extensively on the meeting
agendas and communiqué drafts.17 Describing the high level of cooperation between the two states on summit preparation, one U.S.
official asserted that “the United States was the hand in the Korean glove.”18 This is not indicative of a process shorn of U .S. interest.
 Nuclear Leadership Alt Causes
South Korea doesn’t have capacity or commitment for nuclear
leadership---crushes solvency---THEIR EV
Toby Dalton 15, Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Nuclear Governance: South Korea’s Efforts to Strengthen Regimes and
Frameworks for the Safe and Secure Use of Nuclear Energy”, Middle-Power Korea:
Contributions to the Global Agenda, ed. Snyder, pp. 56-57
Yet the domestic outcomes also reveal gaps in Seoul’s capacity to lead with credibility .
For example, the recent scandal involving faked safety certificates for parts installed in
South Korean nuclear reactors highlights the need for more attention to cultivating a
nuclear safety and security culture in the ROK that improves practices at home while bolstering its reputation abroad.21
South Korea’s recently established regulatory organization—the Nuclear Safety and Security
Commission—still lacks expertise, which undermines its independence and ability to lead a process to correct the regulatory
deficiencies that contributed to the falsified certificates scandal. ( Lack of effective government oversight of
industry is an endemic problem in South Korea that affects numerous sectors, not just nuclear; the Sewol
ferry disaster in April 2014 occurred largely because of regulatory capture by the shipping industry.) Effective leadership
on nuclear safety and security on the international stage does not require perfection at home; however, it does
require an ability to identify gaps and to address them critically, transparently, and
with sustained commitment.
It is also worth noting here another prerequisite of sustained international leadership: capable diplomacy backed by an inter agency
support network at home. As described earlier, South Korea mobilized a major intergovernmental effort to host the summit, but
since then both its diplomatic capacity and interagency process to support global
leadership on nuclear safety and security appear to have withered. The multiple
interagency groups formed to support the summit were not institutionalized, and they dissolved
following the summit’s conclusion . Many of the diplomats and technical specialists who worked on the summit have
moved on to other issues, and there has been no dedicated effort to develop technical or policy
expertise within the foreign ministry or other agencies . To be sure, South Korea has talented nuclear
engineers and scientists, as well as capable diplomats, but global leadership also requires policy
entrepreneurs and innovators who understand both policy and technology and who can
blend them in creative ways. A return to normal governmental operations is to be expected after hosting a major meeting, but as one of
only three governments to have hosted an NSS (the United States and the Netherlands complete the leadership troika), South Korea’s
ability to sustain leadership is threatened by this diminution of capacity.

Perhaps more troubling is that the administration of President Park Geun-hye appears to have concluded that
the 2012 summit is a legacy of the previous Lee administration, rather than an
opportunity for continued leadership. Instead, Park has pursued her own nuclear
initiatives (including one focused on regional nuclear safety) that appear to have neither international
traction nor the type of internal support structure borne by a political commitment such
as the NSS. Without durable political commitments and sustained institutional capacity,
it will be a challenge for South Korea to maintain leadership of any issue, including nuclear
safety and security, on the international stage.
 Rice Production Alt Causes
Vietnamese rice collapse inevitable
The Economist 14, “Against the grain,” 1/18/14,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21594338-vietnams-farmers-are-growing-crop-
no-longer-pays-its-way-against-grain
Party officials trumpet their “rice first” agricultural policies. Yet, more and more, Vietnam’s
rice farmers are being
left behind. Part of the problem is that Vietnamese rice strains tend to be of low or middling
quality—a contrast to the premium varieties grown in Thailand. The costs of fuel, fertilisers and pesticides
are rising. And Vietnam’s rice-export sector is dominated by state-owned firms with
links to corrupt officials. Some farmers, especially in the country’s north, are finding it more
profitable to let their land lie fallow.
In An Giang province, at the heart of the Mekong delta, an
average family earns just $100 a month from
cultivating rice, or about a fifth of what coffee-growers earn in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, says Oxfam, an advocacy group.
Tran Van Nghia, who farms near Sam mountain, says young people in his area supplement farm incomes by working as hotel porters or
construction workers in Ho Chi Minh City and other urban centres.

Vietnam’s rice woes are likely to worsen. Myanmar, long ago South-East Asia’s rice basket, is emerging again as
an export rival. The bulk of Vietnam’s crop is sold directly to other governments, but some of its biggest clients, including Indonesia and
the Philippines, are boosting domestic production. Arup Gupta, a commodities trader in Ho Chi Minh City, adds that as a conse quence of a
crackpot and expensive campaign in Thailand to subsidise the country’s rice farmers, Vietnam is now being undercut
as Thailand unloads stockpiles at bargain-basement prices.
Scientists also warn that the
Mekong delta, which produces about half of Vietnam’s rice, is showing signs of
environmental stress. The earth dykes that were built to keep seasonal floods from inundating the rice paddies
prevent the Mekong river’s alluvial floodwaters from bringing nutrients to the
delta’s soil.
Vo-Tong Xuan, a rice expert who has advised the government on agricultural policies, reckons that many
soils in Vietnam’s
rice-growing regions are now so poor in nutrients that they cannot immediately be
put to other uses, such as cultivating maize. Other problems, he says, include a lack of farmer representation in the powerful
Vietnam Food Association, and resistance by state-owned rice exporters to reforms that would eat into their profits. It does not help that
Vietnam’s new constitution, which passed in late November, calls for state-owned enterprises to keep a central role in the economy.
 Impact D
No resource wars
Tetrais 12—Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS).
Past positions include: Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly (1990-1993);
European affairs desk officer, Ministry of Defense (1993-1995); Visiting Fellow, the Rand
Corporation (1995-1996); Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of
Defense (1996-2001).(Bruno, The Demise of Ares,
csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf)
The Unconvincing Case for ‘‘New Wars’’ ¶ Is the demise of war reversible? In recent years, the metaphor of a new ‘‘Dark Age’’ or ‘‘Middle
Ages’’ has flourished. 57 The rise of political Islam, Western policies in the Middle East, the fast development
of emerging
countries, population growth, and climate change have led to fears of ‘‘civilization,’’ ‘‘resource,’’
and ‘‘environmental’’ wars. We have heard the New Middle Age theme before. In 1973, Italian writer Roberto
Vacca famously suggested that mankind was about to enter an era of famine, nuclear war, and
civilizational collapse. U.S. economist Robert Heilbroner made the same suggestion one year later. And in 1977, the great
Australian political scientist Hedley Bull also heralded such an age. 58 But the case for ‘‘new wars’’ remains as
flimsy as it was in the 1970s.¶ Admittedly, there is a stronger role of religion in civil conflicts. The proportion of internal
wars with a religious dimension was about 25 percent between 1940 and 1960, but 43 percent in the first years of the 21st century. 59
This may be an effect of the demise of traditional territorial conflict, but as seen above, this has not increased the number or frequency of
wars at the global level. Over the past decade, neither Western governments nor Arab/Muslim countries have fallen into the trap of the
clash of civilizations into which Osama bin Laden wanted to plunge them. And ‘‘ancestral hatreds’’ are a reductionist and uns atisfactory
approach to explaining collective violence. Professor Yahya Sadowski concluded his analysis of post-Cold War crises and wars, The Myth
of Global Chaos, by stating, ‘‘most of the conflicts around the world are
not rooted in thousands of years of
history--they are new and can be concluded as quickly as they started.’’ 60¶ Future
resource wars are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the
Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has
been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwait--a nationwide bank robbery--may go down in history as being the last great
resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation
to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are
the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. ¶ China’s and India’s
energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over
the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as
oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously
untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically
attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and
political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been
overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We
no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. In
an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any
other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There
may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean,
but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.
Loose Nukes
 No Collapse---1NC
Stability high---growth and reform
Chung-in Moon 12/28, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, “North Korea still
stable despite external vulnerabilities,” 12/28/15,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/28/north-korea-still-stable-despite-external-
vulnerabilities/
North Korea seems to have had an internally stable 2015. Its economy is far from
faltering and Kim Jong-un has firmly consolidated his power base. There were no
explicit signs of internal challenge. Kim is both reigning and ruling. But Pyongyang’s provocative
behaviour in the international domain could produce severe consequences for North Korea. Uncertainty remains high.

In late October, Pyongyang announced that it will hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in May 2016, 3 5 years
after the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the late North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il mentioned
to then South Korean president Kim Dae-jung that he would convene a congress, but it was never realised. Kim Jong-un succeeded power
without the congress ever being held. This announcement is therefore a significant move.

Kim Jong-un is likely to use the upcoming party congress as a platform to declare the
beginning of a new era under his leadership. His 2015 New Year speech had already hinted the possibility of
redirecting the governing ideology.

Kim Jong-un’s previous New Year speeches made it clear that his rule is founded on two pillars: the ideological lines of his grandfather
Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il. But in 2015, such ideological edifices did not appear. Instead, Kim Jong-un routinely mentioned old
rhetoric such as strengthening monolithic leadership, juche (self-reliance), as well as the importance of songun (military first) politics.
The North Korean leader may well introduce his own brand of ruling ideology at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016.

The decision reveals Kim Jong-un’s growing confidence in economic performance and
power consolidation. North Korea underwent major economic difficulties in 2015 —
partly because of international sanctions and poor harvests, and partly because of falling prices of coal and iron ore that accounted for
almost half of its exports.

But Pyongyang’s economic performance has remained rather robust, owing to the
flourishing informal sector. Since 2009, more than 400 jangmadang (informal marketplaces) have been
introduced. They have facilitated the distribution of necessary consumer goods through a quasi-
market mechanism. Such informal markets critically mitigated the negative consequences of
severe drought and poor harvest. This was a sharp contrast to the period of mass starvation of the 1990s, after which
the public distribution system collapsed. Equally important is the advent of donju ( money holders) who are serving as
new agents of capital accumulation as well as sources of valuable hard currency.
The size of the informal sector is now believed to be larger than that of the formal sector. Some
experts even compare the
current North Korean economy to the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping’s
reform and opening up initiative. As the logic behind a market economy becomes more widespread, the state
economy is becoming increasingly flexible. The state no longer commands and dictates the economy.
Citizens themselves have become increasingly adaptive and entrepreneurial , seeking their
own survival through whatever means available. Paradoxically, the adaptive behaviour of ordinary citizens has weakened the
effectiveness of international sanctions.
 SQ Solves Coordination
Lots of coordination now---their author
Richard Fontaine 10, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Managing
North Korea: The Need for Coordination between Washington and Seoul,” Harvard National
Security Journal, 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Book-
Chapter_Fontaine-Springut_US-ROK.pdf
Apart from diplomatic harmonization, coordinating plans and policies for contingencies north of
the demilitarized zone represents a core activity of the U.S.-ROK alliance. While diplomats
seek to steer the peninsula towards greater stability, both nations actively prepare — often beyond the headlines —
for the possibility of upheaval. Since the Korean War, ROK Armed Forces and U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK) have worked to deter and contain North Korean aggression. Both nations are also
well aware of the potentially devastating impact of a DPRK collapse, a contingency that could destabilize the
peninsula and the region if not properly managed. Short of regime collapse, other events — including renewed famine and nuclear
disaster — would demand a coordinated response.
 SQ S ISIS
Retaking Ramadi turns the tide against ISIS
Zalmay Khalilzad 1-1, former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense,
was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 1/1/16, “The War
Against ISIS After Ramadi,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-ramadi-iraqs-war-
against-isis-14774
These caveats aside, the recent success in Ramadi is significant, and may mark a turning point
in the war against ISIS. After the Iraqi army’s collapse in Mosul, Iraqi security forces—especially its special
forces—have largely recovered in terms of their reorganization, professionalism and willingness
to fight. Although the operation took a long time, Iraqi Special Forces backed by the regular army, U.S.
airpower and newly trained Sunni tribal forces performed well against a talented enemy in a
difficult urban environment. Whereas previous successes against ISIS, such as in the Sunni Arab city of Tikrit, were
spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shiite militias, it was the Iraqi security forces that took the lead in pushing
ISIS out of the heart of Ramadi. By all account, the Shiite militias played a minimal role.
Encouraging, too, was the role that recently trained Sunni Arab fighters played in the
liberation of Ramadi. The Sunni Arab role in the fight against ISIS is vital. ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in
Iraq, had largely been defeated in 2006 and 2007. The growing sectarianism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, however, radicalized
sizable elements of the Sunni Arab community. ISIS emerged in Syrian sanctuaries, expanded into the Sunni parts of Iraq and e ventually
became a voice for Sunni Arab disenchantment. More recently in Tikrit, where Shiite militias took over Sunni cities , the short-term
success against ISIS led to a wave of sectarian abuses against the local population. The resulting Sunni Arab alienation gave ISIS a
strategic victory amid the tactical defeat.

