I. FILING FEES
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 RULE 141 LEGAL FEES
Section 1.Payment of fees. — Upon the filing of the pleading or
other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees
prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. (n)
Section 2.Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final judgment
awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than
that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect
the corresponding fees. (n)
Section 3.Persons authorized to collect legal fees. — Except as
otherwise provided in this rule, the officers and persons hereinafter
mentioned, together with their assistants and deputies, may
demand, receive, and take the several fees hereinafter mentioned
and allowed for any business by them respectively done by virtue of
their several offices, and no more. All fees so collected shall be
forthwith remitted to the Supreme Court. The fees collected shall
accrue to the general fund. However, all increases in the legal fees
prescribed in amendments to this rule as well as new legal fees
prescribed herein shall pertain to the Judiciary Development Fund
as established by law. The persons herein authorized to collect legal
fees shall be accountable officers and shall be required to post bond
in such amount as prescribed by law. (la)
Section 4.Clerks of the Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court.
—
(a) For filing an action, proceeding, appeal by notice or record on
appeal when required, entering appearance of the parties, entering
orders of the court, filing and docketing all motions, docketing of
case on all proper dockets, and indexing the same, entering,
recording and certification of judgment and remanding of records of
the lower court, taxing the costs, administering all necessary oaths
or affirmation in the action or proceeding, recording the opinion of
the court, and issuing all necessary process in the action or
proceeding not herein otherwise provided for, each action or special
proceeding, five hundred (P500.00) pesos;
(b) For the performance of marriage ceremony, including issuance of
certificate of marriage, three hundred (P300.00) pesos.
(c) For furnishing transcripts of the record or copies of any record,
judgment, or entry of which any person is entitled to demand and
receive a copy, for each page, four (P4.00) pesos;
(d) For each certificate not in process, thirty (P30.00) pesos;
(e) For every search for anything above a year's standing and
reading the same, fifteen (P15.00) pesos;
(f) For a commission on all money coming into his hands rules or
order of the court and caring for the same, two and one-half (2.5%)
percent on all sums not exceeding four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos,
and one and one-half (1.5%) percent upon all sums in excess of four
thousand (P4,000.0) pesos, and one (1%) percent on all sums in
excess of forty thousand (P40,000.00) pesos. (4a)
Section 5.Fees to be paid by the advancing party. — The fees of the
clerk of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court shall be paid
him at the same time of the entry of the action or proceeding in the
court by the party who enters the same by appeal or otherwise, and
the clerk shall in all cases give a receipt for the same and shall enter
the amount received upon his book, specifying the date when
received, person from whom received, name of action in which
received and amount received. If the fees are not paid, the court
may refuse to proceed with the action until they are paid and may
dismiss the appeal or the proceeding. (3a)
Section 6.Fees of bar candidates. —
(a) For filing the application for admission to the bar, whether
admitted to the examination or not, one thousand and seven
hundred fifty (P1,750.00) pesos for new applicants, and for
repeaters, plus the additional amount of two hundred (P200.00)
pesos multiplied by the number of times the applicant has failed in
the bar examinations;
(b) For admission to the bar, including oath taking, signing of the roll
of attorneys, the issuance of diploma of admission to the Philippine
Bar, one thousand and seven hundred fifty (P1,750.00) pesos;
(c) Other Bar Fees. — For the issuance of:
1. Certification of admission to the Philippine Bar P50.00
2. Certificate of good standing (local) 50.00
3. Certificate of good standing (foreign) 100.
4. Verification of membership in the bar 50.00
5. Certificate of grades in the bar examinations 50.00
6. Other certification of records at the Bar Office, per page
15.00
7. A duplicate diploma of admission to the Philippine Bar
500.00
For services in connection with the return of examination notebooks
to examinees, a fee of thirty (P30.00) pesos shall also be charged.
(6a)
Section 7.Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. —
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of
court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total sum
claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in
litigation, is:
1. Less than P100,000.00 P500.00
2. P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00 P800.00
3. P50,000.00 or more but less than P200,000.00 P1,000.00
4. P200,000.00 or more but less that P250,000.00 P1,500.00
5. P250,000.00 or more but less than P300,000.00 P1,750.00
6. P300,000.00 or more but less than P350,000.00 P2,000.00
7. P350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 P2,250.00
8. For each P1,000.00 in excess of 400,000.00 P10.00
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated P600.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure of
mortgage which shall be governed by paragraph (a) above 600.00
3. All other actions not involving property600.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is
none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
(c) For filing requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate or
chattel mortgage, if the amount of indebtedness, or the mortgagee's
claim is:
1. Less than P50,000.00 P275.00
2. P50,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 P400.00
3. P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00 P500.00
4. P150,000.00 or more but less than P200,000.00 P650.00
5. P200,000.00 or more but less than P250,000.00 P1,000.00
6. P250,000.00 or more but less than P300,000.00 P1,250.00
7. P300,000.00 or more than but less than P400,000.00 P1,500.00
8. P400,000.00 or more but less than P500,000.00 P1,750.00
9. P500,000.00 or more but not less than P1,000,000.00 P2,000.00
10. Fore each P1,000.00 in excess of P1,000,000.00 P10.00
(d) For initiating proceedings for the allowances of wills, granting
letters of administration, appointment of guardians, trustees, and
other special proceedings, the fees payable shall be collected in
accordance with the value of the property involved in the
proceedings, which must be stated in the application or petition, as
follows:
1. More than P100,000.00 but less than P150,000.00 P2,000.00
2. P150,000.00 or more but less than P200,000.00 2,250.00
3. P200,000.00 or more but less than P250,000.00 2,500.00
4. P250,000.00 or more but less than P300,000.00 2,750.00
5. P300,000.00 or more but less than P350,000.00 3,000.00
6. P350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 3,250.00
7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P400,000.00 10.00
If the value of the estate as definitely appraised by the court is more
than the value declared in the application, the difference of fee shall
be paid: provided that a certificate from the clerk of court that the
proper fees have been paid shall be required prior to the closure of
the proceedings.
(e) for filing petitions for naturalization or other modes of acquisition
of citizenship, two thousand P2,000.00) pesos;
(f) For filing petitions for adoption, support, annulment of marriage,
legal separation and other actions or proceedings under the Family
Code, two hundred (P200.00) pesos;
If the proceedings involve separation of property, an
additional fee corresponding to the value of the property involved
shall be collected, computed in accordance with the rates for special
proceedings.
(g) For all other special proceedings not concerning property, two
hundred (P200.00) pesos;
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(h) For the performance of the marriage ceremony including
issuance of certificate of marriage, three hundred (P300.00) pesos;
(i) For filing an application for commission as notary public, five
hundred (P500.00) pesos;
(j) For certified copies of any paper, record, decree, judgment, or
entry thereof for each page, four (P4.00) and fifteen (P15.00) pesos
for certification;
(k) For a commission on all money coming into the clerks' hands by
law, rule, order or writ of court and caring for the same, one and one-
half (1.5%) per centum on all sums not exceeding forty thousand
(P40,000.00) pesos, and one (1%) per centum on all sums in excess
of forty thousand (P40,000.00) pesos.
