Professional Documents
Culture Documents
According to Diderot
2I8
The Resemb/,ance ofPortraits 219
One could cite multiple texts in which Diderot uses the word rigorously to
emphasize the imperative nature of this rule, whose corollary indeed
seems to be, on the one hand, the refusal of any "poetic" embellishment,
ofany alteration, and, on the other, the critique of academic painting. In
looking at Chardin's paintings, it is enough to keep the eyes that nature
gave us and to use them well; academic painting, in contrast, actually
6>rces the spectator to "make himself new eyes" in that it interposes, be-
tween the eye and nature, a set of conventions and rules that alter the nat-
ural model, deform and impoverish it under the pretext of embellishing
it. All those rules that scholarly painting follows are merely the symptom
of our laziness, our inexperience, our ignorance, and our bad eyes. "If we
ltally knew how things fit together in nature, what would become of all
llhose symmetrical conventions?" (OE, 734). And yet no man-not even
•din-will ever have perfect eyes, that is to say, divine ones, and the
studio will never be the equivalent of nature. To want to imitate
Jlature too rigorously is to be doomed, necessarily, to failure. The rule
of Imitation must therefore not be understood naively, as it is by the
dauber on the Pont Notre-Dame, who aims only to "make it
mble" utterly rigorously. Because man is man-neither God nor
re-because his eye is always ever so slightly off [mauvais], imitation
fainting will never be utterly rigorously reproductive; and painting
uld not be an art if it were not, ever so slightly, productive.
And so the rule of rigorous imitation is not the only and not the last
rd on Diderot's aesthetics. In the first place, this is because, generally
king, Diderot, a philosopher who is as variegated as life itself, is far
oved from any dogmatism; he knows that in one moment he is never
e same as what he was in another; he knows that he never agrees with
'msdf," never has the same taste or the same judgments about the true,
good, and the beautiful, 3 and so never decides categorically, never
nounces the last word but says only: "Such are my thoughts for the
mt'.nt, at the risk of having to go back on my error, if it is one" (OE,
). Because generally speaking Diderot does not see things as defini-
ly right or wrong and is always capable of reversing, paradoxically, the
that he seems finally to espouse, the rule of rigorous imitation that
ma!>:sivdy affirmed in most of his texts is just as suspect in other texts
t offer a completely different conception of mimesis. "In art as in na-
, there are no sudden leaps: nihil per saltum; and this to avoid making
ow holes or circles of light, and of being cut up [decouptf]. 'Aren't
220 The Truth in Painting
these shadow holes and circles of light to be found in nature?' 'Yes, I think
they are. But who ordered you to be the rigorous imitator of nature?' •
(OE, 805). But it is mostly for specific reasons stemming from the very
structure of art that Diderot, even if he never completely erases the im-
portance of the rule of imitation, is ultimately compelled to attenuate its
"rigor" in favor of a mimesis that is not reproductive but creative.
ally dccprivc. Resemblance upsets all the categories that clearly distin-
guish between model and copy, life and death; it causes all oppositional
CMCgorics and decidable meaning to founder. 4 And it is this shift in the
aeal, and in all the categories whose identity has been undermined, which
fucinarcs and disquiets. To admire that life, flesh itself, should be so well
amdered is to conceal from oneself the fact that there is no life, no flesh,
chat is not always already touched [entamees] by death. Diderot does not
underscore this pharmaceutical function of admiration, but the term re-
IUlllS insiscemly in the text, as if art's ultimate objective were precisely to
mouse this admiration, even going so far as to suggest a resemblance where
there is none. "One sees the model where, strictly speaking [a la, rigueur],
i is not, and one cries out in admiration" (OE, 507-8).
if this is the function of art, would it not be essentially phar-
for Diderot? Would its aim not be to camouflage everything
tbat produce5 anxiety and that disquiets? We shall see this confirmed in
what fullows. Even if Diderot does not speak of anxiety directly in the
&cc of the work of art, one might say that this anxiety reveals itself in a way
that is through a series of theoretical questions: How does one
'5tinguish between a good and a bad mimesis? Between a portrait and a
work ofilnagination? What makes us think that these are in fact ponraits,
111d !lrithout being mistaken? What is the difference between a fantastical
liead (une tete de fontaisie] and a real one? In the case of La Tour, it can be
leaded without hesitation: we are definitely dealing with portraits, and
with good ones, although "all the conventional rules of drawing are broken:
in the posture, the dimensions, the form, and the proportion of the parts"
(OE, so5). For in La Tour's works, as in Chardin's, "it is nature itself; it is
lhoystem of nature's imperfections such as we see them every day" (Ibid.).
