RIGHTS AGAINTS DOUBLE JEOPARDY On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were

arrested and charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE
TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor,
Department of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, THE HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the
Military Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm,
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section
1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of
Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City;
and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-
1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: The accused were:

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then 1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September
27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to 2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them." 3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, 4. Antonio Occaciones
"exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others,
over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly 5. Leopoldo Nicolas
related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and
security of the Republic. 6. Enrique Labita

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons 7. Oscar Yaun
. . . as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. 8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie

Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the 9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses
cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and 10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should
have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President
may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. 12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
 13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-one
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong (21) days, to twenty (20) years.

15. Manuel Beleta, and A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER
and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition). the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).

(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.) Eight (8) of the accused, namely:

Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President 1. Oscar Yaun
Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the 2. Enrique Labita
defendants' lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case
was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of 3. Eusebio Tan
Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were
detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame. 4. Alfonso Tan

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." 5. Go E Kuan
Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released
from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo). 6. William Tan (petitioner herein)

Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The 7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up
twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
75, Rollo).
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
promulgated by the Military Commission finding five (5) of the accused
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and
namely: abolished the military tribunals and commissions.
1. Luis Tan On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military
Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered
2. Ang Tiat Chuan on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al.
and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction,
3. Mariano Velez, Jr. even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal
offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open
4. Antonio Occaciones, and and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court
declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try
5. Leopoldo Nicolas civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:
 Due process of law demands that in all
criminal prosecutions (where the accused
stands to lose either his life or his liberty),
the accused shall be entitled to, among
others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the
due process clause of the Constitution, in
relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial
by judicial process, not by executive or
military process, Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the
Executive Department of the Government
and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by the legislature
for the President as Commander in-Chief to
aid him in properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline therein,
and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of
powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the
Government of the Philippines, the power
and the duty of interpreting the laws (as
when an individual should be considered to
have violated the law) is primarily a function
of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the
function of the Executive Department,
through the military authorities. And as long
as the civil courts in the land remain open
and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of
martial law in the country, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them
and which are properly cognizable by the
civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a
violation of the constitutional right to due
process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer,
et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150
SCRA 144, 158-160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas
corpus petitions were filed in this Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the
national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted
by the military commissions during the nine-year span of official martial rule
(G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and
entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160
SCRA 700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional
General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals, annul the proceedings
against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil courts
where their right to due process may be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160
SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-
political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice
as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be
controlled by martial rule.
The Court —
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of
some who had fully served their sentences, or had been acquitted, or had
been granted amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still
serving the sentences meted to them by the military courts, but, without
ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED
insofar as petitioners Virgilio
Alejandrino, 2Domingo Reyes, Antonio
Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado,
Daniel Campus, 3Reynaldo C. Reyes and
Rosalino de los Santos, 4 are concerned. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby
ordered to effect the immediate release of
the abovementioned petitioners, unless there
are other legal causes that may warrant their
detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners
Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno
Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C.
Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto
Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay,
Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel
Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera,
Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz,
Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino
Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin
Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan,
Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis.
Democrito Lorana who are all military
personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department
of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE
the necessary informations against them in
the courts having jurisdiction over the
offenses involved, within one hundred
eighty (180) days from notice of this
decision, without prejudice to the
reproduction of the evidence submitted by
the parties and admitted by the Military
Commission. If eventually convicted, the
period of the petitioners' detention shall be
credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary
informations are filed are DIRECTED TO
CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary
proceedings inclusive of those for the grant
of bail which may be initiated by the
accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160
SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued
Department Order No. 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to
collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the
evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor
Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of
the regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on
December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two
(2) informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original
defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those who had already
died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the
Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et
al. vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983,
79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565
as all accused are detained 6 except those
that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p.
8, Rollo). Later, he increased the recommended bail to P140,000 for each
accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case
(Crim. Case No. 88-825), he recommended that the bail be increased to
P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and
Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on
October 28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9,
Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or
reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City,
were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo.
Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued
an order on October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit
certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever
they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing
the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order
(Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order
for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the criminal
cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim.
Case No. MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because
none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs.
Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed
this petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in
Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge
dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any
other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting,
prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because
they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in
Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the
petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion
to quash the allegedly invalid informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825
(Annexes D and E) whose annulment they
seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in
the lower court of such motion is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of the
petitioners. The existence of that remedy
(which they have not yet availed of) bars
their recourse to the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec.
1, Rule 65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court
that the lower court had issued warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we
issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the
respondents from implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to
comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction
and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed
authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of
informations by the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who, like the
petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the
period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were
not parties in that case, who were not heard, and over whom the court did not
acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection
against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had
been acquitted by the military tribunal which the State itself had clothed with
jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may
not retroactively divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and
acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that
acquitted the petitioners would amount to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81,
Rollo, Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null
and void because it was filed without a prior preliminary investigation, nor a
finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State
Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios
disclosed that the information in Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal
possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing
on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for
dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman
who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military
Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information
for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12)
others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37,
Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it
will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of
the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from
attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res
judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been
interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military
Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings
involving civilians before a military commission were null and void because
we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over
civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not
bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their
discretion and acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction in
misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's
decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the
criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by
Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an
unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be
searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever
faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies
more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and
injustice unless given a limited application only to the parties/petitioners
therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against
themselves and prayed for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases
against them. They alone are affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not
all and sundry who at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a
court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters
adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it." (54
C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in
a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties to the self same
case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's pronouncement
in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against the
civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of informations against
them in the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were
not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the court's
jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94
Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in
which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right
to due process, the same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this
Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the proceedings against them in
the military tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of
civilians by military process was not due process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the
Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrilewhich needs to be rectified. For, although
the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were
still serving their sentences after conviction by the military courts and
commissions, and we directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the
court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had
finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had
been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order their reprosecution,
retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted
by the military courts and were still serving their sentences, and another rule
for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of
their sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first
group (whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper civil
courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court
ordered to be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or
the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of
the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused
should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which
sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be
a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for the municipality of Balabagan in the
reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity
accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been because the executive order is, in legal
acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and contemplation, as inoperative as though it
commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a had never been passed.' For the existence of
military court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact
undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil which cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief
court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County
a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another
hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to 'The courts below have
serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the proceeded on the theory that
second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held the Act of Congress, having
without bail pending the completion of his second trial which may take as been found to be
long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already unconstitutional, was not a
served. law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military imposing no duties, and
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971- hence affording no basis for
1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the challenged
the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be decree. Norton vs. Shelby
justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and County, 118 U.S. 425,
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry.
which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S.
