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Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked • PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY
Card 7 18, 1970
144 [introduction.]
III
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Pseudo-Revolutionaries
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Unmasked
Card
PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970
8
Text
The centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has become a holiday for working people p
HTML
the world over. It has developed into a convincing demonstration of the triumph of
PS
PDF
Lenin’s cause, the vitality of Lenin’s ideas and behests. With the name of Lenin,
with his all-triumphant teaching, are linked all the historical accomplishments of our
T* agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism in the
19* USSR, the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system, the upsurge
of the international working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse
### of colonialism, and the emancipation of the oppressed nations.
The progressive world public has widely observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration p
of the birth centenary of the leader of the world revolution has served for the
Communist and Workers’ Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism, as a
powerful stimulus in their entire ideological and political activities. The fraternal
Parties have increased the struggle for the unity of the communist movement, for the
cohesion of all antiimperialist forces.
In the minds and hearts of revolutionary fighters throughout the world Lenin’s name p
is inseparably linked with the first socialist state and its Communist Party which
consistently implement his behests and continue his cause. The keynote of the Lenin 9
celebrations in the majority of countries was recognition of the outstanding role of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process,
expression of gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless heroic struggle, for its
loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless assistance to
all revolutionary liberation movements.
Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the world-wide battle for the minds and p
hearts of people. It has shown people everywhere the prospect for deliverance from
imperialism, and more and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of its economic,
social and political organisation. The community of socialist countries has become a
force without which, and in defiance of which, not a single major problem of our
time can be solved. The united might of the socialist countries and their active
policy in defence of peace are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions of the
imperialists and preventing the outbreak of a world rocket and nuclear war.
The celebration of the Lenin centenary has vividly reflected the growing tendency
manifested at the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties-the
tendency towards united action of all revolutionary and progressive forces of the
world; it has raised to a new level their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh
and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary process which unites the three great
forces of our time-the world socialist system, the international working-class and
national-liberation movements.
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10
I
It is not surprising that the masters of the outgoing world are resorting to lies and p
slander in an attempt to discredit and belittle the historical accomplishments of
Lenin’s homeland, of the fraternal socialist countries, the world communist and
working-class movement, and the fighters for national liberation. There is nothing
new about their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet
state.
The Soviet people and entire progressive mankind know the real reasons for the p
anti-socialist actions of imperialism. We first heard them more than half a century
ago. What is worth noting is something else-the fact that during the days when the
peoples of the world were celebrating Lenin’s anniversary the Peking leaders came
out in unison with imperialism’s malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign.
Peking has timed for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of fanning animosity
and hatred towards the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community, and
the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the world.
Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are the successes of the USSR in the p
development of socialist industry, agriculture, science and technology, the steady rise
in the living standard and cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the
defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set by our Party for further
intensification of socialist production for the purpose of building the material and
technical basis of communism and strengthening the positions of world socialism. In
its desire to discredit the inspiring example of the Soviet Union and the other 11
countries of the socialist community, Peking propaganda resorts to incredible lies and
distortions, abuses and slander.
Following in the wake of imperialist propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the p
“ aggressiveness” of the USSR and the “crisis” of Soviet economy; it resuscitates
Trotskyite “ideas” about "bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,” and equates US
imperialism with the Soviet Union which they call "social-imperialism.”
Such ravings make up the content of a series of articles published in April in the p
Jenmin jihpao, Hungchi and Chiefangchiun pao, and of an article marking May Day.
These publications show that Peking has made it a tradition to resort to methods of p
rabid political and ideological provocations so characteristic of imperialist
propaganda.
Communists and all those who cherish the interests of peace and progress are p
deeply alarmed by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the international arena and
seriously concerned about the destiny of the Chinese revolution.
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The June 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties pointed p 12
out that recent events in China and the nature of the resolutions adopted at the 9th
CPC Congress had a negative effect on the entire world situation and on the struggle
of the anti-imperialist forces. The present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular
and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive activities against the countries of the
socialist community and seeking to split the ranks of anti– imperialist forces.
The actions of the Chinese leaders following the International Conference, which p
Peking terms a "black gathering,” show the soundness of the conclusions drawn by
Marxist-Leninist Parties to the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually launched
struggle against the world socialist system, the international communist movement
and the revolutionary fighters all over the world.
All this calls for greater vigilance with respect to Peking’s activities in the
international arena and for watching closely which way the Mao group is leading
China.
II
The entire home and foreign policy course of the Peking leaders is dictated by p
great-power and hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of realizing these
aspirations that China was turned into a proving ground of adventurous experiments,
the burden of which fell heavily upon the shoulders of the Chinese people.
The People’s Republic of China is going through an acute crisis in all spheres of its p
political, economic and cultural life. The Communist Party has been broken up. The
constitutional bodies of people’s power, trade-unions, Komsomol and other 13
democratic organisations and unions of artists and intellectuals have been dissolved.
There is nothing left of the Communist Party except its name, for Mao and his
associates are building up an altogether new political organisation which will serve as
a tool of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in the country.
State power bodies in China are built on the militarist pattern inherited from Chiang p
Kaishek’s rule. All power is concentrated in the hands of the military, Mao’s yes-
men, who are the bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The commanders
of military areas, armies and garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They
head the "revolutionary committees" and supervise the “regulation” of Party
organisation!?. Army units are quartered at enterprises, educational establishments
and offices. At industrial plants shops and teams are classed as companies and
squads. The same militarist system is being introduced at government offices and
educational institutions. The army controls the country’s economy and culture.
Commanding army officers issue orders, which workers, peasants, office employees p
and students must carry out unconditionally. This is the way society is being run
today in China, this is the way in which the ideas that all Chinese must be "obedient
bulls,” "eternally unrusting screws" and "Mao’s good soldiers" are translated into
practice. The Chinese people are being driven into barracks and are denied access to
knowledge and culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, "the more a person knows, the
more stupid he becomes.” In the last four years not a single work of fiction has 14
been published and no feature film has been released in the country. All museums
and libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao quotation books and his other
“works” are circulated in 3,000 million copies.
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During these years more than 70 million children of school age were deprived of
normal education in school. The country fell short of several million specialists, since
the academic process at institutions of higher learning was broken off. Such is the
result of the practical implementation of Mao’s thesis: "Schools are little tombs out
of which can come nothing but evil; they are shallow ponds swarming with turtles.”
Developing this thesis Mao said in 1964: "The course of science may be cut to half
its present length. Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music, arrow
shooting, chariot driving, holy books and arithmetic... No matter how many books
you read, you will not become an emperor... The point today is that, in the first
place, there are many subjects and, secondly, there are many books.”
But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim they are playing the part of Messiah in p
today’s world.
The implementation of "Mao Tse-tung’s ideas" has also led to grave consequences p
in the economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy in a planned and
balanced way on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his
supporters, having discarded the Leninist principles of economic management and 15
replaced them by voluntarism, have caused the country to embark on the road of "big
leaps" and militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of industry and
agriculture.
The PRC’s economy has twice in the last decade been hurled back below the level p
it had reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year plan wa>3 carried out
successfully; this was at a time when the CPC guided the country’s economic
development on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, drawing on the
experience and relying on the all-round support and assistance of the USSR and
other socialist countries. At that time the PRC ranked among the first in the world in
development rates. But the second fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,”
and the third by the "cultural revolution.” As a result, industrial production has not
reached the levels mapped by the second and third five-year plans. It has been
marking time on the 1959 level.
It should be taken into account that the increase in population in the country, p
according to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year. This means that in the last
ten years per capita production of many major industrial and agricultural items has 16
not risen, but decreased.
Basic foods and manufactured goods are being supplied to the population under a p
strict rationing system.
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production. The Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the national economy
out of its logjam. Emergency measures are being taken to remedy the situation.
Certain negative consequences of the " cultural revolution" in the sphere of
production are being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy in economic
management. But the Peking leaders are endeavouring to solve this problem
primarily by military-administrative methods,- by methods of coercion. Meanwhile
living standards of the working people remain to be very low: the wages of the
workers in the last four years have shrunk by at least 10–15 per cent and working
hours have been increased.
The economy of the People’s Republic of China is actually divided into two parts. p
One comprises a narrow group of sectors connected with military production. This
part enjoys overall priority, and has not been subjected to the "cultural revolution" 17
treatment. The other part of the economy consists of the civil production sectors,
which are told to "lean on their own resources,” and not to expect investments.
This military deformity of the economy makes China’s entire economic and social p
development lopsided.
In these conditions, the Peking propagandists seek to divert the attention of the p
population from the disastrous consequences of the economic policy which the
Maoists have imposed on the nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that the
USSR and other socialist countries are worse off than China, and thus to neutralise
justified discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes practically every day
articles about an "economic crisis" in the Soviet Union. The Peking propagandists
turn everything upside down in their attempt to belittle the achievements of the
Soviet people, to conceal from the population of China the truth about our country.
The following facts are, of course, known to the Peking leaders, but they are p
carefully hidden from the people. In the 1960–69 period in the Soviet Union
production of electricity went up from 292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000
million kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608 million tons; oil, from 148
million to 328 million tons; steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and grain, 18
from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.
The Soviet Union today ranks first in the world in the extraction of coal, iron ore p
and manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe and second in the world in the
extraction of oil, smelting of steel, production of electricity, and the output of many
key engineering items, chemicals and other important products.
Major successes have also been scored by the working people of other countries of p
the socialist community. For instance, industrial output in the member-states of the
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Council for Mutual Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950– 69 period.
During the same period industrial output in the advanced capitalist states rose only
2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose populations make up only one-tenth of
the world population, account for about one-third of world industrial output, and
their share in world industrial production is steadily rising.
In the past few years the socialist countries took important steps towards raising the p
efficiency of social production through its intensification on the basis of scientific
and technological progress. They are strengthening fraternal cooperation and working
to promote socialist economic integration. The successes of the socialist world not
only serve the interests of the socialist countries, but have a tremendous
revolutionising effect.
The rapid development of the national economy of the countries of the socialist p
community, whose economic growth rate is outstripping that of the capitalist states;
the improvement of the living standard of the working people; the fact that socialism 19
now leads in a number of fields in science and technology-all these real results of
the creative effort of the peoples of the socialist countries most decisively help to
ensure the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism over imperialism.
This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin’s teaching that we can make the greatest p
impact on the world revolution through our economic policy.
It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of p
China in 1956 pointed out the following: "The main purpose of the entire work of
the Party is to satisfy to the utmost the material and cultural needs of the people.
Thus it is necessary, on the basis of development of production, to improve the life
of the people, which, in turn, is an essential condition for stepping up the production
activity of the masses."/Peking now declares that concern for the people’s welfare is
"black economism" and "bourgeois degeneration.”
Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is being trampled underfoot in the PRC. p
As a result, production is made to serve the purpose not of steadily improving the
material and cultural standards of the working people, but of building up a military
potential necessary for carrying out expansionist activities in the world-aims totally
alien to the interests of the working masses.
The Peking leaders have weakened the positions of the working class, undermined p
its alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the socialist superstructure in China,
creating antagonistic relations between the main social sections of society.
Today, four years after the launching of the "cultural revolution,” the contradictions p 20
besetting China’s society remain acute, although it would seem that all measures have
been taken to suppress and exterminate the genuinely revolutionary, internationalist
forces in China, against which the "cultural revolution" was directed. This is why the
Chinese press continues to call for the rooting out of the "handful of enemies,” as all
opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called. Terror reigns in the country. Frame-
up trials continue to be held in large cities ending in group executions in squares and
stadiums in front of thousands of people.
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ethnic groups. In the course of the "cultural revolution" local autonomy, already
limited, is turned into a fiction. The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The districts inhabited by the national
minorities have become centres of "labour armies" and concentration camps. The
age-old culture and distinctive features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and others-are being
systematically destroyed. This cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.
More and more troops are being dispatched to break their resistance. Many units are p 21
being brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.
The native population is being driven out of the districts bordering on the Soviet p
Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic. Yet despite all this Peking propaganda
finds it possible to praise the order forced upon the national minorities of China and
at the same time slander the Leninist policy of equality, friendship and fraternity of
the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland« tis required to prevent the truth about p
the USSR reaching the Chinese people.
The experience of national construction in the Soviet Union over a period of more p
than half a century has shown that the CPSU and the Soviet state, by implementing
the Leninist principles of national policy, have succeeded in creating and
strengthening the unshakable moral and political unity of all the peoples of the
USSR, have ensured the genuine blossoming of their economy and culture. This is
proved by data on the development of the Union Republics, former backward
outskirts of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power industrial output in
Uzbekistan increased 70 times over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times. These were areas with an almost
100 per cent illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and academies of
sciences and a wide network of schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.
The solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union (and this is one of the p
most acute and difficult problems of social life) is a major achievement of our
socialist system, an important step in mankind’s social development. The attempts of 22
the Peking leaders to discredit the Soviet Union’s national policy only succeeded in
exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han policy.
The barrack “communism” which they try to establish in China runs counter to the
requirements of a socialist society-the development of the productive forces and
utilisation of the results of the scientific and technological revolution; it runs counter
to the vital interests of the masses-improvement of their material and cultural
standards, development of socialist democracy, and provision of genuine equality of
nations; it runs counter to all the objective processes of social development which
spell victory of scientific socialism.
III
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which boils down to the idea that war is inevitable and even desirable. "As for the
question of world war,” Mao said, "it is a case of either war provoking a revolution,
or revolution preventing war.” In explaining the meaning of this formula, Lin Piao at
the CPC’s 9th Congress, and later the Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution
with war. Thus, the newspaper Chieh tang jihpao said that revolution "must of
necessity develop into war.” According to this thesis war is not only something that
cannot be avoided; it is even some-
thing that should be sought. The paper deplores the fact that for a quarter of a 23
century now there has been no world war.
In one of their publications Chinese propagandists bluntly state: "The theory that p
war can be avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt that there will be a
war. The question is only when, whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to
avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged against views claiming that war can
be avoided in the obtaining situation.”
By preaching war the Maoists are writing off the interests of world socialism, the p
working people in all lands, and the world revolution. The Peking strategists proclaim
that "a civilisation hundreds of thousands of times better" will be built up on the
ruins of "crushed imperialism and social-imperialism.”
Thus at a conference of Party workers in Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: "If, for p
instance, the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one can do except start
building anew after the war when we may possibly obtain somewhat better results
than now.” In the last ten years whenever there was a heightening of international
tensions, the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve ona aim: that of heating
up the situation still more and of prodding the world towards war.
After the CPC’s 9th Congress the position of the present Chinese leaders on the p
issue of war and peace has been stated time and again in anti– Soviet tirades which
include the most recent articles. The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the
Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US imperialism. The current
campaign of nation-wide militarisation conducted by the Maoists is accompanied by 24
calls for preparing for war against the USSR and the other socialist countries, for
struggle to overthrow the socialist system in these countries.
The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the people’s attention from the deep social p
and political crisis that has seized the country by whipping up a rabid campaign of
jingoism and of hate towards the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and some
of China’s non-socialist neighbours. They are trying to lay the responsibility for all
the suffering and misery which Mao’s adventuristic course has caused the Chinese
people on "external enemies,” among whom Peking puts first not imperialism, but the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The intensity of the
false and provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat of an attack on the PRC
from the North" is a matter of common knowledge. Also common knowledge are the
unfounded territorial claims that the leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China’s neighbours including the USSR.
To further these claims and stir up hate toward neighbouring nations the leaders of p
the PRC engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the smokescreen of the
war hysteria that has been created in China, a policy is being carried out at an
intense pace of suppressing popular resentment, speeding up the country’s
militarisation and propagandising the inevitability of war.
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In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify this policy. One such pretext has been p
discovered in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about China’s exclusiveness,
about its historically ordained role of leader "beneath the heavens.” This chauvinistic
rubbish is clothed in the form of an "ultra– revolutionary" struggle to assert the 25
"thought of Mao" in the world.
Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal p
greatpower concepts, “super-revolutionary” phrasemongering and what is actually
anti-revolutionary practice.
The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill and cunning in passing themselves p
off as revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of the world revolution. If
we were to believe even for a moment the newspaper tirades and the speechifying of
the Peking leaders, one might think that there they were working round the clock to
promote the cause of the world revolution.
In an attempt to hold back the world revolutionary process, the imperialists are p
uniting their efforts on an international scale. The Chinese leaders, however, are
spearheading their foreign policies against the cohesion of the countries of the
socialist community, they are trying to undermine the allied relations of the socialist
states-members of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the implementation of the
plans for the further development of socialist economic integration. And this, 26
precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to achieve.
In the last few years there has not been a single instance where, in a crisis world p
situation caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the PRC has joined the
socialist community and the anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the forces of
reaction and aggression.
The leaders in Peking are responsible for dooming some detachments of the p
communist and national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa to defeat by
imposing on these detachments their adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of
courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from Peking lost their lives, and the
revolutionary movement in some countries suffered serious setbacks and great losses-
such is the bloody result of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of the Peking
"ultra-revolutionaries.”
The Soviet Government’s Statement of May 4, 1970, noted that "the escalation of p
the US aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the need for unity and
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the strengthening of cohesion of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace forces in
the struggle against aggression.”
Such is the stand of our Party and Government and of the Soviet people. Such is p
the stand to which the fraternal socialist countries and the MarxistLeninist Parties of 27
the world adhere.
Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been conducting for some years a course p
of undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states, of
isolating the national– liberation struggle of peoples from their real alliesthe countries
of the socialist community and the international communist and workers’ movement.
Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied by attempts to slander the Soviet
Union’s internationalist policies. The "friends of people" from Peking are trying to
present the political, economic and military support given by the CPSU and the
entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist countries, to peoples fighting against
imperialist aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a " social-imperialist
policy”; they even concoct monstrous lies about "Soviet neocolonialism.”
According to their logic, it would have been better for the nations fighting against p
imperialism to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces of our time and left to
deal single-handed with a strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is actually
what the imperialists are dreaming of as they plan their adventures.
In acting in this manner Peking is telling the imperialists that it does not intend to p
take joint measures with the USSR and other socialist countries against imperialist
aggression. Such a stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the imperialist circles 28
and encourages them to continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and designs.
Yet another proof of this are the recent events in Indochina.
The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear by their actions that they are p
endeavouring to use the heroic struggle of the peoples for freedom for furthering
their own global intrigues, for they proceed from great-Han dreams of becoming
some new emperors of "great China" that would rule at least Asia, if not the entire
world.
Such a policy contradicts the interests of the world socialist system, the international
communist and workers’ movement, the national– liberation struggle of the peoples;
it contradicts the real interests of the Chinese people. "Super– revolutionariness" in
word and betrayal of the class interests of the working people in deed-such is the
meaning of Maoism in international relations.
IV
The current Chinese leadership is compelled to reckon with the tremendous prestige p
enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that he will not be able to
win the masses and keep them under his control with his name and his “ideas”
alone. For a certain period he disguised himself as a Marxist, and now he is even
trying to pass himself for a successor to Marx and Lenin.
There was a time when many of the notions that constitute Mao Tse-tung’s p
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The developments in China have revealed the real essence of Maoism, a reactionary p
Utopian petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the theoretical plane, is an eclectic
hotch-potch of widely different views including elements of Confucianism,
anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois nationalism.
From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the ideas about the special revolutionary p
character of the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of the working class.
Reactionary Utopian ideas, born of historical backwardness, are elevated by Mao to
the rank of a new theoretical discovery.
Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist doctrines great-power and chauvinistic p
views, transforming them into a Messianic theory about China’s exclusiveness.
To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about the precedence of political aims over p
the objective laws of social development; about the " tightening of the screws" and
the militarisation of society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph anywhere
before the victory of the world revolution; the theory of export of revolution,
according to which a world war is the only way of carrying out a revolution on the
world scale; and, finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of conducting
subversive activities in the ranks of the international communist and working-class 30
movement.
But this attempt is doomed to failure. The anti-socialist character of Maoism, its p
theoretical impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty cannot be compensated
for by the Mao cult.
However “ultra-revolutionary” they may sound, Mao’s ideas boil down to aggressive p
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring of Peking’s entire home and
foreign policy. And this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for the cause of
socialism in China.
The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in Peking was caused by Mao himself; this p
was to be expected and is now confirmed by the press. Recent articles from the
Chinese press contain direct references to Mao’s pronouncements aimed at creating
hate towards the Soviet Union among the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles
also quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties when he came out with
protestations of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.
In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central Committee’s Plenary Meeting that "on the p
whole, Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet Union.” Exactly a year 31
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later he said the following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in
Moscow devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "By
creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the solution of practical problems,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the Soviet people
continuous victories in the building of a new life. The programme of the
construction of communism in the USSR, put forward by the 20th Congress of the
CPSU, is a great model.”
What is all this if not cynical perfidy as regards our Party and people? p
Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest hopes on ideological subversion in the p
struggle against socialism, the subversive activities of the Maoists aimed at the
weakening and collapse of socialist countries, at splitting the communist movement
and mass progressive organisations, are actually making things easier for the class
enemies of the working people. In this the Chinese leaders are steadily drifting
towards anticommunism. A "shuttle communication" is under way between the
Peking propagandists and the bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each other’s
methods, terminology and "arguments,” and both use the poisoned weapon of anti–
communism. No renegade or hireling of the proletariat’s class enemies has ever done
bigger damage to the world revolutionary process than the Peking leaders are doing
today.
The latest articles from the Peking press and the Maoists’ actions in the p
international arena show that Peking has renewed its subversive activities against the
Marxist-Leninist Parties. The knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups in 32
various countries for fighting the Communist and Workers’ Parties and carrying out
provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class and national-liberation
movements has become one of the basic elements of the tactics of the Peking
leaders.
The interests of the world revolutionary movement call for resolute action to rebuff
the subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for maximum unity in the
struggle against imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.
***
For China there is only one way of socialist development, and this way was tested p
in practice by the Chinese people themselves in the years of their struggle for
freedom, in the years of creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist
community. It is the Leninist way to which, as developments in China have shown,
the most experienced and mature sections of Communists and non-Party people,
genuine internationalists, remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal
Communist and Workers’ Parties have been calling on the Chinese people to follow.
Unity and solidarity with the forces of the world socialist community and the p
revolutionary liberation movement, rehabilitation and consolidation of the truly
socialist basis of Chinese society -this is the only course that accords with the
interests of the Chinese people.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government have been consistently pursuing a policy p
aimed at restoring and promoting friendly relations with China. It is not through our 33
fault that these relations have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The present state of
relations between the PRC and the USSR and other socialist countries is a result of
the chauvinist policies conducted by the Chinese leadership, a result of its departure
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The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and unambiguous stand on the Peking p
negotiations on the question of normalising the situation along the Soviet-Chinese
borders. Our country believes that it is necessary to reach an agreement that would
permit turning the borders into a line of goodneighbourliness. As it has been
repeatedly emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government,
we, while not retreating from our just and principled positions and while defending
the interests of our socialist homeland and the inviolability of its frontiers, will
continue doing everything in our power to normalise our inter-state relations with the
People’s Republic of China.
We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that Peking is bent on whipping up p
militaristic psychosis, demanding that the people "prepare for famine, prepare for a
war.” Even the launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless efforts of 34
Chinese scientists, engineers and workers, is used as an occasion for fanning
nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our country.
If all this is being done with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet p
Union, one must say in advance that these are vain efforts. The Soviet people have
strong nerves. Our people possess everything necessary to uphold the interests of our
homeland.
We proceed from the belief that the vital and long-range interests of the Soviet and p
Chinese peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact they coincide.
“In jointly following the road charted by Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against p
the sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph of the sacred cause of
socialism and communism,” L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, said in his report at the meeting marking the centenary of the birth of
Lenin, "lies the correct path for the future development of relations between China
and the Soviet Union, and between China and other socialist countries.”
The Soviet people proceeding from this historical path, retain a friendly attitude p
towards the Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and internationalist policy is bound
to triumph in China. Such is the objective logic of historical development.
***
TEXT SIZE
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<•> Concerning the 50th 35
Text July 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party p
HTML of China. In the past half-century it has traversed a long and devious road of great
PS achievements as well as grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists united
PDF to form the Communist Party of China. Relying on the support and experience of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire international communist
T* movement, the Communist Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the
19*
Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and led the Chinese people to an
### historic victory in October 1949.
People’s China led by the Communist Party became part of the socialist camp, and p
established friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other fraternal states. With
their help the Chinese people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the national
independence of the People’s Republic of China, eliminating the remnants of the
semi– colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad democratic reforms. In
accordance with the will of the multi-million working masses the Communist Party
of China led the country along the road of building a socialist society, as defined in
the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in September 1956. The first five-
year plan for the country’s economic development was fulfilled in 1957. The 36
Communist Party of China emerged as a major contingent of the world communist
movement and enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the international meetings of
communist and workers’ parties in 1957 and 1960.
But in the late 1950’s the CPC leadership initiated a foreign and home policy p
which deviated from Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the principles of
proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. It began to
pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power
chauvinism, camouflaged with “left” phraseology; it openly embarked on a course of
undermining the unity of the socialist community, of splitting the world communist
movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups in a number of countries, in an
obvious attempt to unite them and turn them against the world communist movement.
This resulted in a considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist Party
and the working class within China and an upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist
elements.
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The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties, resolutely countered the attempts to p
distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in the socialist community, 37
the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU Central
Committee and the Soviet Government displayed restraint and refused to be
provoked while doing everything they could to improve relations with China. The
last one and a half years have seen some signs of a normalisation of USSRPRC
relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts of the Soviet Union. At the same time
the Chinese leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line in their propaganda
and policy; the 9th CPC Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti– Marxist
course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Peking’s actions in
the international arena testify that the foreign policy of the PRC has in fact broken
away from proletarian internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.
The Communist Party of China was founded as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. p
At its First Congress the party set the task of carrying out a socialist revolution, 38
establishing the dictatorships of the proletariat and building a classless, communist
society. The Congress adopted a decision on the party’s joining the Comintern. In
early 1922 Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.
At the time when the CPC came into being the working-class movement in China p
was just beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary experience in class
struggle. The November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a political trend and as a party at a
time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself as a class and when
the class movement of workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge of the
national-liberation movement in China, in which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the earlier period, took place long
before the class awareness and class struggle of the exploited masses assumed an
appreciable scale.”
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The "May 4 Movement" was a response to the October Revolution and showed that p
the working people of China were ready for a decisive struggle against imperialist
oppression. It was necessary then to merge the Marxist circles into a party capable of 40
leading the struggle of the young working class, and the democratic and national-
liberation forces against social oppression, against imperialism. Such a party came
into being in the 1920s. Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed within the
communist movement in China with the help of the Comintern, which set a correct
political course.
The Second Congress which took place in July 1922 confirmed the CPC’s striving p
to become a truly proletarian party. "We must be a real political party created by the
proletarian masses, imbued with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for the
interests of the proletariat and lead the proletarian revolutionary movement,” said the
Resolution on the CPC’s Rules. The Congress called for organisation of the party
after the Bolshevik model and adopted a resolution on joining the Comintern, which
subsequently guided the political and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists.
The world communist movement invariably came to the help of the Chinese
revolutionaries whenever they made mistakes.
The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and 4th (January 1925) Congresses p
regarded the proletariat as the party’s mainstay, the vanguard and then the leader of
the revolution, and the peasantry as the proletariat’s chief ally whose active support
was vitally important for the Chinese revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress
(April-May 1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more than 50 per cent of
whom were workers and about 19 per cent peasants.
The 6th Congress was an important landmark in the development of the Communist p
Party of China. It was held in June and July 1928 and was attended by a delegation 41
of the Comintern Executive. In February of the same year the 9th plenary meeting of
the Comintern Executive adopted a Resolution on the Chinese Question which
summed up the current developments and the specific features of the revolutionary
movement in China and pointed out that "the Comintern Executive has directed all
its sections to support the Chinese revolution in every way.” Guided by this
resolution the Congress adopted documents which in effect constituted the first
comprehensive programme of the CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese
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This showed a truly Marxist approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution, the p
solutions to which were worked out by the Communists– internationalists.
But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend in the CPC another, essentially p
petty-bourgeois and nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of the upsurge
of the national liberation movement radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined
the party in great numbers. "Lifted by the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm of the 42
initial period, lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling, ignorant of the
experience of the international proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited
lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken no part in the class struggle of
the workers and peasants, a considerable part of these revolutionary petty-bourgeois
elements, far from being assimilated by the party and becoming consistent proletarian
revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all the political instability, inconsistency and
indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian habits and traditions, prejudices
and illusions characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,” stressed the
November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. This tendency,
associated mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into a petty-bourgeois and
nationalist trend which came to be known as Maoism.
The struggle between the Marxist, internationalist trend guided by the ideas p
underlying the Great October Socialist Revolution and the petty– bourgeois,
nationalist trend marked the entire history of the Communist Party of China. This
struggle was reflected in the decisions of the party congresses, in the theories and the
practical activity of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these two trends has
been and remains characteristic of the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and
his historiographers seek to distort the true picture, to confuse the issue. To this end
they oppose the "true line" of Mao Tse-tung to a host of “wrong” lines, whose
number grows in Peking publications every year. Recently most of the party cadres
have been labelled "those vested with power in the party and following the capitalist 43
road.”
The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the CPC was guided by the theses set p
forth in Lenin’s works and in the documents of the international communist
movement. These theses include the definition of the essential feature of the Chinese
revolution as a combination of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle
against imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement and the revolutionary
struggle in the countryside and to set up strongholds when the revolution is in
decline; the expediency of an alliance with the petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that in China armed
revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union of
the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and others. It was the implementation of
these theses by the Communist Party of China that made possible the victory of the
Chinese revolution in 1949. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist faction
was quite different. It did not and could not make any positive contribution to the
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Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the Maoists from time to time p
attempted to make the party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had to retreat. It
is significant that Mao Tse-tung attended only three out of the six CPC congresses
held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was deprived of the right to vote. The
Maoists launched fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with difficulties. 44
After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in April 1927 the Communist Party of p
China functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides -from the central
Kuomintang government and the separatist military cliques, from the troops of the
Western imperialist colonialists and the Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy
losses when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the remote north-western regions of
the country following the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the party gave
their lives in the struggle for the cause of the working people. The loss of the tried
cadres devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism seriously
weakened the position of the CPC.
At the same time the obtaining situation and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the p
Chinese people forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in the mainstream of
the revolutionary struggle.
In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced the idea of a united anti-imperialist p
front, stressing its particular importance for countries in colonial bondage at a time
of imperialist expansion. In keeping with this thesis a united front of the Communist
Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of resistance against Japanese imperialism
(1937–45) was proclaimed in China, which furnished the basis for rallying all
segments of the Chinese people for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The
petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united front, seeking every opportunity to
undermine it. Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the Chinese national-
liberation movement, the courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of the
CPC leadership for consistent implementation of the Comintern line, and were forced
to retreat. The united front policy helped to make the CPC a mass party, the
vanguard of the Chinese people, a political force of nation-wide significance.
The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler nazism and militarist Japan was of p
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tremendous importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945–49 the centre of the
Chinese revolutionary movement shifted to Manchuria where active preparation began
with Soviet assistance for the final phase of the struggle for liberating China from 46
colonial and social oppression.
The routing of militarist Japan, in which the Soviet Union played a decisive role, p
strengthened the revolutionary forces in China. The People’s Liberation Army had
then a safe rear and was able to reorganise and improve its combat equipment with
the Japanese arms and materiel captured by the Soviet troops.
The revolutionary forces of China received extensive material assistance from the p
Soviet Union. In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian organisations helped
in every way to rehabilitate the economy, to repair communication lines destroyed
during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the main railways in central and southern
Manchuria were restarted in a short time and large formations of the People’s
Liberation Army of China were able to regroup and concentrate, which helped to
complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its expulsion from Manchuria, and
furnished favourable conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.
The Chinese people were able to express their will freely in the areas liberated from p
the Japanese by the Soviet Army and began to set up people’s democratic bodies of
power.
At that time the USSR Government did everything to prevent open military p
intervention by the United States in China, above all in Manchuria.
Manchuria with its well-developed industry and the large share of the country’s p
working class, its strong party organisations, and also thanks to the fact that it
borders on the Soviet Union, became in 1945–49 a strategic bridgehead from which
the People’s Liberation Army was able to launch a powerful offensive and quickly
liberate the whole country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their imperialist patrons.
The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese people was crowned with a glorious p
victory. In the vanguard were Communists true to Marxism– Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. At every stage of that struggle the Communist Party of
China had leaders who represented everything best in the Chinese revolutionary
48
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movement. These were the Chinese Communists whose real role was subsequently
ignored or wilfully distorted by the Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung
as the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement and creating a myth about
his infallability. Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or were forced out
from the CPC leadership, but their glorious memory lives on.
The fraternal union of the Chinese revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for
the relative weakness and disunity of the Chinese working class; it promoted the
consolidation of the internal forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them
against the import of counter-revolution. The victory of the Chinese people
convincingly proved the correctness of Lenin’s thesis that ”. . .this revolutionary
movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a
successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our
Soviet Republic against international imperialism.” [48•1
II
The formation of the People’s Republic of China and the establishment in China of p
people’s demo- : cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i ist Party, the
extensive and disinterested assistance I of the USSR and other fraternal countries,
and the changed balance of class forces in the international arena in favour of
socialism opened before the Chinese people broad possibilities of successful building
of socialism. In the first years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China the Communist Party drafted concrete ways of carrying out socialist 49
construction. In 1953 the CPC’s general line in the transition period was made
public, which called for mobilising all the forces for making China a mighty socialist
state.
In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and endorsed the course of building a p
socialist society in the People’s Republic of China. At the same time the Congress
proclaimed that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-
Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly interprets the laws of social
development, shows the correct ways of building socialism and communism.” This
thesis did away with the idea of "Sinoised Marxism" and with "Mao Tse-tung’s
thought" as the CPC’s ideological platform set forth at the 7th Party Congress in
1945.
The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired a strong foundation in China. But p
the petty– bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay down their arms.
They continued to deal underhand blows at the section of the party leadership and
rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.
In the mid-50’s the People’s Republic of China entered "the core of the p
revolutionary course,” to use Lenin’s expression. Radical changes were carried out in
the non-socialist economic sectors. The achievements of the first five-year plan
period furnished the basis for further advancement, for organising large-scale socialist
production under strict government control. The prospect of complete elimination of
the petty-owner element became quite real. This naturally aroused the resistance of
that element, greater vacillations, which, in turn, affected the petty-bourgeois, 50
nationalist elements in the CPC leadership. "In April 1956 ... we began to advance
our own line of construction,” Mao Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC
Central Committee in 1958.
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At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the road of petty-bourgeois reformism. p
Even within the framework of CPC’s general orientation to scientific socialism they
advanced "new political stipulations,” which reflect right-wing opportunism.
The successful completion of the first five-year plan, the growth of the country’s p
economic and military might and of the international prestige of the Communist
Party of China and the People’s Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist
leaders from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they turned eagerly to petty-
bourgeois revolutionism, reflected by the so-called three red banners policy
announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC general line which provided a definite
plan of socialist construction a new "general line" was proclaimed in the form of a
vague appeal: "To strain all forces, to strive forward, to build socialism according to
the principle ’more, faster, better and more economically.’ " The "great leap" and the 52
setting up of "people’s communes" were declared the basis of the country’s economic
policy. In the international arena the line was to heighten tension, attain world
hegemony, worsen relations with the USSR and other socialist states.
The Communist Party of China found itself unable to cope with the consequences of p
these " innovations,” and a considerable portion of its membership began to waver.
This happened not only because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres had been
paralysed and ousted from leadership by that time. The fact is that owing to the
specific conditions in which the party had developed, and to the cadres policy that
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had been pursued for many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the party, the
petty-owner elements had become the dominating trend in the Communist Party of
China.
According to official Chinese data, in the late 50s the share of workers among party p
members was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.
Neither should we forget Lenin’s teaching that whenever former small owners join p
the party in vast numbers ”. . .the proletarian policy of the party is not determined 53
by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed
by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party.” [53•1
To be sure, the difficulties faced by the Communist Party of China were not p
insurmountable. As experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be coped with if
the party follows the Marxist– Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it
tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry
under the leadership of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests of the
working people. Yet the Maoists staked on petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the
basic interests of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia.
Moreover, the systematic “purges” struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres.
The home and foreign policy advanced by the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in p
the CPC leadership had a disastrous effect on China’s economy and brought about
real calamities in the country. Added to this were severe droughts and floods for
three years in succession. As a result, according to various estimates, the gross
national product in the People’s Republic of China fell by one-third, industrial output
was halved and the national income shrunk by more than one-quarter.
In the face of this the CPC leadership made changes in its home policy, although p
the "three red banners" slogan was not officially retracted. At the cost of tremendous
efforts of the working people and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to
socialist economic forms, the People’s Republic of China managed to regain the 54
1957 level of industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964. But the
country’s population grew considerably during this period. In 1964 China exploded
its first atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms race despite its limited
resources. Enormous sums had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for propaganda
and subversion against the world communist movement and for pursuing its great-
power foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC’s cooperation with socialist states did
irreparable damage to the country. As a result, difficulties continued to mount in
China.
The strife inside the CPC leadership was further aggravated. The key issue now was p
the question of the country’s further development. The choice was between returning
to the time-tested practice of socialist construction in close cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and following the petty-bourgeois,
nationalist road. In his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung admitted that attitude
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to the Soviet Union represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.
It should be stressed that the positions of the working class in the PRC were p
seriously weakened at that time. The destruction, during the "big leap,” of large-scale
industry which Lenin called the proletariat’s "vital basis" and the curtailment of
industrialisation deprived it of its class strength and undermined its ability to resist
petty-bourgeois vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the pettyowner, anarchist
element on developments in the country and its fluctuations continued despite the
fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative basis. Lenin thus characterised the main 55
features of this element: "It will take collectives, collective farms and communes
years to change this.” [55•1 The Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get
the upper hand in the CPC leadership.
Quite obviously this course of events was not fatally inevitable, even in the
complex conditions of the People’s Republic of China. After the successful
completion of the first five-year plan in 1957 the country was on the threshold of
new achievements in economic and cultural development, in promoting democracy,
and in foreign affairs. Such achievements would undoubtedly have taken place had
the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded
and enhanced the party’s leading role, had it promoted in every way the growth of
the ranks of the working class, its political awareness and its influence in society.
But it was China’s misfortune that the party and the country came to be guided by
the representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views and aspirations. Their activity
furnished conditions for further attacks by the small-owner element against the
working class, which gradually turned into a frontal assault. It began at a signal
from Mao Tse-tung who called for "opening fire at the headquarters" (i.e., party
organisations). It became the notorious "cultural revolution.”
III
Lenin wrote the following with regard to the possible outcome of the struggle p
against the anarchist element represented by the small owner: 56
“Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can p
do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-
proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will
overthrow our workers’ power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was
overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of
petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands. That is the only view we can
take of the matter. . .” [56•1
The negative results of the "cultural revolution" are generally known. The situation p
in the People’s Republic of China developed in the direction of the second variant
predicted by Lenin. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the political system of
the People’s Republic of China as a state governed by the working class was
destroyed. The bodies of people’s power ceased to function. The Communist Party of
China itself as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to
bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist League, all other public
organisations, including the young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of socio-
political, economic and cultural life were put under the army’s control. The result
was what Lenin called a "shitt of power,” the ousting of the working class from the
real bodies of power and the loss by its party of the leading position in society. A
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In order to step up and legalise this process of “shift of power" the Maoists broke p 57
away completely from the ideological and organisational principles formulated by the
Communist Party of China at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the 9th
CPC Congress held in April 1969. The Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the
army whose representatives headed the "revolutionary committees" that replaced the
elective local bodies of power in the course of the "cultural revolution.” The army
actually seized the highest party organs set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee
Politbureau (15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee (145 out of 279); this
did not include persons who formerly served in the army or were closely connected
with it. The Congress advanced as a programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the country. The Party Rules adopted by
the Congress proclaim "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" to be Marxism-Leninism of the
modern epoch. Though the Maoists use the term "democratic centralism" quite often
in the official press, in reality all their activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party. The Party Rules in effect
envisaged the creation, under the name of the Communist Party of China, of a new
political organisation which would serve as an obedient tool of the military-
bureaucratic dictatorship.
However, the formation of such an organisation dragged out in the face of serious p
difficulties. Thus Peking propagandists are forced to return once again to the question
of "streamlining and upbuilding the party organisations,” "cleaning up the party,” etc. 58
On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China the work of
forming provincial party committees was stepped up, although many district and other
local party organizations had not yet been established. The delegates to the
conferences (called “congresses” by the Chinese press) which form provincial party
committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the respective "revolutionary
committees.” The latter became the leaders of the new party committeesnearly all of
them being representatives of the army.
One indication that the petty-bourgeois nationalists are running into difficulties is the p
fact that they are forced to restore the former organisational structure which was
crushed during the "cultural revolution" under their instructions. The party Central
Committee continues to exist, though only formally, as does its Politbureau, and
medium– level and lower party links are being formed, though slowly. They have
been and are being "set up" by methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist party
norms. Their members are predominantly servicemen, while the Politbureau includes
people closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his private secretary, his
former bodyguard, etc). But this structure may come to play a positive part should
conditions in the party and the country take a favourable turn. Besides, the present
CPC leadership is faced with the necessity of reinstating some of the former party
cadres, who were persecuted or discredited during the "cultural revolution.”
Another indication of such difficulties encountered by the Maoists is that despite the p
many years of propaganda and mass “brainwashing” and the “re-cducation" of the 59
CPC members and party functionaries in the "May 7 schools,” which differ only
slightly from concentration camps, and the worst manifestations of the personality
cult, the attempt to inculcate "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" in the minds of the Chinese
Communists and the advanced sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with
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resistance. Only this can explain why, in the conditions obtaining in the People’s
Republic of China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun pointing out the need
to study the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main
purpose of this “study” is to bolster the influence of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
ideology-"Mao Tse-tung’s thought"-under the slogan of " disseminating Marxism-
Leninism.” The People’s Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung’s
works, ten million copies of the works of Marx and Lenin. This is, of course, a
mere drop in the ocean, considering the enormous population of the People’s
Republic of China and the fact that during the "cultural revolution" the number of
copies of Mao Tse-tung’s “quotations” and other works exceeded the astronomical
figure of three thousand million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung’s works is
continuing.
The resistance encountered by the Maoists in implementing their plans testify to the p
unceasing opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the CPC. The true
Communists of China are in a difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive programme for China’s development along
the socialist road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress, which the 9th
Congress had nothing to counter with.
However complicated the present situation in China may be, the resurgence of the p 60
Communist Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type, its reunification
with the world communist movement, the return of the People’s Republic of China
to the road of scientific socialism and friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with
the socialist community-these are objective demands of Chinese society. All the more
so since there remain elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite the fact
that these surviving socialist elements in the economy and social structure are
neutralised by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and deformed by the anti-socialist
policy, so long as the economic basis of society has not undergone qualitative,
radical changes, it can serve as the basis for China’s development in a positive
direction.
***
The 50-year experience of the Communist Party of China is highly instructive not p
only to the parties functioning in countries whose level of development is similar to
that of China, but to the entire communist movement. The main conclusion to be 61
drawn from this experience is that a Communist Party must constantly strengthen its
combat efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need for a determined
struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society: "The force of habit in
millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that
has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest
people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the
mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully.” [61•1
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The fate of the Communist Party of China confirms once again Lenin’s thesis that p
the struggle ".. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices,
looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the
dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single
country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a
dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and
capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole).” [61•2
These words deserve special attention in our time when the world socialist system is
emerging as a decisive factor in mankind’s development.
That is why in waging a struggle against Maoism one must proceed from an p
awareness of the incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of social-
chauvinism with the aims of the world communist and liberation movement, with the
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning socialist construction, international
affairs and revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of violence and
overestimation of the power of the bayonet, great-power chauvinism and claims for
world hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of superstructure, which
means substitution of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people’s democratic
social system, and militarisation of society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.
That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully approved the principled Leninist line p
and the concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet
Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. It noted: "In a situation in which the
Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological– political platform,
which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist
countries and at creating a split of the international communist and the whole anti- 63
imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of
consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of
the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our
socialist Motherland.”
Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the slanderous fabrications of the Chinese p
propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government,
borrowed from the arsenal of Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist
fanatics.
At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed the CPSU’s course of normalising p
relations between the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good– neighbourly relations
and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Soviet p
Communists send fraternal greetings to the Communists and working people of
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China. The Soviet people are convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations
and friendship will be restored between the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China, since this meets the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the
interests of the world socialist system, of the revolutionary, liberation movement of
all the oppressed, the interests of universal peace.
***
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<•> Concerning 64
Text Half a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the inaugural congress of the Communist Party p
HTML of China (CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the foundation of the
PS Communist Party of China, a proletarian party of a new type. The congress
PDF documents stated that the Party’s aim was to bring about the dictatorship of the
proletariat, build socialism and fight for communism, and that the Party was
T* connected with the Communist International.
19*
Since then the CPC has traversed a long and thorny path. It headed the struggle of
###
the Chinese people for national and social liberation, led them to the victory of the
revolution, and directed China along the socialist road of development. The Party
was able to fulfil this task because the Communists, guided by the great Marxist-
Leninist teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and waged an unremitting
struggle against imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords, against
petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing and right-wing deviations, chauvinism
and nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist– minded members of the Party
constantly fought against the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring about the
triumph of the ideals of scientific communism.
65
I
The founding of the Communist Party of China was a result of the stepped-up p
political activity of the rising working class and the upsurge of the revolutionary
democratic and national-liberation movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of young Soviet Russia.
Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and, later on, a co-founder of the CPC p
and one of its leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist, said the following
about the significance of the October Revolution for China:
“We should greet the Russian revolution with pride as the beacon of a new world p
civilisation. We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from new Russia which is
being built on the principles of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we keep up
with world progress.”
In China, the struggle for social emancipation of the working people was closely p
tied in with the tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main obstacle to the revolution
at the time was imperialism which had made the country its semi-colony. Lenin’s
view that capital is "an international force" was confirmed in the course of the
liberation struggle which developed in China under the Party’s guidance. An
international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood, is needed to
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vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party and the people of the Soviet
Union, the world communist and workers’ movement became a reliable ally for the
CPC and the working people of China.
The Communist International and the Soviet Communists gave the Chinese p
revolutionaries the necessary practical assistance in organising the first Marxist 66
groups which appeared in China after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May Movement"
of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International and Lenin’s
speeches at this congress on the national and colonial questions served as an impetus
and ideological basis for the unification of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The
Communist International gave considerable assistance to the Chinese revolutionaries
in assimilating Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the Leninist Party of
Bolsheviks.
Right from the first the CPC found itself in the crucible of the national-democratic p
revolution and put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal programme. The period
between the first and third congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was a
period of Party organisational and ideological growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted
to the Communist International. At its Third Congress (1923) the Party advanced the
policy of building a united national-revolutionary front with the Kuomintang then
headed by the great revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen.
The anti-imperialist action of the people, with the working class as its chief force, p
kept mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for the CPC to ensure
proletarian hegemony in the national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong and
Canton sailors’ strike, the general strike of the Shanghai workers, and the growth of
the peasant movement in the country showed that the proletariat was the main
support of the Party, the vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was the 67
principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without whose support the victory of the
revolution in China was impossible.
The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927 by the right wing of the Kuomintang p
headed by Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united front. The Communist
Party of China and those supporting it were subjected to bloody terror. Hundreds of
thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese people were victimised. Among
those who perished were such outstanding leaders of the CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa
and Chu Chiu-po, CPC Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai, a
prominent leader of the peasant movement; Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser
of the Young Communist League of China; Su Chaocheng, leader of the famous
Canton Commune, and Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary
bases of the CPC.
Another feature that complicated the situation was the right-wing deviation that p
developed in the CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party’s ties with the
masses, hampered making use of the experience of the world communist movement
and implementing Comintern recommendations. The Sixth CPC Congress (1928),
convened at such a critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the Party in the
new situation. The Congress resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement and dealt with basic problems
such as the strategy and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution, the building of
the armed forces and the establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of developing the Chinese
revolution.
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The late twenties and first half of the 30’s again proved quite complex for the p 68
Party. The Communists were constantly persecuted by the reactionaries. In the Party
proper petty-bourgeois elements became active and in the mid-30’s seized the key
Party positions.
The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against the CPC, while conducting an anti- p
Soviet campaign, followed by armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The
Chinese Communist– internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary meaning of
Chiang Kai-shek’s slogan calling for war against the Soviet Union and slanderously
trying to accuse the USSR of "red imperialism.”
Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell the Chinese people as a result of this p
counter– revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that every time the enemies
of China, the enemies of socialism inside the country attempted to weaken the
revolutionary movement, to make it deviate from the right course, they inevitably
whipped up a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the years of the struggle
for the liberation of China. The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois elements
later on.
In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet Communists initiated a mighty p
international movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The Comintern called
upon all the Communists of the world to render "every kind of support to the
Chinese revolution.”
The war against Japan was long and hard. The defeat of Hitlerite fascism and p
Japanese militarism made possible China’s final liberation from the Japanese
invaders. The decisive part in winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This provided highly favourable
conditions for the victory of the people’s revolutions in a number of countries of
Europe and Asia, including China. The liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the
Far East, the routing of Japan’s crack Kwangtung Army, the liberation of Manchuria
with the active participation of the troops of the Mongolian People’s Republic, the
Chinese and Korean guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan and
ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also predetermined the possibilities for the
subsequent defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the Soviet Union, US
intervention of China was prevented.
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major event which greatly influenced world development. The success of that
revolution marked the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China. International solidarity,
the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with the international communist and
working-class movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and other
countries of the world socialist system ensured the victory of the Chinese people, the
Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in the many-year selfless struggle they
had waged under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.
II
The victory of the revolution paved the way for the Chinese people to radical p
political, social and economic transformations. The objective requirements of the
further development of the revolution, with China taking the socialist road, as well as
the threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative for China to establish the closest
friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries which could render the PRC
the necessary political, military and economic support and assistance.
True to the great principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the CPSU and p
the Soviet people, just as during the years of revolutionary struggle, rendered the
Chinese people all the necessary support in building socialism. With the assistance of
the USSR more than 250 large modern industrial enterprises and other projects were
built in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these enterprises became "the 71
backbone of China’s industry.” "The assistance of the Soviet Union in the economic
construction of our country," Jenmin jihpao wrote at that time, "both quantitatively
and in scale is unprecedented in history.”
During the first decade following the founding of the PRC, the basis of socialism p
was laid in the country-an economic basis which provided opportunities for further
socialist construction.
The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the banner of strengthening the Marxist- p
Leninist forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the Party’s history, in the
life of the Chinese people. It confirmed the general line of building socialism in
close alliance with the countries of the world socialist system.
The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff to the nationalist and chauvinist p
tendencies in ideology and policy which had been manifested in the Party and the
country. In the "Fundamental Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical foundation of the Party was resolutely
stressed: "The Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-
Leninism.”
Having mapped out concrete ways and means of continuing socialist transformations p
and having determined the major tasks in developing the country’s national economy,
the 8th Congress stressed that the basic aim of the Party’s entire activities is "the
fullest satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the life of the people.”
In the foreign policy sphere the Congress defined as the major task the need "to p
continue to strengthen and consolidate the eternal and inviolable fraternal friendship 72
with the great Soviet Union and all People’s Democracies.”
Aware of the complex tasks of socialist construction facing the Party and the p
country, and mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the Congress urged the
Party to be vigilant and resolutely combat all manifestations of great-power
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Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance with the line of the Eighth p
Congress, the greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC considered the time
was not ripe to implement them and, concealing their true intentions, had to vote for
the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on, however, Mao Tse-tung and his
following took action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened the lock-gate to
the surging wave of petty– bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class.
Capitalising on the Chinese people’s desire to build socialism in the shortest possible
space, advocates of this course used “left”-revolutionary slogans to plunge the
country into the voluntarist "great leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of
China characterised this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois fanaticism,” for
which even then the Chinese people had paid dearly.