La Tour is a good portraitist because he is a true painter (one who
truly), because he is a painter and nothing else. He rigorously re-
Produu:s nature without embellishing it, without transforming it
duough the rules of art. What he does "is not poetry; it is nothing but
flainring'" (Ibid.). The bad portrait confuses genres, painting and poetry.
!he term poetry must be taken in its etymological sense here: to be a poet
IS to produre with complete freedom, without slavishly submitting to a
lbodel in order to reproduce it as rigorously as possible. The opposition
bctwc n painting and poetry is the traditional opposition that comes to
Us from Aristotle, 5 between a mimesis that reproduces nature, a given
ftlodd, and a productive mimesis, which supplements some deficiency
222 The Truth in Painting
like La Tour's, is the result not of some gift of genius but of long study
and assiduous work. The good portraitist and the great actor must there-
fore lose themselves to be as close as possible to nature in its diversity:
They must not have their own tone; they should be nothing more than
excellent instruments, "marvelous" technicians, if not, in fact, like the au-
tomatons invented by Vaucansson, marvelous and fantastic machines
themselves. The actor, says the Paradox, "shuts himself up in a big wicker
mannequin, whose soul he is, and he moves this mannequin in a most
frightening way." For only a machine can be truly devoid of all feeling,
only a machine can be perfect, and therefore only a machine can rigor·
ously imitate nature and be a perfect portraitist. A machine or God. As
prodigious and marvelous as any painter's technique may be, be he La
Tour, Vernet, or Chardin, this technique will necessarily be "particular
fpropre] and limited"--even if the painter is not slave to a facile and nar-
row technique, even if he has nothing to do with some "adherent to pro-
tocol," that humble servant to the rainbow, even if he does not spend his
life moving the same little corner of canvas around everywhere (like a
great lord who has but one outfit and keeps his valets in the same livery).
No matter how intrepid their brush, "which delights in mixing together
all of nature's colors, in all of their hues, with the greatest boldness, the
greatest variety and the most sustained harmony," the greatest and most
rigorous imitators of nature will never be perfect: "because man is not
God, and because the artist's studio is not nature" (OE, 679). God's true
rival is thus not the painter who devotes himself to a poetic, creative
mimesis, who seeks, in a more or less ingenious fashion, to perfect and
embellish the divine or natural creation (the bad portraitist), but the
painter who devotes himself to a reproductive mimesis: the true rival is
the good portraitist. If Leonardo da Vinci thought he had found an anti·
dote to the desire to rival God in the rule of the imitation of nature,
Diderot, for his part, anticipates Hegel, who will condemn the strict imi·
tation of nature as presumptuous, sacrilegious, demonic, and unworthy
of spirit because it is the work of pure, technical skill rather than of a cruly
creative power. Far from eliciting admiration, a perfectly executed imica·
tion ought to produce only boredom, displeasure, and nausea. 10 And yet
both those who are wise and those who are ignorant admire portraits that
are lifelike, an admiration that can therefore be explained only by the
need to camouflage the uncanniness [l'inquiitante ltrangete] that a strict
resemblance awakens.
The &semblance ofPortraits 225
vain artist, "vexed at seeing himself brought down to the level of a man who
did not come up to his ankles," and cannot help lecturing him:
Oh, La Tour, was it not enough that Perronneau told you, "You are the best"?
You could not be happy without the public saying so, too? Well, if you had
only waited a bit, your vanity would have been satisfied, and you would not
have humiliated your colleague. In the long run, everyone gets what he de-
serves. Society is just like Bertin's house: a fool is seated at the head of the
table the first time he shows up, but, little by little, he is displaced by the new
arrivals; he makes the full tour of the table and ends up in the least desirable
place, to one side or the other of the Abbe de la Pone. (OE 506--07) 12
This lesson does not encourage La Tour to renounce his mimetic rivalry
but only to have patience and to spare his rival humiliation. La Tour's
fragility probably prevented him from hearing this lesson because it pre-
vented him from "waiting even for a moment"; his fragility prevented
him from waiting his turn [tour], from deferring even for a bit the satis-
faction of his vanity, that is to say, the public proclamation of his om-
nipotence necessary to reassure him, to guarantee him first place. La
Tour-and this was his weakness-could not submit to the tribunal of
history, could not wait for the last judgment, where "in the long run,
everyone gets what he deserves." He needed to be recognized immediate!¥
and to sit at the head of Benin's table.
