VI PERSONS LIABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING
A. THE TORTFEASOR
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
1. PARENTS
2. GUARDIANS
3. TEACHERS & HEAD OF
INSTITUTIONS
Art. 218, FC. The school, its administrators and teachers, or
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219, FC. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. (n)
Art. 2180, CC. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
MERCADO v.
L-14342 LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE: This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS:
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-
plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing,
while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee
Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto
Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be
described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy
bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held
responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the
inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic
School (during recess time)
2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive.
HELD
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his
son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
- It would be seemed that the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction
and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In
these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother
to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of
the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils
appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their
homes with their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not
apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father
or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children.
2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a
quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court
considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed
the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate
that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in
or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from
Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of
the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault
or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to
get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals,
we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was
shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral
damages is not justified.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971
NATURE: An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of
law from a decision of the CFI Manila.
FACTS:
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at
the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for
damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a
fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory
room of the said Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon were classmates, and one afternoon, they, together
with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory
room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were
in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working
on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was
acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped
slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a
strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid
the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged
blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused
him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he
was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the
incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of
the institute; Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof;
Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the
deceased belonged; and Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of
the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single
proprietorship, but lately, it was duly incorporated.
- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this
wise:
“In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the Code is
not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence of the teachers and
heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions
by the pupil supersedes those of the parents...The clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents...There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived
and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of
the school.”
ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors with Daffon.
HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute,
Valenton and Quibulue, respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so
long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis
and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing
principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the
Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would
seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence. It is
true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational institution"
- phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students)
remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court,
and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower
court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable,
since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and therefore the
school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in
as party defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as
follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and
severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador
Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the
costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing
defendants' counterclaims. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting
opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and
school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils
who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law.
- Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility
prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the
article expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and
of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had
intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other
categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have
expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates
an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of
persons under age. Further, it is not without significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their
authority and supervision over the children and wards end by
law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and
custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of
the latter.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this
Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it is highly
unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the size
of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions,
academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes
and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their
teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly
liable for torts committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without commensurate
authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to
damage suits for causes beyond their power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the
majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault,
defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already
of age at the time of the tragic incident." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in
their company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long
as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to
teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase
"who live in their company" as used in reference to parents;
and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages
caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the
tortious acts of their students in the same age category.
AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315 CRUZ; April 15, 1988
Facts:
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school
to submit his “Report in Physic”. While they were in the
auditorium of their school, he was shot to death by his
classmate Pablito Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or non-
academic. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except
where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade
establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be
answerable.
“There is really no substantial difference distinction between
the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under
their control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where he is teaching”. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains
at present. x x x “
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or
has ended or has not yet begun. The term “custody” signifies
that the student is within the control and influence of the school
authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes
or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that
at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in
a position to prevent it.
Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not
the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed
within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of
its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of
respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be
exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180.
Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in
Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However teachers are not
expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that
imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal
in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline
more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or
the head for the tort committed by the child.
As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the
school remised in the discharged of their duties, they were
exonerated of liability.
(Note – the court view on increasing students activism likely
causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of the school
premises – J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x
x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or
reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and
other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively
rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students
even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could
be no in loco parentis relationship.
The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has
outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it can only
apply the law with its imperfections. However the court can
suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785 PARAS; April 25, 1988
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be
rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the
complaint as against the respondent school and denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal.
FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta University were
accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by
Abdul Karin Madidis alias “Teng”. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was
subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized
and to undergo surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and
Arante University based on Art 2190 CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision
only applies to vocational schools and not to academic
institutions. They also claim that the civil liability in this case
arose from a crime, which they did not commit. Since it was a Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out,
civil case, respondent school claims that a demand should pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result
have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later.
an action for damages against respondent school. MTD was
granted by the CA. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for
- Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Motion damages against both private respondents Aquino and
was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in
ISSUE line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino
WON the Art 2180 CC1 applies to academic institutions exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and
(3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
HELD imprudence.
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the petitioner
wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is ISSUE
liable. The answer is no since the provision speaks of WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the
“teachers or heads” Civil Code, both private respondents can be held liable for
Dispositive damages.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

YLARDE vs. AQUINO
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo
Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was
littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of
the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II.
Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez
stated burying them all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo
Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to
eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig
beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished.
The following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue
the digging. These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the
excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this
point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while
the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil
that was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils
got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the
children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he
went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private
respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving,
private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to
touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the
four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into
the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down
towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to
scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for
1"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180
states:
"Art. 2180. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be
made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being
the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and
trades.
Reasoning:
This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine
that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher
and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court
went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
head of the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the
children for being negligent in his supervision over them and
his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any
injury on their persons.
Reasoning:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers
and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an
excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to
be a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they
had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it
was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the
children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the
excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident
that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This
should not be the case. The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to
the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be
judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age
and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the
child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
DISPOSITION: Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274 PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges
Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF
ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of
Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of the
University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in
the parking space of BCF. BCF is both an academic and arts
and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of
AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC
Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of
BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education
and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and
Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay
private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving
the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he
shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Ratio:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are
hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The
rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon
to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long
as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA.
According to the CA, while it is true that Abon was not
attending any class or school function at the time of the
shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening;
but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening
was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The
time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court
spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. In line
with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the
concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the
school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of
his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises,
or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the
mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in
the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory
with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
194 SCRA 340 Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS:
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS
wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His
parents didn’t allow him to go due to short notice but directed
him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight
home. However, he was persuaded by his teachers to go and
later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS,
represented by its principal, Illumin, and several teachers for
damages incurred from the death of their son, contending that
it occurred due to petitioners’ failure to exercise proper
diligence of a good father of the family. The TC found against
the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not
testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to
swim. Also, the male teachers who were to watch over the kids
were not even in the area as they went off drinking. The TC
dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher
Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which
was not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class
to supervise then and was not actually invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of
St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with the 1 st, 4th, and 5th
paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply
because it wasn’t an “extra-curricular activity of the HS”. From
the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of the
picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the
holding of the event. As such, under Article 2180, both are
jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages
incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners
contend that the victim’s parents failed to prove by evidence
that they didn’t give their son consent to join the picnic. The
Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence
of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the
drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily
explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have
participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper
HELD
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or
the negligence of people under them. At the outset, it should
be noted that the victim’s parents allowed their son to join the
picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross
examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does
not show acquiescence or consent to it. If the CA’s findings are
to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or
omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions
are committed while they are not in the performance of their
duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the
presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised
diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers
were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in
First Aid and swimming. Life savers were brought in the event
of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E.
teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly par 4.
For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused damage or
prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned task. In the case at bar, the
teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the
picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned
activity.
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised
the diligence required of them, no moral or exemplary
damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of
respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET
ASIDE
PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729 Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992
FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3rd year commerce course of
PSBA, was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants
who were from outside the school’s academic community. This
prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/
Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA
and its corporate officers, alleging negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack of the victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since they
were presumably sued under Art 2180, there was no cause of
action since academic institutions are not subject to the said
provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by
the TC, yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and
2180
HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the parties, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern; but the court has repeatedly held
that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a
contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad:”… the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties”
-Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a condition
sine qua non to PSBA’s liability; hence, any finding of
negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual
obligation only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student for
enrollment, a contract is established between them, resulting in
a bilateral obligation. The school is obliged to provide the
student with an education, along with a safe atmosphere that
promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn, the
student abides by the school’s academic requirements and
observes its rules and regulations. However, a school cannot
be an insurer for its students against all risks; one can only
expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether
the contract was breached due to PSBA’s negligence in
providing proper security measures. At this stage, the
proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondent’s complaint and the record is bereft of all
material facts which only the TC can determine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin
is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with
this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE: Civil complaint for damages
FACTS
- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman, Jr.,
a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC),
was in the campus premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy
Solomon, who was then in the premises of said school
performing his duties as security guard under the employment
of defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without any
provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was
confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not
be able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months. Petitioner, represented
by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for damages against
RCC, RL Security Agency and Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint
stated no cause of action against it. It argued that it is free from
any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for
the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard
Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act
of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph,
of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds
teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCC’s motion
to dismiss. Petitioner’s MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180, as well
as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code
2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law,
for the injury sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for damage
inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists
not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or
omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible.
Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or
omissions of another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helper, acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding
RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard
Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the employer
of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R.L. Security
Agency Inc., while the school was the client of the latter. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires
and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the
agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability
for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients of such
agency. There being no employer-employee relationship
between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose
vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or
student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an
employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-
quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly
not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of
Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code
invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor
and student are fixed by government regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment
be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and
president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila
Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of
Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which resulted from fist
blows delivered by Daffon, another student of the Institute. It
will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it
expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted
above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts
existing in the instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made
responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the
child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In
the instant case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious
acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no
substitute parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of
the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been
injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the
school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision.
At the same time, however, the court stressed that an implied
contract may be held to be established between a school which
accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the
students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties. It held: When an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit
or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition
sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21
of the Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's
motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the CA and
this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the
court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon
the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based,
and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or
allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute
breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. Respondent
trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that
petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge
should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather
should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to
prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or
ex lege on the part of RCC.
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the
comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to
dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo
for further proceedings.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002
NATURE: Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution
denying MFR
FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II (then 15,
driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and
was driving the jeep, Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the
owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to
an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle
turned turtle. It was found out that the steering wheel guide
was detached. Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II,
his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents
and school liable
-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that school
was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a
teacher accompanying them.
ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Mary’s Academy)
WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for death of
Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for damages
HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only
a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence
of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim.
-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James
Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so
reliance on A219 is unfounded.
-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in
control of the jeep, and was in fact the one who allowed James
Daniel II to drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents
primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver
or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was
the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the
trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner
St. Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED.
4. OWNERS & MANAGERS OF
ESTABLISHMENT
PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231 AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE: Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision
FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed
a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS,
Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK,
owned by Phil-Am, along the nat’l highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by
Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered
injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for
79 days. This deprived the company of earnings of about
P8,600.
- Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that
Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the
complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of action against
him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the
ground that he was not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Art.2180 CC.
- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is
merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital
stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had
subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction
should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife
should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But
this was not alleged in their complaint.*
ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903
OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck
(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)
HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of
Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer.”
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or
quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an
employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be
unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided
on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct
from that of the Balingit spouses.
Dispositive Lower court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
5. EMPLOYERS
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
FACTS
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for
damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of
gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and
regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape
from a crime
Private Respondents’ Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 o’clock,
the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider
bicycle along the Gomez Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 driven by
defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in
order to start its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and
the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general
direction of the said Gomez Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus
continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time
when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was
directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and
suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said
functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on the
victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and,
thereafter, was run over by the said bus.
Petitioner’s Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City,
warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds
within the city proper of Calbayog.
-While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along
Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking towards the same
direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and
swerved left to the center of the road.
-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig
applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was
bumped from behind and run over by the bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent
record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training
before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the
victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions
such as seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the
death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and
denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal
ISSUE
WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for
damages
HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-
delict under Article 21762 and 21803 of the Civil Code against
petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco,
respectively.
-We have consistently held that the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner
Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of
the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or
solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194
expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its
only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on
quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever
pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.
Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue)
CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
Dec. 21, 1999. Davide
Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente
Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the
normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective
helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's
Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin
Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with
plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove
the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the]
flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom
St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the
pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe
injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought
Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu
Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of
Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay

(limited to that involved in the outline)
2Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
3Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental
charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the
investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against
Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. So, the present action for damages was
commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez,
parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the
same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect
unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So
Vasquez.
Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial
employee of a company-issued vehicle.
Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The negligence of
ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX
presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the
employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture
it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth
paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions
apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the
fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts
included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so
long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned
task, even though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They
perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of
duty.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where
the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as
truck operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot,
therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is
necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager
of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to
whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is
a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however,
subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded
on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception
obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the
finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving
petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties
as a manager.