The nationalist group in the CPC leadership kept enforcing their own platform on p 73
the Party and the country. By working up nationalist and jingoist sentiments, they
sought to gear Chinese home and foreign policies to the attainment of hegemonic
aims in the international arena.
The present leaders of the Communist Party of China spoke out against the world p
communist movement line jointly evolved by communist and workers’ Parties, the
CPC included. They put forth their own ideological and political platform,
inconsistent with Leninism on major questions concerning international affairs and
socialist upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties upholding Marxism-
Leninism had effectually thwarted all attempts to revise this science from “left”-
opportunist and nationalist positions, the Peking leadership launched an unprecedented
smear campaign and subversive activity against our Party and other fraternal parties.
This activity was extended to include not only the socialist system and the
communist movement but also the entire anti-imperialist front.
Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC ranks and among the vast masses of p
the Chinese people. To do away with this opposition, Mao Tsetung and his followers
started a fight against Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the CPC,
against politically-conscious workers, peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary
goal of the "cultural revolution" which dealt the CPC a telling blow and during
which many outstanding Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of Communists
fell victim to reprisals.
At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung and his entourage tried to legalise p
their home and foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile to Marxism- 74
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in China they, at the same time, came
up with the thesis on the “impossibility” of the victory of socialism before the
triumph of the world revolution. Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of " preparing for war" and turning the
entire country into a military camp the goal of China’s economic development and
the country’s socio-political life. Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic task.
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the Chinese people require a genuinely socialist policy based on the principles of
scientific communism.
However, the economic foundations of socialism, laid in the first decade of the p
PRC, are now subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the policy pursued
by the present Chinese leadership who seek to place the country’s resources at the
service of their great-power and hegemonic aims. This policy imperils the socialist
gains of the Chinese people and impedes the country’s progress.
The attempts of the present Chinese leadership to cast aspersions on the experience p
of the USSR and other fraternal parties, and statements made against the socialist
community create additional obstacles to building socialism in China.
As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU policy and the Soviet state, they are
resolutely rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful to sow discord
between the USSR and China when the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities
against the socialist countries and freedom-loving peoples. US imperialism and 75
Japanese militarism nurture aggressive plans against China as well as the USSR.
Therefore, the policy of using anti– Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting
territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists encourages the reactionary circles of the
United States, Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the anti-imperialist
front. Now, more than ever before, the situation in the world and in Asia demands
solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces. This was
stressed again at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties.
The trend of present-day world development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.
III
The Soviet people and our Communist Party have regarded and continue to regard p
the development of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people and the
Chinese Communists as an important prerequisite for strengthening the positions of
world socialism and promoting the unity of the international communist movement
and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is precisely this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU p
and the Soviet state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and essence were
clearly described in the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at
plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and in speeches by Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against carrying over existing serious p
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The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that the objective requirements of China’s p
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for this normalisation. The long-
term vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash; on the
contrary, they make it imperative to restore and develop their cooperation and
friendship.
The numerous constructive steps for normalising relations with the PRC which were p
taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, are widely
known and approved of.
Soon after the meeting of the heads of government of the two countries held in p 77
Peking in 1969 on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks on border
questions began. Taking a constructive approach to this matter, the Soviet side
proposes that measures be taken to promote mutual understanding and a final
solution of all border disputes be achieved by concluding a new border treaty.
However, in order for the talks to be successful both partners must show goodwill
and seek to reach an agreement.
Of late the PRC Government, too, has made statements to the effect that ideological p
differences "should not interfere with the maintenance of state relations between
China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.” We take into consideration the statements by the Chinese side of their
willingness not to carry over ideological differences to inter-state relations.
Expressing the will of our Party and the people, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the p
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:
“We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The CPSU will
continue tirelessly to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries and the world
communist movement on a MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and
the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an improvement in relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would be in line with
the fundamental, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of socialism, the
freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is why we are prepared in every
way to help not only to normalise relations but also to restore neighbourliness and 78
friendship between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and express
the confidence that this will eventually be achieved.” This just and constructive stand
of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets with the
understanding and approval of fraternal socialist countries, communist and workers’
parties, all progressive and peace-loving forces, including the Chinese people.
***
The difficult half-century road of the Communist Party of China confirms that p
Marxism-Leninism alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear understanding of the
objective laws and trends of social development and a scientific approach to evolving
strategy and tactics in the struggle for the transformation of the world and the
construction of socialism and communism. Fidelity to MarxismLeninism and
proletarian internationalism guarantees the success of the activities of the
Communists. Inversely, when a detachment of the world communist movement
departs from these principles it is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause of
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***
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<•> Renunciation of the Principles 80
of Marxism-Leninism
TOC APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
Card THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA
Text
HTML
N. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev p
PS
PDF
The International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow p
in June 1969 was a major success of the communist, working-class and liberation
T*
movements. It was an important step towards greater international cohesion of
19*
Communists on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
###
Immense importance attaches to the conclusion made at the Conference to the effect p
that Communists must consistently uphold their principles, work for the triumph of
Marxism-Leninism and, depending on the specific situation, combat right and “left”
opportunist distortions of theory and policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand
against revisionism, dogmatism and “left” sectarian adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a vital condition for the correct
orientation and successful activity of the Communist and Workers’ Parties.
The harm that can be inflicted on the world communist movement by a departure p
from Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with internationalism is shown by the actions
of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China. This was thoroughly 81
analysed at the Conference by L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation.
"Almost ten years ago,” he said, "Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted an
attack on the principles of scientific communism. In its numerous statements on
questions of theory the CPC leadership has step by step revised the principled line of
the communist movement. In opposition to this it has laid down a special line of its
own on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .
“The facts show that the Chinese leadership speaks of struggle against imperialism p
while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by everything it does. It helps
the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps
them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at|
ttmes of acute international crises. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence
of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass
organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union
movement, and so on.
“Naturally, the imperialists make the most of Peking’s present orientation in the p
field of foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle against world socialism
and the liberation movement.”
The actions of the CPC leaders were also criticised by the heads of delegations p
from the absolute majority of other Parties represented at the Conference.
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It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want to listen to this criticism. They p
continue to stand in the way of the unity of the socialist countries, unity based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and are not giving up their 82
attempts to split the international communist and working-class movement. The
propaganda put out by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the reactionary,
imperialist forces striving to break up the community of the socialist countries.
The erroneous and harmful tenets of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were p
given the status of official Party policy at the Ninth Congress of the CPC, which
was held last year. In effect, the character of the decisions passed by that Congress
was predetermined by the artificially created situation in which the Congress itself
was prepared and held. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the lawfully elected
leading Party organs were uprooted. The "revolutionary committees" headed by the
military took over the management of Party affairs. The old Party cadres and all who
disagreed with the Maoist line or doubted that it was correct were defamed, put on
the list of the "black gang,” and subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything
was done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism and nationalistic passion. In a
situation like this there naturally could be no question of a free discussion of
questions worrying the Party and the country.
Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not elected but nominated from among the p
Maoists. There are grounds for stating that this was not a regular congress of the
Communist Party of China, which has fine revolutionary traditions, but the first
congress of a new political organisation called upon to serve China’s military–
bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though indirectly, by the Maoists
themselves. How else is one to interpret, for instance, their official slogan: "Long 83
live the great victory of the Ninth All– China Congress of the Communist Party of
China"? A victory over whom or over what? All the indications are that this is a
victory over the Party’s healthy forces, over those who make the Party a Marxist-
Leninist organisation that had once occupied a prominent place and enjoyed
recognition in the world communist and working-class movements.
A new situation fraught with serious negative consequences for the cause of p
communism has thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot fail to see this or
pass it over in silence. They feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist, anti-
popular essence of the Maoists’ ideological and political concepts.
New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth Congress of the CPC. There is, of p
course, nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have been adopted. Every
revolutionary party bases its activity on the two main documents-the Programme and
Rules. The Programme determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets out and
scientifically substantiates its aims. The Rules define the Party’s organisational
principles, the norms of its inner life and the methods of work used by Party
organisations. There is a close link between the Programme and the Rules. While the
Programme is the foundation of the Party’s ideological unity, the Rules are the
foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without organisational unity there cannot
be ideological unity and, conversely, ideological unity is inconceivable without
organisational unity.
In working out a more or less long-term strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party p 84
sees to it that its organisational forms, the rules governing its life and the methods
used in its practical work conform to the new political tasks and ensure their
fulfilment. Therefore, from time to time Communist and Workers’ Parties amend or
supplement the operating Rules or adopt new Rules.
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Life introduces corrections into the specific forms of the parties’ organisational p
make-up and into the methods of work employed by them, and this must be
reflected and recorded in their Rules. Organisationally, in the choice of the forms
and methods of its work and in its entire political activity, the Party relies on
revolutionary theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of coucrel?
historical conditions.
Soviet Communists know from their own ex- | perience how important it is to make
sure that I the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I it should conform to the
requirements of the day ’ and enable the Party to successfully carry out its tasks. For
that reason they understand the concern that the fraternal parties show for this I
problem.
I p
In the case of the Communist Party of China, this is a particularly pressing problem p
for a number of reasons. We shall recall only two circumstances. First, although
nearly fifty years have passed since the CPC was founded, it has no Programme to
this day and this adds weight to its Rules as the only basic Party document. Second,
in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier, no Party Congress was convened
for thirteen years. Consequently, it is important to enhance the role of the Rules and 85
introduce into them provisions that would prevent violations of inner-Party democracy
and serve as a guarantee that the principles and norms of Party life are strictly
observed by all its members.
This is the approach that should be taken if the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the p
party is used as the guideline.
What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have been adopted at the Ninth p
Congress? A close scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they flagrantly
contravene the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party and run counter to the views
of the Communists on the questions of party development. In all respects the new
Rules are not an improvement of but a step back from the former Rules, which were
passed in 1956 by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a direct retreat
from the Marxist-Leninist positions that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions so as to turn the party into an
obedient tool of the present leadership for carrying out their greatpower, chauvinistic
policies.
In the former Rules of the CPC the first section was headed "Fundamental p
Provisions of the Programme.” It gave a definition of the Party and the cardinal
principles underlying its development. It outlined the ways and means of achieving
socialist transformations in China and named the tasks that had to be carried out in
the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science and culture and in the matter of
attaining a higher standard of living. Tasks were formulated also with regard to the
national relations, and it was emphasised that "particular attention must be paid to 86
preventing and surmounting greatHan chauvinism.” On the whole, this section
actually filled the void caused by the absence of a Programme. In the new Rules,
this section has been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that the Communist Party
of China has no Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say the least.
Moreover, the content of the new section upsets everything worthy of description as
a Marxist party.
The new Rules of the CPC actually endorse the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet p
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foreign policy of its present leadership. The former Rules stated: "The Party bends
every effort to promote and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace, democracy
and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.”
The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites with genuinely Marxist-Leninist p
parties" and jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism headed by the USA, and
modern revisionism,” it being understood that the Chinese leaders regard the "Soviet
revisionists" as the hub of this revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists mean
by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.” These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting of renegades and turncoats who act
on their instructions. Although they are numerically weak and ill-assorted, they have
inflicted quite a lot of harm on the world communist movement, and for this they
are lavishly praised by Peking. The Peking leaders classify as “revisionists” the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and Workers’ Parties adhering to Marxism-
Leninism and rejecting the theoretically untenable and politically erroneous and 87
harmful Maoist tenets.
They accuse the Communist Parties of France, India, the United States of America, p
Italy, Latin America and many others of the deadly sins of “revisionism” and
"apostasy.” Naturally, they make every effort to slander the Communist Parties of
many socialist countries, above all, the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee,
which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have reached a point where the Chinese
leaders place in the same category imperialism and the Soviet Union, the country that
blazed the road to socialism and is now leading the way to communism. Barefaced,
undisguised anti-Sovietism is one of the major if not the key element of Maoist
foreign policy.
The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party as being the main obstacle standing p
in the way of their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they have specially written
anti-Sovietism into the Rules as official party policy. Though, formerly, the Chinese
leadership was also free-handed in its anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow opposition to and open acts of
hostility against the CPSU and other communist and workers’ parties.
The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party’s ideological and theoretical foundations p 88
and replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. It was stated in the former Rules: "In
its activity the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Only
Marxism-Leninism correctly explains the laws of social development and correctly
indicates the ways of building socialism and communism.” In the new Rules it is
recorded: "The Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism and the
thought of MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation determining its ideals. The
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism
moves to its total collapse and socialism advances towards victory throughout the
world.” Although the words “Marxism-Leninism” are used there this is nothing more
than camouflage. The only reason they are used is to delude people inexperienced in
politics and ease the transition from Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.
There is not the least doubt that it is a question of precisely such a transition. What p
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else explains the fact that the provision in the Rules about the "thought of Mao Tse-
tung" is assessed by Chinese propaganda as a "great victory of the cultural
revolution"? Mentioning MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the authors
of the new Rules give it an interpretation Which emasculates it completely. In their
view, which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung "inherited, upheld and
developed Marxism– Leninism, and raised it to a new level.” The purpose of these
and similar arguments is starkly clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism and
is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin belong to the past. In the world today there
is only one "leader,” Mao, and one has to follow him without burdening oneself with 89
thoughts about where and how he will lead.
Having invented "Sinoised Marxism,” the present Chinese leaders have thereby p
made it clear that “conventional” Marxism, i.e., Marxism in its true and generally
accepted sense, does not suit them. They have gone even further, declaring that the
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the "summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.”
However, no subterfuges over wording can conceal the obvious fact that the "thought
of MaoTse-tung" is a glaring contradiction of MarxismLeninism.
The new Rules of the CPC officially propagate the personality cult, which is alien p
to MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a whole.
It should be remembered that the report to the 8th CPC Congress on the changes in p 90
the Rules said in part that the CPC "rejects the deification of a personality as alien
to its policies.” The former Rules stressed that "activities putting the personality
above the party" are inadmissible within the party, that the party should be especially
concerned with "modesty and discretion.” These lines have disappeared from the new
Rules which, instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader of the Communist
Party of China. Not only is the emperor named, but his successor also. "Comrade
Lin Piao,” say the Rules "is always holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-
tung’s ideas; he is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the proletarian
revolutionary line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the continuer of his cause.” Thus, it
is declared in advance who is to “inherit” and “supervise” the party.
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history, at the same time paying tribute to those leaders who correctly understand
and express the basic interests of the working class and all working people. This is
the cornerstone of the Marxist– Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.
In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly declared their fidelity to the Marxist- p 91
Leninist doctrine on the decisive role of the working people in social development.
They proclaimed their belief in the people. But later this line was abandoned and a
new policy emerged-one of unrestrained glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung
who was henceforward to be reverently worshipped. Immodesty and self-advertisment
of the CPC leadership know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao with the sun
seems inadequate to some of his worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime,
while Mao Tse-tung "shines always.” Anyone guilty of casting the slightest doubt on
the infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient zeal, is anathematised,
described as a "black revisionists" and persecuted. As for the mass of the people,
Mao Tse-tung said about them the following: the Chinese people are "a blank sheet
of paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can be written and the most
beautiful pictures drawn.” And indeed the Maoists are busily “writing” and
“drawing” for all they are worth. The multi– million people with an ancient culture
are looked upon as being no more than an object of political self-seeking. What is
this if not an outrage against everything that is sacred for all Communists, for their
ideology?
In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions on membership of the Party have been p
drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments is to renew the Party’s
composition in the direction desired by the Maoists. It is suggested that those "who
fail to reform after educational work has been conducted with them" should be
forced to leave the Party, and that "the Party organisations should be constantly 92
improved by removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.” Facts show that the
words "removing the unworthy" are directed not against actual class enemies but
against people who do not share the Maoist ideas, against those who can be
suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists. People linked with "Soviet
revisionism,” i.e., those who have preserved their friendly feelings towards the Soviet
Union and its Leninist Party, are classified as the most dangerous.
Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation within the party, Lin Piao said, p
menacingly, at the 9th CPC Congress: "Anyone who dares to come forward against
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and against his ideas, no matter what the circumstances,
will be censured by the party and punished by the whole country.”
As regards the ruling on "enlisting the new,” its meaning is elucidated by the p
simplified procedures of admission to Party membership and the introduction of new
provisions opening the floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the former Rules it
was stated that only a person who does not exploit the labour of others can be a
member of the CPC. Today this demand has been deleted from the Rules, although
in China, according to the admission of the Maoists themselves, its significance has
not diminished to this day. Under the present Rules the "Chinese worker, poor
peasant, lower middle peasant, revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary
element" can become a member of the CPC. One can understand the purpose of this
wording in the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists regard as genuine
revolutionary elements the hungweipings and tsaofans and all who unquestioningly 93
follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive, anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door
to Party membership precisely for these elements and allows the present CPC
leadership to bring into the Party the forces which it regards as its mainstay.
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No data on the CPC’s social composition or, as a matter of fact, any other data p
characterising the situation in the country have been published for a long time. No
information of this kind is contained even in the documents of the Ninth Congress
of the CPC. It is known that in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members of
whom less than 14 per cent were workers. There are grounds for believing that as a
result of the disbandment of workers’ organisations and the mass injection of "new
blood" into the Party through the admission of hungweipings and other elements, this
percentage is today even smaller. The organisational principles of Marxism–
Leninism require that the Party should be built up on a democratic foundation
allowing for the utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity of Communists.
In all questions of the Party’s policy and practical work, Party members should have
the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only he is worthy of the lofty name of
Communist who independently ponders over his Party’s destiny and bears a personal
responsibility for it.
There was a time when in the CPC this was recognised as an indispensable p
condition of the Party’s militancy. In the former Rules it was stated, for example,
that it was necessary "to take effective measures to promote inner-Party democracy
and to encourage the activity and creative initiative of all Party members.” There is 94
not a word about this in the new Rules, where the accent is on something quite
different. In effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish inner-Party
democracy, enforce barrack practices in the Party and turn Communists into
submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership’s instructions. To justify these
amendments it is stated that in China there "is a threat of subversion from within
and of aggression by the imperialists and modern revisionism.”
The demand that all Party members should be absolutely, categorically and p
unconditionally true to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an atmosphere in the
Party which leaves no room for inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like the old, the new Rules provide for
convening periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses in the localities and
Party meetings, they contain the addition to the effect that "in special cases they
(congresses, meetings.-Author) may be convened earlier or postponed.” Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under what circumstances this may be
done. The door is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a “legal” infringement
of one of the key norms of Party life. True, even when this reservation was non-
existent, the CPC leadership ignored the provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this can be justified with references to
the Rules.
The former Rules envisaged a democratic procedure for forming the Party’s leading p
organs. It stated: "Elections shall be held by secret ballot, and the electors shall be
ensured the right to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.” In lieu of this 95
provision, the current Rules contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the effect
that "the leading Party organs at all levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic
consultations.” Obviously, this can be interpreted in any way and given any
meaning, which is evidently what the Maoists want.
A new provision has been introduced, stating that "the convocation of congresses p
and the composition of the Party committees in the localities and in the Army shall
be approved by higher Party organisations.” This affords the Maoists the possibility
of manipulating the composition of the leading Party organs at their own discretion
and appointing to leading positions persons devoted to them. Significantly, the
provisions on central and local Party control commissions have been deleted
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There are clauses consolidating the position held by Mao Tse-tung and his p
entourage in the CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the CC, his Deputy
and the Standing Committee of the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it is stated in the Rules that "some
necessary compact and operational organs to conduct the current work of the Party,
the Government and the Army are established under the guidance of the Chairman,
Deputy Chairman and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.” The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the disbandment, in the course of the
"cultural revolution,” of democratically elected Party committees and the setting up
of organs not envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious headquarters for "cultural 96
revolution" affairs, and, second, to give the top leadership a free hand in the future.
If necessary, they will establish "compact and operational" agencies legally and rely
on them in the struggle against any opposition.
The position occuppied by ruling parties such as that of the Communist Parties in p
socialist countries requires that the forms and methods of their work and the
principles underlying their leadership of state and public organisations should be
clearly denned in their Rules. This has been done in the Rules of the CPSU and
other fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC also contained the appropriate
provisions, which specified the functions of Party organs at all levels, spoke clearly
of the need to rule collectively and denned the Party’s relations with state and public
organisations. There were sections headed "Party Groups of the Leadership in
NonParty Organisations" and "The Party and the Young Communist League.” None
of these provisions and sections is to be found in the new Rules. Instead, there is a
provision stating: "The state organs of power of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the People’s Liberation Army as well as the Young Communist League, the
revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor peasants, lowest middle peasants
and Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations shall be subordinate to
the leadership of the Party.”
It is hard to reconcile this provision with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role p
played by the Communist Party and the character of its relations with state and
public organisations. Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of placing all 97
power in the hands of the Party leadership with Mao at the head.
Leninism teaches us that in exercising political leadership of all state and public
organisations the Party does not have recourse to administration by injunction and
does not take over their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist society’s political
structure and coordinating and directing the work of the mass organisations of
working people, the Communist Party at the same time bends every effort to enable
them to operate with self-assurance and confidence within the context of their rights
and functions. This means that in societies building socialism and communism, along
with the growth of the tasks to be carried out, the upswing of the people’s
activeness and the heightening of the Party’s role, a process is under way of the
enhancement of the role played by state and public organisations, and of the
development and improvement of socialist democracy. This is one of the laws
governing the development of socialist society, and one of the many laws the
Maoists are grossly violating.
***
The CPSU’s point of departure is that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have common p
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basic interests, and it is doing everything in its power to sustain fraternal friendship
between them. At the same time, the Soviet Communists and all other Marxist-
Leninists consider it their duty to wage an uncompromising struggle against the
divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line and anti-Leninist and anti-popular
ideological and political tenets of the Peking leaders.
An analysis of the amendments introduced into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as p 98
compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress shows that while formally
retaining the Party’s former name, the CPC leadership is steering towards the
creation of a fundamentally different political organisation. Underlying its structure
and activity are the personality cult, extreme centralism, militarism and the
renunciation of inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this is a nationalistic
and chauvinistic organisation with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.
In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open revision and abandonment of the p
Marxist– Leninist principles of party development. The future will show whether the
CPC has the strength to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the positions of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to rejoin the united front of
the world’s Communist and Workers’ Parties. This would conform to the vital
interests of the Chinese people and to the interests of the world proletariat and the
working people of all countries.
***
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MAP
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<•> II 99
Text P. Fedoseyeu p
HTML
PS The course of world development and the events in China clearly show the hostility p
PDF towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the special ideological and political
platform set forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental issues of international
T* life and the world communist movement.
19*
The theoretical and practical activities of the Maoists, their efforts to split the p
### revolutionary forces, and their great-power and hegemonic ambitions do serious harm
to the anti-imperialist struggle, to the world communist and workingclass movement,
to the forces fighting for democracy and national freedom and to the entire cause of
socialism and the social progress of mankind.
***
The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a rather narrow group of interdependent p
people, who, in one form or another, are dependent on Mao and his closest
associates. This group carefully conceals its real convictions and aims, seeking to
present Maoism as a certain "development of Marxism in modern conditions.” As
one can see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this kind of camouflage to confuse
the issue of the social support of the current Peking regime.
An analysis of the history and present-day essence of the ideology and policy of the p
Mao Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds support, first and foremost, in the
nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and, to a considerable
extent, declasse strata of Chinese society.
In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic p
trend. However, its non-proletarian essence was not so clearly shown during the stage
of national– liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite different social forces
against imperialism. The differences of principle between Maoism and scientific
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communism were revealed after the victory of people’s power in China, when
fundamental socio-economic changes were in progress.
The experience of many countries shows that the pressure of the ideology and p
psychology of the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front increases sharply during 102
the course of a revolution, and especially when socialism is in the process of being
built, when a drastic breaking-up of old social relations takes place. It is precisely at
such a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go over from a petty-bourgeois
revolutionary stand to one of struggle against the proletarian leadership of society.
And this was what happened in China too.
The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology of the Chinese peasantry are not p
straightforward. They are of a complicated and contradictory nature, and can be
correctly understood only on the basis of a consideration of the class essence of 103
Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic socio-political trend.
Marx and Engels disclosed the social heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. p
They showed how to distinguish between its prejudices and reason, between its past
and its future, between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and its natural
gravitation, as a toiling class, towards an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in
the struggle for a new life free from exploiters and parasites. Opponents of Marxism
alleged that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois reaction, identified the whole
of the peasantry with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin said: "I was not
attacking the working peasants when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let us
leave the working peasants alone-that’s not what I am talking about. But among the
peasantry there are working peasants and pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty
proprietors at the expense of others; the working peasants are exploited by others,
but they want to live at their own expense.” [ 103•1
Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to the crying contradictions in the life and p
activities of the peasantry, which in some conditions spontaneously and energetically
rose up in struggle against the exploiters, and, in others, either humbly let themselves
be led off to be shot or whipped by the police, or else even made up the basis of
the support for the reactionary forces.
This is, to a considerable extent, also true of the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, p
under feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified and, therefore, disunited.
The bulk of the Chinese peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation was 104
common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal ideology with its ruler cult and worship of
the traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being in their mass downtrodden,
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illiterate and scattered, for many years remained very submissive and fully
subordinated to the authorities. The backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national narrow-mindedness and the nationalist
outlook.
At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has rich revolutionary traditions. More than p
once it rose in struggle against the landowners. Furthermore, the peasantry made up
the main force of the revolutionary armies both in the nationalliberation struggle and
in the revolution. The Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative farming on the
road of socialist development of the countryside. It was precisely these peasant
masses, who, under the leadership of the working class and its vanguard, the Party
of MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in working for the triumph
of a genuinely socialist way of development.
But this, regretfully, did not take place. Starting from the late fifties, and especially p
in the course of the "big leap" drive, and, later, in the "cultural revolution,” a serious
blow was struck at the organisations of the working class and the Party. The Party
divorced itself to a considerable extent from the working class and the peasantry,
and disunity was deliberately sown among the working class. As for the peasants,
most of them were deceived by the pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The
rest were intimidated by a terror campaign, and, although they did not accept the 105
"cultural revolution,” neither did they dare to put up any open resistance.
In the process of its moulding and development, Maoism came under the political p
and ideological influence of the urban petty bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of
artisans and handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen. This social
grouping came into being in feudal China, and its members were, for the most part,
distinguished by their conservative views and nationalist outlook.
But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per cent reactionary. A sizable section of p
it took an active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too, under the leadership of the
working class, could have taken the socialist road together with the overwhelming
majority of the people.
The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that in the struggle between the two p
courses-the course of proletarian internationalism and that of petty-bourgeois
nationalism-the latter prevailed at a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was
unable to withstand the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie and to secure the leading
role of the working class.
The national bourgeoisie has still been preserved in China. It was not subjected to p
repressions in the years of the "cultural revolution.” Representatives of the exploiting
classes which, as admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise more than 50 million
people, hold important positions in the management of the economy, and continue to
exert an influence on the economic and political life of the country. Because they
subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the 106
nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas and actions of the Maoists.
A particularly complicated question is that of the attitude of the Maoists towards the p
working class. They keep talking all the time about the leading role of the working
class and the Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the
proletarian revolutionary character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of the
Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian nature, although, in pursuit of their aims,
by means of demagogy, they try to make use of certain sections of the workers.
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It is generally known that the Chinese working class is heterogeneous. Its greater p
part consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not gone through a real
schooling of socialism and internationalism. But it has a militant core, which has
many revolutionary traditions. As was shown by the events in the "cultural
revolution,” it was precisely the militant core of the working class which came to the
aid of the Party organisations which were attacked by the hungweipings. In the
factories and plants the Maoists failed to achieve the scale of the "cultural
revolution" which they desired. Although the working class of China is still
relatively small in number (it barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the backbone of the Chinese revolution and
of the cause of socialism in China and it still is. The working class is the real force
which is exerting a restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation of
Maoism in the life of the country.
The army officers’ circles exerted a great influence on the rise and evolution of p 107
Maoism. These circles have always played an active part in the social and political
life of China.
At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue fear the army, especially its p
revolutionary backbone of career officers who went through the crucible of the war
for national liberation. Unquestionably a considerable section of the career command
personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary
traditions and experience in fighting not only the internal counter-revolution but also
international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the fact that the Maoists are
transforming the people’s army into an all-China police force-a force directed against
the people and designed for their suppression. Although drawing the army into the 108
work of the "cultural revolution" did help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the discontent within the Chinese army
and the freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from their illusions and a
fanatical faith in the wisdom of the "great helmsman.” It also enabled many of the
army men to understand, from their own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. Therefore, as was only to be expected,
the army has now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist moods, and that is why
the Maoists are carrying out purge after purge, and repression after repression against
many career military men, ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the antiMaoist
movement in the People’s Liberation Army of China.
Removed from under the control of Party and state bodies, and placed at the service p
of the hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and his group, even before the
development of the "cultural revolution,” the army was preparing to carry out the
role allotted to it. This was the militarisation of all public life-conducted under the
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The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao’s is quite clear, although Peking prefers to p
keep silent about it. The revelation of the substance of the intrigues that permeate all 109
of Mao’s activities and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique would not do
the "great helmsman" any good, and this is understood very well in Peking.
The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages its petty-bourgeois class nature and p
tries to manoeuvre between the different classes, taking advantage of the weakness
and lack of organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it difficult to discern
the class nature of Maoism and they also serve as a means of attracting to its side
politically unstable elements drawn from different classes of the population.
Marx and Lenin called such tactics Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the p
revolution and was called on to defend it, although it had actually always served the
bourgeois or pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism, which served as a
cover for an anti-proletarian policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern times.
In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its characteristics as reliance on the military,
manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled social and nationalistic demagogy.
An analysis shows that the policy and tactics of Maoism have quite a number of p
features resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific Chinese setting, of course: 110
firstly, a reliance on army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance on a
combination of different, sometimes diametrically opposed, social forces, on a
manoeuvring between classes, making use first of some social groups, then of others,
first of high-school and college students, then of working youth, and especially of
the petty-bourgeois, backward peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian
elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and political demagogy: the shouting of the
most revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary– chauvinistic policy, verbal calls
for defending the proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home and foreign
policy, appeals to the people in words and their suppression in deeds.
Marx included among the Bonapartist manifestations the deification of the supreme p
leader and the mystical faith of the broad masses in the ruling personality. Mao Tse-
tung exerted every possible effort to have his personality glorified and his views
advertised, and he placed his favourites in the most important posts in the party, the
army and in the machinery of state.
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ideological and theoretical origins is quite important. The lengthy domination of 111
feudalism and militarism, economic and cultural backwardness, the undeveloped
public and social relations, the small number of proletarians and the absolute
predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created special difficulties for China’s
revolutionary development.
The militarists’ traditional participation in ruling the country and the extensive p
dissemination in the course of centuries of one of the reactionary aspects of
Confucianism-the cult of the supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a military-
bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler at the head.
The Maoists made use of historical and demographic facts for their own ends to p
spread great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has rich historical traditions. For a
long time the country held the leading place in Eastern Asia. China is the home of
an ancient culture. The Chinese are the most numerous people in the world. The
existence of a comparatively high civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers
of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the superiority of the Chinese. All
other nations were declared “wild” and "barbarous,” and all "barbarians.” China’s
eternal enemies. For thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China that she was
the centre of the world. That is how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later
acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.
In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle nationalism was the ideological weapon p
of the progressive forces which were fighting for national liberation and social
progress. It was the ideological basis for rallying and uniting the broadest sections of 112
the Chinese population, pushing into the background in some cases social
differentiation and differences in class interests. After the victory of the anti-
imperialist, democratic revolution in China and its growth into a socialist revolution,
nationalism exhausted itself as an ideological basis for uniting the progressive forces
of the nation in its struggle against foreign capital-its struggle for national
independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in Chinese society between nationalism
and internationalism.
***
The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien to the Maoists. But they understand p
very well that there is no other ideology capable now of winning over the minds of
the peoples of the world. That is why the Maoists decided to monopolise the right to
interpret and “develop” Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own way and
thereby to turn it into an instrument for achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.
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For them this was an important step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to reveal itself with the appearance of the
assertion that Mao Tse-tung’s ideas are an interpretation of Marxism for all the
countries of the East. Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its appearance.
The next step was taken during the "cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be the teacher of all peoples, the only
Marxist theoretician of the entire world communist movement, and Mao’s ideas the
apex of scientific thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current epoch. But this
slogan is only a cover. The real meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace Marxism by Maoism. That is how
the concealed, previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic, hegemonic schemes
of the Maoists were revealed.
In their attempt to achieve the recognition of Mao Tse-tung as the only leading p
world theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and the CPC as the centre
of the entire revolutionary movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of degeneration
and revisionism, and of compromise with imperialism, against large and authoritative
Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and against the entire world communist 114
movement. All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are haughtily
“excommunicated” from Marxism– Leninism, from the revolution and from
socialism, and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle covered by Marxist phrases
and revolutionary slogans has been launched against the " dissenters.” And in this
struggle no methods are barred, not even military provocations.
What then is Maoism from the standpoint of its ideological and theoretical content? p
The influence and eclectic mixture of the most diverse doctrines, views, theories and p
concepts are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political, economic, philosophical,
sociological and tactical concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include:
feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that p
part of this philosophy is taken which is characterised by scholasticism, idealism,
primitive dialectics, the preaching of the spirit of submission, the glorification of
imperial power, and the exaggeration of the role of the subjective factor in history;
Trotskyite views, which were more or less widespread in the Chinese revolutionary p 115
movement in the twenties and early thirties;
anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable influence in China at the start of the p
twenties. Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission, went in for anarchism quite
actively in that period.
It is through the prism of all these views that Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas p
of MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in general is concerned,
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neither Mao Tse-tung nor his closest associates ever made a systematic study of it,
limiting themselves to reading popular articles. Mao has never had an integral
Marxist-Leninist world outlook.
The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and adapted them to their interests. p
Maoism ignores the objective laws of social development, as does Trotskyism, and
exaggerates the role of the subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in
politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in economics are characteristic for both.
An antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world revolutionary process is a feature
common to both Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic purposes the Maoists made
use of the Trotskyite theory of "the export of revolution,” regarding world war as the
only way of solving the problems of revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is the tactics of splitting the
revolutionary forces, with crude slanderous attacks against the Marxist-Leninist
parties and the socialist states, rabid anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within
the ranks of the international working-class and communist movement. 116
The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon in the “art” of arbitrarily designing p
contradictions. They proclaim a state of “unity” or of "struggle,” of anyone with
anyone, so long as this facilitates the attainment of their greatpower, hegemonistic
aims.
These, in the most general way, are the ideological background of Mao Tse-tung p 117
and his followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and policy of Maoism quite
often link up with the ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no accident, either,
that the theoretical revelations and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded to the
skies by imperialist ideologists and politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of social progress and socialism.
While noting the eclectic nature of Mao Tsetung’s views, it should be borne in p
mind, that, as a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly shows, great-power
nationalism is the leading and organising force behind his miscellany of ideas. From
diverse ideological and theoretical concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested in
taking and using those that serve nationalist and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This
emphasises the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the theory and practice of
Maoism. Mao Tse-tung and his followers advance and uphold those theoretical
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theses and political slogans which directly serve their ends in the present historical
period, and they bury in oblivion those of their own conclusions which have ceased
to be in accord with their utilitarian aims, without showing any concern for logic or
the continuity of ideas.
Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group
goes from one extreme to another in its domestic and foreign policies, as it seeks the
support of both the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or indirectly, of the most
reactionary circles of bourgeois society.
*** 118
The most eloquent and concentrated expression of Maoism was seen in the course p
of the " cultural revolution" and in the resolutions of the Ninth CPC Congress,
which is an important landmark in the development of Maoist policies, strategy and
tactics, and is of decisive importance for an understanding of the innermost
tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.
Even as it declares its irreconcilability with imperialism, the Mao group weakens p
and splits the world’s anti-imperialist forces, undermines the national-liberation
movement and specifically interferes with the establishment of unity of action to
support the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of
conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an antiSoviet foundation.
Although the Maoists shout a lot about socialism, they have launched a wild p
political campaign against most of the socialist countries, have started pursuing a
course of outright hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a situation of war
hysteria.
Although verbally they champion the idea of world revolution, and make much ado p
about their "revolutionary nature,” Mao’s supporters at the same time slander the
working class of the capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist degeneration. They
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also attack most of the Communist Parties, and undermine the workers’ and
democratic movement.
Events of the past decade show that the Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of p
the revolution, if its development does not conform to their great-Han nationalistic
interests. But they understand very well that only an orientation towards revolution
can offer any historical prospect. That is why they are so amazingly insistent-and 120
unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to use the world revolutionary
process for their own ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy a leading
position in it, so as to mould it to the requirements of Chinese nationalism: the
implementation of the ambitious dreams of the supporters of the great-Han policy
contemplating China as the centre of the world. This is the strategic design of the
Maoist leadership.
The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a great discrepancy between their words p
and deeds, and between their theoretical concepts and practice. While proclaiming
themselves the most resolute fighters against imperialism and declaring that
imperialism is a "paper tiger,” they actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the
same time link up with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism.
The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the stand of great-power chauvinism, p
preserves leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese society and in the
world arena there are powerful social, political and ideological forces at work whose
efforts are directed at the protection, strengthening and development of socialist
gains, the restoration and consolidation of the theory and policy of Marxism-
Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism in China.
Maoism is opposed in the first place by the objective tendency of the socialist p
development of the country. This is embodied primarily in the foundations of
socialism built by the efforts of the Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the other socialist countries. The 121
military– bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the political superstructure
does not mean the automatic collapse of the socialist basis. Of course, deformations
in the basis can and do take place under the influence of reactionary changes in the
superstructure.
Broad sections of the Chinese population are interested in carrying out a socialist p
policy in China-the main core of the working class, the progressive part of the
peasantry, broad masses of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary section of the
army. The Maoists cannot ignore the interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed,
Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist sentiments and strivings of the Chinese
working people. A great many Chinese Communists take a socialist stand. Although
genuine Communists have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle against
Maoism, they have not given up.
The world socialist system, its successes and the principled Leninist policy of the p
Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, exert an influence
on the development of the political struggle in China. Broad sections of the Chinese
people remember that the USSR is the first country of socialism, and they remember
the aid which the USSR rendered the working people of China during the years of
the anti– imperialist struggle, the revolution and the construction of socialism. No
anti-Soviet hysteria can do away with this sympathy.
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The ideology and policy of Maoism do not correspond to the objective course of the p
development of society and the requirements of the socialist development of China.
Maoism suffers one defeat after another and its ultimate failure is historically
inevitable. There can be no doubt that the Communists, the working class and all the
working people of China will find the strength to embark once again on the road of
a close unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries and ensure the
success of the great cause of socialism in the PRC.
This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The November p
Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the Politbureau of the
Central Committee is consistently carrying out the line of the 24th Congress
regarding the People’s Republic of China and expressed full agreement with the
position of the Politbureau in solving associated practical questions. The Soviet
Union is working for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations. This
aim is also promoted by the ideological-political struggle against “left-wing”
revisionism which Lenin called "petty-bourgeois revolutionism.”
***
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<•> Dialectics, 123
Text V. Lektorsky, p
HTML G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu
PS
PDF The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that criticism of bourgeois and revisionist p
concepts remains an important component of the Party’s theoretical work. "The
T* Congress considers,” says the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report
19* of the CPSU Central Committee, "that the creative development and propagation of
the Marxist– Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts to revise it must
###
remain a central task in the Party’s ideological work.” [123•1
Revisionist concepts of both right and “left” varieties, and the Maoist ideology in p
particular, are particularly dangerous forms of the many attempts that have been
made to rob Marxist– Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and misrepresent
socialist and communist construction. While posing as defenders of the “purity” of
Marxism-Leninism and employing “Marxist” and “revolutionary” terms, the Maoists
seek to foist on the world communist and workers’ movement an ideological and
political platform of their own which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. They 124
have launched a virulent campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting
out with their divisive policy to undermine the revolutionary struggle and sow
discord in the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters. ”. . .the Chinese leaders,” Leonid
Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party
Congress, "have put forward an ideological-political platform of their own which is
incompatible with Leninism on the key questions of international life and the world
communist movement, and have demanded that we should abandon the line of the
20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.” [124•1
Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign was launched in China against the p
"theory of combining two into one" and advocating "the principle of dividing one
into two.” Ostensibly, the campaign was directed against distortions and falsifications
of the core of materialist dialectics, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not scientific, since its purpose was to
justify the special views held by Mao and his adherents. The polemic over the
problem of contradictions, of the unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to be 125
more exact, was artificially produced) precisely when there was a need for
"philosophical substantiation" of the policy of splitting the ranks of the international
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The actual socio-political and ideological aim of the spate of bombast let loose in p
China in 1963–64 around the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is obvious.
It has been exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of Marxist theoreticians,
some of which were printed in the journal Questions ot Philosophy. [ 125•1 The
Maoist interpretation and application turned dialectics into a political gimmick,
demagogically designed to camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung’s political line. If
this presented a purely historical interest, referring even to the very recent past, there
would hardly be any need to return to an analysis of the specifically Maoist
interpretation and application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is still very much
the practice in present-day China to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the 126
Maoist line of thought.
The most recent and instructive example of the Maoist interpretation and application
of materialist dialectics is provided by the article "The Theory of Combining Two
into One" published in the March 1971 issue of the magazine Hungchi. Coming from
"a group of authors of revolutionary criticism" of the Higher Party School of the
CPC Central Committee, the article criticises the "reactionary and absurd thesis of
’combining two into one’ advocated and spread by the traitor and provocateur Liu
Shao-chi" and gives the “correct” i.e., Maoist, interpretation of the law of the unity
and struggle of opposites. As the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the basic
law of materialist dialectics means that "in human society and in Nature the whole
always splits up into unequal parts" which are engaged in a constant struggle,
leading to "one side overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the other.” For
instance, the revolutionary always destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the
erroneous, etc. "By advancing the proposition of the division of one into two,” the
authors go on to say, "Mao Tse-tung has summed up most profoundly and
laconically the law of the unity and , struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the
very I gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has | demonstrated that both in
Nature and in human I society and consciousness there exist contradictions and
struggle, not the law of ’combining two into one’.” All talk of combining opposites
is , nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- | tion of the "counter-
revolutionary, revisionist line j directed against the socialist revolution with the aim 127
of combining the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and
socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.” The present polemic between
those who adhere to the "theory of dividing one into two" versus those who support
"the theory of combining two into one" is regarded as a "reflection of the bitter and
complex class struggle of that period (the first half of the 60’s) in the ideological
sphere within and without the country. In the final analysis, the point at issue was
whether the dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the socialist system
consolidated or the proletarian dictatorship should be liquidated and the capitalist
system restored.” If one adds to this the opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly metaphysical ’theory of combining
two into one’ has been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50’s as the
interpretation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites and serves as
theoretical justification for the ’restoration of capitalism’ in that country and as an
instrument of ’collusion with the US imperialism’,” one will readily see that the
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latest campaign of “repudiating” the "theory of combining two into one" has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what are these aims and what, in
general, is the place and the real value of Maoist “dialectics” in the present-day
political and ideological struggle?
***
The Maoists have grown very fond of the formula of the need to "divide one into p
two,” which they view as the ultimate philosophical justification of their splitting
policies. They have grown so fond of it that the thesis of the "synthesis of opposites 128
into one" appears to them as out– andout "revisionism.” Characteristically, however,
Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that "the division of one into two" is
progressive and inevitable when they find it politically advantageous, completely
“forgetting” about it when, for some reason or other, they consider it
disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in lauding the benefits of “division”
when it concerns the communist movement, the differences and contradictions within
its ranks, for then the Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One can hardly
deny that, for it is indeed beneficial, only the question is-to whom? General
formulas, however sound, keep “silent” on that question. This accounts for the
predilection of Peking “ dialecticians” for endless repetition of general and abstract
schemes which they stick like labels on concrete and particular cases whenever it is
thought "advantageous,” but which they refrain from using when it appears to be
disadvantageous to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such, in the final
analysis, is the criterion of acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical
proposition employed by the Maoists.
Marxism has long emerged as the most influential world outlook of our time known p
for its convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even by those who are not Marxists.
But it has so much to offer it is a tempting inducement to social forces which, alien
to and often far removed from Marxism, lack a banner of their own that will carry
weight and evoke the desired response.
Attempts to “borrow” and use some elements of Marxism have been made more p
than once by various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other circles at crucial
moments or when starved for ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the appeal of
Marxism. "Extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in
formulating their aims,” Lenin wrote in 1910, "had assimilated that doctrine in an
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extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain ’slogans/ 130
certain answers to tactical questions, without having understood the Marxist criteria
for these answers.” [130•1 Even then Lenin warned against the danger of this
tendency, which leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of Marxism, to the
drowning out of its essence by slogan-shouting, so that "nothing but the phraseology"
remains of it.
However, in those days this tendency had not yet reached the point it has today p
under Maoism; and while the utilitarian tendencies must be described, and were
described by Lenin in his time, as vulgarisation, they may appear as something not
far short of refined thought compared with present-day samples. In the writings of
Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even magazine articles, formulas such as
"division of one into two" and empty slogans do not merely supplant logical
thinking; they go so far as to lend verbal decisions an almost physically tangible
character by their sheer bluntness, their grossness in putting across the practical
political motive.
In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one can find any number of such "great p
leaps" from the most general to the most particular. A typical feature of this mode
of thinking is the art of making such "great leaps" without bothering to investigate
the particular cases or to ensure consistency in the transition from the general phrase
to a particular problem or the real state of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each
time there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism’s political actions. In seeking to
substantiate a thesis on the need to split the international communist movement, for
instance, the line of reasoning adopted is as follows: any process in nature, society
or thought develops through the "division of one into two.” No process can take
place without the "division of one into two.” Hence, the international communist
movement, too, must be "divided into two" which is viewed as a triumph of
dialectics.
The procedure, then, is simple enough. First, the universe is supplied with a set of p
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abstract formulas and slogans, which are “urgently” needed, a kind of quiver with
appropriate ideological arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is discovered that the
necessary slogan has been “shot” by the universe itself.
When put to such use, the dialectical terminology becomes a device of political p
demagogy, the language of such demagogy, designed to influence people who respect
Marxist-Leninist theory. Direct justification of any act of brazen voluntarism by
abstract universal philosophisms is meant to create a semblance of profound
philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a freakish and essentially harmful 133
policy. You object to the split in the ranks of the international communist movement.
Well, then you are opposed to the thesis of "dividing one into two,” hence also to
dialectics. You maintain that the main law of dialectics is not reduced to the struggle
of opposites but presupposes also “unity” of opposites. Then you are betraying the
line of Chairman Mao and preach capitulation in face of the domestic bourgeoisie
and collusion with international imperialism.
That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul of the letter of Marxist-Leninist p
dialectics, is perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this law unity has been
dropped, so that what remains is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all familiar
with the rudiments of dialectics will know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and
their fusion into a new category." [134•1 Lenin, too, repeatedly spoke of the need 134
to be able to unite, or synthesise, opposites. In his speech "On the Trade Unions" he
pointed out that those who studied Marxism even superficially "have learned how
and when opposites can and must be combined,” drawing the important conclusion
that ".. .in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined
opposites again and again." [ 134•2 Moreover, the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites and the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" lie within totally
different frames of reference. Indeed, the two could be compared only if the law of
the unity and struggle of opposites were simply an abstract universal ontological
statement of facts (“everything in the world is such that in the given case or
example this or that takes place”) along with other such statements. However, in
reality the entire spirit of dialectics, especially in its consistent, Marxist embodiment,
its whole message-the message of concreteness-is directed against empirical facts
being “explained” by superimposing on them universalised rules, by-passing the
complex chain of intermediate links connecting the methodological principles of the
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highest order with empirics, bypassing the investigation of the specific whole
whereby, and in the context of which, particular facts can be explained. Dialectical
laws in general and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites in particular, as
Lenin stressed, stem from the whole experience of the cognitive work of man’s
thought: each is "a law of cognition (and . . .a law of the objective 135
world.)” [ 135•1 Nothing, therefore, is further removed from materialist dialectics
and more alien to it than an attempt to present it as a set of abstract rules covering
everything under the sun and excluding, by their very nature, a creative approach to
anything.
Having shown that the universalised " principle of dividing one into two" is p
incompatible with anything in dialectics, it is only natural to consider if there is
anything, any concept, with which it can be compared, and to attempt to compare
the latter with dialectics to find the connecting links.
Such a concept (if it can indeed be called a concept) exists in the folklore, p
mythology and religions of many peoples-the concept of two world principles locked
in eternal conflict. In such a world, indeed, there is no unity, and strife and absolute
division rule supreme. The question of a whole does not arise for the simple reason
that from the outset two principles are presupposed, which have nothing in common,
are not related in any positive way, hence, the eternal conflict between them can
never be resolved. Being omnipresent, they rend asunder every object into warring
extremes and plunge them into a futile and ruthless universal holocaust. But because
the opposing absolutes are supposed to have nothing in common, precisely by virtue
of their absolute disunity and absolute insurmountable division, the war of extremes
has no perspective of any kind, it does not and cannot result in any progress, any
synthesis, nothing new can emerge from it: the same drama repeats itself over and 136
over again. For the victory of one extreme immediately leads to its being split, in
turn, into the same feuding poles.
It is fairly evident that this archaic mythologem which paints a lurid picture of the p
world as a perpetual St. Bartholomew Massacre sheds no light on the logic and real
problems of real struggle. It can only serve as a means of fanning mass hysteria.
But it is this mythologem which the Maoist ideologists, who have advanced the p
slogan: " Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad thing,” regard as an
example and a model for their world outlook. In accepting the mythologem about the
impossibility of combining extremes, these ideologists devote their current campaign
to “rebuffing” the idea of unity of opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the
word "unity,” which inspires them with mortal fear. As they themselves admit, "the
gist of the theory of combining two into one" lies in the word "combination.”
Let us examine, then, the relation between the historical tradition of dialectics and p
the archaic mythology of universal duality, division and destruction. Casting a
retrospective look at the past ages, we see that dialectics proper originated and took 137
root precisely in contrast to the mythologem about the two world absolutes, to the
fatalism of the eternal confrontation of opposites, to the idea that the world is
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doomed to revolve forever in one and the same circle. The core of dialectics has
always been, not dualism, not repetition of fate, not statics, but development spurred
by contradictions, creation of the new in the process of destruction and elimination
of the old.
Denial, too, holds a definite place in dialectics, but it is truly dialectical denial, and p
not a nihilistic one, a denial that draws a clearcut line between the idea of the
struggle of opposites, or, to be more precise, their unity and struggle, [ 137•1 in the
sense of a general outlook, of dialectical logic; a struggle in the direct social
meaning of the word, implying the interaction of human wills as a result of which
people part with their past, with the obsolete, and build their future, on the one
hand; and the specifically antagonistic forms of the social struggle, on the other. One
of the rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first, nor in the second
interpretations of the concept of contradiction does the struggle of opposites represent
the extrapolation to the entire world of the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to
Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the same time genuine Marxism
essentially differs from the Maoist version in its interpretation of the essence and the
role of antagonistic forms in social development.
The inability to examine antagonisms from the standpoint of the universal nature of p
contradictions, the inability to understand the specific character of the antagonistic
contradictions, cannot be regarded merely as an innocent gnosiological mistake. In 139
dealing with such an "inability,” one must not forget which social forces are apt to
reduce the antagonistic type of contradictions to some distinct and absolutised
essence, to an ideological principle. It is characteristic of “ultra-left” extremists to
have a tendency to regard as the criterion of revolutionariness, not creation
representing sober-minded historical responsibility, but irresponsible fanatical
militancy blinded by the spirit of total destruction and nihilism. Absolutisation of the
antagonistic form of contradictions provides them with a concept that suits their
ends.
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whether these social forces seek to transform the objective logic of the "unity and
struggle of opposites" into a logic of building new social relations and structures, or
to destroy the conditions for such creative work. Whenever an antagonistic
contradiction is treated by itself, the objective tasks and problems either disappear
from view altogether or are regarded as some purely derivative thing, as something
artificial, as some enemy scheming. In this case, what is required of a revolutionary
is not a thorough understanding of the real, subtle and intricate dialectics of history,
in its concrete situations, but unbridled bellicosity, a professed determination "to
annihilate the enemy,” as well as a readiness to resort to the most ferocious, most 140
violent measures against those who, unaffected by the passion for " universal division
into two,” try to understand the objective logic of social development instead of
inventing high-sounding slogans. Lenin in his time showed how irresponsible this
"super– revolutionarism" with its extremely “left” phrases was.
