DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE/ATTY. OLIVER O.
cause ordered for the immediate release of his client and that he
LOZANO v. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
Adm. Case No. 8108/Adm. Case No. 10299, July 15, 2014,
SERENO, CJ
Facts:
Brodett and Tecson, the “Alabang Boys”, were accused in
cases filed by PDEA for Illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a
joint resolution, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask
clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly
prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House
Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings.
It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared
the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul
Gonzales.
The complainants Jimenez and Vizconde sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had
thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued
that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should
be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.
Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal
processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking
public official, even though the latter was not a government
prosecutor.
The defense of the respondent is that the Joint Inquest
Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable
believes in sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to
their cause that prompted him to prepare and draft the release order.
That if the secretary signs the papers then everything may be
expedited, and as it was without any sign it is a mere scrap of paper
with no effect at all.
The investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or
any similar action.
The IBP Board of Governors found the respondent liable for
improper and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving
the appearance of influence upon a public official. Recommendation
was adopted by the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Felisberto can be held administratively
liable for the preparation of the draft release order with stationery in
order to expedite the release of his clients
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. He violated
Canon 13 of the CPR. We believe that other provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling
not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the
justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.
Statements made during the hearing establish respondent’s
admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite
the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and 2)
respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on
official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the
end in view of "expediting the case."
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly
subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means,
not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even
in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and
unethical.
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always
be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in
the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain
a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell
short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L.
Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in
relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that
repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
RESPECT FOR THE COURT
HON. MARIBETH MANAHAN vs ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
FACTS: Judge Manahan was the presiding judge in a civil case for
damages where Atty. Flores was the counsel for the defendant. In the
preliminary conference, Atty. Flores was directed by Judge Manahan
to file a Pre-Trial Brief. Atty. Flores submitted a Pre-Trial Brief but
without proof of his MCLE Compliance, hence the brief was expunged
from the records. Atty. Flores asked for time to submit the said proof,
and he was given several chances to appear and submit a Pre-Trial
Brief, but he failed to do so. The preliminary conference was reset
several times. Judge Manahan issued an order giving Atty. Flores a
last chance to submit with a warning that a failure will constitute a
waiver to submit a brief. Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation which states:
a. “When you took your oath as a lawyer, you promised to
serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are
being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?”
b. “Ignorance of the law excuses no one, which is why Erap
was convicted. Even worse is a lawyer who violates the
law.”
c. “God said: Thou shall not lie. The Constitution commands:
Give every Filipino his due. The act of the plaintiff is
violative of the divine and human laws.”
Atty. Flores later filed a Pre-Trial Brief with an MCLE number that was
merely superimposed without the date and place of compliance. He
failed to appear and submit proof again. Atty. Flores filed a Letter
stating: “If only to give your honor another chance to prove your pro
plaintiff sentiment. I am filing this Motion which you may again assign
to the wastebasket of nonchalance. With the small respect that
remains, I have asked he defendant to look for another lawyer for I
am no longer interested in this case because I cannot do anything
right in your sala.” Judge Manahan issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting herself and stating that Atty. Flores’s acts may constitute
grave misconduct. A copy of the order was given to the Bar Discipline
Committee that treat such as an administrative complaint. It was
recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended for one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Flores is administratively liable for failing
to give due respect to the court?
RULING: YES.
DISCUSSION: Atty. Flores failed to obey the Judge’s order to submit
proof of his MCLE compliance despite the numerous opportunities
given him. Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his
pleadings. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the CPR enjoins all lawyers to
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the courts. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within his
right of freedom of speech such right must be exercised responsibly.
The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense
of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within
the confines of reason and common sense.
CONCLUSION: However, the Court finds the one year suspension
too harsh as Atty. Flores has been practicing for 50 years, thus he is
already in his twilight years. (humanitarian reasons)
DISPOSITIVE: Atty. Flores is fined P5,000 with a stern warning.
MADRID vs. DEALCA
A.C. No. 7474; September 9, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Dealca entered his appearance in People v. Arsenault pending in
Sorsogon City RTC Branch then presided by Judge Jose L. Madrid.
Atty. Dealca moved that the case be re-raffled to another branch
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding
Judge and the undersigned.” Judge Madrid denied the motion. The
Appearance of Atty. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William
Arsenault was likewise denied.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of
the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering
his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding
judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.
Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to
counsel, among others. And that it should be Judge Madrid himself
who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary
for gross ignorance of the law.
The IBP Sorsogon recommended a penalty of SUSPENSION in the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months from finality of the
decision against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag found Atty. Dealca guilty of
violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
by filing frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of
law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was
devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal
whims.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and
dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit. MR denied.
ISSUES:
1. Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
2. Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the
inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and
penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner
Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges,
court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had
all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients
or his side. He should now be reminded that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law,
not to harass them.
