G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
— Where from the time the
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; PARTY
GUILTY OF LACHES MAY NOT INVOKE LACK OF
JURISDICTION ON APPEAL AS IN INSTANT CASE. — It is
undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy
spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only —
an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date
when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case, We are of the opinion that the Surety is now
barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case
with its active participation.
2. ID.; ESTOPPEL; DIFFERENT WAYS A PARTY MAY BE
BARRED FROM RAISING QUESTION. — A party may be
estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
3. ID.; LACHES; DEFINITION. — Laches, in a general sense,
is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. ID.; ID.; BASIS. — The doctrine of laches or of "stale
demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
5. ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN PARTY MAY BE ESTOPPED
FROM INVOKING QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. — A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy.
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO RAISE QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION AT AN EARLIER STAGE BARS PARTY
FROM QUESTIONING IT LATER.
Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu by reason of the sum of money involved
which was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts but failed to do so and instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits, and it was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally raised said
question of jurisdiction, to sanction such conduct on its part
would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had
in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and
Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano
for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company,
Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 —
the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until
the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed
their answer in which, after making some admissions and
denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by
the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the
Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The
writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond
(Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a
written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1)
Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the
Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment.
Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to
deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also
the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id.
p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that
no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand
was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing
thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer
the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court
granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and
from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97).
Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules,
and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question
but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its
order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the
incident as submitted for resolution, without a
summary hearing and compliance with the other
mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17,
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering
the issuance of execution against the herein bonding
company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying
the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the
herein bonding company-appellant as well as its
subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not
quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises
the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of
Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming
the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received
notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of
time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of
the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading
entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that
appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become
effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the
Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion
prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court
of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to
dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the
same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to
certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution
read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action
at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the
sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the
filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17,
1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving
the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A.
No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in
appellant's motion is an important one which merits
serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was
filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been
pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the
entire proceeding appellant never raised the question
of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse
decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable
Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration
in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al.
vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-
10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co.,
Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al.
vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-
15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable
Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable
practice' of appellants submitting their case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, if
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has
the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue"
(See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we
hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme
Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of
this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True
also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be
set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred
by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case
with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety
became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed
a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19).
Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance
with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs.
Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability
under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in
support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a
quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of
such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to
dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R.
79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride,
141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September
26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court
of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised
the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of
the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the
entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as
follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of
money, a writ of attachment was issued against
defendants' properties. The attachment, however,
was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of
Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond
subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been
returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under
Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of
execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to
enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion
was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the
ground that there was "no showing that a demand had
been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company
for payment of the amount due under the judgment"
(Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon
the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon
the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs
again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for
issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with
notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October
31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and
notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on
November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he
be given time within which to answer the motion, and
so an order was issued in open court, as
follows:1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr.,
counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday,
November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after
which this incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of
November, 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or
objection within the period given him, the court, on
December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety; and on
December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of
execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution on the ground that the
same was "issued without the requirements of Section
17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been
complied with," more specifically, that the same was
issued without the required "summary hearing". This
motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial;
which motion was likewise denied by order of March
26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958
and March 26, 1958 — denying the surety's motion to
quash the writ of execution and motion for
reconsideration, respectively — the surety has
interposed the appeal on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have
granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
because the same was issued without the summary
hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which
reads;
"Sec. 17. When execution returned
unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If
the execution be returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any
bond given pursuant to the provisions of this
role to secure the payment of the judgment
shall become finally charged on such bond,
and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon
demand the amount due under the judgment,
which amount may be recovered from such
surety or sureties after notice and summary
hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in
the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure
by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with
the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary
legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790).
What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or
summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to
hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a
defense, after which follows an adjudication of the
rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the
extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will
naturally lie upon the discretion of the court,
depending upon the attending circumstances and the
nature of the incident up for consideration.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the
plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when
the same would be submitted for consideration. In
fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when
the motion was called, and it was upon his request
that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection.
The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an
answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its
defenses can be set up during the hearing of the
motion even if the same are not reduced to writing"
(Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in
this pretense because, as stated above, the record
will show that when the motion was called, what the
surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed
and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was
stated in the order given in open court upon request of
the surety's counsel that after the four-day period
within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be
deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel
apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his
instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
It is also urged that although according to Section 17
of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate
action, there must, however, be a separate judgment
against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A
bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section
12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff
of any judgment he may recover in the action," and
 stands "in place of the property so released". Hence,
after the judgment for the plaintiff has become
executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied"
(Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the
bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the
surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant
despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue
against the surety to enforce the obligation of the
bond.
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety
and Fidelity Company, Inc.
Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G. R. No. 162322
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 14, 2012
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------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of
the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial
courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan,
Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No.
68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporations (Corporation) application for original registration
of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been
raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this
Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title
over a parcel of land with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920
and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire
property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-
D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732
square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan,
Batangas. [3]
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for
initial hearing on 22 October 1997.[4] On 7 August 1997, it
issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997.[5]
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with
the RTC.[6]
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu
proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan,
because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less
than ₱100,000.[7]
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8]
and commenced with the reception of evidence.[9] Among the
documents presented by respondent in support of its
application are Tax Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale
in its favor,[11]and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and
disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to
respondent Corporation.[13]
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that
since the former had actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.[15]
The CA further found that respondent Corporation had
sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the
subject property after having proven open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even
before the outbreak of World War II.[16]
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this
instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in
support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]

