EMATA VS.

IAC
FACTS: Petitioner purchased a car on installment from Violago Motor Sales Corp. with a down
payment of P 14,982 and a promissory note(PN and chattel mortgage as security. Violago endorsed
the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corp. and later assigned
the remaining installment balance to Servicewide who alleged non-payment of it and filed for
replevin and damages. Petitioner alleged that the PN did not express true intent and procured
through fraud by inflating the value and charging more.

He filed a Motion to Implead Filinvest because it retained interest over the balance even of it
assigned to private respondent. He was given (15) days to file the third-party complaint against
Filinvest but petitioner did not comply. He filed an urgent motion to cancel the scheduled pre-trial
and the trial court reset the same. Another motion for postponement filed was denied, whichthe
court issued an order declaring him in default. Respondent Corp. was then allowed to present
evidence ex parte. Upon subsequent motion, the trial court not only lifted the default order but also
allowed him to cross-examine private respondent's sole witness "as a last opportunity to adduce
evidence in support of the material allegations of his answer." The court decided mostly favoring
the private respondent to which he argued that the trial court erred in requiring him to file a third-
party complaint against Filinvest, instead of impleading the latter either as party plaintiff or
defendant. He insists that Filinvest is the real party in interest in the present case and it should be
impleaded under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court Sections 10 11 and Rule 6.

RULING: The third-party complaint against Filinvest, had petitioner filed the same, would be a
claim in respect of the plaintiffs claim since the former arises from the same transaction on which
the plaintiffs claim is based, that is, the promissory note which was eventually assigned to private
respondent. He cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3 which envisages a party who
should be joined as a plaintiff but who does not assent to such joinder because uch unwilling party
must be a real party in interest. In the case at bar, Filinvest's position and the evidence thereon was
that it was not a real party in interest, as it was no longer entitled to the avails of the suit by reason
of the anterior assignment it made in favor of private respondent.
Hence, at the very least, its capacity was in issue and it would be a case of procedural petitio
principii for the trial court to have categorized it as an unwilling co-plaintiff, with the procedural
consequences thereof, although such operative issue was still unresolved. Furthermore, the option
lies with the plaintiff on whether or not to join an additional party in his complaint. The original
plaintiff cannot be compelled, on the mere representations of the defendant, to implead anyone,
especially if it does not appear that such joinder is proper or is necessary for the complete and
expeditious adjudication of the case.

Nor can the general rule in Section 11, Rule 3, on the power to order the addition or dropping of a
party at any stage of action, be of solace to the petitioner. This is a power addressed to the sound
discretion of the court to be exercised on such terms as are just, and by this is meant that it must
be just to all the other parties. 15 Obviously, given the facts of this case, the trial court wisely
exercised its discretion in refusing to give in to the unjustified importunings of petitioner.
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION v. JOVEN L. NGO

FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with Bautista for a parcel of land for
a total of P7.3m Petitioner was to make a down 2.1m upon its execution, with the balance to be
paid upon completion by Bautista of the documents necessary for the transfer. Despite receipt of
payment of P6.5 Bautista failed and refused to execute the deed and even sold the property to
another. Hence petition for specific performance and damages and caused the annotation of a
Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT. However, before it could proceed, Bautista's counsel filed a
Manifestation and Notice of Death RTC directed Bautista's counsel to substitute the latter's heirs
and/or representatives in the action pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It held in
abeyance the proceedings in said case until petitioner procures the appointment of an executor or
administrator pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the ROC. Joven L Ngo filed a Verified Petition for
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens alleging that Bautista owed him 8M secured by such
property involved which was foreclosed and sold to public auction upon failure to pay. The CA
held that the complaint for specific performance and damages was an action in personam since its
object was to compel Bautista to perform his obligations under the Deed of Conditional Sale and
hence, rendered him pecuniarily liable. As such, the obligations in the contract attached to him
alone and did not burden the subject property. Since the action was founded on a personal
obligation, it did not survive Bautista's death. Hence, the CA concluded that the dismissal of the
complaint by reason thereof, and not a resort to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, was the
proper course of action. The CA opined that the issue involving the propriety of the consolidation
of the two cases had become moot and academic.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Case in view of Bautista's death.

RULING: Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who
dies during the pendency of a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is
not extinguished by his death. As early as in Bonilla v. Barcena, the Court has settled that if the
claim in an action affects property and property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-
litigant, viz.:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is
to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

In the instant case, although the CA correctly pointed out that the Case involves a complaint for
specific performance and damages, a closer perusal of petitioner's complaint reveals that it actually
prays for, inter alia, the delivery of ownership of the subject land through Bautista's execution of
a deed of sale and the turnover of title in its favor. This shows that the primary objective and nature
of the case is to recover the subject property itself and thus, is deemed to be a real action.