On the issue of whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope
of his assigned tasks, ABAD, who was presented as a hostile
witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving
a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of
petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had
some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done
overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast
rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the
problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is
engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor
vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with
each state of facts. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals
were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a
company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned
tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. The SC does
not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence
on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor
vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in
Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his
employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he
intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not
ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the
absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go
to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-
off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the findings that an employee is acting within the
scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to
or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of
work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the
employee, and not a part of his services to his employer.
Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer
other than the mere performance of the services available at
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting
within the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable where he
derives some special benefit from having the employee drive
home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits
from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's
duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed
place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to
various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently
applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving
commission" rule, under which it can be found that the
employee continues in the service of his employer until he
actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be
deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in
going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is
not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident,
the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home
and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular
Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an
employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular
working hours is generally not liable for the employee's
negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of
permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee
for personal as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished
and he has started the return trip to his house where the
vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return
trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater
familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the
employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it
is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m.,
way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day
had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His
being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a
"haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts,"
had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any
relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe
benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992
NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a
janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a
son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan
lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the president’s house
free of charge while a student at FCI.
- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the
kids home, then go back to the school, then go home in the
school jeep. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in
the morning he’s supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to
school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a student
license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that the road was
clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast moving
truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. Funtecha swerved
right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in
his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had only
one functioning headlight that night.
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed, saying
that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the
grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose
acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable.
ISSUE
WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be
held liable
HELD: YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's
job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use
it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day.
- It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school
president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven
home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having
a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act
the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing
that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes
of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes
any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of
the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act,
the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have
an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the
petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact
that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with
the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner
of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The
petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules and
regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons
other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on the
part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the
jeep.
- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for
injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha
drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the
petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes
upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its
employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180,
primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209 ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by
the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound
for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of
the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-
collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the
death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well
as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against
NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of
NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians
for the latter's projects, but in this case it was alleged that they
own the dump trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any
liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and
sentencing NPC to pay damages.
ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck,
which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims
HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding"
entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that
PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. In a "labor
only" contract, the person acting as contractor is considered
merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is
responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the
same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is
equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship
existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the
"labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry."
- In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary
with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment
for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against
PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which
gave rise to the action.
DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN
vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
397 SCRA 75 VITUG, J/February 6, 2003
NATURE: APPEAL from CA’s DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the
area approached Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated
by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanor’s widow), along with their children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a
cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while
Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a
demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory
damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor
Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of
P50,000.00; c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and
Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of
Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman
jointly and severally liable for the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as nominal
damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; d) P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as
and for attorney’s fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent
from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link
the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that
Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon
the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of
death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train
owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure
to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the
application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the
train.
- CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.
ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD
LRTA’s CLAIMS:
-Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall
on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have
been foreseen or prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and
LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee
of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death
of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence
imposed upon a common carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or
avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm
to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the
provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. (But there
wasn’t any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of
Navidad in this case- SC) The premise, however, for the
employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer can then be
made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that
the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in
the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
that has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when
the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in
culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from
liability as Prudent is. Needless to say, the contractual tie
between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence.
REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy,
is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for
death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip
but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or
wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury,
the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault
or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden
shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident
occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at
fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must
be proved.
DISPOSITION: CA’S DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
13
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.
14
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517 Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
NATURE: Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private
respondents, Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo, and driven by
Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee,
Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all passengers of the
Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was
loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from
the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the
way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck;
he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the
brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane,
on the said bridge.
- Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision.
- Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a
result of a vehicular accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are
liable for the resulting damages
HELD
YES
- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in
failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in
law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the
truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as
follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence
in the selection and supervision of employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos.
4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.)
253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she
had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd.,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to
the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of
the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help
her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven
by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle
of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the
rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for twenty
(20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She
filed a claim for damages against defendant.
- Li’s alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was
suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the
opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid
colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car,
which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color,
with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area
was poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or
negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA absolved
Alexander.
ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued
car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Li’s employer
HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no
difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street,
and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample
time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were
alert as every driver should be to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
"fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a manner which would
have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due
to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a
"very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would
have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather
than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.
- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his company-issued
Mitsubishi Lancer
2. NO
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. Under the "emergency rule"
adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of
an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful
care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.
3. YES
- Since important business transactions and decisions may
occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of
guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee
or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company
car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the
company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the
public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued
car are able to use the company issue capably and
responsibly.
- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to
our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took
the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited
use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability
for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on
the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.
6. STATE
MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
34 Phil 311 TRENT; March 31, 1916
NATURE: Appeal from decision of the CFI
FACTS
- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the General
Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly and unexpectedly
to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn, in
contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act.
- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was
slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the
plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
- Witnesses testified that plaintiff’s physical and mental
condition before the accident was excellent. He was one of the
best contractors of wooden buildings. He could not now earn
even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. He had to
dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give
up a contract for the construction of a building.
- Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the
negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum
of P14, 741.
- Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that “E. Merritt is hereby
authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government
of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.”
ISSUES
WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a
tort committed by an agent or employee of the government
HELD
NO
Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers
and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.
Reasoning
- In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for
the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.
- As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises
out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915,
thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.
- The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person
causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the
person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in
the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage.
It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees
in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary,
we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part
in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an
that of private persons interested in its operation. Between
these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case
where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations.
- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the
obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas
in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle
is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to
acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly
cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons
and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of
the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence
of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives
way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases
when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer
in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition
to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state,
but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a
special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the
fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
- Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the
general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the
damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or
resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches
of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression
of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet
said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to
have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive
official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the
owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
- The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the
case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and the regulations.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and
not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to
a public official charged with some administrative or technical
office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the
manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was
not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903
On the computation of damages
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which
are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award
awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the
amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the
plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We
find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing
the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows,
and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however,
limited the time to 2months and 21 days, which the plaintiff was
actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was
error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was
wholly incapacitated for a period of 6 months. The mere fact
that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days
while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home,
would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore,
find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,
without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount
of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained
by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests
solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
81 Phil 453 FERIA; August 31, 1948
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor
FACTS
- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which
gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of
Emergency Control Administration (ECA, a government
agency).
- The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner,
thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for
his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in
said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the
City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing
flammable substances, which ECA didn’t have).
- Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON the government is liable for the damages
HELD: NO
- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
“Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the preceding
article is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omission but also for those persons for whom another
is responsible.
xx
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom it properly
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held the
following:
“ ’… The state is not responsible for the
damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in
the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office… n relations of a private nature governed by
the civil law can arise except in a case where the
 state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations.’
xx
“ ‘That the responsibility of the state is limited
by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives
a definite and fixed order by the commission, foreign
to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him.
- There being no showing that whatever negligence may be
imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by a special
agent, because the officers of the ECA did not act as special
agents of the government within the above defined meaning of
that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in
the warehouse of ECA, the government is not responsible for
damages caused through such negligence.
- Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the filing of
claims against the government with the Insular Auditor, and
appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision
to the Supreme Court, it does not make any and all claims
against the government allowable, and the latter responsible
for all claims.
DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed.
MENDOZA V. DE LEON
G.R. L-9596 Trent Feb. 11, 1916
FACTS
 Plaintiff was the grantee of an exclusive lease privilege
under Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After
a little over one year, plaintiff was forcibly ejected
under and pursuant to a resolution adopted by the
defendants-members of the municipal council of
Villasis, Pangasinan.
 Thus, plaintiff brought action against such individual
members for damages. Act No. 1643 provides that the
use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable,
market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality
or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or
for such longer period not exceeding five years as
may have been previously approved by the provincial
board of the province in which the municipality or
township is located.
ISSUE:
W/N the municipality is liable for acts of its officers or
agents in the performance of governmental functions.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
 It depends. In this case, it is not liable.
 When the acts of its officers come within the powers
which it has as agent of the state, it is exempt from
liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the
acts of the officer or agent of the city are for the special
benefits of the corporation in its private or corporate
interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of the
city, but where the act is not in relation to a private
or corporate interest of the
municipality, but for the benefit of the public at large,
such acts by the agents and
servants are deemed to be acts by public or state officers,
and for the public benefit. Governmental affairs do not
lose their governmental character by being delegated to
the municipal governments. The state being immune for
injuries suffered by private
individuals in the administration of strictly governmental
functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in
the performance of the same duties, unless it is
expressly made liable by statute.