(l) For any other services as clerk not provided in this section, one
hundred and fifty (P150.00) pesos shall be collected. (7a)
Section 8.Clerks of Courts of the First Level. —
(a) For each civil action or proceeding, where the value of the
subject matter involved, or the amount of the demand, inclusive
of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P150.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but not more than P100,000.00
500.00
3. More than P100,000.00 but not more than P200,000.00
1,250.00
4. More than P200,000.00 but not more than P300,000.00
1,750.00
5. More than P300,000.00 but not more than P400,000.00
2,500.00
In a real action, other than for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
the assessed value of the property or if not declared for taxation
purposes, the assessed value of the adjacent lots, or if there is
none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
(b) For initiating proceedings for the allowance of wills, granting
of letters of administration and settlement of estates of small
value, where the value of the estate is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P250.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but not more than P100,000.00
1,350.00
3. More than P100,000.00 but not more than P200,000.00
2,000.00
4. For each proceeding other than the allowance of wills
(probate) granting of letters of administration, settlement of estate of
small value, two hundred (P200.00) pesos;
(c) For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, one hundred and
fifty (P150.00) pesos;
(d) For appeals in all actions or proceedings, including forcible entry
and detainer cases, taken from courts of first level, two hundred
(P200.00) pesos
(e) For the performance of marriage ceremony, including issuance of
certificate of marriage, three hundred (P300.00) pesos;
(f) For taking affidavit, twenty-five (P25.00) pesos;
(g) For taking acknowledgment, thirty (P30.00) pesos;
(h) For taking and certifying depositions, including oath, per page,
eight (P8.00) pesos;
(i) For certified copies of any record, per page, ten (P10.00) pesos;
(j) For stamping and registering books as required by articles
nineteen and thirty-six of the Code of Commerce each book, thirty
(P30.00) pesos;
(k) For performing notarial acts for which fees are not specifically
fixed in this section, the same fees which notaries public are entitled
to receive (8a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. -
Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate
family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage
of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with A FAIR
MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION of more than THREE hundred thousand
(P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal
fees.cralaw
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise
provides.cralaw
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall
execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a
gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit.
The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s
affidavit.cralaw
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be
sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the
pleading of
that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have
been incurred. (16a)
1. Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation
V. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009
FACTS:
- Ruby Shelter obtained a loan from Tan and Obiedo secured by a
REM consisting of 5 parcels of land in the name of the former.
- Despite an extension granted by Tan and Obiedo and several
negotiations, Ruby was notable to pay.
- Hence, Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of a MOA, executed Deeds of
Absolute sale in their favor covering the 5 parcels of land. The MOA
provided that if Ruby fails to pay the loan, 5 deeds of absolute sale
would be executed in favor of Tan and Obiedo.
- So Ruby Shelter filed complaint for declaration of nullity of the
deeds. Believing that their action was one which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, they paid docket fees amounting to about 13K.
It said that it only wanted to annul the deeds so no issue of title or
recovery of possession is present to classify it as a real action.
- Tan and Obiedo moved to dismiss the complaint and ask for
damages (also pursuant to the MOA – there was a provision that if
Ruby Shelter brought suit against them, it would be liable for P 10M)
contending that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because the case involved recovery of real property making it a real
action which requires payment of docket fees equivalent to a
percentage of the fair market value of the land (P 700K).
- RTC and CA ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo ordering Ruby
Shelter to pay additional docket fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ruby Shelter should pay additional docketfees.
HELD/RATIO: YES. For the court to acquire jurisdiction, docket fees
must be paid first. Payment is mandatory and jurisdictional.
To determine whether an action is real, it must affect title to or
recovery of possession of real property. In this case, Ruby Shelter
did not disclose certain facts which would classify the complaint it
filed as a real action (like the execution of deeds of sale pursuant to
a MOA). The action was really one for recovery of possession of the
parcels of land. Hence, it is a real action.
The docket fees for cases involving real property depend on the fair
market value (or the stated value) of the same: the higher the value,
the higher the fees due. For those incapable of pecuniary estimation,
a fixed or flat rate is imposed.
DOCTRINE:
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.”
Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but
also jurisdictional. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,
the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its
previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular
circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
szamorazamoraaid fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
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3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the
allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No.
2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they
do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the
five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.
Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a
real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of real
property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct
docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since
Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the
real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same for nonpayment of the correct docket fees.
In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the
real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher)
or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
The Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by
petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and
possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving
real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in
accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error
in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional
docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
2. Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation, et
al., G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011
DOCTRINE:
What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their
Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original
complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due
on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing
fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the
jurisdiction it already had over the case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the
actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still
plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim
that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason
for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that
they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed
them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint
and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make
special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.
3. Philippine First Insurance v. First Logistics, G.R. No. 165147,
July 9, 2008
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE VS. FIRST
LOGISTICS
FACTS: Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation (Pyramid)
alleged in its complaint that its delivery van,which was loaded with
goods belonging to California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC)
valued at 907,149.07, left the CMC Bicutan Warehouse.
However, the van, together with the goods, failed to reach its
destination and its driver and helper were nowhere to be found, to its
damage and prejudice. It filed a criminal complaint against the driver
and helper for qualified theft, and a claim with Philippine First
Insurance Co., Inc., and Paramount Insurance General Corporation
as co-insurers for the lost goods. However, the insurance companies
refused to compensate for the loss in violation of their undertaking
under the insurance policies. For this reason, Pyramid suffered
damages and was constrained to engage the services of counsel to
enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under the
insurance policies, and for which services, it obligated itself to pay
the sum equivalent to 25% of any recovery in the instant action, as
and for attorney’s fees and legal expenses. It prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the insurance companies to comply with their
obligation under their respective insurance policies to pay to it jointly
and severally the sum of 50,000 plus 1,500 for each court session
attended by counsel until the case is terminated as attorney’s fees,
and the costs of suit. Pyramid was assessed a docket fee of 610 on
the basis of the amount of 50,000. Pyramid later filed an amended
complaint
containing minor changes in the body but bearing the same prayer.
Branch 148 of the Makati RTC, to which the complaint was raffled,
admitted the amended complaint. The insurance companies filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not
having paid the docket fees in full. It argued that in the body of its
amended complaint, Pyramid alleged that it suffered damages, but in
the prayer, it deliberately omitted to specify what these damages
are. This deliberate omission by Pyramid was intended to evade the
payment of the correct filing fee. The insurance companies invoked
the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA that a
pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought
shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the
court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. Pyramid, on the other hand, insists the application of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion and subsequent rulings
relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee
within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed
docket fee.The CA applied the liberal rule in Sun Insurance.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in applying the liberal rule in Sun
Insurance???
RULING: YES, the CA erred. The Manchester rule applies. In the
case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte,
the SC clarified the effect of the Sun Insurance ruling on the
Manchester ruling as follows: The requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been
revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in
the amended pleading, the trial court now being authorized to allow
payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has
been added, governing the awards of claims not specified in the
pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading – as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. In the case at bar, Pyramid failed
to specify in its prayer the amount of claims/damages it was seeking
both in the original and amended complaint. It reasoned out that it
was not aware of the extent of the liability of the insurance
companies under their respective policies. It left the matter of liability
to the trial court’s determination. Even assuming that the amounts
are yet to be determined, the rule in Manchester, as modified by Sun
Insurance, still applies. In the case of Ayala Corporation vs.
