RULE 78 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
— If no
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
and THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE
J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, and JOHN
STEVEN J. MARCELO, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE T. MARCELO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The vesting of succession rights on the heirs upon the death of the
decedent gives occasion for the baring of sibling disaccords right at the
onset of the estate proceedings which is the determination of the
administrator of the decedent's estate. In such instances, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the decedent's estate is prolonged and the
issue of administration becomes, contrary to its very objective, itself the
hindrance to the ultimate goal of settlement of the decedent's estate. We
catch a glimpse of that in this case.
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived
by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4)
respondent Jose, Jr.
The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr. should administer
their father’s estate reached us in G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals and Edward Marcelo): we did not find reversible error
in the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674. We disposed
of the case via a Minute Resolution dated 22 May 1996,7 ultimately
affirming the RTC’s and the appellate court’s separate rulings of
Edward’s competence and better suited ability to actas regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently opposed Edward’s actions as
administrator and his inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate. He filed anew serial
motions which culminated in the following 23 June 2000 Order of the
RTC.
In its 13 December 1991 Order, the RTC categorically ruled on who
between Edward and Jose, Jr. was fit to administer the estate of Jose,
Sr.
In affirming the issuance of letters of administration to Jose, Jr., the
appellate court dwelt largely on the considerable latitude allowed a
probate court in the determination of a person’s suitability for the office
of judicial administrator. The Court of Appeals only briefly delved into
Jose, Jr.’s numerous attempts to be appointed regular administrator of
Jose, Sr.’s estate which were all denied previously by the same probate
court.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court.1âwphi1 The determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal
unless the said court is clearly in error. The RTC did not err in appointing
Jose, Jr. as the new administrator, even though his previous prayer for
appointment was denied. Notably, by virtue of Edward’s death, the office
of the regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate was vacated, and it was
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as probate court, to appoint a new
administrator.23
Evidently, the Court of Appeals like the RTC in its second order, closed
its eyes on the facts detailed by the RTC in the first order.
Considering the two (2) sets of conflicting rulings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals in the two stages ofthis litigation, we put into proper
perspective the 13 December 1991 Order of the RTC appointing Edward
over Jose, Jr. as regular administrator of their father’s estate, which
Order was upheld by us in G.R. No. 123883.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general
disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators.— No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of preference
in instances when there is a contest of who should be appointed
administrator:
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or ifthe surviving spouse, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
the administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one ormore of the principal creditors,
if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Because Edward and Jose, Jr. are both compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr.,
they were, at the time the issue of administration first cropped, equally
preferred to administer Jose, Sr.’s estate. Necessarily, the courts also
delved into the question of their suitableness and fitness to serve as
administrator, preferring one over the other, framing it as Edward being
more fit and suited to be administrator:
1. Edward has kept the Marcelo family corporations and his own in good
financial condition;
2. The trust reposed by the decedent on Edward who voted on Jose,
Sr.’s behalf in a Marcelo corporation; and
3. Edward being made a co-signatory for money deposited for Jose, Jr.’s
own children.
Plainly, the RTC in its Order dated 13 December 1991, found Edward
competent to serve as regular administrator, more competent than Jose,
Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference,
manifesting none of the disqualifications set by law. Still and all, the
same Order likewise judged Jose, Jr.’s suitableness and fitness,or lack
thereof, for the office of administrator, albeit in comparison withEdward
and not with the rest of Jose, Sr.’s children. Jose, Jr. was not what
Edward was.1âwphi1 The fact however, that Edward was made co-
signatory for money deposited for Jose, Jr.’s own children is a telling
commentary against Jose, Jr.’s competence, if not integrity.
Then too, the RTC in the original order made a specific finding, "[viewing
it] with deep concern," Jose, Jr.’s handling of the records of the Marcelo
Group of Companies. It euphemistically called taking of the records
evidencing liabilities of the decedent as "borrowed/taken." However, the
RTC noted that such cannot be justified as the records and other
pertinent documents taken "do not form part of the estate of Jose P.
Marcelo, Sr. but to the corporation from where they were taken."
Contrary to the recent rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
appointing Jose, Jr. as administrator, there is a previous and categorical
ruling on Jose, Jr.’s fitness to serve as such:
It is Jose T. Marcelo’s position that he is more competent, qualified and
suitable for the position of regular administrator.1âwphi1 This, above all
else is the main thrust of this second motion for reconsideration.