***
It will be seen that the "absolute truths" of the Maoist ideologists, when put to the p
test, prove to be mere euphemisms for a situative political tactic mythologically
codified by the symbolics of the political passions of the time. All the “ dialectical”
talk about "division of one into two" and other world ontological depths supposedly
fathomed by them turns out in reality to be nothing but pompous garb disguising
both the splitting policies of the Maoists in the international communist movement
and their repressive measures within the country.
The true dialectics of Marx and Lenin is, primarily, a method used for an objective p
and scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega of it being a concrete
analysis of a concrete subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In contrast, in
the hands of the Maoists, dialectics has become something incompatible with any
kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is out of the question, not to speak of
a thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological heralds of universal truths are
not concerned about a vitally important action to be taken or the reaction to the
difficulties and problems in which the Chinese politicians have become entangled,
but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of attempts to blame everything on
universal rules, of the sleight of hand involving their substitution for the earthly
political passions, has been merely to translate their very concrete failures, their 142
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destructive measures, their internecine strife and splitting policies into the language
of universal recommendations. After causing enormous political harm at home these
ideologists are trying to make a universal law of this mess and to impose this law
upon the world. Having proved totally incapable of drawing any lesson from their
sad experience of "dividing one into two" they undertake to teach others the
universal truths. And so the Maoists accuse our Party of all the mortal sins because
it has “revised” those universal truths, which, they assent, call for world-wide
dissension and strife, violent rebellion and vindictive repression.
“Viewing socialist society from the standpoint of division of one into two, it must p
be admitted,” say the authors of the article referred to above, "that throughout the
socialist stage, from beginning to end, there are classes, class contradictions, class
struggle, a struggle between two paths-the socialist and the capitalist, there is a
danger of the restoration of capitalism.”
The progress of a developed socialist society in which the exploiting classes have p
been destroyed is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to introduce into it the 143
methods of “division” into mutually opposed classes, any tendency deliberately to
identify the uncompromising class struggle the proletariat is waging against hostile
bourgeois and revisionist ideologies with the creative quest in the constructive
endeavour to consolidate and develop socialism, are utterly inadmissible and alien to
the nature of socialism, and to the creative dialectics of its development. Such
dialectics has nothing in common with the pitiable myths which the Maoists have
adopted as their weapon and which increasingly reveal themselves as miserable fakes
of Marxist dialectics.
***
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Notes
[ 123•1] Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, pp.
235–236
[ 124•1] Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, p. 15.
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[ 137•1] We may recall here Lenin’s definition: " Dialectics is the teaching which
shows how opposites can be.. . identical.. .” (Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 109), i. e., not
only combined, but in unity leading to identity.
< >
<< Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Crisis in the Political Development >>
Essence of China
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MAP
<<< A DESTRUcTIVE POLIcY [ThE ChINESE lEadErShIp aNd ThE @AT LENINIST
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<•> Crisis in the Political 144
Development of China
TOC [introduction.]
Card
L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin p
Text
HTML Developments in China clearly show that the notorious "cultural revolution" is p
PS entering the final stage of its long-drawn-out existence. This is shown particularly by
PDF the political manoeuvres of the Mao Tse-tung group aimed at stabilising and
consolidating its rule, stemming the tide of wanton tyranny, lawlessness and the
T* deliberate derangement of the life of society and state that they themselves let loose,
19* and confining it within the strict and definite limits of the “new” order. No longer
bothering to keep up the pretence of struggle against bourgeois influences in art,
### science and education and against all those "following the bourgeois path,” the
Peking leaders have lately been openly pursuing purely political objectives in order
to maintain their power.
***
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<•> THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE 145
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
TOC
Card It emerges more and more clearly that what is now taking place in China is a p
radical restructuring of the entire social-political, and especially state-legal,
Text mechanism that was established after the victorious revolution and the proclamation
HTML of a People’s Republic in China and was fixed in essence in the 1954 Constitution.
PS Much of the political organisation of Chinese society have since been destroyed,
PDF although the Constitution and many other laws, constituent acts, policy documents
and fundamental party decisionsincluding the documents of the 8th CPC Congress-
T* have not been repealed or much amended. At the same time new bodies and
19* organisations are springing up in China, and a political system is emerging which is
evidently called upon to perform the functions of a Maoist dictatorship.
###
It is no accident that Mao Tse-tung and his group should have set out to destroy by p
force the state apparatus and the entire political system of China as they had been
until early 1966, when the notorious "cultural revolution" was unleashed. The fact of
the matter is that the mechanism of people’s government in China was built and
developed on the Leninist principles of socialist statehood, which were studied and
applied in practice, as well as on the basis of the experience accumulated by the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.
Although the conditions under which China had to develop were extremely p 146
challenging and difficult owing to the economic and cultural backwardness inherited
from the past, to the small working class and to the influence of the semifeudal
habits and customs, the people’s government very soon achieved considerable success
in developing and building up democratic institutions and arousing the political
consciousness of the people. Under the 1954 Constitution, the People’s Republic of
China was declared a people’s democracy led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants. The working people exercised their power through
a system of representative bodies-assemblies of people’s representatives-which were
set up both in town and countryside. The state apparatus was built on the principle
of democratic centralism, a combination of collective and oneman management, and
control by the people. The leading role belonged to the Communist Party of China
which proceeded under the banner of Marxism-Leninism together with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. The CPC relied in
its activities on the United Popular Democratic Front which comprised all the
democratic classes, parties and groups, popular organisations and democratic elements
not in the Party.
But both the structure and the working of such a mechanism had their defects. This p
was due to lack of experience and competent personnel and, particularly to the
Maoist distortions, which were perceptible even at the earliest stages of China’s
post-revolutionary development, although not as clearly as now. As a social-political
and theoretical-ideological current. Maoism did not take shape at once, showing 147
suddenly against the background of the "cultural revolution,” but emerged and gained
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The Maoist political-legal doctrine was more than a revision and denial of the p
fundamental primary principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the substance and
political forms of power during the establishment and strengthening of the socialist
system. The doctrine is based primarily on the thesis that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat is a dictatorship exercised by the masses.” [147•1 This proposition
which Mao Tse-tung laid down as early as 1957, [147•2 and which was widely
publicised during the "cultuml revolution,” made it possible to disregard the leading
role of the working class and ignore its genuine needs and interests as well as its
views. At the same time it suggested that society should be divided, not on a class
principle but according to political views or, to be more precise, on people’s attitude 148
to the policies of the Maoist rulers. All the social forces that supported the
adventuristic nationalist and hegemonic Maoist line were assumed to be "the people,”
while all those under the least suspicion of being disobedient or disrespectful to the
"great helmsman" were declared enemies of the people and "capitalist– supporters.”
Maoist ideologists often refer to the special features of China’s social development p
and especially to the fact that the peasants form the bulk of the population while the
proletariat is very small. Indeed, this is of importance to social reforms. The Chinese
revolution was carried through and the first successes in socialist construction
achieved largely because the CPC had managed to win over and lead the peasantry.
But the concrete historical conditions should have precisely made it of primary
concern to the government and Party to provide for the leadership of the working
class, to help enhance its leading position in the alliance with the peasants and to
work to introduce proletarian ideology among the rural population. Under such
conditions the bodies of political power must be particularly careful not to let the
influence of the petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry eclipse or distort the
interests and aims of the workers, the genuine exponents of social progress and
consistent fighters for socialism, who although not numerous by comparison, are to
lead society.
The Maoists, however, have no faith in the creative ability and revolutionary energy p
of the people; moreover, they are suspicious of any voluntary activity or initiative of
the workers. Instead, they offer a grotesquely inflated personality cult which serves 149
to suppress the democratic relations and norms of the party and public life, as well
as criticism and control from below, and enforces unquestioning blind obedience to
the will of the absolute "leader.” Nor are the masses required to understand the
meaning and purpose of the decisions for, as the Chinese press points out, you must
"carry out Mao’s instructions no matter whether you have as yet grasped their
meaning or not.” [149•1
Taking its cue from the semi-feudal traditions of deifying the supreme ruler, the p
peasants’ ageold habit of obedience to authority, etc., Maoist propaganda is, in effect,
trying to preserve and perpetuate the political apathy of the masses and to implant a
system of bureaucratic administration and handle all social and political issues in a
subjective way.
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These days the Peking leaders never recall what the classics of Marxism-Leninism p
had to say about the role played by the individual in history in general and in
revolutionary change in particular. They try to put it out of people’s minds that V.
Lenin, the head of the Party and the Soviet state, resolutely checked all attempts to
extol his work. The Maoists fiercely attack the resolutions of the CPSU and other
fraternal communist and workers’ parties which condemn the manifestations of the
personality cult in some countries and which preclude subjectivism and arbitrary
action by individuals. Carrying on " unreserved propaganda of Mao’s ideas and
arming the people with them" [150•1 is declared to be the main point of the 150
Maoist doctrine.
It is plain that the Maoist political-legal doctrine extremely exaggerates the role of p
coercion in the carrying out of social reforms. It views compulsion as very nearly
the key to all social problems including those (e.g., in the economic field) which
require a different approach, such as reasonable estimates, a wise distribution of
manpower, or provision of the necessary facilities. The slogans "Power comes from 151
the barrel of a gun" and "Politics takes command,” which were adopted long ago at
the time of the armed struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist rulers
retained in peace-time and not only while revolutionary government was being
established but also later on, during the building of socialism. With the start of the
"cultural revolution,” with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the rampage and
the army acting as a shield, violence actually became the Maoists’ sole means of
handling, not only all political issues that presented themselves, but also those arising
in the sphere of science, culture and education.
As they shift the centre of gravity to the use of force, the Maoists openly ignore the p
Constitution and defy socialist law. The Maoists instituted repressive actions against
the working people long before the "cultural revolution.” They carried out this policy
by sending the local bodies of power obligatory quotas of so many per cent of the 152
population to be dealt with as enemies of the people. The rules concerning the
administration of justice by the courts alone, the independence of the judges, and
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centralised Procuracy were declared harmful and "bourgeois.” Practically nothing was
done to codify laws while proposals for endorsing new codes voiced at the 8th
Congress of the CPC, came to be viewed two years later as "subversion of the
people’s democratic dictatorship”. The Maoist rulers regarded the citizens’ democratic
rights and liberties as empty declarations which, if anything, ought to be limited and
curtailed, not enhanced by legal and material safeguards.
The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers and the entire ideological and
theoretical platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and megalomaniac course
imposed on China by its present Peking leadership, are not in any sense an
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and special features of the vast
country. Still less are they the "acme of revolutionary theory,” as Mao’s followers
claim. Rather, they are a hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and bombastic
slogans betraying lack of faith in the creative capacity of the people and a denial of
the leading role of the proletariat, and put forward to excuse violence, the cult of
personality, and extreme nationalism. And what is most important, these are not
isolated mistakes such as may be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of the
infantile disorder of leftism in communism, but rather a fully-developed system of
anti– Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles and objectives of the world
communist movement.
***
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Notes
[ 147•2] See Mao Tse-tung, Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,
M., 1967.
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<•> THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS 153
TOC The causes, motive forces and forms of the political coup the Maoists are trying to p
bring off under the guise of the "cultural revolution" certainly need to be studied and
Card analysed further. For example, we still have to find satisfactory explanation of why it
was that the Maoists were able to set off the so-called "cultural revolution,” destroy
Text much of the former social-political and state-legal system, and begin to establish the
HTML mechanism of an absolute military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Why was there no force
PS within the Party and the state strong enough and sufficiently well-organised to stand
PDF in the way of Mao Tsetung and his group, to defend the purity of Marxist-Leninist
teachings and provide for China’s successful advance along the socialist road?
T*
19* Of course an examination of these questions will require a most detailed and p
extensive analysis of a variety of social factors.
###
Notwithstanding their boastful declarations, the Maoists have not yet managed to p
achieve complete victory. Chinese developments connected with the "cultural
revolution" are not yet over. At the same time it would be useful to noteeven if only
tentatively and touching mainly on the political-legal sphere-some of the
circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese affairs.
The first thing to point out is the inadequate general development of the political p
life in China, the absence of sufficiently strong traditions and habits of socialist
democratism. This may be explained in part by the historical past of China whose 154
downtrodden people not only suffered from semi-feudal forms of exploitation but
were also deprived of elementary rights and liberties and were oppressed by military
cliques and foreign interference. It is equally noteworthy, however, that after the
Chinese revolution had been accomplished and people’s government established, not
enough was done to end the onerous legacy of the past. The socialist democratic
forms stipulated in the 1954 Constitution were never completely realised. Even at the
time when they were most active, representative bodies never played quite so
important a part as they were legally entitled to. They did not exercise the necessary
control over the executive bodies and their organisational work among the people,
e.g., the relations between deputies and constituents, was nothing more than a
formality.
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Every now and then the normal course of political life in China has been p
interrupted by vociferous campaigns accompanied by mass-scale repression. For
example, as they were preparing their "big leap,” the Maoists launched a " struggle
against the rightist bourgeois elements.” At first this seemed to be aimed at the
bourgeois liberal intellectuals from the democratic parties but soon spread to the
Chinese Communist Party and to government institutions. The campaign swiftly
developed into a mass persecution of Communists who were sincerely trying to carry
out the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress, democratise the social and political life 156
and establish fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. The policy of "people’s communes" in the countryside, besides dealing a
blow at the agricultural production, actually caused the destruction of representative
bodies in the countryside and discredited a large number of local leaders devoted to
the Party.
Not only did the Maoists disregard the need to observe revolutionary law, but they p
went out of their way to paralyse the very institutions whose function was to
strengthen overall civil discipline and maintain socialist law and order. As early as
the late fifties they started a rabid persecution of the workers in political and legal
institutions, particularly of the courts, procurator’s offices and the people’s control
organisations. Many prominent workers in these institutions, devoted champions of
law and order, were dismissed from office and branded as " counterrevolutionary
elements" who had wormed themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the
fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task groups" was started. These groups
performed the combined functions of the courts, procurator’s offices and public
security bodies. The Committee of People’s Control, which was established soon
after the victorious revolution and which rested on the system of local bodies and on
the active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised into a common ministry, and
later on, both central and local people’s control agencies were finally eliminated.
Already before the "cultural revolution" the part played by the system of p
representative bodies in the country’s life was very small. Most of the important 157
decisions-e.g., on the "big leap" and "people’s communes"-were adopted without
being submitted to the All-China Assembly of People’s Representatives, which was
not even convoked, or to local elected bodies. People’s assemblies were no longer
called regularly, their activities were more and more circumscribed and finally
stopped altogether. Since the launching of the "big leap" policy, elections to
representative bodies have been held only once, in 1964, although under the law
there should have been during that time at least two elections to the AllChina
Assembly of People’s Representatives and four, to the local people’s assemblies.
Real power, both in the centre and at grassroots level, gradually shifted to the
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executive bodies which became increasingly ponderous and unwieldy, and pervaded
by officialism and sycophancy. State administration separated itself from the people
by walls of red tape.
All the revolutionary triumphs and socialist gains of the Chinese were ascribed to p
Mao, and all blunders and flops were attributed to the machinations of his enemies
or failure to understand his "great directives.” There arose a situation in China where
important Party and government leaders, whose great services to the people were
well-known, could not-if they objected to Mao’s policies and the actions of his
aides-speak out against the Mao personality cult and had no option but to support it
publicly, often excusing their particular view by their concern to see the ideas of
"the reddest sun" translated into life to the very best effect.
At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the Peking leaders increasingly set out p
to make use of young people and even schoolchildren, misrepresenting the outrages
perpetrated by the hungweipings and tsaofans as a largely spontaneous mass
movement. The Maoists deliberately set these young storm troopers upon their own
real or imaginary opponents, encouraging savage acts of terrorism. It is significant
that in the widely circulated resolution of the CPC Central Committee of August 8,
1966, the prospective hungweipings were granted free pardon in advance for any
crimes and offences they might commit "in the course of the movement" short of
murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state secrets and counter-revolutionary
crimes " whereof explicit evidence should be available.”
Still, Mao and his followers depended mainly on the army. China’s armed forces 159
played a decisive role in the progress of events, becoming the Maoists’ "steel wall"
and mainstay. It was not by chance that the army was not broken up, reorganised or
even seriously criticised. The removal of some military commanders and even
disturbances in some army units were due to the political purge reflecting the course
of events in China rather than to any other cause. The special features of the
formation, leadership and ideological guidance of the army were used by the
Maoists, who had seized commanding positions in the army in good time, to divorce
it from the people and educate it in the spirit of iron discipline and blind obedience
to Mao Tse-tung. In actual fact, the army has long been independent of Party and
government control and, as developments have shown, has placed itself above
society.
***
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<<< A DestructiVe Policy [THE CHINESE lEadErSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
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<•> PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST 159
POLITICAL SYSTEM
TOC
What are the characteristics of the Maoist political system that is developing? Time p
Card is sure to make its corrections in the answer, for the propensity of Mao Tse-tung
and his supporters for shifting ground and turning right about, for dealing in
Text demagoguery and just deceiving the people must naturally leave its mark on China’s
HTML social and public life. Notwithstanding this, the outline of the Maoist dictatorship
PS emerges quite clearly.
PDF
As things stand, political power in China has been seized by a tiny group led by p 160
T* Mao Tsetung. This group is controlling the social and public life and has taken on
19* itself the functions of the top party and government bodies. From the standpoint of
Chinese constitutional law a group of this kind cannot be identified with any of the
### established institutes of the political system and chiefly resembles the half-advisory,
halfruling institutions of a monarchy or an absolute dictatorship. The "Maoist
headquarters,” as the dictator group is officially described, is a vague enough notion,
not fixed in any legal or other act; it has neither a clear-cut structure, nor an
apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of people. Moreover, the circle of Mao’s
followers keeps contracting and extending by turns as the objectionable ones are
kicked out or-as happens more seldom-those who win back their place by
“repentance” or zealous prosecution of Maoist objectives, return.
Placed at the hub of the entire political mechanism is "Chairman Mao,” whose p
moves and decisions are never debated. Mao’s prestige serves to cover unprecedented
infractions of democracy and law, savage repression and outrages against those
suspected of "sedition.” This inflated prestige is used by the Maoists to ensure the
obedience of the multi-million people. Mao Tse-tung has appointed Lin Piao,
Minister for Defence, his official successor, as if Mao were a monarch.
Liu Shao-chi, who had been elected Chairman of the Chinese People’s Republic p
under the Constitution, was persecuted as the "black band leader,” "power-holder
who follows the capitalist path" and finally removed from all his jobs in the party 161
and government without the slightest regard for law. The All-China Assembly of
People’s Representatives and its Standing Committee are no longer convened and
have practically stopped functioning. As for the State Council of China, it is still
carrying on in certain respects but is kept under strict supervision by the Maoist
ruling clique.
In the provinces, autonomous areas, centrallygoverned cities and, more recently, also p
in the countries and communes, "revolutionary committees" have been set up. These
have replaced Party committees as well as local assemblies of people’s
representatives and their executive bodies, people’s committees. To all intents and
purposes, the Maoists hope that the "revolutionary committees,” described in the
Chinese press as an "outstanding victory of the cultural revolution,” will be their
ohief support and will provide the basis for the new political mechanism.
"Revolutionary committees" are formed of carefully picked “loyal” military men, the
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old cadres, and representatives of the "revolutionary masses.” The leading place in
these committees, with respect both to the number of seats and amount of influence,
is, in most instances, reserved for the army. The Maoists have been wary of
announcing an election to the "revolutionary committees,” although in 1966 they
made declarations to the effect that these new bodies of power would be elective.
In the process of rebuilding the political system the Maoists have uprooted p
influential and strong organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions and the Young Communist League. These organisations, which had extensive
revolutionary experience and were devoted to Marxism-Leninism and friendship with
the Soviet Union, seemed dangerous to the Maoists. Yet, as they would like to pass
off the "cultural revolution" as a popular movement and draw the mass of the
working people into their gambles, the Peking leaders have lately started to organise
"work brigades for the propagation of Mao’s ideas.” These brigades are usually
mustered and directed by servicemen and fulfil auxiliary functions in restoring order
in the provinces. "Work brigades" are eagerly exploited by the Maoists who seek to
show in this way how loyal they are to the slogan of working-class leadership. They
also rely on these brigades to get rid of the hungweipings-so that no blame should
attach to the army-and achieve political stability.
Recently the Maoist ruling clique set some schemes on foot concerning the p
Communist Party of China. It is well known that during the " cultural revolution" the
CPC had to take many hard knocks. More than 130 of 174 members and candidate
members of the CPC Central Committee elected by the 8th Congress were subjected
to persecution. The Political Bureau and Secretariat are not functioning. Party
committees in the provinces, autonomous regions, towns and communes are
paralysed. The "cultural revolution group" while claiming to speak on behalf of the
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Party, actually set the hungweipings and tsaofans upon the Party and attacked and 164
took repressive action against Communist Party officials. However, in late 1968, the
Peking leaders started on another course, setting out to purge the Party, substitute
Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the Party by recruiting new members from
among the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and make further use of the army
style of work. They want to turn the Party into an obedient tool. They mean to turn
to account the Party’s revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war record, its
prestige among the working people, and its immense organisational and educational
potential. For all practical purposes, what they are setting up in China under the
name of the Communist Party of China is a new political organisation which is
intended to serve as a support for Maoist rule.
***
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<•> Maoism Preaches Poverty 165
TOC A Arzamastseu p
Card
Poverty is not an inevitable accompaniment of mankind’s development. It is p
unavoidable only as long as the productive forces are not sufficiently developed and
Text the economy has not risen above a production level that meets only immediate
HTML needs. Exploitation in class society, new requirements and the accumulation of
PS wealth aggravate poverty and awaken in the people a desire to put an end to
PDF oppression and privation. However, insufficient economic development has for a long
time prevent the possibility of discovering the correct way for ending poverty. This
T*
became possible only when Marxism came into being in the middle of the 19th
19*
century. Till then numerous Utopias were evolved in a futile attempt to discover the
### laws of social development.
Only socialism which unites the material and social factors is capable of resolving p
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this problem and ending poverty. Socialist revolution cuts the very roots of poverty 167
and ends the glaring inequality of people. The all-round development of production
and the attainment on this basis of complete social homogeneity are essential for the
elimination of poverty. To achieve this takes more than good intentions, since
production has its own laws of development. One must have certain capital, establish
a new labour discipline and a new organisation of labour, teach people new skills
and techniques and make the workers interested in the results of their efforts.
The only way to get rid of poverty is through creating a more advanced mode of p
production and through raising labour productivity.
The republic could not count on external economic aid. It had to rely on its own p
strength to break the vicious circle. The strength came from the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the people who made sacrifices in the name of victory and a better
future. The accomplishment of tasks, which would be unthinkable at other times, is
made possible by revolutionary heroism each time a new social system is born. The
October Socialist Revolution evoked an unprecedented enthusiasm. For the first time
in history people were making a revolution for themselves, and for the first time in
history they had real opportunity to display their capabilities. The heroism at the
fronts of the civil war was rivalled by the heroism of the workers in the rear, of
which the communist subbotniks were only one example. Conscientious work had a
great effect on the economic life of the country. It raised labour productivity and
improved labour discipline.
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The problem of socialist changes also faced China after the 1949 socialist p
revolution. Its economy was then even more backward than that of Russia in 1917.
The pulse-beat of economic life could hardly be felt after the many years of
Japanese occupation and the civil war. The few undamaged industrial enterprises
were lost in the ocean of primitive farm production, and were unable to exert any
noticeable influence. The feeble links between various parts of the country were
breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist Party of China set about the task of
ending the famine, the poverty and the rural backwardness, and of attaining 170
abundance. The external conditions were favourable. The country received
comprehensive economic, cultural and military assistance from the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. Neither was popular enthusiasm lacking. The vast country
began socialist construction. Factories and plants were rehabilitated and reconstructed,
and new industries were built with the help of the Soviet Union. The moral uplift
and material incentive promoted labour productivity and a new labour discipline. By
following this road China could build an advanced socialist economy in a few
decades. There were no insurmountable obstacles in the way, since socialism met the
basic demands of both the working class and the peasantry. The danger lay
elsewhere.
Under certain conditions politics is known to conflict temporarily with its economic p
base and hinder its development. State leadership in China fell into the hands of
people whose petty– bourgeois views and sentiments kept them from becoming true
Marxists. The initial successes in China and the people’s willingness to work
selflessly for the common cause evoked adventurist leanings in the leadership who
sought to ignore the laws of social development, which is so characteristic of the
petty bourgeoisie. Primitive petty-bourgeois mentality raised to the level of ideology
culminated in voluntarism, the personality cult, nationalism and anti-Sovietism.
The second half of the formula, poverty, is inseparable from the first. A person p
seized by “ super-revolutionary” enthusiasm, according to Mao, need not and should
not possess any material benefits beyond the bare minimum. Poverty should be part
of universal self-denial.
It is no accident that the Maoists have made use of this idea. Poverty and equality p
have been always regarded by the oppressed as being as closely related as their
opposites-wealth and inequality. All egalitarian Utopias emphasise and praise poverty
as the key requisite of universal equality. Poverty was lauded by Proudhon, one of
the founders of petty-bourgeois egalitarian socialism, who even developed an
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economic theory to justify the perpetuity of poverty. He held that nature had given
man two opposed qualities-a limitless capacity to consume and a limited capacity to
work. Poverty was therefore claimed to be man’s natural condition to which man
must reconcile himself. "It is clear that we cannot even think of escaping tihis
poverty-tHie law of our nature and our society,” wrote Proudhon. "Poverty is a
boon, and should be regarded as the basis of our joys.” [171•1 This was said over
a hundred years ago, at the time of the first industrial revolution, and is being 172
repeated by Mao Tse-tung in the age of atomic energy and of turbulent scientific
and technological advancement.
In Maoism the Leninist principle of material incentive gives way to the idealisation p
of " poverty.” But can poverty as it exists in real life serve as a stimulus to work?
Poverty means hunger, cold, disease, stupefaction, humiliation, and a degree of
dehumanisation to which man could never be Teconciled. It invariably evokes
protest, bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless when it fails to provide a
tolerable living for the worker. Real poverty does not go together with construction,
least of all socialist construction. Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of
attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as a blessing. He stated: "In addition to its
other special features, the 600-million population of China is conspicuous for its
poverty. This may seem bad but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes, action,
revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of paper one can write the most beautiful
hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful pictures.” [172•1
So the way out of the difficulty was to accept poverty, to adorn it with a halo of p
sanctity and nobility, to turn it into something to be sought after and carried with
pride and delight by everyone. Only then would it become a source of joy, creative
quest, selfless labour and heroism.
Having received this instruction of Mao’s, the Chinese ideological machine swung p
into action. Its main job now was to create a new type of worker who would labour
for the good of society, demanding no material remuneration. All newspapers, 173
magazines and the radio joined in the drive to “emancipate” the individual. The
purpose was to instil in people an aversion to material well-being, comfort and
cultural advancement-to free their souls from the "chimeras of civilisation."’ The
ideal held up was for a man to reduce his requirements to the bare minimum, the
resulting vacuum to be filled with love for the leader and nationalistic ravings about
the hegemony of the "Greater China.” Such a person should derive consolation for
the loss of material and cultural benefits from the grandeur and might of his country.
It is obviously a case of wishful thinking when the Chinese press serves the reader p
with numerous instances of cures from egoism and greed. For example: "Formerly
one young communemember would not do hard work and was angry when he was
given very few work-units. Recently, when the commune-members had to bring
fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he brought more than 50 kilograms on a
yoke. He was asked: ’How many units do you want this time?’ He replied: ’I don’t
care for work-units any more, for I am tilling the land in the name of the
revolution.’ " [ 173•1 The commune member completely suppressed his egoism
and got rid of the state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously call poverty !
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road to it as a road of moral purification from the vice of material and cultural
requirements. The kingdom of “pure” communism will come when people do away
with all “revisionist” survivals, learn to make do with little, and get rid of their
personal interests; when class distinctions will be removed and social equality
achieved. "And the objective world which is to be remoulded,” Mao Tse-tung wrote
in his article On Practice, "includes the opponents of remoulding, who must undergo
a stage ot compulsory remoulding (i.e. the recalcitrants should go to concentration
camps or do field work in remote areas-A A.) before they can pass to a stage of
conscious remoulding. When the whole of mankind consciously remoulds itself and
changes the world, the era of world communism will dawn." [174•1 (Emphasis
added-A. A.} When speaking of communism, Mao does not say a word about
economic development or the improvement of living standards. This is only to be
expected, since his kind of communism "is not far distant.” To achieve it the
working people only have to perform a revolution in their souls.
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"elements of the true characteristic of human relations;" the Young Hegelians were
pygmies. That is why the speculative method of Bruno Bauer and his circle was a
caricature of Hegel’s method, devoid of any understanding of the dialectics of social
life.
The counter-revolution in Hungary was bad, but it became good in the process of its p
suppression. Hungary got rid of its enemies and grew stronger,
Japan’s attack on China was bad. But China learned a great deal in the course of p
the war and was victorious. Thus a bad thing became good.
It will be bad if a third world war breaks out. But a nuclear war conflagration will p
finally do away with the capitalist world, and that is good. .. If one is to employ this
kind of logic, not only poverty, but also war, counter-revolution and disease can be
made out to be good things! In other words, everything that brings misfortune to
people, particularly to working people, and which they vigorously resist, is, according
to Mao, a source of future happiness. Now we can understand these words of
Mao’s: "It is terrible to think of the time when all people will become rich.” To him
this would mean the end of development, for "only poverty calls for change, action,
revolution.” According to Mao, it follows that not the striving to end poverty, but
poverty itself, is an inexhaustible source of creative energy and progress. There is
nothing scientific about this reasoning, not even a thought to exclude or prevent what 178
is bad. The arch-dialectical verbiage camouflages a plain statement of facts and the
unwillingness to analyse them in all their complexity.
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all his free time to studying the leader’s maxims. Everything that might remind 179
people of material or cultural values is to be destroyed. Monuments are being pulled
down, books are being destroyed, and musical works are prohibited. Universal
levelling is also reflected in clothing-blue trousers and a buttoned-up cloth or quilted
jacket have become a compulsory uniform for everybody. This is how the ideals of
egalitarian communism are put into practice and a regimented society is created.
The preaching of asceticism, and of universal poverty as the most effective means p
of ending social inequality, accompanied many actions of peasants and artisans in the
Middle Ages (T. Miinzer, the Taborite movement in Bohemia, etc.). It was also
present in the first actions of the proletariat (the Babouvists). So strong were these
sentiments that Marx paid considerable attention to this trend in communist thinking
at the beginning of his socio-political activity when his materialist and communist
outlook was taking shape. He devoted one chapter of his Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts ot 1844 to the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx’s basic idea
was that this primitive communism, with its praiseworthy intention of doing away
with private property and creating a just society, had not gone beyond, had in fact
not even attained to, private property. It strove not to master all the wealth created 180
in conditions of predominant private property, not to transform and greatly expand
the economic, political and cultural base of man’s liberation from exploitation, of
satisfying the requirements of people, and of the fuller manifestation of their
abilities, but, on the contrary, to discard everything that had been achieved. The
reason given for this attitude is that the available material and cultural benefits
cannot be shared by all because of the limited means required for their production.
Hence the rejection of culture and talent for the sake of primitive, arithmetical
equality. The negative attitude of egalitarian communism to private property is
nothing but envy by poor private property of the richer private property. "How little
this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the
abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the
unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to
go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it,” wrote Marx, adding
that crude egalitarian communism is "in its first form only a generalisation and
consummation of this relationship.” [ 180•1 That is why it reflects all the iniquity
of the old world. Work is not an end in itself in this society but a means of
obtaining a certain amount of food. A guaranteed food minimum becomes the only
aim in life, the summit of happiness. The production of life’s necessities (bread,
vegetables, etc.) is accordingly declared the most important activity. Physical labour 181
is opposed to mental work as the only worthy occupation. The individual is reduced
to the state of a dumb animal blindly following the orders of the leader of its herd.
Under such a “communism” equality in work and income does not compensate for a
man’s loss of individuality and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed at
transforming the world.
Marx said that the transfer of private property to common ownership would be p
accomplished by a communism which would keep intact all the wealth of previous
development and would return "man to himself as a social (i.e. human)
man.” [ 181•1 The necessity of its establishment is conditioned by the entire
history of industrial development. Incomplete communism of the egalitarian kind
looks backwards, not forwards, in proving its right to existence, and seeks
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justification in the existing state of affairs. It cannot count on the future and is
destined to share the fate of private property whose prisoner it is. The universal
spread of poverty does not save mankind from social upheavals. ".. .and. with
destitution,” wrote Marx and Engels, "the struggle for necessities and all the old
filthy business would necessarily be reproduced.” [181•2
Ideas of equal distribution have been appearing in countries with mainly small-scale p
production both in agriculture and industry, where abundance of products is only a
dream. They have always held a place of prominence in Chinese social Utopia. To 182
many progressive thinkers egalitarianism and poverty seemed the only way of ending
hunger and oppression. These ideas are to be found in the works of the ancient
Chinese philosophers, Lao-tse and Mo-tse, and of the thinkers of modern times, such
as Kung Tse-chen, Hung Hsiu-chuan and others. Still fresh in the people’s memory
is the first peasant state, Tai Ping Tien kuo-the Heavenly State of Great Welfare
(1851–64)-where the first attempt was made to introduce equality in land tenure.
Hung Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping uprising, wrote: "It is
necessary that all inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and jointly the
great happiness granted by our true master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that
land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together, that clothing be used and money
expended jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all should be properly fed
and clothed.” [ 182•1 Taiping laws obliged every peasant family to give the entire
harvest to the state without compensation, saving only what was absolutely necessary.
The surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans in towns and used for the
upkeep of the army and administration. This organisation of life evoked no protest
among the masses in view of the everpresent danger of returning to bondage under
landlords.
The ideals of egalitarian communism played a progressive role in feudal times. The p
idea of universal equality was an immense mobilising force among the poorest
peasants, based as it was on the demand to confiscate the landlords’ land. The
peasant uprisings undermined the foundations of feudalism and prepared conditions 183
for the emergence of new social relations.
This "vicious circle" can be broken only by recognising human dignity. Full p
development of all aspects of human life can be ensured only by socialism whose
productive efforts will be used, in Lenin’s words, not only to meet the daily needs
"but with the object of ensuring full wellbeing and free, all-round development for
all the members of society.” [183•1 The half-century history of socialism has
borne out this thesis of Lenin’s. The great accomplishments in science, technology
and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new man whose interests coincide with
the final goal of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific conception of
communism has nothing in common either with the pharisical “philosophy” of 184
poverty as a “blessing” or with the bourgeois-philistine cult of things. Material
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Notes
[ 180•1] K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, pp. 93,
94.
[ 181•1] K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, p. 95.
[ 181•2] K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, M., 1964, p. 46.
[ 182•1] Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the Modern Times, M.,
1961, p. 69.
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<•> Great-Power Chauvinism 185
of Mao Tse-tung
TOC
Card T. Rakhimou, V. Bogoslovsky p
The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People’s Republic demonstrated that the p
Text
country’s outlying areas were the most troublesome for its organisers. For instance,
HTML
Tibet and Sinkiang were th^e last provinces in the country to set up the so-called
PS
PDF
revolutionary committees. This happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports
still carry warnings to the effect that "class enemies there have refused to accept
T* their defeat and continue to hinder the country’s progress to socialism.”
19*
The Maoists find it difficult to effectively administer the outlying areas inhabited by p
### nonChinese nationalities, not just because they lie far from Peking, but mainly
because the local people know from long and bitter experience the meaning of the
"nationalities policy" pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group.
The Chinese state became multi-national in the course of centuries of conquest. The p
annexed lands were intensively colonised. Meanwhile the conquered nations were
partly exterminated and partly assimilated by the Chinese. This naturally caused the
non-Chinese peoples to distrust the Chinese.
All this made it necessary for the Communist Party of China and the state to p
proceed with caution in dealing with the nationalities question, to take the interests
of all peoples inhabiting Chinese territory into account, and to strictly observe
Marxist-Leninist theses on the nationalities question.
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the 8th Congress in 1956 demanded: "The Communist Party of China must make
special efforts to raise the status of the national minorities, help them to attain self–
government, endeavour to train cadres from among the national minorities, accelerate
their economic and cultural advance, bring about complete equality between all the
nationalities and strengthen the unity and fraternal relations among them. . . Special
attention must be paid to the prevention and correction of tendencies of great-Hanism
on the part of Party members and government workers of Han nationality.”
All this seemed to tend towards solving the nationalities question in the PRC. But p
great-power chauvinistic tendencies, affecting the legal status of the non-Chinese
nationalities in particular, made themselves increasingly felt in the policy of the
Chinese leadership.
From the very first these peoples, numbering 45 million, were denied the right to p
self– determination, to statehood. They were granted so-called regional autonomy.
"The People’s Republic of China,” says Article 3 of the Constitution, "is a unified
multi-national state. . . Regional autonomy applies in areas entirely or largely
inhabited by national minorities. The national autonomous areas are an inalienable
part of the People’s Republic of China.”
But the status of "regional autonomy" (an empty word since autonomous regions are p
as “ independent” as provinces) was granted only to five (out of the one hundred)
national minorities. Among the nationalities denied this right are the Yitsu (3.3 mln),
Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians (2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln). But even the peoples 188
(the Tibetans, Uigurs, Tungans, Mongolians, Chuangs) that were nominally granted
the right to "regional autonomy" were allocated territories demarcated in a rather
peculiar way. The Tibetan people were actually torn apart, and less than half of them
now live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region while the rest reside in the provinces of
Chinghai, Szechwan and Yunnan. The Mongolians in “autonomous” Inner Mongolia
constitute a mere 10 per cent of the local population and may be rightly called a
national minority.
The non-Chinese peoples are all but divested of political rights. All the people’s p
committees called upon to represent the interests of the national minorities, have
been dissolved. Power has been transferred to the so-called revolutionary committees
set up by the army command on Peking’s orders and under complete army control.
The "revolutionary committees" are headed by Chinese. Thus the "revolutionary
committee" of Inner Mongolia is under Teng Haiching, one-time Deputy Commander
of the Peking Military Area, that of the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Regionunder
Lun Shu-chin, former commander of the Hunan Military Area.
Acts of repression on a mass scale and persecution of the local cadres, party p
functionaries, statesmen, intellectuals have become commonplace. The mass drive to 189
eliminate the so-called Rightist deviation and Pan-Turkism was let loose in 1958 in
the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. Many people were slandered and victimised,
among them Liya Samedi, a prominent Uigur writer. Chairman of the local Writers’
Union, Ibrahim Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a
revolutionary and a staunch fighter for the people’s cause during the time of the
Kuomintang.
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There was wide-spread persecution of the national minorities during the "cultural p
revolution.” Practically all the intelligentsia and Party and state cadres of the
minorities were accused of counter-revolutionary activities and complicity with
imperialism and "Soviet revisionism.” Among those victimised are Ulanfu, Chairman
of the People’s Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Alternate
Politbureau Member of the CC CPC, and Iminov, Vice– Chairman of the People’s
Committee of the SinkiangUigur Autonomous Region.
The notorious "big leap" and the "people’s communes" had an even more harmful p
effect on the minorities than on China at large. Production slumped at the few
factories that were in existence. Farm production declined and famine struck whole
regions.
The economy of China’s outlying areas is largely colonial in character. The few p
industrial enterprises are either put to military use, or the products they manufacture
are shipped to the country’s central areas. The engineers and skilled workers they
employ are the Chinese settlers from central areas. The local nationalities do
unskilled arduous jobs only. In this way the advancement of the working class in the 190
country’s outlying areas is intentionally retarded.
The only type of construction still undertaken there is the building of strategic p
roads, air fields, and atomic-weapon testing grounds. Non-Chinese peoples are forced
to work on these projects en masse.
Communes were set up in the areas populated by the minorities in order to seize as p
much as possible of their produce so as to feed and clothe the countless thousands
of Chinese soldiers stationed in the national areas, and to supply the big cities.
The migration of the Chinese to the national areas undermines the economy of those p
areas and lowers the status of the local population. The Chinese in the Sinkiang-
Uigur and Tibet areas now constitute approximately half the local population. The
proportion of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given
the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always been a shortage of arable land. In
Inner Mongolia pastures are being put to the plough to provide new settlers with
land.
According to official propaganda the Chinese are being resettled en masse, and p
most of the 25 million citizens being sent to the countryside will go to the national
areas. Calls to revert to the communes of the "big leap" period are becoming more
frequent.
By colonising the outlying areas, the Maoist group does not merely seek to p
“relieve” the country’s central areas of “redundant” people, or get rid of trouble-
makers. The mass migrations of the Chinese have the objective of turning the local
populations into national minorities by saturating the resettlement areas with the 191
Hans, thereby preparing the ground for an eventual assimilation of the non-Chinese
peoples. Nor do the Maoists intend to postpone the assimilation, and measures are
being undertaken to that end. On numerous occasions girls of Uigur, Kazakh, Tibetan
and other nationalities have been compelled to marry Chinese on pain of severe
punishment.
For years now the languages other than Chinese have been "sinoised.” The p
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minorities are forced to adopt the Chinese script, and not only internationally
accepted words, but also the basic vocabularies are being superceded by the Chinese
vocabulary. The minorities are no more taught their native languages at school. One
of the charges levelled against Ulanfu was that he demanded that the Mongolian
language be taught at national schools at least on a par with Chinese.
The Maoists have even worked out "theoretical premises" towards assimilating the p
non-Chinese peoples. In 1960 Sinkiang Hungchi wrote that the nationalities of the
PRC were merging into a single entity on the basis of the Chinese nationality. It was
echoed by Sinkiang jihpao which went so far as to claim that the assimilation was
"Marxist and communist.” "Those who oppose such assimilation oppose socialism,
communism and historical materialism.” These are not empty words. Those who
demand that modern industry be built in the outlying areas, that a working class be
formed there, that local engineering and managerial personnel be trained and national
cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of “black” views and supporters for "an
open revision of the fundamental principles of MarxismLeninism.” The implications 192
of such charges are clear enough.
In this connection it is significant that the new Party Rules adopted at the so-called p
9th Party Congress make no mention of the nationalities policy or the non-Chinese
peoples. The Maoists make believe that non-Chinese peoples no longer exist in the
PRC, that they have already been assimilated.
It is only natural that the great-power, chauvinistic policy pursued by Mao and his p
group is encountering the growing resistance of the nonChinese peoples, which often
takes the form of armed action such as the continuing guerrilla struggle being waged
by thousands of Tibetans, and the numerous instances of armed action by
Mongolians, Chuangs, Uigurs. In January, 1969, over 4,000 people were killed in an
armed clash in Sinkiang.
There is every reason to believe that the “ troublesome” regions will cause Mao p
Tse-tung and his group even more trouble in the years ahead.
The nationalities question in the PRC can be solved only on a genuine Marxist- p 193
Leninist basis The rich experience accumulated in the course ot the economic and
cultural development of the national minorities in other socialist countries could serve
as a useful guide.
194
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<<< A DestrUctive PoLicy [THE CHINESE lEadErSHIp aNd THE @AT LENINIST
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<•> III 195
PS 196
PDF V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, K. Kukushkin, M. Yuryev p
T* Founded fifty years ago, in July 1921, the Communist Party of China radically p
19* transformed the development of the Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle for
national and social emancipation. It led the popular revolution, whose triumph in
### 1949 gave birth to the Chinese People’s Republic. The development of the new
China began with the abolition of feudalism and of the domination of China by the
imperialist powers, with revolutionary changes in town and country, initiated by the
Communist Party of China with the building in the 1950’s of the foundations for
socialist industrial and cultural development, and with collectivisation in the
countryside. The membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60 in 1921 to
nearly 20 million in the mid-1960’s. [196•1
The Communist Party of China has traversed a complex and difficult path during p 197
the last half-century. It has known ups and downs at the various stages of its
development, both before the victory of the people’s revolution and also during the
existence of People’s Republic of China. On the way to victory, the CPC had twice-
in 1927 and 1934-experienced the bitterness of defeat. But that did not break the
will of the Chinese Communists to fight. Thousands and millions of new fighters
took the place of the fallen. The Party was outstandingly successful as leader and
organiser of the working people in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949–52)
and of the first five-year plan (1953–57), and enjoyed increasing prestige at home
and in the international arena. In the first half of the 1960’s, the Party shouldered all
the difficulties caused by the adventuristic "big leap" policy that the Mao Tse-tung
group had imposed on the Party and country.
In the course of its history, the CPC has experienced sharp clashes and long periods p
of intraParty struggle, sometimes open and sometimes hidden, which reflected the
confrontation of the two opposing tendencies in the Party development-the Marxist-
Leninist, internationalist line and the nationalistic line.
The Party gained extensive experience of fighting and mass organising during the p
course of the national revolution (1925–27), during the revolutionary struggle under
the slogan of Soviets (1927–36), during the liberation war against the Japanese
invaders (1937–45) and the civil war against the Kuomintang reactionary forces
(1946– 49) and during the construction of the People’s Republic of China. Within
the Party there were experienced organisers and military leaders who were looked on 198
as the backbone of the Party because of their revolutionary staunchness and devotion
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The rich experience of the Communist Party of China forms part of the treasure- p
house of the world revolutionary movement. The names of Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po,
Chang Tai-lei, Teng Chung-hsia, Pen Pai and other prominent leaders of the Party,
its founders, organisers and theorists, are revered by Communists and revolutionaries
all over the world. Their great work cannot be depreciated by the deviations that
have taken place in the development of the PRC and the CPC, by imperialism’s
slander regarding the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communists, or by the
unbridled campaign launched by the Maoists in recent years to defame the Party, its
noble traditions and tested cadres, and veterans of the revolution.
The fifty-year history of the Communist Party of China provides ample food for p
thought in connection with the fate of the revolutionary and communist movement in
China and other countries with a similar socio-economic structure. There is no need
to prove the vast scientific and political significance of analysing the major processes
that determined the essence and paths of development of the CPC. Even our
ideological and political opponents are well aware of this fact. The history of the
CPC and the elucidation cf the key facts and stages in its development have long
been the subject of acute ideological controversy. Since the early 1960’s, when the
divergence of the Mao Tse-tung group from the concerted line of the international
communist movement became conspicuous, the interpretation of Maoism and its 199
course have come to the fore as one of the central problems of the ideological
struggle, in which the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the history of the Chinese
revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is opposed by bourgeois historians of
various persuasions, by Maoists, revisionists and “Left” radicals.
An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist p
Party brings out a common feature: nearly all the works devoted to the general
problems, to separate periods or even to separate events in the history of the CPC
somehow concentrate on the question of its relationships (political, ideological, etc.)
with the international communist and revolutionary movement-with the Comintern
and its largest section, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the
countries and communist parties of the world socialist system.
Since the time when the first anti-Marxist versions of the history of the Chinese p
Communist Party appeared, a certain change has taken place in the bourgeois
treatment of the Chinese Party’s relationships with the international communist
movement. In the 1920’s-40’s, bourgeois authors tended to present the CPC as a
“hand” and “weapon” of the Comintern. After the victory of the Chinese revolution,
the American Sinologists (J. Fairbank, B. Schwartz, R. North, and C.
Brandt [ 199•1 ) put forward the idea that the Chinese Emacs-File-stamp: 200
"/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/299.tx" people had triumphed
in 1949 because the Party leadership had acted counter to the theory, practice and
recommendations of the international communist movement. Attempts were also made
to reduce the CPC’s political course in the 1940’s to the ideas and principles of Mao
Tse-tung. As the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its
outright attack on the concerted line of the international communist movement, this
view began to predominate in bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and “
deepened” in the works of American and West European Sinologists dealing with the
Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in biographies of Mao Tse-
tung, and in books and articles on Maoism. The “deepened” view consisted in the
tracing, by many American and West European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung’s “
special” course, which had allegedly determined the ultimate victory of the Chinese
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revolution and the opposition of his line to that of the Comintern, back to the 1930’s
and even the 1920’s. The works, published in the 1960’s, of S. Schram, Y.
Chen [ 200•1 and especially of J. E. Rue [ 200•2 , all develop this theme.
The essence of the Maoist version of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, p
spelled out in a number of official documents issued by the Maoist leadership and in
books on the Party history circulated in the 1950’s in the PRC and elsewhere, is
this: already in the 1920’s, Mao Tsetung had drawn up his own–"the only correct"–
line for the development of the Chinese revolution; but it did not become the Party’s
policy until the mid-1930’s, until he and his followers came to the leadership of the
Communist Party of China. The entire history of the Party is accordingly divided into
two major stages-the "stage of defeats" (before Mao’s advent to power) and the stage
in which the Party and the revolution in China achieved victory, allegedly by
translating Mao Tse-tung’s “ideas” and "principles" into reality. [ 202•1 In the 202
1940’s-50’s, the Maoist versions and assessments of the history of the Chinese
Communist Party insisted on the thesis that the Party’s policy, its ideological and
political platform and its best cadres were shaped without any help from the
international communist movement. We quote literally from the resolution of the
Central Committee of the CPC concerning the decision of the Presidium of the
Comintern Executive Committee to disband the Comintern: "The best cadres of the
Chinese Communist Party were moulded without the slightest outside
help.” [ 202•2 In his report, "On the Party" to the CPC’s Seventh Congress (1945),
which whipped up the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and endorsed his “ideas”
Liu Shao-chi said that the CPC’s platform consists of ”. . . great theories ot their
own. . ." ( ItalicsAuthors). ”. . .Since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party
there has been created and developed unique, integrated, and correct theory
concerning the people’s revolution and national reconstruction in China,” the report
added. "This theory is none other than Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese
revolution-Comrade Mao Tsetung’s theory and policy in regard to Chinese history,
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution.” [202•3
Ever since the late 1950’s, when the Maoists began to follow and propagate their p
"special course,” their opposition to the policy of the international communist 203
movement became increasingly evident. Chinese textbooks and other publications no
longer contain even the well-known facts about the interaction of the CPC and the
Chinese revolution with the forces and contingents of the world revolutionary
process; nor do they mention the assistance given to the CPC by the Comintern, the
world revolutionary movement, the CPSU and the Soviet state. [203•1
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In the course of the "cultural revolution,” the falsification of the history of the p
Chinese Communist Party, its relationships with the international communist
movement became still more blatant. Earlier Mao Tse-tung was depicted as the
Party’s sole “infallible” leader, whereas now he is also represented as its one and
only founder. "The CPC was founded and fostered by Mao Tse-tung," [ 203•2 Lin
Piao said in his report to the Ninth Congress of the CPC. We are presented with a
frankly idealistic outline of the history of the Chinese Communist Party-its successes
are attributed to Mao Tse-tung alone. All the former outlines and works which gave 204
an already falsified version of the history of the CPC and the PRC are now
considered to be “inadequate” and said to "belittle the role of Mao Tse-tung and his
ideas in the history of the CPC and the international communist movement.” Because
they mentioned just a few facts about the assistance of the Comintern and the CPSU
to the CPC, the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese revolution, their authors
are accused in official publications of showing sympathy with "contemporary
revisionism.” The Maoist leadership’s latest directive article, published on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, likewise outlined
the Party’s history without making any mention whatsoever of the international
communist movement. [ 204•1
Although Maoist and bourgeois historiographers may have different motives, they all p
exploit the fact that the events connected with the history of the Chinese Communist
Party have been inadequately studied until recently in order to distort the real nature
of the relations between the CPC and the international communist movement.
While examining in the present article the problems of the relationships of the CPC p
with the international communist movement, the authors have based themselves on
recently published Soviet historical works which are the outcome of research into
new factual material concerning the history of the Chinese revolution and the
Chinese Communist Party. [ 204•2
In the period of the Comintern’s foundation and formation, V. Lenin worked on the p 205
fundamentals of the relationships of the international communist movement with the
communist and other revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent countries in
the new historical era ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution.
We shall recall the chief points of Lenin’s approach to the problems of the p
interaction between the international communist movement and its contingents and
other revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries.
