18

Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta vs Juan Ignacio Araneta

9 Oct 2013

Facts: After 7 years of marriage, Juan and Michelle separated and Michelle had
custody of their 2 children. Juan filed a PETITION FOR CUSTODY of their children
with the Makati RTC. After initially failing to file an answer Michelle filed a
Motion to Admit Answer and with a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Protection Order. The Makati judge was disinclined to grant Michelle’s motion f or
a TPO and declared her in default. Subsequently, she interposed a Motion to
Withdraw her Motion for TPO. Subsequently, Michelle initiated a PETITION FOR
TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER with the Muntinlupa
RTC, which granted the same. Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
litis pendentia and arguing that this constitutes forum shopping, which the RTC
only partially granted. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA ruled
that although the Petition for Certiorari is a prohibited pleading

ISSUE: Did Michelle commit forum shopping? (YES)

Ruling:

under RA 9262, the case can’t be dismissed because it would in effect “reward” the
forum shopping done by Michelle. Court said that Michelle committed forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on
the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable
disposition. Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second cause
of action becomes vexatious and unnecessary. Applying the rules, Michelle
committed forum shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of the adverse
ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.
PETITION FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER in
Muntinlupa RTC is dismissed.
- Michelle argues that:

-She withdrew her petition for protective order in the custody case. Besides, the
CA decided that Makati RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her so all its
issuances were void.
-There was no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties and the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for aren’t the same
-It wasn’t possible for her to apply for a protection order under RA 9262 in the
custody case because she wasn’t a petitioner in the Makati case and the venue for
the application for a protection order under the law is the place where the offended
party resides, which is Muntinlupa. - Court pointed out that Michelle only
withdrew her petition for protective order in the Makati Court after it was denied.
Also, there is nothing in the CA decision declaring that all issuances of the Makati
RTC were void for lack of jurisdiction over Michelle the Court said that this
posture was meant to deceive and mislead the court.
- Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable
disposition.
The test for determining whether there is forum shopping is where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other case.
Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second cause of action
becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For this to apply, the ff. requisites must be
present:
1. Identity of the parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata in the other
Thus it has been held that there is forum shopping:
1. Whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another;
2. If, after he has filed a petition before the SC, a party files another before the CA
since in such case said party deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as
one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case offering
a similar remedy would still be open; or

3. Where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after

failing to obtain it from the original court. - Applying the rules, Michelle
committed forum shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of the adverse
ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.
The cases have identical parties. In a long line of cases, the SC has held that
absolute identity of parties isn’t required, it being enough that there is substantial
identity of the parties or at least such parties represent the same interests in both
actions. The fact that the identities of parties are reversed doesn’t negate the
identity of parties for the purpose of determining whether the case is
dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based on the same facts
. Both courts will have to
make a finding on Michelle’s allegations of abuse and whether granting visitation
rights will be in the children’s best interest. Elements of litis pendentia are present
and any any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is
successful, will amount to res judicata.
In the custody case, Juan asserted his right to visit his children and enjoy custody
over them. In the Petition for Protection Order filed by Michelle, on the other hand,
she asserts that the grant of visitation rights in Juan’s
favor will not be in the best interest of the children. A favorable decision in one
case would amount to res judicata in the other. - The evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by 2 competent tribunals of 2
separate and contradictory decisions, thereby causing confusion, is present in this
case. Petition for TPO filed by Michelle in Muntinlupa RTC should be dismissed
with prejudice since this is a clear case of forum shopping. CA Decision
AFFIRMED.

19

ATTY. EMMANUEL AGUSTIN, ET AL. v. ALEJANDRO CRUZ-HERRERA

FACTS:

Respondent Herrera is the President of Podden, the company in which petitioners are employed.
Petitioners alleged that they were illegally dismissed by Respondent, thus, they enagged the
services of petitioner lawyer, Atty. Agustin, upon the verbal agreement that he will be paid on a
contingency basis at the rate if 10 % of the final monetary award.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioners. No appeal was posed by respondent on
such judgement, hence, a motion for execution was filed by petitioners. However, respondent
moved to deny the motion and invoked that he and the employees-petitioners already executed a
compromise agreement and settled their dispute. Agustin opposed.

In resolving the conflict, LA reversed its previous decision and dismissed the case. On appeal to
the NLRC, the latter reversed the LA’s decision. Then, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint.
Hence, this present case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision to dismiss the case on the ground of the
compromise agreement which is with no knowledge of Agustin?

RULING: The Court held no.