However, the court in the exercise of its sound discretion after a
consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, ruled otherwise
and instead appointed Edward T. Marcelo as regular administrator.
x x x True, Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. was initially appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate of their deceased father but the same was
without the benefit of a hearing on the qualifications of the parties
concerned. x x x This did not however confer on Jose Marcelo, Jr. as
Special Administrator a better right to the office of regular administrator.
x x x.
xxxx
The third assigned error raised by [Jose, Jr.] "that both trial judges erred
in not appointing Special Administrator Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. as Regular
Administrator considering his tested probity and competence as special
administrator, his good name and integrity in accordance with the
evidence," is devoid of merit, as already discussed earlier.
The findings of the lower court in this regard deserve full consideration
x x x.24
Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unsuitable to administer his father’s estate.
To obviate further delay in the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate, we
emphasize that such is already at the liquidation and distribution stage
which project of partition had long been conformed to by the parties.
We note that this case has been unnecessarily prolonged and resulted
in added litigation by the non-payment of estate taxes which is the
ultimate responsibility of the heirs having inchoate right in the estate,
should there be assets remaining, to be partitioned and distributed. The
inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate, indirectly the heirs:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – When the
debts, xxx, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, xxx.
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.25
Given the factual considerations that led to the prior findings on the
unfitness of Jose, Jr. to act as regular administrator; the Affidavit of
Helen26 preferring George as administrator; and the conformity on
record of the rest of Jose, Sr.’s heirs to George’s administration as
reflected in petitioners’ Appellants’ Briefbefore the Court of Appeals:
More importantly, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, not only is George the eldestson of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his
most immediate kin, he has, moreover, been chosen by the rest of the
heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an administrator. In this
regard, in addition to George and the heirs of Edward, Helen executed
an Affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the
appointment of George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of
which was given to the [Court of Appeals.]27 we thus issue Letters of
Administration to George to facilitate and close the settlement of Jose,
Sr.’s estate.
G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE
GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA
GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI
ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-
GABRIEL, petitioners, vs.
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO
GABRIEL, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver
that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving
spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an
administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal
surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should,
therefore, be preferred over private respondent who is one of the
illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia.
Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the
next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an
illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel,
as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent
who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-
observance or violation per se of the order of preference already
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of
preference because the same is not absolute and the choice of who to
appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to
the fact that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never
applied for appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months
from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the
probate court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is
not denied that several properties of the deceased have already been
relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have no interest in
applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent submits
that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified
from being appointed or serving as administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It
would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and
sufficient reason therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators
for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. 13
This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account
in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of
her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have
an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the
law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next
of kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the
widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very
much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since
one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who
has less. 16
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no
longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for
letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her
husband, as required under the rules.
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given
to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court
where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty
(30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered
opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong
case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. 17
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the
decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not
absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the
mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance,
so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone
in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as
an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of
private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent,
in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment
and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said
court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and
corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle
them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of
Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate
court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally
before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an
act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient
or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the
instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased,
there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate
ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that
the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court
may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where
those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.
21
On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no
reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein,
more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both
legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule
78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both
the surviving spouse and the next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which
may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be
remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor
or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-
administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of
the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services
rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent
for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of
co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased; 25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied
and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in
the office. 28
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable
and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the
deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-
administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different interests represented, especially considering that
in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and
illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be
expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the
representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision
of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent
Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the
appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in
Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO,
ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL
AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of
the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent
Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and
Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of
Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The
other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP
Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate
on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of
the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition
by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed
Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial
Partition", considering that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to
a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their
desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole
issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of
law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding
that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the
instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character
and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in
Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the
existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be
reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of
resolving the same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in
danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and
attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for
conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus,
procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal
basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor
in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust,
or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 74 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the
gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate
or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made
to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by
the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be
held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from
the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested
persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without
delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to
determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate
and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such
debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or
by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting
the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk,
and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves
without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit
the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent
left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age."9 With this finding,
it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner
insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character
of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a
complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court
of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower
court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court
converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial
partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm.
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the
partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an
ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have
held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to
the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible
error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial
court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 146737. December 10, 2001]
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin
Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN,
MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the
intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., petitioners, vs.
JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate on December 11, 1990,
respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and
time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass
of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin,
Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin;
and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan
C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein,
as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the
existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which
Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J.
Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the
alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")[4]
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent
claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on
September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby
GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents -
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal[7] does not apply when there appears in the record of the
case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have
been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted,
that if considered, would affect the result of the case.[8] Here, the trial
court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have
altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons
preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration,
thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of a person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor.[9] Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such
that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[10] In Gabriel
v. Court of Appeals,[11] this Court held that in the appointment of the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of
administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural
son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the
estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register),
the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines
are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births
cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely
access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate
one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more,
has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in
Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit
"D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court
should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of
Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of
respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38
years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio
G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth
record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January,
1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing
records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has
to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard,
we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded
in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be
used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered
that "xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form
and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not
satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958
could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised
in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume
that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter.
But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit
"8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been
given more faith and credence by the courts below.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar[16] that:
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of
the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be identified.
Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by
the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child. (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where this Court said that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its
preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of
recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of
the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has
all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that
office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live
Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring
discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D"
and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the
Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil
Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of
the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19]
lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage
and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while
standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming
the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of
letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner,vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE
BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-
six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for
letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by
his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the
decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular
administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.
The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo G.
Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that she
was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She
characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental incapacity. She
prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of
Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut's
appointment as special administrator. In that same order the lower court
noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the
witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".
The probate court in its order of November 27, 1975 terminated the
appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators
and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond of
P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as surviving spouse she
has a preferential right to be appointed as administratrix of her deceased
husband's estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal
estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased.
The lower court said it was convinced of the widow's capacity and that
her "sufficient understanding" justified her appointment.
Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted
her bond. She took her oath of office on November 29, 1975.
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent
Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino spouses this special civil action of
certiorari in order to set aside the order of November 27 appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order of November 27 and from disposing of the funds or
assets of the estate in their possession or deposited in certain banks.
The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware
that Jose Espino was acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero
Baluyut as his natural child.
Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted
the administration proceeding after he had failed to get from her a cheek
for P500,000 belonging to the decedent's estate and that he grossly
misrepresented that she was mentally incompetent. She further alleged
that the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declaring
her an incompetent was issued in a blitzkrieg manner because it was
based on the report of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz which was filed in court
just one day before the order was issued.
Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as
to her competency to act as administratrix.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed
that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will
he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal
assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-
fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene, Erlinda,
Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio
and Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs.
Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will.
In this Court's resolution of May 7, 1976 respondents' comments were
treated as their answers. The case was deemed submitted for decision.
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut
as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of
administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that
she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress
hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and
does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness
to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the
will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered
him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the
suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the
opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance
to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106, January
31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs.
Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not
give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had
squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court
assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's
estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the
decedent's alleged will.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court
into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See.
1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98
Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be
revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82,
Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620;
Rodriguez vs. De Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the
interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to
determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix.
Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in
summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption
that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity
became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the
decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development when he
articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills
which should be delivered to the court for probate.
Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed
by the lower court or if the petitioner's contention is clearly tenable or
when the broader interests of justice or public policy justify the
nullification of the questioned order (Manila Electric Company and
Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez and Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499,
503; Pacheco vs. Tumangday and Fernando, 108 Phil. 238; Raneses
vs. Teves, L-26854, March 4, 1976).
Before closing, a pending incident herein should be resolved. Alfredo G.
Baluyut in his motion of January 15, 1976 prayed that respondent Judge
be enjoined from acting on Mrs. Baluyut's motion for the appointment of
Espino as special administrator. In view of Alfredo G. Baluyut's
manifestation of
April 2, 1976 that his motion had become moot, the same is hereby
denied.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration
granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to conduct
further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this
decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.
G.R. No. 162934
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA JEAN,
DANIEL, MELCHOR, Present: MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all
surnamed - versus - DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL,
November 11, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B.
Almoradie, died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable
inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.[3]
A little over a month after Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta
Santiago Vda. de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 72, docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. She alleged, among others, that to her
knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate with an
estimated net value of P1,500,000.00 and that such estate was being
managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by
two other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of
administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother
of the deceased, and that she be awarded her share of the estate of her
daughter after due hearing.[4] However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as
administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo
Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then
removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his
stead.[5]
On October 16, 1989, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming
to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention.[6] Resolution on this motion was, however, held in
abeyance pending some incidents in the CA.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of
Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for
probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in
his favor. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 211-MN. [7] He
alleged that he discovered his mothers will on October 25, 1989 in which
he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as
alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga,
a brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985
or 1986.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as
special administrator of his mothers estate.[9]
On May 23, 2001, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel,
Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a Motion[10]
praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late
mother Belinda, who died in 1990.