When he advanced the policy of establishing the closest international ties between p
the communist and working-class movement in the developed countries and the
communist and nationalliberation movement in the East, Lenin was proceeding from
the fact that the efforts of the Communists of various countries, and their policy of
international cohesion and mutual assistance provided a means for realising the
potentialities stemming from the objective concurrence of the basic interests of the 206
world’s revolutionary forces in their fight against imperialism and all forms of
exploitation. [ 206•1
At the same time, Lenin stressed that regulating that interaction and establishing p
stable international ties were by no means an easy process that would take place
automatically. He maintained that in the colonial and dependent countries of the East,
this process, together with the tremendous political development of their
revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, “ secondary” difficulties owing to
the preponderance there of non-proletarian strata and to the various nationalistic
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prejudices of the masses. The experience of the first contacts with the representatives
of various trends of national revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries brought
Lenin to the conclusion that the involvement of the non– proletarian masses there in
revolutionary activity might, besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt the
representatives of these forces to “repaint” the non-proletarian liberation trends and
platforms in the "colour of communism.” [ 206•2 Lenin pointed to the possibility,
under these circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the principles of the
international communist movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain tactical
slogans without understanding their essence and the reason why they had been
advanced in the first place.
The development of the revolutionary forces in China at all its stages and the p
history of the Chinese Communist Party have borne out Lenin’s prediction about the 207
importance and character of the interaction of the international communist movement
with its separate national contingents. The interaction and close ties of the CPC with
the international communist movement, and the allround assistance it received from
the Comintern and communist parties were a powerful impetus and one of the
decisive prerequisites for the victory of the revolution in China. At the same time,
Lenin’s warning against the possibility of the Marxist doctrine being distorted by
representatives of the nationalistic, non-proletarian forces provides a key to
understanding the social and gnoseological roots of the theory and practice of
Maoism.
China’s revolutionary movement of the 1920” s40’s bore the imprint of the directing p
theoretical, political and organisational activity of the Comintern. At the most
important stages of the development of the Chinese revolution, the Comintern’s
assistance to the Chinese Communist Party and close connection with it, armed the
Party with decisions and conclusions based on the achievements of the theoretical
and political thought of the world communist and liberation movement. The young
Communist Party of China was able to utilise in its struggle the experience of the
Marxist-Leninist parties with the Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on
their support. That is an example of the big part played by the international factor in
the formation and development of the communist parties and the communist
movement in colonial and dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of the
Chinese Communist Party at its First Congress was the first major landmark of this 208
interaction and represented the result of the tremendous work done by the first
Chinese Marxists and the Comintern’s envoys in order to disseminate the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution, and to organise China’s
revolutionary forces that were attracted to Marxism. The first communist groups in
China were founded with the direct organisational and other help of the Comintern.
There can be no doubt that had the Comintern not provided assistance in the form of
instructions, advice, funds, training of leaders, laborious political and organisational
work in which its representatives engaged daily in China, the pre-foundation period
in the history of the Chinese Communist Party would have dragged on for many
years. [ 208•1
Without underestimating the role of the objective internal factors favouring the p
dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China, or the importance of the work and
creative search of Chinese Communists, full credit must be given to the immense
help of the Comintern and the CPSU in elaborating the theoretical and political
foundations of the Marxist conception of the 1925–27 revolution in China, and in
building up the Party during the period of the preparation and accomplishment of the
revolution.
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For the Chinese Communist Party, one of the most difficult aspects of the Chinese p
revolution was the theoretical and practical problem of combining and interrelating
the national and class features of the revolutionary movement. To supplement the
theses of the Comintern’s Fourth Congress on the Eastern question with reference to 209
the conditions of China, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted, on January 12,
1923, a special resolution "On the Chinese Communist Party’s Attitude Towards the
Kuomintang,” which proved the necessity for setting up a unified front in China and
elaborated a concrete means by which this might be achieved-by the Communists’
joining the Kuomintang while retaining the independence of the Chinese Communist
Party. [ 209•1 For the first time the Comintern squarely faced the CPC with the
peasant question. The Directive of the Comintern Executive Committee to the Third
CPC Congress on January 12, 1923, stated: "The peasant question is the central issue
of the entire policy. . . Only by placing the slogans of the antiimperialist front on an
agrarian basis can we hope for real success.” That is why the CPC, being the
political leader of the masses in the unified front, "is obliged constantly to propel the
Kuomintang towards an agrarian revolution." [209•2 In the same Directive, the
Comintern raised the question of a people’s liberation war in China against the
militarists, feudal lords and foreign imperialists as a means of developing the Chinese
democratic revolution. Proceeding from this general principle and replying to the
request of Sun Yat-sen, the CPSU and the Soviet state actively helped the
Kuomintang to build up the National Revolutionary Army of China, and to plan and
carry out its operations.
On the basis of Lenin’s ideas contained in the resolutions that the Second and p 210
Fourth Congresses of the Comintern passed on the colonial question, the Comintern
Executive Committee, in a number of directives to the CPC and in special
resolutions on the Chinese question-particularly Resolutions VI (March 1926) and
VII ( NovemberDecember 1926) of extended plenary meetingsgave profound
theoretical backing and practical recommendations on such fundamental problems of
the Chinese revolution as the character of a revolution and the place of the various
classes in it, the hegemony of the proletariat and its allies, the agrarian question, the
tactics of the united national front, the role and applicability of armed struggle,
relationship of the national and class features of the revolution, and so on. A
selfstyled theorist, Mao Tse-tung later arrogated some of these instructions to
himself, distorting them in the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic manner.
The Comintern’s help facilitated the spread and consolidation of internationalist ideas p
among the Chinese Communists and the shaping in its leadership of a communist
internationalist group that resolutely combated any manifestations of nationalism and
other anti-proletarian views in the Party. As a result of the interaction of the
Communist Party of China and the international communist movement during the
years of the formation of the CPC, and of the Comintern’s consistent line towards a
united front against both “Left” and Right vacillations in the ranks of the CPC, the
Party had already become an important factor in the country’s political life by the
mid1920’s, i.e., in the period of the 1925–27 revolution.
The elaboration of the revolutionary strategy and tactics by the Chinese Communist p 211
Party in close cooperation with the Comintern was a prolonged and complex process
in the course of which various conclusions and recommendations were tested in
practice, incorrect or obsolete principles were cast aside, the successes of the
revolution were summed up and the causes of its failures (especially in the period of
struggle under the slogan of Soviets) analysed. In Marxist literature these matters are
not made sufficiently clear because the events of this difficult, and at times
contradictory, period in the history of the CPC have been but poorly studied.
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Maoist historiography is largely responsible for that. In the official document of the p
Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "Resolutions on Some Questions in the
History of Our Party,” [211•1 which set stereotyped patterns for all works on the
history of the CPC published in China, the Maoists have crossed out all the Party’s
experience in those years, and under the pretext of criticising the "Wang Ming-Po
Ku line" they virtually deny any positive role played by the Comintern in mapping
out the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maoists assert that
the Party leadership of those days, headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku, was
“unaware” of the need to build up armed forces for the Party took a wrong approach
to the agrarian question, and did not realise the importance of organising
revolutionary bases in the countryside and of the proper balance between the Party’s 212
work in town and country, i.e., it totally "failed to understand" and “rejected” the
correct line of the Chinese revolution, allegedly already drawn up by Mao Tsetung in
those years.
Furthermore, after the event, the Maoists laid claim to the credit for having critically p
interpreted and summed up the rich and complicated experience of the revolutionary
struggle in that period-credit that legitimately belongs to the international communist
movement and to the Marxist-Leninist forces within the CPC. The Comintern, jointly
with representatives of those MarxistLeninist forces, drew up a number of valuable
conclusions and recommendations on the fundamental questions of the Party’s
strategy and tactics, whose practical implementation ensured the further development
of the Party and its armed forces and the triumph of the revolution in
China. [ 212•1
After summing up the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China, the Sixth p
Congress of the Communist Party of China, at the recommendation of the Comintern,
adopted the tactics for the immediate future of making a retreat and rallying its
forces in the towns, while waging fullscale guerrilla warfare and building up
revolutionary bases (Soviet zones) and a Red Army in the countryside. [ 214•1 The 214
experience of the revolutionary struggle at the time of the Sixth Congress was as yet
uncapable of indicating how the revolution would proceed: whether the revolutionary
struggle would centre in town (as the 1925–27 revolution did), or whether the
revolutionary forces would rally at their bases in the countryside. Subsequent
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In 1930–31 the Comintern, having analysed this situation never before witnessed by p
the revolutionary movement, boldly mapped out new ways of development for the
Chinese revolution. The letter of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC
regarding the Li Li-san doctrines (September 1930) and the resolution of the
Comintern Executive Committee Presidium on the tasks of the Communist Party of
China (August 1931) set out the chief task as that of reinforcing the Red Army,
which "shall become the centre for rallying and organising the revolutionary forces
and the key lever for heightening the entire revolutionary movement...”; they
proposed the idea of "encircling the towns, including the major and largest ones, by
a ring of peasant revolts." [214•2 These objectives, based on the Comintern’s
recommendations, were formulated in the CC CPC decisions of April 4, 1932: "The 215
specific feature of the Chinese revolution is manifested in the fact that the proletariat
is leading the masses and extending Soviet power from the countryside to the towns,
and from small towns to big cities.” [215•1 These Comintern and CPC documents
demonstrate the inconsistency of Maoist historiography’s assertions that the course
towards unfolding the revolution in rural areas and towards encircling the towns by
the revolutionary countryside was advanced by Mao Tse-tung to counter the allegedly
erroneous lines of the CPC leadership of those days. Contrary to the Comintern’s
course towards achieving proletarian leadership in the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-
tung made an absolute of the importance of peasant war and in effect rejected the
idea of proletarian leadership. Today the Maoists are trying to extend their anti–
Marxist views on the importance of the peasant war in China to the world
revolutionary process.
A big part in building up the armed forces of the Communist Party of China was p
played by the Comintern’s recommendations (worked out by the organisers of the
armed forces of the CPC and Soviet Communists-experienced military leaders)
concerning the foundations for the formation, the strategy and tactics of China’s Red
Army and the principles of its relations with the population. The implementation of
these recommendations allowed the Chinese Communist Party, in 1932–33, to become 216
a major political as well as military force.
The Comintern’s help in exploring the agrarian and peasant question was particularly p
important for the Communist Party of China, which from 1927 to 1949 operated
mainly in rural areas. The decisions of the Party’s Sixth Congress on the agrarian
question and the peasant movement [216•1 were the first comprehensive,
scientifically-based platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy on the agrarian-
peasant question, laid down in the CPC decisions and Comintern recommendations in
the late 1920’s-early 1930’s, served the Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide
throughout the subsequent period of its revolutionary activity in the countryside. It
was precisely these decisions and the experience of these years (the principles of
determining class appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party’s decisions on
agrarian reorganisation in the late 1940’s-early 1950’s. [216•2
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The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) and its historic decisions opened up p
a new stage in the development of the world communist and national-liberation
movements. Its decisions also signified a turning point in the development of the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution. The policy of the united
national front brought the Communist Party allies from the population at large and
turned it into a powerful political force. During the period from the Seventh
Congress of the Comintern to the victory of the people’s revolution in 1949, the
CPC grew into a more than three-million party, having at its disposal a strong army,
vast liberated areas, and enjoying the support of the masses and of the entire
international communist movement, particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.
The struggle within the Party immediately centred on the attitude towards the p
Comintern’s directives and decisions and on the correlation of the national and
international tasks of the liberation movement in China. The Chinese Communist- 218
internationalists, one of whose leaders was Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), defended
the course aimed at the unification of all potential allies into a single national front
for struggle against Japanese imperialism. They interwove into a single whole the
national and international tasks of the Chinese revolution, regarding the cohesion and
support of all contingents of the international communist movement as the most
important factor for the victory of the revolution in every individual country,
particularly in China.
The development cf the Chinese revolution after the Seventh Congress of the p
Comintern, and until its victory in 1949, proved that, despite all the attempts of 219
Mao’s nationalistic leadership of the CPC to steer the liberation struggle along the
"specific Chinese path,” the revolutionary movement in China triumphed as part of
the world liberation process. This was practical confirmation of the universal
applicability of Marxist-Leninist teaching and the importance of the united action of
all the contingents of the world communist movement.
The victory of the Chinese revolution was the result of the alliance between the p
international communist movement and the national-liberation, mainly peasant,
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movement in China. This alliance materialised in the form of the ideological and
political support given to the CPC and the Chinese revolution by the international
communist movement, as well as in economic, moral, military and diplomatic
assistance from the Soviet Union and later on from the People’s Democracies.
The victory of the revolution in China became possible as a result of the radical p
changes that took place in the international situation after the Second World War.
The aggressive forces of imperialism were checked by the unprecedented might and
prestige of the Soviet Union, the formation of the world socialist system and by the
powerful upsurge of the communist and nationalliberation movements in the world.
The only imperialist power that had gained in strength at the time-the USA-was
compelled under the circumstances to refrain from direct military intervention in
China. Besides, it was more concerned with the rehabilitation of capitalist Europe,
where the influence of the communist parties had increased. 220
The victory of the people’s revolution in China was made possible by the execution p
of the fundamental strategic plans jointly worked out by the Comintern and the
Chinese Communist Party to give impetus to the liberation movement (the policy of
the united national front; the peasant movement as the main part of the democratic
revolution in China; the leadership of the Communist Party in the peasants’ armed
struggle as the basic factor for the victory of the revolution; the alliance of the
Chinese liberation movement with the international proletariat and primarily with the
USSR and the socialist camp). So the Chinese people won their historic victory
against domestic reaction and the foreign forces of imperialism in close fraternal
unity with and assistance of the forces of the world communist movement.
The carrying out of the basic tasks of the people’s democratic revolution in the p
interests of the working people as a whole paved the way for China’s advancement
along the socialist path. The successes scored by China in the early years of the
people’s power-when increased fraternal help was coming from the Soviet Union,
when there was all-round cooperation between the two countries and their parties,
and when there was wide publicity in China of the Soviet example and experience-
created a favourable situation for the further growth of the proletarian, Marxist–
Leninist forces and tendencies inside the Chinese Communist Party. On the other
hand, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist trend in the Party as yet lacked a firm
foothold to mount a counteroffensive. It was manoeuvring, biding time, accumulating 221
strength and searching for a stratagem suited to the new historical situation. This
enabled the Party’s internationalist forces, with the support of the CPSU and the
world communist movement, to take the initiative and put the Party and country on
the path of socialism.
The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 1956) was a p
significant event in the life of the Party and the Chinese people. It summed up the
experience of one of the largest communist parties over a long period, during which
the people’s revolution had triumphed and the first achievements in socialist
construction had been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress the CPC had
10,700,000 members and candidate members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per
cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals). [221•1 Such a composition was bound to
affect its ideology, policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois, nationalistic tendencies
in the Party continued to exist and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in China
depended on the outcome of the struggle between the nationalistic tendencies and the
proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome could not but affect the interests
of the international communist movement as a whole.
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The main feature of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC is that they p
endorsed the Party’s general line towards socialist construction in conformity with
the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of close cooperation and
fraternal mutual assistance with the world socialist community and all progressive,
revolutionary trends of the day. The consistent realisation of the socialist programme 222
hammered out by the Eighth Congress was to ensure for China continuing social
progress and a speedy growth of the productive forces, which meant a better
standard of living for the working people as a whole.
In the years between 1949 and 1957, the People’s Republic of China, following the p
basic principles of building socialist society, and relying on the help and international
solidarity of the socialist countries and their parties, made the first substantial steps
towards the construction of socialism. But this was fiercely opposed by the petty-
bourgeois forces and trends. The development of the Communist Party of China and
the Chinese People’s Republic in that period was not straightforward, but highly
complicated, contradictory and confused. By the end of the period there was an
unmistakable growth of the pettybourgeois, nationalistic trends, which the Party was
incapable of overcoming.
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the nationalistic forces interfered with the p
Party’s constructive interaction with the international communist movement, its
course of development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance of the
concerted line of the international communist movement. They imposed the "big
leap" policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one hand, certain weaknesses in the
Party (the disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the personality cult of
Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on the other, by making great use of avantgardist slogans
when the country was in a state of animation and indulging in nationalistic
distortions of the true causes of the successes of the People’s Republic. The basic 223
features of the Mao group’s “special” course were the opposition of the policy of the
CPC to the concerted line of the fraternal parties and the attempt to revise its
fundamental precepts. Soviet party and political literature quite comprehensively and
explicitly shows the sources, causes and essence of that “special” course in the
PRC’s domestic and foreign policy as a continuation in the new conditions of the
confrontation between the two lines, the two trends inside the Communist Party of
China. [ 223•1 The “special” course and its consequences (sharp economic and
political crisis) ultimately led to the "cultural revolution" and initiated a new stage in
the intra-Party struggle.
The genuine internationalists in the ranks of the CPC-Li Ta-chao, Chang Tai-lei, p
Chu Chiu-po, Yun Tai-ying, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Peng Pai and many
others who had made a decisive contribution to the dissemination in China of
Marxist-Leninist ideas and implanted internationalist traditions in the Party with the
aim of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory and using it as a basis for the political line
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The nationalistic forces had a different attitude to international unity and interaction p 225
with the fraternal parties, and to assistance from the Comintern, the CPSU and the
Soviet Government. In the course of the history of the CPC, they have worn all sorts
of disguises, ranging from an attempt to receive help unilaterally from the
Comintern, the CPSU and other fraternal parties, to an almost unconcealed attempt to
play on the contradictions between the forces of socialism, democracy and progress
on the one hand, and international imperialism on the other. They have always
regarded the world communist movement and the forces of socialism, whose help
they sought to use in furtherance the nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as
a “third” force.
As early as the 1920’s and 1930’s, various avantgardist theories and platforms p
became a characteristic ideological cover for such nationalistic view in the CPC. For
example, Cheng Chaolin, subsequently expelled from the Party for his Trotskyite
views, put forward the idea of transferring the centre of the world revolution to
China. [ 225•1 In 1930 a group of CPC leaders headed by Li Li-san, propagated
and tried to carry through a programme according to which the Chinese revolution
was to become the main seat, the “pillar” of the world revolution. Li Li-san and his
followers counted on an "international war" by which they hoped to “prompt” the
world revolution, thereby “guaranteeing” the successful development of the revolution
in China. Mao Tsetung too backed up these views. [225•2
The “special” course persistently imposed by the Mao group on the Party and the p 226
country ever since the late 1950’s has hidden under its avantgardist veil all the
elements involved in the nationalistic approach to relations with the forces of world
socialism and the international communist movement.
However, the policy of the nationalistic forces in the CPC could not completely p
destroy the influence exercised by the ideological and political platform of the
international communist movement, and by its experience and its recommendations,
on the political and ideological positions of the Party.
The status of the CPC as a section of the Comintern and, more important, the entire p
course of the Chinese revolution-which had borne out the correctness of the
Comintern’s main conclusions and recommendations relating to the strategy and
tactics of the Communist Party of China-the high prestige of the Comintern and the
CPSU among the majority of Chinese Communists played an important role in that
even the nationalistic elements in the Party’s leadership had to take the Comintern’s
experience and recommendations into account when choosing the Party’s political
course. Yet the nationalists were either unable to, or did not want to, assimilate
entirely the platform of the international communist movement, although they
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adopted, employed and "crammed,” as Lenin put it, certain tactical slogans. Inside
the Party, covertly or openly, clumsy conceptions and theories were advanced that 227
exaggerated the importance of various aspects of the situation in China and the
experience of the Chinese Communist Party, giving a narrow interpretation of the
results of the Party’s work and those of the entire revolutionary process in the
country-an interpretation that took no account of objective factors, both national and
international. On the other hand, the pursuance of the political courses mapped out
by the international communist movement facilitated the advancement of the CPC in
the general current of revolutionary struggle and at times veiled the real attitude of
the nationalists within its ranks towards Marxism-Leninism and the general platform
of the international communist movement.
The history of the Communist Party of China shows that in the periods when the p
Party’s international ties were weakened (either as a result of objective causes or
vacillations in its leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party increased their
activity. That was precisely the case in 1934–35, when the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat from Kiangsi in the north-west of the
country, had no liaison with the Comintern for some time. The same is true of the
period of the Second World War, especially the years of the Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet people.
The nationalists knew that, in order to improve their own position in the Party, it p
was necessary to weaken the Party’s ties with the international communist movement
and to lessen the influence of its platform and experience on the Party. The
offensives of the nationalistic forces were always accompanied by attacks, 228
camouflaged or open, on the line of the international communist movement, and by
their attempts to discredit and distort it. Li Li-san and his followers imposed their
platform under the slogan "The Comintern misunderstands the situation in China.”
The advent of the Mao group to the Party leadership in the late 1930’s-early 1940’s
was likewise accompanied by attacks on the Comintern’s platform, which were
masked by criticism of the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line,” and by the calls to "do away
with foreign patterns" and to "give Marxism a Chinese interpretation.” The new stage
of the offensive by the nationalistic forces in the CPC in the late 1950’s, and their
imposition on the Party of the "big leap" and "people’s communes" course, were also
prepared and accompanied first by covert, and then by more and more open “
criticism” of the international experience of socialist construction, of the concerted
foreign policy course followed by the socialist countries, and of the international
communist movement’s concerted general line enshrined in the Declarations and
Statements adopted by the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties in
1957 and 1960. The Maoists concentrated their attacks on the USSR and the CPSU
because, as Communists all over the world have correctly noted, the Peking leaders
regard the prestige of the USSR and the CPSU as the chief obstacle to the spread of
their ideas and influence. At the same time, the attacks on the CPSU were meant to
pave the way for revising the general line of the world communist movement.
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That conclusion is borne out by the lessons of the intra-Party struggle during the
last decade, and by the course and results of the massive Maoist onslaught on the
Communist Party of China, called the "cultural revolution.” Soviet publications have
dealt at length with the causes, development and results of the "cultural
revolution.” [ 229•1 We should like only to emphasise that one of the causes of
the severe defeat suffered by the Party was the vacillation of a considerable number
of its leaders (including those who became victims of the "cultural revolution”) on
the fundamental questions of the general line, and their departure, temporary though
it may have been, from a number of its basic principles. This circumstance enabled
the Mao group gradually to oppose the Party’s platform to the general line of the
international communist movement, to isolate the anti-Maoists in the Party from the
international movement, and to carry out the ideological re-orientation of the
country’s population, especially the young people who were later charged with the 230
task of destroying the leading bodies of the Party.
***
The history of the Communist Party of China over these past years shows that its p
departure and self-isolation from the international communist movement and from its
general line and experience, led to serious mistakes in the Party’s activity, to great
intra-Party crises and damage, and to the loss of revolutionary gains. The way out of
the critical situation in which the CPC found itself as a result of the actions of the
Maoist group is to restore relations with the international communist and working-
class movement, to return to the latter’s concerted line, and to base the Party’s entire
activity on Marxism– Leninism. The fifty-year development of the Communist Party
of China has borne out the importance and relevance of the Leninist proposition
that.. . "The urgency of the struggle against. . . the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois
national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of
converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing
in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international
one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced
countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a
whole).” [ 230•1 While combating Maoism as the ideological and political trend of
petty– bourgeois nationalism, it is essential first of all to see that it is incompatible 231
with the objectives of the world communist and liberation movements and with those
of the Chinese Communist Party’s development along the socialist path.
That is why the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which fully approved the principled p
Leninist course and the steps taken by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in
Soviet-Chinese relations, noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came
out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with
Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split
of the international communist and the whole anti– imperialist movement, the CC
CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of consistently defending the
principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world
communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist
Motherland.” [ 231•1 The Congress also endorsed the consistent course of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising relations between the
USSR and the Chinese People’s Republic and establishing good– neighbourliness and
friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would meet the vital,
long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of
intensifying the struggle against imperialism.” [231•2
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***
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 196•1] Official data regarding the membership of the Communist Party of China
over the last ten years are not available. In his speech made on June 30, 1961, on
the occasion of the Chinese Party’s 40th anniversary, Liu Shao-chi said the Party had
over 17 million members (Jenmin jihfiao, July 1, 19G1).
[ 200•1] S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, L., 1963; Y. Chen, Mao
Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, L., 1966.
[ 202•1] For a detailed account of the Maoist historiography of the CPC, see: V.
Glunin, A. Grigoryev, Maoist Falsifications in the History of the Chinese Communist
Party, Moscow State University Gazette, Vostokovedeniye (Oriental Studies), No. 1,
1970.
[ 202•3] Liu Shao-chi, On the Party, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.
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New Documents of the Comintern, Kommunist, No. 4, 1969; The Chinese People’s
Republic, M., 1970; Prominent Soviet Communists and the Revolution in China,
Collection of Articles, M., 1970; L. P. Delyusin, The Dispute Over Socialism, M.,
1970; 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 194.5-70, A Short Essay,
M., 1971.
[ 208•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 242–299.
[ 212•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 313– 349.
[ 213•1] The Sixth Congress passed the decision to prepare the official programme
of the Party for the next congress. The decision, as everyone knows, remains
unfulfilled up to this day (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 6, Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, M., 1930).
[ 213•2] In that period Mao Tse-tung believed that the revolution in China had
entered the socialist stage (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 2, M., 1930, pp. 80–81).
[ 214•1] That course was endorsed in the resolutions on the agrarian revolution, the
peasant movement and on the building of Soviet zones and the Red Army (see
Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hook 6).
[ 215•1] CC CPC resolution "On Opportunist Vacillations in the Party’s Ranks Over
the Question of the Primary Victory of the Chinese Revolution," Materials on the
Third “Left” Line, Collected Documents and Materials, Vol. 1, Peking, 1957, p. 85)
(Chinese ed.).
[ 216•1] See Policy Documents of Communist Parties in tlte East, M., 1934, pp. 34–
51; Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Book 6.
[ 216•2] In 1947–48, several documents of the early 1930’s were re-issued in full to
be used as a guide for the agrarian reform.
[ 217•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 350–379.
[ 221•1] Sec Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Parly of
China, M., 1956, p. 65.
[ 223•1] Sec B. Xancgin, A. Mironov, Ya. Mikhailov, On Events in China M., 1967;
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Roots of the Present Events in China; A. Bovin, L. Delyusin, ’The Political Crisis in
China, M., 1968; Perilous Course, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; The Anti-
Imperialist Essence of the Views and Policy of Mao Tse-tung, M., 1969; Yu.
Yaremenko, The "Big Leap" and "People’s Communes" in China, M., 1969; Foreign
Policy of the Chinese People’s Republic, M., 1971.
[ 225•2] For details of the leftist platform emerging in the CPC in 1930, see Letter
of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC Regarding the Li Li-san
Doctrines; The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution
as Exemplified by China, p. 290; The Comintern and the East, pp. 313–349.
[ 229•1] See The Present Situation in China and tlic CPC, Kommunist, No. 4, 19G9;
Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group on the International Arena, Kommunist, No. 5,
1969.
[ 231•1] 24th Congress of the CPSU, Documents, APN Publishing House, M., 1971,
p. 212.
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<•> Regarding Peking-Washington 232
Contacts
TOC
Card I. Alexandrou p
As has been reported, talks were recently held in Peking between Premier Chou En- p
Text
lai and the US President’s adviser Kissinger. During the talks, Chou En-lai, on
HTML
behalf of the Government of the Chinese People’s Republic, invited President Nixon
PS
PDF
to visit China, and the invitation was accepted.
In China there have been no official comments on Nixon’s forthcoming visit. Anti- p
imperialist sentiments continue to be expressed and loud assurances are given about
support for the anti– imperialist movement of nations. At the same time, the anti- 233
Soviet policy and the “splitting” activities against the anti-imperialist, revolutionary
forces do not cease.
Such a reaction to the news can probably be explained by the fact that the true p
political intentions of the two countries are veiled by a dense propaganda screen and
that the declarations and statements of the two governments are quite often in
complete contradiction to their actual political line. All this time Peking is known to
have been calling for an uncompromising fight against US imperialism, and for the
overthrow of the Nixon Administration, while the United States has just as
demonstratively boycotted the People’s China and supported the Chiang Kai-shek
regime in Taiwan.
In the press and speeches, statesmen and public leaders have voiced the most p
diverse opinions and very often given contrasting assessments of the Peking-
Washington contacts.
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Still, a great many of the views expressed have had one thing in common- p
satisfaction at the opportunity to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s
Republic and the United States However, the reasons behind this satisfaction vary
considerably.
Some say that the recognition by Washington of the PRC signifies a turn towards p
realism in the policy of the US Administration. It is also noted that the invitation 234
extended to President Nixon to visit Peking apparently means a desire on the part of
the Chinese leadership to secure a special position in the international arena by
means of a detente with a number of capitalist states, and a prompt one with the
United States.
The most reactionary press of the USA interprets the President’s forthcoming visit p
as a foreign policy manoeuvre dictated by the aims and interests of anti-communism.
The New York Daily News wrote with utter cynicism about the hope that President
Nixon had been pursuing a far– reaching Machiavellian policy of setting Red China
and Red Russia against each other.
The US big press is not quite as frank but, nevertheless, outspoken enough in its p
comments on the direction of Washington’s strategy. The New York Times wrote that
the White House would like to capitalise on the coinciding intention of both Peking
and Washington (although the latter has its own, special reasons) so as to bring
pressure to bear on the USSR and its foreign policy. The newspaper quotes
Washington officials who allege that Nixon’s visit to Peking will become a turning
point in US diplomacy and that the Chinese leaders are worthy partners in such an
affair. The New York Post reported that Washington’s present contacts with Peking
had been the result of the strategic decision that neither China’s interests nor her
potential capabilities were a threat to American might and influence and that
Moscow was the only real danger.
The US bourgeois press also notes that Peking’s invitation has done Nixon a good p 235
turn in his electoral campaign and has helped him to elude the demands that serious
consideration should be given to the new peace initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and an end should be
put to the dirty US war in Vietnam.
While giving its approval to Washington’s and Peking’s move, the West-European p
bourgeois press expresses anxiety that Washington does not hesitate to solve its
problems at the expense of its allies in military-political blocs and to disregard them
by flirting with China. The London Times remarks that the ideological dispute
between Washington and Peking has been put aside by both and that the nationalistic
interests have taken the upper hand. The West German press, along with the
enthusiastic comments of the extreme right-wing newspapers of the Springer concern,
refers to the hegemonic, global aspirations of the United States and points out that
Washington’s move "has dealt a blow at the Third World countries.”
The progressive press stresses that the peoples would like the Sino-American p
contacts to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation
of peace, but notes at the same time that both sides give more than sufficient
evidence to cause serious doubts about their real intentions.
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Rude Pravo, organ of the Central Commitec of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, p
writes:
“As to the attempt to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s Republic p
and the United States, the world public is unanimous that such an act, which, 236
incidentally, has been urged ever since 1969, could only be welcomed if it meant a
policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. For, indeed,
it has been the absurd policy of the United States for many years to ignore the
existence of a new social system in China.”
The Hungarian Nepszabadsag notes that the peoples and the governments of the p
socialist countries more than anyone else have exerted efforts to secure a firm and
lasting peace. The socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have, for over 20
year, been defending the interests of the Chinese people, urging international
recognition of the PRC and the restoration of its lawful rights in the United Nations.
The newspaper says that anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the ChineseAmerican
detente is taking place.
“It is difficult to predict how the relations between the USA and China will develop p
in the future,” writes the Polish Trybuna Ludu. "One thing is, however, clear:
China’s departure from the socialist community and the departure of the Communist
Party of China from the world communist movement were meant, above all, to clear
the way for broader contacts with the imperialist states and the United States in
particular.”
President Nixon’s decision to visit China, says Akahata, the Japanese Communist p
Party newspaper, means the bankruptcy of the aggressive US policy in Indochina.
The present rapprochement with China, according to the newspaper, is a typical
example of the divide-and-rule policy.
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No one should be deceived about Mr. Nixon’s motives, says the Morning Star, the p
newspaper of the British Communists. As before, he is the leadcr of an imperialist 238
power waging a brutal aggressive war in Indochina. One of Nixon’s goals is to
provoke still greater differences between the socialist countries, the newspaper
remarks.
In its editorial on July 19, 1971, the Vietnamese Nhan Dan wrote that the p
implementation of the Nixon doctrine had led to the intensified military activity of
US imperialism in that region of the world. The newspaper added that the US policy
was aimed at scraping together an alliance of counter-revolutionary forces in every
region and also at splitting the socialist countries.
“Nixon’s policy," Nhan Dan pointed out, "has ended in failure. It is driven into a p
corner. The whole of the United States and all the world loudly demand: End the
aggressive war in Vietnam immediately and bring all US soldiers home! Finding
himself in this predicament, Nixon began a feverish search for a way out. But he
went in the wrong direction. The door for exit was open, but he has entered a blind
alley.”
The Lebanese Al-Nida remarks that the interest of the West in China was growing p
as the Peking leadership stepped up its anti-Soviet, divisionist tactics.
The progressive press of Asian, African and Latin American countries assesses the p
moves towards a Peking-Washington rapprochement as testifying to the hegemonistic
aspirations of the ruling quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks
about Nixon’s official visit to China help to expose the Maoist propaganda which 239
served to camouflage the moves taken by the Chinese leaders to reach an
understanding with imperialism. The Cairo AlGoumhouria says that the forthcoming
visit to Peking cloaks the intention of US diplomacy to divide the anti-imperialist
camp and, above all, drive a wedge between the USSR and the People’s China.
Thus, the world comments on the Chinese– American negotiations reflect the p
attitude of modern political and class forces to the basis and aims of the detente
between Washington and Peking. All the progressive, peace-loving forces are
watching closely the manoeuvres of certain circles which would like to use the
normalisation of ChineseAmerican relations to the detriment of socialism, of the
international communist and workers’ movement, and of the peoples which are
fighting imperialist aggression.
The Soviet Union does not see in the ChineseAmerican contacts any cause for p
sensation. Soviet people regard the contacts from the viewpoint of the Marxist-
Leninist analysis of the international situation and of the basic tendencies of world
development that was made at the 24th CPSU Congress. The congress clearly defined
the Soviet Union’s policy in its relations with the Chinese People’s Republic and the
United States, and international developments confirm the correctness of this policy.
The Soviet Communist Party and state support the normalising of relations between
the USSR and the PRC and the restoring of friendship between the two peoples,
which would be in the interests of both countries, of world socialism and would help
to step up the struggle against imperialism. But the Soviet Union is waging a
consistent struggle against the anti-Leninist platform of the Chinese leadership, and 240
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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.2-Regarding.Peking-Washington.Contacts
its splitting tactics aimed at undermining the anti-imperialist front, the socialist
community and the world communist and workers’ movement. It rejects the great-
power chauvinistic policy of Peking and the slanderous fabrications of Chinese
propaganda about the policy of the Soviet Communist Party and state.
The Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist states, consistently p
pursues the Leninist foreign policy for consolidating peace, security, freedom and the
independence of nations, and the positions of world socialism. Proof of this is the
support and all-round assistance that the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries give to the heroic people of Vietnam, the patriots of Laos and Cambodia,
the peoples of the Arab East and to all the peoples in their just liberation struggle.
The Soviet Union believes that the well-known proposals put forward by the DRV
Government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam, the United National Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos are
a constructive and realistic basis for solving the Indochina problem. The Soviet 241
people support these proposals.
Future developments will reveal more clearly the actual intentions of Peking and p
Washington. The Soviet Communist Party and state will take into account all the
possible consequences of the Sino-American contacts. Any hopes Peking and
Washington may entertain of using these contacts to bring pressure to bear on the
USSR or the states of the socialist community are unrealistic.
The Soviet Union believes that political decisions should be aimed, not at p
complicating the international situation, but at easing tensions. Undoubtedly, the long-
term interests of the Chinese and American peoples, just as the interests of all
peoples, call for decisions which would strengthen peace and security, and not for
political plotting against other states. As history shows, such plots eventually turn
against those who sponsored them.
The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to cooperate actively with all states, p
including the PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace and the freedom,
independence, progress and prosperity of nations.
***
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normal
Notes
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<•> TITLE: A Destructive Policy
This is a collection of articles from the Soviet press, exposing
TOC the policy of the Chinese leadership for what it is---a policy
SUBTITLE:
harmful to the cause of socialism, and the world revolutionary
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[BEGIN]
__TITLE__
<b>A DESTRUCTIVE
POLICY</b>
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-12-28T11:24:00-0800
__SUBTITLE__
[the Chinese leadership
and the causes of socialism and the
world revolutionary and liberation movements]
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
CONTENTS
<b>I</b>
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Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked.....
8
<b>II</b>
Essence............100
Development of China........144
[5]
<b>Ill</b>
Chinese Leaders.........2;>4
Practice............277
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<em>A. Nadezhdin</em>, Peking Against the Socialist
Community ............320
[6]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
<b>I</b>
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Pseudo-Revolutionaries
<br /> Unmasked</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970</b>
[7]
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implement his behests and continue his cause. The
keynote of the Lenin celebrations in the majority
of countries was recognition of the outstanding
role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in the world revolutionary process, expression of
gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless
heroic struggle, for its loyalty to the principles
of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless
assistance to all revolutionary liberation
movements.</p>
<h2 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h2>
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<p> The Soviet people and entire progressive
mankind know the real reasons for the anti-socialist
actions of imperialism. We first heard them more
than half a century ago. What is worth noting
is something else-the fact that during the days
when the peoples of the world were celebrating
Lenin's anniversary the Peking leaders came out
in unison with imperialism's malicious anti-Soviet
and anti-communist campaign. Peking has timed
for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of
fanning animosity and hatred towards the
Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist
community, and the Communist and Workers' Parties of
the world.</p>
10
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<p> Such ravings make up the content of a series
of articles published in April in the <em>Jenmin
jihpao, Hungchi</em> and <em>Chiefangchiun pao</em>, and of an
article marking May Day.</p>
11
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>
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the shoulders of the Chinese people.</p>
12
13
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quotation books and his other ``works'' are
circulated in 3,000 million copies.</p>
14
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of the USSR and other socialist countries. At
that time the PRC ranked among the first in the
world in development rates. But the second
fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,'' and
the third by the "cultural revolution.'' As a result,
industrial production has not reached the levels
mapped by the second and third five-year plans.
It has been marking time on the 1959 level.</p>
15
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<p> The hardships of life in China are aggravated
by the Peking authorities' concentration of the
main effort on militarisation of the country. More
than 40 per cent of the national budget is set
for military purposes. This is done to the
detriment of housing construction, which has all but,
stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its
modernisation have been slashed), and education,
health and cultural advancement of the people.</p>
16
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kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608
million tons; oil, from 148 million to 328 million tons;
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__
<b>2--193</b>
17
18
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socialist countries most decisively help to ensure
the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and
socialism over imperialism.</p>
19
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<p> The forcible assimilation of national
minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular character
of the present regime in China. Annually millions
of new settlers are being sent from Peking,
Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner
Mongolia and the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous
district. National minorities (that is, 45 million
people!) are doomed to complete forcible
absorption and disappearance as national, ethnic groups.
In the course of the "cultural revolution" local
autonomy, already limited, is turned into a fiction.
The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The
districts inhabited by the national minorities have
become centres of "labour armies" and
concentration camps. The age-old culture and distinctive
features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and
others-are being systematically destroyed. This
cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.</p>
20
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industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 70 times
over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times.
These were areas with an almost 100 per cent
illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and
academies of sciences and a wide network of
schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.</p>
21
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>
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22
23
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a rabid campaign of jingoism and of hate towards
the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and
some of China's non-socialist neighbours. They are
trying to lay the responsibility for all the suffering
and misery which Mao's adventuristic course has
caused the Chinese people on "external enemies,''
among whom Peking puts first not imperialism,
but the Soviet Union and other countries of the
socialist community. The intensity of the false and
provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat
of an attack on the PRC from the North" is a
matter of common knowledge. Also common
knowledge are the unfounded territorial claims that the
leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China's neighbours including the USSR.</p>
24
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internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the
actions of the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces,
and imperialism would have a more limited field
for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks
against the revolutionary forces. However, Peking
has made a different choice. China's present
leaders must answer to the socialist countries, the
international working-class and national-liberation
movements for having placed the PRC in
opposition to the common front of anti-imperialist forces.</p>
25
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<p> The Soviet Government's Statement of May 4,
1970, noted that "the escalation of the US
aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the
need for unity and the strengthening of cohesion
of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace
forces in the struggle against aggression.''</p>
26
27
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imperialist circles and encourages them to
continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and
designs. Yet another proof of this are the recent
events in Indochina.</p>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>IV</em></h3>
28
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different views including elements of
Confucianism, anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois
nationalism.</p>
29
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<p> However ``ultra-revolutionary'' they may
sound, Mao's ideas boil down to aggressive
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring
of Peking's entire home and foreign policy. And
this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for
the cause of socialism in China.</p>
30
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communism. No renegade or hireling of the
proletariat's class enemies has ever done bigger damage
to the world revolutionary process than the
Peking leaders are doing today.</p>
31
__*_*_*__
32
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China. It is not through our fault that these relations
have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The
present state of relations between the PRC and
the USSR and other socialist countries is a result
of the chauvinist policies conducted by the
Chinese leadership, <em>a</em> result of its departure from the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__
3--193
33
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must say in advance that these are vain efforts.
The Soviet people have strong nerves. Our people
possess everything necessary to uphold the
interests of our homeland.</p>
[34]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Concerning the 50th
<br /> Anniversary of the Communist Party
<br /> of China</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <em>O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov</em>
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other
fraternal states. With their help the Chinese
people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the
national independence of the People's Republic of
China, eliminating the remnants of the semi--
colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad
democratic reforms. In accordance with the will
of the multi-million working masses the
Communist Party of China led the country along the road
of building a socialist society, as defined in the
decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in
September 1956. The first five-year plan for the
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__
3*
35
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<p> The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties,
resolutely countered the attempts to distort the
36
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h3>
37
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<p> The emergence and development of the
Communist Party of China proceeded in extremely
complex conditions as a result of China's economic,
social, political and cultural backwardness and the
insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese
proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in
China comprised three different currents: the
struggle of the peasantry and the petty national
bourgeoisie against the survivals of feudalism, the
nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist
oppression, for national independence, and the
proletariat's struggle for socialism.</p>
<p> At the time when the CPC came into being the
working-class movement in China was just
beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary
experience in class struggle. The November 1927
Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a
political trend and as a party at a time when the
Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself
as a class and when the <em>class</em> movement of
workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge
of the <em>national-liberation</em> movement in China, in
which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the
earlier period, took place long before the class
awareness and class struggle of the exploited
masses assumed an appreciable scale.''</p>
38
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and theories of the world revolutionary movement,
such as no other country possessed.''~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
39
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4th (January 1925) Congresses regarded the
proletariat as the party's mainstay, the vanguard and
then the leader of the revolution, and the
peasantry as the proletariat's chief ally whose active
support was vitally important for the Chinese
revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress (April-May
1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more
than 50 per cent of whom were workers and about
19 per cent peasants.</p>
40
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41
42
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and the revolutionary struggle in the countryside
and to set up strongholds when the revolution is
in decline; the expediency of an alliance with the
petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that
in China armed revolution is fighting against
armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union
of the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and
others. It was the implementation of these theses
by the Communist Party of China that made
possible the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949.
The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
faction was quite different. It did not and could not
make any positive contribution to the development
of the communist movement in China. The
revolutionary movement suffered setbacks and defeats
whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists
wittingly or unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist
theses.</p>
43
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In the autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union
and the entire international communist
movement were concentrating their efforts on the
struggle against nazism, they launched a "drive to
streamline the style of work" in the CPC. The aim
of the campaign was to turn the Communist Party
of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand to a
petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political
platform (the 22 works selected for compulsory
study during the ``campaign'' were mostly articles
and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and
other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the
opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and
moral terror. After more than three years of struggle
44
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shifted to Manchuria where active preparation
began with Soviet assistance for the final phase of
45
46
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leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one
extreme to another in assessing the forces in the
Chinese revolution. In 1945--46, for example, they
overestimated their forces and displayed "
revolutionary impatience,'' ignoring the need to conserve
forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive
blow and the need to combine the political and
diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of
the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948--49,
after the Kuomintang offensive and the loss of
Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC
leadership showed disbelief in the possibility of an early
victory and proved helpless in dealing with
practical questions connected with the establishment
of people's power all over China.</p>
47
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now develop effectively, can reach a successful
issue, only in direct association with the
revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against
international imperialism.''~^^1^^</p>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>
_-_-_
48
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entered "the core of the revolutionary course,'' to
use Lenin's expression. Radical changes were
carried out in the non-socialist economic sectors. The
achievements of the first five-year plan period
furnished the basis for further advancement, for
organising large-scale socialist production under strict
government control. The prospect of complete
elimination of the petty-owner element became quite
real. This naturally aroused the resistance of that
element, greater vacillations, which, in turn,
__PRINTERS_P_49_COMMENT__
<b>4--193</b>
49
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_-_-_
50
__PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__
<b>4*</b>
51
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international arena the line was to heighten tension,
attain world hegemony, worsen relations with the
USSR and other socialist states.</p>
_-_-_
52
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working class and the peasantry under the leadership
of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests
of the working people. Yet the Maoists staked on
petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the basic
interests of the working class, the peasantry and the
working intelligentsia. Moreover, the systematic
``purges'' struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist
cadres.</p>
_-_-_
53
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following the petty-bourgeois, nationalist road. In
his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung
admitted that attitude to the Soviet Union
represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.</p>
54
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>
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possible outcome of the struggle against the
anarchist element represented by the small owner:
_-_-_
55
_-_-_
56
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completely from the ideological and organisational
principles formulated by the Communist Party of China
at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the
9th CPC Congress held in April 1969. The
Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the army
whose representatives headed the "revolutionary
committees" that replaced the elective local bodies of
power in the course of the "cultural revolution.''
The army actually seized the highest party organs
set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate
members of the Central Committee Politbureau
(15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee
(145 out of 279); this did not include persons who
formerly served in the army or were closely
connected with it. The Congress advanced as a
programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the
country. The Party Rules adopted by the Congress
proclaim "Mao Tse-tung's thought" to be
Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch. Though the
Maoists use the term "democratic centralism"
quite often in the official press, in reality all their
activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party.
The Party Rules in effect envisaged the creation,
under the name of the Communist Party of China,
of a new political organisation which would serve
as an obedient tool of the military-bureaucratic
dictatorship.</p>
57
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they are forced to restore the former organisational
structure which was crushed during the "cultural
revolution" under their instructions. The party
Central Committee continues to exist, though only
formally, as does its Politbureau, and medium--
level and lower party links are being formed, though
slowly. They have been and are being "set up" by
methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist
party norms. Their members are predominantly
servicemen, while the Politbureau includes people
closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his
private secretary, his former bodyguard, etc). But
this structure may come to play a positive part
should conditions in the party and the country
take a favourable turn. Besides, the present CPC
leadership is faced with the necessity of
reinstating some of the former party cadres, who were
persecuted or discredited during the "cultural
revolution.''</p>
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implementing their plans testify to the unceasing
opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the
CPC. The true Communists of China are in a
difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive
programme for China's development along the socialist
road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress,
which the 9th Congress had nothing to counter
with.</p>
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drawn from this experience is that a Communist
Party must constantly strengthen its combat
efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need
for a determined struggle against the forces and
traditions of the old society: "The force of habit
in millions and tens of millions is a most
formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been
tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the
confidence of all honest people in the class in
question, a party capable of watching and
influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle
cannot be waged successfully.''~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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<p> That is why in waging a struggle against
Maoism one must proceed from an awareness of the
incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of
social-chauvinism with the aims of the world
communist and liberation movement, with the basic
principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning
socialist construction, international affairs and
revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of
violence and overestimation of the power of the bayonet,
great-power chauvinism and claims for world
hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of
superstructure, which means substitution of a
military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people's
democratic social system, and militarisation of
society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.</p>
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working people of China. The Soviet people are
convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations and
friendship will be restored between the USSR and
the People's Republic of China, since this meets
the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet
peoples, the interests of the world socialist system, of
the revolutionary, liberation movement of all the
oppressed, the interests of universal peace.</p>
[63]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Concerning
<br /> the 50th Anniversary
<br /> of the Communist Party of China</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <em>I. Alexandrov</em>
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<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h3>
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was a result of the stepped-up political activity of
the rising working class and the upsurge of the
revolutionary democratic and national-liberation
movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of
young Soviet Russia.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_05_COMMENT__
<b>5--193</b>
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the Chinese revolutionaries in assimilating
Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the
Leninist Party of Bolsheviks.</p>
<p> Right from the first the CPC found itself in the
crucible of the national-democratic revolution and
put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
programme. The period between the first and third
congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was
a period of Party organisational and ideological
growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted to the
Communist International. At its Third Congress
(1923) the Party advanced the policy of building
a united national-revolutionary front with the
Kuomintang then headed by the great revolutionary
democrat Sun Yat-sen.</p>
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ties with the masses, hampered making use of the
experience of the world communist movement and
implementing Comintern recommendations. The
Sixth CPC Congress (1928), convened at such a
critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the
Party in the new situation. The Congress
resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement
and dealt with basic problems such as the strategy
and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution,
the building of the armed forces and the
establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of
developing the Chinese revolution.</p>
67
<p> The late twenties and first half of the 30's again
proved quite complex for the Party. The
Communists were constantly persecuted by the
reactionaries. In the Party proper petty-bourgeois elements
became active and in the mid-30's seized the key
Party positions.</p>
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country, and made the question of saving the nation
paramount. Speaking at the Comintern in 1936,
68
<p> The war against Japan was long and hard. The
defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese
militarism made possible China's final liberation from
the Japanese invaders. The decisive part in
winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This
provided highly favourable conditions for the
victory of the people's revolutions in a number of
countries of Europe and Asia, including China. The
liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the Far
East, the routing of Japan's crack Kwangtung
Army, the liberation of Manchuria with the active
participation of the troops of the Mongolian
People's Republic, the Chinese and Korean
guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan
and ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also
predetermined the possibilities for the subsequent
defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the
Soviet Union, US intervention of China was
prevented.</p>
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solidarity, the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with
the international communist and working-class
movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet
Union and other countries of the world socialist
system ensured the victory of the Chinese people,
the Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in
the many-year selfless struggle they had waged
under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China.</p>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>
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<p> The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff
to the nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in
ideology and policy which had been manifested in the
Party and the country. In the "Fundamental
Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical
foundation of the Party was resolutely stressed: "The
Communist Party of China is guided in its
activities by Marxism-Leninism.''</p>
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plunge the country into the voluntarist "great
leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist
forces in the Communist Party of China characterised
this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois
fanaticism,'' for which even then the Chinese people
had paid dearly.</p>
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to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in
China they, at the same time, came up with the
thesis on the ``impossibility'' of the victory of
socialism before the triumph of the world revolution.
Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of "
preparing for war" and turning the entire country into
a military camp the goal of China's economic
development and the country's socio-political life.
Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic
task.</p>
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the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties. The trend of present-day world
development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.</p>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>
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<p> The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that
the objective requirements of China's
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for
this normalisation. The long-term vital interests
of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash;
on the contrary, they make it imperative to restore
and develop their cooperation and friendship.</p>
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[79]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
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<b>Renunciation of the Principles
<br /> of Marxism-Leninism</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
<br /> THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
<br /> PARTY OF CHINA</b>
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obstructions to relaxation of international tension
at| ttmes of acute international crises. It helps
them by striving to hamper the emergence of a
broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split
the international mass organisations of youth,
women and scientists, the peace movement, the
trade union movement, and so on.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__
6---193
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there naturally could be no question of a free
discussion of questions worrying the Party and
the country.</p>
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__PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__
<b>6*</b>
83
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<p> This is the approach that should be taken if
the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party is
used as the guideline.</p>
<p> What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have
been adopted at the Ninth Congress? A close
scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they
flagrantly contravene the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on the party and run counter to the views of
the Communists on the questions of party
development. In all respects the new Rules are not
an improvement of but a step back from the
former Rules, which were passed in 1956 by the
Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a
direct retreat from the Marxist-Leninist positions
that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions
so as to turn the party into an obedient tool of
the present leadership for carrying out their
greatpower, chauvinistic policies.</p>
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<p> The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites
with genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties" and
jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism
headed by the USA, and modern revisionism,'' it
being understood that the Chinese leaders regard
the "Soviet revisionists" as the hub of this
revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists
mean by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.''