Madayag, the SC pronounced the mfollowing: While it is true that the
determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion
of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to
specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make
a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate
docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified
or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court
is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a pleading which does not
specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or
shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists on the application of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion and subsequent rulings
relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee
within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed
docket fee.
In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, the
Court clarified the effect of the Sun Insurance ruling on the
Manchester ruling as follows: As will be noted, the requirement in
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Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the
Manchester ruling] that complaints, petitions, answers, and
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent “amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading,”
the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period or reglementary period.
Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of
claims not specified in the pleading — i.e., damages arising
after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading — as to which
the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on
the basis of the “sum claimed,” on the one hand, or the “value of the
property in litigation or the value of the estate,” on the other.
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages,
the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount
claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the
complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of
this Court, “specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case.”
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar
pleading sets out a claim purely for money and damages and
there is no statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event
the rule is that the pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.” In other words, the
complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which
amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated
the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of
every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again,
the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription
has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for “specific
performance and damages” even if it was, as the allegations in its
body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums
of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its own
admission, “knew.” And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in
the complaint the amount of its claims/damages.
As the salient allegations of Pyramid’s complaint show and as
priorly stated, they constitute, in the main, an action for collection
of its claims it admittedly “knew.” Assuming arguendo that
Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which are yet to be
determined by the trial court, the rule established in Manchester
which was embodied in this Court’s Circular No. 7-88 issued on
March 24, 1988, as modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still
applies.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages is left to the
sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming
such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of
which the court may make a proper determination, and for the
proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The
exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for determination of the court is limited
only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
4. Benjamin Bautista v. Shirley Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July
4, 2008
Facts:
On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales[4] and
Francis Martin D. Gonzales (petitioners) filed a Complaint[5] for
"Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3)
and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary
Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc.
(respondents) before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s
shares... which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc.
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were
already paid by them in full in the books of S.J.
Land, Inc.,... but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011
to the corporation's stockholders
Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court.
issued a temporary restraining order... and later... granted the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
respondents filed a motion to dismiss... on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case
involves an intra-corporate dispute and... should, thus, be heard by
the designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.
April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by
respondents. It found that the case involves an intra-corporate
dispute
It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch
256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special
Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the
case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the matter,...
including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction...
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,... Branch 276 denied
the motion for reconsideration, holding that it has no authority or
power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special
Commercial Court
Issues:
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 17,
2012 and July 9, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11-077 is
REFERRED... to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City
for re-docketing as a commercial case. Thereafter, the Executive
Judge shall ASSIGN said case to Branch 256, the sole designated
Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is
ORDERED to resolve... the case with reasonable dispatch. In this
regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC shall DETERMINE the
appropriate amount of docket fees and, in so doing, ORDER the
payment of any difference or, on the other hand, refund any excess.
DOCTRINE:
Their failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees was due
to a justifiable reason.
The right to appeal is a purely statutory right. Not being a natural
right or a part of due process, the right to appeal may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the rules provided
therefor. For this reason, payment of the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona, the strict
application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on
payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice. It is always within the power of this Court to suspend its
own rules, or to except a particular case from their operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it.
As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios, the Court ruled that where
an appellant in good faith paid less than the correct amount for
the docket fee because that was the amount he was required to
pay by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is
error to dismiss his appeal because “(e)very citizen has the right
to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain
4
duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law.
To penalize such citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith
is repugnant to justice.”
5. Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
706 SCRA 698 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was
not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for the filing
fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the
MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact,
admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety.
Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to
pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable
of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial
status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP
Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner’
request.
The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire
P540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation, when that figure was
nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count
of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. Granting
petitioner’s request would not constitute a deferment in the payment
of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees
of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for
each initiatory pleading filed. In criminal actions, these
pleadings refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation
of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC. And each of the forty
(40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the
amount of check one covers. Under the rules of criminal procedure,
the filing of the forty (40) counts is equivalent to the filing of
forty (40) different informations, as each count represents an
independent violation of BP Blg. 22.
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated
from a single complaint filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact
remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22
that were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40)
individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make
any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases involving
related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not
transform the filing fees due for each case consolidated into
one indivisible fee.
6. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET FEES,
[ A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010 ]
DOCTRINE:
The subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from
the payment of filing fees and court fees. Section 22 of Rule 141
reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. — The Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal
fees provided in this rule. Local government units and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets, expressly
states that the NPC “shall remain as a national government-
owned and -controlled corporation.”
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation
on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court,
citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is
clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC
Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its
basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
7. Unicapital v. Consing, 705 SCRA 511 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees
lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has long been settled that
while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at
the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are
paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s
insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees
enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation
v. CA should be by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing
fees.
As pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon.
Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid
by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
8. Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No.
151242, June 15, 2005
PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NACIONAL DE PARIS
Facts:
 Proton Pilipinas availed of credit facilities of Banque Nacional de
Paris (BNP).
 Proton’s resulting debt of $2M was guaranteed by Automotive
Corporation Philippines, Asea One Corp., and Autocorp Group.
 BNP and Proton subsequently executed trust receipt agreements,
where Proton would receive passenger motor vehicles in trust for
BNP, with the option to sell them, subject to the condition that Proton
would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to the
former’s debt. Vehicles remaining unsold would be returned to BNP.
Proton allegedly failed to deliver.
 BNP demanded from Proton’s corporate guarantors $1.5M, the
total outstanding obligation. The guarantors refused. BNP filed a
complaint with the Makati RTC praying for $1.5M plus accrued
interest and other related charges.
 Respondent Proton filed a motion to dismiss, contending that 1)
BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees which is supposed to
include interest, based on Admin Circ. No. 11- 94, and therefore the
court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case, 2) the clerk
of court failed to apply the correct exchange rate, and that 3) since
no demand letter was given, the complaint was premature.
 The court denied the petition, stating that the petitioner properly
paid the docket fees. It stated that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount
being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed
filing fees. It court further added that assuming the correct filing fees
were not paid, the rule is that the court may allow a reasonable time
for the payment of the mprescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and
upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly
take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription
has
set in and consequently barred the right of action.
 Regarding the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P 43.00 to
US$1. Absent any office guide of the rate of exchange which said
court functionary was duty bound to follow, the rate he applied is
presumptively correct.
 With regard to the demand letter, the court said that the failure to
make a formal demand is not among the legal grounds for the
dismissal of the case.
Issues:
1) Whether BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees
2) Whether the Clerk of court applied the wrong exchange rate
3) Whether the amount of interest was not specified in the prayer,
rendering the complaint void.
Held:
1) Petitioner relied on a case decided in 1989 where Rule 141 was
applied, the interest and costs having been excluded in the
computation of the aggregate amount. However, the present case
was filed in 1998, when such rule had already been amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94.The amended rule includes the
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and other costs in the computation of the aggregate
amount. In the complaint, respondent prayed for “accrued interest…
5
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.” The complaint
having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondent’s claim
includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent not having paid the fees for such, cannot claim the
interest within such duration, unless respondent is allowed by motion
to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the
precise amount of interest petitioners owe within the period and pay
the corresponding
docket fee. With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the
complaint, the same can only be determined after a final judgment
has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay
the
corresponding docket fee. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule
141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent
should be made to pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in
the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest
accruing after the filing of the complaint.