The liberation
of Ramadi provides the Iraqi government with another opportunity to
win over disenchanted Sunni Arabs and defeat ISIS. Three steps are now necessary:
First, remaining ISIS pockets in Ramadi must be defeated and the city and its suburbs must be cleared. The army and local Sun ni forces
should carry out this mission with coalition air and intelligence support. Avoiding collateral damage and abuses of the civilian population
to the absolute extent possible will help ensure that Sunni Arabs rally against ISIS.

Second, the Baghdad government and anti-ISIS Sunnis should move quickly to address the needs of the local population in terms of
security, good governance and services. A sizable reconstruction effort is needed to gain the confidence of the local population. Recent
surveys suggest that severe dissatisfaction with both Iraq’s central government and local politicians among Iraqi Sunnis played a central
role in the rise of ISIS.

Third, Iraqi leaders must expedite negotiations on the issue of Sunni self-rule in Anbar and other Sunni areas. Many Sunnis who opposed
the federalization of Iraq when the national constitution was ratified in 2005 now favor the type of autonomy that the Kurds enjoy. The
Iraqi constitution guarantees to provinces the right to pursue self-rule on local issues. Maliki’s decision to violate the constitution and
move against Sunni provinces pursuing the federal option was a major grievance in the Sunni Arab community.

Equally important, the Iraqi government will need to reach agreement on a scheme for power and resource sharing between the central
and local governments. Provincial guard forces should be given responsibility for maintaining local security to the maximum extent
possible.

Achieving these objectives will not be easy especially in the current circumstances when oil prices are low and the government faces
serious financial problems. On
the positive side, though, Prime Minister Abadi appears more willing than
his predecessor to address legitimate Sunni grievances. Opposition from Shiite hardliners will remain a
factor; Abadi’s recent decision to refuse the U.S. offer to deploy American attack helicopters, for example, was driven in large part by t he
resistance of Iran-backed militias. Growing
cross-sectarian confidence in the Iraqi government
will give Abadi the political capital to resist hardline Shiite pressure.
Ramadi is an important test case, particularly because of the coming battles for Fallujah
and for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. If the coalition and Iraqi government can develop a
coordinated strategy

to consolidate victory and make visible progress on political and economic

reconstruction, the playbook in Ramadi could serve as a model for how to move against ISIS
in Mosul and in Syria. In fact, Ramadi could very well become a turning point if progress
in the city catalyzes a shift in the Sunni Arab community away from ISIS and toward the Iraqi
government.

The United States has limited influence, but active engagement by Washington could tip
the scales, transforming a temporary tactical advance in Ramadi into an enduring
strategic victory against the forces of instability and terror in Iraq.
 No China !
No terrorism in China---their arg is Chinese propaganda
Rachel Delia Benaim 14, freelance journalist based in New York, “Should China Fear
Islamic Insurgency?” 5/29/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/should-china-fear-
islamic-insurgency/
Yitzhak Shichor, the Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and one of the “Xinjiang 13”
who are still banned from China, is one of those who is skeptical of the existence of the ETIM. “ Most
Uyghurs in Xinjiang
aren’t looking for independence. Even the expat Uyghur community isn’t.” Rather, what
they seek is equality and opportunity. Thus, even the stated mission of what is currently referred to by the
Chinese government as ETIM comes into question ¶ Shichor added, “I’m not sure that it exists today , certainly not
inside China.” If the ETIM exists at all, he contended, it must be somewhere on the Internet. ¶ The first mention of the ETIM appears to
have been in 2000. Its Uyghur leader, Hasan Mahsum, was killed in 2003, and many claim that since his death, the ETIM has
ceased to exist. Despite a number of videos allegedly produced by the group, according to Gardner Bovingdon, a professor of
Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University and another one of the Xinjiang 13, “it doesn’t pass the sniff test.” ¶ “They’re
amateurish and small scale,” Bovingdon stated. Though the people in the videos speak in Uyghur, “ There’s no
compelling evidence that they represent a movement that presents substantial
military threats to China.Ӧ There is no question that Islamic radicalism exists in Xinjiang, but
its dimensions and impact remain unclear. China created a correlation between Uyghur violence and religion
because the Uyghur are religious. But perhaps that’s not the motivation at all. ¶ Take three of the major alleged
Uyghur separatist attacks that have happened in the last few years: the Urumqi riots in 2009, the Tiananmen Square
attack in October 2013, and the Kunming knife attacks in early March this year. The first two were economic
protests turned violent, in which the initial protests didn’t necessarily have radical Islamic elements but were expressions
of mainline frustration with the government.¶ The knife attack was different. Not only did it lack Islamic undertones, is
didn’t even take place in Xinjiang – Kunming is more than 2,500 miles from Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi.¶ These three
events were violent and tragic, “but there is no evidence that it was a Uyghur separatist movement,
other than [China’s] word,” Bovingdon contended. He adds that a violent separatist group would
normally be expected to be more active. Drawing an analogy to another frustrated stateless people, he draws a broad
comparison with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: “There is no comparison between the number of episodes, their
scope, and degree of plausibility if you compare these [alleged ETIM attacks] with the Intifada.”
2NC
CP
 Cyber A/O
Ineffective cyber security decks South Korean cyber diplomacy
David Fidler 15, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Cybersecurity at CFR, “South Korea’s Difficult
Path as a Middle Power in International Cyber Politics,” June 4 2015,
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/04/south-koreas-difficult-path-as-a-middle-power-
in-international-cyber-politics/
South Korea is one of the world’s most wired countries, which demonstrates the country’s embrace of cyber technologies.
However, this commitment renders South Korea vulnerable to malicious cyber activities. As has happened in
many countries, South Korea has scaled up its domestic cybersecurity efforts to address cyber threats,
including the appointment in 2015 of a presidential adviser on cybersecurity. Despite increased attention on cyber
defense and resilience, South Korea has not developed approaches that obviously stand out from
equivalent efforts by other countries. South Korea struggles with the same problems as other nations, which
means its domestic cybersecurity activities do not necessarily boost its middle power
ambitions.¶ These ambitions also suffer because South Korea faces threats from North Korea that
dominate South Korea’s cybersecurity agenda. Although North Korea is a cyber menace beyond the Korean
peninsula, no other country bears the cyber burden Pyongyang imposes on South Korea. Indeed, in no
other country is cybersecurity so interwoven as part of an existential security threat. This burden damages South
Korea’s middle power aspirations in cyber affairs by highlighting South Korea’s
vulnerabilities, forcing Seoul to prioritize North Korean cyber threats, and undermining the idea South
Korea has effective strategies other countries can use.

The plan can’t solve---the problem is that South Koreans are legally
required to use Internet Explorer and ActiveX
Simon Mundy 14, Seoul Bureau Chief for the Financial Times, “South Korea suffers poor
cyber security controls,” June 5 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ae2b288-e29a-
11e3-a829-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3o6AqBkQa
South Koreans internet users have to
are the envy of computer geeks around the world for having the fastest average internet speed on the planet – more than double that of the US. Yet

contend with a cumbersome, dated security system that is blamed for hindering ecommerce and innovation – and also, paradoxically,

undermining internet security. ¶ By law, anyone using online banking in South Korea
must use ActiveX an outdated technology
a “digital certificate” issued by a bank. This process requires an plug-in, developed by Microsoft that is broadly ignored by web developers outside

incompatible with browsers except

South Korea and is Internet Explorer ¶ internet Microsoft’s unfashionable . Thus, South Korea holds another world record. It is the

only country where Internet Explorer accounts for more than half the browser market. Research site StatCounter says 76 per cent of South Koreans use the Microsoft browser instead of faster, more reliable browsers developed by the likes of Google and Mozilla.¶ This has
created a self-perpetuating cycle where many South Korean web developers focus only on building sites compatible with Internet Explorer. Users of other browsers find that many South Korean websites – including the local sites of foreign groups such as Standard Chartered
and Citibank – do not function properly.¶ Reliance on Internet Explorer was a source of alarm in April, when the US government advised citizens to avoid using the browser, after it was discovered that a programme flaw could allow hackers to steal personal data. ¶ Microsoft

fixed that problem but even it advises users to shun the ActiveX technology, where possible.¶ Microsoft admits on its website that ActiveX controls can
“pose a security risk” and says: “It’s best to avoid using them if the website will work without them. They can stop your computer from functioning correctly, collect your browsing habits and personal information without your

South Korean internet experts say the

knowledge.” It adds: “Also, ‘good’ ActiveX controls might contain unintended code that allows ‘bad’ websites to use them.”¶

vulnerability of ActiveX is one of the main reasons for the high rate of hacking and data
leaks in South Korea ¶ Internet users have to download so many plug-ins
. that when web surfing,

malicious ones can easily slip through . A high-profile incident last year saw systems brought down at several broadcasters and financial institutions in an attack attributed by the government

¶
to North Korean agents. ¶ “Because of ActiveX, Korea has become a
Media reports said the hackers had exploited ActiveX, although investigators said this could not be proven.

number one place for hackers,” says Lee a professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Min-wha,
Science and Technology. “South Korean internet users are trained to click ‘yes’ to
everything.”¶ ¶
The system was initially an object of pride for the South Korean government, which saw it as proof of the country’s move towards the technological cutting edge. In 1998, the authorities deemed the available online payment

systems too insecure. The new SSL protocol had not been authorised for export from the US. As other countries waited for SSL, South Korea developed its own system, SEED, which can be used only with ActiveX plug-ins.¶ For years, regulators and card operators resisted
calls to change the system, deterred by fears of the disruption that a new model would cause, and of security risks that could be caused if it were implemented badly.¶ This year, the government is at last promising change, with public frustration having reached new highs. ¶
A survey, by the Federation of Korean Industries, a lobby group, found that 84 per cent of respondents wanted a new system. The burdensome old one is blamed for holding back the development of ecommerce.¶ It has also protected local personal computer makers
Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics against Apple, whose Mac computers account for just 1.7 per cent of the South Korean PC market, compared with 8.9 per cent globally, according to StatCounter.¶ President Park Geun-hye intervened when she heard of the frustration

No plans exist to
of Chinese fans of a South Korean soap opera, who could not buy associated merchandise because of the security controls. As a result, digital certificates will not be required for online transactions from June.¶

change the system for online banking. any change Moreover, to the ecommerce payment systems needs support from
South Korean card companies. This may not be forthcoming , warns Lee Dong-hwan, information officer of Paygate, an alternative payment system
that has been shunned by card operators despite interest from online retailers.

Air-gap solves
Weimann 4 – Gabriel Weimann is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace
and professor of communication at the University of Haifa, Israel. December 2004,
"Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?"
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15033/1/Cyberterrorism
How Real Is the Threat.pdf?1
Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the Internet
to inflict death on a large scale. Some pointed out that the resilience of computer systems to
attack is the result of significant investments of time, money, and expertise. As Green
describes, nuclear weapons systems are protected by “air-gapping”: they are not

connected to the Internet or to any open computer network and thus they cannot
be accessed by intruders, terrorists, or hackers. Thus, for example, the Defense
Department protects sensitive systems by isolating them from the Internet and
even from the Pentagon’s own internal network. The CIA’s classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the
FBI’s entire computer system. The 9/11 events and the subsequent growing awareness of cyberterror highlighted other potential targets for such
attacks. In 2002, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described “the absolute havoc and devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut
down our air traffic control system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight.” However, argues Green, “cybersecurity experts give some of their highest
marks to the Federal Aviation Authority, which reasonably separates its administrative and air traffic control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter.”
THAAD
 Turns Middle Power
Turns middle power---crushes South Korean neutrality
Jin Kai 15, research fellow at the Center for International Studies (CIS) at Yonsei University
in South Korea, Ph.D. in International Relations from the Graduate School of International
Studies (GSIS), Yonsei University, South Korea, “The Other Reasons China Wants to Block
THAAD Deployment,” Apr 18 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-other-reasons-
china-wants-to-block-thaad-deployment/
But beyond that, THAAD deployment, which has yet to be finally confirmed, could pose two less obvious but serious
diplomatic challenges for China.¶ First, THAAD could conceivably check both China and South
Korea in the East Asian power game. The hidden message from the United States could be
that the Beijing-Seoul honeymoon will always have to give way to traditional security
ties between Seoul and Washington. That means Seoul’s diplomacy with Beijing will
be constrained every time U.S. politicians decide to invoke South Korean security concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear
and missile threat. Merely the discussions between Seoul and Washington regarding THAAD — forget about the actual deployment —
will be a very uncomfortable wedge driven into China’s painstakingly-built good neighbors
policy with South Korea. No wonder some Chinese believe that the United States is actually alienating both China and South
Korea with talk of THAAD deployment. China may be confident in South Korea’s economic reliance, but an “unfriendly”
decision to deploy THAAD will be regarded in China not only as a humiliation, but as a stab
in the back.
 Link Turn
No issue linkage now
Richard Weitz 14, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Affairs at
Hudson Institute, “For U.S. and South Korea, Missile Defense Looms as Next Big Challenge,”
10/28/14, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14290/for-u-s-and-south-korea-
missile-defense-looms-as-next-big-challenge
After years of tense talks on the issue between the two countries, visiting South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel finally
agreed that conditions were not ripe for near-term transfer of wartime operational
control to South Korea. They did not set a new date for the transfer, but instead cited the need for an
improvement of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and a strengthening
of the South’s “critical” military capabilities before it could take place. ¶ Hagel said that the postponement would “ensure that when
the transfer does occur, Korean forces have the necessary defensive capabilities to address an intensifying North Korean threat.” These critical capabilities