 A municipality is not exempt from liability for the
negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or
business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual so far as its liability to third
persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its
contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the
torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their
employment in precisely the
same manner and to the same extent as those of private
corporations or individuals. As to such matters the
principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these
purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the
courts.
 The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder
for a specified period of time is not a governmental but
a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered
into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect.
 It cannot be said that in rescinding the contract with the
plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to an
action for damages for no valid reason at all, the
defendant councilors were honestly acting for the
interests of the municipality. The defendants are liable
jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the
ferry privilege in question.
FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS; Feb 27, 1991
NATURE: Resolution
FACTS
- The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that
it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the
tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special
agent.
o NIA believes this bases this on:
 PD 552 – amended some provisions
of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
 The case of Angat River Irrigation
System v. Angat River Workers’ Union
- Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that
the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental
function because the nature of its powers and functions
does not show that it was intended to “bring to the
Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary
profit”, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River
system is a government entity exercising proprietary
functions.
- The Angat dissenting opinion:
- Alegre protested the announced termination of his
employment. He argued that although his contract did
stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976,
since his services were necessary and desirable in the
usual business of his employer, and his employment had
lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular
employee and could not be removed except for valid
cause.
-
- The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the
Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been
promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after
the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby
opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the
damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent
HELD YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified
into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant.
The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and
considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the
exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for
purposes of local government. While it may be true that the
NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed
at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does
not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-
function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of
"constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all
communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state
and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the
irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby
created which shall be known as the National Irrigation
Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after
the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in
all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis
for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water
from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its
administration, such fees or administration charges as may be
necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and
insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a
reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with
government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof
expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of
communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be
preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the
crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all
other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred
liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration
charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the
National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . .
. business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued
in court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate
powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2,
subsection (f):
(f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment
of the above powers and objectives, including the power to
establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise
all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.
DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation
Administration is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not
a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver
who was not its special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated
December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED.
DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to
suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from
tort committed by its employees, is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental
functions may be held liable for tort committed by its
employees only when it acts through a special agent.
Art. 2189, CC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision. (n)
CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968
NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner of the
Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeep.
After waiting 5 mins, he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. As
he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep, and took a
few steps, he fell inside a manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due
to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine
General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which
he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his
left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh,
the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an
abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and
the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical
treatment by a private practitioner.
- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police.
- Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron
was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that
in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by
constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement
covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time
whenever funds were available.
- CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and
dismissed the amended complaint, without costs.
- This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
- The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present
case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce
the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
- Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over
the latter, because RA 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
ISSUES
WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages
suffered by Teotica.
REPUBLIC vs PALACIO
23 SCRA 899 REYES, J.B.L., J.: May 29, 1968
FACTS:
Ortiz instituted action against Handong Irrigation Association to
recover possession of land which HIA allegedly entered and
occupied at the inducement of Irrigation Service Unit, an
agency under the Dept. of Public Works and Communications.
A writ of execution and order of garnishment was served
against the deposits and trust funds of ISU to pay for the
damages to Ortiz .CA upheld on the basis that ISU is engaged
in the private business of purchase and sale of irrigationpumps.
ISSUE:
WON State or its fund can be made liable for damages
HELD : NO
RATIO:
The ISU liability in inducing HIA to invade and occupy land of
Ortiz arose from torts and not from contract.It is a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that embodied in Art 2180 of
CC that the State is only liable for tortscaused by its special
agents especially commissioned to carry out the acts
complained of outside of such agent’s regular duties.There
being no proof that the making of the tortuous inducement was
authorized, neither the state nor its fundscan be made
liable.Other issues:Even if the liability of the state had been
judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for
itself whether to paythe judgment or not. Thus execution
cannot issue on a judgment against the state.

HELD
YES.
Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189,
CC governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a

national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At any
rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires
is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the
City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila
and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court
of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of
said Court thereon are not subject to our review.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should

be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila.

Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.