These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting
of renegades and turncoats who act on their
instructions. Although they are numerically weak
and ill-assorted, they have inflicted quite a lot
of harm on the world communist movement, and
for this they are lavishly praised by Peking. The
Peking leaders classify as ``revisionists'' the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and
Workers' Parties adhering to Marxism-Leninism and
86
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as official party policy. Though, formerly, the
Chinese leadership was also free-handed in its
anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow
opposition to and open acts of hostility against the
CPSU and other communist and workers' parties.</p>
87
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<p> Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means
a fossilised teaching. As no other theory it is
linked with life, with the working-class and
national-liberation movements, with the struggle for
socialism and communism. As a science, it
demands that it should be treated as such, that it
should be constantly developed and advanced. But
the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in
common with a revision of its basic propositions, with
attempts to evolve national variants.</p>
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is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the
proletarian revolutionary line of Comrade Mao
Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the
continuer of his cause.'' Thus, it is declared in
advance who is to ``inherit'' and ``supervise'' the party.
</p>
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everything that is sacred for all Communists, for
their ideology?</p>
91
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hungweipings and tsaofans and all who
unquestioningly follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive,
anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door to
Party membership precisely for these elements
and allows the present CPC leadership to bring
into the Party the forces which it regards as its
mainstay.</p>
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<p> The demand that all Party members should be
absolutely, categorically and unconditionally true
to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an
atmosphere in the Party which leaves no room for
inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like
the old, the new Rules provide for convening
periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses
in the localities and Party meetings, they
contain the addition to the effect that "in special
cases they (congresses, meetings.<em>-Author</em>) may
be convened earlier or postponed.'' Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under
what circumstances this may be done. The door
is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a
``legal'' infringement of one of the key norms
of Party life. True, even when this reservation
was non-existent, the CPC leadership ignored the
provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this
can be justified with references to the Rules.</p>
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CC, his Deputy and the Standing Committee of
the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it
is stated in the Rules that "some necessary
compact and operational organs to conduct the
current work of the Party, the Government and the
Army are established under the guidance of the
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.'' The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the
disbandment, in the course of the "cultural
revolution,'' of democratically elected Party
committees and the setting up of organs not
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__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__
7--193
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centralism, militarism and the renunciation of
inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this
is a nationalistic and chauvinistic organisation
with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.</p>
[98]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
<b>II</b>
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Maoism: Its Ideological
<br /> and Political Essence</b>
[99]
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<p> The theoretical and practical activities of the
Maoists, their efforts to split the revolutionary
forces, and their great-power and hegemonic
ambitions do serious harm to the anti-imperialist
struggle, to the world communist and
workingclass movement, to the forces fighting for
democracy and national freedom and to the entire
cause of socialism and the social progress of
mankind.</p>
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clearly shown during the stage of national--
liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite
different social forces against imperialism. The
differences of principle between Maoism and
scientific communism were revealed after the victory
of people's power in China, when fundamental
socio-economic changes were in progress.</p>
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of Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic
socio-political trend.</p>
expense.''^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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in their mass downtrodden, illiterate and
scattered, for many years remained very submissive and
fully subordinated to the authorities. The
backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national
narrow-mindedness and the nationalist outlook.</p>
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under the leadership of the working class, could
have taken the socialist road together with the
overwhelming majority of the people.</p>
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which they desired. Although the working class
of China is still relatively small in number (it
barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the
backbone of the Chinese revolution and of the cause
of socialism in China and it still is. The working
class is the real force which is exerting a
restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation
of Maoism in the life of the country.</p>
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their suppression. Although drawing the army
into the work of the "cultural revolution" did
help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the
discontent within the Chinese army and the
freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from
their illusions and a fanatical faith in the
wisdom of the "great helmsman.'' It also enabled
many of the army men to understand, from their
own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage.
Therefore, as was only to be expected, the army has
now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist
moods, and that is why the Maoists are carrying
out purge after purge, and repression after
repression against many career military men,
ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the
antiMaoist movement in the People's Liberation
Army of China.</p>
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bourgeoisie, which strives to ``rise'' above the classes
and present its egoistic interests as the interests
of the nation as a whole.</p>
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glorified and his views advertised, and he placed
his favourites in the most important posts in the
party, the army and in the machinery of state.</p>
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<p> In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle
nationalism was the ideological weapon of the
progressive forces which were fighting for
national liberation and social progress. It was the
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of developing the revolution and the transition
to socialism in the specific conditions of China.
But the Maoists had their own understanding of
this formula. For them this was an important
step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to
reveal itself with the appearance of the assertion
that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are an interpretation
of Marxism for all the countries of the East.
Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its
appearance. The next step was taken during the
"cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be
the teacher of all peoples, the only Marxist
theoretician of the entire world communist
movement, and Mao's ideas the apex of scientific
thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current
epoch. But this slogan is only a cover. The real
meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace
Marxism by Maoism. That is how the concealed,
previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic,
hegemonic schemes of the Maoists were revealed.
</p>
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<p> feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly
Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that part of this
philosophy is taken which is characterised by
scholasticism, idealism, primitive dialectics, the
preaching of the spirit of submission, the
glorification of imperial power, and the exaggeration
of the role of the subjective factor in history;</p>
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Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic
purposes the Maoists made use of the Trotskyite theory
of "the export of revolution,'' regarding world
war as the only way of solving the problems of
revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is
the tactics of splitting the revolutionary forces,
with crude slanderous attacks against the
Marxist-Leninist parties and the socialist states, rabid
anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within the
115
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<p> These, in the most general way, are the
ideological background of Mao Tse-tung and his
followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and
policy of Maoism quite often link up with the
ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no
accident, either, that the theoretical revelations
and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded
to the skies by imperialist ideologists and
politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of
social progress and socialism.</p>
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and the national-liberation movement, and with
the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism on
fundamental issues of socialist construction, world
development, and revolutionary strategy and
tactics.</p>
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<p> Although verbally they champion the idea of
world revolution, and make much ado about their
"revolutionary nature,'' Mao's supporters at the
same time slander the working class of the
capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist
degeneration. They also attack most of the Communist
Parties, and undermine the workers' and
democratic movement.</p>
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of the country. This is embodied primarily in the
foundations of socialism built by the efforts of the
Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the
120
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<p> The ideology and policy of Maoism do not
correspond to the objective course of the
development of society and the requirements of the
socialist development of China. Maoism suffers
one defeat after another and its ultimate failure
is historically inevitable. There can be no doubt
that the Communists, the working class and all
the working people of China will find the strength
to embark once again on the road of a close
unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist
countries and ensure the success of the great cause of
socialism in the PRC.</p>
[122]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Dialectics,
<br /> Genuine and Spurious</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST INTERPRETATION
<br /> AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS</b>
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Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts
to revise it must remain a central task in the
Party's ideological work.''~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not
scientific, since its purpose was to justify the
special views held by Mao and his adherents. The
polemic over the problem of contradictions, of the
unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to
_-_-_
<p> ^^1^^ Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism
Publishers, p. 15.</p>
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125
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socialist system consolidated or the proletarian
dictatorship should be liquidated and the
capitalist system restored.'' If one adds to this the
opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly
metaphysical 'theory of combining two into one' has
been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50's
as the interpretation of the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites and serves as theoretical
justification for the 'restoration of capitalism' in
that country and as an instrument of 'collusion
with the US imperialism','' one will readily see
that the latest campaign of ``repudiating'' the
"theory of combining two into one" has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what
are these aims and what, in general, is the place
and the real value of Maoist ``dialectics'' in the
present-day political and ideological struggle?</p>
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<p> The language of materialist dialectics has, in
Maoist hands, become simply a euphemism, at
once a realisation and a disguise for practical
political action, a kind of instrument kit consisting
of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames.
The Maoists' treatment of the theoretical wealth
accumulated by materialist dialectics is a striking
example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic
comprehension and use of ideas which,
irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are
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9--193
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dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous
exploitation of some of the turns of phrase typical
of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!</p>
__PRINTERS_P_131_COMMENT__
<b>9*</b>
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discovered that the necessary slogan has been ``shot''
by the universe itself.</p>
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<p> That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul
of the letter of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, is
perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this
law <em>unity</em> has been dropped, so that what remains
is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all
familiar with the rudiments of dialectics will
know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two
contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion
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. . .a law of the objective world.)''~^^1^^ Nothing,
therefore, is further removed from materialist
dialectics and more alien to it than an attempt to
present it as a set of abstract rules covering
everything under the sun and excluding, by their
very nature, a creative approach to anything.</p>
_-_-_
135
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<p> But it is this mythologem which the Maoist
ideologists, who have advanced the slogan: "
Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad
thing,'' regard as an example and a model for
their world outlook. In accepting the
mythologem about the impossibility of combining
extremes, these ideologists devote their current
campaign to ``rebuffing'' the idea of unity of
opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the word
"unity,'' which inspires them with mortal fear.
As they themselves admit, "the gist of the theory
of combining two into one" lies in the word
"combination.''</p>
136
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the social struggle, on the other. One of the
rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first,
nor in the second interpretations of the concept
of contradiction does the struggle of opposites
represent the extrapolation to the entire world of
the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to
Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the
same time genuine Marxism essentially differs
from the Maoist version in its interpretation of
the essence and the role of antagonistic forms
in social development.</p>
_-_-_
137
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<p> The inability to examine antagonisms from the
standpoint of the universal nature of
contradictions, the inability to understand the specific
character of the antagonistic contradictions, cannot
138
139
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<p> By revolutionarism Marxism means not
vindictive destruction or bellicose hysterics justified by
the absolutised form of antagonism, but, on the
contrary, a form of social activity which
theoretically and practically overcomes the inert
framework of the antiquated antagonistic class society
and works out new forms of a socialist and
communist society. Truly revolutionary activity is
activity based upon the creative energy of the
masses, so that even at the height of the struggle
against the political, class enemy the inner logic
of the historical process is never lost sight of.
Genuine revolutionaries will never allow the real
laws of the class struggle to be supplanted by
doctrinaire mythologising. Genuine
revolutionaries know how to subject even the most drastic
and rapid breakdown of antiquated social
structures to the logic of creation of the new, the logic
of their most humanistic aims-the aims of
building the new society precluding social
antagonisms. Absolutisation of the role of antagonistic
contradictions in the process of establishment and
development of socialist society and the cult of
militant destruction are phenomena alien to the
dialectics of resolving real contradictions. At the
same time ultra-left, nihilist destructiveness
denies the creative, problematic content of the
struggle for socialism and communism and is
essentially reactionary. When the Maoists act as
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scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega
of it being a concrete analysis of a concrete
subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In
contrast, in the hands of the Maoists, dialectics
has become something incompatible with any
kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is
out of the question, not to speak of a
thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological
heralds of universal truths are not concerned about
a vitally important action to be taken or the
reaction to the difficulties and problems in which
the Chinese politicians have become entangled,
but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of
attempts to blame everything on universal rules,
of the sleight of hand involving their substitution
for the earthly political passions, has been
141
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<p> The progress of a developed socialist society in
which the exploiting classes have been destroyed
is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to
142
[143]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Crisis in the Political
<br /> Development of China</b>
__ALPHA_LVL3__
[introduction.]
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well as internally. This is because its essence,
forms and trends are due to economic, political
and social factors-which differ as to the force,
time and duration of their action-and also to the
special national features and historical traditions
of the vast country. Concealed behind the ample
evidence of opposition-often indistinct and even
imperceptible-of the social forces, is shrewd
calculation and the cunning political line of the
Maoist ruling clique.</p>
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__ALPHA_LVL3__
<b>THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE
<br /> POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
<br /> CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC</b>
__PRINTERS_P_145_COMMENT__
<b>10--193</b>
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``amendment'' and "improvement,'' against the
``right-leading'' and ``bourgeois'' elements, made
it impossible for the Maoists to feel politically
secure.</p>
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__PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__
10*
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precisely made it of primary concern to the
government and Party to provide for the
leadership of the working class, to help enhance its
leading position in the alliance with the peasants
and to work to introduce proletarian ideology
among the rural population. Under such
conditions the bodies of political power must be
particularly careful not to let the influence of the
petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry
eclipse or distort the interests and aims of the
workers, the genuine exponents of social progress
and consistent fighters for socialism, who although
not numerous by comparison, are to lead society.</p>
148
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arbitrary action by individuals. Carrying on "
unreserved propaganda of Mao's ideas and arming
_-_-_
149
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150
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gun" and "Politics takes command,'' which were
adopted long ago at the time of the armed
struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist
rulers retained in peace-time and not only while
revolutionary government was being established
but also later on, during the building of
socialism. With the start of the "cultural revolution,''
with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the
rampage and the army acting as a shield, violence
actually became the Maoists' sole means of
handling, not only all political issues that presented
themselves, but also those arising in the sphere
of science, culture and education.</p>
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151
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<p> The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers
and the entire ideological and theoretical
platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and
megalomaniac course imposed on China by its present
Peking leadership, are not in any sense an
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and
special features of the vast country. Still less are
they the "acme of revolutionary theory,'' as
Mao's followers claim. Rather, they are a
hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and
bombastic slogans betraying lack of faith in the
creative capacity of the people and a denial of the
leading role of the proletariat, and put forward
to excuse violence, the cult of personality, and
extreme nationalism. And what is most
important, these are not isolated mistakes such as may
be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of
the infantile disorder of leftism in communism,
but rather a fully-developed system of anti--
Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles
and objectives of the world communist
movement.</p>
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__ALPHA_LVL3__
<b>THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS</b>
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At the same time it would be useful to
noteeven if only tentatively and touching mainly on
the political-legal sphere-some of the
circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese
affairs.</p>
153
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154
155
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to observe revolutionary law, but they went out
of their way to paralyse the very institutions
whose function was to strengthen overall civil
discipline and maintain socialist law and order.
As early as the late fifties they started a rabid
persecution of the workers in political and
legal institutions, particularly of the courts,
procurator's offices and the people's control
organisations. Many prominent workers in these
institutions, devoted champions of law and order, were
dismissed from office and branded as "
counterrevolutionary elements" who had wormed
themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the
fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task
groups" was started. These groups performed the
combined functions of the courts, procurator's
offices and public security bodies. The
Committee of People's Control, which was established
soon after the victorious revolution and which
rested on the system of local bodies and on the
active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised
into a common ministry, and later on, both
central and local people's control agencies were
finally eliminated.</p>
156
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efficiency, forfeiting its prestige among the
working people to a considerable extent because, on
the one hand, the more progressive cadres were
now and again subjected to persecution, being
made the target of ``purges'' and assorted "
campaigns,'' and, on the other hand, because it based
its activities on peremptory army-style commands
and one-man decisions instead of on the state
bodies. The principle "The first secretary of the
Party Committee is the commander-in-chief,''
which the Maoists have propounded in Party
work at all levels since the late fifties and early
sixties, in actual practice meant that many
157
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158
__ALPHA_LVL3__
<b>PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST
<br /> POLITICAL SYSTEM</b>
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act; it has neither <em>a</em> clear-cut structure, nor an
apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of
people. Moreover, the circle of Mao's followers keeps
contracting and extending by turns as the
objectionable ones are kicked out or-as happens
more seldom-those who win back their place by
``repentance'' or zealous prosecution of Maoist
objectives, return.</p>
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respect both to the number of seats and amount
of influence, is, in most instances, reserved for
the army. The Maoists have been wary of
announcing an election to the "revolutionary
committees,'' although in 1966 they made
declarations to the effect that these new bodies of
power would be elective.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__
11--193
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propped up by numerous prison camps and prisons.
Besides imprisonment, another current method of
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11*
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Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the
Party by recruiting new members from among
the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and
make further use of the army style of work. They
want to turn the Party into an obedient tool.
They mean to turn to account the Party's
revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war
record, its prestige among the working people,
and its immense organisational and educational
potential. For all practical purposes, what they
are setting up in China under the name of the
Communist Party of China is a new political
organisation which is intended to serve as a
support for Maoist rule.</p>
[164]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Maoism Preaches Poverty</b>
<p> A <em>Arzamastseu</em></p>
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the material one. Many Utopians saw the source
165
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a new organisation of labour, teach people new
skills and techniques and make the workers
interested in the results of their efforts.</p>
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heroism of the workers in the rear, of which the
communist <em>subbotniks</em> were only one example.
Conscientious work had a great effect on the
economic life of the country. It raised labour
productivity and improved labour discipline.</p>
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168
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ocean of primitive farm production, and were
unable to exert any noticeable influence. The
feeble links between various parts of the country
were breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist
Party of China set about the task of ending the
_-_-_
169
170
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of enthusiasm is evidently devoid of the element
of awareness and reason and borders on
fanaticism. Although exaltation whipped up by extreme
nationalism can take hold of a section of the
population, mostly the youth, it cannot be universal
or lasting. Reality with its daily cares is a
sobering factor, and the intoxication cannot last.</p>
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171
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bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless
when it fails to provide a tolerable living for the
worker. Real poverty does not go together with
construction, least of all socialist construction.
Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of
attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as <em>a</em>
blessing. He stated: "In addition to its other special
features, the 600-million population of China is
conspicuous for its poverty. This may seem bad
but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes,
action, revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of
paper one can write the most beautiful
hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful
pictures.''~^^1^^</p>
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For example: "Formerly one young
communemember would not do hard work and was angry
when he was given very few work-units.
Recently, when the commune-members had to bring
fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he
brought more than 50 kilograms on a yoke. He
was asked: 'How many units do you want this
time?' He replied: 'I don't care for work-units
any more, for <em>I</em> am tilling the land in the name
of the revolution.'~"~^^1^^ The commune member
completely suppressed his egoism and got rid of the
state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously
call poverty~!</p>
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<p> It is not our intention to belittle the importance
of "consciously transforming oneself.''
Communism is not all economy, well-being and cultural
development. It is also a highly organised society.
But to reduce one's "conscious transformation"
to ascetic self-sacrifice and mortification of the
flesh and spirit means to violate the human and
social nature of man. Man's awareness and
_-_-_
<p> ~^^1^^ Mao Tse-tung, <em>Sel. Works</em>, L., 1954, Vol. 1, p. 297.</p>
174
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the People</em>, M., 1957, p. 43.) Mao illustrates this
thesis by the following examples:</p>
__PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__
12--193
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camps were set up all over the country. Millions
of people familiar with any cultural and
technological achievements, with the fundamentals of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, are being banished
from towns for "re-education by labour" in the
village. Barracks discipline is introduced at
factories and in rural communes, and civil
administration is replaced by military rule. In
keeping with the so-called principle of unity of
industry, agriculture and military service, everyone
is obliged, besides his main occupation, to work
in agriculture (if he is an industrial worker) or
in industry (if he is <em>a</em> peasant), and also to
undergo military training. Conscious discipline is
out of the question and order at production
enterprises is maintained exclusively through non--
economic coercion. The military uniform is an
indispensable part of every working collective. The
private life of every Chinese is strictly
regimented. He must devote all his free time to studying
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Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts ot 1844</em> to
the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx's
basic idea was that this primitive communism,
with its praiseworthy intention of doing away
with private property and creating a just society,
had not gone beyond, had in fact not even
attained to, private property. It strove not to master
__PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__
12*
179
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labour is opposed to mental work as the only
worthy occupation. The individual is reduced to the
state of a dumb animal blindly following the
orders of the leader of its herd. Under such a
``communism'' equality in work and income does
not compensate for a man's loss of individuality
and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed
at transforming the world.</p>
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181
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to introduce equality in land tenure. Hung
Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping
uprising, wrote: "It is necessary that all
inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and
jointly the great happiness granted by our true
master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that
land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together,
that clothing be used and money expended
jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all
should be properly fed and clothed.''~^^1^^ Taiping
laws obliged every peasant family to give the
entire harvest to the state without compensation,
saving only what was absolutely necessary. The
surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans
in towns and used for the upkeep of the army and
administration. This organisation of life evoked no
protest among the masses in view of the
everpresent danger of returning to bondage under
landlords.</p>
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<p> This "vicious circle" can be broken only by
recognising human dignity. Full development of
all aspects of human life can be ensured only by
socialism whose productive efforts will be used,
in Lenin's words, not only to meet the daily
needs "but with the object of ensuring <em>full</em>
wellbeing and free, <em>all-round</em> development for <em>all</em> the
members of society.''~^^1^^ The half-century history
of socialism has borne out this thesis of Lenin's.
The great accomplishments in science, technology
and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new
man whose interests coincide with the final goal
of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific
conception of communism has nothing in common
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[184]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Great-Power Chauvinism
<br /> of Mao Tse-tung</b>
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organisers. For instance, Tibet and Sinkiang were
th^e last provinces in the country to set up the
so-called revolutionary committees. This
happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports
still carry warnings to the effect that "class
enemies there have refused to accept their defeat
and continue to hinder the country's progress to
socialism.''</p>
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China, when Communist-internationalists still
predominated in the CPC and the Mao group had
not yet thrust its openly chauvinistic course on
the Party leadership, a great deal was done to
raise the living standards and the cultural level
of the non-Chinese peoples. A number of
industrial enterprises were built in the areas populated
by the minorities, an agrarian reform was carried
out and schools and health facilities were opened.
State and Party authorities of the PRC worked
out a positive programme for solving the
nationalities question. "All nationalities are equal,'' said
Article 3 of the Constitution of the PRC (1954).
"Discrimination against, or oppression of, any
nationality, and acts which undermine the unity
of the nationalities are prohibited.'' The Party
186
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five (out of the one hundred) national minorities.
Among the nationalities denied this right are the
Yitsu (3.3 mln), Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians
(2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln).
187
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Chairman of the local Writers' Union, Ibrahim
Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of
Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a revolutionary and a staunch
fighter for the people's cause during the time of
the Kuomintang.</p>
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areas undermines the economy of those areas and
lowers the status of the local population. The
Chinese in the Sinkiang-Uigur and Tibet areas
now constitute approximately half the local
population. The proportion of Mongolians in Inner
Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given
the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always
been a shortage of arable land. In Inner Mongolia
pastures are being put to the plough to provide
new settlers with land.</p>
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nationalities of the PRC were merging into a
single entity on the basis of the Chinese
nationality. It was echoed by <em>Sinkiang jihpao</em> which went
so far as to claim that the assimilation was
"Marxist and communist.'' "Those who oppose
such assimilation oppose socialism, communism
and historical materialism.'' These are not empty
words. Those who demand that modern industry
be built in the outlying areas, that a working
class be formed there, that local engineering and
managerial personnel be trained and national
cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of
``black'' views and supporters for "an open
191
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troublesome'' regions will cause Mao Tse-tung and
his group even more trouble in the years ahead.</p>
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13--193
[193]
[194]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
<b>III</b>
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>The International Communist
<br /> Movement and the Communist
<br /> Party of China</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th ANNIVERSARY
<br /> OF THE CPC</b>
__PRINTERS_P_195_COMMENT__
13*
[195]
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building in the 1950's of the foundations for socialist
industrial and cultural development, and with
collectivisation in the countryside. The
membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60
in 1921 to nearly 20 million in the mid-1960's.~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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49) and during the construction of the People's
Republic of China. Within the Party there were
experienced organisers and military leaders who
197
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<p> An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with
the history of the Chinese Communist Party brings
out a common feature: nearly all the works
devoted to the general problems, to separate periods
or even to separate events in the history of the
CPC somehow concentrate on the question of its
relationships (political, ideological, etc.) with the
international communist and revolutionary
movement-with the Comintern and its largest section,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and
with the countries and communist parties of the
world socialist system.</p>
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the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party stepped up its outright attack on the
concerted line of the international communist
movement, this view began to predominate in
bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and ``
deepened'' in the works of American and West
European Sinologists dealing with the Chinese
revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in
biographies of Mao Tse-tung, and in books and
articles on Maoism. The ``deepened'' view consisted
in the tracing, by many American and West
European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung's ``
special'' course, which had allegedly determined the
ultimate victory of the Chinese revolution and
the opposition of his line to that of the
Comintern, back to the 1930's and even the 1920's. The
works, published in the 1960's, of S. Schram,
Y. Chen~^^1^^ and especially of J. E. Rue~^^2^^, all
develop this theme.</p>
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concerted policy of the international communist
movement.</p>
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_-_-_
<p>~^^3^^ Liu Shao-chi, <em>On the Party</em>, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.</p>
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valuable and reliable sources.</p>
203
_-_-_
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of the relationships of the international
communist movement with the communist and other
revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent
countries in the new historical era ushered in by
the Great October Socialist Revolution.</p>
_-_-_
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that would take place automatically. He
maintained that in the colonial and dependent
countries of the East, this process, together with the
tremendous political development of their
revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, ``
secondary'' difficulties owing to the preponderance
there of non-proletarian strata and to the various
nationalistic prejudices of the masses. The
experience of the first contacts with the representatives
of various trends of national revolutionary forces
in the Eastern countries brought Lenin to the
conclusion that the involvement of the non--
proletarian masses there in revolutionary activity might,
besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt
the representatives of these forces to ``repaint''
the non-proletarian liberation trends and
platforms in the "colour of communism.''^^2^^ Lenin
pointed to the possibility, under these
circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the
principles of the international communist
movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain
tactical slogans without understanding their
essence and the reason why they had been advanced
in the first place.</p>
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s40's bore the imprint of the directing theoretical,
political and organisational activity of the
Comintern. At the most important stages of the
development of the Chinese revolution, the
Comintern's assistance to the Chinese Communist Party
and close connection with it, armed the Party
with decisions and conclusions based on the
achievements of the theoretical and political
thought of the world communist and liberation
movement. The young Communist Party of China
was able to utilise in its struggle the experience
of the Marxist-Leninist parties with the
Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on their
support. That is an example of the big part
played by the international factor in the formation
and development of the communist parties and
the communist movement in colonial and
dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of
the Chinese Communist Party at its First
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was the theoretical and practical problem of
combining and interrelating the national and class
features of the revolutionary movement. To
supplement the theses of the Comintern's Fourth
_-_-_
<p>~^^1^^ For details see <em>The Comintern and the East</em>, pp. 242--299.</p>
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__PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__
14--193
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contradictory, period in the history of the CPC
have been but poorly studied.</p>
_-_-_
__PRINTERS_P_211_COMMENT__
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China.~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
<p>~^^1^^ For details see <em>The Comintern and the East</em>, pp. 313--
349.</p>
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decision, as everyone knows, remains unfulfilled up to this
day (see <em>Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the
CPC</em>, Book 6, <em>Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the
CPC</em>, M., 1930).</p>
213
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214
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were the first comprehensive, scientifically-based
platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy
on the agrarian-peasant question, laid down in
the CPC decisions and Comintern
recommendations in the late 1920's-early 1930's, served the
Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide
throughout the subsequent period of its
revolutionary activity in the countryside. It was
precisely these decisions and the experience of these
years (the principles of determining class
appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party's
decisions on agrarian reorganisation in the late
1940's-early 1950's.~^^2^^</p>
_-_-_
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particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.</p>
_-_-_
<p> ^^1^^ For details see <em>The Comintern and the East</em>, pp. 350--379.</p>
217
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the united national anti-Japanese front in China
itself. During the Second World War, the
nationalistic forces within the Chinese Communist
Party sought to make the best of international
support not so much for waging war against
Japanese imperialism as for preserving and
increasing their own armed forces.</p>
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increased.</p>
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been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress
the CPC had 10,700,000 members and candidate
members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per
cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals).~^^1^^ Such
a composition was bound to affect its ideology,
policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois,
nationalistic tendencies in the Party continued to exist
and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in
China depended on the outcome of the struggle
between the nationalistic tendencies and the
proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome
could not but affect the interests of the
international communist movement as a whole.</p>
_-_-_
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nationalistic forces interfered with the Party's
constructive interaction with the international
communist movement, its course of development on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance
of the concerted line of the international
communist movement. They imposed the "big leap"
policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one
hand, certain weaknesses in the Party (the
disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the
personality cult of Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on
the other, by making great use of avantgardist
slogans when the country was in a state of
animation and indulging in nationalistic distortions
222
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and "<em>People's Communes" in China</em>, M., 1969; <em>Foreign
Policy of the Chinese People's Republic</em>, M., 1971.</p>
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to an almost unconcealed attempt to play on the
contradictions between the forces of socialism,
democracy and progress on the one hand, and
international imperialism on the other. They have
always regarded the world communist movement
and the forces of socialism, whose help they
sought to use in furtherance the
nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as a ``third'' force.
</p>
_-_-_
__PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__
15--193
225
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movement, and by its experience and its
recommendations, on the political and ideological positions of
the Party.</p>
_-_-_
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international ties were weakened (either as a result
of objective causes or vacillations in its
leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party
increased their activity. That was precisely the
case in 1934--35, when the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat
from Kiangsi in the north-west of the country,
had no liaison with the Comintern for some time.
The same is true of the period of the Second
World War, especially the years of the Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet people.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_227_COMMENT__
15*
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their ideas and influence. At the same time, the
attacks on the CPSU were meant to pave the way
for revising the general line of the world
communist movement.</p>
228
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of the Party.</p>
__*_*_*__
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international communist and the whole anti--
imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the
only correct stand-a stand of consistently
defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost
strengthening of the unity of the world
communist movement, and protection of the interests of
our socialist Motherland.''~^^1^^ The Congress also
endorsed the consistent course of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising
relations between the USSR and the Chinese
People's Republic and establishing good--
neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet and
Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations
between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China would meet the vital, long-term interests
of both countries, the interests of world socialism,
the interests of intensifying the struggle against
imperialism.''~^^2^^</p>
_-_-_
231
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Regarding Peking-Washington
<br /> Contacts</b>
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difference between the preaching and practice of
the US ruling circles. In deeds the United States
continues the aggressive war in Indochina,
supports the Israeli extremists, and hinders a
relaxation of tension in Europe. It is not any accident
that many people in the United States itself view
the contacts with Peking as a continuation of this
reactionary anti-communist line.</p>
232
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<p> Some say that the recognition by Washington of
the PRC signifies a turn towards realism in the
policy of the US Administration. It is also noted
233
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Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam, and an end should be put to the
dirty US war in Vietnam.</p>
235
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in the United Nations. The newspaper says that
anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the
ChineseAmerican detente is taking place.</p>
236
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among the anti-imperialist forces.''</p>
237
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quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks
about Nixon's official visit to China help to expose
238
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and state.</p>
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<p> The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to
cooperate actively with all states, including the
PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace
and the freedom, independence, progress and
prosperity of nations.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_241_COMMENT__
<b>16--193</b>
[241]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Questions Requiring an Answer</b>
<br class="bullet" /> <b>CONCERNING THE US-CHINA TOP-LEVEL
<br /> MEETING</b>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h3>
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242
__PRINTERS_P_243_COMMENT__
16*
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progressive circles in the United States fully
realise that the hard trials which have fallen to the
lot of the Chinese people, and for which the
Peking leadership must bear the main responsibility,
are partly the result of the imperialist policy of
isolating China and putting obstacles in the way
of her peaceful construction.</p>
<p> But this is not the whole story. There is also the
matter of the changes which are taking place in
bourgeois public opinion which is generally
shaped by official propaganda. After its hatred
campaign against China, which had gone on for many
years, this propaganda changed its tone and
direction. It is impossible not to associate this change
244
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policy, and that in any event China could be dealt
with, no matter what the Peking leaders might say
or the Chinese press write. Name-calling, after all,
never hurts anyone.</p>
245
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Vietnamese patriots. The <em>New York Post</em> was
genuinely puzzled and suggested that it was up to
the Sinologists and Maoists to explain why the
Chinese Communists had decided to make things
easier for the President.</p>
246
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>
247
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knowledge of the public or even the Congress.
Others are concerned about the effect the trip may
have on Soviet-American relations and the
prospects for reducing the arms race and achieving a
detente. And many among the US ruling circles
are beginning to feel uneasy about the possible
impact of the Peking rendezvous on the USA's
relations with its West European allies, with Japan
and other countries. In fact, the news of the
planned visit was received by many of them with
unconcealed alarm, to say nothing of the confusion
it caused in the camp of the US puppets in Taiwan,
Seoul and Saigon.</p>
248
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press, the American public is particularly anxious
about the possible effect of the move undertaken
by the US Administration on US relations with the
socialist countries, particularly with the Soviet
Union. This is understandable, if one takes into
account the political, economic and military
prestige of the Soviet Union on the world scene--
prestige which it has gained as a result of its might
and its peaceful constructive policy-and if one
takes into account the role of the Soviet Union in
world developments. There are many people in the
United States who clearly see that much of what
is important for both countries and for the world
at large depends on US-Soviet relations.</p>
249
<p> The Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the
US press itself gives a very ambiguous
interpretation of such assurances. The <em>Washington Post</em>, for
instance, writes that, despite all formal refutations
issued by the US Government, officials in the
Nixon Administration privately express views to the
effect that it is not in the interests of the United
States to dispel the Soviet Union's suspicions about
some details of US-Chinese relations which may
give reason for dissatisfaction or concern in
Moscow.</p>
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State Department who were victimised in
McCarthy's time for their advocacy of US-Chinese
detente. Explaining their attitude of those days, they
emphasise that they understood detente as a means
of alienating China from the socialist camp. By
taking advantage of Mao's readiness to seek ways
for improving relations with Washington, which
had been in evidence since the forties, they hoped
to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and
China. By such comments, the US press is openly
persuading the reader of the benefits of detente
with China for stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.
</p>
250
<p> For over twenty years now the Soviet Union has
pressed for the international recognition of the
legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic.
It can only be regretted that the United States has
taken so long to acknowledge realities and make
its first steps toward renunciation of its cold-war
policy towards China. It is also to be regretted
that this step has been taken under the
circumstances which cast doubts upon the motives.</p>
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<p> The sincerity of statements is tested only by
practice. And this is true of the case in question,
all the more so since the world public knows that
the speeches and assurances of US politicians have
often been at variance with their deeds.</p>
251
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exclusive military blocs by continental systems of
collective security, is very important.</p>
__*_*_*__
[253]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>The Preaching and Practice
<br /> of the Chinese Leaders</b>
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<p> Experience has convincingly confirmed the
correctness of the conclusion drawn by the
International Conference of Communist and Workers'
Parties in 1969 that "<em>the world system oi socialism is
the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle.</em>"
It has become a powerful accelerator of the
historical progress that was started by the Great
October Revolution, a mighty bulwark of peace and
the security of the peoples.</p>
254
<h2 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>I</em></h2>
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``Left'' theses that allegedly were to facilitate the
speediest destruction of imperialism and an
acceleration of the world revolution by any means, not
ruling out a world thermo-nuclear war. They tried
to impose this platform on the international
communist and workers' movement. Actually
Maoism's ``Leftism'' only camouflaged the conceited
hegemonistic designs of the Maoists to which
Peking's entire domestic and foreign policy was
subordinated.</p>
255
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poverty to be the ``basis'' of revolutionism, and the
desire to improve the life of the people-"
revisionism,'' "bourgeois economism.'' They galvanised
the old Trotskyite anti-Leninist thesis of the ``
impossibility'' of successfully building socialism
before the triumph of the world revolution.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_257_COMMENT__
17--193
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birth and also in a later period, for instance, in an
article in the May 14, 1969 issue of the <em>Chiehfang
jihpao</em>.</p>
258
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provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, developing
them into armed clashes in the spring and
summer of 1969. In an atmosphere of anti-Soviet
psychosis and militaristic frenzy that was
simultaneously generated in China, the course hostile to
the Soviet Union was proclaimed an official
doctrine at the 9th CPC Congress.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_259_COMMENT__
17*
259
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territorial and other claims.</p>
260
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socialist countries, alleging that without such a
revolution "capitalism will be restored.'' Peking went
261
<p> But the Maoists did not derive the results they
wanted either from the "cultural revolution" or
from the "line of the 9th Congress of the CPC.''
On the contrary, in the period from 1966 to 1969
they aggravated the state of crisis and the
country's even greater international isolation. Although
by methods of violence, terror and demagogy the
Chinese leadership succeeded in suppressing open
resistance to its course and in imposing this course
on the country, it could not help seeing that it
would not be able to overcome by these means
either the domestic crisis or the international
isolation.</p>
262
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the cause of peace, national liberation and
socialism. The Conference highly assessed the role of
the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the liberation
struggle and the USSR's peaceful foreign
policy.</p>
<h3 class="NUMERIC_LVL3">
<em>II</em></h3>
263
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betrayal'' and "collusion with imperialism,'' now the
Chinese leadership even teaches others how to
pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. The
Chinese Government has officially proposed the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis of
relations between the PRC and the United States.
At the same time it has enlivened its contacts with
many Western countries, having established
diplomatic relations with a number of them. Peking
has tuned down outright propaganda of the thesis
of the inevitability of a world thermonuclear war
and, more than that, now tries to feign love of
peacefulness.</p>
264
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policy of the Chinese leadership at the present
stage, and in what measure do they accord with
the aspirations of the peoples, including the people
of China? In fact, this is a question of the
correlation and interconnection of the Chinese
leadership's strategy and tactics in the present
conditions. Only facts, their thorough and objective
analysis can produce the answer.</p>
265
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supported the Chinese people's revolutionary
struggle in the course of many decades and gave
it fraternal assistance in its advance along the road
of socialism, is deliberately erased from the minds
of the Chinese working people.</p>
267
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We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to
national exclusiveness. We are internationalists.''~^^1^^
Contrary to Leninism, contrary to the communist
logic of class struggle Peking rejects the idea of
united action of socialist countries, of all the
revolutionary forces in the struggle against
imperialism. Thus the Chinese leadership assumes a grave
responsibility for creating an opportunity for the
imperialists to step up their actions and attempts,
on a number of sectors, to mount a counter--
offensive against the world revolutionary movement,
suppress the liberation movement in South-East
Asia and support the Israeli aggression in the
Middle East.</p>
<h3 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
<em>III</em></h3>
_-_-_
268
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China will never be a ``superpower'' and during
personal contacts between Chinese leaders and
representatives of different countries it is stressed that
China is the best defender of countries fighting
against the "two superpowers.''</p>
269
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9th Congress of the Communist Party of China,
was directly adapted to the demagogic conception
270
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<p> It is this that determines the principled and
consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet state
in regard to China, a line that has again been
authoritatively confirmed in the Report of the
Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th
Congress of the Party and in the Resolution of the
Congress, in the Decisions of the Plenary Meetings
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the
speeches of the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.</p>
272
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<p> People in the Soviet Union regard with due
appreciation the development of normal relations
between states, and on this plane, the
normalisation of relations between the PRC and the USA
is no exception. But the Soviet people cannot help
giving attention to the fact that in its overtures
to Washington, the Chinese leadership again
frankly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet
Union.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_274_COMMENT__
<b>18--193</b>
273
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pettybourgeois ideological-political movement basically
alien to Marxism-Leninism, parasitising on the
principles of scientific socialism, on the striving
of the popular masses of China for socialism. The
goals and practice of Maoism are incompatible
with the tasks of the world communist, liberation
movement. Here one should fully take into account
that Maoism, in its present struggle against the
Marxist-Leninist teaching, the communist
movement, the socialist community, objectively links
274
__PRINTERS_P_275_COMMENT__
18*
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275
[276]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Peking Foreign Policy
<br /> Doctrines and Practice</b>
277
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with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. But even at this period the Chinese leaders
made plans to swallow up the Mongolian People's
Republic and complained about China's having
``lost'' large areas of Southeast Asia which the
armies of the Chinese emperors had reached once
upon a time. At the Asia and Oceania trade union
conference at the end of 1949 the Chinese
representatives declared that all peoples fighting for
national liberation must follow "the path of Mao
Tse-tung.'' In 1950--51 the Maoists tried to impose
their own programme on the Communist Parties
of India and Indonesia: in these predominantly
peasant countries the revolution had, they claimed,
to follow the same lines as in China. Later on
they put out the famous formula about "the wind
from the East beating the wind from the West,''
which was certainly rather equivocal.</p>
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sought to justify factionalism in the communist
movement. Anyone who refused to accept the
Maoist "general line" was labelled a "revisionist,''
a "traitor to Marxism.''</p>
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conception: he preferred the fighting to be done by
others, and pinned his chief hopes on a nuclear
clash between the USSR and the USA.</p>
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international isolation. Many of the splinter groups
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<p> While posing as "staunch,'' ``firm'' allies of the
national liberation movement and accusing others
of ``collusion'' with imperialism, the Chinese
leaders forget all about their duty to that movement
as soon as they see a chance to make a deal with
the imperialists that will serve their nationalistic
ambitions. That is the light in which the
progressive forces see a number of recent moves by
Peking.</p>
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so as to eat up the goat's little ones?</p>
[284]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Concerning the Economic Relations
<br /> Between the
<br /> Soviet Union
<br /> and China (1950--66)</b>
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their continuous slandering of our country the
Maoists are attempting to whip up hatred for the
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<p> The economic ties between the USSR and the
People's Republic of China, dealt with in this
article, are an important aspect of Soviet-Chinese
relations. A study of these ties affords a good idea
of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period
between 1950 and 1966.~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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and technical assistance rendered by the Soviet
Union to China was unprecedented in its scale
and effectiveness. The USSR provided this
assistance at the most critical period for the People's
Republic of China, when the restoration and
development of the national economy was a question
of life and death for new China. In that
complicated domestic and international situation Soviet
economic and technical assistance provided the
means for solving extremely difficult political,
social, economic and other problems. This
assistance enabled the People's Republic of China
to restore and reconstruct its national economy in
record time and lay the foundations of a modern
industry which made it possible for China to
eliminate the economic backwardness of the country
and build the material and technical basis of
socialism.</p>
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aluminium--38 thousand tons, ammonia--150
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__PRINTERS_P_289_COMMENT__
19--193
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_-_-_
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<p> ^^2^^ Ibid., p. 203.</p>
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__PRINTERS_P_291_COMMENT__
19*
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technical training in the Soviet Union. In the same
period more than 11 thousand Chinese students
and postgraduates studied at Soviet educational
establishments. About one thousand scientific
workers from the Academy of Sciences of China
underwent training at research institutes of the
USSR Academy of Science. In addition to this,
over 1,500 Chinese engineers, technicians and
scientists visited the Soviet Union to study the
scientific and technological achievements and
experience of this country.</p>
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building factories and plants for defence and
equipping them with modern machinery, the Soviet
Union furnished China with a great deal in the
way of blueprints and technological specifications
for the production of modern armaments and
military equipment. China also received large
amounts of modern military materiel, armaments,
and other equipment for the People's Liberation
Army of China.</p>
_-_-_
293
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<p> The active balance in Soviet-Chinese trade
meant therefore that the Soviet Union allocated
from its national income and extended to China
_-_-_
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295
_-_-_
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the same period the Soviet Union delivered to
China 1.5 million tons of petroleum products
(including 506,000 tons of benzine, 477,000 tons
of kerosine, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel, and
154,000 tons of lubricants). As a result of
Soviet assistance the output of petroleum products
in the People's Republic of China rose from
436,000 tons in 1952 to 1,460,000 tons in 1957.
But in spite of this increase the Soviet Union
remained China's main supplier of petroleum
products. In the course of the first five-year plan
period the Soviet Union delivered about seven
million tons of petroleum products to the People's
Republic of China. In 1957 alone the USSR
exported 1,803 thousand tons of petroleum products
to the People's Republic of China.~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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like to emphasise the fact that the fraternal
socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union,
rendered us tremendous disinterested aid which
helped to expedite socialist construction in our
country and create the mainstay of socialist
industrialisation.''~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
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were in fairly large supply on the home market.
Considering the economic situation in China and
its export possibilities, the Soviet Union
imported from China, between 1950 and 1960, raw
materials for the production of foodstuffs, rare and
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blockade and trade embargo had failed,~^^1^^ and
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<p> ~^^1^^ <em>Duivai Maoi</em> (Foreign Trade), 1958, No.~1.</p>
301
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trade had no long-term legal basis, and that it
was the Soviet Union which did not want to
commit itself to any long-term trade agreement with
the People's Republic of China. The fact is that, in
the first place, in the period between 1950 and
1964 Soviet-Chinese trade meant more than a mere
commercial operation. Soviet exports to the
People's Republic of China included, besides purely
commercial deliveries, deliveries under an
economic aid programme and under a military aid
programme. Chinese exports to the USSR included
trade deliveries and payment for Soviet
economic and military credits to China and interest on
them. As for economic aid, military aid and
credits, they were extended to the People's Republic
of China on the basis of long-term agreements.
In the second place, the Soviet Union repeatedly
suggested that both sides review the question of
signing a long-term agreement in order to
provide for stable commercial ties between the USSR
and China. The Chinese side, however,
permanently declined to discuss this question.</p>
_-_-_
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importance for the Soviet-Chinese trade relations. In its
letter to the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party of February 29, 1964, the Mao
Tsetung group said that prices on many goods and
equipment imported from the Soviet Union were
much higher than those on the world market.~^^1^^
That is not true. The Soviet-Chinese trade
agreement of April 19, 1950, stipulated that prices in
Soviet-Chinese trade would be determined "on the
basis of world market prices in roubles.'' In the
course of the Soviet-Chinese trade talks in 1950
all sale and purchase prices were based on the
world capitalist market prices of equivalent
commodities for the preceding year. This system of
price setting was largely in use until 1958. The
principle of stability of prices used in trade
between the USSR and China, as well as in trade
between the USSR and other socialist countries,
was aimed at protecting the prices established in
trade between socialist countries from the
harmful effects of the unstable capitalist market. This
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The new prices were set by both sides in line with
average annual prices on the major world
markets for 1957 and have since remained unchanged
by agreement between the two sides.</p>
_-_-_
<p> ^^1^^ Sec Peng Ming, <em>The History of Friendship Between the
Soviet and Chinese Peoples</em>, in Chinese, Peking, 1955
p. 138.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_305_COMMENT__
20--193
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Soviet equipment, which had actually been caused
by the lack of experience of Chinese workers and
technicians. This was in order to cause doubts
about the quality of Soviet-made goods.</p>
_-_-_
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reduced to about a fifth as compared with the
preceding year, and that in 1962--63 it would be
terminated.~^^2^^ The political implications of this move by
the Chinese leadership are quite obvious, since the
People's Republic of China was at the same time
importing industrial plant from the capitalist
countries. For example, China purchased industrial
plant for 20 factories from Britain, Italy, West
Germany, France and Japan.</p>
_-_-_
<p>~^^1^^ See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Op. cit., pp. 193, 200, 212,
240; M. Kapitsa, <em>To the Left of Common Sense</em>, M., 1968,
p. 66.</p>
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reduced the volume of goods which had become
traditional Chinese exports to the Soviet Union.
This manoeuvre of the Chinese leadership
inevitably led to a sharp reduction in Sino-Soviet trade
in the years which preceded the so-called
cultural revolution in China. Between 1959 and 1966
the volume of trade between China and the
Soviet Union decreased by almost 85 per cent.
SinoSoviet currency relations are an important aspect
of the economic ties between the USSR and China.
In the early stages of Soviet-Chinese economic
relations, when China was still suffering from
inflation, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China agreed upon the rate of exchange of their
currencies. On June 1, 1951, the governments of
the USSR and China signed an agreement on the
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Union and China. On December 30, 1957, the
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economic relations. They facilitated the building of
socialism in the People's Republic of China, and
helped to strengthen its national economy and
defences. The credits the Soviet Union extended
to the People's Republic of China meant that part
of the surplus product which forms the
accumulation fund, was temporarily taken out of the
Soviet national economy and was transferred to
China in the form of credits, instead of being
used for the expansion of the productive capital or
for capital construction in the cultural and
service spheres which could have brought additional
benefits to the Soviet people. From the purely
commercial point of view the Soviet Union stood
to gain nothing from its credits to China. Under
the planned system of economic management, the
Soviet Union would have gained much more from
using them for its own domestic needs-for the
expansion of production, in order to export the
additional products in exchange for the necessary
commodities, instead of shipping equipment and
machinery (especially complete sets of plant) on
credit to China. The payment of interest on its
credits - which, by the way, was much lower than
on the capitalist market - serves as only a partial
compensation for the losses sustained by the
Soviet national economy through the temporary
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1961 when the adventuristic policy of Mao
Tsetung created an extremely difficult economic and
political situation in the country.</p>
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315
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modern army. The very fact that the People's
Liberation Army of China was fully equipped with
modern materiel, equipment and weapons (
including jet planes, modern tanks, artillery, submarines,
and surface war ships) received from the Soviet
Union or manufactured according to Soviet
blueprints at Chinese factories, and with Soviet aid,
speak for the scope, effectiveness and significance
of the Soviet credits for the People's Republic of
China. Soviet military credits were also used for
the building of barracks and for providing the
soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation
Army of China with foodstuffs and equipment.
Soviet credits were provided in sufficient quantities
to have a decisive effect on the progress of China's
economy and on the building of her defences.</p>
_-_-_
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and hegemonic designs. However, as the Chinese
people built the foundations of socialism,
drawing on Soviet experience and aid, this process
became increasingly at variance with the anti--
Marxist adventuristic and great-power aspirations of
the Mao Tse-tung group. The building of
socialism in China necessitated the observance of
certain objective laws of socio-economic development
and an internationalist attitude towards the USSR
and other socialist countries, whereas Mao
Tsetung and his supporters deliberately ignored these
facts. It was precisely for this reason that Mao
Tse-tung, in the last few years of the first five--
318
[319]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>Peking Against
<br /> the Socialist Community</b>
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
socialist community is welcomed by the
imperialist policy-makers as the best possible contribution
to the attainment of this strategic objective at a
time when direct military pressure on the
socialist states is clearly not only ineffective but also
dangerous. Imperialism today hopes to achieve
with Peking's assistance what it failed to
accomplish through years of reliance on its own forces
alone.</p>
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countries towards strengthening world socialism,
lessening international tension and organising broad
resistance to the stepped-up activity of the
forces of imperialism and reaction
invariably evokes a flood of invective and slander
from Peking. This was the case during
the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962
when the Soviet Union took a number of
__PRINTERS_P_331_COMMENT__
21--193
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<p> In 1950--59 the USSR pledged the Chinese
People's Republic help in the building, expansion and
reconstruction of more than 400 major
enterprises, separate factory departments, and other
projects. Of these over 250 were completed or
partly put into operation. In 1952--61 other European
socialist countries built or helped in the building
in China of more than 260 enterprises, factory
departments, technological installations and other
economic projects. Already by 1960 enterprises
built with Soviet help produced 8.7 million tons
of pig iron and 8.4 million tons of steel, and
accounted for 80 per cent of the motor trucks, over
90 per cent of the tractors, 55 per cent of the
steam and hydraulic turbines, 25 per cent of the
electric power and 25 per cent of the aluminium
turned out in China.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_323_COMMENT__
<b>21*</b>
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of which are aimed against the socialist camp,
but also in the basic concurrence of the stance
and policy of the Peking leaders and those of the
Chinese bourgeoisie, which exists to this day in
the Chinese People's Republic. In 1957 the Maoists
gave this bourgeoisie every opportunity publicly
to propound its anti-socialist views.</p>
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principles recorded in the Constitution and were out
to "practise reactionary great-power chauvinism.''
"The foreign policy programme of the bourgeois
Right-wing elements <em>is</em> pivoted on anti-socialism
and pro-Americanism,'' Tsien Chun-jui said.</p>
325
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victory of the revolution in China the MPR would
"automatically,'' "of its own free will,'' once again
become part of China. In April 1945 Chou
Enlai's private secretary told some American
officials that the Chinese leaders would like to "join
Outer Mongolia (meaning the MPR to China).''