The Lawyer’s Oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit." As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of
his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in
Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thus
wise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
As he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper
his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard
himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist
the courts in the proper administration of justice. He disregarded
his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints,
including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload
of the Judiciary. Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court
personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on
his part, considering that he made allegations against them
therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully
deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and
serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various
complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even the
Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit: “With due respect,
what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed
against erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e.
without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.” Atty.
Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the
Court could have promulgated in frequently dismissing his
unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance
his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of
the rules of procedure applicable to the Court. The minute
resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the
actions by the Court. The requirement for stating the facts and
the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court
issues in disposing of a case.
2. Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently states:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives
not supported by the record or haveno materiality to the case.
All lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases
being handled by him directly insinuated that judges could choose
the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which
hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their
counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been
assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not
only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even
include any particulars that could have validated the averment.
Nor did he attach any document to support it.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the
first administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty.
Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that
a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed
on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, and Canon
11, Rule 11.04 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty.
Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03
and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN
WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
AIDA CAMPOS vs Atty. ELISEO CAMPOS
A.C. No. 8644
*Respect for the Court*
FACTS:
 Wife (complainant) files this case for disbarment against the
husband lawyer.
 Judge Eliseo and Aida had a son, Alistair, and a daughter,
Charmaine. Judge Eliseo bought real property 936 sqm lot in
Agusan Del Sur and applied for an OCT over the lot in Alistair’s
name.
 The OCT was issued and Alistair and his wife possessed the
lot and built a house thereon.
 Afterwards, Judge Eliseo filed a petition for the Declaration of
Nullity of his marriage with Aida on the grounds of
psychological incapacity, by saying he was a homosexual.
 Eliseo made an Affidavit of Loss of the OCT of the land where
Alistair was residing. He caused the annotation of the affidavit
to the OCT held by the Register of Deeds.
o Subsequently, Alistair filed an Affidavit of No Loss,
and claimed that the OCT was with him, and that
Eliseo made a misrepresentation in producing the
Affidavit of Loss when the latter knew fully well that
the OCT was with Alistair.
o Alistair filed a criminal complaint for perjury against
Eliseo.
o Eliseo countered that he owned the property, and
only caused it to be issued in the name of Alistair. He
further claims he did not give the OCT to Alistair, and
that it was truly in his files as far as he remembers.
He further claims he started to have the OCT be
transferred to his own name when he found out
Alistair was about to use the property as collateral,
and that he only created the affidavit when the
Registry of Deeds purportedly told him that a certified
copy of the OCT will only be issued upon the
production of said Affidavit.
o The fiscal dismissed the complaint, holding that
Alistair made the same in good faith, and that Alistair
was in fact the one who is remiss in informing Eliseo
of the whereabouts of the title.
 The wife Aida now filed a civil case for legal separation, and
an administrative complaint for dishonesty, misconduct, and
immorality. She avers that Eliseo declared under oath that he
was a homosexual but that he admitted to the children,
Alistair and Charmaine, that he had another woman.
 (Pertinent to the topic) During the hearing on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity, the presiding judge asked the parties to
a conference in his chambers. It was claimed by the
complainants during this point that now-ex-judge
Eliseo assaulted Charmaine by choking her and
attempting to box Alistair. This was listed in a police
blotter.
 Afterwards, the wife Aida, son Alistair, and daughter
Charmaine all filed another administrative complaint, this time
for disbarment.
 The side of Eliseo provided for the following:
o He executed the Affidavit of Loss on September 10,
2008 as a pre-requisite to his filing of an action in
court for the registration of the property in his name.
o HE did not admit he had a relation with another
woman, but only said that given the way Aida treats
him, that he might be better off with a different
woman who’s more caring and loving.
 o What happened in the court chambers is that
Charmaine was being deliberately and unceasingly
offensive, using abusive words even during court
(hence she was thrown out by the judge during the
hearing), and that in the chambers she kept shouting
at Eliseo and hurling invectives, despite the presence
of the judge, and interrupting him in talking with the
judge as regards a possible compromise on the
partition of the conjugal property; and that he merely
held Charmaine’s shoulder and told her to calm her
down, and that Alistair suddenly boxed him
afterwards, and Charmaine locked his arms to render
him defenseless, and that he elbowed Charmaine to
defend against Alistair; and that Alistair and Eliseo
had a fistfight which only ceased when the judge
intervened.
o Aside from their testimony, there was no other
independent evidence, either documentary or
testimonial evidence, of the events and the so-called
“choking”, not even a medical certificate to attest to
the same.
 Given the evidence before it, the CBD recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of
substantial evidence.