On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel,
filed a Manifestation and Motion[11] where she informed the probate
court of her husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as
substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged that
she had a bachelors degree in law and had worked for several years in
a law office.[12]
On August 14, 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores manifestation
and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriels next
of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.[13] This elicited a
Reply[14] from Dolores where she refuted these allegations.
On August 24, 2001, Bena Jean filed a Motion for Appointment as
Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel[15] praying that she
be appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
On October 11, 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean,
claiming that the latter has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta
Gabriel nor shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix of
the estate.[16]
On November 28, 1991, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of
Mariano Yanga, Jr. in CA-G.R. SP No. 25897.
In a Resolution[17] dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed
Dolores as special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The
probate court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs
of Belinda,
stating that they were mere strangers to the case and that their cause
could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding. According to the trial
court, contrary to the assertions of Oppositors Heirs of Belinda A.
Castillo, movant Dolores L. Gabriel has amply proven her kinship with
petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel, and therefore her kinship, by operation of
law, with decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel. In the probate proceedings, this
Court has the power to determine questions as to who are the heirs of
the decedent , the recognition of a natural child , the validity of
disinheritance effected by the testator and the status of a woman who
claims to be the lawful wife of the decedent. ...
The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider.[19] In the meantime, Dolores
took her oath of office on January 11, 2002.[20]
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Belindas heirs in its Order[21] dated March 19, 2002. The said heirs then
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or/and preliminary injunction against Dolores and the
probate court. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70645. They
prayed, among others, that Bena Jean be appointed as the regular
administratrix of Crisanta Gabriels estate.
On October 30, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 70645. It ruled that the probate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Dolores as special administratrix.[23]
The heirs of Belinda Dahlia Castillo, now the petitioners, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari against Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel.
The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have any right
to inherit from their grandmother, either by her own right or by the right
of representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as administratrix
of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta Gabriels only compulsory
heirs. They insist that the respondents late husband, Roberto, was just
a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted son as he claimed
to be. Even assuming this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is
not naturally related to the decedent by blood in the direct descending
line makes it unfair to appoint her as the special administratrix. Citing
jurisprudence, the petitioners explain that the principal consideration in
the appointment of administrator of a deceased persons estate is the
applicants interest therein. This is the same consideration which Section
6,[25] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court takes into account in establishing
the order of preference in the appointment of such administrators. The
underlying assumption behind this rule, the petitioners insist, is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. Lastly, the
petitioners posit that since CA-G.R. SP No. 25897 had long been
dismissed by the CA, a regular administrator of the said estate should
now be appointed.
The petition is without merit.
In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA
ratiocinated as follows:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion
of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not
apply to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the
administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold that
the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient
reason.
The facts of this case show that Roberto Gabriel the legally adopted son
of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel survived Crisantas death. When Crisanta
died on January 25, 1989, her estate passed on to her surviving adopted
son Roberto. When Roberto himself later died on April 16, 2001,
pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate which he inherited
from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow, private respondent.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither
a compulsory nor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is
considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private
respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate
because she is an heir of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the
former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.[26]
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
probate court.[27] A special administrator is a representative of a
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.[28] When
appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of
the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the
court.[29] As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of
the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the
entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.[30] The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs.[31] In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the
estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted
litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses
unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets
in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment,
likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.[32]
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators appointed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to
appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court.[33] In De
Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.,[34] the Court further elucidated
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court.
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is
being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an
appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be
appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase by any cause includes those incidents
which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay
in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will
consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of
a special administrator.[35]
As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint
respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-
Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted son,
Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties. However,
pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the
respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much
stake in Crisantas estate in case the latters will is allowed probate. It
needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the
shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to
administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution.[36] Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies
to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled
that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators.[37] Thus, in
Roxas v. Pecson,[38] this Court ruled:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred
right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for
removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. ... As the law does not say who shall be appointed
as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have,
the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
On the plea of the petitioners for this Court to appoint their co-petitioner,
Bena Jean Castillo, as the regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel, the matter should be addressed to the probate court for
its consideration. It is not for this Court to preempt the discretion of the
probate court and appoint a regular administrator in the present action.
