1

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were
officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or
residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense,
stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of
committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies
thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of
court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money
not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation
cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5)
the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance
with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in
accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event
the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution,
the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the
corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued
against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its
seizure.

Held:

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of
search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

II

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws.

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights -
that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the
elimination of general warrants.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege.
In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough;
but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with
the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence,
then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for
the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences
are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Stonehill vs. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged
to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search
petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the
offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are
not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus
they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant,
and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to
search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are
made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and

(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

 The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has
been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would
be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is
immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters
and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

November 29, 1920

In re Application of MAX SHOOP for admission to practice law

MALCOLM, J.:

Application has been made to this court by Max Shoop for admission to practice law in the Philippines Islands under
paragraph four of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law, effective July 1,
1920. The supporting papers show that the applicant has been admitted to practice, and has practiced for more than
five years in the highest court of the State of New York.

THE RULES

That portion of the rules of this court, in point, is as follows:

Applicants for admission who have been admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States or in
any circuit court of appeal or district court, therein, or in the highest court of any State or territory of the United
States, which State or territory by comity confers the same privilege on attorneys admitted to practice in the
Philippine Islands, and who can show by satisfactory affidavits that they have practiced at least five years in
any of said courts, may, in the discretion of the court, be admitted without examination.

The above rule requires that New York State by comity confer the privilege of admission without examination under
similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of the New York court permits
admission without examination, in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases, among which are the
following:

1. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years as a member of the bar in the highest
law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia.

2. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years in another country whose jurisprudence
is based on the principles of the English Common Law.

This court is advised informally that under this rule one member of the bar of the Philippine Islands has been admitted
to practice, without examination, in the State of New York, and one member of the same bar has been refused such
admission, the latter being the more recent case. The rulings of the New York court have not been bought to the
attention of this court authoritatively, but assuming that reports of such rulings by the New York court are true, in view
of the apparent conflict, it seems proper to enter upon the consideration of whether or not under the New York rule as
it exits the principle of comity is established. It must be observed that under the rules of both jurisdictions, admission
in any particular case is in the discretion of the court. Refusal to admit in any particular case is not necessarily
conclusive as to the general principles established by the rules.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — A TERRITORY.

Under paragraph 1 of the New York rule, practice for five years in the highest court in any "State or territory of the
American Union" is the basic qualification. If the Philippine Islands is a territory of the United States within the meaning
of the word as used in that rule, comity would seem to exist.

The word "territory" has a general and a technical meaning. It is clear that the Philippine Islands is not an "organized
territory" incorporated into the United States under the constitution. (Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 138.) It is likewise clear
that the Philippine Islands is not a "foreign country." (The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S., 176.) In the language of that case
it is a "territory of the United States over which civil government could be established." So also is Porto Rico (De
Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 1.) It has been held that Porto Rico is not a foreign territory and that the United States
laws covering "territories." such as the Federal Employer's Liability Act, includes Porto Rico. (American Railroad Co.
of Porto Rico vs. Didricksen, 227 U.S., 145.) Porto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska are now incorporated, organized
territories of the United States. (Muratti vs. Foote, 25 Porto Rico, 527; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197;
Rasmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 516.)

An opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States holds that —

While, like Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands are not incorporated in the United States, they clearly are territory
of the United States and to the extent that Congress has assumed to legislate for them, they have been
granted a form of territorial government, and to this extent are a territory. (30 Op. Atty.-Gen., U.S., 462,
reversing 24 Op. Atty.-Gen. U.S., 549.)

Further, the Philippine Islands have been held not to be "another country" within the meaning of the Cuban
Commercial Treaty. (Faber vs. U.S., 221 U.S., 649.) Chief Justice Marshall, in construing the phrase "United States"
once observed:

Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the American Empire? Certainly this question
can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great Republic, which is composed of states and
territories. The District of Columbia or the territory west of Missouri is not less within the United States than
Maryland or Pennsylvania. (Loughborough vs. Blake, 5 Wheat [U.S.], 317, at p. 319.)

This is the broad general view which would seem to have been the point of view of the New York courts in using the
phrase "Any state or territory of the American Union." The New York rule contemplates "state," "territory," and "another
country." It seems clear that the Philippine Islands is not "another country." It is not believed that the New York court
intended the word territory to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory, or it would have used the more
accurate expression. the full phraseology, "any state or territory of the American Union," indicates a sweeping intention
to include all of the territory of the United States, whatever the political subdivision might be, as distinguished from
foreign country. Otherwise, the Philippine Islands would be in an anomalous position like unto Edward Everett Hale's
"A Man Without a Country" — a land neither "another country," nor a "state," nor a "territory" — a land without status.

Of course the construction of what is intended by the use of that phrase is for the New York courts finally to determine,
but in the absence of any authoritative decision from the New York courts on the point, we feel justified in concluding
that under paragraph 1 of the New York rule there exists between that jurisdiction and this, with reference to admission
of attorneys without examination, a basis of comity sufficient to satisfy the requirement in the rule of this court in that
regard.

A COMMON LAW JURISDICTION.

But assuming that comity is not permitted under paragraph 1 of the New York rule, we turn to a consideration of
whether or not it exits by virtue of paragraph 2. This rule applies to "another country whose jurisprudence is based on
the principles of the English Common Law." We have then further to assume that if the Philippine Islands is not a
"state or territory," that it must be "another country." The question then presented is upon what principles is the present
jurisprudence of these Islands based? this is a question which can property be answered by this court. It is a problem,
however, upon which books could be and have been written. We will endeavor to make a brief analysis of the situation.

What is "jurisprudence based on the principles of the English Common Law?" Jurisprudence is the groundwork of the
written law, or, as Bouvier defines it, "The science of law. The particular science of giving a wise interpretation to the
laws and making a just application of them to call cases as they arise." In an untechnical sense, it sometimes means
Case Law.

COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.

We must assume that the New York court, in using this phrase, considered that the jurisprudence of New York State
was based upon the principles of the English common Law. We should, therefore, consider to what extent the English
Common Law principles apply to New York. In a case in 1881 we find the following:

And the Common Law of England was the law of the colony at that date (April 19, 1775), so far as it was
applicable to the circumstances of the Colonists. And it has since continued so to be, when conformable to
our institutions, unless it was established by an English statute which has since been abrogated or was
 rejected in colonial jurisprudence, or has been abolished by our legislation. (cutting vs. Cutting, 86 N.Y., 522,
p. 529.)

And again:

This court has interpreted this provision of the constitution to man not that all of the Common Law of England
was the law of the Colonists at the time of the making of the Constitution, but only so much of it as was
applicable to the circumstances of the Colonists and conformable to our institutions. Cutting vs. Cutting, 86
N.Y., 522, p. 529; Williams vs. Williams, 8 N.Y., 525, p. 541. (Shayne vs. Evening Post Publishing Co., 168
N.Y., 70, at p. 76.)

In Morgan vs. King (30 Barber [N.Y.], 9), the New York court said that in adopting the English Common Law, New
York adopted:

The written law of England as a constantly improving science rather than as an art; as a system of legal logic,
rather than as a code of rules, — that is, that the fundamental principles and modes of reasoning and the
substance of the rules of the Common Law are adopted as illustrated by the reasons on which they are based,
rather than the mere words in which they are expressed.

Once more, in 1903, the New York court said in connection with a question of the right of the public to use the
foreshore:lawph!l.net

In adopting the Common Law of the Mother country we did not incorporate into our system of jurisprudence
any principles which are essentially inconsonant with our circumstances or repugnant to the spirit of our
institutions. (Barnes vs. Midland Railroad Terminal Co., 193 N.Y., 378, at p. 384.)

The above statements of the New York court clearly indicate the scope of the English Common Law in that state. In
most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the
law of the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not an
exclusive degree, in the old English cases. In fact, present day commentators refer to American jurisprudence or
Anglo-American jurisprudence as distinguished from the English Common Law.

Accordingly, in speaking of a jurisprudence which is "based on the English Common Law," for present purpose at
least, it would seem property to say that the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction is based upon the principles of
that Common Law, if, as a matter of fact, its statute law and its case law to a very large extent includes the science
and application of law as laid Down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the American cases.

COMMON LAW ADOPTED BY DECISION.

The concept of a common law is the concept of a growing and ever-changing system of legal principles and theories.
and it must be recognized that due to the modern tendency toward codification (which was the principle of the Roman
and Civil Law), there are no jurisdictions to-day with a pure English Common Law, with the exception of England itself.
In the United States the English Common Law is blended with American codification and remnants of the Spanish
and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring in this
jurisdiction to-day. Some of the western states, which were carved out of the original Louisiana territory, have adopted
the Common Law by decision. (State vs. Twogood, 7 Iowa, 252; Barlow vs. Lambert, 28 Alabama, 704;
Parsons vs. Lindsay, 41 Kansas, 336; McKennen vs. Winn, 1 Okla., 327.)

Louisiana has long been recognized as the one State of the Union which retained a portion of the Civil Law. In a case
in 1842 in Louisiana, the court considered the question of whether a protest on a promissory note had been made
within the required time. The court rejected the straight Civil code rule, and adopted the custom of New Orleans, which
was the law of the sister States, saying:

The superior court of the late territory of Orleans very early held that although the laws of Spain were not abrogated
by the taking possession of the country by the United States, yet from that event the commercial law of the Union
became the commercial law of New Orleans; and this court has frequently recognized the correctness of these early
decisions, principally in bills of exchange, promissory notes and insurance. (Wagner vs. Kenner, 2 Rob. [La.], 120.)

In Xiques vs. Bujac (7 La. Ann., 498, p. 504), the court after deciding a question involving the dedication of real
property according to the Civil code rules, said:

I must add that the general doctrine laid down in Common Law courts has been admitted by our courts with
some modification resulting from our different systems of law. lawph!l.net

Louisiana, by statute, adopted certain common law rules, and with reference to these the court said, in State vs.McCoy
(8 Rob. [La.], 545):

We concur with the counsel in believing that the legislature in adopting the Common Law rules of proceeding,
method of trial, etc., adopted the system as it existed in 1805, modified, explained and perfected by statutory
enactment, so far as those enactments are not found to be inconsistent with the peculiar character and genius
of our government and institution.

From this brief survey of the extent of the English Common Law basis in the States, we may conclude — (1) that the
New York court in referring to a jurisdiction whose jurisprudence is based on the English Common Law, uses the
phrase in a general sense; and (2) that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence by decision of
the courts where practical considerations and the effect of sovereignty gives ground for such a decision. If, in the
Philippines Islands, a comparatively young jurisdiction, English Common Law principles as embodied in Anglo-
American Jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the extent that such Common Law principles are not
in conflict with the local written laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and
subsequent legislation, and there is no other foreign case law system used to any substantial extent, then it is proper
to say in the sense of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippine Islands is based on the English
Common Law.

IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The extent of the English or the Anglo-American Common Law here has not been definitely decided by this court. But
when the subject has been referred to by this court there has been a striking similarity to the quotations from the
American decisions above cited with reference to the English Common Law.