2) In the Clerk of Court’s application of exchange rate, the
presumption of regularity is disputable, not conclusive. Petitioners
have presented rebutting evidence that the exchange rate when the
case was filed was P43.21 to US$1, not P43.00. Thus, the docket
fees were insufficient. However, the trial court did acquire
jurisdiction. Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by
the Clerk of court. In such a case, where there exists no effort in
defrauding the government, respondent even demonstrating his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
as required, the court acquires jurisdiction.
3) Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or
before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified.
While the determination of certain damages is left to the discretion of
the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to
specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make
a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate docket fees. The exception to the rule is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof. Petition is partially
granted. The Clerk of Court is ordered to reassess and determine
the docket fees that should be paid by respondent within fifteen (15)
days, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired.
DOCTRINE:
FILING FEES ARE INCLUSIVE OF INTEREST, DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND COSTS
The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by
taking into consideration “the total sum claimed, inclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in
litigation.”
APPLICATION OF EXCHANGE RATE
Respecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the clerk of court
did not err when he applied the exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00
“[i]n the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which
said court functionary was duty bound to follow,[hence,] the rate he
applied is presumptively correct,” the same does not lie.
The presumption of regularity of the clerk of court’s application
of the exchange rate is not conclusive. It is disputable. As such,
the presumption may be overturned by the requisite rebutting
evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners have adequately proven
with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the
complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21. In
fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
MERELY RELIED ON ASSESSMENT MADE BY CLERK OF
COURT
The ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former there
was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to
pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff
demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional
fees as required.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment
made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect.
Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility
of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.
INTEREST ACCRUING UNTIL FILING OF COMPLAINT
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for “accrued
interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.” The
complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondent’s
claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date
of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding
to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of
the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is
required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No.
11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the
complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest
from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless
respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint within
a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of interest
petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and
pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
INTEREST ACCRUING AFTER FILING THE COMPLAINT
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint,
the same can only be determined after a final judgment has
been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the
corresponding docket fee therefor
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to
pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the
trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing after
the filing of the complaint.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid
down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in
the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to
which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
9. Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal
Aid Clients from Paying Filing and Docket Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-
7-SC, August 28, 2009
LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM
PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.
On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No.
24. The resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee on Legal
Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various
IBP chapters like the exemption granted to PAO clients under RA
9406. The Court lauded the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for
its effort to help improve the administration of justice, particularly, the
access to justice by the poor. In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the
Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its
duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration
of justice." In approving the Rule, the Court stressed that the
Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the
courts and to adequate legal assistance.” It found “the legal aid
service rendered by
the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses
the right to adequate legal assistance and that the recipients of the
service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP Chapters may enjoy
free access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees
assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in
court.” The Court held that “with these twin initiatives, the guarantee
of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution is advanced and access
to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a
major roadblock.” The Court concluded with a declaration that
access to justice “is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law.”
Recognizing the “right of access to justice as the most important
pillar of legal empowerment of the marginalized sectors of our
society,” it has “exercised its power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights to open the
doors of justice to the underprivileged and to allow them to step
inside the court to be heard of their plaints.”
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to
the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service
rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters
nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
6
chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them
from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing
of a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the
guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and
access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock.
10. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption form legal
and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No.
09-6-9-SC
Facts: Roger was the administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation. As such administrator, he wrote a letter to the Chief
Justice (this was 2009 so Puno). In essence, the letter stated the ff:
1) They were thanking the court for their 1st indorsement that the
foundation pays the nominal fee of P5000 and balance upon
collection action of P10M.
2) Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out the need to comply
with
OCA Circular No.42-2005 and Rule141 that reserves this “privilege”
--- exemption from filing fees --- to indigent persons. However, the
law mainly deals with an individual indigent and does not include
foundations or associations that work with and for indigent persons.
3) It was noted that the Good Shepherd Foundation reach out to the
poorest of the poor, newly born and abandoned babies, children who
never saw a smile of their mother, old people who cannot afford to
pay for common prescriptions, broken families...etc.
4) They were asking the courts to grant to the foundation the same
option to be exempted from filing fees as given to indigent people (2
executive judges they previously approached disapproved this
interpretation).
Issue: Whether the special privilege (referring to the exemption from
filing fees) granted under Rule141 and OCA Circular is applicable to
foundations/associations?
Held: NO!
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free
access clause under Sec11, Art3 of the Consti. “Free access to the
courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” This provision is
very important. In fact, a move that it be removed because it was
already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated. To
implement the free access clause, SC promulgated Sec21, Rul3 and
Sec19, Rule141 of the Rules of Court. (very long provisions so I
won’t put it here but you have to read it) The clear intent and precise
language of the provisions indicate that only a natural party litigant
may be regarded as an indigent litigant. Good Shepherd Foundation
is a corporation with a separate and distinct juridical personality and
as such cannot be exempted from legal and filing fees. This is the
ruling even if the foundation is working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The Consti premised the free access clause
on a person’s poverty which only a natural person can suffer.
Another reason why the exemption cannot be granted to juridical
persons even if they work for indigent and underprivileged people is
because it may be prone to abuse. Also, the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too time consuming
and wasteful for the courts.
DOCTRINE:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to
foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same
exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal
and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III
of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.
The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules
of Court on indigent litigants indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its
members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to
acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations
and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees
granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no
moment.
Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access
clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural
person can suffer.
Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be
prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on
circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of
compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too
time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
II. JURISDICTION
 BP 129
 RA 7691
Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where
the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where
the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00)."
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
7
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof."
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila
where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand
does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included
in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where
there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions;
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession; and
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots."
Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in
these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts."
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and
Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act,
shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00):
Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five
(5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00).
Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of
all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan
courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the
Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the
appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative
procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of
jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure as
amended
REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED OCTOBER 15,
1991 PROVIDING FOR THE REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE FOR METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.
Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P Blg. 129) and to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases referred to herein, the Court Resolved to
promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. Applicability
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure
in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A. Civil Cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of
the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered.
Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the total
amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs.chanrobles virtual law
library chanrobles virtual law library
B. Criminal Cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; chanrobles virtual
law library
(2) Violations of the rental law; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances; chanrobles virtual law
library
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a
fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall
govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00).
8
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of
action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action
subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the
offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case
subject to the ordinary procedure.chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. — Upon the filing of a civil or
criminal action, the court shall issue an order declaring whether or
not the case shall be governed by this Rule A patently erroneous
determination to avoid the application of the Rule on Summary
Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.chanrobles virtual law
library chanrobles virtual law library
II. Civil Cases
Sec. 3. Pleadings. —
A. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are
the complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded
in the answer, and the answers thereto.
B. Verifications. — All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the case
falls under summary procedure, it may, from an examination of the
allegations therein and such evidence as may be attached thereto,
dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom
for the dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is found it
shall forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary
procedure under this Rule shall apply. d-c chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons,
the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not
pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered
barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed
and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which
they are pleaded.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in
its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees
claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later
than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases
shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference
shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not
apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common
cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at
the peliminary conference.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. — Within five (5) days
after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall
issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not
limited to:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and
if so, the terms thereof;
(b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;.