Double Mimesis
Had he been able to leave it to the judgment of history, to the judgment
of posterity, would posterity indeed have guaranteed him first place? Was
La Tour's haste to be recognized not justified? Did he not know, deep
down, that posterity would prefer his rivals-his true rivals, not the imagi-
nary rivals he had invented for himself and over whom he was sure to tri-
umph? That is, not the Perronneaus, but the painters who, far from simply
yielding to the imitation of nature, exaggerate, alter, and correct its forms-
in a word, the painters who are veritable creators. For the man of taste actu-
ally prefers what Diderot calls a "flattering caricature (caricature en beau]"
to a painting that is only a painting, a painting that "so resembles it is nau-
a
seating [ressemblante jusqu la nausee].,, And posterity confirms this choice:
it actually prefers the bad portraitist to the good, the one who, like a history
painter, poetizes, embellishes, ennobles [agrandit] nature, supplements its
The Resemblance ofPortraits 227
fJenre painters and history painters never openly avow the contempt they
feel for one another, but it can be detected. The latter see the former as
228 The Truth in Painting
Each double proclaims its own superiority. As for Diderot, he does not ex-
actly adopt either of these two points of view, whose radical opposition is
the product of polemic and rivalry alone. For here again, like Niensche,
Diderot shows that there can never be "realistic" or naturalistic art in the
strict sense of the word. For even the pure imitator, if he is truly an artist, is
always a bit of a poet, always puts on a bit of a show. The opposition be-
tween the two rival genres is, in the final analysis, only that between two
literary genres, one slavish, the other noble: the opposition between prose
and poetry, history and epic poetry, heroic tragedy and bourgeois tragedy,
bourgeois tragedy and gay comedy. Even if he does not admit it, a good
portraitist like La Tour, the pure technician-because he is not rruly a
machine--is also an inventor, an artist, even if only a minor one, a mere ac-
tor rehearsing the roles handed out by that great director, Nature or God.
The pictorial stage, no more than the theatrical one, is not the world
stage. It always represents something other than what is given; it obeys a
set of conventions or principles, an entire protocol-"a three-thousand·
year-old protocol," says the Paradox. "Nothing takes place on the stage
the way it does in nature," and the portrait that is the most lifdike
The Resemblance ofPortraits 229
We want man, in the most extreme of moments, to retain his human charac-
ter, the dignity of his species.... We want this woman to lose her virtue with
liccency, gently, and this hero to die like an ancient gladiator ... with grace,
with nobility, in an elegant and picturesque pose.... The ancient gladiator,
like the great actor-the great actor, like the ancient gladiator--<loes not die
in bed, as we do, but is obliged to act out another death for our pleasure. (OE,
ll7-18)
In painting, there can never be, any more than there can be in the theater,
an absence of conventions, rules, poetry. It is in the name of the very nature
230 The Truth in Painting
things, the absence of identity of the model that continually changes be-
fore his eyes and tortures him:
What ends up driving the great colorist mad is the vicissitude of this flesh;
that it comes to life and fades from one instant to the next; that, while the
artist's eye is on the canvas, his brush engaged in rendering me, I disappear;
and that when he turns to look at me again, he can no longer find me. The
Abbe Le Blanc comes to mind, and I yawn with boredom. The Abbe Trublet
appears, and I take on an ironic expression. My friend Grimm or Sophie ap-
pear to me, and my heart skips a beat; a tenderness and serenity spread across
my face; the pores of my skin begin to exude happiness, my heart rejoices, my
little reservoirs of blood tremble, and the imperceptible tint of the fluid that
escapes them spills rosiness and life from all sides. Fruits and flowers change
under La Tour's or Bachelier's attentive gaze. What torture a man's face must
be for them, that restless canvas that moves, stretches, slackens, blushes, dulls
1fCOOrding to the multitudinous alternations of the light and invisible breath
we call the soul. (OE, 680)
If the painter does not want to go mad, he must take only "enduring beau-
ties" as models; that is, he must invent an ideal, conventional model of
beauty, whose essential merit is precisely permanence, for "if one depicted
l-cings in their rapid vicissitude, every painting would represent only a
llteting instant, and every imitation would be superfluous" (OE, 160).