include enhancing South Korea’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities;
acquiring precision-guided munitions and their associated delivery systems; and improving South
Korea’s capabilities for maneuver and network-centered warfare. These capabilities will prove useful for conducting
operations both in Korea and for extra-peninsular missions. ¶ Both sides endorsed the U.S. Army’s new practice of rotating U.S. combat forces from outside the region to various U.S.
allies and partners in the region. This “Pacific Pathways” concept involves visiting Army units conducting on-site exercises to increase readiness and strengthen partnerships. While
useful in countries that seek to keep their security ties with the United States modest, such arrangements provide nowhere near the visibility and regional impact of the permanent
U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan.¶ Recently heightened animosity between Seoul and Tokyo, however, has thwarted U.S. efforts to move away from the traditional hub-
and-spokes pattern for U.S. alliances in Asia toward a more balanced multilateral structure. Last week in Washington, the ministers did agree to share information on North Korea’s
missile and nuclear programs with Japan through the trilateral dialogue process they started earlier this year. However, this modest exchange hardly outweighs the territorial and
historical strains between both countries.¶ The South Korean and U.S. ministers made no evident change in their positions regarding North Korea, despite complaints that their firm
stance was contributing to North Korean intransigence on restarting the Six-Party Talks to end the North’s nuclear program. They said that they were “open to dialogue with North
Korea” but that there was no point in engaging in talk for talk’s sake—Pyongyang must first commit to end its nuclear weapons program and take concrete measures to demonstrate
that it would act on that commitment. In Kerry’s words, “North Korea must demonstrate that it is serious about denuclearization, and we need to be certain that it is prepared to live
up to its international obligations and abide by international norms of behavior.” ¶ Foreign Minister Yun gave vent to what are undoubtedly shared frustrations regarding North Korea,
noting that Pyongyang was at times aggressive, but also striving for dialogue with Washington and Seoul. Yun argued that unification of the two Koreas would provide the most
effective and secure means of eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons. Yet, North Korean leaders have evinced little interest in developing concrete plans for unification or
eliminating their nuclear weapons. ¶ For this reason, the two sides stressed their intent to keep their forces ready and strong. Hagel said that the United States would not make major
reductions in the number and kind of forces stationed in South Korea. Repeating a deterrence formula that has been called into question in recent years by the U.S. failure to enforce its
military red lines against Syria, as well as its inability to defend Ukraine, Hagel “emphasize[d] that the United States remains committed to using all our military capabilities, both on
and off the Korean peninsula, including conventional strike missile defense and our nuclear umbrella, to ensure that our extended deterrence is credible and effective.Ӧ To better deal
with North Korea’s missile threats, the two sides endorsed the “Concepts and Principles of the Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Operations,” a joint mechanism to “detect,

the two parties have yet to engage in discussions let

defend, disrupt and destroy” missiles. Nonetheless, Hagel said that

alone decide on South Korea’s purchasing THAAD missile defense systems, which are more
advanced than anything the United States or South Korea now has on the Peninsula. Russia and increasingly China oppose such

deployments as potential threats to their own nuclear deterrent as well as likely to provoke further North
Korean missile tests.

No THAAD now---South Korea isn’t willing to deal with the consequences

Erik Slavin 12/11, Navy and Asia writer for Stars and Stripes, “South Korea unlikely to
gain US missile defense system, for now,” 12/11/15,
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/south-korea-unlikely-to-gain-us-missile-defense-
system-for-now-1.383306
Placement of a U.S. mobile missile defense system in South Korea remains unlikely in the
near term despite continued concern about North Korea’s nuclear program, analysts and government officials say. ¶ ¶ Top U.S.
military officials want the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, ready to deploy in the Asia-
Pacific region on a permanent basis — and its bases in South Korea are ideally where they need to be to counter a
possible North Korean offensive.¶ Last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work said the Pentagon had conducted
site surveys for THAAD within South Korea. However, what makes sense from a military tactical
standpoint doesn’t always correspond with how leaders view the strategic and
diplomatic consequences.¶ When rumors spread in March of a deal to deploy THAAD to South Korea in an emergency,
China decried the possibility as a threat to its security, with Russia voicing opposition as well.¶ That
left South Korea uncomfortably positioned in a dispute pitting China and Russia on one
side and the United States and Japan on the other, said Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at the Korea National
Diplomatic Academy in Seoul.¶ The result was that despite discussions between President Barack Obama and South Korean
President Park Geun-hye earlier this year, along with high-level ministerial talks between both nations, neither side has
confirmed ever having had formal talks about THAAD.¶ Seoul’s caution in regard to THAAD
also comes from concern over harming its recently stabilized relations with Pyongyang, Kim
said.¶ The Koreas have technically remained at war since 1953, so everything is relative when it comes to measuring stability. But r ecent
cross-border family reunions and a series of official talks that began in November — the most recent took place Friday at a North Korean
border town, according to The Associated Press — aren’t something the South wants to jeopardize, Kim said. ¶ “The situation is now
considerably better than it was last spring,” Kim said. “ It would be making a fool of ourselves to [deploy
THAAD].”

OPCON transfer means the U.S. can successfully push THAAD---causes

massive great-power tension and turns the case
The Hankyoreh 13, South Korean newspaper, 10/2/13, “[Editorial] Missile defense and
the possibly delayed OPCON transfer,”
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/605492.html
US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel emphasized the need for South Korean missile
defense before the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON).
Hagel held a press conference aboard the plane while flying to Korea to participate in the
45th yearly US-ROK security deliberations. When asked by a reporter what capacity the
South Korean military would need to make an OPCON transfer possible, Hegel said
that missile defense would be “a huge part of this.”
This is the first time that a high-ranking American official has clearly stated the country’s
plans to link negotiations about Korean participation in missile defense with the issue of
the OPCON transfer.
In contrast, Hagel took a step back on the question of delaying the OPCON transfer, which
Park’s government has been calling for. “I don’t believe we’ll be in a position to make any
final decisions,” Hagel said.
In Korea, there are loud calls for delaying the OPCON handover, while public opinion in the
US tends to oppose putting the transfer off yet again. It can be inferred that Hegel’s remarks
are calculated to take advantage of this disagreement in a bid to achieve American strategic
interests to the greatest possible extent.
It is very likely that this trend will have repercussions not only on participation in
American missile defense but also on the next-generation fighter project that will have to
restart from scratch and the 9th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for sharing the cost of
supporting US forces in Korea.
Indeed, some analysts suggest that that US hopes for Korea to field a stealth fighter capable
of countering China and Russia played a part in the ultimate rejection of the Boeing F-15SE,
the final candidate in government efforts to acquire a next-generation fighter.
If negotiations about the OPCON transfer go as the US hopes they do, they could lead to the
worst possible scenario for Korean national security. In this case, Korea would provoke
China and Russia without even gaining the sovereignty that OPCON would represent. This
would mean that Korea would find itself on the front lines in a major power conflict
pitting the US and Japan against China and Russia.
Needless to say, this would make it impossible for Park to carry out her policy goals of
maintaining an alliance with the US while working with China and bringing about
change in North Korea.
 A2 THAAD Inevitable (Jee 15)
This card is normative not predictive---it says that South Korea should
accept the THAAD but is actually pursuing a policy of strategic ambiguity
to avoid having to choose between the US and China---only the plan tips
the balance
David Eunpyoung Jee 15, Korea Foundation Associate Researcher of the Asia-Pacific
Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as a
military officer at the operation center of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army
Missile Command 4-7-2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/solving-the-thaad-puzzle-
in-korea/
Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea General Curtis Scaparrotti, the highest U.S. military official in the country, recommended Seoul deploy THAAD
to
protect itself from the threat of North Korean missiles. But during a meeting between Chinese Defense Chief Chang Wanquan and South Korean Minister of
National Defense Han Min-Koo, China publicly expressed its concerns over America’s proposal to deploy the air defense system. Mindful of Chinese concerns,
Seoul’s official stance is the “three nos,” meaning no decision has been made; there was no
consultation with the United States, and no request from Washington.¶ Americans want Koreans to say yes
to THAAD; the Chinese want Koreans to say no. Meanwhile, Seoul is hesitant to provide an official stance. Amid the
THAAD debate, there are three questions to be answered; why Beijing is concerned, why Seoul is staying quiet, and what the three stakeholder countries
should do.¶ Why is China concerned? ¶ Why is Beijing concerned about extended American air defense capability in Northeast Asia? China believes that
THAAD will not only operate to protect the Korean Peninsula from North Korean missiles, but will also monitor Chinese air activity off the east coast of the
Chinese continent and shoot down Chinese missiles as required. However, it is unlikely that China would launch missiles to strike U.S. assets in the Pacific.
Both Washington and Beijing are aware of the catastrophic consequences of a clash between the two superpowers. China should not be concerned about
America’s ‘shield’ as long as Chinese missiles will not strike U.S. assets. THAAD is not aimed at China, but directed at North Korea.¶ Why is Seoul staying
Seoul maintains its strategic ambiguity in order not to be forced to choose between
quiet?¶

its economic and security interests. Currently, the South Korean economy is heavily dependent on
Beijing, China is both its largest exporter and importer (China, including Hong Kong, accounts for 31 percent of exports and 16 percent of imports). At
the same time, South Korea is well aware of the national security benefits of a U.S. military presence in the country. Even though South Korea boasts one of
the most powerful armies in Asia, it still heavily relies on U.S. ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities and is likely to rely further on
Since both economic interests and security interests are
U.S. air defense capabilities if THAAD is deployed.

important, Seoul is reluctant to accept the U.S. proposal (which could cause estrangement in the South Korea-China
relationship) but equally hesitant to reject the air defense system.¶ What should the three countries do? ¶ First,
Beijing must understand that the deployment of THAAD is ultimately beneficial for China. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press
conference on April 9, 2013 shows that China wants the deterrence of armed conflict, stability, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing is well aware of
the tragic consequences of conflict should North Korea miscalculate and inflict damage on its rival to the south. ¶ If South Korea remains exposed to North
Korean missile threats and is eventually attacked, the safety of more than one million Chinese living in South Korea will be at risk. Besides possible Chinese
casualties, the turmoil of the South Korean economy will directly impact Chinese interests. When the U.S.-South Korea alliance strikes back, they may decide
to put an end to Kim Jong-un regime, meaning millions of North Korean refugees will rush to the border with China seeking food, water, and survival. The
consequences of North Korean missile use on the Korean Peninsula will not be contained within the peninsula; it will directly threaten Chinese interests as
well.¶ The American ‘shield’ to protect its ally state could also protect Chinese interests from North Korean missiles. In addition, as the country with the most
influence on North Korea, China must play a more active role in inducing North Korea to change its coercive strategy. To guarantee survival of the regime,
the North Korean leadership sticks to brinkmanship and a coercive strategy involving nuclear programs, military provocations, threatening rhetoric, and
cyberattacks against its southern rival and United States. China should convince its neighbor that there are other options than this coercive strategy, which
has kept North Korea isolated from the outside world and economically depressed. It is time for China to show its neighbor the right way to build a “strong
***AFF CARD BEGINS HERE***¶ Second, Seoul has to send a clear message to
and prosperous nation.Ӧ

Beijing that deploying THAAD is an inevitable option in pursuit of national security because the country is still
vulnerable to North Korean missile threats. Despite efforts of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense to protect the country by building two key air
defense components — Kill-Chain and KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense system) — the country will remain exposed to missile threats until 2024, when
the air defense system is expected to be operational. Plus, a key component of KAMD, the PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capability) system, is not a reliable
provider of air defense. Due to a limited number of sensors and shooters, it is impossible to detect and destroy hundreds of North Korean mobile missile
Seoul cannot let its sky remain exposed to threats until 2024.¶ THAAD could
launchers. However,

provide bridging capability with its 100 percent success rate, as shown by U.S. Missile Defense Agency tests. It will be a reliable shield
against North Korean missile threats until the air defense systems are complete in 2024. Plus, more than half of the Korean public supports deployment of
THAAD for national security. Deployment of THAAD is an inevitable option to defend South Korean national security. Seoul must emphasize that interests of
a neighboring country cannot outweigh ROK national security concerns, including the need to protect civilian lives and property.
 A2 SK/THAAD Not Key
South Korean THAAD is key---it’s China’s primary focus because it would
allow easy detection of decoys, which threatens their deterrent---causes
expansion of their arsenal and nuke war
Wu Riqiang 9/25, associate professor at the School of International Studies at Renmin
University of China, where his research focuses on missile defense, strategic stability, and
Sino-US crisis escalation, visiting fellow at Dartmouth College's Dickey Center for
International Understanding, PhD in Political Science from Tsinghua University, Sept 25
2015, “Stabilizing China-U.S. Nuclear Dynamics,”
http://xivisit.nbr.org/2015/09/25/stabilizing-china-u-s-nuclear-dynamics/
the potential deployment of the Terminal High-
Similarly, the expansion of U.S. theater missile defense in East Asia, specifically