G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY, Petitioner,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON,
As Presiding Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth
Judicial Region, sitting at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H. UY,
Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The facts of the case show that Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate
on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and
his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia ,
Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).
On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was instituted
and Lilia Hofileña was appointed as special administrator of the estate
of the deceased. Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing
Lilia Hofileña as special administrator with prayer that letters of
administration be issued to him instead.4
On June 9, 1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña’s
appointment as special administrator and denied her petition to be
appointed as regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of administration
were granted to petitioner, who took his oath of office as administrator
on June 23, 1998.
On February 17, 1999, Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a
motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the
estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor
of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be
included in the estate.
The trial court initially denied private respondent’s motion to intervene,5
but on March 16, 2000,6 it reconsidered its earlier order and appointed
private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied.
The main issues for resolution are: (1) whether the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co-
administrator to the estate of the deceased; and (2) whether the Court
of Appeals deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process
and his right to petition the government for redress of grievances by not
addressing the issues raised before it.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is
already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no
authority to re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator
without removing the incumbent administrator; that private respondent
is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that
the trial court’s appointment of private respondent as co-administrator
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular
administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9,
1998. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene sought to
be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the
decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s
properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner as
administrator, appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the
estate.
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates
of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of
administration.9 In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of
administration to petitioner and thereafter to private respondent as co-
administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the
preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as
follows:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances.10 In Sioca v. Garcia,11 this
Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse
to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the
person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may
appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for
the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will
not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the
court below was in error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. x x x.12 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the
trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private
respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable
and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact,
petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his
administration. In its March 16, 2000 Order,13 the trial court found thus:
Going over all the arguments of the parties, after hearing has been set
relative thereto, this Court has observed that indeed the judicial
administrator had not submitted to the Court any report about the Estate
under his administration except those involving the cases he filed and/or
intervened in other branches. This may be due to his being
inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him
from the administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof.
However, considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch
of the Uy family and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the
businesses and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling
of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed
co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial
Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to
the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the
decedent’s Estate pending before this Court.14
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises
all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration.15 The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate
proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,16 this
Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-
administrators under certain circumstances, to wit:
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of
co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue
of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent
administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable
latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own orders
as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely
applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made
by the interested parties.18 In the instant case, the estate of the
deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the
jurisdiction of the court.
The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised by
petitioner. We see no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the Court
of Appeals, because its findings of fact is conclusive and binding on the
parties and not subject to review by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the exceptions to the rule.
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO JAKE TAN and GERALDINE TAN,
REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS, Petitioners, - versus -
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA,
REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31
October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children
of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be
legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator.
They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo),
be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition
to private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the
private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since
they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that
Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was
already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed
commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix. More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC,
acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve
pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the
directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued
an Order[4] appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos
Estate.
Petitioners contend[11] that they should be given priority in the
administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs
of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the
doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the
decedents estate.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private
respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos estate.
Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo Jake Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a
long time and continue to reside on Gerardos estate, while respondents
are not even in the Philippines, having long established residence
abroad.
Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the
administratrix of the estate since Gerardos death on 14 October 2000
and is thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of the
estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings).[12]
As regards the denial of petitioners plea for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial
would leave Romualdo, private respondents attorney-in-fact, free to
enter Gerardos estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the
prejudice of petitioners.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference
in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-
quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of
the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.[14]
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a
special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term
which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.[15]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge
Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge
Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided against her appointment
for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner,
directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latters capacity as de fact[o]
administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money
and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the
estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan
was likewise directed to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was
likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background
of the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her
administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18,
2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on
the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan
another ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no
compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan
for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the
farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the
requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and
impartially administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of
all the heirs.[16] (Emphases supplied.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better
suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo,
who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of
Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would constitute a
mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of
discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of
Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari
petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their
claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent
and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of Gerardos
estate. Contrary to petitioners bare assertions, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma
to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a
considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for
the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo,
who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special
administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and
can, thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference
provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner
Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which
necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is
delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves
behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves
behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.[18]
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is
to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.[19]
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the
appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the
failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-
appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of
appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful
orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the
defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives
of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardos estate and
to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos
estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient
justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did
not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a
manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts
orders.
Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents,
there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners arguments regarding
the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
G.R. No. L-17633 October 19, 1966
CIRILO LIM, petitioner-appellant,vs. BASILISA DIAZ-MILLAREZ,
oppositor-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
On February 26, 1954, Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late
Jose Millarez who died intestate on October 22, 1953, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for his
appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. The
petition alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as descendants,
ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals
To the said petition, Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the
late Jose Millarez, filed an opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner
has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the
estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her as plaintiff and
Cirilo Lim as defendant in Civil Case No. 2986.
Trial of the case was postponed several times. When the case was
called for hearing on March 17, 1959, both parties manifested the
existence of a litigation between them over the properties of the estate.
Hence, the trial court issued the following order:
When this expediente was called for hearing today, Atty. Enrique Mariño
for the petitioner and Atty. Amado B. Parreño, Sr. for the oppositor
appeared. Both manifested that there is an ordinary civil case between
the parties herein, that is Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, as plaintiff and Cirilo
Lim, as defendant, litigating between them on the ownership of the
properties belonging to the deceased Jose Millarez, in the sense that
while plaintiff Basilisa Diaz-Millarez in said civil case, now oppositor in
the special proceeding alleged that she is the legitimate widow of the
deceased Jose Millarez, yet defendant Cirilo Lim in said civil case, now
petitioner herein, alleged that he is contesting said allegation because
she is not the legitimate spouse of the deceased; that the said civil case
was already decided in favor of the defendant therein and against the
plaintiff by the Second Sala of this Court and now pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals.
Under the above considerations, the present expediente is of no
consequence. However, upon the final termination of said civil case, the
parties concerned without prejudice can file another application for the
judicial administration of the property involved in this administration. It is
to be noted that this expediente was filed way back on February 26,
1954 that is more than 5 years and neither a special nor a regular
administrator has been appointed so that the dismissal of the expediente
would not be prejudicial to any of the parties interested in the same.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this expediente is ordered dismissed.
Failing in his motion for the reconsideration of this order, the petitioner,
Cirilo Lim, brought the case to the Court of Appeals but that court has
certified the appeal to Us for the reason that there is no question of fact
involved.
Meanwhile, the civil case between the parties which was also elevated
to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 24561-R) was decided on February
18, 1965. From the body of the decision, it appears that Basilisa Diaz-
Millarez sought to recover from Cirilo Lim one-half of the total amount of
P22,000 allegedly delivered to him by her and the deceased Jose
Millarez on various occasions and to declare her as the owner of ½ of
the profits and gains derived therefrom, on the ground that Jose Millarez
and she used to live as husband and wife for about 23 years and as
such she is entitled to ½ of the property held in common by them. She
asserted further that since she contributed capital and labor to the
tobacco business in which she and the deceased were engaged and
from which they gave P22,000 in cash to Cirilo Lim, she would be
entitled to ½ of the capital and ½ of the proceeds and profits derived
from such capital. In answer, Cirilo Lim alleged that the money he
received from Jose Millarez on various occasions was handed to one
Tan Suaco for investment in the tobacco business. While the trial court,
after hearing, ordered Lim to make an accounting of the P22,000
invested in the tobacco business to be submitted to court, the Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, made the following conclusion:
We agree with the court a quo, that the plaintiff Basilisa is entitled to ½
of the estate of the late Jose because she contributed labor and capital
in the form of cash to a common fund with Jose during the period from
1930 up to the date of the death of Jose in 1953.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is set aside and the records of this case
are hereby remanded to the court a quo with instructions (1) that it
appoints a qualified certified public accountant to examine with
painstaking care the documentary evidence presented and to determine
how much over and above the amount of P12,500 was invested by the
late Jose Millarez and the plaintiff in the tobacco business together with
the defendant Lim, and to assess the extent of the profits and gains
derived from such investment; (2) to admit such other evidence as the
court may consider material and relevant; and (3) to render judgment
anew on the basis of the examination to be conducted by the qualified
certified public accountant and such further evidence, if any, as shall be
presented, adjudicating in favor of the plaintiff Basilisa Diaz-Millarez ½
of the capital and ½ of the profits and gains derived therefrom that
properly pertain to the late Jose Millarez after the accounting shall have
been accomplished. No pronouncement as to costs.
From what appears above, the claim which Basilisa has against Cirilo in
the civil case supposed to be now again pending in the trial court, is
based on her declared right to one-half of the estate of the deceased. It
cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, as a relative of the
deceased, has some interest adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have
some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo can not
compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, one
is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he
has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate. (Sioca v. Garcia, 44 Phil. 711; Arevalo v.