(c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and
admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without
the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall
be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
(d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted;
and chanrobles virtual law library
(e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the
case.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. — Within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together
with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material
facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or
other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt
of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days
after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time
for the rendition of the judgment.
III. Criminal Cases
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities. such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio. chanrobles virtual law library
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits
of the compliant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as
there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's files.If this
requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the care may be dismissed.chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 12. Duty of court. — chanrobles virtual law library
(a) If commenced by compliant. — On the basis of the compliant
and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the
court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis
or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. — When the case is commenced
by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding
paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies
of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution,
shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf,
serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later
than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may
file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits of the defense.
Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. — Should the court, upon a
consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits
submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be
immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall
forthwith be sentenced.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles
virtual law library
9
Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. — Before conducting the trial, the
court shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which a
stipulation of facts may be entered into, or the propriety of allowing
the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be
considered, or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the
issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case.However, no
admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced
to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel.A refusal or
failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.
Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. — At the trial, the affidavits submitted
by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses
who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected
to cross-examination, redirect or re-cross examination. Should the
affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as
competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the
adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose.
Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to
testify unless his affidavit was previously submitted to the court in
accordance with Section 12 hereof.chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or
counter-affidavits as part of his direct evidence, he shall so manifest
during the preliminary conference, stating the purpose thereof. If
allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the prosecution or
the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court
and served on the adverse party not later than three (3) days after
the termination of the preliminary conference. If the additional
affidavits are presented by the prosecution, the accused may file his
counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within
three (3) days from such service.
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. — The court shall not order the arrest
of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.
Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on
recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.
Sec. 17. Judgment. — Where a trial has been conducted, the court
shall promulgate the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the
termination of trial.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual
law library
IV.COMMON PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508
where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement,
shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be revived only after
such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision
shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested
without a warrant.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following
pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule: chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any
other paper; chanrobles virtual law library
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default; chanrobles virtual law
library
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Rply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
Sec. 20. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under
this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the
affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their
competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel
who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to
expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the
record.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable
to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in
accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The
decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this
Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed
repealed.
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure
prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases
herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not
inconsistent herewith. chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 23. Effectivity. — This revised Rule on Summary Procedure
shall be effective on November 15, 1991.chanrobles virtual law
library chan
 Rules on Small Claims
RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES Section 1.
Title. - This Rule shall be known as " The Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases."
Section 2. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions
before the Metropolitan trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment
of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and
costs.
Section 3. Definiton of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Plaintiff - refers to the party who initiated a small claims action.
The term includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim against
plainfill;
(b) Defendant - is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a
small claims action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom a
defendant has filed a claim, or a person who replies to the claim;
(c) Person - is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability
partnership, association, or other juridical entity endowed with
personality by law;
(d) Individual - is a natural person;
(e) Motion - means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for
an orderaction. It shall include an informal written request to the
court, such as a letter;
(f) Good cause - means circumtances sufficient to justify the
requested order or other action, as determined by the judge; and
(g) Affidavit - means a written statement or declaration of facts that
are shown or affirmed to be true.
Section 4. Applicability - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions which are; (a) purely
civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is
solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the
civil aspect of criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the
criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule of 111 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
These claims or demands may be;
(a) For money owned under any of the following;
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;
10
4. Contract of Sale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;
(b) For damages arising from any of the following;
1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this Rule
pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims
action is commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and
verified Statement of Claim (Form 1 - SCC) in duplicate,
accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum Shopping (Form 1-
A,SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable
document/s subjects of the claim, as well as the affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence
shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or
submitted together with the Claim, unless good cause is shown for
the admission of additional evidence.
No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim described in
this Rule, is necessary to initiate a small claims action.
Section 6. Joinder of Claims - Plaintiff may join in a single statement
of claim one or more separate small claims against a defendant
provided that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interest and
costs, does not exceed P100,00.00.
Section 7. Affidavits - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which
are admissible in evidence.
A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the
counsel who assisted the party in the preparation of the affidavits, if
any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The inadmissible affidavit(s)
or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.
Section 8. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket
and other legal fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court, unless allowed to litigate as an indigent.
A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for immediate action in case of
multi-sala courts, or to the Presiding Judge of the court hearing the
small claims case. If the motion is granted by the Executive Judge,
the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court designated to
hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be
given five (5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise,
the case shall be dismissed without prejudice. In no case shall a
party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from the payment of
the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes in civil
cases.
Section 9. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that
the case falls under this Rule, it may, from an examination of the
allegations of the Statement of Claim and such evidence attached
thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright of any of the grounds
apparent from the Claim for the dismissal of a civil action.
Section 10. Summons and Notice of Hearing - If no ground for
dismissal is found, the court shall forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-
SCC) on the day of receipt of the Statement of Claim, directing the
defendant to submit a verified Response.
The court shall also issue a Notice (Form 4-SCC) to both parties,
directing them to appear before it on a specific date and time for
hearing, with a warning that no unjustified postponement shall be
allowed, as provided in Section 19 of this Rule.
The summons and notice to be served on the defendant shall be
accompanied by a copy of the Statement of Claim and documents
submitted by plaintiff, and a copy of the Response (Form 3-SCC) to
be accomplished by the defendant. The Notice shall contain an
express prohibition against the filing of a motion to dismiss or any
other motion under Section 14 of this Rule.
Section 11. Response - The defendant shall file with the court and
serve on the plaintiff a duly accomplished and verified Response
within a non - extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of
summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified
photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and
other evidence in support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed
during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together
with the Response, unless good cause is shown for the admission of
additional evidence.
Section 12. Effect of Failure to File Response - Should the defendant
fail to file his response within the required period, the court by itself
shall render judgement as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the Statement of claim limited to what is prayed for. The court
however, may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of damages for
being excessive or unconscionable
Section 13. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule - If at
the time the action is commenced, the defendant possesses a claim
against the plaintiff that (a) is within the coverage of this rule,
exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same transaction
or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does not
require for its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not
the subject of another pending action, the claim shall be filed as a
counterclaim in the response; otherwise, the defendant shall be
barred from suit on the counterclaim.
The defendant may also elect to the file a counterclaim against the
plaintiff that does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
, provided that the amount and nature thereof are within the
coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and the other legal
fees are paid.
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following
pleadings, motions, and petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the compliant except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgement, or for
reopening of trial;
(d) Petiton for relief from judgement;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any
other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
Section 15. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel. -
The Clerk of Court or other personnel shall provide such assistance
as may be requested by a plaintiff or a defendant regarding the
availability of forms and other information about the coverage,
requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.
Section 16. Appearance. - the parties shall appear at the designated
date of hearing personally or through a representative authorized
under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 5-SCC ) to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documentary exhibits
Section 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall
appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the
attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her
claim or defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its
discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist
that party upon the latter's consent.
Section 18. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to
appear shall be cause for the dismissal of the claim without
prejudice. The defendant who appears shall be entitled to judgement
on a permissive counterclaim.
11
Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as
failure to file a Response under Section 12 of this Rule. This shall
not apply where one of two or more defendants who are sued under
a common cause of action and have pleaded a common defense
appears at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with
prejudice of both the claim and counterclaim.