 The IBP Board of Governors reversed, and held there was
sufficient evidence as regards the anomalous filing of the
Affidavit of Loss, the allegedly admitted infidelity to the
children, and the version of the complainants as to the boxing
and choking incident. Recommendation: TWO-YEAR
SUSPENSION.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eliseo should be faulted for the scuffle inside the
judge’s chambers.
HELD:
We first resolve the issue of the other misconduct committed by Eliseo.
AS regards the other grounds relied upon, he was already fined
in a previous case for those transgressions regarding the purchasing
of property and causing it to be issued in the name of the son.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and the
previous complaint are anchored upon almost the same set of facts,
except that in the former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on
September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not intend to
punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they pertain to
his private life and were not actually committed in connection with the
performance of his functions as a magistrate before.
It was provided here the concept of “automatic conversion of
administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers”, wherein pending administrative
cases against judges shall be considered also as administrative
complaints against them in their capacity as lawyers if based on the
same grounds as those for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or
for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution
AS REGARDS THE MAIN ISSUE, In the instant disbarment
complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged. It bears
stressing that not one of the parties had presented even one
independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of
Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a
fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with
much certainty.
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the
incident, and understands that the successive acts of the parties
during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high,
he shall not be excused for comporting himself in such an undignified
manner.
What Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than
his own children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court shall
not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is
looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred
place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice
solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within or around the vicinity
diminishes its sanctity and dignity. Although Alistair and
Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of
decorum and restraint was then expected from Eliseo , whose
conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend credit to the
nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.
Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his own children in
the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: PHP 5,000.00 FINE
IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003
IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822, A. C. NO. 6332
FACTS:
This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno
M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s
Urgent Omnibus Motion (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two
consolidated petitions involving respondent that were pending before
the Court.
This motion is directed against the then ponente of the consolidated
petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio. In support of his claims to inhibit
the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two
copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of this Court, which
he claimed to have anonymously received through the mail. He also
attached a copy of the Court’s internal Resolution regarding the
transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First Division, upon
the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latter’s alleged special
interest in the case.
In response, the Court issued a resolution to require Atty. Peña and
Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated
petitions, to appear before the Court for an Executive Session. The
executive session was called because the Court is perturbed by some
statements made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña involving
strictly confidential matters which are purely internal to the Court and
which the latter cites as grounds in his “Urgent Motion to Inhibit and
to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion.
Atty. Peña answered that he was 100% certain that those documents
are authentic and he assumed that they came from Manila because
the Supreme Court is in Manila. He believed that they are official
documents of the Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of
another resolution issued by the Court when the same was faxed to
him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that he was
only joking to Atty. Singson when on the cellular phone he intimated
that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new
Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer categorically
whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty.
Peña could not make any candid or forthright answer.
He was evasive. The Court ordered that a formal investigation be
undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of
Atty. Peña.
The OBC opines that although respondent Peña may appear to have
been passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used
is not to be considered as malicious imputations but mere expressions
of concern based on what he discovered from the internal documents
of the Court that he had secured. The OBC recommended the
dismissal of the second charge that respondent supposedly submitted
falsified documents to this Court as annexes. On the third charge for
contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal
of the same. Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the
fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled by respondent Peña against
Urban Bank and the individual bank directors.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8, 10, & 11 of
the CPR.
RULING:
[Violation of Canon 11 – Rule 11.03 & 11.04] As officers of the
court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and
must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported
by the record or have no materiality to the case. While lawyers are
entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of foul and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession.
[Violation of Canon 10] Candor and truthfulness are some of the
qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal profession.
Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice. As disciples of truth, their
lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts
of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. In the instant case, the
submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a
member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the
ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
[Violation of Canon 8 – Rule 8.01] Lawyers shall conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
professional colleagues. They shall not, in their professional dealings,
use language that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Lawyers shall use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of a
judicial forum. The Court cannot countenance the ease with which
lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical
conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal
profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of
the cause with which they are charged. It has not escaped the Court’s
attention that respondent Peña has manifested a troubling history of
praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for the
re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless
and unfounded accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection
for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an
apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear, includes 21 pleas and
motions.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect
to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon
his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.
[ A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 ]
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie
R. Bunagan, entered into a contract of marriage. However,
notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and
Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted
his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with
Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly
immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
Issue:
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice
Ruling:
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION (FORMERLY LAGUNA
PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.), Complainant, v. ATTY. AL C.
ARGOSINO, Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:
FACTS as to how the case started
Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development
and sale of subdivision houses and lots. Respondent was counsel for
Rodman Construction & Development Corporation (Rodman).
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, under
which the latter was to acquire from the former a subdivision house
and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event
that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to
pay the full contract price of P4,412,254.00, less the downpayment
of P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of the loan
disapproval.
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the
property.
In three separate letters, complainant demanded that Rodman pay
the outstanding balance of P3,088,577.80. Both parties agreed that
the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.