In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson (21 Phil., 308), this court, in passing upon an objection of counsel, that while a
certain rule was universally recognized and applied in the courts of England and the United States, it was not the law
in the Philippine Islands, said:

To this we answer that while it is true that the body of the Common Law as known to Anglo-American
jurisprudence is not in force in these Islands, "nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts,
save only in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict
with existing law" (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241); nevertheless many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of
the Common Law have, to all intents and purposes, been imported into this jurisdiction, as a result of the
enactment of new laws and the organization and establishment of new institutions by the Congress of the
United States or under its authority; for it will be found that many of these laws can only be construed and
applied with the aid of the Common Law from which they are derived, and that to breathe the breath of life into
many of the institutions introduced in these Islands under American sovereignty recourse must be had to the
rules, principles, and doctrines of the Common Law under whose protecting aegis and prototypes of these
institutions had their birth.

xxx xxx xxx

And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports numbers of cases might be cited wherein
recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the Common Law in ascertaining the true
meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under
American sovereignty. (Pp. 331, 333.)

And later in speaking of the judicial system of the Philippines Islands (page 333):

The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible
without some knowledge of the judicial system of England and the United States. Its manifest purpose and
object was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources,
with a new system modelled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial system of the United States. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests must be held to be abrogated by the law
organizing the new system.

In U.S. vs. De Guzman (30 Phil., 416), the court spoke as follows:

We have frequently held that, for the proper construction and application of the terms and provisions of
legislative enactments which have been borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-American precedents, it is
proper and of times essential to review the legislative history of such enactments and to find an authoritative
guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of American and English courts of last resort
construing and applying similar legislation in those countries. (Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 100; 11 Phil., 669;
Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.S., 470; 11 Phil., 762; Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308.) Indeed it is a
general rule of statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes
which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity
and operation. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 309.)

In U.S. vs. Abiog and Abiog (37 Phil., 137), this court made this further statement on the subjects:

To elucidate — the principles of the Anglo-American Common Law are for the Philippines, just as they were
for the State of Louisiana and just as the English Common Law was for the United States, of far-reaching
influence. The Common Law is entitled to our deepest respect and reverence. The courts are constantly
guided by its doctrines. Yet it is true as heretofore expressly decided by this Court that — "neither English nor
American Common Law is in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our
courts, save only in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not
in conflict with existing law." (U.S. vs. Cuna [1908], 12 Phil., 241.)

What we really have, if we were not too modes to claim it, is a Philippine Common Law influenced by the
English and American Common Law, the derecho comun of Spain, and the customary law of the Islands and
builded on a case law of precedents. Into this Philippine Common Law, we can properly refuse to take a rule
which would estop other courses of reasoning and which, because of a lack of legal ingenuity would permit
men guilty of homicide to escape on a technicality.
At this juncture, three years after the last quoted comment, the influence of English and American jurisprudence can
be emphasized even more strongly. A survey of recent cases in the Philippine Reports, and particularly those of the
last few years, shows an increasing reliance upon English and American authorities in the formation of what may be
termed a Philippine Common Law, as supplemental to the statute law of this jurisdiction. An analysis will show that a
great preponderance of the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon Anglo-American case law precedents, —
exclusively in applying those statutory laws which have been enacted since the change of sovereignty and which
conform more or less to American statutes, and — to a large extent in applying and expanding the remnants of the
Spanish codes and written laws.

PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW.

Introductory to analyzing what Spanish written laws remain in force to-day, we will consider in a general way those
Spanish laws which were in force at the time of the change of severeignty.

Spanish law became highly codified during the nineteenth century. All of the laws of Spain were, however, not made
applicable to the Philippine Islands; only those were effective here which were extended by royal decree. The chief
codes of Spain made effective in the Philippine were as follows:

Penal Code 1887

Code of Commerce 1888

Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure 1888

Civil Code 1889

(Except portion relating to marriage, thus reviving a portion of Marriage Law of 1870.)
1870
Marriage Law

Mortgage Law 1889

1875 and
Railway Laws
1877

Law of Waters 1866

In addition to these there were certain special laws having limited application: Las Siete Partidas; Las Leyes de Toro;
Leyes de las Indias; La Novisima Recopilacion; Mining Law; Notarial Law; Spanish Military Code, and the Corpyright
Law.

The foregoing were written laws which, by change of sovereignty, acquired the force of statute law in the Philippine
Islands. There was no properly called Common Law or Case Law of Spain to accompany and amplify these statues,
although there were, of course, the customs of the people of the Islands, which continued, in a sense, unwritten law.
Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of stare decisis; consequently, there could be no Common
Law in any sense analogous to the English or American Common Law. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:

When there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy, the customs of the place shall be observed
and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

In order to determined the general principles of law "judicial decision cannot be resorted to" . . . . (2 Derecho Civil of
Sanchez roman, pp. 79-81; 1 Manresa, p. 80.) A lower court of Spain is at liberty to disregard the decisions of a higher
court. This is the general continental rule. (Holland's Jurisprudence, 11th Ed., pp. 68-70.) "The Partidas is still the
basis of Spanish Common Law, for the more recent compilations are chiefly founded on it and cases which cannot be
decided either by these compilations or by the local fueros must be decided by the provisions of the Partidas." (IV
Dunham, History of Spain, p. 109.)

The Partidas is a code law and cannot in any proper sense be considered as Common Law. It specifically provided,
however, for recourse to customs when the written law was silent. The customs to which resort is to be had are the
customs of the particular place where the case arise; the customs of one locality in Spain having no effect on the
application of law in another place. (1 Manresa, pp. 77-79; Civil Code, art. 6; Code of Commerce, art. 2.) Accordingly,
the Spanish customary law could not have any force here. The law or custom cannot be migratory. Manresa does not
defined what is meant by "general principles of law." but from his discussion under article 6 of the Civil Code it appears
how far from a case law system is Spanish jurisprudence. He formulates the rule that courts are governed: first, by
written law; second, by the customs of the place; third, by judicial decision; and fourth, by general principles of law. In
fact, un urging that resort to judicial decisions should come before resort to general principles of law, Manresa rather
implies that the practice of the courts is the contrary.