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, 559, 566. It is quite clear,
did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, however, that such broad
where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the statements as to the effect of
creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the a determination of
local government thus abolished: unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications.
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice The actual existence of a
Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a statute, prior to such a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no determination, is an
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no operative fact and may have
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as consequences which cannot
inoperative as though it had never been justly be ignored. The past
passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds cannot always be erased by
issued by a board of commissioners created a new judicial declaration.
under an invalid statute were unenforceable. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This have to be considered in
is not to say, however, that the acts done by various aspects-with respect
 to particular relations,
individual and corporate,
and particular conduct,
private and official.
Questions of rights claimed
to have become vested, of
status, of prior
determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute
and of its previous
application, demand
examination. These
questions are among the
most difficult of those
which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and
federal, and it is manifest
from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive
invalidity, cannot be
justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents'
apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would
have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the
creation of that municipality. (Municipality
of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were
no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the
jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges
against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this
Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before
the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information
against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if
not in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the
strong arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of
finality. A single prosecution for any offense
is all the law allows. It protects an accused
from harassment, enables him to treat what
had transpired as a closed chapter in his life,
either to exult in his freedom or to be
resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and
is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for
the state as well. It has been referred to as
'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a
criminal prosecution is inflicted only once,
not whenever it pleases the state to do so.
(Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the military commission in their particular case by
retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had
exercised over them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in
sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule,
is one which —
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an
act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
 3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35
SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of
an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information
against them is invalid because there was no preliminary investigation, no
finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of
the information by the City Fiscal before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge
the petitioners from the information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The
temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I am glad that the Court has adopted my dissenting opinion in Cruz, et al. v.
Enrile (160 SCRA 700 [1988]) where I urged that the ruling in Olaguer, et
al. v. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144 [1987]) should not
be given any retroactive effect.
When a new Administration takes over the reins of Government, it may be so
angry with perceived misdeeds of the past and so flushed with its power and
popularity that it lashes out indiscriminately at everything it dislikes,
ignoring many undesirable consequences that correctly raise constitutional
questions. The 217 civilians charged with common crimes in Cruz v.
Enrile should never have been tried by military tribunals while civil courts
were open and fully functioning. However, we cannot ignore the fact that
they were actually tried and convicted by military tribunals. Evidence was
presented and on the basis of that evidence, the accused were convicted.
There are things that took place in the past which in legal contemplation are
null and void. But they have already taken place and no amount of declaring
them unconstitutional can wipe their effects clean from the slate as if the acts
had never been done.
We now rule in this petition that Olaguer should be applied prospectively.
What happens to the 90 convictions for murder, 21 for kidnapping, 5 for
kidnapping with murder, 23 for robbery with homicide, 10 for frustrated or
attempted murder or homicide, 20 for robbery, 4 for rape, 22 for illegal
possession of firearms and one for abortion which the Court nullified in Cruz
v. Enrile? Most of those convicted and serving sentence have been released
and the filing of new prosecutions have been ordered. Shall the new
prosecutions now stop and all the 217 petitioners be ordered recommitted to
jail? If the new prosecutions will continue because that is the law of that case
why should William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan be treated
differently Why should the judgments of military tribunals involving civilian
be valid for one group while invalid for another? Prospective for some and
retroactive for others?
I am disturbed whenever I find myself and others in this Court inadvertently
caught by inconsistencies. Consistency has an important purpose-to maintain
the record of this Court for stability and continuity especially in a period of
transition.
Whenever venerable institutions are objected to senseless and destructive
assaults, when executive officers sweep away policies and personnel of
former administrators, including those of their immediate predecessors under
the very same administration, and when so much disarray and indecision is
evident, the Court's image of judiciousness and rationality becomes a
stabilizing factor.
I concur in the Court's adoption of my dissent in Cruz, et al. v. Enrile but am
disturbed by the new problems that it poses because of what we ordered in
that decision.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I am glad that the Court has adopted my dissenting opinion in Cruz, et al. v.
Enrile (160 SCRA 700 [1988]) where I urged that the ruling in Olaguer, et
al. v. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144 [1987]) should not
be given any retroactive effect.
When a new Administration takes over the reins of Government, it may be so
angry with perceived misdeeds of the past and so flushed with its power and
popularity that it lashes out indiscriminately at everything it dislikes,
ignoring many undesirable consequences that correctly raise constitutional
questions. The 217 civilians charged with common crimes in Cruz v.
Enrile should never have been tried by military tribunals while civil courts
were open and fully functioning. However, we cannot ignore the fact that
they were actually tried and convicted by military tribunals. Evidence was
presented and on the basis of that evidence, the accused were convicted.
There are things that took place in the past which in legal contemplation are
null and void. But they have already taken place and no amount of declaring
them unconstitutional can wipe their effects clean from the slate as if the acts
had never been done.
We now rule in this petition that Olaguer should be applied prospectively.