Section 19. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for
postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the
physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the
scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1)
postponement.
Section 20. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session,
the judge shall read aloud a short statement explaining the nature,
purpose and the rule of procedure of small claims cases.
Section 21. Judicial Dispute Resolution. - At the hearing, the judge
shall conduct Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) through mediation,
conciliation, early neutral evaluation, or any other mode of JDR. Any
settlement (Form 7-SCC) or resolution (Form 8-SCC) of the dispute
shall be reduced into writing, signed by the parties and submitted to
the court for approval (Form 12-SCC).
Section 22. Failure of JDR. - If JDR fails and the parties agree in
writing (Form 10-SCC) that the hearing of the case shall be presided
over by the judge who conducted the JDR, the hearing shall so
proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and terminated
within one (1) day. Absent such agreement, (a) in case of a multi-
sala court , the case shall, on the same day, be transmitted (Form
11-SCC) to the Office of the Clerk of Court for immediate referral by
the Executive Judge to the pairing judge for hearing and decision
within five (5) working days from referral; and (b) in case of single
sala court, the pairing judge shall hear and decide the case in the
court of origin within five (5) working days from referral by the JDR
judge.
Section 23. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties. The decision shall be final
and unappealable.
Section 24. Execution. - If the decision is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, execution shall issue upon motion (Form 9-SCC).
Section 25. Applicability. of the Rules of Civil Procedure - The Rules
of Civil procedure shall apply suppletorily insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this rule.
Section 26. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on October 01,
2008 for the pilot courts designated to apply the procedure for small
claims cases following its publication in two newspaper of general
circulation.
1. LapuLapu vs PEZa
Facts:
The Philippine Economic Zone Authority is exempt from payment of
real property taxes.
These are consolidated... the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City)...
appealed the Regional Trial Court
's decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property
taxes.
the Province of Bataan (the Province)... assails the Court of Appeals'
decision... granting the PEZA's petition for certiorari. The Court of
Appeals... ruled that the Regional Trial Court,... gravely abused its
discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the
Province of Bataan.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in
1972... the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to
operate, administer, and manage the export processing zones
established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan... and such other export
processing zones that may be created by... virtue of the decree.
EPZA was declared exempt from all taxes that... may be due to the
Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities, and
other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Specifically, Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 declared the
EPZA exempt from payment of real... property taxes
From all income taxes, franchise taxes, realty taxes and all other
kinds of taxes and licenses to be paid to the National Government,
its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies
and instrumentalities... the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic
Act No. 7916 or "the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995"
The PEZA was granted the power... to register, regulate, and
supervise the enterprises located in the economic zones.
By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in Mariveles, Bataan
became the Bataan Economic Zone... and the Mactan Export
Processing
Zone the Mactan Economic Zone.
s for the EPZA, the law required it to "evolve into the PEZA
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 282, directing
the PEZA to assume and exercise all of the EPZA's powers,
functions, and responsibilities "as provided in Presidential Decree
No. 66
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded
from the PEZA... real property taxes for the period from 1992 to
1998 on the PEZA's properties located in the Mactan Economic
Zone.
It cited Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code of 1991
that withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted to
or presently enjoyed by all persons.
PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief... praying that the trial
court declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
According to the trial court, the PEZA remained tax-exempt
regardless of Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
The PEZA, therefore, is not liable for real property taxes on the land
it owns.
Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government,
the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA
The City then appealed
Facts of G.R. No. 187583
Issues:
Facts of G.R. No. 184203... whether... the PEZA is exempt from
payment of real property taxes.
Ruling:
The PEZA is exempt from payment... of real property taxes
Under Section 133(o), local government units have no power to levy
taxes of any kind on the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and local government units:... the PEZA is an
instrumentality of the national government. It is not integrated within
the department framework but is an agency attached to the
Department of Trade and Industry.
Attachment, which enjoys "a larger measure of independence"
As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the
PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic
zones in the Philippines.
12
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA
cannot be taxed by local government units.
Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers,...
the PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
taxable for real property taxes.
To be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation, the
entity must have been organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation.
Government instrumentalities, on the other hand, are also created
by law but partake of sovereign functions. When a government
entity performs sovereign functions, it need not meet the test of
economic viability
The law created the PEZA's charter. Under the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and
developing special economic zones to attract investments and
provide opportunities... for preferential use of Filipino labor.
Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed
with some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a...
stock... or non-stock... corporation. Nothing in the PEZA's charter
provides that the
PEZA's capital is divided into shares.[272] The PEZA also has no
members who shall share in the PEZA's profits.
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in
the country. The government may even subsidize the PEZA's
operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995, "any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA's] capital outlay
shall be... included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as
an equity of the national government."
The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real property
taxes.
The PEZA assumed the non-profit character, including the tax
exempt status, of the EPZA
The PEZA's predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in
character with all its revenues devoted for its development,
improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit
character, the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real
property taxes under its... charter.
Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property
taxes by virtue of its charter.
The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of the EPZA under
Presidential Decree No. 66.
Principles:
Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property such as
lands, buildings, machinery, and other improvements not otherwise
specifically exempted under the Local Government Code.
Real property taxes are ad valorem, with the... amount charged
based on a fixed proportion of the value of the property.
Under the law, provinces, cities, and municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila Area have the power to levy real property taxes
within their respective... territories.
The person liable for real property taxes is the "taxable person who
had actual or beneficial use and possession [of the real property for
the taxable period,] whether or not [the person owned the property
for the period he or she is being taxed]."
2. Bernabe L. Navida, et al. v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon et al., G.R.
No. 125078, May 30, 2011
FACTS:
2 petitions, G.R. 125078 & 125598, assailed the perceived lack of
jurisdiction of RTC over the matter
Proceedings before the texas courts:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
different texas state courts by citizens of 12 foreign countries,
including the Philippines;
Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained from their exposure to a chemical used to kill nematodes
while working on farms in 23 foreign countries;
Respondents want the case be dismissed under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens
The federal district court granted the motion to dismiss subject to
certain conditions;
Proceedings in the RTC of General Santos City
336 plaintiffs from GenSan filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of
GenSan.
They prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses
and injuries suffered from DBCP, claiming that they were exposed to
the said chemical even though the defendants knew it was harmful;
Defendant filed their motion for bill of particulars
The RTC dismissed the complaints on the following grounds:
The activity took outside the Philippines territory, hence, outside
Philippine jurisdiction;
The tort in the complaint, which is “product liability tort” is not the tor
category within the purview of Philippine Law
That Petitioners coerced into submitting their case in the Philippines
The voluntary appearance of defendants has little significance;
Petioners violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia
The case is barred by “litis pendencia” – SINCE THE CASE IS
PENDING IN THE US COURTS, THE PRESENT COMPLAINT
MUST BE DISMISSED
The petitioners filed a Petition for Review
Proceedings in the RTC of Davao City
155 plaintiffs from Davao filed a complaint in the RTC of Davao,
similar to the complaint of Navida etal (GenSan)
However, the RTC likewise junked the case for the following
reasons:
That Petitioners would have this court dismiss the case to pave the
way for their getting an affirmance by the supreme court
It shares the opinion of legal experts, to wit:
The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of
damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action
alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws (Former
Justice Secretary Demetria);
While a class suit is allowed in the Philippines, the device has been
employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit injury
within the contemplation of Philippine statute (Retired Supreme
Court Justice Sarmiento);
Absence of doctrine in the Philippines regarding product liability
Petitioners (Davao) contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad
enough to cover the acts complained of; and that the opinions of the
legal experts are bereft of basis;
Motion to withdraw was filed by Respondents asserting that the
Petition for review is moot and academic since they already entered
into an amicable settlement with petitioners
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court is correct in dismissing the petition due to
lack of jurisdiction?