THAAD) system in South Korea, has been the focus of the missile defense
Altitude Area Defense (

debate between China and the United States. It is THAAD radar (TPY-2), rather than the interceptors,
that concerns China. Besides serving as the fire control radar of the THAAD system, this radar could also be deployed in
forward-based mode, tracking Chinese strategic missiles during the boost phase of flight
and the deployment process of decoys and actual warheads. Therefore, the system could
easily discriminate real warheads from decoys, as decoys are much lighter and the
releasing of decoys causes smaller velocity changes of the offensive missile. If deployed,
THAAD radar would pose a major threat to Chinese strategic missiles.¶ Another challenge
faced by China in this domain is responding to and managing the risks of escalation from
conventional weapons use to nuclear use in the event of a conflict with another nuclear power. For example, China and the
United States might engage in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea, all of which would carry serious escalatory
risks. Such conflicts could lead to different forms of nuclear escalation. First, in a conventional conflict, the United States might deliberately attack Chinese
nuclear weapons with conventional munitions to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent gradually and challenge China’s “no first use” policy. Second, the
United States might use low-yield and high-accuracy nuclear weapons to attack China in order to signal resolve and blackmail the country. Finally, even if
neither side desires a nuclear conflict, because of the difficulties in discriminating between Chinese conventional and nuclear assets, the United States might
inadvertently attack nuclear weapons. Such attacks would likely be interpreted by China as disarming strikes and put high pressure on China to respond.¶
Recommendations for China and the United States in the Nuclear Domain ¶ To maintain strategic stability, China and the United States should reach a
common understanding on strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, the United States could limit its missile defense—enough to counter
North Korea’s unsophisticated missiles without threatening China’s more advanced strategic missiles. In return, China could agree to refrain from expanding
its nuclear arsenal. If the United States is sincere in its declaration that homeland missile defense is not directed at China, this solution is in Washington’s
China has maintained a small nuclear arsenal for several decades, and the only
interest.

reason it would have to increase its stockpile of weapons is to compensate for its
nuclear deterrence capability being undermined by improved U.S. missile defenses. So this
solution is also in Beijing’s interest.
 2NC Indo-Pak Impact
Kolbin says that Chinese nuclear buildup triggers an Indian buildup and
Indo-Pak arms race---that goes nuclear
Tom Hundley 12, Senior Editor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, journalist with
nearly two decades’ experience as a foreign correspondent covering more than 60
countries, master’s degree in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania,
“Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” Sep 5 2012,
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-
race-energy-cold-war
the severest nuclear threat emanating from
Yet, though the danger of a loose Pakistani nuke certainly deserves scrupulous attention, it may not be

South Asia, as I came to realize after interviewing more than a dozen experts in Pakistan, India, and the United States this summer. Since the 9/11 attacks, preventing the world's most dangerous weapons
from falling into the hands of the world's most dangerous actors -- whether al Qaeda terrorists or Iranian mullahs -- has understandably been America's stated priority. Yet the gravest danger -- not only for the region, but

for the United States itself -- may be the South Asian incarnation of a Cold War phenomenon: a nuclear arms race.¶ Pakistan, with an estimated 90 to 120 warheads, is now
believed to be churning out more plutonium than any other country on the planet -- thanks to two Chinese-built reactors that are now online, a third that is undergoing trials, and a fourth that is scheduled to become
operational by 2016. It has already passed India in total number of warheads and is on course to overtake Britain as the world's No. 5 nuclear power. Pakistan could end up in third place, behind Russia and the United
States, within a decade.¶ This April, Pakistan tested a short-range ballistic missile, the Hatf IX, a so-called "shoot and scoot" battlefield nuclear weapon aimed at deterring an invasion by India's conventional forces. This
development carries two disturbing implications. First, Pakistan now has the know-how to build nuclear warheads compact enough to fit on the tip of a small missile or inside a suitcase (handy for terrorists). Second,
Pakistan has adopted a war-fighting doctrine that does not preclude nuking its own territory in the event of an Indian incursion -- a dubious first in the annals of deterrence theory.¶ India, meanwhile, has just tested its
first long-range ballistic missile, the Agni-V, with a range of 3,100 miles. In April, the Indian Navy added a new Russian-made nuclear-powered submarine to its fleet and is now building its own nuclear subs. One has
already been launched and will enter service next year, and India is determined to add submarine-launched ballistic missiles to its arsenal. This puts India on the verge of joining the elite nuclear "triad" club -- states with
the ability to survive a first strike by an adversary and deliver a retaliatory strike by land, sea, or air.¶ India has also said that it has successfully tested an anti-ballistic missile shield that could be deployed "in a short
time" to protect New Delhi and Mumbai. The downside of this defensive measure -- putting aside the question of effectiveness -- is that it invites an adversary to build many more warheads in the hope that a few will be
able to slip through the shield.¶ India claims that it is not really engaged in an arms race -- or that, if it is, its opponent is not Pakistan, but China, a nuclear-armed superpower and economic rival with which it shares a
disputed border. The Agni-V was dubbed the "China-killer" in some overheated Indian headlines. China's nuclear ambitions are geared toward deterring the United States and Russia, but it obligingly stirs the pot in South
Asia by providing Pakistan with plutonium reactors -- in flagrant violation of its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.¶ Meanwhile, through a 2008 deal negotiated by George W. Bush's administration,
the United States has given India access to nuclear fuel on the international market. In the past, India had been barred from such trade because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not consider its nuclear weapons
program legitimate, and its limited supplies of domestic uranium forced it to choose between powering its reactors and building more nuclear weapons. "Power production was the priority; now they can have both,"
explained Toby Dalton, deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.¶ With both sides armed to the teeth, it is easy to exaggerate the fears and much harder to
pinpoint where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some of Pakistan's warheads or its fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -- or, worse, that the whole
country falls into the hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity
between terrorists, extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who
know the country best.¶ To outsiders, Pakistan appears to be permanently teetering on the brink of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not
reassuring. But a weak state does not mean a weak society, and powerful internal dynamics based largely on kinship and tribe make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever fall under the control of an outfit like the
Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but even in the worst of times, the military has maintained a high standard of
professionalism. And there is nothing that matters more to the Pakistani military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- its crown jewels -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists.¶ "Pakistan
struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political
prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe."¶ Pakistan's nuclear security is in the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Division, which appears to function pretty much as a
separate branch of the military. It has its own training facility and an elaborate set of controls and screening procedures to keep track of all warheads and fissile material and to monitor any blips in the behavior patterns
of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored are the mostly heavily guarded in the country. Even if some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, it is highly unlikely the group would be able to
use it. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the
city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment, Pakistan has a stockpile of about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly
enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is stored.¶ "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially so," said Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that
authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course there are concerns. Some are genuine, but much of what you
read in the U.S. media is irrational and reflective of paranoia. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this."¶ Perhaps the most credible endorsement of Pakistan's nuclear
security regime comes from its most steadfast enemy. The consensus among India's top generals and defense experts is that Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100 percent secure, but I think they are
more than 99 percent secure," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been taken. This business of the
Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think it's unlikely. The Pakistani military understands the threats they face better than anyone, and they are smart enough to take care it."¶ Yogesh Joshi, an analyst at the
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees: "Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes] because its nightmare scenario is that
Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the years is that Pakistan, probably more than any other nuclear weapons state, has taken measures to secure its weapons. At the political level here,

there's a lot of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure."¶The greater concern -- not only for India and Pakistan, but
for the United States and everyone else -- may be the direct competition between the two South Asian states.
True, in terms of numbers and destructive capacity, the arms buildup in South Asia does not come close to what was going on during the Cold War, when the United States and the

Soviet Union built enough bombs to destroy the planet many times over. India and Pakistan
have enough to destroy it only once, perhaps twice.¶ But in many ways, the arms race in South Asia is more
dangerous. The United States and the Soviet Union were rival superpowers jockeying for influence and advantage on the global stage, but these were also two
countries that had never gone to war with each other, that had a vast physical and psychological separation

between them, that generally steered clear of direct provocations, and that eventually had mechanisms in
place (like the famous hotline between Moscow and Washington) to make sure little misunderstandings didn't grow into
monstrous miscalculations.¶ By contrast, the India-Pakistan rivalry comes with all the venom
and vindictiveness of a messy divorce, which, of course, it is. The two countries have officially fought three wars
against each other since their breakup in 1947 and have had numerous skirmishes and close calls since then. They have a festering territorial dispute in

Kashmir. The 1999 Kargil conflict, waged a year after both countries went overtly nuclear, may have come closer to the nuclear brink than even the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the height of the showdown,
there was credible intelligence that both sides were readying their nuclear arsenals for deployment.¶ Pakistan lost all three of these wars. Its very large army is still only half the size of India's, whose military budget is
more than seven times larger than Pakistan's. Pakistan's generals are well aware that in any all-out conventional confrontation with India, they're toast. The guiding ideology of Pakistan's Army -- from the generals on
down to their drivers -- is that India represents a permanent existential threat. This is why Pakistan clings to its nukes and attempts to maintain at least the illusion of what its generals call "bilateral balance."¶ This

conventional asymmetry increases the danger of the nuclear arms race -- it feeds India's hubris and Pakistan's
sense of failure. Here are two countries headed in opposite directions. India's $1.7 trillion economy is eight times the size of Pakistan's and has grown at an enviable 8.2 percent annually over the last three years,
compared to just 3.3 percent for Pakistan. India is in the forefront of the digital revolution, and while the country's leaders were embarrassed by this summer's massive two-day blackout, Pakistan's broken-down
infrastructure struggles to provide citizens with more than a few hours of electricity each day. India, the world's largest democracy, is on the cusp of becoming a global power; Pakistan, with its on-and-off military
dictatorships (off at the moment), ranks 13th on Foreign Policy's most recent Failed States Index.¶ More significant than these statistics is the mindset behind them. India is brimming with confidence. Pakistan is hobbled
by fear, paranoia, and a deep sense of inferiority. India's major cities, New Delhi and Mumbai, are modernizing global metropolises. Checking into the Marriott in Pakistan's capital is like checking into a maximum-security
prison -- high walls topped with razor wire, armed guards in watchtowers. Islamabad today looks and feels like a city under siege where there could be a coup at any moment. Soldiers and checkpoints are everywhere. It
felt this way the first time I visited, in 1985.¶ This economic and cultural lopsidedness is strikingly reflected in the countries' nuclear competition.¶ In perhaps no other major power is the military quite so submissive to
civilian authority as it is in India. "The civilian side lords it over the military in a manner that often borders on humiliation -- and there is no pushback from the military," said Ashley Tellis, an India expert with the
Carnegie Endowment. The reasons for this are rooted in India's long struggle for independence against a colonial master that filled the ranks of its police and army with natives. "The military was seen as a force that
served a colonial occupier," said Tellis. With the Indian officer corps' fondness for whiskey, mustaches, and other Briticisms, "the nationalist leadership looked at them as aliens" and took extreme measures to make sure
there would be no coups.¶ From a nuclear standpoint, the result of this dynamic is a command-and-control system that is firmly in the hands of the civilian political leadership, a clearly stated "no first use" policy, and a
view that nukes are political weapons -- a way to project global power and prestige -- not viable war-fighting tools.¶ In theory, Pakistan's nuclear trigger is also in civilian hands. A body called the National Command
Authority, headed by the prime minister, is supposed to be the ultimate decider of whether to initiate a nuclear attack. In reality, however, it is the military that controls the process from top to bottom.