What happens to the 90 convictions for murder, 21 for kidnapping, 5 for
kidnapping with murder, 23 for robbery with homicide, 10 for frustrated or
attempted murder or homicide, 20 for robbery, 4 for rape, 22 for illegal
possession of firearms and one for abortion which the Court nullified in Cruz
v. Enrile? Most of those convicted and serving sentence have been released
and the filing of new prosecutions have been ordered. Shall the new
prosecutions now stop and all the 217 petitioners be ordered recommitted to
jail? If the new prosecutions will continue because that is the law of that case
why should William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan be treated
differently Why should the judgments of military tribunals involving civilian
be valid for one group while invalid for another? Prospective for some and
retroactive for others?
I am disturbed whenever I find myself and others in this Court inadvertently
caught by inconsistencies. Consistency has an important purpose-to maintain
the record of this Court for stability and continuity especially in a period of
transition.
Whenever venerable institutions are objected to senseless and destructive
assaults, when executive officers sweep away policies and personnel of
former administrators, including those of their immediate predecessors under
the very same administration, and when so much disarray and indecision is
evident, the Court's image of judiciousness and rationality becomes a
stabilizing factor.
I concur in the Court's adoption of my dissent in Cruz, et al. v. Enrile but am
disturbed by the new problems that it poses because of what we ordered in
that decision.
G.R. No. L-36342 April 27, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO
GAPAY y MALLARES, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mario F. Estayan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
RELOVA, J:
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City
Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru
reckless imprudence filed against private respondent, Francisco Gapay y
Mallares, in Criminal Case No. E-505633 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Respondent court held that the private respondent having been previously
tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for
the resulting death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been
prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless
imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had
suffered.
In Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, this Court held that "where after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot
be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the second offense." However,
the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the
case at bar in view of this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383,
that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and
not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for
and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the
same negligence although for a different resulting injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following
day, October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the
same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was
sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, and
commenced serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence
was filed against private respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private
respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless
imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot
be charge again with the same or Identical offense though the latter be lesser
or greater than the former. However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People,
supra, the rule of Identity does not apply when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. "Thus, where the accused
was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy." Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new
fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information
was filed, and the accused was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October
20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was,
therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was
already in jeopardy.
In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on
October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the
"hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is
information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information
would have to be amended." Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident
and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" (P. 103, Rollo) and that on October
20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced
accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after
the arraignment and conviction of the accused.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that
the arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious
circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery
sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process (Cf.
Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10).
The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed on October 18, 1972.
The victim of the accident died on the same day.
Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the
inevitably slow pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of
cases with the Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the
accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of
serious physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the
filing of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The
accused does not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his
immediate arraingment right after the filing of the information. The only
sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused
was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a
charge for homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would
be a trifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to
fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for
the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it remains
speculative, however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records
fail to show what were the results of an investigation, if any was conducted
to ascertain why the assistant city fiscal's suspicions were not aroused when
the case was hurriedly set for arraignment, contrary to the usual procedures
in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant city fiscal was naively new to
the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the accused, in
which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the
affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the
Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Vasquez, J., I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:
I am constrained to concur because the records are inadequate to show that
the arraignment, while hasty and surrounded by seemingly suspicious
circumstances, was tainted by fraud, collusion, or other form of chicanery
sufficient to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process (Cf.
Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10).
The incident happened on October 17, 1972. The information for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed on October 18, 1972.
The victim of the accident died on the same day.
Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the
inevitably slow pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of
cases with the Fiscal or before the various salas, it is most surprising that the
accused could have been arraigned on October 20, 1972 for the charge of
serious physical injuries only three days after the incident, two days after the
filing of the information, and two days after the death of the victim. The
accused does not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his
immediate arraingment right after the filing of the information. The only
sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused
was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a
charge for homicide even before it could be filed. In such a case, there would
be a trifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort amounting to
fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused for
the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it remains
speculative, however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records
fail to show what were the results of an investigation, if any was conducted
to ascertain why the assistant city fiscal's suspicions were not aroused when
the case was hurriedly set for arraignment, contrary to the usual procedures
in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant city fiscal was naively new to
the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the accused, in
which case remedial measures are called for. At any rate, I concur in the
affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many protections that the
Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Vasquez, J., I join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
[G.R. No. 121179. July 2, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONINE B.
SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal
recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to
aspiring overseas contract workers.These unsuspecting job applicants are
made to pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost
invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their purported country
of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously
repatriated. This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as
being naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala.[1]
In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10,[2] appellant Antonine B.
Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in
large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming
the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397[3] (Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal
Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-
CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-
1428 (Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo
C. Arcega P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B.
Salbino P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano
DamologP25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo
Belino P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter
Arcega P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline
Tiangge P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the
date of the commission of the crime, the following information in Criminal
Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior
to or subsequent thereto, at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS and by means of deceit through
false representations and pretenses made by her prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said ADELINE
TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there representing herself as a
duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment,
when in truth and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to her the
total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad
and after having received it, she appropriated and misappropriated
the same for her own use and benefit and despite repeated demands
made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed, neglected,
and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the
damage and prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the
total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law.[4]
For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor
Code, five separate informations were also instituted against appellant on
various dates. These cases (with the names of the complainants) include: (1)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case
No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92- CR-1416
(Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario)
and (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical
information in these indictments read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto
at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment,
by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized
or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to be
false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were
completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from
the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the
damage and prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to Law.[5]
The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal
recruitment in large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1, of Presidential
Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read:
That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
recruit the following: PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO,
MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO B.
SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for
overseas employment, by then and there misrepresenting herself as
a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she
was not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was
completely relied upon by the said complainants whom she
recruited, either individually or as a group amounting to illegal
recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able
to obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P175,000.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice
of the foregoing complainants in the total sum aforesaid.
"Contrary to law. [6]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment
and estafa. The criminal cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of
the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were
consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon
arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").