And in 1954 Mao with unadulterated great-power
arrogance took up with the Soviet Government
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socialist countries which eventually developed into
open enmity towards them.</p>
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and political platform and great-power
hegemonism.</p>
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through the socialist system itself. Hence utmost
clarity is essential in assessing its place and role
in the global confrontation of the forces of
progress and reaction.</p>
330
[331]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>New Strategy for the Same Ends
<br /> AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST INTERNATIONAL
<br class="bullet" /> POLICY</b>
<p> O. <em>Ivanov</em></p>
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
current period have clearly shown that Mao
Tsetung and his group are intent on following the
basic political course endorsed by the Ninth
Congress of the Communist Party of China. This
means a rejection of the proletarian, class
approach in assessing social phenomena,
undermining the socialist community and the anti--
imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the
endeavour to establish world hegemony.</p>
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adherents. This is all part of the Maoists' broad
political manoeuvre aimed at stabilising the internal
situation.</p>
333
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<p> Being well aware of the dangerous
consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist-Leninist
parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese
problem. They voiced their principled position at the
International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. In
this respect the Meeting marked an important
stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to
strengthen the unity of their revolutionary ranks,
to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory,
and to counteract the anti-Leninist and subversive
activity of the Maoists.</p>
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without going against their principles and
national interests. At the same time the Marxist--
Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks
and expose the ideological platform of the
Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with
Marxism-Leninism.</p>
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relations with China causes difficulty for the Maoists
and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home
and on the international scene.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_337_COMMENT__
22---193
337
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and the Maoists are again helping the American
imperialists to find <em>a</em> way out of the Indochina
338
__PRINTERS_P_339_COMMENT__
22*
339
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the same time, they have always considered that
the development of bilateral relations between
states must not interfere with the interests of
other countries or proceed at their expense. The
policy of improving the entire international
situation is the pivot of the peace programme put
forward by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev in the Report
of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and
endorsed by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU
and the Soviet Government towards China is
inseparably linked with this general programme.
Their objective is to defend the basic interests of
the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist
principles, and the ideals of peace, democracy
and communism. The CPSU will never go against
its own principles, against the state interests of
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries,
or against the world revolutionary process and
the anti-imperialist struggle.</p>
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Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what
is more, the Maoists want to exploit
normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries
(which have not adopted the doctrine of Maoism
or approved the "cultural revolution'') in order
to destroy or undermine their system. So although
the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles
of peaceful coexistence, which include non--
interference in one another's affairs, in actual fact
they are trying to legalise their subversive
activity against the socialist countries and
interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of
waging a "principled struggle.''</p>
341
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the state of their relations with the Soviet Union.
Nor is Peking niggardly with its promises of
economic benefits and credits for separate socialist
countries provided they are ``neutral'' in the
major dispute between the international communist
movement and the CPC leaders, and provided
they loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. That
is how the Peking leaders are trying to expand
342
343
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class conception of the balance of forces in the
world, the Maoist politicians now contend that
the chief contradiction is the one between the
two ``superpowers'' (the USSR and the USA) on
the one hand, and the rest of the world on the
other. The slogan of combating "the hegemony
of the two superpowers" has become the banner
under which the Chinese leadership is trying once
again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small
and medium-sized" states, irrespective of their
socio-economic systems. This slogan is an
extension of the Maoists' anti-Marxist schemes about
the "intermediate zones" and the divisions of all
states into ``rich'' and "poor,'' and is obviously
devised to justify their anti-Soviet policy. Under
the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers,'' the
Maoists are discarding the idea of the
confrontation of the two systems. Instead they equate
socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to
attain hegemony.</p>
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towards the "movement of the non-aligned
countries" .and the endeavour to subject their interests
to China's hegemonic policy. It is these aims that
prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise on
the slogan of struggle against "the two
superpowers" and to attempt to separate the Third
World countries from their reliable support in
the anti-imperialist struggle-to separate them
from the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries.</p>
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Disarmament Conference, the Chinese
Government has proved itself to be an opponent of
detente.</p>
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347
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military and other resources of the world's most
populous country.</p>
349
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is a hotchpotch of ``ideas'' that can be adapted
to the most diverse needs. That is why "Mao
Tsetung's ideas" suit the ultra-Left "revolutionaries,''
the extremists and Trotskyites, and the Right
opportunists alike. Maoist ideas are utilised by
outright anti-communists and anti-Sovietists such as
Klaus Mehnert, Benjamin Schwartz and Edgar
Snow. Maoism makes active use of the various
anti-communist trends and of revisionism of all
hues to attack scientific socialism.</p>
350
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Wen-t'ien and others-have been destroyed; some
of these authors are being constantly discredited,
while others are intentionally buried in oblivion.
This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung
as the great "theorist, strategist and tactician"
of the Chinese revolution.
</p>
351
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nothing when Mao Tse-tung and his adherents dealt
with well-known Chinese writers, actors and
artists and with thousands of Communists and
revolutionaries. They say nothing when the Maoists
exile hundreds of thousands of people to
concentration camps called "labour reformatories" and
persecute intellectuals. Nor have they reacted to
Mao Tse-tung's policy of genocide in Tibet,
Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and South China.</p>
__PRINTERS_P_353_COMMENT__
23--193
353
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propaganda meant to mislead readers.</p>
354
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We are deeply convinced that China's genuine
national renaissance, and its socialist
development, will be best served not by struggle against
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries,
against the whole communist movement, but by
alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.''</p>
__PRINTERS_P_355_COMMENT__
23*
355
[356]
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__ALPHA_LVL2__
<b>The Foreign Policy
<br /> of the People's
<br /> Republic of China Since
<br /> the 9th Congress
<br /> of the Communist Party of China</b>
357
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they pose as proponents of a detente and
peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they are hastily
establishing diplomatic relations with other
countries.</p>
358
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<p> The concentration of power in the hands of a
small group of leaders, the reliance on special
army units, the suppression of the opposition, and
the liquidation of the democratic institutions in
the state and the Party offer favourable
conditions for arbitrariness in foreign policy, for a
collusion with imperialism on the basis of
deepening and strengthening the anti-Soviet line and
the tactical renunciation of the ultra-``Leftist''
slogans, as well as curtailing or, at least,
359
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
<p> The resumption of contacts with the United
States in the beginning of 1971 and the attempts
to enter into relations with it on the basis of
360
361
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Chinese leaders to cooperate with imperialist
governments in some world affairs, as a result
of which the PRC may be drawn into the orbit
of imperialism's international relations and
therefore China is in danger of becoming politically
and economically dependent upon the developed
capitalist countries.</p>
362
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immediate proximity to the Chinese borders.</p>
363
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<p> Under these conditions, the unilateral measures
taken by the US Government served their
purpose. They made it possible to conduct secret
negotiations with representatives of the Peking
regime with the result that the State Department
abrogated the need for special entry permits for
US citizens wishing to visit the People's Republic
364
365
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
of political manoeuvring directed against other
states. There are quite a few facts, however, which
warrant no such conclusion.</p>
366
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socialism and to gain control over the vast zone of
the "Third World" in the face of the growing
tendency towards complete national and social
emancipation; on the other hand, the Peking regime
is making no less overt the attempt to secure the
position of the "world's third superpower" and
to use it for the purpose of attaining its territorial
claims and hegemonistic designs.</p>
367
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
"two superpowers.''</p>
368
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__PRINTERS_P_369_COMMENT__
24--193
369
370
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
Chinese leaders unhesitatingly declared that they
"had lost their confidence in the Palestine
guerrillas and do not intend to support them in the
future.'' All this hardly agrees with the
statement made by Chou En-lai in September 1971, to
the effect that "China does not sell her principles
and does not betray her comrades-in-arms.''~^^1^^</p>
_-_-_
__PRINTERS_P_371_COMMENT__
24*
371
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economic and technical cooperation with the Arab
Republic of Egypt, the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Ceylon,
and Mauritania. By the beginning of 1971, the
countries of socialist orientation accounted for
about 60 per cent of the total Chinese aid to the
Third World and for most of the enterprises
actually built.</p>
372
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discontinued its support of the opposition
organisations in Botswana (the Botswana People's
Party), Swaziland (the Swaziland Progressive
Party), and Lesotho (the Lesotho Congress Party).</p>
373
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374
375
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
NATO aggressive bloc.</p>
376
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leadership attempts to hinder a detente in Europe
and to retain possibilities for bringing pressure to
bear on the USSR from the West. The Chinese
leaders regard a detente in Europe as dangerous
to their strategic plans.</p>
377
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ruling Liberal-Democratic Party have become
very active. Despite the fact that the Sato
Government has not responded <em>to</em> Peking's far-reaching
proposals made in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders
have not abandoned their hopes and efforts of
striking a bargain with the Japanese ruling
378
379
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The
Chinese leaders are blackmailing Japan's ruling
circles with the possibly anti-Japanese trend of
the newly-emerging Chinese-US rapprochement.
They demonstrate to the Japanese ruling circles
their blatant anti-Sovietism and solidarity on
the "Northern territories" issue, the solidarity on
which Japan may allegedly rely in bringing
pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.</p>
380
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occupation of Taiwan and South Korea and the split
of Vietnam; and that in Japan, the revival of
militarism has become a reality.</p>
381
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
subversive activity in the socialist community
and the world communist and democratic
movement; they are increasingly developing contacts
with imperialist states, particularly with the USA,
and are endeavouring to use the Third World
countries as an instrument of achieving their
great-power chauvinistic aims.</p>
382
[383]
__ALPHA_LVL0__
The End.
[END]
onAciibin
<b><em>no amAU&cKO</em></b>
<b>Ueiia 47 Kon</b>
[384]
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<•> Questions Requiring an Answer 242
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G. Arbatov p
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HTML The news of the forthcoming visit of the US President to Peking has lost its p
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President Nixon’s projected visit to Peking, as far as it goes, does not give grounds
for definite conclusions about the future of US-Chinese relations and their effect on
world developments. Nevertheless some ideas are already suggesting themselves.
To begin with, it would be interesting to take a look at the forces in the USA that p
are behind the tendency for a change in that country’s policy towards China, a
tendency which became apparent some time ago.
At first glance, this all seems quite straightforward. US policy vis-a-vis China began p
to change when the unfriendliness of China’s leaders towards the Soviet Union, and
their attempts to split the revolutionary and liberation movements, revealed
themselves. This, however, does not mean that all Americans are in favour of 243
improving US-Chinese relations solely for the reason that such a course is counter to
the interests of the other socialist countries.
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mentioned is largely responsible for the shifts in official US policy and in the views
of some of those US statesmen who, only a short while ago, were ready to call a
traitor anyone advocating recognition of the Chinese People’s Republic and an end
to US enmity towards China and the Chinese people. Today many of these statesmen
have turned into ardent advocates of detente with China. And this, naturally, gives
some food for thought. It also cannot be ignored that detente with China is being
welcomed in many countries by bitter adversaries of the Soviet Union, including
counter-revolutionary emigrants from socialist countries and Zionist militants.
At the same time, there are also people of a different kind in the USA who stand p
for better relations with China. Progressive people in America have long objected to
the cold-war policy of their government. Supporting efforts directed towards peace,
they have been demanding an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and
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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.3-Concerning.the.US-China.Top-Level.Meeting
Progressive Americans have been really alarmed and disappointed by what has taken p
place in China in recent years, notably the slide of the Chinese leadership into
nationalistic and chauvinistic positions in foreign policy. While expressing doubts as
to the motives behind the projected changes in their country’s official policy at the
present time, they nevertheless believe that changes are necessary. They consider that 244
the United States must change its attitude to China and recognise the country’s right
to be installed in the United Nations, and that it must put an end to its cold-war
policies directed against the USSR, China, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba,
etc. Moreover, progressive circles in the United States fully realise that the hard trials
which have fallen to the lot of the Chinese people, and for which the Peking
leadership must bear the main responsibility, are partly the result of the imperialist
policy of isolating China and putting obstacles in the way of her peaceful
construction.
Such are the two extreme poles of the rather motley collection of trends and p
attitudes which support the change in US policy towards China.
But it is not only a change in the attitudes which can be discerned at the poles of p
the USA’s political life that is concerned. A change is also to be seen in the
attitudes of the US public at large. This is due, to a certain extent, to the active
campaign for better relations with China which all progressive people have been
waging for many years. Furthermore, confronted with troubles of both an
international and a domestic nature, the US public is growing increasingly aware of
the need to put an end to the cold-war policy and achieve a detente. This fact
cannot be ignored by the US ruling circles.
But this is not the whole story. There is also the matter of the changes which are p
taking place in bourgeois public opinion which is generally shaped by official
propaganda. After its hatred campaign against China, which had gone on for many
years, this propaganda changed its tone and direction. It is impossible not to
associate this change with China’s switch-over to anti-Sovietism and with its policies 245
aimed at splitting the revolutionary liberation movement.
It might have been expected that bourgeois elements in the US would be shocked p
by the " cultural revolution" with its excesses, by Peking’s support of all leftist
adventuristic forces and extremist groupings in different countries, including the USA
itself, by its propaganda moves against peaceful coexistence, and, finally, by its
fierce verbal attacks on the United States. Yet nothing of the kind happened. The
bourgeois element judged China’s policy by her deeds and not by her words. And
her deeds convinced the practical American bourgeoisie that China, despite the
vehemence of her denunciations, posed no real danger to US policy, and that in any
event China could be dealt with, no matter what the Peking leaders might say or the
Chinese press write. Name-calling, after all, never hurts anyone.
Washington’s imperialist policy had long been running into tremendous difficulties p
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created by the heroic resistance put up by the Vietnamese people and the support
given them by the socialist countries and by progressive people throughout the world. 246
Even in the United States, this war was regarded as the most unpopular of all the
wars which that country had ever waged. The shock publication of the secret
Pentagon documents deepened the rift caused by the war. The mounting public
protest in the USA and the new peace initiatives of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam gave the Nixon Administration the alternative of either stopping the war or
exposing itself to the danger of political defeat. The news of the forthcoming Peking
summit was used to stave off a decision on ending the war in Vietnam. The US
ignored the Vietnamese peace proposals and there was talk in certain US circles
about the possibility of reaching agreement on this issue behind the backs of the
Vietnamese people.
But as far as the United States is concerned, an analysis of the attitudes prevailing p
in that country leads one to the conclusion that the recent Washington-Peking 247
contacts and Nixon’s projected trip to China enjoy wide approval, albeit for different,
often mutually exclusive, reasons.
Hopes for much support were evidently no small factor in prompting the decision on
the Peking summit. On the eve of the presidential elections, the US Government is
concentrating on anything which may help the ruling Republican Party to defeat its
political rivals.
II
An understanding of the different motives that prompt the various political groups p
and social strata in the USA to support the idea of improving relations with China is
important, not only to explain the reasons for the recent developments, but also to
forecast the possible consequences of those developments. With the emphasis in US-
Chinese relations being shifted to the sphere of political decisions, the different
motives, initially obscure though they were, are bound to become increasingly clear.
This can already be sensed in press comments and in speeches by US political and p
public leaders. And it is becoming increasingly clear that many Americans feel some
anxiety about the possible long-term results of the political move made by the US
Administration.
Some of these comments assert that, by deciding on Nixon’s visit to Peking, the US p
Administration is evading outstanding political issues such as the necessity to put an
end to the war in Vietnam or the need for changes in the existing practice of
adopting political decisions by which the President could plunge the country into war
without the knowledge of the public or even the Congress. Others are concerned 248
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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.3-Concerning.the.US-China.Top-Level.Meeting
about the effect the trip may have on Soviet-American relations and the prospects
for reducing the arms race and achieving a detente. And many among the US ruling
circles are beginning to feel uneasy about the possible impact of the Peking
rendezvous on the USA’s relations with its West European allies, with Japan and
other countries. In fact, the news of the planned visit was received by many of them
with unconcealed alarm, to say nothing of the confusion it caused in the camp of the
US puppets in Taiwan, Seoul and Saigon.
These and other problems are making themselves felt with increasing sharpness in p
the discussion, now under way in the USA, on President Nixon’s projected visit to
Peking. Even those who unreservedly approve of this step fully realise that a meeting
as such, even a summit one, cannot automatically solve the problems facing the
country. Moreover, some US leaders fear possible disillusionment in the very near
future which, after the great expectations that have been raised, may have the effect
of a political boomerang. What will be the outcome of Nixon’s visit? What will be
its overall effect on the presidential elections to be held in the fall of 1972? How
well has the President "figured it out"? These are the questions that some of the
leaders of the ruling party are asking themselves.
Many questions connected with the President’s projected visit to Peking, notably p
those pertaining to the future of US-Chinese relations and US policy in general,
remain basically unanswered. Neither Washington nor Peking is in a great hurry to
answer them, their obvious desire being to build up an atmosphere of secrecy around
many things concerning their relations. According to the US press, the American
public is particularly anxious about the possible effect of the move undertaken by the
US Administration on US relations with the socialist countries, particularly with the
Soviet Union. This is understandable, if one takes into account the political,
economic and military prestige of the Soviet Union on the world scene– prestige
which it has gained as a result of its might and its peaceful constructive policy-and
if one takes into account the role of the Soviet Union in world developments. There
are many people in the United States who clearly see that much of what is important
for both countries and for the world at large depends on US-Soviet relations.
It is already evident that Americans are very divided on the subject. Some put p
forward proposals to combine efforts to normalise relations with China with equally
vigorous efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the overall
international situation. Others try to figure out how best to use every step towards
detente with China for stepping up pressure on the Soviet Union, for blackmailing it,
and for forcing concessions from it. Still others are advocating a long-term policy of
pitting the governments of "Red China" and “Red Russia" against one another, as the 250
reactionary New York Daily News put it.
As regards US official policy, it has so far confined itself to giving assurances that p
the Peking summit, and normalisation of US-Chinese relations, will not interfere in
any way with the interests of other countries.
The Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the US press itself gives a very p
ambiguous interpretation of such assurances. The Washington Post, for instance,
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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.3-Concerning.the.US-China.Top-Level.Meeting
writes that, despite all formal refutations issued by the US Government, officials in
the Nixon Administration privately express views to the effect that it is not in the
interests of the United States to dispel the Soviet Union’s suspicions about some
details of US-Chinese relations which may give reason for dissatisfaction or concern
in Moscow.
It is worth noting that US press comments on the recent hearings in the Senate p
commission for foreign affairs have a definite orientation. Among the commentators
one finds former officials of the State Department who were victimised in
McCarthy’s time for their advocacy of US-Chinese detente. Explaining their attitude
of those days, they emphasise that they understood detente as a means of alienating
China from the socialist camp. By taking advantage of Mao’s readiness to seek ways
for improving relations with Washington, which had been in evidence since the
forties, they hoped to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. By such
comments, the US press is openly persuading the reader of the benefits of detente
with China for stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.
This line reveals, to say the least, the extreme political shortsightedness of its p
initiators. A dialogue, as difficult as it is important, has long been going on between 251
the United States and the Soviet Union. Covering a wide range of serious problems,
it requires confidence more than anything else for successful completion. But what
can be less conducive to confidence than underhand diplomatic proceedings,
backstage intrigues and duplicity? But let us proceed to the question of how
Washington’s official assurances concerning its intentions should be treated.
For over twenty years now the Soviet Union has pressed for the international p
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People’s Republic. It can only be
regretted that the United States has taken so long to acknowledge realities and make
its first steps toward renunciation of its cold-war policy towards China. It is also to
be regretted that this step has been taken under the circumstances which cast doubts
upon the motives.
As to the question of what is actually behind these changes in the American policy, p
what will be the outcome of the struggle of various forces shaping this policy, the
answer will be found in the actions of Washington, and not in the words about its
intentions.
President Nixon has called his intended visit to Peking a "peace trip" and p
Washington wants to present it as a practical step in pursuance of the policy of
transition "from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiation" which it
proclaimed several years ago.
The sincerity of statements is tested only by practice. And this is true of the case in p
question, all the more so since the world public knows that the speeches and
assurances of US politicians have often been at variance with their deeds.
There are many problems in the tackling of which the United States could p 252
demonstrate whether its policies are motivated by a desire for peace, detente and
normalisation of the international situation, or by new imperialist designs which fit
into the traditional scheme of the positions– ofstrength policy. These are the problems
of Vietnam, the Middle East, European security, curtailment of the arms race, US
relations with the socialist countries, etc. If the steps toward improvement of
relations with China are accompanied by a change to a more constructive US attitude
to these and other questions, then we shall have good reason to take Washington’s
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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382: 3.3-Concerning.the.US-China.Top-Level.Meeting
protestations about its good will and peaceful intentions seriously. Such a change
would undoubtedly be viewed favourably in the Soviet Union. A sincere policy
aimed at lessening tension has always met with understanding and enjoyed support in
the Soviet Union. And it is from this position that we must appraise the intentions of
Peking.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at effecting a change in the course p
of world affairs, at implementing measures intended to normalise the situation, and at
consolidating peace and security throughout the world. This is the sum and substance
of the foreign policy course charted by the 24th CPSU Congress-its proclaimed
peace programme. As was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress, the Soviet Union is in
favour of improving relations with China and the USA, developing relations with
other countries, and promoting bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed
at consolidating peace and the security of nations.
Among the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union there are some which require p
the consideration of all the major powers, including China. In this context, China’s 253
participation in the discussion and solution of problems such as a curtailment of the
arms race, the complete banning of all weapons of mass destruction and the
replacement of exclusive military blocs by continental systems of collective security,
is very important.
Such a development would be to the benefit of all nations, including the USSR, p
China and the USA, and Soviet policy supports it.
At the present time, however, there are many reasons to expect a different
development of events, as US policy remains unchanged, except in relation to China,
and presents the main obstacle to eliminating sharp world conflicts and normalising
the world situation. This being so, Washington’s steps toward detente with China can
have only one meaning. Definite conclusions suggest themselves accordingly. But the
Soviet Union and world socialism are strong enough to meet any possible tide of
events.
***
The answer to the major questions arising in connection with the US President’s p
visit to Peking and changes in US-Chinese relations will be provided, not by the
words or diplomatic manoeuvres of the states in question, but by their actions in the
coming months.
The Soviet Union and other countries will be keeping a watchful eye on these p
actions and on developments in general, for the problems involved are of great
importance for the Soviet Union, for world socialism, for the entire world situation
and for the cause of world peace.
***
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<•> The Preaching and Practice 254
TOC
Card I. Alexandrov p
At the same time, the members of the anti– imperialist front of struggle cannot but
be alarmed by the anti-Leninist, great-power chauvinistic course of the present
leadership of China directed towards undermining the unity of revolutionary, anti-
imperialist forces and inflicting serious damage on their common cause.
I
More than ten years have passed since the Chinese leadership, for the first time, p
openly proclaimed a special ideological-political platform on the main issues of our
time, the development of world socialism, and of the communist and workers’
movement.
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In the field of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage decided to put the p 256
economic basis, the foundations of socialism that were laid in the country during the
first decade after the victory of the revolution, at the service of their aims. Having
discarded the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC aimed at the systematic
building of socialism and ensuring the people’s well-being, Mao Tse-tung and his
group plunged China into the voluntarist adventure of the "big leap,” of building the
"people’s communes,” proclaiming their intention to effect a transition to communism
in 3-5 years, and declaring that "three years of hard work would bring ten thousand
years of happiness.” Apart from other things, the course of the "big leap" pursued
the ambitious aim of assuming a vanguard position among the socialist countries.
This appealed to the Maoists’ hegemonistic aspirations.
In order to protect themselves from the discontent of the popular masses, the Mao p
group blamed the Party and state cadres, who had allegedly "poorly followed Mao’s
instructions,” for the failure of the "big leap.”
Then followed a sharp zigzag in the tactics of the Chinese leadership, when it stated p
that it was impossible to build socialism in China in the lifetime of the present
generation, that this would take many decades if not centuries. It proclaimed poverty 257
to be the “basis” of revolutionism, and the desire to improve the life of the people-"
revisionism,” "bourgeois economism.” They galvanised the old Trotskyite anti-
Leninist thesis of the “ impossibility” of successfully building socialism before the
triumph of the world revolution.
In the sphere of foreign policy the Maoists took the line of sharpening international p
tension, pushing other countries and peoples towards armed conflicts. They rejected
any proposals aimed at a relaxation of international tension. Peking met with hostility
the treaties on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water, and on the non-proliferation of such weapons, on banning the
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor, rejected the idea put
forward by the Soviet Union of creating a system of collective security in Asia and
opposed many other constructive proposals of the socialist countries.
This course was covered up by noisy “Leftist” slogans about the need to p
immediately destroy imperialism. Calls for a "people’s war" in all countries, on all
continents, were issued. The thesis "the world can be changed only with the rifle"
was proclaimed as a universal truth.
No matter what ultra-revolutionary phraseology was used to cover up this course, its p
essence remained unchanged: the striving for hegemony in a war-devastated world. In
this connection even a nuclear-missile war in which, as estimated by Mao Tse-tung,
half of mankind might perish, was declared a sort of boon. Speaking with the
American journalist Strong in 1965, Mao called on the peoples of the world not to
fear nuclear war because "China will survive it.” On the ruins left by this war the 258
Maoists intended to build "a civilisation a thousand times more wonderful,” naturally,
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according to their own recipes. Mao Tse-tung spoke in detail about this in his
conversation with Jawaharlal Nehru and in his speech at the 1957 Moscow
Conference. These ideas were developed in a number of Chinese articles printed in
April 1960 in connection with the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth and also in a
later period, for instance, in an article in the May 14, 1969 issue of the Chiehfang
jihpao.
But the Chinese leadership was not and is not at all eager to rush into battle against p
imperialism. It would like to use for the attainment of its plans the military and
economic might of the socialist countries, the strength of the international working
class, the possibilities of the national-liberation movement, trying to turn them into a
tool of their great-power hegemonism. Although the Maoists declare that they are
"prepared for the greatest national sacrifices" their deeds show differently. They
prefer the position of "sitting on the mountain and observing the tigers fight.”
Together with the other fraternal Parties the CPSU consistently upheld the principles p
of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, pressing for a strengthening of 259
the position and the unity of world socialism, the cohesion of the world communist
movement and the national– liberation, democratic and peace-loving forces in the
struggle against imperialism, reaction and war. So the CPC leaders took the line of
splitting the communist movement, of creating in other countries Maoist groups and
trends opposing the fraternal Parties, and of eroding the socialist community.
The Chinese leaders spearheaded their struggle against our Motherland, against our p
Party and its consistent Leninist course.
The Maoists demanded of Soviet Communists that they renounce the decisions of p
the 20th Congress and the CPSU Programme, started intensive anti-Soviet
propaganda and from the middle of 1960 began systematically to organise
provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, developing them into armed clashes in the
spring and summer of 1969. In an atmosphere of anti-Soviet psychosis and
militaristic frenzy that was simultaneously generated in China, the course hostile to
the Soviet Union was proclaimed an official doctrine at the 9th CPC Congress.
Mao and his entourage are steadily scaling down economic and other ties with the p
USSR and other socialist countries, while simultaneously expanding in every way the
ties with leading imperialist powers, first of all with the United States.
Suffice it to say that the share of socialist countries in the PRC’s foreign trade p
dropped to 25 per cent in 1966, as against 68 per cent in 1959. The volume of
Soviet-Chinese trade in 1969 was about one sixth of that in 1966.
It is indicative that Peking develops its relations with imperialist countries on the p 260
basis of undisguised anti-Sovietism, to the detriment of the interests of world
socialism and the revolutionary, national-liberation movement.
But all the efforts of the Chinese leadership to split the international communist p
movement, to create in Peking a centre opposed to it, to gain ground in the
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The Maoist subversive groups and factions in various countries, based actually on p
an anti– communist, anti-Soviet platform, began to fall apart. In pursuing their plans
to assume leadership of the Third World on the basis of their extremist platform, the
Chinese leaders encountered the resistance of peace-loving, developing states,
especially neighbouring ones against which they made territorial and other claims.
’ p
Precisely these reasons prompted Mao and his grouping to carry out what actually p
amounted to a political coup in the country, implemented in the form of a "cultural 261
revolution" and which, as admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves, was a
"struggle for power.” A military-bureaucratic system began to be implanted in the
country.
Party, trade union, and youth organisations and unions of creative workers were p
demolished in the course of the "cultural revolution" and the constitutional bodies of
people’s power were paralysed. Large masses of Communists, workers, peasants and
especially intellectuals were subjected to repressions. The ideal of “democracy” as
proclaimed in China was to turn the entire people into "loyal soldiers" and "obedient
buffaloes of the great helmsman.”
The blow was dealt first of all at those Communists who saw the perniciousness of p
the voluntaristic ideas of the "big leap" and the anti-popular foreign political course
for the cause of socialism in China, at those who in the period of the escalation of
the American aggression in Vietnam proposed to settle differences with the CPSU, to
achieve unity of action of the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism’s
aggressive intrigues.
At the same time the organisers of the "cultural revolution" continued the campaign p
of hatred and slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, trying to
ascribe to them plans of creating a “circle” around China in collusion with
imperialism. Under this pretext the Maoists started the militarisation of the country,
calling upon it "to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war.” It is monstrous, though it
is a fact, that the Maoists began to call for a "cultural revolution" in other socialist
countries, alleging that without such a revolution "capitalism will be restored.”
Peking went so far as to call for an "assertion of the banner of Chairman Mao’s 262
ideas over the entire globe.”
The 9th CPC Congress, held in 1969, was called upon to legalise the military- p
bureaucratic system in China. Mao Tse-tung and his group actually started to build
the Communist Party anew, throwing aside the political, ideological and
organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Mao’s ideas were presented at
the congress as "the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch.” Declaring a "ruthless
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struggle" against "modern revisionism,” by which Peking has in view the leadership
of most socialist countries and Communist Parties, the 9th CPC Congress thus
signified a new stage in the evolution of the ideological and political theses of
Maoism as an anti-Leninist, petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic ideology.
But the Maoists did not derive the results they wanted either from the "cultural p
revolution" or from the "line of the 9th Congress of the CPC.” On the contrary, in
the period from 1966 to 1969 they aggravated the state of crisis and the country’s
even greater international isolation. Although by methods of violence, terror and
demagogy the Chinese leadership succeeded in suppressing open resistance to its
course and in imposing this course on the country, it could not help seeing that it
would not be able to overcome by these means either the domestic crisis or the
international isolation.
The Chinese leaders could not but realise the full extent of their defeat and the
collapse of their plans when the 1969 International Conference of Communist and
Workers’ Parties in Moscow reaffirmed the unshakable loyalty of the world army of
Communists to the principles of Marxism– Leninism and proletarian internationalism, 263
and demonstrated the growing unity of the communist ranks on this principled basis.
The Conference strengthened the position of the international communist, workers’
movement as the most influential political movement of our time, the vanguard of
anti– imperialist forces in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of peace, national
liberation and socialism. The Conference highly assessed the role of the Soviet Union
and the CPSU in the liberation struggle and the USSR’s peaceful foreign policy.
II
The time came when the Chinese leaders had to mothball some ultra-“Left” slogans p
and even to remove from the front of the stage the persons who had compromised
themselves most by excessive zeal in promoting the "Mao line" during the "cultural
revolution.” The Maoists are making a new zigzag in their policy. And once again
Mao and his group are trying-for the umpteenth time -to blame the barbaric nature
of the "cultural revolution" with its mass repressions and excesses on those whom
they themselves had set against the CPC, and used to clear the way to the 264
establishment of their domination. A “respectable” appearance is being hastily given
to Peking’s policy which is now being pursued by more ingenious methods.
Facts show, however, that if any changes have been made in Peking’s tactics they p
amount only to a giving up of the attempts to accelerate implementation of the old
line, and not renunciation of its aims, to the use of subtler methods of manoeuvering
intended to deceive the Chinese people and also to confuse the international
revolutionary liberation forces.
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In reviewing their foreign policy tactics, the Peking leaders evidently arrived at the p
conclusion that the hungweipings damage first of all China’s prestige not only in the
socialist and developing countries, but also in the West. Outwardly the anti-Soviet
campaign carried on in official statements by Chinese leaders was somewhat altered.
In 1969 the Chinese leaders agreed to a meeting of heads of the governments of the
USSR and the PRC proposed by the Soviet side and also to the holding of Soviet-
Chinese talks on border and other questions of intergovernmental relations.
Striving for a lessening of international tension, for consolidation of peace and the p
security of nations, people of goodwill would like to see a manifestation of elements
of realism in China’s foreign policy behind the changes in the method of action of
the Chinese leadership, elements that would serve the aims of strengthening the anti–
imperialist front and the cause of peace and friendship among the peoples. The
Soviet people, too, sincerely want this.
The question that naturally arises is: what, in deed, is the essence of the changes in p
the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership at the present stage, and in what
measure do they accord with the aspirations of the peoples, including the people of
China? In fact, this is a question of the correlation and interconnection of the
Chinese leadership’s strategy and tactics in the present conditions. Only facts, their
thorough and objective analysis can produce the answer.
The facts are such that neither in its statements nor in its practical deeds, has the p 266
Chinese leadership yet renounced a single provision of its special, incompatible with
Leninism, ideological-political platform on the main questions of international life
and the world communist movement. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China held in the autumn of 1970 reaffirmed the
"militant tasks of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China" and the
advancement to the fore of "intensification of preparations for war.” The Chinese
leadership opposes collective security in Europe and Asia, and the USSR’s and
Poland’s treaties with the FRG. Peking spares no effort to transfer the situation of
military psychosis to Albania in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the
Balkans by this or other methods. Under cover of bombastic declarations, the
Chinese leadership as before opposes concrete steps directed at the attainment of
agreements on questions of disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The
Government of the People’s Republic of China turned down the Soviet proposal to
convene a conference of five nuclear powers, stating that "China’s nuclear weapons
are still in the testing stage...”
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The Chinese leaders continue to declare that they will conduct an "implacable p
struggle" against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist
Parties. At the close of 1970, speaking with his old acquaintance, US journalist E.
Snow, Mao Tse-tung said that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the
CPC are "irreconcilable.”
The Chinese leaders continue to conduct subversive activities against the world p
socialist community, they oppose the collective international organisations of socialist
countries, the Warsaw Treaty and the CMEA. In its time Peking deemed it possible
to express its solidarity with the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia and their
imperialist patrons and then to bemoan the failure of their counter-revolutionary plot.
Vicious attacks against socialist Poland sounded from Peking in unison with the anti-
Communists.
The policy of the Chinese leadership toward socialist countries clearly shows a p
striving, which coincides with the machinations of imperialist reaction, to set the
socialist states at loggerheads, to set one against the other and to prevent the
implementation of the joint political line of fraternal countries in the international
arena.
Whereas previously Peking waged a broad propaganda offensive against all socialist p
countries, at present it is trying to "narrow the field" of struggle, and applies a 268
“differentiated” approach to socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them into
the orbit of its policy. In so doing it makes alluring gestures and promises. For the
time being Peking does not ask much from those it flirts with. The Chinese leaders
would be pleased with any step which, in their opinion, might cause a crack, if only
a small one, in relations between socialist countries.
III
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The Peking leaders need "the theory of two superpowers" for the same purpose as p
they did their old "theory of struggle of the world village against the world town.”
In both of these theories, nationalistic, great-power motives take the place of a class
approach. Having failed in their attempts to divide the world into the economically
developed “town” and the “village” fighting for its liberation or the developing
"village,” the Peking leaders decided to narrow "the front of attack" and direct it,
first of all, against the Soviet Union. Now they urge all countries-capitalist,
developing, and socialist-to fight against the "two superpowers.” Meanwhile, the
Chinese press emphasises that China will never be a “superpower” and during
personal contacts between Chinese leaders and representatives of different countries it
is stressed that China is the best defender of countries fighting against the "two
superpowers.”
The term “superpower” was borrowed by the Chinese leaders from the imperialist p
ideologists of the USA. The latter invented it in order to defend capitalist principles,
to mislead the American people, in the first place, and the world public and
somehow to camouflage the imperialist, aggressive nature of US foreign policy.
Characteristically, the expression "one or two superpowers" has been heard in Peking
during the efforts to establish Sino-American contacts. Apparently it was decided in 270
expectation of Nixon’s visit to tone down the propaganda hullabaloo: "It is not you
we have in mind.”
The putting forward of the patently false thesis of "two superpowers,” allegedly p
opposed to all the other states, is in fact an act of class betrayal. Peking is trying
thus to play down the confrontation between the two world systems-socialism and
capitalism-trying to evade (and it does evade in practice) real struggle against
imperialism. It even goes so far as to advise West European states and monopolies
on how they should pool their efforts in order best to oppose the "one or two
superpowers.” Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have legalised their own political
flirting with US ruling circles.
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the world, the above article upholds China’s tactics of forming blocs with any,
including imperialist, forces for achieving Peking’s foreign policy aims. It would not
be amiss to recall that the thesis of the “re-grouping” of forces had been repeatedly
applied by Mao Tse-tung before for political intrigues.
The article openly justifies the tactics of political double-dealing, under the name of p
"revolutionary dual tactics.” One of the latest Peking’s " revolutionary dual tactics" in
regard to the Soviet Union, was the recent interview by the Prime Minister of the
PRC Chou En-lai to The New York Times observer Reston. Chou En-lai drew
attention to the anti-Soviet essence of Peking’s platform and of its steps aimed at a
rapprochement with Washington. He palmed off to Reston, who was glad to take up
the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China. In another interview, with
a correspondent of a Yugoslav newspaper, Chou En-lai discoursed at length about
"one or two superpowers,” and again spoke of the mythical threat to China from the
North, from the USSR, using the opportunity to stress some special, “liberating”
mission of China in Asia.
As to the threat to China "from the North,” it is well known that the Soviet Union p
has never presented and does not do so now any territorial claims to China and
believes that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have no cause for conflicts.
The CPSU and the working people of the Soviet Union, like the fraternal Parties p
and the working people of the other socialist states, regarded and still regard the 272
development of relations of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people, with
the Chinese Communists, as one of the important conditions for strengthening the
position of world socialism, and consolidating the unity of the international
communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU and the p
Soviet state in regard to China, a line that has again been authoritatively confirmed
in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the
Party and in the Resolution of the Congress, in the Decisions of the Plenary
Meetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the speeches of the General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.
Our Party and people unanimously approve the policy of the Central Committee of p
the CPSU and the Soviet Government of maintaining restraint and not yielding to
provocations, and of doing everything the USSR can to achieve the normalisation of
relations with the PRC and the restoration and development of mutual friendship and
cooperation of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples on the basis of the principles of
MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism.
The constructive line of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in relation to the p
PRC meets with the understanding and approval of the fraternal socialist countries,
of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, and of all the progressive, peaceloving
forces. It evokes the sympathy of all who cherish the true national interests of China,
unbreakably bound with the interests of world socialism, of friendship of the PRC 273
with the Soviet Union.
This line is an inalienable part of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of p
the allembracing programme of activities of our Party and the Soviet state in the
international arena-a programme of struggle for the further consolidation and
development of the forces of socialism, for a relaxation of international tension and
for strengthening peace, for rallying the ranks of the world communist and working-
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class movement, for the consolidation of all the forces coming out against
imperialism and colonialism, reaction and aggression. The peace programme set forth
by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, answering the vital interests of the peoples of
the entire planet, has already become a most important factor of contemporary
international life.
People in the Soviet Union regard with due appreciation the development of normal p
relations between states, and on this plane, the normalisation of relations between the
PRC and the USA is no exception. But the Soviet people cannot help giving
attention to the fact that in its overtures to Washington, the Chinese leadership again
frankly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet Union.
In so doing, it certainly realises that the ruling imperialist circles, first of all in the p
USA, draw appropriate conclusions from this kind of “ respectable” manoeuvres of
the Chinese leaders, of their anti-Soviet direction. And it is no accident, apparently,
that allusions to Peking’s present “obligingness” and the possibility of imperialism
cashing in on it, slip into the pages of the bourgeois American press.
Of course, while waging a resolute ideologicalpolitical struggle against the great- p 274
power chauvinistic theses of Peking in its foreign policy course, we are doing
everything to protect the interests of the Soviet people, who are building
communism, the interests of our friends and allies, against any encroachments.
An examination of the Maoist slogans and the Maoist practice both at home and in p
the international arena gives good reason to pose such a question.
The ideological-political essence of the Maoist platform, its strategic aims, despite p
all the tactical manoeuvres of the Chinese leadership, remain unchanged. The
conceptions of the Chinese leadership and its actions have been and are based on the
anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist ideology of Maoism.
Experience shows that if certain progress has been made in some spheres of the p
Chinese economy in recent years, this was not due to but despite Maoist concepts.
None of the concepts of Maoism, none of Mao’s ideas has stood the practical test of
socialist construction in China and development of international life. Maoism lacks
any constructive content. The more dangerous therefore is the striving of the Peking
leaders for hegemony in the world communist movement, and for leadership in the
Third World. The aim and practice of Maoism are causing tremendous damage to the
international communist and workingclass movement, to the national liberation and
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anti-imperialist struggle. The recipes of the Maoists are doing irreparable harm to
those who give them credence (we all remember the tragic fate of the Communist
Party of Indonesia and of some other Communist Parties whose leadership listened to
advice from Peking).
The Communists are confronted with the task of enhancing in every way their p
political vigilance in the face of the hostile ideology and subversive actions of
Maoism, with the task of further thoroughly exposing the real essence of Maoist
ideology and policy. The Communists are fighting resolutely and on a principled
basis against the theory and practice of Maoism, against Maoists’ machinations in the
world communist movement, in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front. They are
waging a consistent ideological and political struggle against the anti-socialist, anti- 276
Leninist platform of Maoism so that the Chinese people can again take the path of
alliance and fraternal cooperation with socialist countries, with all revolutionary,
progressive forces of the time, forces fighting tor peace, national independence,
democracy and socialism.
***
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CONCERNING THE US-CHINA Practice
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<•> Peking Foreign Policy 277
TOC
Card L. Kirichenko p
Observers of the world scene never stop wondering at the zigzags of Chinese p
Text
foreign policy. One might almost think Peking had been following entirely different
HTML
policies at different times.
PS
PDF
But although there have been several distinct periods in China’s foreign policy of p
the past twenty years, the changes might be likened to the insulation of electric wire,
T*
19*
which may be of different colours though the wire is the same. The methods and
tactics have changed, but the essential policy, the objectives have not.
###
Though they protested time and again in former days that they wanted friendly, p
equal relations with other nations, though they vowed and swore fidelity to
proletarian internationalism, Mao Tsetung and his entourage have in fact always
proceeded from the Sinocentrist doctrines cultivated by the Chinese emperors. They
have always thought in terms of China as a superpower able to impose its will upon
others and ordain the pattern of international relations; in all periods their actions
have been geared to the object of restoring the "Celestial Empire" and making China
the “central” power of the world.
The first period covered the years 1949–58. The Chinese People’s Republic was p
weak, it strove to make maximum use of other coutries’ experience and support to
consolidate its position and build up its economy. Close cooperation was practised
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But even at this period the 278
Chinese leaders made plans to swallow up the Mongolian People’s Republic and
complained about China’s having “lost” large areas of Southeast Asia which the
armies of the Chinese emperors had reached once upon a time. At the Asia and
Oceania trade union conference at the end of 1949 the Chinese representatives
declared that all peoples fighting for national liberation must follow "the path of Mao
Tse-tung.” In 1950–51 the Maoists tried to impose their own programme on the
Communist Parties of India and Indonesia: in these predominantly peasant countries
the revolution had, they claimed, to follow the same lines as in China. Later on they
put out the famous formula about "the wind from the East beating the wind from the
West,” which was certainly rather equivocal.
After China successfully completed the first five-year plan, laying the foundations of p
an industrial structure, they decided they could proceed differently. At home the
Chinese leaders launched the "big leap forward" and started setting up the
communes; the purpose was to make a big spurt in building Chinese economic and
military power, through maximum restriction of the people’s living standards and all-
out mobilization of effort. Abroad, they tried to get the socialist community under
their thumb and use it for their chauvinist ends.
The attempt to gain control of the socialist community did not succeed; the p
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On June 14, 1963, the leaders of the Communist Party of China published a p
document entitled “Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International 279
Communist Movement" (the "25 points”). In it they denied the decisive influence of
the socialist system on the course of world development, belittled the struggle of the
working class in the capitalist countries, contraposed the national-liberation
movement to the socialist world system and the working-class movement, advocated
adventurism in foreign policy and continuance of the cold war, preached sectarianism
and putschism in questions of revolution, and sought to justify factionalism in the
communist movement. Anyone who refused to accept the Maoist "general line" was
labelled a "revisionist,” a "traitor to Marxism.”
Mao also injected a new meaning into his "intermediate zones" conception. The way p
it now came out was that the two poles in the worldwide struggle were China, on
the one hand, and US imperialism and the Soviet Union, on the other, and that
between these poles lay all the other states-socialist, developing, and imperialist. The
countries of this intermediate zone were treated as reserves and potential allies not
only against US imperialism but against the Soviet Union. In Lin Piao’s 1965 article
"Hail the Victory of the People’s War!" was formulated the "people’s war" strategy,
the gist of which was that Asia, Africa and Latin America were the "world village,”
that it was here the revolution would develop, and do so on the Chinese model and
hence under China’s leadership, and that the world-wide victory of the socialist
revolution would come through the revolutionary "world village" closing in on the
"world city"-Western Europe and North America.
On the practical level, the Chinese leaders attempted at this time to break up the p 280
socialist community and then unite what they could around Peking. In the Third
World they tried to persuade the Asian, African and Latin American peoples that
China was the staunchest and most consistent fighter against imperialism -and
colonialism, sought to isolate the national liberation movement from the socialist
countries and the world communist movement, and impelled the freedom– fighters
towards adventurist action. They set their face against any move to lessen
international tension, campaigned for armament-building, and tried to provoke
international conflict wherever possible. In doing so they declared that war would
speed up the world revolutionary process, that "power grows out of the barrel of a
gun.” In talking like this, Mao was not original. He was echoing almost word for
word the conception of the ancient philosopher Shang Yang (4th century B. C.), who
declared that "if a country is poor but bends its efforts to war... it will certainly
become powerful. If a country is rich but fights no wars... it is certainly enfeebled.”
To be sure, Mao somewhat modified that conception: he preferred the fighting to be
done by others, and pinned his chief hopes on a nuclear clash between the USSR
and the USA.
By 1966 it was apparent that Peking had lost out. The socialist countries, with just p
one exception, had declined to support its policy. The Third World nations had
perceived that it was an adventurist and irresponsible policy, and only two or three
of them had remained on friendly terms with China. As may be seen from the secret
Pentagon papers now published in the United States, the US Government had taken 281
advantage of Peking’s divisive line to launch its aggressive war in Indochina. The
Chinese leadership and Mao personally were responsible for having exposed to attack
the Communist Party and other progressive forces of Indonesia.
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A bitter struggle developed within the Chinese leadership as a result. Some members p
of it criticised Mao’s adventurist line, proposed more realistic policies, objected to
the personality cult, recommended ending Mao’s incompetent interference in the
economy.
Leaning on the army and using the youth whom they made their dupes, Mao and p
his group smashed their opponents. A military-bureaucratic regime was instituted in
the country.
During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists attempted to provoke "people’s wars" in p
other countries, and to start a hungweiping movement on a world scale. They
engaged in hostile actions against all socialist countries except Albania. They
interfered grossly in the affairs of India and Burma, Nepal and Ceylon, Laos and
Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia and various African nations.
In the heat of conflict the Maoists revealed their true intentions to an extent which p
they now seem to regret. They threatened to make short work of other peoples, laid
claim to territories belonging to neighbouring countries, declared that China must
lead the world, vowed to "plant the banner of Mao Tse-tung" in other countries’
capitals.
Starting with the latter half of 1969, as the "cultural revolution" was back-pedalled, p
the methods and tactics of Chinese foreign policy again began to change. Peking has
been trying to make its policy look respectable. Interference has been less crude, it
has been covered up carefully with smiling yuan diplomacy. But underneath all this
camouflage the long-term objectives remain the same.
Peking is wooing many Asian and African countries, endeavouring to make them p
bases of its activity. Exploiting the difficulties in Pakistan and the complications
between that country and India, it is trying to catch the Pakistani leaders in its net.
Chinese emissaries are hard at work in Africa, seen as a convenient field to apply
the Maoist conceptions and an area where it is relatively easy to create seats of
international conflict. The aid given some Asian and African nations is meant to
break their links with the socialist states, make them dependent on Peking and turn 283
them into instruments of its policy.
Peking is extending relations with the imperialist states; it is anxious to lay hands p
on their technological achievements and be able to influence their policy.
While posing as "staunch,” “firm” allies of the national liberation movement and p
accusing others of “collusion” with imperialism, the Chinese leaders forget all about
their duty to that movement as soon as they see a chance to make a deal with the
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imperialists that will serve their nationalistic ambitions. That is the light in which the
progressive forces see a number of recent moves by Peking.
The main theme in Chinese foreign policy at the present time is a clamour against p
"the monopoly of the two superpowers.” Ignoring the class approach and attempting
to equate the imperialist United States and the socialist Soviet Union, the masters of
the "Celestial Empire" have produced the idea of a united front of the "small and
medium countries.” This new doctrine is of much the same order as the "intermediate
zones" conception. Its chief purpose is to prove that it is for China to be leader of
the "small and medium countries.” In an interview given a French journalist last
September, the Peking leaders declared that China was "the only country in the
world capable of ending the world supremacy of the two superpowers.” And in
statements repeated recently, China’s Premier has offered China as protector to the
“small” and “weak” countries.
Referring to the Chinese Premier’s remarks about "the hegemony of the two p
superpowers,” General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA Gus Hall 284
observes (Daily World, June 12): "Is the role of the Soviet Union and US
imperialism the same in the Mid-East, in Africa, in Latin America? They are at the
opposite dialectical poles. One is the main force of oppression and exploitation, the
other the main outside force of support to the forces of liberation and freedom. To
speak about them in general terms as ’ superpowers’ is a service to US
imperialism.”
We see that whereas formerly Peking laid claim to leadership of the revolutionary p
forces of the contemporary world, now it is calling for a bloc that would alike
embrace socialist countries, developing nations and imperialist powers. In so doing it
betrays its secret aim-to become, on the pretence of opposing "the two superpowers,”
the greatest superpower of all. Isn’t it like the fairytale Wolf trying to imitate Mother
Goat’s voice so as to eat up the goat’s little ones?
However the Chinese leaders may disguise their true ambitions, their policy was and p
is a chauvinist, great-power policy fraught with danger to the peoples and to the
cause of peace. That will come home in time even to those who today have illusions
about it and even repeat the Maoist rubbish about a "monopoly of the two
superpowers.”
***
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
< >
<< The Preaching and Practice of the Concerning the Economic Relations >>
Chinese Leaders Between the Soviet Union and China
(1950--66)
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<•> Concerning the Economic Relations 285
Between the
TOC Soviet Union
Card and China (1950–66)
Being well aware of the fact that the main barrier to the accomplishment of their p
adventuristic, great-power ambitions is the Soviet Union and its Communist Party,
the Maoists have declared the Party of Lenin and the world’s first state of working
people to be their main enemy. Besides their continuous slandering of our country
the Maoists are attempting to whip up hatred for the Soviet Union which has always 286
stood as the symbol of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
As part of this campaign the Maoists are presenting Soviet-Chinese economic
relations in such a way as to belittle the importance of Soviet economic aid to
China, and are accusing the USSR of wanting to subjugate China to its economic
and political interests. In their efforts to keep the world national-liberation movement
apart from the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international communist
movement, with the aim of turning it into a tool of their great-power policy, the
Maoists are misrepresenting the nature of Soviet economic assistance to the Chinese
People’s Republic by describing China as a “victim” of Soviet foreign economic
policy, and are “warning” the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against
having any economic or other contacts with the USSR.
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to blot out the memory of the internationalist aid, unprecedented in scale and
effectiveness, which the Soviet Union rendered to China in its economic
development. Neither the Chinese people nor the rest of the world have forgotten it.
The economic ties between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, dealt p
with in this article, are an important aspect of Soviet-Chinese relations. A study of
these ties affords a good idea of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period
between 1950 and 1966. [287•1
Soviet assistance to China was not in the form of surplus goods it could find no use p 289
for. The Soviet Union shared with the People’s Republic of China what it often
needed itself. In this the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to help the Chinese
Communist Party and the Chinese people to turn China into an industrial socialist
state and an ally in the common struggle for the triumph of communism. The Soviet
Union was also guided by its desire to strengthen the socialist community as a
whole-this powerful factor of the world revolutionary process.