English Common Law is quite a different conception. While it grew out of the early Anglo-Saxon customs, it came in
time to be a case law of binding force which controlled custom. In fact, it became so binding that it was found
necessary, in order to effect justice in particular cases, to establish the Court of Chancery, which became the court of
equity. The English Common Law recognizes custom only in so far as it does not conflict with the well settled principles
of that law. Under the Spanish system, on the other hand, when the written law is silent, before considering precedents
in the cases the court is governed by the customs of the locality at the time.

Consequently, by the change of sovereignty there was no body of case law or common law of Spain which could be
considered as existing in connection with the written law retained in force in these Islands. The only amplification of
that written law was the local customs of the people of the Islands. This is particularly true of Spanish decision rendered
since the change of sovereignty, which do not preclude the local courts from exercising an independent judgment.
(Cordova vs. Rijos, 227 U.S., 375.)

SPANISH STATUTE LAW.

The Spanish statute law, as amplified by Spanish commentaries but without a background of Spanish precedent or
case law, was by the change of sovereignty, severed from Spanish jurisprudence and made effective in this jurisdiction
to the same extent as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modelled upon those same Spanish
statutes. This retention of the local private law was merely in accordance with the principles of International Law in
that regard. However, by the mere fact of the change of sovereignty, all portions of that statute law which might be
termed political law were abrogated immediately by the change of sovereignty. Also, all Spanish laws, customs, and
rights of property inconsistent with the Constitution and American principles and institutions were thereupon
superseded. (Sanchez vs. U.S., 216 U.S., 167.)

We will give a brief analysis of the further extent to which the Spanish statute law has been repealed and cut down
since the change of sovereignty. The table is the note 1 below illustrates the situation in a general way.

Even the Spanish Civil Code has been largely modified as will appear from the table in the note 2 below.

CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES.

It thus appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from Anglo-American sources; derivative within
the sense of having been copied, and in the sense of having been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority.
This court has repeatedly held that in dealing with the cases which arise under such statute law the court will be
governed by the Anglo-American cases in construction and application. (U.S. vs. De Guzman, 30 Phil., 416, at p. 419;
U.S. vs. Cuna, 12 Phil., 241; Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 33 Phil., 245, 428, 429.)

To illustrate more clearly the scope of the use of Anglo-American cases in this connection, a bried analysis of some
of the more recent decisions of this court is advisable. For convenience the cases will be taken up in the note 3 by
subjects. In all of them, Anglo-American decisions and authorities are used and relied upon to a greater or less degree.
Although in many cases the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net result is the building up of a very substantial
elaboration of Anglo-American case law.

From the foregoing selection of the more recent and typical cases, it appears how broad is the scope of the use of
Anglo-American authorities and precedents in the field of law subjects affected by American derived legislation. In the
application of those statutes in the many cases which come before the court, there is bound to be developed a
substantial common law. There is no question that this exists. We are merely concerned with its extent and source.

CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES.

In addition to the subjects covered above, there is a wide field of use of Anglo-American cases in the interpretation
and application of the remnants of the Spanish statutes. Such is of even greater importance in showing the real
permanency of the hold which Anglo-American Common Law has fastened upon the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction.
An analysis of the cases, particularly those of the later years, justifies completely the well-expressed opinion of former
Attorney-General Araneta quoted below:

We cannot say with certainty that the courts of the Philippine Islands will, in the absence of a statute, be guided
by the common law. It has been said that the common law is expanded slowly and carefully by judicial
decisions based on a standard of justice derived from the habits, customs, and thoughts of a people, and by
this standard doubtful cases are determined; that the office of the judge is not to make the common law but to
find it, and when it is found to affix to it his official mark by which it becomes more certainly known and
authenticated. The announcement of the law comes from the courts after they have had the benefit of the
learning of counsel, which to be comprehensive and useful must embrace a knowledge of the people and their
customs, as well as a knowledge of the principles established by prior decisions. It is, therefore, reasonable
to assume that the courts of the Philippine Islands in cases not controlled by statute will lay down principles in
keeping with the common law, unless the habits, customs, and thoughts of the people of these Islands are
deemed to be so different from the habits, customs, and thoughts of the people of England and the United
States that said principles may not be applied here. (4 Op. Atty.-Gen. P.I., 510, 511.)

To illustrate the scope of the use of Anglo-American cases in connection with the remaining Spanish statutes, a brief
analysis 4 of the more recent cases under a few of the principal subjects, will be appropriate. Frequently in these cases
reference to Anglo-American precedents is for the purpose of showing that Spanish law and the Anglo-American law
s the same, and frequently it is for the purpose of amplifying or extending the Spanish statutes. In most cases it is for
the purpose of applying those statutes to the particular case before the court; but whatever the use, the fact remains
that through the influence of these cases a broad exposition of American case law is made.

The last group of recent cases, which are but typical of many others in the Reports, illustrates clearly the fact that
Anglo-American case law plays a very great part in amplifying and applying the law on those subjects which are still
governed by the remaining portions of the Spanish statutes.

The foregoing two groups of cases in combination, those under the subjects covered by Spanish statutes and those
under the subjects covered by American-Philippine legislation and effected by the change of sovereignty, show
conclusively that Anglo-American case law has entered practically every one of the leading subjects in the field of law,
and in the large majority of such subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of this court in developing the
local jurisprudence. The practical result is that the part twenty, years have developed a Philippine Common Law or
case law based almost exclusively, except where conflicting with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-American
Common Law. The Philippine Common Law supplements and amplifies our statute law.

COLLATERAL INFLUENCES.

This conclusion is further justified by the practical situation which has surrounded the Bench and Bar of the Philippine
Islands for many years and which there is very reason to believe will continue unabated in the future.

This court his, in any increasing degree during the past twenty years, cited and quoted from Anglo-American cases
and authorities in its decisions. The following analysis of the citations of the last twenty volumes of the Philippine
Reports show this graphically.

Cases cited.