The Evidence for the Prosecution. -
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in
Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In
September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3,
La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for
abroad. After Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in
Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which
was to be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his departure
for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount of P30,000.00 on 23
September 1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to
La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on
the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance
of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05
October 1991. When he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the
amount in the old receipt for the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant
handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up and gave last-minute
instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and
stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the
Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other people,
among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October
1991, Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle,
where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers including passports
and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told the group
that their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan
returned to Baguio City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told
this time, however, that his passport was still with the Department of Foreign
Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign
Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his
picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the name of a person
from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the
passport just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the
terminal but only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one
intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and
company were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all home with
a promise that another departure date would be set. She also took back the
show money of US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing
tangible came out of her assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get
appellant to promise that the money he had given her would be
refunded. When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally
reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that
office, appellant executed a promissory note stating that she would return the
amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly
used for getting a passport, to Labadchan.[7]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas
Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder sister, Feling Derecto, that
appellant was recruiting workers for abroad.During the second week of
January 1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellants house
in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in a
factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00 of
the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13
January 1992 at her (Victorias) shop in Shoppers Lane, Baguio City which
appellant acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told
Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks.
When Victoria went to appellants house as so directed, appellant told
her that her flight had been postponed supposedly because prior applicants
had to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven more times only
to be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly fooled by the main
office in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional P5,000.00
from Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave
appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which
appellant gave a corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still nothing happened, Victoria demanded from
appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an advance of P15,000.00. An
acknowledgment receipt with appellants signature affixed thereon would
evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the
promised refund.[8]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay,
Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by appellant who encouraged
Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a
monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she
would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in
Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's
residence during the first week of April 1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid
the total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would
meet her at the airport in Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn,
instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellants friend and
accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry
met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry
soon realized that she was not going to have a job in the factory promised by
appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on
and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean
Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by
Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they
were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were
allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that
they would get a refund of their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement
narrating her experience in Korea.[9]
Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherrys "boyfriend" who later was to become her
husband, corroborated Cherrys testimony that appellant first
received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also
received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of
which amount came from him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts
for the payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated in
Korea.[10]
 In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes,
Baguio City, had known appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in
December 1990, she happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone
booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing
herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon to work
abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would visit
Corazon in her brothers house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able
to convince Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to
Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the
balance of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in the
presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the corresponding
receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had
instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the
airport, Corazon, including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on
dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the
call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself as
appellants friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their show money
of US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the following
morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two hours away by car
from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on
leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman arrived and
took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport
personnel would tell them was that they should be thankful they were only
being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated
everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazons money. Not having
received the promised refund, Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp
Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn statement.[11]
Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the
latter would stay whenever she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of
Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand
pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time
in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she
likewise paid to appellant.[12]
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet,
first met appellant in her house at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he,
together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went
to see appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan
promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a
factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee
of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On
09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport
and gave appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by
their agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction
basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09
October 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back
Juans passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart in a few
days. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more
times until it became clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a
total amount of P24,200.00, including the US$100.00 that would have been
his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident.[13]
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias,
Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline,
accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her house in Buyagan
some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to
see appellant. When she produced the required identification pictures
and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could
be a factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant
agreed to be paid by Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by
installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February
1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by Antonine Saley, with the
remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline,
together with some other applicants, thrice went to appellants office at the
Shoppers Lane to check. She also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the
Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just had
to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the
amount she had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back
to Benguet.[14]
-0-
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for
illegal recruitment in large scale had been submitted to likewise constitute
the evidence to establish the People's case, respectively, in -
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M.
Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that
appellant was recruiting workers for overseas employment. Interested, he, in
the company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellants house in
Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano
Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could
get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00.
She told them that the processing and placement fees would amount
to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang,
Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to
just wait for the results. On 30 September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for
another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his
nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo
Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon
her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment
abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00
should be paid before his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter
with appellant in October 1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave
up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and
when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he
also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian
Licnachan.[15]
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio
City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at
her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that
she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help
him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino
submitted various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992,
Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
"temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel papers could be
processed. The payment was receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her
another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an acknowledgment
receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed
to show up, he went to appellants house in Buyagan to verify. She was not
there. The following week, he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see
her. Appellant's whereabouts could not be determined. Having failed to
locate her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in
Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they were to learn
that appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the
others, then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan.[16]
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street,
Baguio City, went to appellants residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when
informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that
appellant was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told
Damolog that she was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a
position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and
US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid
the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave
him a cash voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City
for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila
to see what had happened to his application. Appellant was again told to
simply stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had
meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In
Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for screening
purposes. Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo
Belino, he was also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went back to
Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992,
he, together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo
Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his P15,000.00 to
appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt, signed by Annie Saley
which, according to appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he
would be among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog
and his companions to repair to appellants house in Buyagan. She was not
home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to wait a few
more days. When still nothing happened, Damolog and his companions went
to the POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that
appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his
companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty.
Licnachan[17] against appellant.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad,
Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992 looking for employment. Fidel
Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant
could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of
getting employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20
September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas,
Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in
appellants residence in Buyagan.Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of
them if they wanted her to be responsible for representing them to get
themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of P15,000.00.When
the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form.
Appellant also made them understand that they would each have to pay her
the total amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith
paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything would have been
arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00
at her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino
returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino went down to Manila after
appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September
1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by
appellant. Appellant signed her name as Annie Saley on the
receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone call
regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came,
Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in
Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in
Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In
March 1993, Belino and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino,
Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega,[18] decided to file a complaint against
appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their
sworn statements were taken.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue,
Baguio City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised
job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to acknowledge the
payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to
appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by Annie Saley. He was
among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645,[19] as a corroborative
witness, Dembert Leon, a 25-year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora
Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring to get an employment abroad,
likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by
Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary papers,
including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon
applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary
of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a
placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid
forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was
issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant
another P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was
issued. The remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before
his flight to Taiwan. No further word came from appellant. Finally, in
December 1992, when he and the others called her up, appellant informed
them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In
March 1993, Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a
complaint against appellant.[20]
Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in
Baguio City, received a request for verification on whether or not appellant
was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was not
authorized to recruit in the City of Baguio and in the region from 1989 to the
present. Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.