of the tribunal is based is not the truth of the work of art but its pharma-
leutical power. Aesthetic pleasure is not a response to a rigorous equi-
valence between imitator and imitated; rather, it corresponds to the
lnticipated jouissance" of man before the consciousness of his own
which is mentioned in the Encyclopedia-a "jouissance as pure, as
ttrong, as real as any other jouissance."
The rules of taste to which the Academie painters are subject exist to
trevent the disgust that certain natural objects might provoke from com-
ing to interfere with this jouissance. Chardin's Gutted Skate-also gutted,
it would seem, of all artifice, for "it is the fish's very flesh, its skin, its
•lood"-affects one as would "the very aspect of the thing," and "the ob-
jecr is disgusting." And yet it takes nothing less than all the magic of art
to make it so that this "skate," gutted as it may be, produces not nausea
but a true aesthetic pleasure-the specific pathos whose paradoxical char-
acter is emphasized by Aristotle (even if his solution to the paradox is not
the same as Diderot's, given that he reduces this pleasure to the pleasure
of cognition, and ultimately asserts the superiority of natural beauty over
that of art). 22
The Academie should therefore teach painters-if it can-what
lhardin's genius and technique achieve magically: "the secret of redeem-
ing, through talent, the disgusting qualities of certain natural objects"
(OE, 484). 23 It is for this same reason that the Academie should ban the
iofound study of anatomy and of ecorchts, which has, despite its bene-
fits, "spoiled more artists than it has perfected" (OE, 815). "In painting, as
in morals, it is dangerous to see beneath the skin" (OE, 815). Like Nie-
'5che once again, Diderot invites the artist to remain on the surface of
things, on the outside, and denounces interior observation as indecent,
.rfidious, and perverse:
Should we not be afraid that this ecorche will remain perpetually in the imag-
ination, and that the artist will persist in his vanity in wanting to show off his
that his corrupted eye will no longer be able to stop at the surface,
that despite the skin and the fat, it will always be making out the muscle, its
beginning, connection, and insertion; that it will make everything much too
tronounced; that it will become hardened and cold; and that I will start to
Hiscover this wretched ecorche even in the figures of women? Since it is only
the outside that I have to show, I would much prefer to be taught to see it
well, and to be spared a perfidious knowledge that I would have to forget.
(OE, 668-69) 24
234 The Truth in Painting
It is true that this passage on the ecorche occurs in the context of a cri-
tique of the Academie in the name of rigorous imitation: far from teach-
ing the artist to look at nature, this kind of study teaches him to see it
other than it is by putting between the artist's eye and his brush a series
of "gloomy ghosts" that he rarely succeeds in exorcising. In this text,
good taste consists, rather, of trying to get rid of academic models that
make one forget the truth of nature and replace it with postures and fig-
ures that are posed, stiff, and ridiculous. "My God, save me from these
models," cries "a young man with taste, before putting so much as a stroke
on his canvas." But in this general critique, the argument against the study
of ecorches has a very different significance. Diderot reproaches the study of
ecorches not only for corrupting the eye by making it hallucinate ghosts
but also for perverting it by making it look into the depth of things in an
indecent, disgusting way. In this, the Academie transgresses its own rules
about taste, which ought to encourage the artist to stay on "the surface"
in order not so see "what is aesthetically offensive inside the man with-
out skin."
Good taste therefore demands that we not try to see "everything,"
and the good eye is the aesthetic eye that knows how to keep to the sur-
face. Good taste ultimately decides against the rule of the rigorous imi-
tation of nature-even if this rule is recommended by the school and its
pedants-in favor of a creative mimesis that poetizes, exaggerates, ag-
grandizes, and corrects and embellishes its forms. The pharmaceutiali
function of art justifies the man of taste against the pedant, for nothing
can remain in men's memories but what is destined to last-that is,
beauty.