Volume. U.S. Philippines Spain England

20
207 63 21 1
........................................
21
217 127 10 3
........................................
22
273 73 21 5
........................................
23
211 181 18 4
........................................
24
194 108 19 1
........................................
25
143 98 24 2
........................................
26
257 104 23
........................................
27
145 132 25 1
........................................
28
145 130 24 3
........................................
29
152 136 9 1
........................................
30
98 85 11
........................................
31
159 103 8 1
........................................
32
103 8 1
........................................
33
121 137 6 5
........................................
34
214 163 34
........................................
35
109 159 17 4
........................................
36
125 217 21 2
........................................
37
340 242 23 5
........................................
38
161 175 19 8
........................................
39
228 143 13 6
........................................

3,810 2,752 361 52

The American citations are over ten times as numerous as the Spanish citations. (In Vol. 1 there were 63 Spanish to
53 United States.) Add to this the cumulative effect of perpetuating this ratio through the citations of Philippine cases
in which American cases have been cited, and it is obvious that Spanish decisions have had comparatively slight
effect in the development of our case law.

It is a fact of considerable practical importance that there are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of Bench
and Bar. On the other hand, the local libraries contain both digests and reports of the Federal Courts and Supreme
Court of the United States, and of most of the State courts, and also many reports of the English courts. Added to his
is a liberal supply of English and American text books. The foregoing not only has a natural influence on the results
of the work of the Bench, but it has a very decided influence on the development of the present Bar of the Philippine
Islands; each year adds to the preponderance of lawyers trained chiefly from a study of Anglo-American case law.

The fact that prolific use of Anglo-American authorities is made in the decisions of this court, combined with the fact
that the available sources for study and reference on legal theories are mostly Anglo-American, present a practical
situation at this moment from which this court can draw but one conclusion, namely, that there has been developed,
and will continue, a common law in the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction (which for purposes of distinction may properly
be termed a Philippine Common Law), based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of an Anglo-
American Common Law, which common law is effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction in so far as it
does not conflict with the express language of the written law or with the local customs and institutions.

CONCLUSIONS.

We may summarize our conclusions as follows:

(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the United States, under a civil government established
by the Congress.

(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in
cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-
American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written
law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with
local customs and institutions.

(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of
Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.

(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a reasonable interpretation, permits conferring
privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded by
the rule of this court.

Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the applicant in this case showing to the satisfaction of the court his
qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby granted and he is admitted to the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands. Our decision is based upon our interpretation of the New York rule, and it does not establish a
precedent which may be controlling on this court with respect to future applications if our interpretation is not borned
out by the future enforcement of that rule by the New York court. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Streets, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3962 February 10, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LING SU FAN, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis and C.W. O'Brien for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was accused of the offense of "exporting from the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins," in a
complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. The complaint was in the words following:

The undersigned accuses Ling Su Fan of the criminal offense of attempting to export Philippine silver coins
from the Philippine Islands, contrary to law, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1906, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ling Su
Fan was freight clerk, supercargo, comprador, and person in charge of all shipments of freight on board the
steamship Taming, which said steamship Taming was then and there about to depart from the port of
 Manila, Philippine Islands, to the port of Hongkong; that the said Ling Su Fan did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously place, conceal, and hide the sum of twenty thousand six hundred pesos (20,600)
pesos in Philippine silver coins, coined by authority of the act of Congress approved March 2, 1903, in his
stateroom on board the said steamship Taming with the intent of exporting the said Philippine silver coins
from the Philippine Islands to the port of Hongkong, and did then and there attempt to export the said
Philippine silver coins from the Philippine Islands to the said port of Hongkong.

Contrary to the provisions of Act No. 1411 of the Philippine Commission.

W.H. POLLEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me and in my presence, in the city of Mania, P.I., this 20th day of
December, 1906, by W.H. Polley.

A.S. CROSSFIELD,
Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila, P.I.

To this complaint the defendant presented the following demurrer:

Now comes Ling Su Fan, the accused in the above-entitled cause, through his undersigned counsel, and
demurs to the complaint filed against him herein and for causes of demurrer respectfully shows:

1. That said complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

2. That the fact charged do not constitute a public offense.

3. That the said complaint is contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America and also contrary to paragraph 1 of section 5 of the act of Congress of the
United States of America dated July 1, 1902.

Wherefore the defendant herein prays the court that the said complaint be dismissed and that he, said
defendant, be discharged from custody and arrest.

Manila, P.I., December 28, 1906.

LIONEL D. HARGIS,
C.W. O'BRIEN,
Attorneys for the defendant, 18 Plaza Cervantes, Manila.

Upon this demurrer the court below made the following order:

This case is before the court for hearing the demurrer to the complaint presented by the defendant.

After examining the demurrer and the complaint, and giving the same due consideration, I am of the opinion
that the grounds of the demurrer are not well taken.

It is therefore ordered that the demurrer be, and it is overruled.

No exception was made at the time of the overruling of the demurrer.

The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded "not guilty." The case then proceeded to trial.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the court below made the following findings of fact:

That on the 12th day of December, 1906, an employee at the Manila custom-house found on board the
steamship Taming in the bunk occupied by and in the exclusive use and control of the defendant, who was
the comprador on board (said ship), 20,600 silver coins, each of 1 peso, being coins made and issued by
and under the direction of the Government of the Philippine Islands; that when the said coins were
discovered as aforesaid and the defendant was confronted with the fact he stated at first that he knew
nothing about it, and afterwards that they had been brought aboard by different Filipinos whom he did not
know and had been stored in the place in which they were found for transportation to Hongkong; that these
statements were made by the defendant voluntarily; that the steamship Taming, on which these coins were
found, had already been cleared from the port of Manila for Hongkong and that she was about ready to sail,
and that the coins were not manifested either in the incoming or outgoing voyage of the said vessel; that the
finding of the coins on board the said steamship Taming as before stated, was admitted by the defendant at
the trial; the bullion value of the said coins at the time they were alleged to have left Hongkong was at least
9 percent more than their apparent face value in the Philippine Islands.

