Center for the National Interest

The New Great Game

Author(s): Subodh Atal
Source: The National Interest, No. 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 101-105
Published by: Center for the National Interest
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897579
Accessed: 19-12-2017 16:17 UTC

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 The New Great Game

ings, uprisings and other violence. Links

vying for influence in Cen- between Uighur separatists and terrorist
OF vying tral ALL tralAsia,Asia,forChinatheisinfluence
likely to China regional is likely in powers Cen- to groups in Central Asian nations, particu-
have the most lasting and broad impact. larly Kyrgyzstan, have been uncovered
Geographical proximity and security and in recent years, raising fears of Central
economic interests all play a factor in the Asian Islamic extremists joining forces
region becoming a top strategic priority with Uighur separatists to form a united
for China. front. Such a possibility has prompted
A major factor in China's outreach authorities in Central Asian nations such
across its western border has been its ex-
as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to collabo-
ploding energy demand. Its economy, rate with China in sharing intelligence
growing at the torrid pace of 9.5 per- on Islamic extremist activities. Oil and
cent per year, has made the nation the gas pipelines traversing Central Asia and
world's second-largest oil importer and XUAR territory would be particularly sus-
will likely account for one-fifth of the
ceptible to sabotage by extremists. Thus,
world's growth in global energy demand stability on its western border is critical
in the next quarter-century. With much to China in ensuring a suitable environ-
of China's current energy imports arriving ment for its continued economic growth.
via the insecure Malacca Strait, its energy Furthermore, China wants to avoid draw-
strategy emphasizes diversification of en- ing the United States into broader in-
ergy routes, including pipelines from Iran volvement in the region in response to
and Kazakhstan. terrorism and instability.
Moreover, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan With much at stake, China has pa-
and Tajikistan all share borders with tiently and skillfully built strong ties to
China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous its western neighbors. Initial distrust of
Region (XUAR). The Uighur population the nation by its smaller neighbors such
of Xinjiang shares religious and cultural as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan has given
links with the Muslim Turkic popula- way to close economic links as China
tion of Central Asia. The Islamic un-has moved to resolve border disputes,
rest in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan hasinvest in infrastructure projects and pro-
spilled over into XUAR in the form vide
of assistance to the Central Asian na-
Uighur separatism, with periodic bomb- tions. China has set up trade missions in
every Central Asian country, is paying
for
Subodh Atal is a foreign affairs analyst focusing on a highway to be constructed from
U.S. foreign policy, South and Central Asia,Kyrgyzstan to China and has offered to
terrorism and nuclear proliferation. help Uzbekistan develop several small oil

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fields. China has even promoted the re- has been fighting Chechen rebels since
vival of the ancient Silk Road era through the 1990s. The group was renamed the
economic integration between Xinjiang SCO with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in
and the eight Central and South Asian June 2001. In the immediate aftermath of
nations of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the 9/11 attacks, with American entry into
Tajikistan, Kyrgysstan, Uzbekistan, Turk- Central and South Asia and Uzbekistan's
menistan and Kazakhstan. close alliance with the U.S.-led operations
Chinese strategy in Central Asia in Afghanistan, the SCO project faltered
draws upon its "New Security Concept", temporarily. However, as the operations
wherein the "use of force and the threat in Afghanistan wound down in 2002, and
of use of force" are replaced with mul- as the March 2003 American invasion of
tilateral "mutual trust, mutual benefit, Iraq deepened fears in China and Russia
equality and coordination."1 This frame- of American unipolarity, the two nations
work evolved during the late 1990s and worked to revitalize the SCO. The decla-
was enunciated in official white papers ration of the June 2003 SCO meeting em-
published in 1998 and 2000 on China's phasized the role of the United Nations in
defense policy. The New Security Con- dealing with international disputes, clearly
cept aims at achieving China's geopolitical targeting U.S. "unilateralism."
goals through multilateral dialogue and The SCO charter, established in 2002,
cooperation and thus at challenging the set up several councils of representatives
emerging American unipolarity after the at various levels of the member nations'
Soviet disintegration. The abrupt entry governments. The councils meet regu-
of the U.S. military after 9/11 into bases larly to discuss regional and international
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the latter issues as well as organizational budget-
one near Bishkek and thus rather close to ary matters. A new permanent organ set
China's border, has strengthened Chinese up in 2004 is the Regional Anti-Terror-
suspicions of an American attempt at en- ism Structure (RATS), with headquarters
circlement. China's fears of American en- in Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent. The
croachment in Central Asia mirror U.S. RATS coordinates SCO member activities
concerns over burgeoning Chinese ties against terrorism, separatism and extrem-
to Latin America, where China is rapidly ism. The SCO has since progressed to
expanding energy and trade links. holding joint military and anti-terrorism
exercises, signaling that it wants to fill in
roles similar to those currently carried
out by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghani-
CHINA'S ship ed inedCHINA'S its roleroleship
in itsin Central theincreation
inSTRATEGIC Central
in the Asia Asiais isreflect-
of creation reflect-
leader- of stan. Apart from its work in regional is-
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization sues, the SCO has begun to interact with
(SCO). The SCO started out in 1996 as the other international agencies, sending rep-
Shanghai Five, consisting of China, Rus- resentatives to such forums as counter-
sia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki- terrorism conferences, thus establishing
stan. Initially focused on resolving long- itself as a significant international force.
standing border disputes between China Some observers regard the SCO as an
and the ex-Soviet states, after 1998 the anti-U.S. grouping, even comparing it
focus of the group expanded to dealing to the Warsaw Pact. While the SCO was
with terrorism and separatism as Chi- far too divided in earlier years to warrant
na's concerns in Xinjiang converged with such a comparison, and even today its
those of several Central Asian nations bat-
tling the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 'Devika Sharma, "China's New Security Concept",
(IMU), as well as those of Russia, which The Pioneer, July 2, 2004.

