VI PERSONS LIABLE
after it is done, if done for their benefit.
A. THE TORTFEASOR
CIVIL CODE:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Art. 2081. The guarantor may set up against the creditor all the
defenses which pertain to the principal debtor and are inherent
in the debt; but not those that are personal to the debtor.
(1853)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42 Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912
NATURE: Appeal from judgment of CFI
FACTS
- Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular
Government commenced an action against defendants
Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma,
Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners,
directors, writers, editors and administrators of a certain
newspaper known as “El Renacimiento” or “Muling Pagsilang”)
for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an
alleged libelous publication.
- The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the
Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and
a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held. The
said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and
devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten
meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a
vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it
bloodless.
- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge of
the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the
defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were
found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to
have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable
jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of
petitioner’s wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to
his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as
P25,000 as punitive damages.
- This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC,
claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering
said judgment among which was that the lower court
committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants.
ISSUE
WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the
commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally
liable as joint tortfeasors
HELD
YES.
Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate
in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort
which they commit. They are each liable as principals, to the
same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed
the wrongful act themselves.
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person
injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly,
or one of them separately, because tort is in its nature a
separate act of each individual.
Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the
present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal
doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with
his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued
separately for the commission of the tort. They might have
sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that
the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note:
Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law**
(In a case of assault and battery committed by various
persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is
the person who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the
commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided,
assisted or counseled, in any way the commission of a crime,
was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the
actual tort.
- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort
which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or
any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage
caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole
damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others
who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in
the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.
- The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged
joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The
courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even
though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this
case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint
and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized
by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: “Every
author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the
publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. Ocampo,
Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit
held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with
interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any liability.
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring]
- We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed
upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder, Ocampo, explicitly
stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid
sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco, he offered
to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid
nothing. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or
title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had
put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how one
could share in the losses thereof, and still less incur liability for
damages on account of some act of the said company, an
unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property, as though
he were a regular general partner when he was not such.
TORRES [dissenting in part]
- I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw, but
dissent as regards Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto,
and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect
participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for
damages, nor were they owners or proprietors of the
newspaper, its press or other equipment. They were donors
who merely contributed a sum of money, as a genuine gift, for
the purpose of founding, editing, and issuing the said
newspaper, it is improper to deduce that the contributors
formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature.
- After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered,
the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all
right to the money donated and to the objects that were
acquired therewith. Therefore they can not incur, jointly and
severally with the director and manager.
Art. 2184, CC. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 Phil 374 MORELAND; March 28, 1914
NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant
FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a certain
"San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and bound for
Manila. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching,
he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed into the street
for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was
a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear
platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but,
seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion,
stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and
waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in
this position he was struck from behind and run over by the
defendant's (Underwood) automobile.
- The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in
his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A
street car bound from Manila to Sta. Ana being immediately in
front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching
the scene of the accident the street car which was following
took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running
along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to
meet and pass each other)- that is, went off the main line to the
left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track.
Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the
main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the
plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in
an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going.
When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front
of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly
went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
- The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
ISSUE
WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his
driver.
HELD
NO.
Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the
other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and
without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
herein at5 the time the act was committed, is not responsible,
either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a
length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his
driver’s act his own.
Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in
running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an
oncoming car upon the wrong side.
- The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his
right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to
pass upon that side of the street car.
- in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall
within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for whose
acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not
present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed
by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is
present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for
such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom.
- it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the
turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening
of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge
defendant with the negligence of the driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
GR NO. L-20392 MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo
FACTS
- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving the
latter’s Cadillac along highway 54. On the other side of the
road, Caedo was driving his Mercury car. He was with his
family.
- A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did not see
the carretela from afar. When he approached the carritela, he
decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the car
of the Caedos’ approaching from the opposite lane. As he did
so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the
forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying
it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle.
- The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of
damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The CFI ruled in
favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable.
ISSUES
WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as
Bernardo’s employer
HELD
No.
- Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No negligence
of having employed him maybe imputed to his master.
- Negligence on the employer’s part, if any, must be sought in
the immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to detain the driver
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.
- No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at a
reasonable speed. The road was wide and open. There was no
reason for Yu to be specially alert. He had reason to rely on the
skill of his driver. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics
of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may
own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the
meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to
avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another
DISPOSITIVE
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
GR No. L-20392 MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968
FACTS
- Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home
in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car
were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his
driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Parañaque home to Wack Wack.
- The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds,
considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic
— the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the
Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights
were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by
a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son,
Julian Bautista.
- Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig
when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is
the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was
provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should
have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he
claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have
been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must
have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
- In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane
from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down
or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was
clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the
curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along
as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided
with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the
Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to
take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would
be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them
in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious.
- It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo
saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he
had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the
oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance
Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear
bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela
and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by
going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The
photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of
his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the
moment of impact.
ISSUE
1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident.
2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is
solidarily liable with him.