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the matter?
That the acts complained of occurred within the Philippines;
That Article 2176 of the Civil Code is broad enough to cover the act;
That assumption by the US District Court did not divest jurisdiction of
the Philippine courts; and,
That the compromise agreement does not justifiably prejudice
remaining respondents.
RULING/S:
ISSUE ON JURISDICTION
The court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set by defendants. What determines jurisdiction of the
court is the nature of action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint.
None of the parties actually move for the case based on the RTC
jurisdiction but more on the prayer for damages.
The trial court has clearly jurisdiction over the matter.
THE RULE IS SETTLED THAT JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF A CASE IS CONFERRED BY LAW AND IS
DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND
THE CHARACTER OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT. Once vested by law,
on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other that the
legislature thru enactment of a law.
13
On whether the act occurred in the Philippines, the Court held YES.
Thus, civil code article 2176 which provides that “whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done..xxx” is applicable in the case
at bar and therefore, RTC obviously has jurisdiction over the matter.
Also, the case at bar is a personal case, not a criminal, hence, lex
situs theory is not necessarily applicable.
The facts clearly shows that the claim for damages is the cause of
action and that the RTC unmistakably has jurisdiction over the
matter.
Moreover, the RTC of GenSan and Davao validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies.
In the case Meat Packing Corp. of the Philippines vs.
Sandiganbayan, the court held that “jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant in civil cases is acquired by his voluntary appearance
in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons..xxx…active participation of a party in the proceedings is
tantamount to an invocation of court’s jurisdiction and willingness to
abide in the resolution of the case”.
Jurisdiction is different from “exercise of jurisdiction”. Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein.
Where a court has jurisdiction over persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is
the exercise of jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular
court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC
in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, was: “SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 0994,
states: “2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action
and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in
General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the
jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended JointComplaints
narrate that the defendants were at fault or were negligent in
that they manufactured, produced, sold, and/or used DBCP and/or
otherwise, put the same into the stream of commerce, without
informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or
health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or omissions of the
defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using,
and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides
which contain DBCP, without informing the users of its hazardous
effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute
the cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasidelict, which
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission
which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasidelict which is the basis
for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each
plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the
civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to
DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located
in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural
areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended JointComplaints all point to their cause of action,
which undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the
Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging
in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition,
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and,
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. The cases are not
criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue
for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages,
the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the
appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides,
or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
CONVENIENT FORUM
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the
claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in
the Philippines:
1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in
General Santos City or in Davao City
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the
chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially
filed their claims for damages
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important
witnesses, such as doctors, coworkers, family members and other
members of the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged
cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the
defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines,
demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in
the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying
these cases.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant
companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and
knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies
designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and
to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the
defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying
for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the
course of the proceedings below.
14
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[t]he defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case,
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
is authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in
the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising
therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.
Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not
affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court
of the jurisdiction over the case.
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their
cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to
allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds
such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
3. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Corazon M. Villegas, G.R. No.
180384, March 26, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for a province has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 (1996) the Supreme
Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners; and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.
By “special” jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power
in addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the
RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural
lands located outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long
as they are within the province where they sit as Special
Agrarian Courts.
R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before
an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian Court. The
Supreme Court has not designated the single sala courts of RTC,
Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City
as Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just
compensation cases just because the lands subject of such
cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special
Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction
over all cases for determination of just compensation involving
agricultural lands within that province, regardless of whether or not
those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
4. Celia S. Vda. De Herrera v. Emelita Bernardo, et al., G.R. No.
170251, June 01, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on
September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an
administrative body established as a means of providing a
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among
small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to
avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances
when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes
which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance,
the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of
the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3
of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land
dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit:
(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in
paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive
in nature,
taking into account the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical
situations requiring
immediate action.
In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer
the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties
to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of respondents’ complaint. The present case does
not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3,
paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute between the
parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a
large number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as
involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and
subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is
entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Respondents’ cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to
their claim of ownership over the subject property, which is an
action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional
Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the
assessed value of the subject property.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and
void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without
jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Having no legal effect, the
situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at
all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the
proceedings.
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY TIME
Respondents’ allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is
15
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost
15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At
several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present
in the case at bar that would justify the application of estoppel by
laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction
of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach
because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
5. Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No.
168785, February 05, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald
filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this
species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the right
court.
What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its Judgment for
Dissolution.” Herald’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the
“various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
agreement on child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone
of the Illinois court’s “retained jurisdiction.”
While the trial court had jurisdiction, the agreement cannot be
enforced because it is void for being contrary to law (daughter was
below 7 years old and, by law, she must stay with the mother). Also,
the agreement was repudiated by the mother when she refused to
allow joint custody.
6. Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12,
2006
 Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of several
realties located in Mandaue City. Prior to 1998, respondents entered
into several credit transactions with petitioner secured by several
real
estate mortgage. Respondents failed to pay the loans thus the
petitioner sought to foreclose the mortgage.
 On February 28, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, Injunction, Damages, Annulment of Promissory
Notes, Documents, and Contracts against petitioner. They allege
that prior to 1998, respondents obtained credit accommodations
from petitioner. The latter required the respondents’ representatives
to sign
“standard pre-printed bank forms in fine print.” Respondents
complied since they trusted petitioner. However, it turned out that
petitioner’s employees filled the blanks with “false an inaccurate
entries.”Respondents deny and dispute the genuineness and due
execution of the documents and pray for the following relief: exparte
TRO and thereafter upon summary hearing TRO for 20 days,
preliminary injunction issued upon posting of bond enjoining
defendant, etc.
 On March 9, the trial court issued an order granting respondents’
order for the issuance of a TRO. Petitioner filed its Answer with
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, Vigorous Opposition to the
Order directing the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary mandatory
injunction. Likewise,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Based on Affirmative Defense
alleging that 1.) the venue is improperly laid; 2.) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of docket fees; 3.)
there is non-joinder of indispensable parties; and 4.) the trial court
has no jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings.
 On March 27, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. Venue has been properly laid. Records show, as
well as defendant’s annexes to its answer admits, that the plaintiffs’
business address and principal place of business are at Mandaue
City. Likewise, similarly situated are the properties sought to be
foreclosed. It is to be noted that the question of jurisdiction has not
been raised by defendant except with the cause of action regarding
annulment of mortgages on defendant’s insistence that the tax
declaration attached is not the latest. Considering however that
annulment of mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation the
court feels that jurisdiction is proper since, according to
jurisprudence, what determines the nature of an action and the court
which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff.