The lower court made the following observations concerning the proof offered by the defendant and his witnesses
during the trial:

Evidence was offered on the part of the defense to the effect that the said money was owned by a
Chinaman in Hongkong, who shipped the same to the Philippine Islands by the defendant, for the purpose of
purchasing Mexican silver coins and Spanish-Filipino silver coins, in accordance with an agreement made
 by the defendant with another person in Manila, under which for 82 Philippine pesos he was to receive 100
Spanish-Filipino pesos, and for 97 Philippine pesos he was to receive 100 pesos, Mexican currency, and in
corroboration of the shipment there was presented an insurance company at Hongkong. The defendant
testified that upon bringing the coins to Manila he ascertained that he could not purchase Mexican coins and
Spanish- Filipino coins as advantageously as he had before agreed, and in accordance with his
understanding with the owner of the Philippine silver coins, and so decided to take the Philippine coins back
to Hongkong to the owner thereof.

The lower court also made the following observations relating to the credibility of the defendant and his witnesses:

From the appearance of the witnesses while testifying, who testified that said coins were brought to the
Philippine Islands for the purpose of buying other coins, and from the unreasonableness of the proposition
advanced by them, I am unable to give their testimony credence. I am unable to believe that any person
would send this amount of money to the Philippine Islands from Hongkong in the care of the defendant, who
was an employee as before stated, on board the steamer Taming without the knowledge of the owners of
the vessel or its shipping agent at Hongkong, and without the knowledge of the master of the vessel.

Upon these foregoing findings of fact and observations the lower court found the defendant Ling Su Fan, guilty of
the offense charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of sixty days and to pay a
fine of P200.

From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of errors:

First. That the court below erred in overruling the demurrer presented to the complaint by the defendant and
appellant; and

Second. that the sentence of the court below was contrary to law and to the great weight of evidence.

The appellant bases his first above assignment of error upon the third ground of the demurrer presented by him in
the court below and which the lower court overruled. The third ground of the demurrer is as follows:

That said complaint is contrary to the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States of America and also contrary to paragraph 1 of section 5 of the Act of Congress of the United
States of America dated July 1, 1902.

That part of the contention of the appellant which refers to the Constitution of the United States can have no
important bearing upon the present case, for the reason that paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress
dated July 1, 1902, is almost exactly in the same phraseology as a portion of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and therefore, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing
said fourteenth amendment, may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining what was intended by Congress in
enacting said paragraph 1 of section 5, and what laws the Philippine Commission may make under its provisions.

Paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress is as follows:

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.

It will be noted that this amendment does not prohibit the enactment of laws by the legislative department of the
Philippine Government, depriving persons, of life, liberty, or property. It simply provides that laws shall not be
enacted which shall deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The question, then, is
presented, Is the act under which the defendant is prosecuted here and under which it is sought to deprive him of
the money which it is alleged he attempted to illegally export, in accordance with due process of law?

The Congress of the United States, on the 2d day of March, 1903, passed an act entitled "An act to establish a
standard value and to provide for a coinage system in the Philippine Islands." Section 6 of said act is as follows:

SEC. 6. That the coinage authorized by this act shall be subject to the conditions and limitations of the
provisions of the act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," except as
herein otherwise provided; and the Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt such measures as it
may deem proper, not inconsistent with said act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, to maintain the
value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold peso, and in order to maintain such parity between
said silver Philippine pesos and the gold pesos herein provided for . . .

In pursuance to the authority granted in said section 6, to wit, "the Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt
such measures as it may deem proper, ... to maintain the value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold
peso ..." the Civil Commission enacted Act No. 1411, dated November 17, 1905, which act was entitled "An act for
the purpose of maintaining the parity of the Philippine currency in accordance with the provisions of sections one
and six of the act of Congress approved March second, nineteen hundred and three, by prohibiting the exportation
from the Philippine Islands of Philippine silver coins, and for other purposes."

Section 1 and 2 of the said act of the Civil Commission are as follows:
 SECTION 1. The exportation from the Philippine Islands of Philippine silver coins, coined by authority of the
act of Congress approved March second, nineteen hundred and three, or of bullion made by melting or
otherwise mutilating such coins, is hereby prohibited, and any of the aforementioned silver coins or bullion
which is exported, or of which the exportation is attempted subsequent to the passage of this act, and
contrary to its provisions, shall be liable to forfeiture under due process of law, and one-third of the sum or
value of bullion so forfeited shall be payable to the person upon whose information, given to the proper
authorities, the seizure of the money or bullion so forfeited is made, and the other two-thirds shall be
payable to the Philippine Government, and accrue to the gold-standard fund: Provided, That the prohibition
herein contained shall not apply to sums of twenty-five pesos or less, carried by passengers leaving the
Philippine Islands.

SEC. 2. The exportation or the attempt to export Philippine silver coins, or bullion made from such coins,
from the Philippine Islands contrary to law is hereby declared to be a criminal offense, punishable, in
addition to the forfeiture of said coins or bullion as above provided, by a fine not to exceed ten thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year, or both in the discretion of the court.

It will be noted that the Civil Commission expressly relied upon the act of Congress of March 2, 1903, for its
authority in enacting said Act No. 1411.

Under the question above suggested it becomes important to determine what Congress intended by the phrase
"due process of law." This phrase has been discussed a great many times by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as by writers upon questions of constitutional law. This same idea, is couched in different language
in the different constitutions of the different States of the Union. In some, the phrase is "the law of the land." In
others, "due course of law". These different phrases, however, have been given practically the same definition by
the different courts which have attempted an explanation of them. The phrase "due process of law" was defined by
Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as "the law in its regular course of administration through the courts
of justice."

Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, says:

Due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers of the government as the
settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights
as those maxims prescribed for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs.