Helped by the Soviet Union, the Chinese people restored the war-ravaged economy p
over the short period between 1950 and 1959, and built more than 250 large
industrial enterprises, factories and various industrial projects, all of them complete
with the latest machinery and equipment. [289•1 Besides expanding and
modernising the old industries, such as the production of iron and steel, non– ferrous
metals, and power industry, China now had brand-new industries for the manufacture
of aircraft, cars, tractors, power and heavy machinery, instrument-making, electro-
technical and radio-technical industries, and some important branches of the chemical
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industry. The factories and plants built in the People’s Republic of China with Soviet
assistance, helped to raise the country’s annual output to the following: cast iron–8.7
million tons, steel–8.4 million tons, rolled metal–6.5 million tons, coal–17.2 million
tons, aluminium–38 thousand tons, ammonia–150 thousand tons, sulphuric acid-250 290
thousand tons, heavy machinery-60 thousand tons, mining equipment-20 thousand
tons, oil processing and chemical equipment-40 thousand tons, steam and hydraulic
turbines (capacity)-1.7 million kw., power generators (capaoity)-0.6 million kw.,
tractors (in conventional units)-42 thousand, lorries-30 thousand, metal-cutting
machines-3.7 thousand, and steam boilers for thermal power stations-total capacity of
7 thousand tons of steam an hour. At the power stations built and reconstructed with
Soviet assistance, turbo-generators with an aggregate capacity of 4 million kw. were
put into operation. [290•1 In 1960 the factories and plants built with Soviet
assistance turned out 30 per cent of the total production of cast iron in the country,
about 40 per cent of the steel, more than 50 per cent of the rolled metal, 80 per cent
of the lorries, more than 90 per cent of the tractors, 30 per cent of the synthetic
amonia, 25 per cent of power, 55 per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, about
20 per cent of the power generators, 25 per cent of the aluminium, over 10 per cent
of the heavy machinery, etc. [ 290•2
The 250 large industrial projects built with Soviet technical assistance are only a p
part of the sweeping fifteen-year programme of Soviet technical assistance to the
People’s Republic of China providing for the construction, reconstruction and
expansion of more than 400 large industrial enterprises, factories and individual 291
projects. The scale of this programme is evident from the fact that the USSR
undertook to help the People’s Republic of China to build 12 metal-smelting plants
and factories with a designed annual capacity of 28 million tons of cast iron, 30
million tons of steel and 25 million tons of rolled metal; three plants for the
production of aluminium with a total capacity of 738 thousand tons a year; factories
for the production of tin with a total capacity of 25 thousand tons a year; seven
plants for the manufacture of metallurgical, mining, oilrefining and chemical
equipment with a total capacity of 240 thousand tons of goods a year; seventeen
plants for the production of steam, gas and hydraulic turbines and generators for
them, with a total annual capacity of 11.2 million kw; 100 factories and plants
working for national defence. [291•1 This programme would have been
implemented had it not been for the Maoist group which began, in 1961, to scale
down the scientific and technical and other ties with the Soviet Union.
When work began in China on the restoration of its national economy .and on the p
implementation of the extensive programme for economic rehabilitation, it had very
few skilled engineers, technicians or scientists. That is why China found it extremely
difficult to build a socialist economy unaided, especially its industry. Because of this,
the Soviet Union, between 1950 and 1960, sent over ten thousand highly skilled
specialists to China, and organised the training of Chinese scientific and technical
personnel and workers at Soviet industrial establishments, at colleges, and at design 292
and research organisations. In the period between 1951 and 1962, more than eight
thousand Chinese citizens received their industrial and technical training in the Soviet
Union. In the same period more than 11 thousand Chinese students and postgraduates
studied at Soviet educational establishments. About one thousand scientific workers
from the Academy of Sciences of China underwent training at research institutes of
the USSR Academy of Science. In addition to this, over 1,500 Chinese engineers,
technicians and scientists visited the Soviet Union to study the scientific and
technological achievements and experience of this country.
The assistance the USSR rendered to China in the scientific and technical sphere p
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Besides economic, scientific and technical aid to China for the development of her p
national economy, the Soviet Union played an important role in building up China’s
modern defence industry. In addition to technical assistance in building factories and
plants for defence and equipping them with modern machinery, the Soviet Union
furnished China with a great deal in the way of blueprints and technological
specifications for the production of modern armaments and military equipment. China
also received large amounts of modern military materiel, armaments, and other
equipment for the People’s Liberation Army of China.
Because of the bad economic situation in the People’s Republic of China in the p
first few years of its existence (a backward economy crippled by war, and rather
poor export possibilities), and in view of its need for rapid economic rehabilitation
and development, as well as for increased defence capability, the Soviet Union made
sizeable economic and military credits available to China. These enabled China to
import from the USSR large amounts of goods, which were of vital importance for
the restoration and development of China’s economy, for the strengthening of her
national defence and for ensuring the vital needs of the Chinese people. Between
1949 and 1955 the Soviet exports to China exceeded its imports from it. Over a
period of six years this excess of export over import ran into 947.3 million roubles.
The active balance in Soviet-Chinese trade meant therefore that the Soviet Union p
allocated from its national income and extended to China long-term credits for the 295
urgent economic needs of the People’s Republic of China. As the People’s Republic
of China used up the Soviet credits in the restoration and development of its national
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economy, its resources increased and export possibilities grew accordingly. Beginning
in 1956, when the national economy of China had been completely restored and
developed, and when many of its branches met the targets of the first five-year plan
ahead of schedule, it began to pay off its debts to the Soviet Union. It was from
1956 on that China’s exports to the USSR exceeded her imports from this country.
Over nine years (1956–64) the People’s Republic of China overcame the imbalance
in its trade with the Soviet Union by additional deliveries of commodities and by
making some payments in foreign currency.
The structure and character of Soviet export to China were determined primarily by p
our country’s desire to render the greatest possible assistance to a fraternal country in
the restoration of its national economy, in the satisfaction of the vital needs of the
Chinese people, in the creation of a firm basis for socialist industrialisation and for
the development of the People’s Republic of China on socialist lines. During the
restoration period in China, the main Soviet export items to China were machines
and equipment, ferrous metals, oil products, etc. Between 1950 and 1952, the Soviet
Union delivered to China 276.93 million roubles worth of machinery and equipment,
or 21.6 per cent of the total cost of Soviet exports to China in that period.
Moreover, while in the first several years of the restoration period the Soviet Union
delivered mostly separate types of machinery and equipment necessary for the 296
restoration and reconstruction of industrial projects built before the establisment of
the PRC, in later years, after 1951, the Soviet export to China consisted to an
increasing extent of complete sets of plant. The reason for this was that the USSR
began providing equipment for 50 industrial establishments, which had been
completed or were being built with its help. These included the Anshan metal-
manufacturing combine, the Fengman hydro-power station, and the thermal power
stations in the cities of Penhsihu, Taiyuan, Chungching, and Sian. During the first
five-pear plan period when the People’s Republic of China was launching an
extensive programme of industrialisation and the country needed machinery and
equipment, the Soviet Union supplied 639 million roubles’ worth of industrial
plant. [ 296•1 Machinery and equipment made up almost half of Soviet exports to
China. In 1957 the share of complete sets of plant in Soviet exports to China was 77
per cent. At a time when the steel industry of the People’s Republic of China was
just being restored and the country was producing no more than 1.3 million tons a
year, the Soviet Union shipped 943 thousand tons of iron and steel to China between
1950 and 1952, or ’ 40 per cent of Chinese production for that period. During the
first five-year plan period when China was suffering from a metal shortage the !
Soviet Union shipped 300,825 million roubles’ worth of rolled steel and tubing
which were in I short supply in China (almost two million tons).
In old China the highest output of petroleum products ever reached (mainly obtained p 297
from shale) was 320 thousand tons. Local oil refineries operated exclusively on
imported oil. It was because of this that Soviet shipments of petroleum products were
of such great importance to the People’s Republic of China. In the years of
reconstruction China produced 943 thousand tons of petroleum products (including
216,000 tons of benzine and 71,500 tons of kerosine). Over the same period the
Soviet Union delivered to China 1.5 million tons of petroleum products (including
506,000 tons of benzine, 477,000 tons of kerosine, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel, and
154,000 tons of lubricants). As a result of Soviet assistance the output of petroleum
products in the People’s Republic of China rose from 436,000 tons in 1952 to
1,460,000 tons in 1957. But in spite of this increase the Soviet Union remained
China’s main supplier of petroleum products. In the course of the first five-year plan
period the Soviet Union delivered about seven million tons of petroleum products to
the People’s Republic of China. In 1957 alone the USSR exported 1,803 thousand
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In the first few years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China the p
Soviet Union exported to it large quantities of cotton fabrics and other consumer
goods, such as sugar, shoes, clothing, and tobacco. However, as the national
economy of China was being restored and as it became more and more capable of 298
supplying its population with consumer goods, their import from the USSR was
sharply reduced and stopped altogether at the end of the first five-year plan period.
The People’s Republic of China greatly benefited from the import of goods from p
the Soviet Union. The economic blockade and embargo on trade with China imposed
by the United States and other imperialist states made the socialist countries, and
especially the Soviet Union, the only supply source of modern means of production
for the People’s Republic of China. "Over a number of years means of production
dominated our import. It helped greatly to restore and develop industrial and farm
production, and speeded up the successful socialist industrialisation of the country,”
wrote Yeh Chi-Chuang, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade. "We would like to
emphasise the fact that the fraternal socialist countries, and especially the Soviet
Union, rendered us tremendous disinterested aid which helped to expedite socialist
construction in our country and create the mainstay of socialist
industrialisation.” [ 298•1
China also imported Soviet goods which it used for the strengthening of its p
defences. The delivery of goods for military purposes was particularly intensive in
1950–53 when the People’s Republic of China and the Korean People’s Democratic
Republic were fighting against American imperialism and China was defending its 299
frontiers. But even after the war the shipment of Soviet weapons rated high in
China’s import, while the country was modernising its armed forces. As the
modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army of China came to an end, and
defence industry enterprises built with Soviet assistance were completed, the import
of military equipment from the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. The large military
deliveries from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1957 were of tremendous
importance for the People’s Republic of China. On the one hand they helped to
quickly re-equip the People’s Liberation Army of China with modern weapons. On
the other hand, the Soviet deliveries of weapons, munitions and equipment enabled
China to use considerable manpower and material resources to speed up the process
of restoration and peaceful development of China’s national economy.
Soviet deliveries to China not only helped to satisfy China’s economic demands, to p
strengthen its defence potential and meet the vital needs of the Chinese people, but
also helped to develop China’s export capacity. China needed greatly to increase
exports to meet the bill for its growing import of industrial goods which it needed
for the restoration and reconstruction of its national economy and later for launching
an extensive programme of economic development. At the same time China wanted
to export the goods which were in fairly large supply on the home market.
Considering the economic situation in China and its export possibilities, the Soviet
Union imported from China, between 1950 and 1960, raw materials for the
production of foodstuffs, rare and Emacs-File-stamp: 300
"/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/383.tx" alloying metals (tin,
mercury, tungsten, molybdenic concentrates, spodumen, beryllium, etc.), textile fibre
(raw silk, wool, jute, hemp, etc.), textiles (silks and woollens, linen table cloths, and
other articles), such raw materials as tung oil, ethereal oils, bristle, hides, etc., some
chemicals, hand– crafted articles, haberdashery, rugs, etc.
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At the same time, having rehabilitated the national economy destroyed by the nazi p
invaders, the Soviet Union was speeding up socialist construction. Beginning with
1953, a large number of measures were taken in the USSR to ensure the growth of
all the branches of the national economy, especially agriculture. The economic
advance in the Soviet Union led to a marked improvement in living standards. In an
effort to satisfy the needs of th’e Soviet people as far as possible and to promote the
further progress of the Soviet economy, the Soviet Communist Party concentrated on
the development of our country’s internal reserves and resources. However, the
import of goods from abroad was welcome at this time and this favoured the export
of Chinese goods to the Soviet Union.
Right from the first years of its existence the People’s Republic of China exported p
most of its goods to the Soviet Union and it is not possible to overestimate the
importance of the capacious and stable Soviet market for China, especially at the
time when she was boycotted by the United States and many other capitalist
countries. Even in 1957 when the imperialist policy of economic blockade and trade
embargo had failed, [300•1 and more than 70 countries and areas of the world 301
had established economic relations with the Chinese Peopled Republic, [301•1 its
export to the Soviet Union was as follows: 100 per cent of its export of jute sacking,
96 per cent of coconut oil, 87.1 per cent of apples, 76.6 per cent of wool, 69.5 per
cent of tin preserves, 66.8 per cent of tobacco, 64.8 per cent of frozen pork, 59.1 per
cent of peanuts in the shell, 58.1 per cent of citrus fruit, 50.8 per cent of frozen veal
and mutton, 50.1 per cent of soya beans, 41.3 per cent of resins, 37.6 per cent of
shelled peanuts, 36.9 per cent of bristle, 31.6 per cent of rice, 28.7 per cent of tea,
91 per cent of tungsten concentrate, 85.2 per cent of tin, 82.9 per cent of
molybdenum concentrate, 80 per cent of cement, 53.4 per cent of cast iron, 28.4 per
cent of caustic soda, 95.3 per cent of woollen textile, 62.5 per cent of manufactured
silk.
It should also be borne in mind that the People’s Republic of China, as a newly p
developing country, with its poor choice and quality of goods, found it difficult to
get into the world market, and to withstand the competition of other developing
countries, as well as of the economically advanced capitalist states. It was only 302
China’s close economic ties with the socialist countries, and especially with the
USSR, that enabled her to export large quantities of industrial and
agricultural [ 302•1 raw material and other commodities at fixed prices.
Trade between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in 1950–67 p
was carried out under the inter-governmental trade agreement signed on April 19,
1950. The goods from the USSR to China and from China to the USSR were
delivered in accordance with inventories which were reviewed and agreed upon by
both sides -every year. The trade agreement of April 19, 1950, was pronounced
effective from January 1 to December 31, 1950, that is, for a term of one year.
However, the governments of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China
regularly extended the term of this agreement by a further year. This means that, in
effect, Soviet-Chinese trade was carried on without a long-term trade
agreement. [ 302•2 Nevertheless it is wrong to say, as some bourgeois authorities 303
do, that Soviet-Chinese trade had no long-term legal basis, and that it was the Soviet
Union which did not want to commit itself to any long-term trade agreement with
the People’s Republic of China. The fact is that, in the first place, in the period
between 1950 and 1964 Soviet-Chinese trade meant more than a mere commercial
operation. Soviet exports to the People’s Republic of China included, besides purely
commercial deliveries, deliveries under an economic aid programme and under a
military aid programme. Chinese exports to the USSR included trade deliveries and
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payment for Soviet economic and military credits to China and interest on them. As
for economic aid, military aid and credits, they were extended to the People’s
Republic of China on the basis of long-term agreements. In the second place, the
Soviet Union repeatedly suggested that both sides review the question of signing a
long-term agreement in order to provide for stable commercial ties between the
USSR and China. The Chinese side, however, permanently declined to discuss this
question.
All practical questions concerning Soviet– Chinese trade relations were regulated at p
first by "The General Terms of Delivery of Goods by Soviet and Chinese Foreign
Trade Organisations,” signed on March 29, 1952, and later by "The General Terms of
Delivery of Goods from the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China and
from the People’s Republic of China to the Soviet Union" which were discussed and 304
signed by both sides twice-on February 12, 1955, and on April 10, 1957. "The
General Terms" included a large number of questions concerning Soviet-Chinese
trade, including "terms of delivery, dates of delivery, quantity and quality of goods,
containers and markings, consignment notifications, payment procedure, sanctions,
complaints, arbitration, and general matters.”
Following this change in prices on the world market which affected the prices of p
certain goods in Soviet-Chinese trade, some price readjustments were made in the
course of 1950–58, by agreement between the two trading partners. In 1958 prices
were again reviewed by mutual consent. The new prices were set by both sides in
line with average annual prices on the major world markets for 1957 and have since
remained unchanged by agreement between the two sides.
The principle of price setting was worked out in two letters (April 23, 1958, and p
February 26, 1959) exchanged between the sides, and was reaffirmed in annual trade
protocols on the Soviet– Chinese trade at the suggestion of the Chinese side and with 306
the consent of the Soviet side. Thus the Chinese statements made after 1960 that the
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prices on many types of Soviet goods and equipment were much higher than the
prices which existed on the world market, and that for this reason trade with the
Soviet Union brought no returns to China are at variance with the facts. The prices
adopted in 1958 by both sides still operate in Soviet-Chinese trade.
It is possible, of course, that the flood of machinery, equipment and other goods p 307
which was sent to China from the USSR over many years, contained some
substandard samples. For example, the People’s Republic of China often imported
large quantities of first models of the latest Soviet equipment. This fact was hailed
with great satisfaction in China. The Chinese press repeatedly pointed out that the
Soviet Union had helped China install equipment which factories and plants in the
USSR did not have themselves. It stands to reason that some of this equipment,
which had not passed the test of time, must have had faults which called for
readjustment of design. In every case such faulty equipment was either replaced or
brought up to the required standards by Soviet specialists and at the expense of the
Soviet side, in accordance with established international commercial practice. The
Chinese goods imported to the Soviet Union were treated in a similar way: when a
commodity from China did not meet the required standards the responsibility for it
was borne by the Chinese side. On the whole the quality of Soviet goods delivered
to China was high. The 250 industrial enterprises, factories and projects built with
Soviet assistance and equipped with Soviet-made machinery, tens of thousands of
machine tools and instruments manufactured from Soviet blueprints and with the help
of Soviet equipment and now working at Chinese factories are evidence of this.
The volume of trade turnover between China and the USSR rose in the 1950–59 p
period (in 1953 it doubled over the 1950 figure and in 1959 was 43 per cent higher
than in 1953), and fell beginning with 1960. This is a specific feature of Soviet-
Chinese economic relations. In 1966 the volume of trade exchange between the 308
USSR and China was only 15.5 per cent of its 1959 volume and was 50 per cent
less than the 1950 volume. This sharp reduction of Sino-Soviet trade cannot be
explained only by the fact that after 1960, following the failure of the "big leap" and
the " people’s communes" policies, China’s foreign trade took a downward turn
which continued up to 1963. The sharp reduction of Soviet-Chinese trade relations
did not stem from the economic situation but from the anti-Soviet political line of
Mao Tse-tung and his group.
This group regarded China’s external economic policy as part of its foreign policy p
and as its tool. Therefore the changes taking place in the foreign policy of the
leadership of the Communist Party of China were immediately reflected in its
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economic policy. The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Communist Party
and the Mao Tse-tung group, caused by the hegemonic aspirations and divisive
activities of the latter, affected the interstate economic relations between the Soviet
Union and China. At the end of 1959 the Mao Tse-tung group took a course aimed
at terminating economic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1960 trade was down 19
per cent on the 1959 level. In 1961 it was reduced by 46 per cent compared with
I960; in 1962 it declined by another 22 per cent, and in 1963 by a further 20 per
cent. And whereas in 1959 the Soviet Union accounted for 50 per cent of China’s
foreign trade, in 1960 its share went down to 40 per cent, in 1961 to 31 per cent, in
1962 to 28 per cent and in 1963 to 21 per cent, and continued to sharply decline in
subsequent years. In 1965 a mere 15 per cent of China’s foreign trade was with the
Soviet Union, and in 1966 this fell to 7 per cent and in 1967 to 2 per 309
cent. [ 309•1
Following the directions of the Mao Tse-tung group, the representatives of the p
People’s Republic of China at the Soviet-Chinese talks cut down the volume of
goods negotiated for trade, rejecting many items which had become traditional Soviet
exports to China. For example, in December 1961 the Chinese negotiators announced
that the import of Soviet complete sets of plant would be reduced to about a fifth as
compared with the preceding year, and that in 1962–63 it would be
terminated. [ 309•2 The political implications of this move by the Chinese
leadership are quite obvious, since the People’s Republic of China was at the same
time importing industrial plant from the capitalist countries. For example, China
purchased industrial plant for 20 factories from Britain, Italy, West Germany, France
and Japan.
The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership in the sphere of foreign trade led to p
a sharp reduction of Soviet exports to China. In terms of value Soviet exports to
China fell from 859.1 million roubles in 1959 to 157.8 million roubles in 1966. The
Soviet Union made every effort to check the downward trend in trade turnover with
China. Soviet representatives at trade talks offered to expand the volume of Soviet
exports to China, but they encountered opposition from the Chinese side. At the
same time the Chinese representatives refused to increase the delivery to the Soviet
Union of goods needed by the Soviet people, including those goods which China was 310
exporting in large amounts to capitalist countries and which had been traditional
Chinese export items to the USSR. As a result, the shipment of these commodities to
the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. Over the 1959–65 period China reduced its
export to the Soviet Union-of tin to 2.5 per cent of its former level, mercury to 3.1
per cent, molybdenic concentrate to 4.2 per cent, tungsten concentrate to 23 per cent,
raw silk to 2.8 per cent, tung oil to 8.3 per cent, wool to 15.4 per cent, bristle to 18
per cent.
The Chinese representatives tried to camouflage this policy, which was aimed at p
terminating Soviet-Chinese economic relations, with talks about China’s desire to
increase the volume of trade with the Soviet Union. They offered in an increasing
volume the goods which China found difficult to sell on the world market, and, at
the same time, reduced the volume of goods which had become traditional Chinese
exports to the Soviet Union. This manoeuvre of the Chinese leadership inevitably led
to a sharp reduction in Sino-Soviet trade in the years which preceded the so-called
cultural revolution in China. Between 1959 and 1966 the volume of trade between
China and the Soviet Union decreased by almost 85 per cent. SinoSoviet currency
relations are an important aspect of the economic ties between the USSR and China.
In the early stages of Soviet-Chinese economic relations, when China was still
suffering from inflation, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China agreed
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upon the rate of exchange of their currencies. On June 1, 1951, the governments of
the USSR and China signed an agreement on the exchange rate of the rouble in 311
relation to the yuan of the People’s Bank of China. The agreement stated that "the
two sides unanimously agreed to establish the parity of the rouble in relation to the
yuan of the People’s Bank of China in line with the official price of gold.” On the
day the agreement was signed the rate of exchange was established at 6,754 yuans to
the rouble. The agreement came into effect immediately and was considered effective
"until the accomplishment of the currency reform in China and the establishment of
the amount of pure gold carried by the currency of the People’s Republic of China.”
On September 22, 1953, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, a protocol agreement
was signed in Peking establishing the exchange rate of the yuan of the People’s
Bank of China in relation to the rouble. According to this protocol, all monetary
operations between the USSR and China were to be conducted on the basis of the
agreed ratio of 5,000 yuans to the rouble (instead of 6,754 as was stipulated in the
agreement of June 1, 1951). The new ratio between the rouble and the yuan was
intended to simplify the working of the forthcoming currency reform in China and to
strengthen the yuan against the currencies of other countries. After the monetary
reform in March, 1955, in the course of which 10,000 old yuans were exchanged for
one new yuan, the exchange ratio between the yuan and the rouble remained the
same: 0.5 yuan to the rouble (two roubles to one yuan). Since no fixed gold content
of the yuan was specified by the reform, this official exchange rate of the yuan in
relation to the rouble remained unaltered, by agreement between the governments of
the Soviet Union and China. On December 30, 1957, the governments of the USSR 312
and China signed a protocol agreement on an increase in the exchange rate of the
yuan for non-commercial payments. Under this agreement, which came into effect on
January 1, 1958, the exchange rate of the yuan in relation to the rouble in non-
commercial payments was raised by 200 per cent. This increase in the value of the
yuan in non-commercial payments raised the Chinese currency to 16.67 yuans to 100
roubles (600 roubles to 100 yuans). The exchange rate of the rouble to the yuan for
noncommercial payments was established on the basis of prices of manufactured
sample goods and foodstuffs, and prices of services, and was in line with the prices
for equivalent commodities and services in the USSR.
The protocol agreements of October 23, 1956, and December 30, 1957, established p
the rate of exchange between the rouble and the yuan for non-commercial payments.
This new exchange rate was subject to review and verification by agreement between
the State Bank of the USSR and the People’s Bank of China in case the retail prices
on goods and services were changed substantially either in one of the countries or in
both of them. After the Soviet Union increased the gold backing of the rouble on
January 1, 1961, the buying power of the rouble was also increased. As a result, the
exchange rate of the rouble in relation to other currencies, including the currency of
the People’s Republic of China, was altered. The State Bank of the USSR and the
People’s Bank of China agreed upon a new exchange rate between the rouble and
the yuan: 45 roubles to 100 yuans in commercial payments, and 77.52 roubles to 100
yuans in non-commercial payments.
These facts show that the currency relations between the Soviet Union and the p 313
People’s Republic of China rested on an objective economic foundation and on the
basis of mutual agreement, and that the Soviet Union did not seek to use its currency
transactions with China to its own advantage.
The credit relations between the USSR and China were an important part of Sino- p
Soviet economic relations. They facilitated the building of socialism in the People’s
Republic of China, and helped to strengthen its national economy and defences. The
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credits the Soviet Union extended to the People’s Republic of China meant that part
of the surplus product which forms the accumulation fund, was temporarily taken out
of the Soviet national economy and was transferred to China in the form of credits,
instead of being used for the expansion of the productive capital or for capital
construction in the cultural and service spheres which could have brought additional
benefits to the Soviet people. From the purely commercial point of view the Soviet
Union stood to gain nothing from its credits to China. Under the planned system of
economic management, the Soviet Union would have gained much more from using
them for its own domestic needs-for the expansion of production, in order to export
the additional products in exchange for the necessary commodities, instead of
shipping equipment and machinery (especially complete sets of plant) on credit to
China. The payment of interest on its credits - which, by the way, was much lower
than on the capitalist market - serves as only a partial compensation for the losses
sustained by the Soviet national economy through the temporary withdrawal of a part 314
of the national product from it. This means that the Soviet Union, true to the
principles of proletarian internationalism, extended credits to China at the expense of
the development of its own national economy and the promotion of the living
standards of its people.
The Soviet credits were quite different from the so-called assistance rendered by the p
capitalist states to developing countries. Soviet credits are not aimed at exploiting
people. Nor is their purpose the economic expansion of the Soviet Union, the making
of super-profits, or the wresting of political or military concessions from weaker
states. The Soviet credits were aimed at helping the Chinese people to build a
socialist society in their country. They were extended to the People’s Republic of
China at the most difficult times of its existence - during the first few years after the
revolution when the restoration and development of the national economy was a
question of life and death for the young republic; during the 1950–53 period when
the People’s Republic of China was participating in the Korean war; in 1961 when
the adventuristic policy of Mao Tsetung created an extremely difficult economic and
political situation in the country.
As a rule these credits were provided in the form of commodities. China also p
received investment credits which went for the construction of industrial projects
designated by the Chinese government. Gold and freely convertible currency as credit
means were used on a limited scale in the economic relations between the USSR
and the People’s Republic of China. One of the features of the Soviet-Chinese credit
relations, as well as the interest on them, was the fact that the Soviet investment and 315
commodity credits were repaid in traditional Chinese export goods. This provided
China with a stable guaranteed market for her goods, enabled many of her industries
to work to capacity, provided employment for her population and consolidated the
fiscal situation in the country.
Most of the credits extended by the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China p
were in roubles. The credit extended to China on February 14, 1950, was in
American dollars, while the credits granted in 1951–55 were in roubles with a gold
backing of 0.222168 grams of gold. On January 1, 1961, the gold backing of the
rouble was established at 0.987412 grams of gold which accordingly raised the
exchange rate of the rouble in relation to the currencies of other countries. The new
exchange rate went a long way towards eliminating the difference between the level
of world prices and the internal wholesale prices of commodities offered for sale on
the world market. The increased gold backing of the rouble made it necessary to
recalculate the debts of the People’s Republic of China and other recipients of Soviet
credits. As a result, the total debt owed to the Soviet Union was reduced by 77.5 per
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cent. At the same time the prices of goods under the existing agreements on
commodity exchange and other deliveries were reduced by exactly the same
percentage. Therefore the amount of goods delivered against the Soviet credits, and
the rate at which the debts were to be repaid, did not change. The upward
revaluation of the rouble did not affect the commodity and credit transaction
concluded earlier between the Soviet Union and China. In fact, China lost nothing 316
from the recalculation of the funds specified in these agreements in terms of new
roubles.
The Soviet credits to the People’s Republic of China went to pay for industrial p
equipment, machinery, transport, technical assistance, military deliveries. Soviet
property handed over to China, and to settle the debts of trading operations. The
Soviet credits were offered to the People’s Republic of China on advantageous
terms-at an annual interest of not more that two per cent-some of the credits were
interest-free. The credits were extended, used and repaid with due consideration for
the national economic plans of the two countries, and this helped both China and the
USSR to fulfill their mutual commitments.
It is important to stress here that the Soviet Union did not claim to provide China p
with all the means necessary for the industrialisation programme of the whole
country, with its collossal population and territory. The aim of Soviet financial
assistance to China was to help the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese
people to make the best use of their domestic resources and internal possibilities in
order to create the primary basis of socialist industrialisation, to build a complex of
industrial establishments, which the People’s Republic of China could use in order to
advance at the fastest possible rate, and to eliminate backwardness and grow from a
poor agrarian country into a powerful socialist nation. Such an industrial base was
created in China with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
According to Li Hsien-nien, China’s Minister of Finance, Soviet loans provided 2 per
cent of China’s total revenue over ten years. [317•1 This figure does not mean 317
that the Soviet loans played a small part in the industrialisation process of the
People’s Republic of China and in the promotion of its defence capability. The
money offered by the Soviet Union was spent very concentratedly, and not within the
framework of the national economy as a whole. It went into the building of large,
modern industrial establishments-the basis of China’s industrialisation. The Soviet
military credits were used for modernising the People’s Liberation Army of China,
for making it a modern army. The very fact that the People’s Liberation Army of
China was fully equipped with modern materiel, equipment and weapons ( including
jet planes, modern tanks, artillery, submarines, and surface war ships) received from
the Soviet Union or manufactured according to Soviet blueprints at Chinese factories,
and with Soviet aid, speak for the scope, effectiveness and significance of the Soviet
credits for the People’s Republic of China. Soviet military credits were also used for
the building of barracks and for providing the soldiers and officers of the People’s
Liberation Army of China with foodstuffs and equipment. Soviet credits were
provided in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the progress of China’s
economy and on the building of her defences.
The unceasing political, ideological and military provocations, numerous hostile acts p
and intrigues of the Maoists against the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist
Party might raise the question whether the aid the Soviet Union extended to China 318
between 1950–66 strengthened the positions of the Maoist group pursuing a
nationalistic and anti-Soviet line? The answer is "no,” because by doing so the
Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet people did their internationalist duty to the
world revolutionary movement. The aim of the Soviet Union was to help the Chinese
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people to transform their country into an advanced socialist state and to make China
its powerful ally in the struggle against imperialism. This was largely achieved. In
the years when the People’s Republic of China was cooperating with the Soviet
Union, and when the Communist Party of China was making wide use of the
experience of the Soviet Communist Party, socialism put down deep roots in China.
The events which are now taking place in China show that the efforts of the Maoists
over the years to loosen these roots have run into opposition from the Chinese
Communists and from wide sections of the Chinese population.
In the early 1950’s the Mao Tse-tung group obviously regarded the Soviet p
assistance and experience as a means of realising its chauvinistic and hegemonic
designs. However, as the Chinese people built the foundations of socialism, drawing
on Soviet experience and aid, this process became increasingly at variance with the
anti– Marxist adventuristic and great-power aspirations of the Mao Tse-tung group.
The building of socialism in China necessitated the observance of certain objective
laws of socio-economic development and an internationalist attitude towards the
USSR and other socialist countries, whereas Mao Tsetung and his supporters
deliberately ignored these facts. It was precisely for this reason that Mao Tse-tung, in
the last few years of the first five– year plan, followed a political line aimed at 319
discrediting the assistance and experience of the USSR, at undermining the
confidence of the Chinese people in the CPSU and in the Soviet Union. This was in
preparation for carrying out his adventuristic and chauvinistic designs.
The divisive, anti-Soviet policies of the Mao Tsetung group are not only sapping the p
unity of the socialist community and weakening the world revolutionary movement,
but are also hindering the process of building socialism in China, and are detrimental
to the interests of the Chinese people themselves. Therefore, the working people of
our country continue to believe, in spite of the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations,
that the present situation in China is transitory by its very nature, and that friendship
and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China will ultimately triumph.
***
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 287•1] This period is marked, on one side, by the conclusion on February 14,
1950, of a Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance
which paved the way for comprehensive inter-state relations between the USSR and
the People’s Republic of China, and, on the other, by the llth Plenary Meeting of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (August, 1966) at which the
Maoists, contrary to the interests of the socialist countries, and especially against the
interests of the Chinese people, enunciated their anti-Soviet line as the official policy
of the People’s Republic of China, stretching Soviet-Chinese relations to breaking
point.
[ 289•1] See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, The Policy of the Soviet Union ’-Towards the
People’s Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism i?i Action; The Leninist Policy
of the USSR Toward.’: China, Collection of Articles, M.. 1968, p. 201.
[ 290•1] See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. The Policy of the Soviet Union Towards the
People’s Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism in Action; The Leninist Policy
of the USSR Towards China, Collection of Articles, M., 1968, pp. 202–203.
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[ 293•1] M. A. Suslov, On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of International
Communist Movement, M., 1964, p. 53.
[ 294•1] An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Studies prepared for the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. US Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1967, p. 592.
[ 296•1] See M. Sladkovsky. Development of Trade Between the Soviet Union and
the People’s Republic of China. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 7.
[ 298•1] Yeh Chi-Chuang. The Foreign Trade of Our Country Over the Past
Decade, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 14.
[ 300•1] In 1957 the capitalist countries of the West relaxed their restrictions on
trade with China. They were compelled to do so by the economic difficulties in the
capitalist world and by the adverse situation on the capitalist market. Besides they
saw that China was getting all that was necessary from her trade with the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries. On May 30, 1957, Britain announced that it
would sell to China goods open for sale to the USSR and the countries of people’s
democracy. Similar announcements were made later by Holland, Denmark, Norway,
Belgium, Portugal, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy. As a result, 33.9 per cent
of China’s foreign trade in 1957 was with the capitalist countries.
[ 302•1] Unprocessed and processed agricultural raw material and the produce from
farmers’ subsidiary plots of land made up 90.7 per cent (in 1950) and 71.6 per cent
(in 1957) of China’s exports. See Ten Great Years. Statistics of the Economic and
Cultural Achievements of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press,
Peking, 1960, p. 176.
[ 302•2] On April 23, 1958, the governments of the USSR and China signed a treaty
on trade and navigation. In this document the two sides expressed a desire to take all
the necessary measures to develop and consolidate commercial relations on the basis
of equality and mutual benefit. The treaty stipulated that the governments of the
USSR and China would conclude agreements, including long-term ones, for
promoting goods turnover to meet the needs of the national economy of each of the
signatory states. The USSR and the People’s Republic of China also announced that
they would accord each other favoured-nation treatment on all questions concerning
trade and other types of econoni’c relations.
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[ 305•1] Sec Peng Ming, The History of Friendship Between the Soviet and Chinese
Peoples, in Chinese, Peking, 1955 p. 138.
[ 305•2] Yeh Chi-chuang, Speech at the 4th Session of the AllChina Assembly of
People’s Representatives, July 11, 1957, Jenmin Jihpao, July 12, 1957.
[ 309•1] See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Op. cit., pp. 193, 200, 212, 240; M. Kapitsa,
To the Left of Common Sense, M., 1968, p. 66.
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<•> Peking Against 320
TOC
Card A. Nadezhdin p
In the confrontation of the two world systems the Maoists have in effect assumed p
Text
the role of an instrument serving imperialism in its efforts to “soften” and break up
HTML
the socialist community, that decisive factor in the development of the world
PS
PDF
revolutionary process. Indeed, the nationalistic Chinese-Albanian estrangement from
the socialist community is welcomed by the imperialist policy-makers as the best
T* possible contribution to the attainment of this strategic objective at a time when
19* direct military pressure on the socialist states is clearly not only ineffective but also
dangerous. Imperialism today hopes to achieve with Peking’s assistance what it failed
### to accomplish through years of reliance on its own forces alone.
The present Chinese leadership sees the main obstacle to its hegemonistic great- p
power ambitions in the solid, science-based revolutionary unity of the socialist
countries and the entire international communist movement. This unity is also the
main barrier to the realization by world anti– communism of its hopes of being able
to destroy the socialist system and halt the forward march of history. Although the
aims of the imperialists and the Peking leaders are not identical, the course they are
steering to achieve them is virtually the same. It lies through struggle primarily
against the most powerful citadel of the world’s socialist forces-the Soviet Union. 321
This is why antiSovietism, long the core of the ideology and policy of anti-
communism, has become basic also to the ideology and policies of the present
Chinese leadership. In concentrating on attacking the USSR, both the imperialists and
the Peking leaders are prompted by the hope that world socialism can be defeated by
hammering at its leading detachment. By underscoring their hostility towards the
Soviet Union they count on dulling the vigilance of the other socialist countries and
forces and persuading them that anti-Soviet actions do not jeopardise the interests of
the rest of the socialist community. In other words, both anti-communists of every
hue and the Chinese leaders employ anti-Sovietism as an instrument for dividing and
weakening the world socialist system. Though both of these reactionary forces claim
to be irreconcilably opposed to one another, the fact remains that they have in effect
joined in a united front against world socialism, against the international communist
movement.
The hostility of the present Peking leaders to the interests of the international p
proletariat is patent in the Maoist slogans, and Peking’s practical policies have given
it tangible form. Every action taken by the USSR and other socialist countries
towards strengthening world socialism, lessening international tension and organising
broad resistance to the stepped-up activity of the forces of imperialism and reaction
invariably evokes a flood of invective and slander from Peking. This was the case
during the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962 when the Soviet Union took a
number of steps essential to help the Cuban people defend their revolutionary 322
achievements. The same happened in 1967, when the USSR and other fraternal
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countries came out against the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, and in 1968,
when they barred the way to counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. As a matter of
fact, there is not an area of international relations in which Peking over the past ten
years has not in one way or another, directly or indirectly, fallen in line with the
imperialist reaction and served its interests. And nothing accords with these interests
more than the divisive policy pursued by the Chinese leaders towards the world
socialist system. Peking has helped to animate diverse “Leftist” trends in the
international working-class movement, given encouragement to proponents of
bourgeois nationalist ideology and both “Leftist” and Rightist splinter groups, all of
which see in Maoist China a backer of their anti-socialist machinations. Indeed
Peking has repeatedly promised them every assistance.
In its efforts to divide the socialist community Peking is not only working to p
undermine the world revolutionary movement, but impeding the building of socialism
primarily in China, and also in Albania. For these countries, which inherited an
onerous legacy of social and economic backwardness from the old order, close unity
with world socialism is a decisive condition of successful socialist development. As
long as they stood together with the other socialist countries, they registered
successes. The Soviet Union and other developed socialist countries rendered them
extensive assistance in resolving the key problems of socialist construction.
In 1950–59 the USSR pledged the Chinese People’s Republic help in the building, p 323
expansion and reconstruction of more than 400 major enterprises, separate factory
departments, and other projects. Of these over 250 were completed or partly put into
operation. In 1952–61 other European socialist countries built or helped in the
building in China of more than 260 enterprises, factory departments, technological
installations and other economic projects. Already by 1960 enterprises built with
Soviet help produced 8.7 million tons of pig iron and 8.4 million tons of steel, and
accounted for 80 per cent of the motor trucks, over 90 per cent of the tractors, 55
per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, 25 per cent of the electric power and
25 per cent of the aluminium turned out in China.
Had China not rejected close cooperation with the socialist camp and the Chinese p
leadership not substituted all-out build-up of military potential for the creation of the
material and technological base of socialism, the Chinese People’s Republic would
undoubtedly have scored further successes in industrialisation and the development of
socialist society in general. For the USSR and other socialist countries, in step with
the development of their own economies, would naturally have expanded
industrialisation aid through the sixties. As a result, a solid material foundation
would have been laid by now for socialist production relations in China. As it is,
however, the material base remains weak, and this, especially with the policies
pursued by the Chinese leaders, facilitates the deformation and emasculation of the
very essence of socialist production relations. (The break with the socialist
community has greatly retarded economic development of Albania too, even though 324
it received substantial material and financial aid from China in the sixties. Whereas
the average annual industrial growth rate in Albania was 17 per cent in 1956–60, in
1961–65 it was only 6.8 per cent as against the 8.7 per cent planned.)
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When in mid-1957 a campaign was at last launched against the offensive of the p
"bourgeois Right-wing elements,” the Chinese press carried articles critical of their
anti-Soviet sallies and fabrications. In one of these articles the then General Secretary
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association Tsien Chun-jui (in the sixties he became a
victim of the Maoist repressions), assessing the stand of the "bourgeois Right-wing
elements,” stressed that their objective was the restoration of capitalism. "The Right
regarded struggle against the Communist Party within the country and against the
Soviet Union on the international arena of utmost importance for the achievement of
this objective,” he said. "Unless the Communist Party is overthrown and friendly
relations with the Soviet Union severed, the positions of socialism are bound to
remain strong.” [ 324•1 The article declared that the "ideology of bourgeois 325
nationalism manifested in relation to the Soviet Union will become ultra-reactionary
anti-Soviet nationalism.” Today many of the aims the bourgeois forces in China
fought for in the fifties have been realized by the present Peking leaders: the
internationalist, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of China were
smashed during the "cultural revolution,” struggle against the USSR has become
Peking’s No. 1 objective, and anti-Sovietism has been made official policy.
The above-mentioned article also noted that the bourgeois Right was "beginning to p
develop a sense of superiority over other nations,” that they had gone so far as to
forget the foreign policy principles recorded in the Constitution and were out to
"practise reactionary great-power chauvinism.” "The foreign policy programme of the
bourgeois Right-wing elements is pivoted on anti-socialism and pro-Americanism,”
Tsien Chun-jui said.
It is perfectly obvious that the foreign policy programme of the bourgeois Right- p
wing elements as set forth in 1957, its nationalistic class essence, has been fully
espoused by the Maoists. It is not by chance that the most active anti-Sovieteers
from the Right-wing camp were rehabilitated soon after 1957.
Peking’s foreign policy line in many respects echoes the policies of Chiang Kai- p
shek, who represents the class interests of diehard Chinese bourgeois-landlord
reaction. Although Mao Tse-tung once called Chiang a man from whom one could
learn only what should not be done, in practice he is a zealous follower of his
"teacher in reverse.” If, after seizing power in China in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and 326
his followers overtly and covertly engaged in anti-Soviet machinations on the
international arena, circulating slanderous allegations concerning some mythical "Red
imperialism,” and today, entrenched in Taiwan, make no secret of their anti-Soviet
credo, the Maoists have openly pivoted their foreign policy on anti– Sovietism and
are talking about Soviet "social imperialism.” And if Chiang Kai-shek and his
followers are active participants in the notorious Asian People’s Anti-Communist
League, the Maoists are fighting the international communist movement both in Asia
and outside its bounds. It is not surprising that entry visas to China were refused the
communist members of a French parliamentary delegation.
Like the Chiang Kai-shek crowd, the present Chinese leaders are not at all happy p
about the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Although Peking bosses
have not ventured to publish maps showing the Mongolian People’s Republic as a
part of China, as has been done in Taiwan, they continue to cherish as they did
decades ago hopes of annexing Mongolia to China.
As far back as 1936, during an interview gran- [ ted to the then obscure US p
journalist Edgar Snow, ’ Mao Tse-tung categorically declared that after the victory
of the revolution in China the MPR would "automatically,” "of its own free will,”
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once again become part of China. In April 1945 Chou Enlai’s private secretary told
some American officials that the Chinese leaders would like to "join Outer Mongolia
(meaning the MPR to China).” And in 1954 Mao with unadulterated great-power
arrogance took up with the Soviet Government the question of annexing Mongolia to 327
the Chinese People’s Republic, but was told that this was a question that should have
been raised with the Mongolian people and government, and not with the Soviet
Union.
Both Chiang Kai-shek and the present Chinese leaders present territorial claims to p
the USSR and other neighbouring countries. Both have taken a chauvinistic, great-
power stance as regards China’s role and place in the world. Even during the
difficult period of the war against Japan, when China was in extreme straits, the
Kuomintangcontrolled press made no secret of the hegemonic ambitions of Chiang
Kai-shek and his followers. The newspaper Yihshihpao, for instance, wrote on
December 16, 1943: "In the future the vast territory in East Asia from the Indian
Ocean in the west to Japan in the east and from Australia in the south to Alaska in
the north will wholly belong to China, and she shall have to bear the responsibility
for the integrity and prosperity of all this territory.” Mao Tse-tung repeated the same
claims in June 1958: "The present Pacific Ocean is in reality not too pacific. In the
future, when it comes under our control, it can become such.”
Indicative too is the identity of the Maoist and Chiang Kai-shek tactics of struggle p
against progressives at home and on the international arena. It will be recalled that in
1927, when the communist movement in China had gained substantial strength,
Chiang Kai-shek struck hard at it, and at the same time brought relations with the
USSR to the breaking point, to armed clashes on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The
strengthening of the forces of socialism registered in China by 1956–57 similarly 328
prompted the Maoists to launch an offensive against them and to accompany the
drive with a worsening of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries
which eventually developed into open enmity towards them.
A comparison of Peking’s foreign policy with , the course steered by world anti- p
communism and the foreign policy programme of the Chinese bourgeois-landlord
reaction shows that although there are definite and at times extremely sharp
contradictions among these three political forces, their positions in relation to world
socialism are very much alike.
However, as distinct from the latter two, Peking prefers to conduct its subversive p
work under a smokescreen fo "ultra-Left,” "ultra– revolutionary" slogans and
professed aims. For this reason the Peking leaders are anxious to have at least some 329
of the socialist countries and communist parties, as well as organisations representing
the nationalliberation movement, concede that Peking too stands on “revolutionary”
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The Marxist-Leninists are not taken in by this tactic. "We,” the Polish Trybuna p
Ludu said in an article on the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Party of China,
"seek normalisation of interstate relations with the Chinese People’s Republic. But
we resolutely reject every attempt to make use of our readiness to normalise
relations to promote ends preventing the strengthening of the unity of the entire
socialist community. Under no circumstances can an anti-Soviet policy and
orientation on splitting the socialist community and the international communist
movement serve as a platform for genuine normalisation.”
Our epoch is a crucial one in human history. The broadest unity of all progressive p
forces, and primarily of the socialist countries and the organised international
working class, is of decisive importance for the success of the struggle against the
threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear war, for peace, democracy, socialism and 330
communism. Hence the magnitude of the harm done to the interests of the
revolutionary forces by the divisive activities of the “Left” and Right-wing
revisionists operating in the ranks of these forces, in camouflage garb, seeking to
speak and act in their name and to subordinate them to their influence. Especially
pernicious and unprincipled is revisionism combined with and nurtured by
nationalism. This combination, if transformed into official ideology governing the
policies of one or another country that has embarked on the socialist road, presents a
danger proportional to the size of the country that has fallen under nationalist sway.
The socialist countries give a resolute rebuff to the divisive activities of Peking, p
which has opened a new front against world socialism, a front that is particularly
dangerous because it runs through the socialist system itself. Hence utmost clarity is
essential in assessing its place and role in the global confrontation of the forces of
progress and reaction.
The future of socialism, its sound, successful development in the various countries, p
and the prospects of the struggle for socialism in the capitalist countries depend to a
great extent, as the experience of the past two and a half decades has convincingly
shown, on the unity of the socialist world system as a whole, on the consistent 331
utilisation of the countless advantages inherent in it. On this depends the success also
of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement. Consequently, the socialist countries,
while resolutely combating Peking’s splitting activities and rejecting the ideological
and political platform of the present Chinese leaders, are working untiringly to bring
about a normalisation of inter-state relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.
This principled line was once again clearly reflected in the decisions of the recent
congresses of the communist parties of Hungary, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the Mongolian People’s Republic, and the German Democratic
Republic.
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***
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<•> New Strategy for the Same Ends 332
Card
O. Ivanov p
Text
HTML The great-power, disruptive policy of the Peking leaders is causing serious damage p
PS to the interests of the world socialist system and the entire communist movement,
PDF impeding the anti– imperialist struggle of the progressive forces and exercising an
adverse influence on the international situation. What is happening in China is being
T* exploited by anti-communist propaganda in order to discredit scientific socialism and
19* Marxism– Leninism as a whole.
### The practical activity, political principles and pronouncements of the Chinese p
leadership in the current period have clearly shown that Mao Tsetung and his group
are intent on following the basic political course endorsed by the Ninth Congress of
the Communist Party of China. This means a rejection of the proletarian, class
approach in assessing social phenomena, undermining the socialist community and
the anti– imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the endeavour to establish
world hegemony.
But instead of bringing the Maoists the desired results, the attempts at a frontal and p
forceful implementation of this policy have deepened China’s internal crisis and its
isolation on the international arena. That is why the Maoists have recently been
compelled, while keeping up their far-going hegemonic aims, to resort to 333
manoeuvring. They are trying hard to make their policy look more respectable and
less aggressive.
Ever since the Ninth Congress of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have p
been trying to complete the legalisation of the political upheaval brought about
during the "cultural revolution,” to bolster up their regime in China and gradually put
into action their foreign policy aimed at achieving hegemonic aims.
In the sphere of the country’s internal development, the chief task of the Maoists p
has been to overcome socio-economic instability and restore the prestige of the
central government, which was shaken by the "cultural revolution.” This has
demanded that attention be confined to the problems of economic, Party and state
construction. To a certain extent regulation of socio-political and economic activity is
achieved by means of all-round militarisation and by maintaining a "besieged
fortress" atmosphere. The personality cult of Mao Tse-tung is being further boosted
and there are endless demagogic claims that the Maoist "cultural revolution" was
"absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat,” and
that it gave "a powerful impetus to the economic, political, ideological and cultural
development of the country.” The outrages committed by the hungweipings, and the
vicious mockery of hundreds of thousands of Communists are said to have been
caused by the "intrigues and provocations of Chairman Mao’s enemies,” meaning Liu
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Shao-chi and his adherents. This is all part of the Maoists’ broad political manoeuvre
aimed at stabilising the internal situation.
However, the process of relative stabilisation is uneven and painful. The agitations p 334
of the " cultural revolution,” particularly those connected with the major reshuffle in
the Party and government, had not yet subsided when a new political crisis broke out
in the ruling Maoist elite. More than one half of the 25 Members and Candidate
Members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China (the Politbureau formed at the Ninth Congress in 1969) have disappeared from
the political arena; and only two of the five Members of the Politbureau Permanent
Committee (known as "the Five”) are politically active.
Quite recently, Lin Piao, CC CPC Vice– Chairman and Member of the Politbureau p
Permanent Committee, was mentioned in the Party Rules as a "close associate" and
the “continuer” of the cause of Mao Tse-tung. But the ink had hardly dried when,
according to foreign agencies, Lin Piao was declared, following Liu Shao-chi, "a po-
I litical swindler and a great careerist.” The coun- ’ try is still dominated by tension,
which, as before, the Maoists are trying to blunt by accelerating their anti-Soviet
campaign and whipping up war hysteria. [334•1
All this cannot be accounted for merely by the struggle for power in the Chinese p
leadership. Everything seems to indicate that the new crisis was caused by a dispute 335
among the Maoist rulers on questions of domestic and foreign policy.
Being well aware of the dangerous consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist- p
Leninist parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese problem. They voiced their
principled position at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties
held in Moscow in June, 1969. In this respect the Meeting marked an important
stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to strengthen the unity of their revolutionary
ranks, to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, and to counteract the anti-
Leninist and subversive activity of the Maoists.
The 24th Congress of the CPSU, the recent congresses of other Marxist-Leninist p
parties, the constructive foreign policy of the USSR and the general offensive
launched by the forces of socialism against imperialism and reaction-these have once
again demonstrated most strikingly the subversive character of the foreign policy
course followed by the Maoists, whose aim is to split the world revolutionary
movement.
The Chinese splitters and their agents abroad have suffered serious set-backs, and p
this has compelled them to revise their strategy. Add to this the collapse of the
imperialist sabotage against socialism in Czechoslovakia (the intrigues of the anti-
socialist forces in that country were approved by the Maoists) and the firm rebuff
given to the provocations of the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese frontier,
and it will become clear what forced the Maoists to alter the strategy of conducting
subversive activity in the international arena.
The CPSU and other fraternal parties contrast Peking’s disruptive policy with the p 336
efforts to cement the unity of the socialist countries, the world communist movement
and the anti– imperialist forces, and also with their policy of normalising interstate
relations with the Chinese People’s Republic. This policy was clearly set forth in the
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress delivered by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev, in the speeches of delegates, in the Congress’s Resolution on the
Report, and in the addresses delivered by the leaders of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist
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parties to the Congress. The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries
are ready to promote the all-round development of interstate relations with the PRC
without going against their principles and national interests. At the same time the
Marxist– Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks and expose the
ideological platform of the Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with Marxism-
Leninism.