Pakistan has never formally stated its nuclear doctrine, preferring to keep the Indians guessing as to when and where it might use nukes. But now it appears to be
contemplating the idea of actually using tactical nuclear weapons in a confrontation with India.¶ The
problem with this delicate state of affairs is not simply the two countries' history of war, but Pakistan's tactic of hiding behind its nuclear shield while allowing terrorist groups to launch proxy attacks against India. The
2001 attack on India's Parliament building and the 2008 Mumbai attack are the most egregious examples. Both were carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba militants based in Pakistan with well-established links to the ISI and
were far more provocative than anything the Americans or Russians dished out to each other during the four decades of the Cold War. (More than 160 people were killed in the attack that held India's largest city hostage
for 60 hours.) Terrorism is the classic underdog tactic, but Pakistan is certainly the world's first nuclear-armed underdog to successfully apply the tactic against a nuclear rival.¶ India has been struggling to respond. "For
15 years this country is bleeding from attack after attack, and there is nothing we can do," said Raja Mohan of the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi think tank. "The attacks correlate directly to Pakistan's
acquisition of nuclear weapons. From the moment they got nukes, they saw it as an opportunity they could exploit. And India has no instruments to punish Pakistan or change its behavior."¶ There are encouraging signs
that Pakistan may be rethinking this tactic, realizing that over the long run the Taliban and others of its ilk pose a far greater danger to Pakistan than to India. The relentless succession of suicide bombings and attacks on
police and military bases and a costly war to wrest control of the Swat Valley from the Taliban seem to have finally convinced Pakistan's military that, in the words of one general, "the threat today is internal, and if it is
not pushed back and neutralized, it will continue to expand its influence and we will have an Afghanistan situation inside our own country." But even if the ISI is sincere about ending its relationship with jihadi proxies,
India's military planners are still searching for an appropriate weapon with which to punish Pakistan in the event of "another Mumbai." ¶ The problem for India is that even though it holds a huge advantage in
conventional forces, its mobilization process is ponderously slow. This shortcoming was humiliatingly exposed after the 2001 attack on the Parliament building, when it took the Indian Army about three weeks to deploy
for a retaliatory strike -- enough time for the United States to step in and cool tempers on both sides. A potential nuclear crisis had been averted, but in 2004, India, still smarting from its inability to retaliate, announced a
new war-fighting doctrine dubbed "Cold Start," which called for the capability to conduct a series of cross-border lightning strikes within 72 hours. The idea was not to hold territory or threaten the existence of the
Pakistani state, but to use overwhelming firepower to deliver a punishing blow that would fall short of provoking a nuclear response.¶ Pakistan's reaction -- or overreaction -- was to double down on developing its short-
range battlefield nuclear weapon, the Hatf IX. Any incursion from India would be met with a nuclear response even if it meant Pakistan had to nuke its own territory. "What one fears is that with the testing of these short-
range nuclear missiles -- five in the last couple of months -- this seems to indicate a seriousness about using theater nuclear weapons," said Hoodbhoy, the physicist.¶ While strategists on both sides debate whether the
Hatf IX, with a range of 60 kilometers and a mobile multibarrel launch system, would be enough to stop an advancing column of Indian tanks -- Hoodbhoy argues that "smaller, sub-kiloton-size weapons are not really
effective militarily" -- they do agree that it would take more than one missile to do the job, instantly escalating the crisis beyond anyone's control.¶ The last nuclear weapon state to seriously consider the use of battlefield
nuclear weapons was the United States during the first decades of the Cold War, when NATO was faced with the overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces. But by the early 1970s, U.S. strategists no longer
believed these weapons had any military utility, and by 1991 most had been withdrawn from European territory.¶ Pakistan, however, seems to have embraced this discarded strategy and is now, in effect, challenging
India to a game of nuclear chicken -- which seems to have made India tread carefully. Tellingly, in 2008, when Lashkar terrorists attacked Mumbai, Cold Start was not implemented. These days, Indian officials seem to be
backing away from the idea. "There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former chief of staff. I have been defense minister of the country. I should know," veteran Indian politician
Jaswant Singh assured me. In a WikiLeaked classified document dated Feb. 16, 2010, Tim Roemer, then U.S. ambassador to India, described Cold Start as "a mixture of myth and reality" that, if implemented, "would likely
encounter very mixed results."¶ Pakistani military planners, however, continue to be obsessed with the idea of Cold Start. It comes up in every conversation about security, and it is the driving force behind the country's
program to develop tactical battlefield nukes. For now, the focus is on missile delivery systems, but according to Maria Sultan, director of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, an Islamabad think tank, there is
growing interest in using nukes in other ways -- such as to create an electromagnetic pulse that would fry the enemy's electronics. "In short, we will look for full-spectrum response options," she said.¶ The arms race
could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored
separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that

military
calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed.¶ Nevertheless,

analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation,
miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such
an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority
necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said
Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse."¶ Both sides speak of the possibility of a

once started, a nuclear exchange would be

limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that

almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange,"
said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control .
Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately.¶ What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5
million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world

would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade.
The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve.

It also causes Pakistani collapse---causes lashout and nuclear escalation

Pervez Hoodbhoy 12, Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Forman Christian College
University in Lahore, PhD in Nuclear Physics from MIT, member of the Permanent
Monitoring Panel on Terrorism of the World Federation of Scientists, and Zia Mian, director
of Princeton’s Project on Peace and Security in South Asia, at the Program on Science and
Global Security, Co-Editor of Science & Global Security, Ph.D. in physics from the University
of Newcastle upon Tyne, “Speculations on the Future of Nuclear South Asia,” in Confronting
the Bomb, http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/01/8.-Future-of-Nuclear-South-Asia-
pdf.pdf
 the Pakistan army’s narrow interests will keep it committed to the struggle
It is as likely, however, that

against India, regardless of cost and consequence. In a replay of the U.S.–Soviet race, Pakistan could
break its back trying to keep up with India. The South Asian region would fester as the two countries wrestle for
advantage in every forum. Left unchecked, it would result in the economic, political and social collapse of

Pakistan, which would unleash chaos. Under such circumstances, it is possible to imagine that the jihadis may
capture a nuclear weapon. A fearful India and United States would intervene, raising concerns
in China. The prospect of great power conflict would loom.¶ The nightmare scenario is that
Pakistan’s generals, faced with collapse, decide to threaten nuclear war. As the Cuban Missile Crisis
showed fifty years ago, in the midst of crisis, there is fear, miscalculation, errors of judgment, flaws in

command and control, and simple bad luck, and any of them could trigger a nuclear war.
The subcontinent’s cities would become radioactive ruins. Tens of millions would die. The pall of smoke would darken the world and become a global
calamity.
Loose Nukes
 No Collapse
Economic growth solves
Chung-in Moon 15, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, “Kim Jong-un secure as
North Korean economy picks up,” 1/27/15,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/01/27/kim-jong-un-secure-as-north-korean-
economy-picks-up/
The longevity of Kim Jong-un’s regime in North Korea has been subject to widespread
speculation by outside observers. Several factors led some to predict an early
downfall for the regime: young and immature leadership, a potential factional struggle, a stagnant economy and a hostile
external environment. But this prediction has not yet been realised. The Kim Jong-un regime is
alive and well. It has been surviving, if not thriving, with stable political leadership and a
gradual economic recovery.
The purge and execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Sung-thaek, then the second in charge, sent shockwaves
through the world in 2013. Some pundits saw it as a prelude to a new power struggle that would foster
the coming collapse of Kim’s regime. But since then, the opposite seems to have occurred. Kim Jong-
un is in firm control of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the military, and the state. With Jang’s
removal, he is not only reigning, but also ruling the daily operation of the North Korean system .
Consolidation of power through new personal and institutional arrangements has further strengthened his grip over national
governance.

Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, ruled the country rather arbitrarily with his own personal charisma, emphasising Songun (military-first
politics) ideology — while downplaying the party-centred governance system. In contrast, Kim Jong-un has completely restored the
primacy of the WPK over the military and the state. This move has been evidenced by the take-over of the military by civilian party
officials: first by Choe Ryong-hae and later by Hwang Pyong-so, appointed as head of the General Political Bureau of People’s Army that
oversees the entire military. Kim has also created a troika system composed of his loyalists that assists his rule. The troika includes party
secretary Choe Ryong-hae, Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong-so, and Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju. Choe manages the WPK, Hwang is in charge of
the military and Pak runs the cabinet. North
Korea under Kim Jong-un’s leadership is likely to be stable for
the time being, because, at least so far, there are no opposition blocs. Political rivals or popular
dissenting groups have not yet emerged.
The North Korean economy has also performed better since Kim Jong-un’s inauguration.
According to the Bank of Korea (the central bank of South Korea), North Korea’s growth rate recorded 0.8 per cent in 2011, 1.3 per cent
in 2012, and 1.1 per cent in 2013. Given its chronic negative growth rates before 2011, such
records are quite
impressive. And outsiders who travelled to North Korea have commonly acknowledged that the overall living
conditions of its people, including food and other consumer goods, have significantly improved. This
can be attributed partly to an increase in exports of coal, minerals, and fishery products to China;
growth in foreign earnings through manpower exports to China, Russia, and the Middle East; and a relatively
good harvest over the past three years.
Equally crucial are economic reform measures. On 28 June 2012, Pyongyang introduced an incentive driven
new economic management system known as the ‘June 28 measure’. The measure stipulates that those who produce more are entitle d to
have more. For example, a collective farm is now subdivided into several farm households each of which is composed of three or four
families. Those farm households retain about 30 per cent of the crops they harvest, while 70 per cent goes to the government. The
This
produce that is retained by farm households can now be traded in 380 farmers’ markets throughout the country.
represents a substantial change. (In the past, the government took the entire harvest and rationed portions to
farmers through a public distribution system). A
similar incentive system is now being applied to state
firms. In this way, a more competitive market system is slowly being adopted.
Kim also instructed the cabinet to exercise unified leadership in economic
management, and, at the same time, banned intervention by the party and the military — which was a major source of policy
discord and confusion. In addition, the North Korean government has designated 19 special economic
development zones in addition to five state-level special economic zones (such as Rajin-Sonbong and Kaesung). Such
institutional reforms have played a positive role in boosting the nation’s otherwise stagnant
economy.

Reforms solve---they’re incrementally improving the economy

Andrei Lankov 12/16, Associate Professor, Social Science Department, Kookmin
University, “Slow progress for North Korea’s cautious reforms,” 12/16/15,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/16/slow-progress-for-north-koreas-cautious-
reforms/
What does the future hold for North Korea? Sometime ago, I had the relatively rare opportunity to have a free chat with a North Korean
merchant. A woman in her forties, the wife of a mid-ranking official, is running an import business dealing in consumption goods. But,
unlike the majority of people with the same background, she also has a keen interest in elite politics. When talking about the most
desirable future for her country, she said: ‘ wedo not need reform and opening up like China, all we need
is reform’.¶ It seems that the Supreme Leader, Marshall Kim Jong-un, shares this idea. Since 2012 North Korea has
undergone cautious and slow reforms, without opening the country. The North Korean
government is slowly changing how it manages the economy, shifting control away
from the state to the market, but it is still maintaining (and, indeed, strengthening) its political control. ¶ These trends
began soon after the ascension of Kim Jong-un. 2015 has not been marked by any significant change in this regard. ¶ The
agricultural reforms initiated by the so-called ‘June 28th Instructions’ of 2012 have continued to yield very
positive results. This is in spite of all the uncertainty and lack of uniformity surrounding these
reforms as well as a severe drought. While the reforms vary from place to place, all the reform models have one thing in common:
farmers no longer work for fixed rations but for a certain share of the harvest. This share is
often said to be 30 per cent. The first estimates of agricultural output are quite optimistic — the
harvest is likely to be only slightly lower than the record-breaking 2014 harvest.¶ News from
industry is less encouraging. In 2014, the North Korean government passed a decision, the so-called ‘ May 30th Measures’, about the
universal switch to an independent accounting system. In practice, this meant that North Korea’s state-owned industrial enterprises
were given the right to choose suppliers for their inputs, sell their produce at market prices, hire and fire personnel at wi ll and pay
employees what they considered to be a realistic wage. But, for reasons unknown, the reforms were cancelled in early 2015. Despite this,
some factories are still allowed to work according to the new model . The vast
majority of these enterprises make money from exports to China and are quite
profitable.¶ On the political front, economic changes have not been accompanied by liberalisation. This is understandable since it
would be politically risky for the regime to be too permissive. Being a divided country with a far richer southern neighbour, the
government would struggle to survive with similar levels of openness found in China today — Kim Jong-un seems to understand this
situation well.¶ So, the year 2015 has been marked by further attempts to reverse the spontaneous political changes that have occu rred
in the last 20 years. Most policies have sought to counteract the government’s biggest worry: the continued flow of information from
overseas into North Korea.¶ There has been a further increase in Sino–North Korean border security. Border crossings are now
remarkably risky, unless one is willing to pay an increasingly steep bribe to guards. ¶ There have also been campaigns against Chinese
mobile phones that allow a small number of North Koreans — largely traders, smugglers and border-crossing brokers — to communicate
with China and the outside world almost freely. Now, such mobile phones are considered to be spying equipment. People found in
possession of them face the threat of five to seven years’ imprisonment. Attempts have also been made to crack down on the spread of
foreign videos, with renewed inspections of homes. ¶ At the same time, the world media was busy reporting the untimely deaths of top
officials. The most notable was the death of defence minister Hyon Yong-chol in early May (allegedly by an anti-aircraft gun). Then in late
September, Choe Ryong-hae, who until early 2015 was seen as North Korea’s second-in-command, disappeared. He has reportedly been
sent to work at a farm as punishment for mismanagement. While reports remain unconfirmed, there is little doubt that Kim Jong-un
continues to purge the elite and those that were once close to him are especially vulnerable. ¶ These high-level
purges have
attracted much attention, but there does not seem to have been any corresponding
increase in repression targeting the average person . So far Kim Jong-un’s wrath has been reserved for
army generals and party dignitaries, not the common folk — most of whom probably do not feel much affinity for the elite. In this sense,
oft-repeated reports of Kim Jong-un’s ‘reign by terror’ are exaggerations.¶ The year 2015 has
been another year of stuttering reform without openness. Though, on balance, this seems to have been
rather good news for the average North Korean.