-0-
The Case for the Defense. -
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the
complainants in applying for overseas employment with duly accredited
travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission.[21]
According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer
of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity,
she would submit to the POEA contracts for processing job orders for
applicants and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When
the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in
the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she
would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas employment by
recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going
abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings
International as such licensed agencies. She had, in the process, been able to
help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and
Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad.[22]
Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see
her again, this time asking for assistance in getting an employment in Korea.
She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that
enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry
her tourist visa. For Cherrys visa and plane ticket, appellant received from
Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and
delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued
her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that
receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another
travel agency saying she did not like the work she had in Korea.[23]
Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment
Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had
already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in
Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi
where she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought
appellant's assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant
introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon
get a tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from
Corazon but these amounts, being for Corazons ticket and hotel
accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also
knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she herself handed
over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00
from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a
receipt by that travel agency showing that she had turned over to it the
amounts received from Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and
otherdocuments from her. When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going
to Korea, she again sought appellants help in looking for a travel agency that
could assist her in going back to that country.[24]
Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named
Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant
was able to assist him and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez
and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which
she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that
agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested her. Of
the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to leave. The
others had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January
1993. She gave them back the plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so
that they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The next time she
saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited
her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan
but the transaction she had with Fast International failed to push through.[25]
Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latters sister
was a former client at the Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to
work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel
and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00
for her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount,
and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to
the travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS,
however, confiscated all the documents in her attache case.[26] Appellant was
able to process Victorias visa for Korea but when someone informed the
latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her
destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had
already been obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her
money. Appellant returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the
amount to be exchanged into dollars for her show money. Victoria issued a
receipt for the amount but appellant entrusted it to her former
lawyer.Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria.[27]
Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline
Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was interested in securing a
tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours.
Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her plane ticket.
Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for
Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in
going to Korea and that her passport application should, instead, be diverted
to Hongkong. In fact, Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed
a case against appellant because when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty
Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of
the P10,000.00 she wanted.[28]
Fidel Opdas was appellants client at the Friendship Agency who was
able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked her if she could find a job for him in
Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew someone who could help,
Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to
Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told
Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their application
for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who
also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents
required by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites
and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought along
Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to
accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what
would be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas
came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred
them to Marites and Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant
P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two gave
her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized by the
CIS agents and never returned. The group subsequently withdrew their
applications although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00
refund.[29]
In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case
containing documents that could bail her out of the charges, appellant
presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who arrested her.
Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8,
the policemen went to the house of appellants cousin at 2320-B San Antonio,
Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia,
however, they did not get anything from appellant because their mission was
only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not
even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief case.[30] Apparently
because of what had turned out to be Deladias adverse testimony, the defense
presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding house when
appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to
enter the boarding house.Santiago did not see what might have happened in
appellant's room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out,
they had with them an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin
Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one of the men
asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did not see any brief
case in the office but one of the men told them that they would "produce"
appellant and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount
of P50,000.00.[31]
On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00
was meant for bonding purposes and that they did not make a formal request
for the release of the brief case.[32]
The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the
responsibility for the crime from appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented
at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a 30-year-old farmer, who testified
that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work because it
was difficult. While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites
and Carol in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that
they knew someone who could "transfer his application to Taiwan." He said
that even after he had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened
constraining him to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00
of the money to him.[33]
Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a
Motion to Reopen Trial with an urgent motion to defer promulgation on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.[34]In its order of 03 March 1995, the
trial court, noting that the newly discovered evidence consisted of affidavits
of desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held
that presentation of the same does not give valid ground for possible
amendment of the decision as the private complainants had already testified.
It agreed with the prosecutor that the affidavits of desistance only (had) the
effect of satisfying the civil liability.[35]
The Judgment of the Trial Court. -
 On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible
appellants claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours
and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true,
said the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead, that
failure exposed her to the adverse inference and legal presumption that
evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced. It also found hard to
believe, the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly
containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated
by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had
the ability to send the complainants abroad for work deployment,
thereby employing false pretenses to defraud them. This was despite
her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The
complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of
overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the accused.
What makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the
accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been
borrowed from money lenders who have no qualms about collecting
usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the
accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or
borrow money just so they could give a decent future to their
families even to the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But
now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may not
have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup
their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But
this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as the
Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the
accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are
trekking or those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that
the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be
too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably
victimizes the poor will forever be stopped.[36]
All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds
accused Antonine B. Saley, also known as Annie B. Saley,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as
charged in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case,
except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate
sentence is not applicable, to suffer an indeterminate sentence for
the duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the
damages due the private complainants, to wit:
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six
(6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T.
Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397
"Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day of prision mayoras MAXIMUM and to pay
Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages,
plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six
(6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-
ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six
(6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-
il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six
(6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del
Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to
Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del
Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427
"Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six
(6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.
"Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay the costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645
"To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) each to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino,
Mariano Damolog, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and
Alfredo Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus
costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
 MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Peter Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
"Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
"Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as
MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM and to
pay Adeline Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00 for actual
damages, plus costs.
"With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397, let these cases be sent to the files
without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have been
arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the
law, let Alias Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief
of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila and in Baguio City. Further, the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is
ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.
"SO ORDERED.[37]
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting
that the trial court had erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged despite
the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes
beyond reasonable doubt.[38] Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court,
on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its decision.[39] The following
day, appellant filed a notice of appeal.[40] The trial court gave due course to
the appeal on 17 April 1995.[41]
The Instant Appeal. -
Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the
accusation. She reiterates her assertion that the trial court has erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged
with by the prosecution.[42] She avers that her transactions with the
complainants have been limited to her assisting them secure their respective
travel visa specifically for tourist and that her assistance to them (has been)
only to refer them to travel agencies such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours
and the Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts
solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia
and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions for bringing in clients
interested in getting tourist visas.[43]
At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the
conviction of appellant not only for the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also for other
offenses for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon
appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in
criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[44] The Rules of Court, allows,
however, the appeal of criminal casesinvolving penalties lower
than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated
in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus -
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed
but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense
for which the penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall
be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of
this Section.