In a very beautiful text, 25 Freud emphasizes the distress produced by
the following thought: beauty-which is meant to camouflage the
evanescent nature of all things-is itself ephemeral. What is at issue in
this distress is a foretaste of the mourning that would be occasioned by
the decline or loss of beauty:
It is impossible that all this loveliness of Nature and Art, of the world of our
sensations and of the world outside, will really fade away into nothing. · · ·
Somehow or other this loveliness must be able to persist and to escape all the
powers of destruction. But this demand for immonality is a product of our
wishes too unmistakable to lay claim to reality: what is painful may none the
less be true. 26
The Resemblance ofPortraits 235
This refusal to mourn beauty, which reveals the intolerable nature of all
lltemeral things, explains the sentence pronounced by the tribunal of
bisrory that rejects the portrait by the dauber and preserves the one by the
man of skill.
"We have art so as not to die of truth." There is no art without poetry.
And if certain natural forms must be more "poetized" than others-for
exam pl , this exceedingly disgusting skate-is this not because, in its very
the skate's flesh figures in an emblematic way the evanescence
and the contingency of life? So much so as to be nauseating. Only the
magic of Chardin's art makes the intolerable tolerable, transforms the
akate into the Gutted Skate, a masterpiece that deserves to last for all eter-
bity because it precisely camouflages the ephemeral and evanescent qual-
ity of all flesh by staging the obscene [en mettant en scene /'obscene].
And yet the tribunal does not openly declare that it was really a pharma-
leutical criterion that determined its judgment, for posterity claims truly to
bow the great men of the past. It is in the name of truth and of resem-
blance that posterity admires historic portraits: it sees resemblance where
there is none, where there is exaggeration, alteration, embellishment-a
•lusion made possible by the generalization of good taste that has trans-
.rmed the eye of an entire people: "The eye of the people conforms to
the eye of the great artist, and for it exaggeration leaves resemblance in-
tact." "It sees the model where, strictly speaking, it is not, and it cries out
in llmiration." The people think they have found the resemblance they
are looking for, not because art has in fact imitated nature rigorously but
because art has succeeded in changing its own essence [sa propre nature].
"l'he eye of the people is not the wild and naive eye of the dauber. It is
&lsdy naive, unwittingly cultured, and does not see all these things that
knowledge has introduced into the painting. The skilled academician suc-
teeds in imposing his perspective on an entire nation because this per-
is complicit with the ideology of an entire society that wants to
'1pose a certain image of its great men, a pretty picture that immortalizes
Uiem and that could serve as the model-the ego ideal?-for future gen-
That is why Diderot rejects "immoral subjects," even if he
knows that "the man who suppresses a dirty book or destroys a volup-
llUous statue is like the fool who is scared to go in the river for fear that a
.lllan may drown there." An immoral painting is necessarily destined to
disappea.r, for one can be sure that there will always be some father who
The Truth in Painting
will want to remove such a painting from his daughter's sight. It does not
deserve to last, to be taken as a model.
Artists, if you are eager to see your works endure, I advise you to stick to hon-
est subjects. Everything that preaches depravity to men is fit to be destroyed,
and all the more surely to be destroyed the more perfect the work. ... Who
among us would dare to blame the honest and barbaric hand that will have
committed this kind of sacrilege? Not I, who am nonetheless not unaware of the
objection that can be made to it: namely, how small is the influence that
the productions of fine art have on public morals. (OE, 471-72)
20. See Plato's Theaetetus, in which a Thracian servant laughs at Thales for
falling into a well while looking at the scars. See also Kofinan, Comments en sortir?
(Paris: Galilee, 1983).
21. Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, trans. James Harkness (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 44-45.
22. See "Canouches," Derrida's reading of the series of coffins by 1itus-
Carmel, in The Truth in Painting.
23. See Kofman, The Childhood ofArt: An Interpretation ofFreud's Aesthetics,
trans. Winifred Woodhull (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Edi-
tors' Note: The first chapter of this book appears in the present volume.
Chapter 9
"La ressemblance des ponraits: !'imitation scion Diderot" was originally pub-
lished in Melancolie de !'art (Paris: Galilee, 1985), 37-70. A first version of the
essay appeared in L 'esprit crlateur 24 (1984): 13-32. All English translations are
those of the translator unless otherwise noted; citations from existing transla-
tions have been silently modified throughout.