The Maoists have met with serious internal and international obstacles to the p
achievement of their aims. The adventurism characteristic of Maoism has come
sharply into conflict with reality, and this has created the ground for fresh political
crisis in China. The policy of Mao Tsetung and his group is facing growing
resistance from the working people and members of the Chinese Communist Party.
No wonder Mao Tsetung declared that "it needs another three or four cultural
revolutions" to get rid of opposition to the policy of the ruling elite and to
strengthen the government, or rather - the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
The Maoists have failed in their attempts to attain their chauvinistic and hegemonic p
aims through frontal attacks on the forces which they regard as their chief opponents.
Nor did their fabrications about a Soviet military threat produce the hoped-for
results.
The fact that the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries are consistently pursuing p
a policy of promoting genuine normalisation of relations with China causes difficulty
for the Maoists and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home and on the
international scene.
What, then, ate the distinctive features of the new Maoist strategy? The most p
conspicuous of Peking’s new strategems is the change in its foreign-policy slogans.
The slogan "Revolution through war or prevention of war through revolution,”
advanced in the course of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, was replaced in the spring
of 1970 by another slogan which says, "The danger of a new world war still exists, 338
and all nations must be prepared for it. But revolution is now the chief trend in the
world.” While retaining the slogan of a world war as the most expedient means of
resolving the contradictions of today, the Maoists now more frequently speak about
their readiness to build relations with all countries, including the socialist ones, on
the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence.” But although Peking is less
bellicose in its statements on international issues, it is keeping to its antiSoviet, anti-
socialist direction in its foreign policy activity.
It is noteworthy that among the many capitalist countries that have recently p
recognized the PRC, those connected with the USA through various military alliances
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The logical consequence of Peking’s new strategy in the international arena is its p
open rapprochement with the ruling circles of the biggest imperialist states. In 1970
the capitalist market accounted for 82 per cent of the PRC’s foreign trade turnover,
as compared to only 32 per cent in 1958. These figures speak for themselves. They
reveal the reorientation of the PRC’s economic ties from the socialist to the capitalist
market.
The USA is experiencing great difficulties in connection with the continuing war in p
Vietnam. It is intensifying its aggression against the peoples of Indochina and
accelerating the implementation of its “Vietnamisation” policy. In doing so
Washington is trying to use the "Peking card,” and the Maoists are again helping the
American imperialists to find a way out of the Indochina impasse. What is more, 339
Mao Tse-tung and his group are starting a new wave of anti-Sovietism to reassure
the US rulers about Peking’s loyalty.
The Soviet Union has always opposed the isolation of PRC and welcomes the p
establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and other countries as
well as the restoration of China’s rights in the UN. It seems that this could lead to
international detente and could make possible the solution of many major problems
and the safeguarding of world peace.
Throughout the years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have steadfastly p
defended the true interests of China as a socialist country. They have consistently
exposed the imperialist policy of isolating and blockading the PRC, and have
supported the legitimate demands to restore its rights in the UN by opposing the
"two Chinas" policy.
Unfortunately, the very first steps of the Chinese delegation in the UN General p
Assembly have shown that the Chinese leadership intends to continue in the United
Nations anti-Sovietism and its efforts to split the progressive forces. The two
speeches made by the leader of the Chinese delegation at the General Assembly bear
this out. Peking’s obstructive stand on the question of calling a World Disarmament
Conference and a conference of the five nuclear powers plays right into the hands of
the enemies of peace, says the Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo. They are
hoping that Peking’s cheap demagogy will influence some Third World countries and
that the imperialists will thus be able to wreck the Soviet initiatives aimed at
establishing peace and security.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government consistently support the normalisation of p 340
relations between all countries because this promotes a general improvement of the
international climate. At the same time, they have always considered that the
development of bilateral relations between states must not interfere with the interests
of other countries or proceed at their expense. The policy of improving the entire
international situation is the pivot of the peace programme put forward by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and endorsed
by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government towards China
is inseparably linked with this general programme. Their objective is to defend the
basic interests of the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles, and the
ideals of peace, democracy and communism. The CPSU will never go against its
own principles, against the state interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries, or against the world revolutionary process and the anti-imperialist struggle.
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Recently the Peking leadership has also changed its strategy in its relations with the
socialist countries. On the one hand, readiness is expressed to promote interstate
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence.” But at the same time, a sixth principle is added,
and this provides for interference into the internal affairs of the socialist countries
and for "prolonged, irreconcilable, principled struggle.”
By proposing this basis for relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, p
the Chinese leadership is not only completely ignoring the class approach in
international affairs, but also trying to create an international legal “ basis” for
considering them as non-socialist. Peking maintains that, apart from China itself, only
Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what is more, the Maoists want to exploit
normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries (which have not adopted
the doctrine of Maoism or approved the "cultural revolution”) in order to destroy or
undermine their system. So although the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles
of peaceful coexistence, which include non– interference in one another’s affairs, in
actual fact they are trying to legalise their subversive activity against the socialist
countries and interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of waging a
"principled struggle.”
The aims and programme of this struggle are openly expounded in the directive p
article, " Leninism or Social-Imperialism?" It is an attempt to give "theoretical
backing" to the subversion against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the
Marxist-Leninist parties and the international collective organisations of the socialist
states-the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty 342
Organisation. Similar aims were expressed by the Chinese leadership in its
publications on the occasion of the events that took place in Poland in December
1970, in the article of March 18, 1971, marking the centenary of the Paris Commune,
and in the article of July 1, 1971, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
CPC.
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how the Peking leaders are trying to expand the channels for their ideological 343
penetration of the socialist countries. They aim to turn them into an instrument of its
policy, and ultimately to undermine or weaken the unity and might of the socialist
system and isolate the USSR as much as possible. This line is reminiscent of the
"bridge building" stratagem by means of which imperialism has long been trying to
weaken the unity of the socialist community and “erode” it from within.
Besides, there are other benefits which the Chinese leadership hopes to get by p
means of its new strategy. For example, it wants the normalisation of interstate
relations between the PRC and the socialist countries to be presented as a victory for
the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and a justification of the course charted by the Ninth
Congress of the CPC.
But something else betrays the treachery of the Maoist "dual tactics.” This is that, p
despite all the efforts of the fraternal parties, the Chinese leadership (while
proclaiming fictitious antiimperialist slogans) vigorously opposes unity of action in
the struggle against imperialism. This, in effect, helps the imperialists in their
attempts to mount a counter-offensive against the revolutionary movement in one
area or another. An example of this is provided by the events in Indochina and also
by the increasing efforts of the reactionary forces to undermine the progressive
regimes in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries.
Peking has not only kept its global strategy against the Soviet Union unchanged, but p
is constantly deepening and "theoretically substantiating" it. Having rejected the 344
Marxist assessment of the major contradictions of today, and the class conception of
the balance of forces in the world, the Maoist politicians now contend that the chief
contradiction is the one between the two “superpowers” (the USSR and the USA) on
the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. The slogan of combating "the
hegemony of the two superpowers" has become the banner under which the Chinese
leadership is trying once again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small and
medium-sized" states, irrespective of their socio-economic systems. This slogan is an
extension of the Maoists’ anti-Marxist schemes about the "intermediate zones" and
the divisions of all states into “rich” and "poor,” and is obviously devised to justify
their anti-Soviet policy. Under the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers,” the
Maoists are discarding the idea of the confrontation of the two systems. Instead they
equate socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to attain hegemony.
Peking’s present foreign policy doctrine consists, on the one hand, in manoeuvring p
within the USSR-USA-Japan-China “quadrangle”-in increasing the contradictions
between the USSR, the USA and Japan for the sake of its own selfish, great-power
chauvinist aims; and, on the other hand, in urging various states (including
developing, capitalist and some socialist ones) to fight what it calls the "hegemony
of the two superpowers,” directing their attack mainly against the Soviet Union-the
bulwark of socialism, world peace and security. Chinese representatives emphasise
that this platform is the basis for a rapprochement with the PRC, that it is on this 345
basis that China is ready to improve relations with any country, regardless of its
system.
The Maoist leadership is trying hard to find allies in the developing countries of p
Asia, Africa and Latin America, counting on the nationalist sentiments and extremist
groupings in some of them. It has begun to step up diplomatic and economic
relations with the developing countries, using more flexible methods and avoiding
blatant intervention in their internal affairs or open imposition of Maoist ideas.
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A new feature of Chinese tactics designed to win the sympathy of the Third World p
was the revision in 1970 of the formerly hostile attitude towards the "movement of
the non-aligned countries" .and the endeavour to subject their interests to China’s
hegemonic policy. It is these aims that prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise
on the slogan of struggle against "the two superpowers" and to attempt to separate
the Third World countries from their reliable support in the anti-imperialist struggle-
to separate them from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
Hegemonic aspirations are also the factor that determines the attitude of the Peking p
leadership towards the problem of Indochina. Recent events are increasingly exposing
its strategic goals in Indochina and its double-dealing policy. Everything seems to
indicate that the Maoists are intent on strengthening their position in this region. If
we were to uncover the real motive behind their monoeuvres, it would be plain that
they are meant to show the US rulers that "the key to the solution of the Indochina
problem lies in Peking,” and to belittle the importance of the initiatives of the 346
Vietnamese patriots for a political settlement. This gives the US Administration the
opportunity to ignore the constructive proposals put forward by the delegation of the
South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government and fully supported by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the progressive and
peace forces of the world.
In order to win the confidence of the Arabs and to strengthen its position in the p
Middle East, Peking now prefers not to voice open objections against a political
settlement of the crisis there. Yet it continues to give active support to the extremist
elements there which oppose any political settlement.
The PRC leadership is dead against all the initiatives of the socialist states for a p
detente in Europe. It sharply opposed the Soviet and Polish agreements with the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the West Berlin talks. Its propaganda discredits
the idea of strengthening European security and does everything possible to interfere
with efforts to attain this end.
By opposing the Soviet proposals to hold a conference of the five nuclear powers p
and a World Disarmament Conference, the Chinese Government has proved itself to
be an opponent of detente.
Peking is now trying to bring its attitude to the international communist movement p
in line with its new foreign policy strategy. It wants to counterpose the various anti-
Soviet political forces and revisionist elements of all hues, both Right and "Left,” to
the tendency towards growing unity among the communist forces. That is why the
pursuance of the ideals of the working class and of scientific socialism today 347
requires firm action against all these enemies of Marxism– Leninism.
The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in 1969 has crippled p
the hegemonic plans of the CPC leaders. Having completely failed to turn the pro-
Chinese groups in other countries into influential political parties or to unite them
into something resembling an international trend, the Chinese leadership have made
another attempt to win over individual communist parties or at least to persuade them
not to make any public criticism of its ideology and policy. With this aim in view,
Chinese propaganda and official CPC representatives have concentrated on slandering
the CPSU’s home and foreign policies and the situation in the USSR and the
socialist community in front of foreign Communists. At the same time any pretext is
used to kindle nationalism and anti-Sovietism among the ranks of the communist
movement and the national-liberation movement.
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In its efforts to subject the revolutionary movement and the national-liberation drive p
to its hegemonic aims. Maoism is managing to confuse some revolutionaries and
trying to direct struggle, not against the real enemies, but against the Soviet Union
and the communist parties which are actively defending Marxism-Leninism and the
unity of all revolutionary forces.
As for the patently pro-Maoist parties, they have recently been considerably p
weakened. Having taken the political course dictated by Peking, they found
themselves in a most awkward situation. For example, there were some communist
parties whose leadership blindly followed Maoist dogmas. This led to the serious
defeat of the revolutionary forces in the countries concerned, while the parties
themselves lost contact with the masses, forfeited worker and peasant support, and
degenerated into conspiratorial sects maintained by Peking.
Maoism is one of the most dangerous adversaries of Marxism in the history of the p 349
revolutionary movement. The danger stems largely from the fact that Maoism is a
political practice which exploits the aspirations of the masses for socialism and
which relies for ideological support on the eclecticism of "Mao Tse-tung ideas,” the
political prestige of the Chinese revolution and the CPC, the state machinery, and the
economic, military and other resources of the world’s most populous country.
Maoist slogans sometimes find some response among certain quarters in the Third p
World and among young extremists in the capitalist countries, and are taken up and
spread by opportunists. This is due largely to the fact that the public in these
countries, not knowing the true nature of Maoism, mistakes the revolutionary rhetoric
of Maoism for a genuine revolutionary spirit and concern for the interests of the
fighting peoples. But deeper knowledge of Maoism dispels these illusions and proves
it to be basically incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, and
with the interests of the struggle for national liberation.
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The anti-Leninist ideological and political platform of the Maoists appeared in the p
late 1950’s and took concrete shape after Peking’s extensive political and ideological
campaign against the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.
Criticism of Maoism should take account of the great gap existing between Mao’s p
published articles, which foster the myth that he is an " outstanding Marxist-
Leninist,” and his actual views. These latter betray themselves in the actual policy 351
and activity of the present Chinese leadership, Mao Tse-tung’s articles and speeches
are reportedly published after thorough revision, after "they have been flavoured with
Marxism– Leninism,” as he himself says. The Maoists deliberately exploit for their
selfish aims the authoritative ideas of scientific socialism, using them to conceal the
unscientific, anti-Marxist character of the ideas of the "great helmsman.” On the
other hand, Mao Tse-tung has adopted many true postulates regarding the strategy,
tactics and driving forces of the Chinese revolution, having borrowed them from the
documents of the Communist International and from works by veterans of the
fraternal parties (including some Chinese). It is the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist
parties, not Mao Tse-tung, that are to be credited with the verified conclusions and
appraisals concerning such basic issues as the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal nature
of the Chinese revolution, the important role in it of the peasantry, the significance
of the revolutionary army and armed struggle in China, and the tactics of a unified
national front.
In order to keep "Mao Tse-tung’s ideas" " unrivalled,” all the works of the well- p
known Chinese propagandists of Marxism-Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Teng Chung-
hsia, Wang Ming, Chang Wen-t’ien and others-have been destroyed; some of these
authors are being constantly discredited, while others are intentionally buried in
oblivion. This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung as the great "theorist,
strategist and tactician" of the Chinese revolution.
The Maoists are thus giving Mao Tse-tung undeserved credit for elaborating the p 352
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fundamental principles regarding the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution,
completely ignoring the decisive role in it of the advice and recommendation of the
Communist International and of the CPSU’s experience. It is essential to distinguish
the “ideas” which really belong to Mao Tse-tung from the correct precepts on which
Maoism is merely capitalising in order to conceal its own anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist
essence.
The importance of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is p
becoming more and more obvious today because of the emergence of a kind of
"unified ideological front" extending from “Left” and Right opportunism to diehard
anti-communism. Today the most varied political forces-the imperialists, Maoists,
nationalists, revisionists of all shades, and bellicose Zionists-are acting together in a
single camp against Marxist-Leninist teachings, the communist movement and the
socialist community. Mao Tse-tung and his group, who pose as ultra-"
revolutionaries,” are actually in alliance with Right revisionists and undisguised anti-
Communists such as Herbert Marcuse, Milovan Djilas, Klaus Mehnert, Ernst Fischer
and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
To strengthen ties with the above-mentioned anti-Marxist "united front" and slacken p
the effectiveness of the principled criticism of the Maoist order by Marxist-Leninist
parties, the Peking leaders are increasingly issuing invitations to Western literary
men, correspondents and numerous delegations. For instance, in the autumn of 1970,
the PRC was visited by Edgar Snow, the “ chronicler” of Maoism. Peking insistently
invites bourgeois journalists to China and works on them diligently so they would
depict the situation in China in a way favourable to the Maoists. Chinese officials
have suddenly become very talkative and great lovers of heart-to-heart discussions
over a cup of tea with American, West German and Japanese bourgeois journalists,
hoping to be favoured with wide publicity of their views and their numerous verbal
attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is not surprising that
on returning home these visitors whitewash the "cultural revolution,” portraying it as
the "purposeful struggle of the masses.”
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mislead readers.
Right opportunists are also trying to form an alliance with the Maoists in the p
onslaught against Marxism-Leninism by making up to Peking and embellishing its
policy and the "cultural revolution.” One of the originators of this trend is Roger
Garaudy, expelled from the French Communist Party for his anti-party activities. In
his writings he presents the theory and practice of Maoism as a "model of backward
socialism" which he says is the logical product of the development of Chinese
society.
The ideological battle being waged by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties p
forces the Maoists to assume a defensive position, change their tactics, and adapt
themselves to the new situation. This principled struggle offers effective moral and
political support to the genuine Communists of China and to those Chinese people,
who are striving to redirect their country along the socialist path.
While consistently combating the chauvinist course of the Maoists, the CPSU is p
constantly educating the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and
patriotism. Soviet people have the greatest respect for the Chinese people and their 355
culture. Despite the anti-Soviet hysteria in China, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship
Society in the USSR is still functioning actively. It is in the USSR, and not in
China, that the classics of Chinese literature are being studied and the works of Lu
Hsin, Lao She, Mao Tun, T’an Han and many other leading Chinese novelists,
playwrights and poets are being widely published. It was not present-day China, but
Moscow, that celebrated the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen and held exhibitions of
paintings by Hsu Pei-hung, Chi Pai-shin and other Chinese artists. These facts serve
to expose the Maoist claims that the Soviet Union conducts "anti-Chinese
propaganda.”
In his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held p
in Moscow in 1969, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said: "We do not
identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the
aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the
Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China’s genuine national renaissance,
and its socialist development, will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by
alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.”
The Soviet stand towards the Chinese People’s Republic was reaffirmed at the 24th p
Congress of the CPSU. While consistently following the course mapped out by the
Congress, the Party continues to be steadfast in exposing the anti-Soviet policy of the
Maoists and their anti-Leninist, nationalist ideology, and to stave off Peking’s
encroachments upon the national interests of the Soviet Union, and upon the unity 356
and cohesion of the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement. The
CPSU is pursuing a stable policy of normalising interstate relations between the
USSR and the PRC.
In its resolution "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU After the 24th p
Congress of the CPSU,” the November (1971) Plenum of the CC CPSU affirmed
that the "Politbureau is consistently pursuing the policy of the 24th Congress in
relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.” The Plenum expressed "complete
agreement with the Politbureau’s position in resolving the relevant practical
questions,” and noted with satisfaction that "the foreign policy course of the CC
CPSU enjoys the full understanding and unanimous support of all Communists and
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the entire Soviet people. Therein lies the main strength of the CPSU’s international
policy.”
The situation today and the present onslaught of the Chinese leadership against p
Marxism– Leninism, and against the unity of the Marxist– Leninist parties and of the
socialist countries, urgently demand still greater efforts in all areas of the ideological
struggle against Maoism, so that peace, democracy and socialism may triumph.
***
TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 334•1] One can get an idea of the scope of China’s anti-Soviet campaign if one
notes, among other things, the fact that in less than 11 months in 1971, the Maoist
government mouthpiece, Jenmin jihpao, carried about 400 items containing crude
attacks on the Soviet Union, and 12 issues of Hungchi magazine carried similar
material. China’s book market is full of anti-Soviet literature; Radio Peking daily
broadcasts anti-Soviet slander.
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<•> The Foreign Policy 357
of the People’s
TOC Republic of China Since
Card the 9th Congress
of the Communist Party of China
Text
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D. Vostokov p
PS
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Since the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) the PRC’s foreign policy has not only p
retained its nationalistic character, but its great-power, chauvinistic essence and its
T*
break with the principles of socialist internationalism are making themselves more
19*
deeply and clearly felt.
###
This has been shown in the decisions of the September 1970 2nd Plenary Meeting p
of the CPC CC as well as in the PRC’s 1970–71 foreign policy activity. The 2nd
Plenary Meeting called on the Party and the army resolutely to implement Mao Tse-
tung’s line and directives and to accomplish the tasks set by the 9th Congress. Thus,
anti-Sovietism and subversive actions within the socialist community and the
international communist movement as well as the striving for a rapprochement with
imperialist states were confirmed as the PRC’s long-term official foreign policy. By
pursuing an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy Peking wants to compensate the Western
states for their aid in the development of China’s economy, as well as for helping it
to carry out its great-power designs of turning China into a state capable of realising 358
its territorial claims on the Soviet Union, and of bringing under its influence the
neighbouring states in East and SouthEast Asia.
The changes in Peking’s tactics are due to a number of setbacks in its foreign and p
home policy. These include:
– the futile attempts to split the socialist community and international communist p
movement. The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties (1969) showed
that the communist parties condemned the "special course" and splitting tactics of the
Peking leaders;
– the abortive plans to use the liberation movement of the developing countries and p
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the progressive democratic movement in the capitalist countries for its own great-
power, chauvinistic purposes by means of pseudo-revolutionary demagogy;
– Peking’s international isolation resulting from its subversive activity and p 359
interference in other countries’ affairs as well as its attempts to provoke armed
clashes and local wars, with China herself taking no part in them. This isolation has
become especially pronounced during the "cultural revolution" since the Chinese
leaders introduced methods of hungweipings’ violence and armed pressures into
diplomatic practice and international relations ;
– the poor state of Chinese economy and low rates of its development caused by p
the recent events of the "cultural revolution" and militarisation, unavailing attempts
to rely on small industries and primitive means of production, and the politically
motivated curtailment of economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist
countries.
At the same time, despite the defeat of the opposition and establishment of a p
military– bureaucratic dictatorship, the political situation in China is characterised by
political instability which forces the Peking leaders to stabilise the regime at any
cost, in order to consolidate it and implement their strategic great-power, chauvinistic
schemes.
The concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders, the reliance p
on special army units, the suppression of the opposition, and the liquidation of the
democratic institutions in the state and the Party offer favourable conditions for
arbitrariness in foreign policy, for a collusion with imperialism on the basis of
deepening and strengthening the anti-Soviet line and the tactical renunciation of the
ultra-“Leftist” slogans, as well as curtailing or, at least, camouflaging their ties with 360
the “Left” extremist pettybourgeois elements in capitalist countries.
Peking’s new tactics show that it has become the Trojan horse of imperialism in the p
international revolutionary movement, this forming the essence of the intensified
diplomatic flirting now taking place between China and the imperialist countries
headed by the USA.
In the new situation, the diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China seeks to p
ensure a favourable attitude to the Peking regime on the part of a maximum number
of states, the capitalist states, in the first place, without affecting the Maoist great-
power, chauvinistic course.
The following are some of the concrete features which characterise the new stage in p
Peking’s policy:
– restoration of the PRC’s rights in the United Nations including its permanent p
membership in the Security Council;
These trends of the PRC’s foreign policy have manifested themselves in numerous p
acts by the Chinese Government in the international arena. Peking is increasingly
seeking to conceal its participation in the activity of the pro-Maoist groups in the
revolutionary and liberation movement. In the "Third World" Peking has begun to
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The resumption of contacts with the United States in the beginning of 1971 and the p
attempts to enter into relations with it on the basis of renouncing the struggle against 361
imperialism are directly linked with what has now become an important component
part of Peking’s foreign policy and a new stage in the PRC’s foreign policy. The
Maoists have been playing on the contradictions between the two world systems in
order to gain time, accumulate strength and prepare the internal and external
conditions for establishing the People’s Republic of China as the "third global"
power. To accomplish this task the Chinese leaders have elaborated and used the
"two superpowers" concept which they have made the core of their foreign policy
since the 9th CPC Congress. Today the Peking regime is striving to win world-wide
support for its hegemonistic aims by resorting to the slogan of uniting the "medium
and small" countries and by manipulating with anti-Soviet and anti-American
catchwords.
At the same time, the Peking regime is continuing to build up its nuclear-missile p
potential, although this task is far from being completed. However, the very
possibility of such a development is already of some political significance since it
enables the Chinese leaders to pursue a geopolitical course in international relations.
Although Peking has formally retained the two main interconnected components- p
anti-Sovietism, as the major course of the foreign policy, and anti-Americanism-in
its ideological, political and propaganda arsenal the latter component has finally
degenerated into nationalistic doctrine which, owing to the objective historical
conditions, sometimes coincides with the struggle waged by progressive forces
against imperialism. Anti– Americanism has been assigned the role of bringing
pressure to bear in the bargaining which Mao Tse-tung and his followers are 362
carrying on with US imperialism for a recognition of their chauvinistic global claims,
especially in East and SouthEast Asia.
At the same time, the foreign policy of the Peking regime, particularly in the "Third p
World" countries, continues to retain its petty-bourgeois radical component. In their
struggle for hegemony in the world revolutionary and liberation movement the
Chinese leaders, orienting themselves on the nationalistic elements prevailing in some
sections of the anti-imperialist front, are seeking, by means of the "two superpowers"
concept, to place nationalism at the service of their anti-Soviet policies.
In the beginning of 1971, the Chinese leadership for the first time responded p
positively to the initiative of the US Government which since 1963 had repeatedly
proposed to normalise US-Chinese relations. Although the Chinese leadership
retained and even developed some forms of relations with the United States on
various levels and, according to some sources, was even willing in 1964 to receive
President Johnson in the People’s Republic of China despite its anti-American
propaganda, all the proposals made by the USA on extending contacts and
establishing them officially were ostentatiously and categorically rejected. 363
This attitude of the PRC Government towards the US proposals was determined by p
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The new Administration took some unilateral measures aimed at normalising the p
US-Chinese relations. To begin with, it relaxed the embargo on trade with the PRC.
This resulted in the restoration of the US-Chinese trade relations (in 1970—3.5 364
million dollars’ worth), the US Government granting licences to overseas branches of
US companies to sell to the PRC such commodities as the General Motors
Corporation lorry engines, excavating machines, pharmaceutical goods, rubber, etc.
Subsequently, in striving to stimulate the restoration of relations, the US Government
lifted all restrictions on exports of non-strategic goods to the PRC, while retaining
the embargo on the trade with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Korean
People’s Democratic Republic, and Cuba.
Moreover, the US 7th Fleet ceased patrolling the Taiwan Strait and the US p
reconnaissance planes discontinued their flights over the PRC territory. The USA
changed its position regarding China’s entry to the UN.
On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his followers, who since 1964–65 have tried p
covertly to improve the Chinese-American relations, could overtly meet the US
“bridge-building” policy halfway only under certain conditions, i.e., when the
establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship as a result of the "cultural
revolution" dispelled their apprehensions that the anti– popular policy of
rapprochement with the US imperialism would consolidate the anti-Maoist opposition
and undermine the already unstable status of the Mao Tse-tung group inside China.
Under these conditions, the unilateral measures taken by the US Government served p
their purpose. They made it possible to conduct secret negotiations with
representatives of the Peking regime with the result that the State Department
abrogated the need for special entry permits for US citizens wishing to visit the
People’s Republic of China, these permits formerly being regarded by the Chinese 365
Government as discriminatory. An agreement was also reached to invite on this basis
US public and press representatives as the first step in developing bilateral contacts.
Soon after this restriction had been annulled, the US pingpong team which had
participated in the world championship games in Japan was invited to China and the
first US newsmen were granted permission to enter the country. In April 1971, the
American athletes and journalists arrived in China thus inaugurating a new stage in
the USChinese relations.
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US imperialism has not as yet ceased its aggressive war in Indochina. The US p
Government has given no answer to the peaceful initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam-the seven-point
proposal. As for the PRC’s stand on the Vietnam issue, Chou En-lai who, in his
lenghty interview with James Reston, The New York Times observer, made public the
principles of the PRC’s foreign policy, did not support the demand of the DRV
Government to fix the date of the US troops withdrawal from Vietnam and did not
even mention the date the PRC wishes the US troops to be withdrawn from Taiwan.
The PRC’s policy on other international issues coincides with the aggressive course p
of US imperialism. The Peking regime sought to utilise the Middle East situation
resulting from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries to discredit Soviet
foreign policy, and tried to intensify the Soviet-American contradictions in that area.
At the same time the Chinese leaders and US imperialism came out in support of the
counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and attempted to profit from the
difficulties which arose in the Polish People’s Republic in 1970. The Chinese leaders
played into the hands of NATO’s global strategists by creating a hotbed of tension
on the Chinese-Soviet borders.
Far from being peaceful are also the policy of building up the nuclear-missile p
potential, the constant opposition to a detente, and the negative attitude towards 367
collective security measures, while the urge to replace a genuine detente by foreign
policy stratagems makes the policy pursued by Peking leaders similar to that of US
imperialism.
These facts have led progressive people throughout the world to the conclusion that p
the true reasons for the rapprochement between the Chinese leadership and US
imperialism are to be found in the homogeneity of their present foreign policy
interests. On the one hand, US imperialism is clearly striving to weaken the
influence of socialism and to gain control over the vast zone of the "Third World"
in the face of the growing tendency towards complete national and social
emancipation; on the other hand, the Peking regime is making no less overt the
attempt to secure the position of the "world’s third superpower" and to use it for the
purpose of attaining its territorial claims and hegemonistic designs.
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The policy of the US-Chinese rapprochement recently manifested itself in new facts. p
At the end of October H. Kissinger made his second voyage to Peking and had
lengthy talks with Chou Enlai. The foreign press reported that these talks covered not
only the protocol and the programme of the US President’s forthcoming visit, but
also some specific problems that are to be discussed during the negotiations.
It was no accident that Kissinger made his visit to Peking at the time when the p
General Assembly of the United Nations was considering the question of restoring
the PRC’s rights in this international organisation. The resolution to admit the PRC 368
to the UN and to expel the Chiang Kai-shek representatives was passed by a
majority vote.
The progressive forces all over the world are hoping that the normalisation of p
relations between the PRC and the USA will not result in increased tension and
deterioration in international affairs. As A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, said to the newsmen in Canada in an interview on October 20,
1971, concerning the Chinese-American negotiations, it is important that they should
lead to a peaceful settlement of issues, to a relaxation of world tension. This
undoubtedly also pertains to all spheres of the PRC’s activity in the international
arena in connection with the possibilities of its extension after the admittance of the
PRC to the UN.
Without modifying their major strategic aims, the Chinese leaders in 1970–71 were p
vigorously changing their tactics with regard to the national liberation movement as
well as the interstate relations with the developing Asian, African and Latin
American countries. Their entire international activity at that period was aimed at
restoring and increasing the Third World countries’ confidence in China as a force
independent of the "two superpowers.”
In their foreign policy activity in the Third World countries, the Chinese leaders p
have again resorted to the principles and formulas of the Bandung Conference and
the methods of the " popular diplomacy" for the extension of all-round contacts with
many countries regardless of their political orientation. China has been restoring her
membership in international bodies and becoming more active in local branches of
various societies. The PRC has not only returned its ambassadors to a number of 369
Afro-Asian countries but has also considerably moderated its own terms for
establishing diplomatic relations in the last two years, so that today it suffices for a
developing country to recognise the PRC Government as "the only legitimate
government of China,” without completely disrupting relations with Taiwan. The
PRC has recently established official diplomatic relations with a number of countries,
including Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone, Kuwait,
Iran, Chile, Peru, the Lebanon and Rwanda.
China’s diplomatic penetration into Latin America also betrays the PRC’s new p
tactics. Peking is continuing to intensify its efforts to extend its official relations with
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Of late, Chinese propaganda has been changing its accents in the "Third World.” p
There now appear fresh catchwords and concepts designed to camouflage the
opportunism of the Peking leaders and their departure from the anti– imperialist
struggle as well as, consequently, to retain the possibility of struggling for the
hegemony of the PRC as the sole uniting and guiding force in the Third World. As
a matter of fact, Chinese “ antiimperialism” has become idle talk which, as was
recently emphasised by the Arab press, serves only as a "serious warning" to
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Moreover, in order to attain its nationalistic aspirations and, for this purpose, to p
dispel the mistrust with which the governments of a number of Third World
countries regarded Peking in 1966–68, the Chinese leaders, under the guise of so-
called double revolutionary tactics, simply betray the forces which they supported
before. For instance, in 1971, China abandoned the Ceylon “Left” putchist forces
which she herself had inspired. The Maoists also acted improperly in relation to East
Pakistan.
Seeking to use Pakistan as its major "strong point" in the Middle East and the p
Indian Ocean area, and playing on the contradictions between Pakistan and India,
Peking also made some peaceable gestures to India in 1971, although its true aims
are in no way concerned with the interests of the two countries.
Peking uses a similar tactic in the Middle East. According to Arab public opinion, p
the Chinese leaders instigated the September 1970 events in Jordan which led to the
defeat of the Palestine organisations. In 1971 the Peking leaders were still interested
in keeping this conflict unsettled, although they no longer talked about it openly. The
Maoists continued to propagate their bellicose principles and to declare their support 371
for the liberation struggle of the people of Palestine, but, at the same time, ceased
their sharp attacks against the peaceful settlement plan, thus playing a double game
with the Palestine resistance movement and the fighting Arab countries. The Chinese
leaders unhesitatingly declared that they "had lost their confidence in the Palestine
guerrillas and do not intend to support them in the future.” All this hardly agrees
with the statement made by Chou En-lai in September 1971, to the effect that "China
does not sell her principles and does not betray her comrades-in-arms.” [371•1
To attain this goal, Peking has changed its formerly negative attitude to the idea of p
nonalignment. Today the Chinese leaders seek to turn it against the USSR as one of
the "superpowers" and hope to utilise the non-aligned countries in their great-power 372
designs.
The PRC’s economic policy in the Third World has also suffered some changes. p
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There is a clear tendency to increase the number of states receiving Chinese aid, as
well as the amount of this aid. The countries of socialist orientation have always
been China’s chief contractors in the development of her economic cooperation with
the Third World countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville, and
Mali were receiving Chinese aid even during the "cultural revolution”). In 1970–71,
the People’s Republic of China concluded a number of new agreements on economic
and technical cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt, the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Ceylon, and Mauritania. By the beginning
of 1971, the countries of socialist orientation accounted for about 60 per cent of the
total Chinese aid to the Third World and for most of the enterprises actually built.
The changes in Peking’s tactics in Africa since the 9th CPC Congress have been p
directly connected with the fact that the genuine nationalliberation movements had
rejected China’s claims to the leadership of the revolutionary forces and had
consolidated their ties with the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular. At
the same time, the pro-Maoist groups and organisations have discredited themselves,
lost their links with the people, and have become overt enemies of the African
revolutionary-democratic forces.
The unscrupulous but more flexible policy of the Chinese leaders is directed towards p
the same old goal, i.e., achieving hegemony in the national liberation movement, and
weakening its union with the socialist countries, and the international communist and
working-class movement.
The major task of the Chinese leadership in Latin America today is the development p 374
of interstate relations. Peking has vigorously striven for recognition by Latin
American governments. Here the Chinese leaders stand on overtly anti-Soviet
positions and endeavour to activate the Maoist groups. At the same time, they are
trying to undermine the revolutionary movement from within and to impose upon it
their ideological and organisational leadership. Thus, Peking is striving to neutralise
the crisis consequences and the discontent in Latin American pro-Chinese groups that
resulted from the changes in the foreign policy tactics of the Chinese leadership, in
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Trade relations are also developing between the PRC and Ecuador. The press p
reported talks on China’s purchases of bauxites and aluminium in Guyana. Eliseo
Berruato, Mexican DeputySecretary for Industry and Commerce, expressed himself in 375
favour of extending trade ties with the PRC.
Since the "cultural revolution" the PRC’s diplomatic activity has extended, first and p
foremost, to the Western capitalist countries which Peking regards as a global force
that has common political interests with China. The Chinese leadership attaches great
importance to establishing ties with European capitalist countries on the basis of
"consolidating all forces against the hegemony of the two “superpowers” and thus
seeks partly to solve the PRC’s political and economic problems through cooperation
with the West; it also wants to use Europe as a means of pressure on the USA and
the USSR.
Having advanced the theory of "small and medium" countries, the Peking leaders p
regard Great Britain, France, the FRG and other Western countries as victims of the
pressure exerted by the “superpowers” and, ignoring the class essence of capitalism,
they are actually willing to regard them as not belonging to the imperialist system.
In extending their relations with developed capitalist states, the PRC’s leaders seek p
to utilise the Western economic, scientific and technical potential for the purpose of
obtaining strategic goods and technical assistance in building military objects.
Thus, in the PRC’s foreign contacts imperialist powers have actually replaced the p
socialist countries with whom the Chinese leaders have curtailed their economic
relations. The capitalist world has become China’s major supplier of plant equipment
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(including military equipment). In the last seven years, British, West German, French,
Italian and other companies have signed contracts with the PRC’s foreign trade
bodies for the delivery of 300 million dollars’ worth of equipment for 43 industrial
enterprises, including 18 chemical, four oil-refining, ten engineering and five steel
manufacturing plants.
The trip of the PRC’s economic delegation headed by the Foreign Trade Minister, p
Bai Sianko, to the West European countries in SeptemberNovember 1971 attests the
PRC’s intentions to strengthen its ties with the capitalist world.
Their common stand also makes itself felt in the questions pertaining to the p
relaxation of tension and the creation of a collective security system in Europe. The
struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist countries for a detente, establishment
of a European security system based on recognition of the territorial status quo in
Europe, and for convocation of an all-European conference meets with stubborn
resistance of the Chinese leadership and the reactionary forces in the NATO
countries, primarily the revanchists in the FRG. Striving to provoke conflict situations
between the USSR and the USA, the Chinese leadership attempts to hinder a detente
in Europe and to retain possibilities for bringing pressure to bear on the USSR from
the West. The Chinese leaders regard a detente in Europe as dangerous to their
strategic plans.
The Peking regime sharply condemned the Soviet-West German treaty of August 12, p
1970. Peking alleged that the treaty was a "betrayal of the interests of the German
people, the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole of Europe" and declared that
the Soviet Union had given to West Germany "tacit consent to annex the GDR.”
Thus, the Chinese leaders’ stand with respect to the Soviet-West German treaty
objectively merged with that of the most reactionary forces of West German
imperialism who, in their turn, described the treaty as a "provocation against China.”
The rather frank statement of Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador to Paris, is p 378
typical of the Chinese leaders’ attitude to the problems of European security. On
November 5, 1970, speaking in Paris on the occasion of the Italy-PRC mutual
diplomatic recognition, he said: "We Chinese are against the Soviet proposal to
convene an allEuropean security conference. By this, the Soviet Union wants to oust
the Americans from Europe so that it may bring greater pressure to bear on China
and to fetter its satellites more than ever before. The agreement between Bonn and
Moscow helps the USSR to implement its plans.”
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mentioned as the chief enemy of the people alongside the two "superpowers.”
However, the Chinese leaders are developing contacts with Japan in practically all
spheres, and their relations with the Japanese ruling Liberal-Democratic Party have
become very active. Despite the fact that the Sato Government has not responded to
Peking’s far-reaching proposals made in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders have not
abandoned their hopes and efforts of striking a bargain with the Japanese ruling
quartcrs on the nationalistic, anti-Soviet basis which they had proclaimed earlier. 379
It is but natural that in their relations with the Mao Tse-tung group, Japanese p
imperialists take into account its anti-Sovietism and subversive activities against the
democratic forces of Japan, as well as the opportunity to utilise JapaneseChinese
contacts to bring pressure to bear on the USA. At the same time, the Japanese
Government continues to consolidate its imperialist efforts in Asia and to extend its
economic and political penetration into Taiwan. Under the conditions of the
escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam, the Japanese Government stopped using
the funds of the Export-Import Bank of Japan for financing deliveries of complete
sets of equipment to China. It also exercises stricter control over the exports and
even the exposition in the PRC (at the Japanese industrial fairs) of non– commercial
samples of goods regarded as strategic.
While further consolidating and extending its military-political alliance with the p
USA, the Japanese Government has agreed overtly to include Taiwan, Vietnam, and
South Korea in the sphere of the "security treaty.” Moreover, it has demonstrated its
readiness to see to it that the status quo in the Taiwan problem be preserved. Thus,
Japan is increasingly more frankly claiming leadership in Asia in union with and
aided by the United States.
Having failed, by means of nationalistic and anti-Soviet flirting with Japan’s ruling p
quarters, to mitigate the anti-Chinese stance of her militarypolitical alliance with the
USA and to gain access to Japanese investments and technology, the Chinese
leadership increased its pressure on Japan and started severely criticising the Sato 380
Government, at the same time activating its relations with the opposition, the so-
called pro-Chinese elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The Chinese leaders are
blackmailing Japan’s ruling circles with the possibly anti-Japanese trend of the
newly-emerging Chinese-US rapprochement. They demonstrate to the Japanese ruling
circles their blatant anti-Sovietism and solidarity on the "Northern territories" issue,
the solidarity on which Japan may allegedly rely in bringing pressure to bear on the
Soviet Union.
At the same time, a very specific feature may be traced in Peking’s growing p
criticism of the Japanese reactionaries and militarists. This criticism increasingly’
boils down to attacks against the activity of the present government making it
possible to use it as a kind of a smoke-screen for the purpose of hiding the actually
growing political ties with the Japanese ruling quarters as a whole. The so-called
pro-Chinese opposition within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition whose
mood, alongside the racial-nationalistic "flexibility,” is characterised by overt anti–
Sovietism and revanchism, speaks on behalf of these quarters. The Chinese leaders
persistently seek to present it as a progressive, anti-imperialist force with which a
mutual understanding would be tantamount to a unification of the Asian peoples’
efforts in their struggle against the US-Japanese reactionaries.
In the joint communiques with the above– mentioned LDP representatives (at the p
annual negotiations in Peking on the trade with the big Japanese capitalists), the
Chinese leadership shows its full accord with them on a number of key international 381
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issues which do not only relate to the Chinese-Japanese relations. Although the
Japanese side represents the upper stratum of the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie’s
ruling party, at the trade talks it makes vigorous attempts to dissociate itself from the
Sato Government foreign policy. It expresses an “understanding” of China’s stand on
a number of world issues, for instance, that the new interpretation of the Japanese–
American "security treaty" has turned it into a more harmful military alliance directed
against the Chinese and other Asian peoples; that the Japanese reactionaries have
become a major supporter of US imperialism and the vanguard in the struggle
against the peoples of Asia; that the USJapanese reactionaries seek to perpetuate the
occupation of Taiwan and South Korea and the split of Vietnam; and that in Japan,
the revival of militarism has become a reality.
Moreover, the placemen of the Japanese monopoly circles, who reflect the interests p
of the monopoly section which, pursuing its own imperialist aims with respect to
Asia, including China, are inclined to be less dependent on the USA, even declare
their resolve to oppose the revival of Japanese militarism.
The Chinese leaders also seek to build their relations with the democratic forces of p
Japan on an anti-Soviet basis. It is well-known that the “revolutionary” activity of
the Peking leaders in Japan during the "cultural revolution" resulted in increased
dissociation of the country’s democratic forces and weakening of some of its
contingents. This service rendered to the Japanese ruling quarters can hardly be
overestimated. The Japanese-American "security treaty" was to expire in June 1970, 382
and a fierce struggle was waged between the US-Japanese reactionaries, on the one
hand, and the progressive forces, on the other, to determine the country’s further
course. The cherished hope of the US and Japanese imperialist circles was to weaken
the stand of the progressive forces and their pressure, and to attain this aim these
imperialists had exerted a great deal of effort.
Objectively, Peking was acting in the same vein. The obviousness of this fact forced p
the Peking leaders somewhat to modify the wording of the thesis of struggle against
the "four enemies" which they had been imposing on the Japanese democratic forces,
although the essence of this thesis remained unaffected. Anti-Sovietism and
subversive actions against the Communist Party of Japan remain the core of the
Chinese leaders’ activity in the democratic movement of Japan.
All this goes to show that, despite the changes in their tactical principles, and p
peaceable verbiage, the foreign policy of the Maoists has not altered its essence and
remains nationalistic and adventurist. The Chinese leaders continue acting on the
strength of their anti-socialist propositions aimed at winning a leading status in the
world by pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, carrying on subversive activity in the
socialist community and the world communist and democratic movement; they are
increasingly developing contacts with imperialist states, particularly with the USA,
and are endeavouring to use the Third World countries as an instrument of achieving
their great-power chauvinistic aims.
Meanwhile the restoration of the PRC’s rights in the United Nations that was p
advocated by the USSR, which has always defended, as a matter of principle, the 383
interests of the Chinese people and China as a great power, offers the PRC fresh
opportunities in international relations. Today it is becoming increasingly evident that
only a policy based on socialist principles can really protect China’s national
interests and give the Chinese people a chance to concentrate their efforts on
socialist construction as well as to restore the genuine prestige of the PRC in the
international arena.
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A Ascent: Careers in the USSR, The
A Asian Dilemma: A Soviet view and Myrdal’s concept
A Asian Dilemma: The essence of social progress in the transitional period
A Astronomy for Entertainment
A At the Bidding of the Heart:
A At the Centr\ve of Political Storms: The memoirs of a Soviet diplomat
A At the Turning Points of History: Some lessons of the struggle against revisionism within the Marxist-Leninist movement
A Atlantis
A Atomic Nucleus
A Authoritarianism and Democracy
A Avengers:
A Awakening to Life: Forming behaviour and the mind in deaf-blind children
A Azerbaijanian Poetry, Classic Modern, Traditional:
B Badges and Trophies in Soviet Sports
B Basic Economic Law of Modern Capitalism, The
B Basic Principles of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, The
B Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: A Soviet view, The
B Basic Principles of the Organisation of Soviet Agriculture, The
B Basic Problems of the Marxist-Leninst Theory: Symposium of Lectures
B Basics of Marxist-Leninist Theory
B Battle for the Caucasus
B Battle of Ideas in the Modern World., The
B Battle of Kursk, The
B Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939–June 1941
B Beginning: Lenin’s Childhood and Youth, The
B Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple:
B Behind the Scenes of Third Reich Diplomacy.
B Benefactors of Peace
B Big Business and the Economic Cycle:
B Big Changes in the USSR: Leafing through the Soviet Journal Kommunist
B Biosphere and Politics, The
B Birth of Nations, The
B Birth of a Genius: The Development of the Personality and World Outlook of Karl Marx
B Black Book and Schwambrania:, The
B Blacks in United States History
B Bolshevik Party’s Struggle Against Trotskyism (1903–February 1917), The
B Bolshevik Party’s Struggle Against Trotskyism in the Post-October Period., The
B Bolshevik-led Socialist Revolution, March–October 1917, The
B Bolsheviks and the Armed Forces in Three Revolutions:, The
B Book About Artists
B Book About Bringing Up Children, A
B Book About Russia: In the union of equals:, A
B Books in the Service of Peace, Humanism, and Progress
B Books in the USSR
B Boris Kustodiev: The Artist and His Work
B Boris Pasternak: Selected writings and letters.
B Bourgeois Economic Thought 1930s–1970s
B Bourgeois Nations and Socialist Nations
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B Breadwinners, The
B Brief Course of Dialectical Materialism: Popular outline, A
B British Foreign Policy During World War II 1939–1945
B Broad-Casting Pirates or Abuse of the Microphone:
B Builder of Socialism and Figher Against Fascism, The
B Bureaucracy in India
B Bureaucracy, Triumph and Crisis: New thinking
B Bureaucrats in Power–Ecological Collapse
B By: ANNA LOUISE STRONG
B By: JASON W. SMITH
C Camp of Socialism and the Camp of Capitalism, The
C Can Man Change the Climate?
C Can Socialists & Communists Co-Operate?
C Canada–USA: Problems and contradictions in North American economic integration
C Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in Developing Africa
C Capitalism and the Ecological Crisis
C Capitalism at the End of the Century
C Capitalism, Socialism and Scientific and Technical Revolution
C Capitalism, the Technological Revolution, and the Working Class
C Capitalist Economy
C Case for Perestroika: Articles from the monthly Kommunist , The
C Categories and Laws of the Political Economy of Communism
C Caught in the Act
C Causality and the Relation of States in Physics
C Cause of My Life., The
C Caution: Zionism!:
C Cecil Rhodes and His Time
C Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October Revolution
C Central Asia and Kazakstan[d] Before and After the October Revolution: Reply to falsifiers of history
C Central Asia in Modern Times:
C Central V.I. Lenin Museum
C Centralised Planning of the Economy
C Ch’ing Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century, The
C Challenges of Our Time: Disarmament and social progress, The
C Champions of Peace
C Changing Face of the Earth:, The
C Chapters from the History of Russo-Chinese Relations 17th–19th Centuries
C Child Development and Education
C Child, Adults, Peers: Patterns of communication
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Chile, Corvalan, Struggle.
C Chile: CIA Big Business
C China Theatre in World War II: 1939–1945., The
C China and Her Neighbours from Ancient Times to the Middle Ages:
C Choice Facing Europe, The
C Choice for Children, A
C Christ–Myth or Reality?
C Christian Ecumenism
C Christianity and Marxism
C Cia Target: The USSR
C Cia in Asia: Covert operations against India and Afghanistan., The
C Cia in Latin America, The
C Cia in the Dock., The
C Citizenship of the USSR: A legal study.
C City Invincible
C City of the Yellow Devil: Pamphlets, articles and letters about America, The
C Civil Codes of the Soviet Republics., The
C Civil Law and the Protection of Personal Rights in the USSR
C Civil War in Russia: Its causes and significance, The
C Civil War in the United States, The
C Civilisation and Global Problems
C Civilisation and the Historical Process
C Civilisation, Science, Philosophy:
C Civilisation, science, philosophy : theme of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy
C Classes and Nations
C Classes and the Class Struggle in the USSR, 1920s–1930s
C Classic Soviet Plays
C Classical Islamic Philosophy
C Cmea Countries and Developing States: Economic cooperation
C Cmea Today: From economic co-operation to economic integration
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H History Versus Anti-History: A critique of the bourgeois falsification of the postwar history of the CPSU.
H History and Politics: American historiography on Soviet society
H History in the Making: Memoirs of World War II Diplomacy
H History of Afganistan
H History of Ancient Philosophy: Greece and Rome
H History of Classical Sociology, A
H History of India (2 v.), A
H History of Old Russian Literature, A
H History of Psychology, A
H History of Realism, A
H History of Religion
H History of Science: Soviet research, The
H History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945–1970
H History of the Ancient World.
H History of the Middle Ages
H History of the October Revolution
H History of the Three Internationals
H History of the USA Since World War I
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART I:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART II:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART III:
H History of the USSR: An outline of socialist construction
H History of the USSR: Elementary course
H History of the USSR: The era of socialism
H Ho Chi Minh Selected Writings, 1920–1969:
H Ho Chi Minh.
H Honour Eternal: Second World War Memorials
H How Many Will the Earth Feed?
H How Socialism Began: Russia Under Lenin’s Leadership 1917–1923
H How Soviet Economy Won Technical Independence
H How Wars End: Eye-witness accounts of the fall of Berlin
H How the National Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia
H How the Revolution Was Won:
H How the Soviet Economy Is Run:
H How to Study Historical Materialism
H How to Study the Theory of Scientific Communism:
H Human Relations Doctrine: Ideological weapon of the monopolies.
H Human Rights and Freedoms in the USSR
H Human Rights and International Relations
H Human Rights, What We Argue About
H Human Rights: Continuing the discussion
H Humanism of Art., The
H Humanism, Atheism: Principles and Practice
H Humanism: Its Philosophical, Ethical and Sociological Aspects.
I I Hereby Apply for an Apartment
I I Saw the New World Born: John Reed
I Icon Painting: State Museum of Palekh Art.
I Ideals and Spiritual Values of Socialist Society, The
I Ideological Struggle Today
I Ideological Struggle and Literature:, The
I Ideology and Social Progress
I Ideology and Tactics of Anti-Communism: Myths and Reality, The
I Illusion of Equal Rights: Legal Inequality in the Capitalist World, An
I Image of India: The Study of Ancient Indian Civilisation in the USSR, The
I Immortality: Verse By Soviet Poets Who Laid Down Their Lives in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945
I Imperial China: Foreign-policy conceptions and methods
I Imperialism and the Developing Countries
I Improvement of Soviet Economic Planning
I In Disregard of the Law
I In Pursuit of Social Justice
I In Search of Harmony
I In Search of Holy Mother Russia
I In Southern Africa
I In the Forecasters’ Maze
I In the Grip of Terror
I In the Name of Life: Reflections of a Soviet Surgeon
I In the Name of Peace
I In the World of Music
I India: Independence and oil
I India: Social and Economic Development (18th–20th Century)
I India: Spotlight on Population
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