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court
has directed that the entire records of the seventeen cases should be
forwarded to this Court.[45] It might be observed that this appeal, which has
been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned
under different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the
incident giving rise to the case for illegal recruitment in large scale. The
cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard jointly below. The
appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which
incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in this
Court, is properly taken.
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment
activity undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.
Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code as
referring -
 x x x to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required
by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers; and
2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34.[46]
Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a) thereof.[47] The proviso in
Article 13(b) lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.[48] The article
also provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or the act of passing
along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview
of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement
officer or bureau.[49]
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the
law against illegal recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that
appellant did represent herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring
overseas contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able
to demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would
then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for employment
overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and
before you were put to jail did you have any occupation?
"A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for
resale.
"Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you
have any other source of income?
"A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad
and asked if I know some agencies who can assist them to go
abroad.
"Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist
them to go abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for
overseas employment?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q By whom?
"A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
"Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?
"A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings
International is duly licensed by the government to recruit
applicants abroad?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where is that?
"A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and
Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go abroad.
"Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets
for applicants going abroad what do you mean by applicants going
abroad?
"A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to
leave for abroad and they are being issued tickets.
 "Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-
applicants?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you remember some of them?
"A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco
Labadchan and others. (Underscoring supplied.)[50]
Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in
acquiring for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination,
however, she admitted that she had made referrals of job applicants to
recruitment agencies.[51] She evidently knew all along that the persons she
was dealing with were applicants for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first
been authorized by the POEA.[52] Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment provides:
SEC. 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every appointment of
representatives or agents of licensed agency shall be subject to prior
approval or authority of the Administration.
"The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance
with the following requirements:
"a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;
"b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;
"c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing
person or company assuming full responsibility for all acts
of the agent or representative done in connection with the
recruitment and placement of workers.
"Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation
does not authorize the agent or representative to establish a branch
or extension office of the licensed agency represented.
"Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be
communicated to the Administration. Otherwise, the designation or
appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a
licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped the complainants secure
tourist visas, could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment,[53] it being
enough that he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to
recruit workers for deployment abroad.[54]
The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and
Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in each of the cases, have testified
against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not thereby make the
case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony of
witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not
an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis
of the testimony of a single witness.[55] Corroborative evidence is necessary
only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness has
perjured himself or that his observations have veered from the truth.[56]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal
case for illegal recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and
it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for
the offense can very well be justified.[57]
Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any
discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal
recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of
authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor
Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than
eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00
or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In
imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the
application of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an
accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special
laws.[58]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[59] whenever the offense is
punishable by a special law, the court shall impose on the accused an
indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same."[60] Accordingly, in imposing the
penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five
cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against
three or more persons "individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1)
the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment
activities as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or
authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or
more persons.[61] The prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for
a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so in
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this offense,
Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus
likewise aptly meted out upon appellant by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum
prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to
warrant conviction.[62] Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a),[63] of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2)
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.[64] Clearly, these elements have sufficiently
been shown in the cases under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth
paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does
not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
fraud be committed by any of the following means: x x x."
In the case of People vs. Gabres,[65] the Court has had occasion to so
state that -
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be `that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed' under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be `within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed' for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can
be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case
exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the
imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws
should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months x x x."[66]
The Court reiterates the above rule; however, in fixing the maximum term,
the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum period to prision
mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal portions of time,"
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence -
Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period
From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years
5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days -
in consonance with Article 65,[67] in relation to Article 64,[68] of the Revised
Penal Code.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its
maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The
maximum penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion
temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever
applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the
complainants who individually charged appellant with illegal recruitment, the
applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco
T. Labadchan in the amount of P45,000.00, two years for the additional
amount of P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315
shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (or added to anywhere
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court
deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional medium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in
the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the
amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer
the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-
ay in the amount of P18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that
amount by way of actual damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty
of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon
del Rosario in the amount of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently
solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him
actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by
the court a quo) of prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline
Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount
as actual damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully
established its case against appellant for illegal recruitment in large
scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a job
recruiter, appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that
they could land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each
complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement
fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in
large scale, only five[69] of them filed separate charges of estafa against
appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only be held liable for
five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large
scale. Since appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the
five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum
period or prision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of
the fact that the amount in excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code is less than P10,000.00).[70] Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending circumstances,
appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as
minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In
addition, appellant should pay the five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00
each as actual damages.
 The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or
cancellation should it be shown that appellant had already paid the
complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in
large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications
hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccionalmedium period as
MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T.
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the
amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.
4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium period as
MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM.
6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00
by way of actual damages.
7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00
by way of actual damages.
8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the amount
of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00
by way of actual damages.
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by
way of actual damages.
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge
the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.
 The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR- On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of
1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal Consented Abduction. In said decision, promulgated on October 29, 1982,
recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, the Court of Appeals made the following statement:
except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember
Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either because xxx xxx xxx
similar awards have already been provided for by the trial court, or for
insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered. This is not to say that the appellant did nothing wrong. With
Costs against accused-appellant. promises of marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, twice, that night before they returned.
SO ORDERED. She was seduced by appellant, as it turned out that he made
those promises just to accomplish his lewd designs That was
G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988 "seduction and not abduction," as explained by Justice
Ramon Aquino. (Rollo, p. 40.)
ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed
another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioner. Qualified Seduction, docketed as Criminal Case No. 83-8228 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch VI. * Petitioner Perez filed a
The Solicitor General for respondents. motion to quash invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the
part of the complainant. However, this motion and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration were denied.