Rodman made a partial payment on 22 March 1999. It also claimed
to have made other payments from March 1999 to July 1999, which
complainant disputed
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial
act, and demanded that Rodman vacate the subject property.
As Rodman remained in possession of the property, complainant
filed an unlawful detainer case against the former before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City. w
Rodman filed a Complaint before the HLURB seeking the nullification
of the rescission of the Contract to Sell.
The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and
dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The HLURB Board directed Rodman "to immediately pay its
outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right
to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by
complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and
less monthly compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of
1% of the contract price per month."
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the HLURB Board's
Decision, questioning the order to refund the sums paid by Rodman
less deductions in case of a rescission of the contract. Rodman filed
a Comment/Opposition to complainant's motion and sought a
clarification of certain aspects of the Decision, but did not move for
reconsideration.
The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution modifying its earlier
Decision.
xxx [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to
the respondent (herein complainant) its outstanding balance of
P1,814,513.27, including interests and penalties which may have
accrued in the meantime, failing in which, the respondent shall have
the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums
paid by the complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the
contract and less monthly compensation for the use of the premises
at the rate of 1% of the contract price per month.
As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period
allowed, it became final and executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the
judgment, but their efforts were in vain. With the judgment award
still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant filed a
motion for writs of execution and possession before the HLURB
Board.
Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment on the motion and
subsequently a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply.
HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the case
records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the
execution of the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, raising issues on the
computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition and
Rejoinder to which respondent filed a Reply and Surrejoinder
On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order denying
Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration. It furthermore enjoined the
parties from filing any pleading in the guise of an appeal on
collateral issues or questions already passed upon.
On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of
Interest before the HLURB Regional Office, citing the disagreement
between the parties as to the reckoning date of the accrual of
interest. Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution and Possession.
HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due,
arriving at the total amount of P2,685,479.64 as payment due to
complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution
implementing the HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.
Main Facts
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of
Execution, respondent, on behalf of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to
Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the
Case for Conference. The said motion injected new issues and claims
and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon
actual receipt of the amount of P2,685,479.64, [complainant] should
simultaneously turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman."
(Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt for
issuing a demand letter to Rodman despite the pendency of the
latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to
thresh out the problems with the execution of the writ. The
conference, however, failed to serve its purpose.
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as
arbiter of the case and for the setting of a hearing on the Petition to
Cite Complainant in Contempt.
HLURB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2)
granted complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution
and Writ of Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on
the Petition citing the latter for contempt.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order,
reiterating that Arbiter Aquino should inhibit herself from the case
because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded and ordered
the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A.
Foronda.
When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Pending Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution,
respondent submitted his vehement Opposition.
He insisted that his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle
should be acted upon first and argued that "the merits of the instant
case as well as the motions filed in relation thereto must be re-
evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling x x x."
Respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued
by Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be
attending the conference, not to submit itself to the jurisdiction of
Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the re-raffling of the case.
Respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda,
claiming that his designation violated due process. He said the re-
raffle was questionable because he was not notified of its conduct
despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.
Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of
whether or not Arbiter Foronda could rule on the pending motions.
Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an
indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction
over a case at the execution stage; (2) the claim of Rodman that its
Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained
unresolved was rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual
inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the summary
dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution was denied.
The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-
out dispute, as respondent did not file any more pleadings.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB
case, complainant - through its vice president for project
development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in
relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of the following
tenets:51
1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.
2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith
to the court.
3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
4. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.
5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation on the Complaint. Neither party filed a motion for
reconsideration or a petition within the period allowed.
ISSUE
Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.
Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the
path towards its resolution became long, tedious, and frustrating
because of the deliberate attempts of respondent to delay the actual
execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings
over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined not to do
so, and made unfounded accusations of bias or procedural defects.
These acts manifest his propensity to disregard the authority of a
tribunal and abuse court processes, to the detriment of the
administration of justice.
The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his
client is untenable.
As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and is expected to serve the latter with competence and
diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every honorable
means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due the
latter
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required
to exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. The Code also obliges lawyers
to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of their client.
ultimately caused unjust delays in the administration of justice.
These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of judgment or misuse court processes.
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath by disobeying the
legal orders of a duly constituted authority, and disregarding his
sworn duty to "delay no man for money or malice."
While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional
misconduct, we find that its recommended penalty of reprimand is
not commensurate with respondent's transgression.
Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.

In Millare v. Montero, the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer

to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process - such as the filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation, and frivolous appeals - for the
sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a
judgment.

In Garcia v. Francisco, a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his

rights of recourse - all of which were rebuffed - to get a favorable
judgment. He was found to have violated his duty as a member of
the bar to pursue only those acts or proceedings that appear to be
just, and only those lines of defense he believed to be honestly
debatable under the law.

What is patent from the acts of respondent is that he has made a

mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and