102

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cohesiveness is suspect, its transforma- ment. That the summit was able to issue
tion into a more robust organization is a strongly worded declaration against
presaged by the consensus declaration U.S. military presence hints at the ability
at its recent annual conference in As- of the alliance to overcome the complex
iana, Kazakhstan's capital. The declara- antagonistic interplay among the member
tion minced no words in demanding nations. a
time-bound withdrawal of U.S. -led coali- With Chinese economic and political
tion forces from Central Asian bases in influence clearly eclipsing that of Russia,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgysstan and Tajikistan. some Russians have expressed concern
The participation of Uzbekistan in thethat in seeking China's help in regain-
issuance of such a statement is a far crying influence in its near abroad, Russia
from late 2001 and 2002, when Tashkentmay itself become China's near abroad.
was considered a close American ally. Despite such concerns, Russia appears to
Russia and China have clearly leveraged regard the growing American influence in
Uzbek differences with the United States Eurasia as more threatening to its inter-
over the repression of dissidents, usingests than a rapidly growing China. Thus,
the SCO forum to help President Islamboth China and Russia are eager to foster
Karimov loosen his ties to the United a strategic partnership aimed at heading
States. The deep antagonism to hosting off American ability to extend its global
the American military is not limited to
dominance into the region.
Karimov's regime. In Kyrgyzstan, the
new government, which replaced Aksar
Akaev's regime, has made strong state-
ments calling for Americans to vacate the INDIA Yet,Yet,
CentralIndia's
India'sconcerns INDIA Central Asian nation or Russia.
DOES Asian over
concernsterror-
nation not border over or Russia. terror- any
Manas base. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, atism his in Jammu and Kashmir are tied firmly
first press conference after winning to thethe
fate of the Islamic extremist move-
presidential election, emphasized that mentsthethat span several Central Asian
rationale for U.S. presence at thenations. base India was reported to have estab-
needed to be reconsidered. lished a military base and medical center
At the July 2005 SCO summit, three in Tajikistan soon after 9/11 and has been
nations - India, Pakistan and Iran - were working to re-establish a presence in Af-
admitted as observers. For India, the ghanistan. India is keenly interested in
move brings it a voice in the future of ensuring that a Taliban-like regime does
Central Asia, where it desperately needs not re-emerge in Afghanistan and that
access to energy markets. Pakistan's SCO the influence of Islamic extremists based
membership as an observer gives it a in Afghanistan and Pakistan on Central
voice in a regional alliance that could Asia is minimized.
help achieve its economic aims, as well India has another critical imperative
as ensures it a status within the organiza- to engage with Central Asian countries
tion on par with that of its rival, India. and the other regional players: It already
India's presence at the SCO is important imports two-thirds of the oil it consumes.
to Russia for balancing against Chinese Consequently, Indian strategy has shifted
power in the region, while the inclusion considerably toward reconciliation with
of Pakistan was insisted upon by China Pakistan and unprecedented partnership
to balance against a potential Russian- with China to pave the way for exploring
Indian bloc in the SCO. Iran's acceptance various options for energy routes through
within the SCO provides it with a hedge Central Asia.
against U.S. and European pressures on The ongoing peace process with Paki-
terrorism and nuclear weapons develop- stan has resulted in the defusing of nucle-