1. Denis Diderot's Oeuvres esthetiques (Paris: Garnier, 1965), 483. All references
to the Oeuvres esthltiques will be given parenthetically as OE followed by page
number directly in the body of the text.
2. See the &public 10, 598c. Zeuxis's birds are a philosophical commonplace
meant to illustrate the power of illusion of the work of art. In the introduction
to his Aesthetics, Hegel will add Biinner's ape in an effort to rebuke and ridicule,
in this appeal to animality, the proponents of a rigorous imitation of nature. On
the motif of artistic illusion in the eighteenth century more generally, see Mar-
ian Hobson, The Object of Art: The Theory of I//usion in Eightemth-Cmtury
France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
3. See Diderot, "De la poesie dramatique," OE, 284.
4. On the Unheim/ichkeit of the work of art, see Sarah Kofman, "La melan-
colie de !'art," in Mllancoiie de /'art (Paris: Galilee, 1985), 9-33· [Editor's Note:
This essay appears as chapter 8 of the present volume.]
5. See Physics 2, 19¥-b and 199a--b. The distinction between these two kinds of
mimesis has been very well analyzed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in "Diderot: Para-
dox and Mimesis," trans. Jane Popp, in 1Jpography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics,
ed. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 2.{&--66.
6. See Hobson, The Object ofArt.
7. For this description of the genius, see the Encyclopedia article "Genius."
8. Hegel will reproach painting for the same reason.
9. Leonardo da Vinci, La peintu", ed. and trans. Andre Chastel, in collabo-
ration with Roben Klein (Paris: Hermann, 1964), 185.
292 Notes to Pages 224-233
What is aesthetically offensive inside the man without skin are bloody masses,
excrement-filled intestines, enuails, all those monsters that suck and breathe and
pump, formless or ugly or grotesque, and that smell terrible moreover. Let us therefore
abstractfrom all that'. That part of all this that nonetheless appears on the outside elic-
its shame (excrement, urine, saliva, sperm) .... This body veikdby skin that seems to
be ashamed! ... Man, to the extent that he is not physiognomy, structure, is an object
of repugnance to himself; he does everything he can not to think about it. (Nachge-
lassme Fragmmte r880-r882, vol. 9 of Siimtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, eds.
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980], 460)
25. Freud, "On Transience," in vol. 14 of The Standard Edition of the Com-
plete Psychological WUrks ofSigmund Freud, eds. and trans. James Strachey et al.
(London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 303-8.
26. Ibid., 14:305.
Chapter JO
This essay was originally published in La part de l'oeil II (1995): 41-46.
Note from the editors of La part de l'oeil: "Sarah Kofman kept her word, as
she always did. She had agreed to contribute to chis issue of La part de l'oeil and
had suggested analyzing the relationship between the body and the book in a
painting by Rembrandt. Her friend Alexandre Kyritsos was kind enough to look
for the manuscript and send it to us. Here it is, then, just as Sarah left it to us.
From his conversations with Sarah Kofman, Alexandre Kyritsos relates a few de-
tails chat deserve to be recalled here because they are part of the history of chis
text and thus part of its reading and interpretation: 'Sarah emphasized that this
pairing of the cadaver and the book, both of chem open and offered to the gazes
of the doctors surrounded by objects situated in a play of light, offered, quite
beyond the conventions of the genre, a representation of the scientific method.
The book, a sum and source of knowledge, at once confronted and supported
by the test of materiality in experimentation, gives a new impetus to the dis-
course of science, its texts and its commentaries.'"
The translator would like to thank the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at
DePaul University for its generous suppon of chis work through a Faculty
Research and Development Grant.
l. Claude Frontisi, Klee, l'anatomie d'Aphrodite: le polyptique dtmembre (Paris:
Adam Biro, 1995): "The term anatomy can refer to several different things. First,
dissection: one thus speaks of an anatomy room, of an amphitheater, of anatom-
ical drawings, or of artistic anatomy. By metonymy, the term designates nudity
(to show one's anatomy) and even the sex (one's private anatomy). Finally, be-
ginning in the seventeenth century, the word is used in a figurative sense to refer
to analytical discourse (the anatomy of a work)" (46--47).