Evidence has not been introduced, to the satisfaction of the court
that indeed Far East Bank and Trust Company no longer exists and
BPI has taken over its assets and liabilities. Besides, the commercial
linkage was between FEBTX and Shemberg as records show. It is
an inherent power of the court concomitant to its very existence to
issue provisional remedies to protect the rights and interest of
parties pending litigation.
 The motion for reconsideration was denied thus the petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari as well as the motion for
reconsideration. Thus this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
 W/N the trial court has jurisdiction o Petitioner: In real actions, the
assessed value of the property or if there is none, the estimated
value
thereof, must be alleged in the complaint and shall serve as the
basis
for computing the fees o Respondents: Since the suit primarily
involves cancellation of mortgages, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, there is no deficiency in the payment of docket fees
 W/N petitioner bank is entitled to writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. UNDER SCTION 19 (1) OF BP 180 AS AMENDED BY RA
7691
 The RTC have sole, exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide “all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court
laid the test for determining whether the subject matter of an action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation:
1. Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought
2. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial
court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim
3. However, there the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim isonly incidental or
a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action isincapable
of pecuniary estimation
 Here, the primary reliefs prayed for is the cancellation of the
mortgages for want of consideration. Jurisprudence provides that
where the issue involves the validity of the mortgage, the
action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
NO.
 There is grave abuse of discretion where the acts complained of
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reasons of passion personal hostility. It is such whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of
the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot be
gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses
in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and
others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each
case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees
can entail tremendous losses to the government in general and to
the judiciary in particular.
Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary
estimation?
Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts have sole, exclusive,
and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide “all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.”
In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for
determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus:
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(a) Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
(b) If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the
trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the
claim.
(c) However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only
incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case
No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real estate and chattel
mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this
Court ruled that where the issue involves the validity of a
mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing
Bumayog, held that an action questioning the validity of a
mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner
has not shown adequate reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog
and Russell. Hence, petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained.
Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the clerk of
court, consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. MAN4045.
7. Arriola v. Nabor Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
FACTS: John Arriola (respondent) filed a case with the RTC for
judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola against
herein petitioners Vilma and Ronald Arriola. John is a son of the
decedent with the 1st wife; Vilma is the 2nd wife, Ronald her kid with
the deceased. The RTC rendered a decision ordering partition of the
subject lot into 1/3 share to each party. This decision became final in
March 4, 2004. However, since the parties failed to agree on how to
partition the lot, John sought its sale through public auction, which
the court ordered. After the date for the public auction had been
scheduled, it had to be reset because thepetitioners Vilma and
Roland refused to include in the auction sale the house standing on
the land. Thus, John filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court praying that petitionersbe held in
contempt. RTC denied the motion, ruling that the non-inclusion of
the house was justified since the decision of the court earlier shows
that nothing was mentioned about the house. Even John’s initiatory
complaint never mentioned the house. The court said it could not
grant a relief not alleged and prayed for in the complaint. MR with
the RTC also denied.
In a petition for certiorari with CA, the court granted the petition,
reversing and setting aside the RTC ruling. It ordered the sale of the
lot, including the house standing thereon. Petitioners filed MR with
CA, but it was denied, hence the present case.
Issue: Did the lower court err in taking jurisdiction over the contempt
proceeding? – Yes, it was wrong for it to do so for failure to comply
with req’ts
Ruling: The contempt proceeding initiated by the John Arriola is one
for indirect contempt. Under Rule 71, it is to be initiated by the court
motu propio or by a verified petition, with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of docs/papers involved and with full compliance
with the req’ts for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. The law is
clear. The filing of a verified petition that has complied with the req’ts
for the filing of initiatory pleading is mandatory and for failure to do
so, the court should dismiss it outright. Here, John Arriola merely
filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt. It was not
verified, and it failed to conform with the req’ts for initiatory pleadings
such as submission of certification against non-forum shopping and
payment of docket fees. The RTC clearly erred in taking jurisdiction
over the contempt proceeding. Even if the contempt proceedings
stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired
jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated
independently
of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for
the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified
petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and
the payment
of the necessary docket fees, must still be faithfully observed.
(Before, it was actually allowed that contempt proceedings be
initiated by mere motion and without compliance with the reqt’s for
initiatory
pleadings, but since the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
such practice was no longer countenanced). [Substantive part: even
if the motion complied with the req’ts of the Rules of Court, it should
still fail on substantive grounds since it turned out that the house is a
family home and despite the death of one or both spouses, it shall
continue for a period of 10y or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition it unless there is a
compelling reason.
No such reason here.]
CA ruling is modified. The house is declared part of the lot, but it is
exempted from partition by public auction until the period provided
for in the law.
DOCTRINE:
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for
indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for
indirect contempt, viz.:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact
but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the mandatory
requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are:
(a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition; and
(b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply
with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71.
He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did not conform
with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such
as the submission of a certification against forum shopping and
the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should
have been dismissed outright by the RTC.
8. Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manza, G.R. No. 163602,
September 07, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a
Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of where “the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.” It is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a
substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies. The only grounds provided
in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent
assurances or negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void
because it granted a relief inconsistent with the nature of an
ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their
answer. They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the
decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal — or in
certain cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 — and not as ground for its annulment.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment
of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack
of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is,
the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter is conferred by law.
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no
other issue than possession and establishes only who has the
right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action
for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. We have
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held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the
ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive
evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with
semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either
party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply
dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs
due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-
lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the
petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the
Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the
leased premises within a certain period (two years from date of
execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be
done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is
who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession
of the property.
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal,
however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence
of, or no jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC
decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have the
authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in Ybañez v.
Court of Appeals:
Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners’
appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it
(RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as
mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on
the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond cavil,
jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC
decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as said court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners’ appeal.
9. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, VS. BRITISH
AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of
law in this country. When the place of departure and the place of
destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is
deemed an “international carriage.” The High Contracting Parties
referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention
and those which subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London,
United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy.
Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to
be an “international carriage” within the contemplation of the
Warsaw Convention.
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER GOVERNED MY
WARSAW CONVENTION
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may
bring the action for damages before —
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the
contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British
corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London
as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and
second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before
the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket
and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and
respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy.
Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has
the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy.
Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of
destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the
routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check.
Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of
Rome, Italy.
We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does
not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
TORTIOUS CONDUCT WITHIN PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline
passenger during the course of the international carriage do not
bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Remedial Law Review
NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION
The special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the
Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court
cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the
contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary
appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a
waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person.
10. Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 702 SCRA
721 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the
DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB. It is not enough that the
controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the
Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What
is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute between the parties.
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an AGRARIAN DISPUTE as
“any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements” and includes “any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.”
Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court held that there must be
a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to
have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of
the following indispensable elements, to wit:
(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land;
(3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production;
(5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject
property, did not allege in their complaint that a tenancy
relationship exists between them and respondent.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise
would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of
the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to
confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the
issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent
on the face of the complaint or petition.
Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the
existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is
bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the
DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised
by petitioners.
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11. Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, 705 SCRA 613 (2013) (HIERARCHY OF
COURTS)
DOCTRINE:
Under the PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS, direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court
is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it
to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby
allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket.
Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances
on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petition, such as:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of

hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court take
cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and
resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more than
twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is
involved is a final judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but
proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and
seek final clarification.

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