The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of non-
forum shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the principal
parties.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification against
forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorneyThe
purpose of the rule rests mainly on practical sensibilitythe certification (against forum shopping)
must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by the attorney. For such
certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action.
Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been
retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by
counsel is a defective certification.The Court has espoused leniency and overlooked such
procedural misstep in cases bearing substantial merit complemented by the written authority or
general power of attorney granted by the parties to the actual signatory=The court stressed that
Atty. Agustin should be reminded that his professional relation with his clients is one of agency,
hence, “the acts of an agent are deemed acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the
scope of his authority”.But under the present case, Atty. Agustin was clearly to have been acting
beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement between his clients
and Herrera.The court also emphasized that it is a settled rule that parties may enter into a
compromise agreement without the intervention of a lawyer. Hence, although without knowledge
of Agustin, the compromise agreement was valid.

20.

5/28/2017 09:16:00 AM
Abbott v. Alcaraz (G.R. No. 192571; July 23, 2013)

CASE DIGEST: ABBOTT LABORATORIES, etc. v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ

FACTS:
Manner of review.

Alcaraz contends that the Court should not have conducted a re-weighing of evidence since a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) is limited to the
review of questions of law. She submits that since what was under review was a ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, the
Court should only determine whether or not the CA properly determined that the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The assertion does not justify the reconsideration of the assailed Decision.

A careful perusal of the questioned Decision will reveal that the Court actually resolved the
controversy under the above-stated framework of analysis. Essentially, the Court found the CA to
have committed an error in holding that no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the
NLRC since the latter arbitrarily disregarded the legal implication of the attendant circumstances
in this case which should have simply resulted in the finding that Alcaraz was apprised of the
performance standards for her regularization and hence, was properly a probationary employee.
As the Court observed, an employee's failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which
have been clearly made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary
employee's non-regularization. As detailed in the Decision, Alcaraz was well-apprised of her
duties and responsibilities as well as the probationary status of her employment:

(a) On June 27, 2004, [Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott)] caused the publication in a
major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating therein the
job description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position;
this prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;

(b) In Abbott's December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a
probationary status;

(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which specifically stated,
inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning
February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;

(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott's employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott's
organizational structure and her job description through e-mail;

(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where [Allan G. Almazar]
informed her that she had to implement Abbott's Code of Conduct and office policies on human
resources and finance and that she would be reporting directly to [Kelly Walsh];

(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance Modules from [Maria
Olivia T. Yabut-Misa] who explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance of
probationary employees; she was further notified that Abbott had only one evaluation system for
all of its employees; and

(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another pharmaceutical company and had
admitted to have an "extensive training and background" to acquire the necessary skills for her
job.[2]

Considering the foregoing incidents which were readily observable from the records, the Court
reached the conclusion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion, viz.:

[I]n holding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed due to her status as a regular and not a
probationary employee, the Court finds that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.

To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on the premise that Alcaraz's receipt
of her job description and Abbott's Code of Conduct and Performance Modules was not
equivalent to being actually informed of the performance standards upon which she should have
been evaluated on. It, however, overlooked the legal implication of the other attendant
circumstances as detailed herein which should have warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz
was indeed a probationary and not a regular employee more particularly the fact that she was
well-aware of her duties and responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the same
would lead to her non-regularization and eventually, her termination.[3]

Consequently, since the CA found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and
denied the certiorari petition before it, the reversal of its ruling was thus in order.

At this juncture, it bears exposition that while NLRC decisions are, by their nature, final and
executory[4] and, hence, not subject to appellate review,[5] the Court is not precluded from
considering other questions of law aside from the CA's finding on the NLRC's grave abuse of
discretion. While the focal point of analysis revolves on this issue, the Court may deal with
ancillary issues such as, in this case, the question of how a probationary employee is deemed to
have been informed of the standards of his regularization if only to determine if the concepts and
principles of labor law were correctly applied or misapplied by the NLRC in its decision. In
other words, the Court's analysis of the NLRC's interpretation of the environmental principles
and concepts of labor law is not completely prohibited in as it is complementary to a Rule 45
review of labor cases.

Finally, if only to put to rest Alcaraz's misgivings on the manner in which this case was
reviewed, it bears pointing out that no "factual appellate review" was conducted by the Court in
the Decision. Rather, the Court proceeded to interpret the relevant rules on probationary
employment as applied to settled factual findings. Besides, even on the assumption that a
scrutiny of facts was undertaken, the Court is not altogether barred from conducting the same.
This was explained in the case of Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna[6] wherein
the Court held as follows:
Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its
specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining
where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings of the
NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.

Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction may be urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition.
For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial
evidence on record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo, as Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if supported by substantial
evidence.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

MR. Denied.