The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an

action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict,
the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract
may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a
seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-
carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between
the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. 20

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may
be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
(which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-
delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not
only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. 27

17 23 SCRA 1117 [1968]. See also Araneta vs. De Joya, 57 SCRA 59 [1974].

18 Citing Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada vs. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez
vs. Borja, 74 Phil. 560.

19 18 SCRA 155 [1966].

20 PARAS, E.L., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1990 ed., 995-996, citing Air France vs.
Carrascoso and Singson vs. Bank of Philippine Islands, supra.

21 63 AM JUR 2d Products Liability, §25.

22 Id., § 91.

23 Id., § 123.

24 Id., §153.

25 Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines, 161.

26 Vasquez vs. De Borja, 74 Phil. 560 [1944].

27 Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines, 162.
A quasi-delict or tort is “the wrongful act or negligent act or omission which creates
a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound
by any other obligation.”[1] Hence, a person is liable for damages against another who
suffers damage as a result of the former’s acts or omissions which are the proximate
cause, whether the same is due to negligence or fault, and there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the two persons.[2]

Catch-all provisions on human

relations
In the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, ever person is
obligated to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.[3] Whether willfully or negligently, a person in contravention of the law causes
damage to another is required to indemnify the latter for the damage done.[4] Only
when willful, a person causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy is obligated to compensate the latter for the
damage.[5]

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune
G.R. No. 141309, 19 June 2007

In her official capacity as BIR Commissioner, Liwayway Vinzons-Chato issued RMC 37-
93 reclassifying the cigarettes of Fortune as locally made with foreign brand resulting in
the issuance of a tax assessment imposing higher taxes when the Tobacco law came into
effect. After Fortune secured a Supreme Court decision invalidating the said circular, the
corporation filed an action for tort under Article 32 of the Civil Code claiming that
Vinzons-Chato violated its constitutional right to due process, among others. In a bid to
dismiss the case, Vinzons-Chato claimed that she should not be held liable since
Administrative Code provisions state that she can only be held civilly liable for acts done
in her official capacity (rule on immunity for official actions) if there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross ignorance. Hence, she claimed that the corporation has no
cause of action.

HELD: The Corporation had a cause of action. Article 32 of the Civil Code (and not the
Administrative Code) is a tort provision which does not require malice/evil intent on the
offender as the wrongful act may either be intentional or unintentional. Considering
that Fortune’s constitutional right to due process was wronged, it had a cause of action.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune

G.R. No. 141309, 23 December 2008 (En Banc)
On motion for reconsideration, the complaint was dismissed for failing to state a cause
of action. An individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on
account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a
particular wrong or injury to the former. The complaint did not state any particular
injury suffered by the corporation. Likewise, no amount was collected even if there was a
tax assessment levied on the corporation arising from RMC 37-93.

A party may file suit for quasi-delict

despite the existence of a contract
Despite the existence of a contractual relation, a party will not be precluded from filing
quasi-delict against the other.

Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110295, 18 October 1993

A store-operator in a kindergarten school filed suit against Coca-Cola claiming that she
closed shop and lost her livelihood after incurring heavy losses due to fiber like
materials in her stock of coca-cola soft drinks. As a defense, Coca-cola claimed that her
cause of action, if any, is for breach of contract – and not quasi-delict.

HELD: Coca-cola was liable for breach of contract and quasi-delict. “The vendor could
likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.”

Vicarious liability for quasi-delict

The liability for quasi-delict extends to “those persons for whom one is responsible”,
including an employee.[6] This is generally referred to as vicarious or imputed
liability.[7] “Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him
vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to
exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to
another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.”[8]

Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez

G.R. No. 132266, 21 December 1999
Complainants are the heirs of Romeo So Vasquez who died after being hit by a
company-issued vehicle driven by Benjamin Abad, who was a manager of defendant
Castilex Industrial Corporation. The incident happened around 2:00 am when Abad was
on his way home from a “lively” restaurant after doing overtime work and leaving with
the vehicle. In their Defense, Castilex claimed that Abad was not acting within the scope
of his functions when the incident happened.

HELD: Castilex Industrial Corporation was not liable. “The mere fact that ABAD was
using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge [the Corporation] with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless
it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.

“The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer’s liability for
the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer’s motor
vehicle:

“I. Operation of Employer’s Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

“It has been held that an employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going from his
work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not
ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some
special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer’s vehicle
to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote
more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is
acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.

“II. Operation of Employer’s Vehicle in Going to or from Work

“In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal
problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the
mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the
employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer’s motor vehicle.

“The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from
having the employee drive home in the employer’s vehicle as when the employer
benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time
at his actual duties. Where the employee’s duties require him to circulate in a general
area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work,
the courts have frequently applied what has been called the ‘special errand’ or ‘roving
commission’ rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the
service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee
be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in
his employer’s vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of
the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.