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ar tensions over the past year and allowed of this strategy, Iran has developed close
the consideration of a trans-Pakistan pipe- ties to China, Russia and India, and aims
line to India. India and China have put to collaborate with those nations in Cen-
aside decades of animosity to work toward tral Asia. This strengthens Iran's ability to
growing trade and economic ties. Dur- deter American or Israeli military strikes.
ing Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to Iran's eastern strategy in the region
India in April, Indian officials floated the is particularly facilitated by the close
idea of joint Indo-Chinese oil consortia in convergence of its regional goals with
Central Asia. India's government-owned those of China, including opposition to
gas agency, GAIL, has invested in Chinese the U.S. military presence, shared con-
gas pipeline projects in Kazakhstan, indi- cerns over the radical Sunni ideology
cating that the two countries are already that spawned the Taliban, the IMU and
moving in this direction. The Indian gov- the Uighur separatists, and energy ex-
ernment is planning to host a major con- ploitation. China is helping to develop
ference of Central Asian energy producers pipelines traversing Iran, Kazakhstan and
this fall in an attempt to create economic Turkmenistan, which will further its own
and political partnerships between emerg- energy security and provide Iran with an
ing energy suppliers and energy consum- outlet for its oil exports that skirts West-
ers in Asia. India's admission to the SCO ern constraints. Central Asian routes for
with observer status gives it farther abilityIran's oil are also coveted by India, which
to shape the regional energy game in thefell short by about 12 percent in meeting
coming decades. its energy needs during 2004.
Both China and Russia are interest- As part of this strategy, Iran sought
ed in drawing India into the alliance toadmission to the SCO grouping in 2004.
neutralize U.S. influence, and to avert For
a China, Iran's presence as an observer
close Indo-U.S. strategic partnership thatin the SCO brings another anti-U.S. na-
could significantly tilt the regional bal-tion to the table and provides a com-
ance. India, despite its growing economic mon platform for China, Iran and Cen-
and military ties to the United States, hastral Asian countries such as Kazakhstan to
not ruled out forming an anti-U.S. alli-discuss regional energy and trade routes.
ance with Russia and China. A joint com- Such growing Iranian links to China,
muniqué released at a meeting of Russian, India, Russia and several Central Asian
Chinese and Indian foreign ministers inrepublics are likely to limit the effective-
Vladivostok, Russia, in June emphasizedness of U.S. sanctions and the ability of
promotion of "multi-polarization" - clear- the European Union to negotiate an end
ly targeting American unilateralism. For to Iran's nuclear program.
India, the impetus to join such an alliance
will likely be its displeasure at the close
American relationship with Pakistan, par- regime in December 2001, the
ticularly if it helps perpetuate the rule of AFTER United regime OUSTING in States
United States December shifted
shifted the 2001, Taliban
towardtoward the
an anti-Indian military regime. utilizing the post- 9/ 11 environment to
For Iran, a strengthening "eastwardextend and fortify its influence in Central
orientation", as propounded by newly
and South Asia. American military bases
elected President Mahmoud Ahmadine- in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz-
jad, constitutes a key component of its stan, which were initially slated as being
strategy to escape the shackles of long- solely for the purpose of fighting the
standing sanctions by the United States War on Terror, started displaying signs
and avoid compromises with Europe over of permanence and began to define the
capping Iran's nuclear program. As part new boundaries of the American empire.

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By January 2002, American troops were tude. The triggering of a race to establish
engaged in renovations or additions at military bases in Central Asia in response
some 1 3 locations in nine countries in the to U.S. intentions of making its bases per-
greater Central Asian region, including manent, the collaboration between China
Pakistan and Uzbekistan. and Russia inside and outside the SCO
Russia and China, with a more direct against the United States, and the shap-
and vital strategic stake in the region, have ing of the contours of an anti-U.S. Chi-
become wary of U.S. moves into their nese-Russian-Indian-Iranian axis are some
backyard and have moved to strengthen of the unintended consequences. Such a
their hold on the region, setting up com- nexus could undermine global counter-
peting military bases and drawing Central terrorism cooperation, impede America's
Asian nations into the SCO, which could ability to effectively and rapidly respond
become an increasingly anti-U.S. alliance. to future threats in Central and South
As American intentions of projecting mili- Asia, and reduce American access to Cen-
tary power in the region have crystallized, tral Asian energy markets.
Russian and Chinese incentives for collab- Reversing this strategy of preponder-
oration with the United States have given ance would entail evaluating American
way to visible antagonism and counter- interests in the context of regional re-
balancing to dislodge or at least constrainalities and does not imply isolationism or
the United States. undercutting key strategic imperatives.
American strategy in the region, in- China, driven by energy needs and secu-
stead of enhancing its own security, has rity concerns, has expanded its strategic
resulted in a potentially dangerous coun- sphere into Central Asia, and can no lon-
ter-alliance, even as the initial goals of ger be considered merely an East Asian
neutralizing the anti-American forces re- power. While other nations, such as Rus-
main unfulfilled. Fighting with a resur- sia and India, also are trying to influence
gent Taliban has cost dozens of American the region's geopolitics, China, with its
lives in recent months. Taliban insur- economic strength, will likely assume a
gents continue to launch widespread at- leading role among the various intersect-
tacks against the Afghan government, and ing forces in Central Asia. The United
southeastern Afghan provinces remainStates stands a better chance of achieving
destabilized, with some areas under Tal- its regional goals through engaging China
iban control. Unless the trends are re- as a Central Asian power, along with Rus-
versed, the region could again be used for sia and India.
plotting international terrorism. The United States does have a long-
The current dilemma is largely a re- term interest in helping the Central Asian
sult of a U.S. strategy that emphasized republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan steer
power projection into the region ratheraway from instability and extremism and
than comprehensively defeating anti-U.S.in ensuring that energy routes in the re-
forces. Many argued that without a per-gion are not monopolized by a particu-
manent American military presence, in- lar nation. However, collaborating with
stability and sources of international ter- regional powers on common goals such
rorism would return to the region. Theas counter-terrorism and defusing of Is-
flip side of the argument is that prolonged lamist insurgencies, rather than intensify-
U.S. military presence could itself engen-ing a new Great Game, may better serve
der instability of an even worse magni- such aims. □

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