Whereupon, petitioner Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition

CORTES, J.:
with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 68122 questioning the denial
of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial
Petitioner Eleuterio Perez raises both procedural and substantive issues in
Court in Criminal Case No.
this petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
83-8228. In a resolution of the Second Division dated August 8, 1984, the
G.R. CR No. 04789 dated October 8, 1987 and its resolution of November
Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
12, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the
The facts of this case are undisputed.
petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court.
Said the Intermediate Appellate Court:
On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against
Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction docketed as Criminal Case No. 618
As the order sought to be annulled is that of an inferior court,
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded
the petition in this case should have been filed with the
not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of
appropriate Regional Trial Court in accordance with Rule
conviction was rendered against Perez.
65, Sec. 4. We have already ruled in several cases that BP
129, See. 9, in giving this court jurisdiction over applications
for writs of certiorari and prohibition "whether or not in aid
 of its appellate jurisdiction," was never meant to authorize
the filing of petitions which, conformably to Rule 65, Sec. 4,
should be filed with the Regional Trial Courts because they
relate to acts of inferior courts. The purpose of BP 129 is to
enable this Court to take cognizance of petitions which,
because of the limitation imposed by the requirement that the
petition must be "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" could or
only be filed before with the Supreme Court (Diocese of
Cabanatuan v. Delizo, AC-G.R. SP No. 06410, Oct. 28,
1985; Uy v. Antonio, AC G.R R. SP No. 05568, March 7,
1985; De Guzman v. Andres, AC-G.R. SP No. 04494, Oct.
25, 1984). [Rollo p. 70.]
Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga docketed as Special Civil Case No.
7623. Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed this petition and
Perez' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated October 8, 1987 this petition was denied, being
inappropriate, aside from the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had
become final and executory. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
xxx xxx xxx
... it is to be observed that what petitioner filed in the
Regional Trial Court was an original petition for certiorari
and prohibition which was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The appropriate remedy
for such dismissal is an appeal from said decision (by filing a
notice of appeal with the RTC concerned), and not a petition
for review. Under the 1983 Interim Rules of Court, all
appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases
where a record on appeal is required, must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order,
resolution or award appealed from. (par.
19).<äre||anº•1àw> An appeal from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals in actions or
proceedings originally filed in the former shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
judgment or order appealed from (par. 20, 1983 Interim
Rules of Court) ...
For not having filed a notice of appeal with the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, the decision of said
court in the petition for certiorari and prohibition ... has
become final and executory (CIR v. Visayan Electric Co., 19
SCRA 696, 698) on July 12, 1987, fifteen (15) days after
receipt by petitioner of the decision of said court on May 18,
1987, deducting the period during which his motion for
reconsideration of said decision was pending resolution
before said court. ... Petitioner might plead liberality in the
interpretation of the rules of procedure, but this plea cannot
be conceded because it involves the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court. It has been repeatedly held that compliance with
the manner and period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory
and jurisdictional Garganta vs. Cabangon, 109 Phil. 150
[1960]; Bilbao vs. Republic, 80 SCRA, 177 [1977];
Volkschen Labor Union vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 98 SCRA 314, 322 [1980]) [Rollo, pp. 93-94.]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for
review.
I. Petitioner claims that what he filed with the Regional Trial Court was not
an original petition for certiorari and prohibition but an appeal from the
resolutions of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 83-8228
denying his motions to quash and for reconsideration. Hence, when the
Regional Trial Court dismissed his certiorari and prohibition case, he
invoked the proper remedy which is a petition for review.
There is no merit in petitioner's claim.
Well-established is the rule that appeal is not the proper remedy from a
denial of a motion to quash [People v. Macandog, G.R. Nos. 18601-2,
January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 195; Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 63559, May 30, 1986,142 SCRA 171; Milo v. Salanga, G.R.
No. 37007, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 113.] This is so because an order
denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and does not finally
dispose of a case. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure prior to its
amendment in 1985, ** after the denial of defendant's motion to quash, he
should immediately enter his plea and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on
appeal the same question covered by his motion to quash [See Sec. 1 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court and Chuatoco v. Aragon, G.R. No. 20316, January
30, 1 968, 22 SCRA 346.]
Further, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer for (1)
the annulment and setting aside of the municipal trial judge's resolutions of
April 11, 1984 and June 11, 1984 denying his motions to quash and for
reconsideration, respectively, and, (2) the prohibition of the same judge from
further taking cognizance of the criminal case for Qualified Seduction
[Annexes "K" and "L".]
A special civil action for certiorari is an original or independent action and
not a continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the
judgment complained of [Palomares v. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773, 776 (1952).]
The same holds true in case of a special civil action for prohibition. These
writs may be issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court [Art. X, Sec. 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution and Secs. 9
(1) and 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.]
In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul or modify
the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions
that has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion [Rule 65, sec. 1.] On the other hand, in a petition for prohibition
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person whether
exercising judicial or ministerial functions who has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition [Rule 65, Sec. 2]
From a denial of a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the trial court, as
in this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal to the Court of
Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment
or order appealed from [Sec. 20, Interim Rules of Court.] Failure to appeal
within fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment renders the appealed
decision final and executory.
A petition for review of a judgment of the regional trial court is proper only
when the judgment sought to be reviewed is an appeal from the final
judgment or order of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal circuit trial
court [Sec. 22 (b), Interim Rules of Court].
Petitioner likewise faults the respondent Court of Appeals for dismissing his
petition for certiorari which "gave rise to the confusion caused by the case
being tossed around from one court to another ending in its dismissal on
mere technicality, thereby depriving [him] of his right to constitutional due
process" [Rollo, p. 133.]