Kim is succeeding in eliminating opponents and solidifying his control

Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov 14, Adjunct Professor of Korean Studies, U.S.-Korea Institute,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “Washington DC
Forum: A Score Card: The First Three Years of Kim Jong Un’s Rule,” Dec 17 2014,
https://www.upf.org/peace-and-security/washington-dc-forum/6250-washington-dc-
forum-a-score-card-the-first-three-years-of-kim-jong-un-s-rule
Let me start by giving you my bottom line up front. The regime is stable, the system is
resilient, and, believe it or not, the North Korean economy is better today than it was three years
ago. The North Korean people have a better life today than they did three years ago when Kim Jong Il died.¶ There is no question in
my mind that we have to deal with one-man rule in North Korea, it is the rule of Kim Jong
Un. He is the decider, the modernizer, the commander-in-chief, and the architect-in-chief. He is the person who makes the decisions in North Korea. There is no second-in-
command. Anyone who tried to assert him- or herself as a second-in-command was cut down in

size and eliminated time and again. I regard all senior officials around Kim Jong Un as
basically the pawns of the supreme leader.¶ There is no collective leadership in North Korea, and no matter what other people may tell you,
the people around him can only give him advice. Hence, we have the system of collective advice, but not collective leadership.¶ Kim Jong Un was able to

solidify and consolidate the “unified guidance system” where all reports are directed to
him. He maintains control over the country through the key institutions — the party, the military
and the security services. Over the past three years, we observed a visible shift from the "Military-First" (Songun) policy, as practiced by his father Kim Jong Il,
to the so-called Pyongjin Line, i.e., the strategic course on parallel construction of the economy and nuclear weapons.¶ We still have to deal with essentially the family-based regime
and take into account the first family politics. We saw how ruthless Kim Jong Un could be. He eliminated people perceived as mounting a political challenge to him, those who sought to
muscle away the power he had inherited from his father. Jang Song Thaek, his powerful uncle who was married to the only daughter of Kim Il Sung, and was in the shadow of Kim Jong
Il for almost 40 years. He did everything to amass his power, including setting up his own private cabinet, his own party within the party, his own security force, and his own reporting
line (guidance system) that was meant to enable him to run the country on his own. But, Jang failed to consolidate his power, and, in the end, Kim Jong Un took him out.¶ Let me make
my position clear. Most people say, “What a horrible human being Kim Jong Un is! He took out his own uncle. How could he do that?!” In my opinion, Jang’s purge was an act of courage
on Kim’s part. Why? Because Jang Song Thaek was a horrible man. His hands were drenched in blood. He was in charge of the North Korean gulag. As the director of the Administrative
Department of the WPK Central Committee, he supervised the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People’s Security, and other principal organizations within the North Korean
repressive apparatus. He was the person who signed all execution orders and all the torture orders. He was the North Korean analogue of Stalin’s henchman, Lavrenti Beria, who was
chief of the secret police apparatus and administered the Soviet Gulag. Everybody in North Korea knew Jang Song Thaek was a frightening human being. With his removal, North

Kim Jong Un step-by-step

Korean citizens no longer have to live in the fear of arbitrary executions and prosecutions.¶ In the past three years,

dismantled the guardianship system created by Kim Jong Il to ease his son’s way to power:
he removed Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho, Jang Song Thaek, and others. He has solidified his position as the supreme leader

by surrounding himself with the people he trusts , including party secretary Choe Ryong-hae and his younger sister Kim Yo
Jong, who was recently appointed as vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.
 No Uighur Terror
ETIM/Uighurs cant carry out attacks—no leadership or capacity
Arabinda Archarya 13 and Lynne Chua, East Asia Country Assessment: China,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-January13.pdf
While the discontent and perceived marginalization of the Uighur leading to acts of violence in Xinjiang could not be disputed, the
capability of organized entities such as the ETIM/TIP is rather limited in China as
they have minimum influence and access to the mainland. With ETIM‘s top
leadership almost completely decimated, the group‘s ability to carry out attacks has
come under severe stress. The ETIM‘s founder, Hasan Mahsum, was killed in 2003 by the Pakistan
military. His successor, Abdul Haq was killed in February 2010 by a United States (US) drone strike in
Afghanistan. It is estimated that the ETIM has less than one hundred members. It also operates
mainly outside of China– mainly in Pakistan. Groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and even Al Qaeda support the
cause of ETIM. But these groups have priorities and problems of their own apart from the Xinjiang issue.
Nuclear Safety
 Disease A/O
Intervening actors solve
Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral
Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've
suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health
emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials

prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had
confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make
one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so

exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when
they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a

problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human

response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that
led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast . They described—and the media reported—what
would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an

extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government

reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The
noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!'
because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances.

They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of

They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events.

really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one

dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby

of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of
1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish
flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public

health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even
Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain
or France had in the early 20th century.

No disease extinction---empirics and isolated populations

Nick Beckstead 14, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter
Doherty, recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the
University of Edinburgh, Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude
Children’s Research Hospital, “How much could refuges help us recover from a global
catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18 Nov 2014, Science Direct
While there is little published work on human
That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion.

extinction risk from pandemics, it seems that it would be extremely challenging for
any pandemic—whether natural or manmade—to leave the people in a specially
constructed refuge as the sole survivors. In his introductory book on pandemics (Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues:¶
“No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species. Even without the protection

provided by modern science, we survived smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded
history. Way back when human numbers were very small, infections may have been
responsible for some of the genetic bottlenecks inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is no formal
proof of this.Ӧ Though some authors have vividly described worst-case scenarios for engineered
pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a special effort to infect people in

highly isolated locations, especially the 100+ “largely uncontacted” peoples who
prefer to be left alone. This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery systems,
flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these
people.
 Rice A/C
Climate change makes collapse inevitable
Parameswaran Ponnudurai 13, Vice President of Programming at Radio Free Asia,
“Climate Change Conjures Up 'Alarming' Scenarios in Southeast Asia,” 7/2/13,
http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/climate-change-
07022013165938.html
Imagine these scenarios: The rice bowl of Vietnam cracking. Popular diving spots in the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia lying idle with no tourists. Nearly half of Bangkok inundated with water. ¶ Well, they could become a
reality in 20 to 30 years—no thanks to the adverse effects of climate change in Southeast Asia
exacerbated by forest fires particularly in Indonesia which recently blanketed the region with deadly smoky haze. ¶
Scientists warn in a new World Bank report of major impacts on the region if the temperature
rises by up to 2 degrees Celsius—warming which they say may be reached in two to three decades—fueled by the burning of fossil
fuels and deforestation.¶ The warming climate will push up the sea level in the region and
cause an increase in heat extremes, a higher intensity of tropical cyclones, and ocean
acidification stemming from excess carbon dioxide in the air, according to the latest edition of the bank's "Turn Down the Heat"
report.¶ The scientific report predicts a drop in agricultural production and widespread
food shortages, rapidly diminishing fish catch, increasing water- and vector-borne diseases, and diarrheal illnesses, impacting
mostly the urban poor, who constitute large proportions of city populations in the region.¶ The climate change effects will also dampen
the region's tourism industry, a top money-spinner, as coral reefs in pristine waters that lure divers and help fish breed are rapidly
destroyed.¶ 'Alarming scenario'¶ The World Bank issued its first "Turn Down the Heat" report last year, likening it to a wake-up call to
climate change. It concluded that the world would warm by 4 degrees Celsius by the end of this century if no concerted action is taken.¶
In the new report, scientists say that if the temperature rises by just 2 degrees Celsius, warming may be reached in 20 to 30 years. ¶ It
gives a more detailed look at how the
ongoing negative impacts of climate change could create
devastating conditions especially for those vulnerable , predicting what the bank's chief Jim Yong Kim
calls an "alarming scenario for the days and years ahead." ¶ "The displacement of impacted rural and coastal communities resulting from
the loss of livelihood into urban areas could lead to ever higher numbers of people in informal settlements being exposed to multiple
climate impacts, including heat waves, flooding, and disease," the report said. ¶ "Basically, you'll have a range of impacts on countries but
the incidence on that will fall disproportionately on poor people, because fisheries
and agriculture [are the key
areas to be affected]," John Roome, the bank's director for sustainable development in the East Asia Pacific Region, told RFA. ¶
He said that while there is greater awareness by governments to combat climate change, efforts needed to be accelerated by putting in
place early warning, monitoring and evaluation systems, and allocating special budgets to mitigate the crisis. ¶ "The alarming part is that a
4-degree world [where the temperatures are 4 degrees warmer] is not going to be a very pleasant place to live in for all the reasons that
are set out in the report but there are things that can be done if countries act soon to stem the temperature rise so that [t he rise] doesn’t
reach 4 degrees," Roome said.¶ Mekong Delta crop production drop ¶ The new report, based on analysis using advanced computer
Southeast Asia's major rice-
simulations to paint the clearest picture of vulnerabilities, says that as early as 2040,
growing region—the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam—will see crop production drop by about 12
percent due to an estimated sea-level rise of 30 cm (nearly 1 foot).¶ The Mekong Delta, popularly known as the “rice bowl” of
Vietnam and home to some 17 million people, makes up half of Vietnam’s total agricultural production and contributes significantly to
the country’s rice exports.¶ "Any
shortfall in rice production in this area because of climate
change would not only affect the economy and food security of Vietnam but would also have repercussions for
the international rice market," the report said.
1NR
Nuclear Safety
 HR Cred Defense
HR cred doesn’t solve war
Moravcsik 2 (Andrew, Professor of Government – Harvard University, Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent
Engagement, Ed. Patrick and Forman, p. 365)

There is little evidence that Rwandan, Serbian, or Iraqi leaders would have been more
humane if the United States had submitted to more multilateral human rights
commitments. The human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public opinion and
NGO networks, in the United States as well as elsewhere, despite the dubious legal status of international norms
in the United States. In sum, the consequences of U.S. nonadherence to global norms, while
signaling a weakening in theory, is probably of little import in practice.

Nations won’t enforce human rights even with foreign support

Goodman 4 and Jinks, 2004 [Ryan and Derek, Assistant Professor of Foreign, International,
and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School and Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of
Law, Duke Law Journal, December, 54 Duke L.J. 621, Lexis]

Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our
discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes especially productive in this arena. Most international
regimes seek to facilitate cooperation or coordination among states. 11 The global promotion of human rights, however, is
importantly different from both types of regimes. 12 For several reasons, the prevalence of human rights violations is not
reducible to a simple collective action problem. First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect human rights
within their territory without coordinating their efforts with [*629] other states. Without question, states retain some
substantial measure of effective autonomy in this area. Second, many
states have little clear interest in
promoting and protecting human rights abroad. Although "bad actors" impose externalities on other states
in extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights conditions trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only
sporadically and typically affect only a few (bordering) states. Third, many states have no interest in promoting and protecting
human rights domestically. Some states
are simply willing to violate human rights when it is
convenient to do so, and they have no interest in accepting structural commitments
that may alter their current decision processes. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems in human rights law is how
best to influence "bad actors" to make fundamental changes. The question whether international law can promote human rights
norms may be recast, in an important sense, as how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social influence.
The task of designing effective human rights regimes is further complicated by several structural characteristics of international
society that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two. First, international
human rights
norms are not self-enforcing. 13 This point issues from the fact that human rights
regimes do not address coordination problems and that states have no clear, direct
interest in securing human rights protection in other states. Second, good faith
participants in such regimes are generally unwilling or unable to shoulder the
enforcement costs necessary to coerce recalcitrant states to comply with human
rights norms. This "enforcement deficit" - exacerbated by high enforcement costs and
negligible direct returns - is a political reality of the current international order.
Deterrence
 2NC vs. MSU Joint Command
OPCON transfer causes North Korea to perceive a short-term
opportunity to strike---the aff argument that transfer bolsters ROK
independence is the reason the North would provoke them
Daniel S. Hurlbut 13, Colonel, U.S. Army; U.S. Army War College Fellow, April 2013, “The
Role of the U.S. Army in Air Sea Battle,” www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA592966
Complicating matters further on the Korean peninsula is the transfer of operational
command in 2015 to South Korea. In accordance with the joint agreement, the South
Koreans will assume operational command of all South Korean military forces in both
peace and wartime in 2015. The transfer of command is an indication of increased South
Korean military operational capability.
The transfer of command may also be viewed by the North Koreans as an opportunity
to act provocatively. They may view it as a lessening of capability (e.g. the US is moved
to a more enabling role) and North Korea may decide to act aggressively to test South
Korean capability, demonstrate their own power, or to negate the powerful
psychological effects an independent South Korean military will have on the minds of
Koreans north of the demilitarized zone.5

Framing issue---the plan transfers OPCON suddenly and unilaterally, and does it over
South Korean protests---those factors swamp their defense and mean none of it
applies
Leslie Forgach 10, research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute, 3/5/10, “US-
ROK OPCON Transfer Should Wait,” http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/us-rok-opcon-
transfer-should-wait/

So uth Ko rea has sounded the alarm again over the plan to disband the U.S.-ROK
Combined Forces Command and transfer of wartime op erational con trol of ROK forces to South
Korea by 2012. Defense Minister Kim Tae-young came out for the second time last week and said: “I hope that the U.S.-led defense
scheme will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.” While he was careful to appeal to the core U.S. security
concerns on the peninsula (nuclear and missile threats), what
should really make both countries think twice
about a premature transfer is the mounting instability within No rth Ko rea and the
asymmetric land-based threat the country poses.
The timing of the transfer couldn’t be worse, as North Korea ramps up for 2012, the year that marks the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung
(the country’s founding father and “Great Leader”), as well as the year Pyongyang projected it would beco me a “strong and powerful
nation” — a projection the regime could seek to manifest in shows of force. Growing domestic instability, as seen in unprecedented
public protests and a hike in hunger-related deaths, along with a looming succession crisis, will also make
the next three
years a particularly bad time to experiment with a hasty reconfiguration of South
Korea’s command and control , potentially putting allied contingency operations at stake.
Three years is also not enough time for the South Koreans to fill the existing gaps in their
defense capabilities (in terms of missile defense, command and control systems, critical
logistical capabilities, etc.), especially with a shrinking defense budget.
The United States’ initial rationale for the transfer is also increasingly being called into question (see here and here). And the

decision to go ahead with the transfer despite South Korea’s protests , and despite the
increasing instability across the DMZ, only further reveals that our view of the North Korean
threat is dangerously myopic. We tend to solely focus on the nuclear threat and not the
asymmetric challenges that the country presents, such as Pyongyang’s long range artillery
deployed along the DMZ or their surprisingly formidable special operations forces — the largest in the
world, at (reportedly) one million strong. The damage North Korea could do on the ground is unimaginable, as they like to re mind us.