“III. Use of Employer’s Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

“An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter’s personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee’s negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the
employer. Even where the employee’s personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is
normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the
employer is not liable for the employee’s negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip.

“The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater
familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer’s business or within the
scope of his assigned task.

“In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner’s office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he
went to Goldie’s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven
kilometers away from petitioner’s place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a ‘lively place” ‘even at
dawn because Goldie’s Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.

“At the Goldie’s Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was
when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That
same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular
accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: ‘Daddy, Daddy! This
woman could not have been ABAD’s daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the
time.
“To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular
accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD’s working day had ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as [the Corporation puts] it, was known as a
‘haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts,’ had no connection to [the
Corporation’s] business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one
of the perks attached to his position.

“Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to him, [the Corporation] had no duty to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.” (Citations omitted.)

Registered owner of vehicle

Insofar as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the
employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an
agent of such owner.[9]

Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas

G.R. No. 174156, 20 June 2012

Complainant Jose A. Espinas filed a complaint for quasi-delict against defendant Filcar
Transport Services. Previously, complainant Espinas figured in an accident when a
vehicle registered under the name of Filcar Transport hit and bumped his car. For its
defense, Filar claimed that the driver of the motor vehicle was not its employee.

HELD: Filcar was liable. It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the
motor vehicle that hit caused damage to the complainant’s car. “It is well settled that in
case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered
as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort
committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code.”

Consequently, “in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner.”
Businesses impressed with public interest
expected to exercise “utmost diligence” in the
performance of their work
A business impressed with public interest is expected from them to exercise utmost
diligence in the performance of their work.[10] Thus, even if the law did not require it to
put such alarms, it was still required to do so as a matter of public duty or public safety.

Philippine National Railways v. Brunty

G.R. No. 169891, 02 November 2006

Rhonda Brunty, who came to the Philippines for a visit is the daughter of complainant
Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, died due to an accident when the car she was in
collided with a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train. Previously, Rhonda, along
with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia and their driver, was on their way to
Baguio on a Mercedes Benz sedan. Around 2:00 am, approaching a railroad crossing,
the driver speeding at 70km/hr overtook a vehicle. Unaware, they collided with the
train. Rhonda and the driver died, with Juan suffering severe injuries.

Brunty’s heirs filed a Complaint for damages claiming that PNR was negligent for not
having placed no flag bar, red light signal, and other mechanisms in the railroad classing
where the accident happen. PNR claimed that the law did not require it to put such
alarms.

HELD: PNR was liable. PNR’s business is impressed with public interest; hence, it is
expected from them to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their work. Thus,
even if the law did not require it to put such alarms, it was still required to do so as a
matter of public duty or public safety.

“It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising
a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings,
which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the
crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make
and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient,
and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to
admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters
placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for trains.

“This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its
failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such
failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is
no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or
equipment be installed.”

Garcia v. Salvador
G.R. No. 168512, 20 March 2007

As part of the requirement for her employment, trainee Salvador underwent a medical
check-up with a clinic owned and operated by defendant Garcia. Salvador, an employee
of the clinic, conducted HBs Ag blood tests and released the results showing she had
Hepatitis B. She lost her job. After informing her father, he died of heart attack.
Meanwhile, she went to a hospital for a second check-up and 2 check-ups again with
Garcia to confirm her condition. This time all results showed negative. She was rehired.
She sued Garcia for damages.

HELD: Garcia was liable. He was negligent for failing to follow the laws relative to
running a clinic. In sum, the clinic failed to comply with the following: (1) that a licensed
physician should supervise it; (2) that HBs Ag test be conducted with supervision by a
licensed physician; and (3) that the test result be released with authorization from the
supervisor.

The elements of an actionable conduct are as follows: (a) duty on the part of the
defendant; (b) breach of such duty by the defendant; (c) injury caused to the plaintiff
due to such breach; and (d) proximate cause of the injury is the breach of duty.

–––

[1] Sps. Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal v. Sps. Luiz San Pedro and Kenichiro
Tominaga, G.R. No. 164601, 27 September 2006, citing Arturo M. Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 592 (1992).

[2] CIVIL CODE. Article 2176, cf. 2217.

[3] Ibid. Article 19.

[4] Ibid. Article 20.

[5] Ibid. Article 21.

[6] Ibid. Paragraph 1, Article 2180.

[7] Sps. Buenaventura v. Jayme, et al., v. Rodrigo Apostol, G.R. No. 163609, 27
November 2008.

[8] Filcar Transport Services v. Jose A. Espinas, G.R. No. 174156, 20 June 2012.

[9] Filcar Transport Services v. Jose A. Espina, G.R. No. 174156, 20 June 2012.

[10] Philippine National Railways v. Ethel Brunty, et al., G.R. No. 169891, 02
November 2006.