Petitioner's assertion that he was consequently denied due process in
unfounded. Respondent court did not foreclose his right to seek his remedy
elsewhere as it is clear from its decision that "the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
Regional Trial Court" [Rollo. p. 70.] Thus, petitioner was never denied
recourse to the appropriate court. On the contrary, the Intermediate Appellate
Court pointed the direction for petitioner to take.
II. Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against him of an
information for Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for Consented
Abduction.
The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973
Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same
offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The
rule on double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is explicit:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information. [Sec. 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.]
xxx xxx xxx
There is no question that petitioner was validly charged with the crime of
Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had
been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was
subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. In the case at bar, the only
issue posed by petitioner relates to the Identity of the two offenses of
Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.
In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for
Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented
Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support
charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was
acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise,
petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of
double jeopardy.
It is true that the two offenses for which petitioner was charged arose from
the same facts. This, however, does not preclude the filing of another
information against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each
requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if
each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and
conviction under the other. [U.S. v. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24, 34
(9106) citing In re Hans Neilsen (131 U.S. 176); Emphasis
supplied.]
xxx xxx xxx
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded
merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of
law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in
fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double
jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or
more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and
if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other. [People v.
Doriquez, G.R. Nos. 24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA
163, 171-172; Emphasis supplied.]
xxx xxx xxx
An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that
although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not
Identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she
must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two
elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to
the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended
party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the
offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd
designs. On the other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also
requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or
relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity
between them. As this Court has stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman
with her own consent, who is still under the control of her
parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the
parents and family" of the abducted person, and the
infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in
cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong
done the young woman who is seduced. ... [U.S. v. Jayme,
24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913).]
xxx xxx xxx
III. Finally, petitioner avers that the complaint for Qualified Seduction is
barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter
having opted to consider the case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges
that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case
against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party.
Petitioner's stance is unmeritorious. The complainant's filing of a subsequent
case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is estopped from
filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to
have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective,
must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110,
Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover the length of
time it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she
filed it within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90
par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes punishable by a correctional
penalty such as Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the Revised Penal
Code.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and
MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines
seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against
private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered
that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building" 1owned by the private respondent. These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner
"designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage]
plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in
a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of
this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five
Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not
exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This
information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec.
6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S.
1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and
penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric
wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of
electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at
Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such
 unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices
made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was
damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN
CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the
period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the
damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas
in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine
currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information.
On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas
City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two
months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the
information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of
the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of
the Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and penalized
by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974,
and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba,
Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas
Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate
electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN
CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light
System, owned and operated by the City Government of
Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned
thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976,
the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the
case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first
case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to
quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges
that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10
Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage
to the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis
supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of
illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of
P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with
intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas.
If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it
could have alleged illegal connections which were done at
one instance on a particular date between November, 1974,
to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that
from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the
City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization
from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric
wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant
to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information could not
have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.
 When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the
indictment before the City Court, he had already been
exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what
allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21,
1975 which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of
Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and
parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the
petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the
People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the
first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts
which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas.
Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense under this City
Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority
therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City
Electrical System or the District Engineer. The petitioner urges that the
relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and
their connection with the Electrical System shall be done
either by the employee of the system duly authorized by its
Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly
authorized by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical
service permitting the works of installation or connection
with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly
authorized therefor shall be considered guilty of violation of
the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure
that electrical installations on residences or buildings be
done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to
avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is
primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or
curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by the
Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument
continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority
from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense
under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the
part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas
in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These
elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can
be effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by,
for instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
 2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not
register the actual electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down
the rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under
the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that
the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved —
which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the
petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the
first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the
second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets
forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs.
Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of
the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance
No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the
City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile —
"recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby endangering other
vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three months later, Yap was
again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this
time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The
information charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law
(Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving
and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a
result thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved
to quash the second information upon the ground that it placed him twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the
respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal judge had
acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for
certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the
respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having
reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist
from continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge
brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the
decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and
later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through
reckless driving — with which Diaz stood charged in the
court of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal
Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile
Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587).
Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same
law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes
committed through reckless driving are punishable
under different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence
— from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished
from political or Constitutional Law — they constitute,
strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions,
one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once
placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may
be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case.
(Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said
clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same
act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even
if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact
that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other
a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one
and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law
or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has
attached under one of the informations charging said offense,
the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the
same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor
acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or
not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner
could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be
convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in
which he has already been acquitted. The information in case
No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the
place therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly
and without reasonable caution" an automobile described in
said information. Upon the other hand, the information in
case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in
the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent
manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended by
Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if
the theories mentioned in the second information were not
established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in
case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal
ordinance charged in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded
double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred
eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which
the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses
under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are
charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If
the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written
into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance
would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by
definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would
never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-
making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea
of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted
precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the
first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such
elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute
must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such
acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two
informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where
those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or
voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized
as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously
under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo
City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets of
acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The
additional technical element of serious physical injuries related to the
physical consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e.,
the impact of the automobile upon the body of the offended party. Clearly,
such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated
the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the
acts of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame:
from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused
Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he
effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of
reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the
very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate
physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of
electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding
recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric
current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and
devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of
offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double
jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The
law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo
Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution
for the same offense, it seems elementary that an accused
should be shielded against being prosecuted for several
offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful
act or omission may give use to several prosecutions
depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by
said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime
of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely
alleging that by force and intimidation the accused
prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88
Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and
therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were,
to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground
that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the
accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No
"prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of pronouncement as to costs.
criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same SO ORDERED.
offense. 15
_____________
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari
and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a
businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment
because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an
information for an offense which he should have known had already
prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the
protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private
respondent in this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by the
Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of
First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present
case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted
during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the
installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While
the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did
not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence
in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by
Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by
the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the
Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial
could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived
expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the
electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and
rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the
civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First