The maintenance of a unified command — one time-tested over 30-plus years — is an assurance that the

allies will be ready on the ground if conflict arises.

In the long run, OPCON transition may indeed prove to be a step worth taking — while
maintaining close coordination between U.S. and ROK forces, of course. There’s no doubt, for instance, that
having ROK forces at the helm during any sort of military confrontation would further legitimize the South Korean government’s post-

conflict role on the peninsula. But transition now only makes sense if So uth Ko rea is ready, which
their senior leaders are plainly telling us is not the case .

Maintaining U.S. OPCON’s vital to deter nuclear conflict with the North---the U.S. is
distracted by other crises which makes reinforcing deterrence through other means
after the plan ineffective---means the link beats their defense
Victor Cha 14, senior adviser and Korea Chair at CSIS and professor of government and
director for Asian Studies at Georgetown University, 2014, “Keeping Focus on Korea,” in
2015 Global Forecast, eds. Cohen & Gable,
http://csis.org/files/publication/141110_Cohen_GlobalForecast2015_Web.pdf
It is hard to tell what the bigger concern on the Korean peninsula will be over the next year:
more nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests by the North, or potential political
discontinuities inside the Pyongyang regime . Neither is a good outcome.
The first scenario would highlight the fact that over 20 years after the first nuclear agreement with North Korea in October 1994 (the
Agreed Framework), and 10 years after the second nuclear agreement in September 2005 (the Six-Party Joint Statement), the problem
has become exponentially worse in 2015. North
Korea, under Kim Jong-un’s byongjin strategy appears to be aiming to
develop the full spectrum of nuclear capabilities, from plutonium and uranium-based weapons to potential
battlefield use. The Obama administration might try to make one last push for a denuclearization deal like the September 2005
agreement, but success would be highly unlikely.

The second scenario is no better. The machinations of North

Korean leadership dynamics raise concerns
about regime stability. It is not clear if the young leader is calling the shots or if there are
power struggles among elites in the party and military over a shrinking pie. Even if internal power
struggles are not the problem, Kim’s health may be. Westerners who have met the young leader in person at diplomatic function s in
Pyongyang have observed that he is grossly obese, much more so than official pictures depict; that he is a chain smoker; that he drinks
heavily; and that his face looks unusually unhealthy for a 29- or 30-year-old. There is a history of heart disease in the family (Kim’s father
and grandfather both died of massive heart attacks), as well as purported kidney and liver problems. The chances that he can rule for
decades like his predecessors are slim.
The challenge for the United States will be how to maintain focus on this problem when the
White House will be preoccupied with Ebola in West Africa, Russia and Ukraine, and the war
against ISIS. A crisis with the North (in the form of a fourth nuclear test or provocations against South Korea) will certainly grab
attention, but the reaction will be to seek a temporary solution that provides compensation to Pyongyang in return for de-escalation—a
familiar outcome that has contributed directly to the growth of the North’s nuclear program over the past 25 years. On the ot her hand, if
the North does not invoke a crisis it will mean little attention from Washington, allowing the North’s nuclear program to develop
unimpeded.

The best antidote to this catch-22 is to continue robust defense cooperation with South
Korea . This means enhancing missile defense, including the introduction of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
delay of the transfer of wartime operational control ( OPCON ) from the United States to
(THAAD) to the peninsula;

South Korea; and

a rigorous regimen of military exercises to reinforce deterrence. Washington
and Seoul might consider improved defense cooperation in areas like drone technology, which could be
useful against North Korea. Regional security also requires better defense cooperation and information sharing between South Korea and
Japan. As reluctant as the South Koreans may be to work with their neighbor, enhanced U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral alliance cooperation is
the best answer to North Korea’s threats and possible regime instability.
 AT: Transfer Turns Deterrence
The best, most comprehensive read of Kim Jong-Un concludes
deterrence is working now and risk of escalation is limited---also
predictive
Ken E. Gause 15, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program of the Center for
Strategic Studies, CNA Corporation, August 2015, “North Korea’s Provocation and
Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime,”
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf
Any discussion of deterrence should be tied to considerations of escalation. In the case of
North Korea, these discussions should also be tied to the Supreme Leader’s drivers and
boundaries. Carrying out random strategic messaging without understanding how those messages will resonate with Kim Jong-un
is only a selfsatisfying act of wishful thinking. In the end, North Korea’s calculus is tied largely to the personality and p redilections of an
individual. It is his fears and aspirations that need to be manipulated to deter, dissuade, or, if all else fails, mitigate.

Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s brinksmanship strategy used a framework with three stages: Provocation, Marking the Position, and
Maintenance and Recognition. On the international level, this strategy was tied to missile and nuclear tests. Within the inte r-Korea
context, it was linked to naval (and later cyber) provocations. In both of these arenas, Kim Jong-il’s planning revolved around securing
these three stages, ultimately achieving international recognition of the North Korean point of view. His tolerance for escalation was
informed by decades of observation of South Korean and U.S. responses. De-escalation off-ramps were part of each provocational
engagement.

An early assessment of Kim Jong-un portrayed him as a leader who was growing in self-
confidence and would likely see provocations as a policy tool. This assessment also portrayed
Kim as someone who was bolstered by the outcome of the 2013 crisis and, therefore, less willing to
forgo confrontation, confident that his will would win out in the end. Not endowed with his father’s deep knowledge of
escalation dynamics on the peninsula, this assessment continued, Kim Jong-un was more prone to
miscalculation. His growing self-assurance would deter his advisers from providing advice that contradicted his worldview. The
events of the last couple of years suggest that this assessment may not be entirely correct.
It is most likely applicable to intercrisis periods, as opposed to the period leading up to a provocation. In other words, during periods
of increasing tension on the peninsula, Kim Jong-un may be willing to push strategies that
appear bold and aggressive. But during this period, his decisionmaking is still informed
by advisers and calibrated depending on external stimuli. After a provocation occurs and the escalatory
ladder is engaged (if the 2013 crisis is any indication) his decision-making changes. Decisions are heavily weighted toward the
implications for his own position and legitimacy within the wider leadership. His self-perceived ability to de-escalate (and risk showing
weakness) is diminished. How far he is willing to move up the escalatory ladder is unknown.

If this model of a leader (and by extension, a regime) going through a power consolidation is placed in the context of decision-making on
future provocations, certain
assumptions can be made that comport with how North Korea has
acted since Kim Jong-un took over. It is a regime that will engage in non-violent
demonstrations where escalation can be managed. On one hand, even in the face of warnings from the United
States, South Korea, and China, North Korea conducted two missile tests in 2012 and a nuclear test in 201 3. Such demonstrations feed
the requirements for Kim’s power consolidation process. But, on the other hand, as
international pressure has grown
and the Sino-North Korean relationship has become more strained, Pyongyang has not
engaged in another demonstration—although it has apparently engaged in a high profile (yet covert) cyber-attack.
According to some sources, the economic pressures on the regime (especially from China) may not have deterred other
tests, but may have slowed the pace of testing. If true, it suggests that Kim Jong-un, while eager to move forward
with these programs, has
been influenced by external pressure and has likely listened to those
within the regime who caution against moving too quickly.
Despite its aggressive rhetoric, which has reached a new level of animosity under Kim Jong-un, the regime has
not yet engaged in violent provocation. Even during the Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in
2013, 2014, and 2015 when the regime could have justified aggressive actions as a way of bolstering its own deterrent and responding to
the aggressive actions of the United States and South Korea, it
chose to confine its actions to rhetorical
fusillades and Scud launches into the Sea of Japan. It made no attacks on South Korean territory or
ships at sea. This suggests that the cost somehow outweighed the benefits that could have been gained from
undertaking such actions. According to some reports, the pressure from China and the threats of retaliation
from the Blue House and the South Korean Joint Staff, including decapitation strikes, may have figured into the
North Korean calculus. The U.S. decision to forgo the testing of the Minuteman missile in 2013, as well as the U.S.-South
Korean decision to downplay the 2014 and 2015 exercises, may have also provided needed off-ramps and a more deliberative decision-
making process to occur inside Pyongyang. Contrary
to the portrait of an impetuous leader who makes
emotional decisions and lashes out at perceived threats, to date, Kim Jong-un has proven to be
a pragmatic decision-maker—someone who may be able to be deterred at the upper end of
the escalation scale.
 AT: No Impact (Jackson)
The North Korean nuclear threat’s set to massively expand in the short
term---throw out old defense
Joel Wit 15, Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS and a Senior Research
Fellow at Columbia University Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies, 4/22/15,
“North Korea's Unstoppable Nuclear-Weapons Program,”
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas-unstoppable-nuclear-weapons-program-
12686?page=show
In the past month, a disagreement has broken out into the open between the United States and its ally, the Republic of Korea, over the
seriousness of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. This dispute, centering on whether Pyongyang can mount
nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles—the United States says yes, and South Korea says no—reflects first and foremost the two sides
jockeying for position over whether Seoul should introduce an advanced U.S. missile-defense system known as Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD). While THAAD is intended to deal with the threat from Pyongyang, Beijing opposes its deployment, given
concerns that the system is really aimed at its own missile forces. But the dispute also reflects a bigger problem—namely, South Korea’s
unwillingness to come to grips with the reality that the nuclear-weapons threat from the North is poised for
significant expansion .
That expansion will benefit from accomplishments achieved between 2009 and 2014, banner
years for Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Aside from the obvious manifestations—
two tests of nuclear devices and three of long-range rockets—North Korea has conducted a host of other activities intended to lay the
foundation for the future growth of its nuclear deterrent. For example, in 2011, Pyongyang
unveiled a new modern
plant able to produce highly enriched uranium that can be used to expand its nuclear-weapons stockpile. More
recently, that plant has doubled in size, possibly meaning it can produce twice as much of this material. On the
missile front, aside from modernizing its main launch facility to test larger rockets, the North is also
gearing up to eventually deploy a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile able to reach the west
coast of the United States.
What do these developments mean for North Korea’s nuclear future? We have been looking at this prospect at the U.S.-Korea Institute at
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and have concluded that the threat is going to grow, perhaps
quite dramatically, by 2020. Of course, predicting the future of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is difficult, given
inherent uncertainties in prognosticating about the most secret programs in an already secretive country. But there
is also more
evidence about these programs today than at any time in the past, in part because of the availability of
commercial satellite and on-the-ground photography able to spot new developments, but also because as these programs
move towards fielding operational weapons through visible activities, such as testing, it is easier
to observe their progress.
Given these uncertainties, any prudent analysis has to construct different scenarios ranging from a “worst case” outcome for the North
Koreans—little or no growth—to a “worst case” outcome for its neighbors and the international community—a great deal of growth—
with a middle scenario that essentially reflects their current program and where it is heading. We did that working with Da vid Albright, a
well-known nuclear nonproliferation expert and head of the Institute for Science and International Studies, starting with a baseli ne of ten
to sixteen nuclear weapons in Pyongyang’s stockpile, based on our understanding of how much fissile material the North had produced
by the end of 2014. And the projections were not just for numbers of bombs, but also looked at Pyongyang’s ability to build s maller,
lighter weapons (allowing the North to place them on top of missiles) with greater yields (that would cause more damage). (See Graph)

The outcome is sobering. Whichever scenario takes place, the North Korean nuclear threat will
grow at an alarming rate, although just how alarming remains unclear. Even in a worst-case scenario for
the North Koreans—they do not conduct any more nuclear tests, their ability to produce nuclear material
for more bombs remains limited and their efforts to acquire foreign technology are unsuccessful—Pyongyang’s stockpile
grows 100 percent, from ten to twenty weapons. In the worst-case scenario for the rest of us, North
Korea steps up its yearly nuclear-test program, operates plants at full capacity to produce bomb-
making material and is successful in acquiring foreign technology. The result is a stockpile
numbering one hundred nuclear weapons by 2020, as well as significant progress in
miniaturizing warheads to place on missiles and in increasing the explosive yields of those
weapons. In the third, most likely “mid-range estimate”—based on Pyongyang continuing its
infrequent nuclear tests, a more reasonable rate of fissile-material production and limited
success in foreign cooperation—North Korea could still produce fifty nuclear weapons.