The famous constitutional lawyer Daniel Webster, in his argument before the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward (4 Wheaton, 518), gave a definition of this phrase which the Supreme
Court of the United States quoted and adopted. It was:

By the law of the land is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.
Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the
land.

There are but few phrases in the Constitution of the United States which have received more attention by the courts
of the United States, in an endeavor to ascertain their true meaning, than have been given to this expression "due
process of law." Recently a volume has been published devoted entirely to the meaning of this phrase.

"Due process of law" is process or proceedings according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is not that the
law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply —

First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government;

Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;

Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and

Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.

When a person is deprived of his life or liberty or property, therefore, under a law prescribed by the proper
lawmaking body of the state and such law is within the power of said department to make and is reasonable, and is
then enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed, and is applicable alike to all the citizens or
to all citizens of a particular class within the state, such person is not deprived of his property or of his life, or of his
liberty without due process of law. When life, liberty, and property are in question there must be in every instance
judicial proceedings, and that the requirement implies a written accusation and hearing before an impartial tribunal
with proper jurisdiction, an opportunity to defend and a conviction and a judgment before punishment can be
inflicted, depriving one of his life, liberty or property. (Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., secs. 1943-1946; Principles
of Constitutional Law, Cooley, 434).

Such have been the views of able jurists and statesmen, and the deduction is that life, liberty, and property are
placed under the protection of known and established principles which can not be dispensed with either generally or
specially, either by the courts or executive officers or by the legislative department of the Government itself.
Different principles are applicable in different cases and require different forms of procedure; in some, they must be
judicial; in others the Government may interfere directly and ex parte; but in each particular case "due process of
law" means such an exercise of the powers of the Government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction
and under such safeguards for the protection of the individual rights as those maxims prescribed have to the class
of cases to which the one being dealt with belongs. (Principles of Constitutional Law, Cooley, 434).

Illustrations might be given indefinitely, showing how the Supreme Court of the United States as well as the courts of
the different States of the Union have applied this general doctrine. The question is fully discussed in the following
cases: "Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land Co. (18 How., 272), Dartmouth College, vs. Woodward (4 Wheaton,
518), Bank of Columbia vs. Okley (4 Wheaton, 235), Walker vs. Sauvinet (92 U.S. 90), Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations (Chap. SI), Story on the Constitution (secs. 1943-1946), Milligan's Case (4 Wallace, 2), Davidson vs.
New Orleans (96 U.S., 97), Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wallace, 36), and French vs. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
(181, U.S., 324), which contains a historic discussion of the general meaning of this phrase.

In the present case the following facts may be noted:

First. That the Civil Commission on the 17th day of November, 1905, regularly and under the methods prescribed by
law, enacted Act No. 1411, providing for the punishment of all persons who should export or attempt to export from
the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins.

Second. That this law had been enacted and published nearly eleven months before the commission of the alleged
offense by the defendant.

Third. That a complaint was duly presented, in writing, in a court regularly organized, having jurisdiction of the
offense under the said law, and the defendant was duly arrested and brought before the court and was given an
opportunity to defend himself against the said charges.

Fourth. That the defendant was regularly tried, being given the opportunity to hear and see and to cross-examine
the witnesses presented against him and to present such witnesses presented against him and to present such
witnesses in his own defense as he deemed necessary and advisable.

Fifth. That after such trial the said court duly sentenced the defendant, complying with all the prescribed rules of
procedure established.

Sixth. That said Act No. 1411 was duly enacted by the Philippine Commission in pursuance of express authority
given said Commission by the Congress of the United States in an act duly approved March 2, 1903.

A question remaining is, Did the Civil Commission have the authority to enact said Act No. 1411? Certainly said
Commission is limited in its powers. As Daniel Webster said in the famous Dartmouth College case:

Everything which may pass under the forms of an enactment is not to be considered the law of the land. If
this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments,
and acts directing and transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees, and
forfeitures in all possible forms would be the law of the land. Such a strange construction would render
constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to
establish the union of all the powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for the
courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle
ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees, but not to declare the law or to
administer the justice of the country.

But notwithstanding the limitations upon the power of the Commission, there are certain powers which legislative
departments of Government may exercise and which can not be limited. These are known as the police power of the
state. The police power of the state has been variously defined. It has been defined as the powers of government,
inherent in every sovereignty (License Cases, 5 Howard, 583); the power vested in the legislature to make such
laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cushing, Mass.,
85); the powers to govern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons and the protection of all property within the state (Thorpe vs. Rutland and B. R. Co., 27 Vermont, 149);
the authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public
interests (People vs. Budd, 117 New York, 14). This question of what constitutes police power has been discussed
for many years by the courts of last resort in the various States and by many eminent law writers.

Blackstone, in his Commentaries upon the common law, defines police power as:

The defense, regulation, and domestic order of the country whereby the inhabitants of a state like members
of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good
neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
(4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 162.)

Chief Justice Shaw in the case of the Commonwealth vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53, 84), said:

We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community ... . Rights of property like all other social and
conventional rights are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,
 under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.

The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by which the state
seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the state but also to establish for the
intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably
consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. The police power of the state includes not only public health and
safety but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best interest. It is so
extensive and all pervading that courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on
its own merits (Harding vs. People, 32 Lawyers' Rep. Ann., 445). This power has been exercised by the state in
controlling and regulating private business even to the extent of the destruction of property of private persons when
the use of such property became a nuisance to public health and convenience. (Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wallace, 36; Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S., 678; Walling vs. Michigan,
116 U.S., 446; Duncan vs. Missouri, 1252 U.S., 377; Morgan, etc., vs. The Board of Health, 118 U.S., 455;
Jacobson vs. Mass., Feb. 20, 1905.)