HELD
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly
traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be
held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence.
- The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory
is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his
own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury
or damage.
- The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil
Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners
are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics
of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may
own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the
meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to
avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were
the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness,
employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by -
their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
would be effectively proscribed.
- Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and
regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may
be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if
any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him
clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.
We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car
was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide
and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was
no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert.
He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the
sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from
liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant
Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA
FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a
vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis
dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license)
at a gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his
father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding
P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000
compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his
companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the
decision, and attorney’s fees of P50,000 (no interest
mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for
damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the
RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the
decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The
instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the
CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that
the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the
death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of
litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for
unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages,
P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and
atty’s fees of P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they
had no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a
nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age,
married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally
employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet”).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings
had no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net
unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the
deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of
P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal
expenses).
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age
and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by
factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing,” thus
lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years.
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various
positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the
trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus
coming up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However,
the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30,000,
due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net
annual unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced
the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports
the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity
tending to shorten his life expectancy. “That Luna was
engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-
kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-
karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It
was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the
determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed.”
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without
increasing the gross income. “It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase because of the
‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto
R. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his
income would also increase considering the manifold sources
thereof”
2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of
damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances,
interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of
the court.
(The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of
the compliant.)
Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the
court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had
attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas
now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead
of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice.
Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also,
he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.”
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the
earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of
atty’s fees.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
QUASI TORTS (Black’s Law Dictionary)
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 603:THE CHILD AND YOUTH
WELFARE CODE
CHAPTER IV: Liabilities of Parents
Article 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their parental authority
in accordance with the Civil Code.
FAMILY CODE:
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental
authority over the person and property of the child who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
RPC:
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1,
2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of
this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the
persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall
be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined,
even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,
the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter
that part of their property exempt from execution.
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers
and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case
of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission
of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected
to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
CIVIL CODE:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
1. PARENTS
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE
CAPUNO L-10068-70 06291957 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro
Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as
mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right to
bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged
and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he
committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present
action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno
asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for
the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the
defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of
Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense
was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it
only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in
the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy
Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo
and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr.
Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold
of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of
its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a
consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did
he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only
came to know it when his son told him after the accident that
he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the
damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed the negligent act
which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and
was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are
not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father
from liability.
ISSUE
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable,
jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting
from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act
of minor Dante Capuno.
RULING
YES.1
RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor
children living with them although at the time of the tort, the
children were under the direct control or supervision of an
academic institution. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE,
WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA
VS. COURT OF APPEALS)
REASONING
The provision “Teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody", only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution.
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity,
he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in
connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with
some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred.
In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for
the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student
of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This
defendants failed to prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense
that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of
liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the
old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
1The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, (school’s liability
versus parental liability) which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody."
academic ones. What substantial difference is there between
them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance
over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his
pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used
in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades"
does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments".
The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear
that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that
he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right
to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved
that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities
that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father
has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of
proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the
part of the parent in order to render him liable.
Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
SALEN V. BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414 | April 27, 1960
FACTS
 Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the
sum of P2,000.00
 Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen
who died single from wounds caused by Gumersindo
Balce, a legitimate son of defendant.
 Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a minor below 18
years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result
of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce accused and
convicted of homicide and was sentenced imprisonment
and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the
amount of P2,000.00.
 Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the
deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the indemnity but it was returned
unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent
and had no property in his name.
 Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant,
father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity
the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus
causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.
 The trial court held that that the civil liability of the son
of appellee arises from his criminal liability and,
therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee must
be determined under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new
Civil Code which only applies to obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the father can be held subsidiary liable to pay
the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced
to pay in the criminal case filed against him.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes.
While the court agrees with the theory that, as a rule, the
civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, it disagrees with the
contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of
those who are under their custody should likewise be
governed by the same Code even in the absence of any
provision governing the case, for that would leave the
transgression of certain right without any punishment or
sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would
uphold the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court.
A minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is
silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article
2180, the pertinent portion ofwhich provides: "The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company."
To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant
case because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal
Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent
decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.
FUELLAS V. CADANO
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making
defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas, the father of
the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano, also a
minor, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for
damages.
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on
September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High
School, Dansalan City. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepito’s
injury, his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the
ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages
for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court
held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that
according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one
wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being
no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor
son, but deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not
applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or
negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that
the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for
the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his
son?
Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R.
No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding the defendants
jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for
damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the latter,
this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: —
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them in proportion to their means", while
on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants failed to
prove.
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce,
below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo
was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen,
minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor
son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be
determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the
decision, this tribunal held: —
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a
father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son
only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age,
or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without
discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or
negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the
act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who
has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control.
But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt
from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to
the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted.
In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is
our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the
instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised
Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this
Court which cover equal or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault
or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the
present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind
the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's
criminal responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision
appealed from is affirmed
GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931
Nature:
an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against the five defendants, to recover damages in
the amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result
of an automobile accident.
Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership
collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon
bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las
Piñas, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The
automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad
18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and
mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the
collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together
will several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all,
were accommodated therein. Narcisso Gutierrez was a
passenger of the bus. He had a fracture on his right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was caused by
negligence pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez blames
both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the
car in turn blames the truck.
the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur,
that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on
approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty
given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to
operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts
of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the
minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused
by the minor.
Issue:
1. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable.
2. WON the owner of the truck is liable.
Held:
1. Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the
head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who
maintains it for the general use of his family is liable
for its negligent operation by one of his children,
whom he designates or permits to run it, where the
car is occupied and being used at the time of the
injury for the pleasure of other members of the
owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of
the law is that the running of the machine by a child to
carry other members of the family is within the scope
of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of
master and servant.
2. Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of
the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests
on a different basis, namely, that of contract. The
reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of
the trial court concerning the position of the truck on
the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and
 the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its
broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions,
with neither being willing to slow up and give the right
of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a
collision and an accident
Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment
appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have
judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez,
Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally,
for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA
FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a
vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis
dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license)
at a gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his
father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding
P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000
compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his
companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the
decision, and attorney’s fees of P50,000 (no interest
mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for
damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the
RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the
decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The
instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the
CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that
the award for atty’s fees should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the
death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of
litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for
unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages,
P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and
atty’s fees of P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they
had no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a
nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age,
married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally
employed (“His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet”).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for atty’s fees should have legal interest
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings
had no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned
earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of
another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000
(P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses).
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age
and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by
factoring in the “engagement of Luna in car racing,” thus
lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years.
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various
positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the
trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus
coming up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However,
the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30,000,
due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net
annual unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced
the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports
the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity
tending to shorten his life expectancy. “That Luna was
engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-
kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-
karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It
was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the
determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed.”
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without
increasing the gross income. “It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase because of the
‘escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto
R. Luna's social standing’ [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his
income would also increase considering the manifold sources
thereof”
2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of
damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances,
interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of
the court.
(The atty’s fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of
the compliant.)
Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the
court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had
attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas
now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is “unwilling to apply equity instead
of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice.
Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also,
he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.”
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the
earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of
atty’s fees.
LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS
GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO; Sept. 18,1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court.
FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann
Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took
place and from which she died on January 14,1979, was an
18-year old first year commerce student of the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age
living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same
event on the same date.
- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when
Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused, prompting him
to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under
Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter
turning the gun on himself to commit suicide
Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased
or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of
the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witness and thereby avoid identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious
liability under A2180 CC. CFI dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable
ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libi’s liable for
vicarious liability
HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law
in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of
the instruction and supervision of the child. Had the
defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities
of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach,
they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the
absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the
point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however,
that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account
in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the
body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband,
Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners
holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the
gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly,
cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had
really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family
by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit
box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to
the bag of his mother where the other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers
obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages.
But if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would
constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS
CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the
parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY
OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT
SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO
> RULES:
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the
legal authority and control or who live in the company of the
parents: PRIMARY
= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or
under or 9-15 but without discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-
21 (now 18)
+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS
AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY
OVER THE MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same
rules in A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518 Feliciano, J; 1992
NATURE: Appeal for review of CA decision
FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged ten, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. He was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had
acted without discernment. The adopting and natural parents of
Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents
of Bundoc.
- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the
indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the
spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption
decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed
with the respondents and dismissed the complaint.
- The case contained procedural questions which were raised
in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear the appeal
based on substantial justice.
ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the
tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD-
- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not
retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at
the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents
had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of
the incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do
so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and
unconscionable.
Reasoning-
- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him under Article 2176. However, because of his
minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable.
Article 2180 reads “ the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible… The father
and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are
responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in
their company… The responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
- The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious
liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the Anglo-
American tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is not
only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or
logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the
parents which include the instructing, controlling, and
disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that
when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the
parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and
responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to
overcome this presumption.
Disposition –
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
Cuadra v. Monfort
Makalintal G.R. L-24101 | Sept. 30, 1970 |
FACTS
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort,
13, were classmates in Grade Six. Their teacher assigned
them, together with three other classmates, to weed the
grass in the school premises. Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she
had found an earthworm and, to frighten the Cuadra girl,
tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face
her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part
and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor
for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first
on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which
the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa
Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the
parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso
Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was
ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the
costs of the suit.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the parents are liable for the acts of their minor child
when the act or omission of the child is committed in the
absence of the parents.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: NO.
There is no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in
every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been
prevented.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee
such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher.
The act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor
did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait
in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and
sympathy for the tragedy
that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to
compensate her suffering, compulsion of good conscience.
2. GUARDIANS
FAMILY CODE:
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or
abused children and other children similarly situated, parental
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions
duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
CIVIL CODE:
Arts 2180-2181: supra