Impact defense is wrong---risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis is

significantly higher than it appears in relative peacetime
Anthony H. Cordesman 13, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS; and Ashley Hess,
MA in international relations from Seoul National University, June 2013, “The Evolving
Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Volume II,”
http://csis.org/files/publication/130513_KMB_volume2.pdf
The tensions between the Koreas - and the potential involvement of the People's Republic
of China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) at both the
political and military levels — create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible
conflicts. These range from posturing and threats - "wars of intimidation" — to major
conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula to intervention by outside power like the
US and China to the extreme of nuclear conflict.
There are powerful deterrents to such conflicts. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South
Korea) has emerged as major economic power, and one that is important to the economies
of the US, Japan, and China — as well as to the world. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is one of the world's most heavily militarized states, but is
still a relatively small military power by US and Chinese standards. It remains vulnerable to
US aid, missile power, and precision strike capability, and runs a serious risk of being
isolated if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support.
The fact remains, however, that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war.
This is particularly true if one considers the number of times that war has resulted from
unpredictable incidents and patterns of escalation. The historical reality is that the
likelihood of less-probable forms of war actually occurring has been consistently higher
than what seemed in peacetime to be the most probable contingencies and the patterns of
escalation that seemed most likely from the viewpoint of a "rational bargainer."
 AT: End Strength
Overall U.S. posture in Asia and with South Korea specifically is highly
credible---crises elsewhere don’t thump the link---only our ev
distinguishes fact from spin
Janine Davidson 15, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, CFR, 7/20/15, “Greatest Hits: How
Serious Is the Rebalance? U.S. Military Record Tells (Part of) the Story,”
http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/07/20/greatest-hits-how-serious-is-the-rebalance-u-
s-military-record-tells-part-of-the-story/
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s travels to Japan and South Korea last week—designed no doubt to highlight the continued U.S.
Skeptics
commitment to the region—instead resurfaced concerns that the rebalance to Asia is no longer a priority for Washington.
worry that world events from Russian aggression in Ukraine, to the continued conflagrations across the
Middle East, and negotiations with Iran will continue to challenge Washington’s ability to deploy what Carter
referred to as the “next phase of our rebalance.” Debates over the defense budget back in Washington further
stoke worries that the military side of the rebalance will remain more talk that action. While there may be
other valid concerns about the rebalance (Is it focused sufficiently on Southeast Asia?Overly provocative toward China? Likely to be
derailed entirely without the TPP?), concerns that the
United States has not prioritized the rebalance do not
stand up to the facts. A survey of actual U.S. military activity in the region helps differentiate
facts from opinion.
That Secretary Carter visited Tokyo and Seoul so soon after stepping into the job reflects the priority
the Pentagon places on the region . Between them, these two countries host over80,000 U.S. military personnel and
the majority of forward deployed assets in the Western Pacific (note: there are 65,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe and roughly
35,000 currently deployed to the Middle East). In Tokyo, Secretary Carter’s visit was timed to coincide with the
final revisions to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, a bilateral priority given the
dramatic regional geopolitical shifts since the guidelines were last revised in the late 1990s. His discussions with counterparts
in Seoul did tiptoe around the U.S. proposed introduction of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea,
but highlighted the solidarity of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Beyond these recent steps, the Pentagon’s plans and movements have made Asia-Pacific a top priority
since the earliest days of the rebalance. The Department of Defense is on track to position 60 percent of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces in
the region by 2020 with 55 percent of the Navy’s 289 ships, including 60 percent of its submarine fleet, already based across Asia.

Marines are shifting from being primarily in Okinawa to having a presence in mainland Japan, Australia, Guam, and Hawaii. In Australia, a
country now caught between closer security ties with Washington and economic connections to China, the U.S.-Australia Force Posture
Agreement ensures both that 2,500 Marines rotate annually through Darwin for the next twenty-five years and that U.S. military and
intelligence representation at Australian facilities continues. As the U.S. Army withdraws troops from Afghanistan, it is re -focusing the
efforts of more than 80,000 soldiers in Hawaii, Alaska, and Japan in support of its Pacific Pathwaysmultilateral training and exerc ising
initiatives in Asia and is sustaining its robust presence on the Korean peninsula.

Beyond such rebalancing of U.S. forces within the region, is the effort to ensure the newest cutting-edge technology finds its way into
service in Asia before use elsewhere. The Pacific has seen the main deployment of the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the latest Virginia-
class submarine, the principle basing for the advanced F-22 and (soon) the F-35, the introduction of the advanced P-8 maritime patrol
aircraft, increased rotation of U.S. Air Force and Navy airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and the replacement of theUSS
George Washington with the more capable Ronald Reagan.

In Japan, two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense-capable ships, joint high-speed vessels, and a second TPY-2 missile defense radar
are being deployed. Additional submarines willrotate regularly to Guam as part of a new, higher volume presence. And in Singapore, a
regular rotation of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) enhances the strong U.S.-Singapore security relationship.

Drawing from the Army’s foreign area officer program, the Navy inaugurated a similar initiative, ensuring that culturally astute officers
can spend their careers in the Asia-Pacific. Military personnel will have the opportunity to link up multiple deployments in Asia,
accumulating regional expertise and building lasting relationships with their counterparts in other nations. By the time these officers
reach senior-level command positions, they should have a wealth of cultural and substantive experience—often to include regional
language skills—that position them for success in their positions and in cooperation with Asian military leaders.

These moves provide opportunity for deeper, more meaningful military-to-military

cooperation and substantive agreements with U.S. allies across the Asia-Pacific. In addition to the
U.S.-Australia Framework Partnership Agreement, Washington also inked the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with
the Philippines, authorizing access by U.S. forces to predetermined locations across the islands.

Meanwhile, multilateral military exercises across Asia continue at a steady clip, ranging from the
biannual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which included over 22 U.S. allies and partners, including China last year, to the annu al Cobra Gold
exercise (the largest in the region), Southeast Asian Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training (CARAT), Southeast Asia Cooperation and
Training (SEACAT), and Operation Malabar, a bilateral U.S.-Indian exercise whose status was upgraded earlier this year.

There is a tendency in Washington circles to draw sweeping policy judgments (“The rebalance is
fundamentally flawed! “The rebalance is dead!”) with few facts to back them up. Yet, even as crises
in other regions vie for Washington’s attention and debates over the U.S. defense budget continue, a
review of the actual U.S. military posture and activity in the Asia-Pacific, shows the
strategy inaugurated by President Obama in 2011 remains—at least where the military is concerned— pretty much on
course.
 OPCON---Causes Troop Withdrawal
OPCON transition crushes Congressional support for the overall troop presence
Christopher Robert Escamilla 10, MA, National Security Studies, American Public
University System, 2010, “THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE TRANSITON OF THE LEAD OF THE
COMBINED DEFENSE FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA,”
http://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/masters-theses/Escamilla_8-2010.pdf

Bechtol argues that the loss of unity of command and political aspects of the ROK-U.S.
Alliance must be considered prior to the conduct of OPCON transition. “The loss of a unified
command (which exists today) is likely to curtail the high degree of coordination that exists
between ROK and U.S. forces today.” Bechtol believes this will likely result in higher
casualties. The current ROK-U.S. Alliance command relationship is seamless and extends
from two separate national command authorities in Washington, D.C. and Seoul. In
wartime, designated ROK forces chop to the commander CFC who then answers to both the
U.S. and South Korean national command authorities and carries out their strategic
direction in the execution of a bilateral unified command, CFC. Post OPCON transition, CFC
will disestablish and ROK forces will no longer fall under a bilateral command. Two
separate warfighting commands, KORCOM for the U.S. and Korea Joint Forces Command
(KJFC) for the ROK. Bechtol argues unity of command will no longer exist with forces
fighting on the Korean Peninsula answering to two separate national command authorities.
53, 54
Bechtol states politically that the change in wartime OPCON can lead to the misperceptions
about the ability of the ROK military to independently conduct a war with North Korea.
Additionally, this could result in a loss of congressional and U.S. domestic support for
the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. A reduction of U.S. forces on the Korean
Peninsula would not bode well for either South Korean or regional security. Bechtol
concludes that by the U.S. allowing the ROK government the opportunity to increase its
military capabilities and improve its forces through delaying the implementation of
OPCON transfer the ROK-U.S. alliance will be reinforced in maintaining “the security of the
Korean Peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia as a whole .” 56, 57
 OPCON---ROK Readiness
The ROK military’s not ready to regain OPCON---they lack necessary C4ISR and
there’s domestic opposition to modernization
Bruce Klingner 14, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage Foundation, 8/7/14,
“The U.S. and South Korea Should Focus on Improving Alliance Capabilities Rather Than the
OPCON Transition,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/the-us-and-
south-korea-should-focus-on-improving-alliance-capabilities-rather-than-the-opcon-
transition

The transfer of full operational control of South Korean forces to Seoul during both armistice and
wartime has also been delayed over concerns about Seoul’s ability to adequately exercise
command and control of its forces and to coordinate wartime actions with U.S. and
international forces . The decision to postpone the OPCON transition would alleviate some of the near-term pressure on
Seoul, but the Park Geun-hye administration needs to clearly articulate plans to redress shortages in the country’s defense capabiliti es.

General Scaparrotti testified that, although

Seoul continues to expand defense spending—this year’s defense
budget represents a 4 percent increase over 2013—“it
still has not been able to meet the ambitious defense
spending objectives of its current long-range defense plan, prompting a re-evaluation and re-prioritization
of defense acquisition priorities and future force posture.”[20]

The South Korean military still lacks the necessary C4ISR systems and capabilities to overcome
stovepiped command structures and to enable interoperability across services. U.S. officials
privately comment that at present the South Korean military is not capable of truly joint operations.

Seoul had previously committed itself to Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 12-30,[21] a wide-ranging military
modernization strategy to compensate for demographically driven large reductions in manpower
by upgrading to a smaller, high-technology defense force. Seoul would procure improved command and
control systems and more capable weapons.[22]

Yet South Korea did not implement the JCS-centric command structure included in DRP 12-30. The
ROK National Assembly refused to pass the required laws because of considerable
domestic opposition, especially from retired generals. The organizational revision would have enabled
a more flexible and joint military force. By augmenting real-time joint battlefield management capabilities and
indigenous target warning and acquisition skills, Seoul could exercise more effective joint command.
 OPCON---ROK Restraint
OPCON transfer causes the ROK to escalate against NK provocations---
the U.S. lead role is highly restraining
Daniel Pinkston 14, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis
Group in Seoul, 6/18/14, “U.S.-ROK Alliance Management: OPCON Transition and ISR,”
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/asia/2014/06/18/u-s-rok-alliance-management-opcon-
transition-and-isr/
Seoul has been outspoken in its desire to retaliate sternly against any future North
Korean provocations. This sentiment was borne out of what some ROK political and
defence officials viewed as an overly restrained response both to the sinking of the Ch’ŏnan
and the shelling of Yŏnp’yŏng Island in 2010. With this in mind, the development of ROK
weapons capabilities in addition to the possibility of OPCON transfer opens up broader
issues related to future deterrence and crisis stability within the context of U.S.-ROK
alliance dynamics.
Credible threats to strike back with greater force may strengthen deterrence by signalling
to Pyongyang that future provocations would be too costly. However, if deterrence fails and
the ROK delivers retaliatory strikes that are more extensive and robust than in the past, the
danger of rapid escalation is real since Pyongyang could perceive the response to be the
first wave of much larger military operations or the beginning of a full-scale war. In other
words, if the U.S. were to relinquish wartime OPCON, the threat of counter-strikes against
provocations such as the Ch’ŏnan sinking is more credible because the ROK military would
perhaps feel less restrained in seeking to settle some scores with the North. With Seoul in
the driver’s seat the barriers to escalation could be reduced since Seoul appears to be
less concerned about escalation and stability than Washington. As long as an American
general is in command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), stability will be viewed
as more important than revenge against the [North] Korean People’s Army (KPA).