The state not only has authority under its police power to make such needful rules and regulations for the protection
of the health of its citizens as it may deem necessary; it may also regulate private business in a way so that the
business of one man shall in no way become a nuisance to the people of the state. It may regulate the sale and use
of intoxicating liquors, the sale of poisons, the sale of foods, etc., and it would seem that nothing is of greater
importance to the safety of the state, in addition to the regulation of the morals health of its people, than to regulate
and control its own money. In addition to the fact that said Act No. 1411 was enacted in accordance with express
permission given by the Congress of the United States, this court has already decided, in the case of Gaspar vs.
Molina (5 Phil. Rep., 197), that the Philippine Commission possesses general powers of legislation for the Islands,
and its laws are valid unless they are prohibited by some act of Congress, some provision of the Constitution, or
some provision of treaty.

We are of opinion, and so hold, that Act No. 1411 was enacted by the Philippine Commission with full power and
authority so to do. We are of opinion, therefore, and so hold, that the lower court committed no error in overruling
the demurrer presented by the defendant.

With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, relating to the sufficiency of the proof adduced
during the trial of the cause, we are of opinion, and so hold, that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause
was sufficient to justify the findings of fact and the conclusions of the lower court.

An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows the following facts to
be true:

1. That on the 12th day of December, 1906, on board the steamship Taming, after the said ship had raised anchor
and was ready to sail out of the harbor of Manila for the port of Hongkong, there was found in the room occupied by
the defendant the sum of 20,600 Philippine silver pesos, coined by authority of the act of Congress of the United
States, March 2, 1903.

2. That the defendant was confronted with the fact that this amount of said money was found in his room, and that
he then and there stated that the same had been brought into his room by a Filipino whose name he was unable to
give; and that he did not know why the money had been placed there.

3. The money was not on the manifest of the ship when she came into the harbor some days before the said 12th
day of December, neither was the said money on the manifest of the ship which had already been prepared for the
trip to Hongkong on the said 12th day of December. The said money was taken charge by W. H. Polley, a detective
of the custom secret service of Manila, and was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands. The
defendant was duly arrested and charged with the crime of attempting to export Philippine silver coin from the
Philippine Islands contrary to law.

At the trial of the cause the defendant attempted to show that he had brought the money in question from Hongkong
to be exchanged for certain Mexican coin and Spanish coin in Manila. These statements of the defendant were
corroborated by a Chinaman called Wong Tai from Hongkong, and also by testimony of Juan On Hieng of Manila.
The said Wong Tai testified that he had sent the said P20,600 from Hongkong to Manila on the said
steamship Taming, for the purpose of buying of the said Juan On Hieng old Spanish silver and Mexican silver; that
said money was sent in the care of the defendant.

In support of the statements of Wong Tai the defendant presented an insurance policy or a duplicate copy of an
insurance policy alleged to have been issued by a certain Japanese insurance company doing business in the city
of Hongkong. No proof was offered however to show that said duplicate copy of an insurance policy had actually
been issued by said company. The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila objected to the introduction of the said
duplicate policy upon the ground that it had not been sufficiently identified. This objection was overruled. No
evidence was presented to show that said company ever, as a matter of fact, issued the policy. In the absence of
proof showing that the document had been issued by the proper authorities, the same should not have been
admitted in evidence. The duplicate policy did not prove itself. It was dated on the 4th day of December, 1906. In
support of the testimony of Wong Tai, the defendant also presented Juan On Hieng as a witness. This witness
testified that he had an arrangement with Wong Tai to exchange with him at a certain rate Spanish silver coin and
Mexican silver coin for Philippine silver pesos, and that he had an arrangement with a certain Filipino in Manila from
whom he was to purchase said Spanish and Mexican coin. He could not remember, however, the name of the
Filipino from whom he was to purchase said coins; neither could he describe him, nor could he tell where the said
Filipino resided. We do not believe the statements of these witnesses notwithstanding the fact that they seem to
corroborate the statements of the defendant. Courts should not lightly regard the statements of witnesses under
oath, but nevertheless when the testimony of witnesses seems to be unreasonable from every standpoint it should
be weighed with care, when it comes loaded with the temptations of private interests and the impressions of
personal penalties; if the defendant had not been guilty of attempting to violate the law, there would have been no
occasion for him to have stated at the time the money was found in his room what were the true facts, and then
there would have been no difference between his statements then and the statements he made at the time of the
trial. These conflicting statements lend much suspicion to the veracity of the defendant as well as to the truth of the
statements of the witnesses called in his behalf. The evidence also shows that Philippine silver coin was worth, at
the time the coins in question were shipped, about 9 percent more in bullion than they were as money.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the sentence of the lower court should be
affirmed with costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Willard, J., concurs in the result.

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
STREET, J.:
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course
and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got
hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result
of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover
of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held
to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is
this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that
an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that
the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and
the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

37 Phil. 809

STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum
of P31,100, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from
liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff
was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles, per hour.
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts,
as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is
shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached,
the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet
exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the
railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case
we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile
and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries
the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge,
he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he
must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the
moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape
being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the
animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the
conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger
he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation ? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard suppose to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take
care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in
a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be
mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of
the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in
Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which
were hauled along a narrow track. At a certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason
of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in
consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of a typhoon which had dislodged one of the supports
of the track. The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the
bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory
negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while
the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in
proper repair, nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted
in an omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually present
and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh
the negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of
their, relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the
immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court
of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred,
the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary investigation the
defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the
acquittal of the defendant at a trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned
would be res adjudicata, upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence a point upon
which it is unnecessary to express an opinion the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the
criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no such effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and
Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with
costs of both instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical
expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on
the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or
otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

CONCURRING OPINION
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this case. I do so
because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly
applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is
"concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveller when he reaches the point of collision is in
a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But
Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the defendant succeeded that of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval of time, and that at that moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the
accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveller has
reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his
negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury
and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl, 330.)