Bustamante, 69 Phil. 656).
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. (Sioca
v. Garcia, supra).
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II
and IMELDA R. MARCOS,
August 4, 2009
PERALTA, J.:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279,
issued an Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to
respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-
Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand
E. Marcos.
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00, let letters
testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-
Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors therein.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized
to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.
Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent,
and to any other persons having an interest in the estate for them to lay
their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace.
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not
respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of
Ferdinand Marcos.
Ozeata v. Pecson[28] is instructive:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint
one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code
of the Philippines), the management of his estate by the administrator of
his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable
objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It
has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the
duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as
executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023).
xxxx
The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the
same principle.
The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to
determine who is most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his
solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After the admission
of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better executor for the
testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other
person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory
grounds of incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393,
114 N.E. 854. x x x[29]
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent
to serve as executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.
No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
xxxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of
letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following
grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been
convicted of a number of cases[30] and, hence, should be characterized
as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.[31]
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following
findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity
on the part of Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand
Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament, so
as to render them incompetent to serve as executors, the Court sees at
this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate
and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is
disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the
matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error
or gross abuse of discretion is shown.[32] The Rules of Court gives the
lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in its opinion
an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any
ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the
part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules
of orders of the court.[33]
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must
evaluate the evidence presented or alleged by petitioner in support of its
petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review of the
records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed
no error or gross abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed
to substantiate its allegation.
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against
respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed by this Court.
Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this Court
in Dans, Jr. v. People.[34] Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No.
17450 was reversed by this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.[35]
Hence, the so-called convictions against respondent Imelda Marcos
cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand
Marcos II involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file
income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50 (non-
payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977 (NIRC).
It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,[36] the CA
acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for
violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four
charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the
CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file
his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner,[37] said
decision is still pending appeal.
Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his
conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same
should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an
executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming
arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still
insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an income tax return is
not a crime involving moral turpitude.
In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,[38] this Court held:
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted
the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."
In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as
encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or
good morals."
xxxx
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that
"not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what
crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine."[39]
Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:[40]
Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and
swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general
rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving
moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
The failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral
turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the
fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is
supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court
decisions which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax
return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2)
a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return.
Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will,
and are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors
thereof. Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that
respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers of
the court.
This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and
instead, accepts the explanation given by respondents, to wit:
Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are
disclaiming the existence of the will, but because of certain legal
grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite interest to
institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached to the petition
for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as
administrator of the estate.[43]
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition,
respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted
within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the
probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later
on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents
were fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition.
Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this
Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion.
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,vs. ALELI "CORAZON"
ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998,
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City, respondent filed a
petition2 for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco,
hereinafter).
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of
respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. In support
of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco
on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court
of Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites
at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time.
Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim
of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has
not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or
produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently
to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco,
petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged
that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per
certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. In the same reply, respondent dismissed as of little
consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed
with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption
entered by the RTC at Caloocan.4
The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of
whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco
M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved the
issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered
the trial court to appoint respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s
estate.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion
on the legitimate status of respondent, or, to be precise, on her
legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and,
therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents
and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on
the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate."
In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly
quoting from Tison vs. Court of Appeals,16 stated that since petitioner
"opted not to present any contrary evidence", the presumption on
respondent’s legitimacy stands "unrebutted."17
Following is an excerpt from Tison:
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court
evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if
conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such
child cannot be attacked collaterally.
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and
invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not
introduce evidence to prove that fact.18 For, a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-
emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal
presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved,19 the
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that
the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or
birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the
presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review,
did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial
was the presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But
even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For,
save for respondent’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate
of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to
respondent’s mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage
certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of
Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized –
was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing
authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the
marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent
presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed
marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was
Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin
because his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both
Francisco’s siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon would testify
seeing respondent in 1948 in Francisco’s house in Caloocan, the same
Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war.23 In all, no
evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco
Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their
marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the
persons present, and like significant details.
We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to
say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any
of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the
marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments;
or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy
of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was recorded as
the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And
the word "married" is written in the certificate to indicate the union of
Francisco and Genoveva.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error
for the Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that [respondent’s] Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married".
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as
simple as it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed
by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De
Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child. Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the
fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.25
Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as
validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must
be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the
father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative
value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth
certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is
void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.27
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from
her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and
government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco
Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures
which showed Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These
papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation
or recognition.31 And needless to stress, they cannot support a finding
of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.
Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or
acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner
cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original;
words in bracket added)
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.38 When the law speaks
of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property;39 one whose
relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an
heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO,
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila
and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an
intestate proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona
Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4)
children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F.
Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of
the estate.
On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the
United States accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving
medical treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes filed
a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as
co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental
to the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was
served upon petitioner's then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro
who, since 2 June 1984, had been suspended by the Supreme Court
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines.
After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent
Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an Order dated 4 December 1984 which
required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition,
if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F.
Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the United States
attending to her ailing husband.
In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the
letters of administration granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained
Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales.
Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order
dated 15 January 1985 should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82,
Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal — If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .
While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the
action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
administrator, 4 we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse
the order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of
the estate.
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased 5 who shall act as representative not only of the
court appointing him but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate.
In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two
or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators
for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration
of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence,
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific
causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally
before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act
or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient
or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making
such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by
law and precedents.
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the
petitioner as co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in
respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on,
nor determine the validity of the charges brought against petitioner by
respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of the petitioner on the
fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and respondent
Teresa Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added
circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the country since
October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned
order.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate
be marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for
mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct,
one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally,
and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests
in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest
of the estate and its heirs.
We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a
quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony
between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment
of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to
the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her
continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the
interests of the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as
respondent Olbes and the other heirs in that the properties of the estate
be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and
there is as yet no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to
prejudice said estate to warrant the probate court into removing
petitioner as co-administratrix.
Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent
from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent
Olbes alone to administer the estate.
In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985,
petitioner explained to the court a quo that her absence from the country
was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the
United States for medical treatment. It appears too that petitioner's
absence from the country was known to respondent Olbes, and that the
latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually maintained
correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the
estate during the petitioner's absence from the country. 14 As a matter
of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a
letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November
1984, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests
accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use
them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the
administration. 15
The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned
her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in
the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus,
as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state,
maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not
such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2)
of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes
and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-appointment
of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the
removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and
dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the
court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re
William's Adm'r., the court held:
A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly
authorized by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost their
right of precedence, could not remove the appointee merely because of
the request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court that the
best interest of deceased would be thereby subserved, since the
administrator had such an interest as entitled him to protection from
removal without cause. 17
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no
satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner
Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was
therefore improper.
[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY* and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a
decision is the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabels
petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate by
virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico
Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese
Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely:
Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that
in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal case[1] against her
husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)[2] a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity
and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living
with their mother.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive
portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared
null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted
by the parties and shown by the records that the question of the case
and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case
between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special
Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels
paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without
leaving a will.
Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo
Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition
for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate
Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. In her petition,
she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren
of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of
the estate.
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he
is the surviving spouse of the decedent.
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition,
petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the
main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix
of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under
Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed
by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother.
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his
mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession
by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the
declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent
Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has
no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the
decedent.[10] On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed
order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.[11] When his motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January
9, 1998,[12] petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in
denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration
on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the
motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabels parents null and
void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and
had, in fact, been executed.
The petition must fail.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the
decision may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement
(78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto
v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support
from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City,
marked as Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the
basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which
are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a
voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered
legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).[15]
The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure
to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.[16]
The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall
under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to
dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before
the filing of petitioners opposition.[17] which is the counterpart of an
answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed
almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the
presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had
presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only
improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in
fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact,
the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision
of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the
marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear under paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment
of the Family Code.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the

CFI decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents is null and void and that the legal effect of such
declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children
born out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83[18] of the New Civil Code classify
what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for
which a marriage may be annulled.[19]

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that

void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of
void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are
provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under
Article 89[20] irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void
marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and

produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment
of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects
of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born
in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of

annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by
legal fiction.[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes

the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it
cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance.[22]

Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing;
annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish;
to do away with[23] whereas null and void is something that does not
exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that
it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning.

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the
marriage of respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article
85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the
children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second
paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to
the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside
their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For
purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate
grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their
successional right of representation in the estate of their grandmother
Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay,
had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice
to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may
be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the
successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedents
estate.

It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all
magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of
care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of
a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of
thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the
body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or
interpretation.[28]