The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to
the court a quo for further proceedings in order to determine if
the property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
I Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period for
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the
former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The
rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged
by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.[20]Consequently, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time
on appeal.[21]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions,
belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that
the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are
aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed
pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving
an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did
the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction.
Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that
estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant
from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In
Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be
construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only
in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to
that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the
exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic
filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the
records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner
could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the
MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court.
When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner
neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional
doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant
appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude
that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question
the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over
the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the
value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the application, because the RTC set the date
and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period
provided under the Property Registration Decree.[28]
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court
shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall
not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on
17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of
the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting
the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96
days from the Order.[30] While the date set by the RTC was
beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact
did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v.
Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein
contended that there was failure to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because
there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the
initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the
lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the
date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself
was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he
has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official
in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in
matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within
its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor
control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.[32]
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize
respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for
registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August
1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,[33] within
the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued
that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second
Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the
application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the
Property Registration Decree.[34]
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of the
application for registration, as provided in the Property
Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its jurisdiction.
Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance
with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction
over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the
action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory
periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the law
deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to
be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the records of this
case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the
RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the
filing of the application for registration,[37] except that it had to
issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set
beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of
the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to
respondents application for original registration was
₱160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral
and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of
which should not exceed ₱100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land
registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy
or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such
value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in
the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
(As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because
petitioner opposed respondent Corporations application for
registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance,
because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed
₱100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should
not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather,
Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that
the value of the property sought to be registered may be
ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant;
second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are
more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration
of the real property.[42]
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined
using the first method, because the records are bereft of any
affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the
property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the
second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a
joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims
the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by
respondent Corporation together with its application for
registration. From the records, we find that the assessed value
of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property.[43] Based
on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of
the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the
MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its
delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in
granting respondent Corporations application for original
registration in the absence of sufficient proof that the property
in question was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.[44] The applicant for land
registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of
State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible
evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government.[45] We
held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO
certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered.[46] The applicant
must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.[47]
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO[48]Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[49]
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application.[50] Clearly, this falls
short of the requirements for original registration.
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception
of further evidence to prove that the property in question forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
If respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation
presents a certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original
registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient
proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable
based on a positive act of the government, the application
should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of
evidence to prove that the property sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the
Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to
refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court
En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral
argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must
be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the
case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court
of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in
that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2While the
present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not
only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in
the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case,
the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such
property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the
subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the
money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial
as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of
payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the
Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and
P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the
complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action
for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid
upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the
basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case
was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar
other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the
Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave
of court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for
the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-
plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an
order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were
investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed
plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no
amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered
the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did
not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the
action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with
leave of court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one
for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was
found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as
to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had
acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the
amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be
the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation
and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in
the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such
original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of
over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent
practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint,
deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for
in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to
the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court
directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required
docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall
be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS
AND D.J. WARBY, Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG,
Respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles
Law Offices, for Petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law
Offices for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED
RETROSPECTIVELY. — Private respondent claims that the
ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil
case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as
yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this
Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that
Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS
UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. —
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-
PARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. — The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED
WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN
THE PLEADING. — Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not
a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy
Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure
to file the required answer within the reglementary
period.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed
a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177,
initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The
complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages,
attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from
the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
docket fee which prompted petitioners’ counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent
Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled
to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a
sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges
in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires
all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of
docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose
sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued
an order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a
certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private
respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in
said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer
was filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended
complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office
on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring
the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court’s
letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the
pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact
amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended
Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in the
prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint
however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory
damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order
admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein
that the same constituted proper compliance with the
Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private
respondent’s claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as
docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private Respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated
January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70.
On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
ruling, among others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-
09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint, as
amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due
course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of
the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent
Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private
respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the
said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-
payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners
allege that while it may be true that private respondent had
paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above
related, and considering that the total amount sought to be
recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be
dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled. In support of their theory, petitioner cite the latest
ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation v.
CA, 4 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in
Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-
41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was
no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent
avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in
Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee
paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to
this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible
entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of
Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing
the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but
he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00
as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5)
days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the
additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only
fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court
held that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction
to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not
thereby perfected.
In Lee v. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2
months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This
Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance
with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed
at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship.
Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner’s
declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal
effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23,
1956.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In Malimit v. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in
Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo
warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as
provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees
were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment
must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid
petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica v. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule
that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a
petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is
not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several
wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a
separate action for each will but instead he may have other
wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending
before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit
and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the
docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriff’s fee, the complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the
complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was
also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom
the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made
to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to
the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as
moral damages, attorney’s fees in the amount of P250,000.00,
the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition
was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the
recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based
on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the
correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,140.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended
complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the
prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages
earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely
sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney’s
fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant
filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition
notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the
trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of
the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the
total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he had to
pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended
complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff
may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing
fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule
that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the
recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and
that as the action is also for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages
alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment
of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in
the original complaint.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in
Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in
said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants’ announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of
such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy
any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the
issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract
of purchase and sale of the subject property and annual
defendants’ illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was
also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved
during the trial for attorney’s fees. The plaintiff also asked the
trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase
price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purpose of payment, and
to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly
suffered by plaintiff.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of
only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the
action for specific performance where the amount involved is
not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious
from the allegation of the complaint as well as its designation
that the action was one for damages and specific performance.
Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about
P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the
prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of
court, filed a amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by
the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention
of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of
the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were
investigated. On November 12, 1985 the trial court directed the
plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages
alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint
was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00
for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint
thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
they was no such original complaint duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken
by the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several
cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were
investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts
and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In
the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the
amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was
for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only
P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986,
private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the
prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the
body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not
less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
damages so that his total claim is approximately
P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid
an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation
of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987
wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition,
and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988,
private respondent paid an additional docket fee on
P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid
a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering
the total amount of this claim in the amended and
supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70,
petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee
of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint
could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required. The
promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the
additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It
triggered his change for stance by manifesting his willingness
to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the
claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower
court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge
should determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the 1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
additional fee.chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad

2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to
reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the 3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental
complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs. SO Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I
ORDERED. of the Trial Court, presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez.
Civil No. 2210 was assigned to Branch 2, presided over by
Judge Jesus Matas.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1)
Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790
Manila square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-
46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the defendants to
occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having
himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands
EN BANC on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable
rentals therefor, but these demands had been refused; and (4)
the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the same
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989 reliefs, to wit:

MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, 1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied
petitioners, by the defendants;

vs.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, 2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be
Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped
Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of by them;
Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.

3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:

Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.

1) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;

RESOLUTION

2 ) Actual damages, as proven;

3) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court

NARVASA, J.: may fix ;

In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three 4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation
fees of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;" 4

(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 )

were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three and
(3) defendants, docketed as follows:

4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and
remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation
(evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as
and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual
damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make
the entire phrase read, " P5,000.00 as and for actual damages
as proven. 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the
defendants by common counsel .6 Every motion alleged that
the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the case —
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the mandatory
and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ... Supreme Court
dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of
damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;" and
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute.
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case
No. 2210 but ordered the expunction of the "allegations in
paragraph 11 of the ... complaint regarding moral as well as
nominal damages . 7 On motion of defendant Panes, Judge
Matas later ordered the striking out, too, of the "handwritten
amount of 'P5,000. 00 as and for.' including the typewritten
words 'actual damages as proven' ... in sub-paragraph b of
paragraph 4 in the conclusion and prayer of the complaint ..." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered
2211 and 2209 were also denied in separate orders
promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez. 9 His Order in Case
No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the
"action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney's
fees ... (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b)
that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages "are
only one aspect of the cause of action," and (c) because of
absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral,
nominal and actual damages, they should be "expunged from
the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and
Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders above described, the
defendants in all three (3) actions have filed with this Court a
"Joint Petition" for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be
annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the
complaints "without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's
re-filing a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7."
The joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because
the complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed
as actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo
had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not
have accepted the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b)
it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for damages
and allow "the so-called cause of action for "reivindicatoria"
remain for trial" by itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's
Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the
challenged Orders thereto attached 11 were not certified by the
proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative.
Certification was made by the petitioners' counsel, which is not
allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally
important reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in rendering
the Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of
any proper cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On
the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the
law to the admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being
claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true,
however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of
sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession
of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana.
Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is
the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession,
and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an
action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an
accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for
partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage
on, said real property 13 - in other words, a real action-may be
commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim
for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia
over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." 14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the real
property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or
not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint
involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question
of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases
e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal
property, 15 or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16
in which the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal
property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the
personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus
be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the
dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired
by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987),
has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be
discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since
been clarified and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R.
Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who
omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of
the amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended
for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment
of the filing fee." The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amount sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent
"amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of
the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing awards of
claims not specified in the pleading - i.e., damages arising after
the filing of the complaint or similar pleading-as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are
assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand,
or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the
estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words, as already
above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property,
in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's
jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for assessment
of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings,
involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or
damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of
the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside
from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees).
19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or
damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should,
according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar
pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and
there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In
this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In
other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or
the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion,
permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-
barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the
amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and
here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the
balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured
and the court may properly take cognizance of the action,
unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis
of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over
the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied
by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court
may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed
for an action involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and
nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not
be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the
action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of
the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to
expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints
so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages
and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the 1.
relevant prescriptive period.
2.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines 3.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
4.
THIRD DIVISION
5.
G.R. No. 116121 July 18, 2011
6.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., 7.
represented by Ruben Reinoso Jr., Petitioners,
vs.
Or a total of
COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE
GUBALLA, and FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,** Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20,
1994 Decision1 and June 30, 1994 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 19395, which set aside the
March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket fees. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the complaint in this
case is ordered DISMISSED.
No costs pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a
passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon
City. As a result, a passenger of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso,
Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The passenger jeepney was owned
by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by Alejandro
Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano
Geronimo (Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a
complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn,
Guballa filed a third party complaint against Filwriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under Policy Number OV-
09527.
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioners and against Guballa. The decision in part,
reads:
In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose Guballa:
₱
For the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr. ……………… 30,000.00
Loss of earnings (monthly income at the time of
death (₱ 2,000.00 Court used ₱ 1,000.00 only per
month (or ₱ 12,000.00 only per year) & victim then
being 55 at death had ten (10) years life
expectancy……………………………………………… 120,000.00
Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all
incidental expenses in the wake in serving those
who condoled ………… 15,000.00
Moral damages …………………………………….. 50,000.00
Exemplary damages ………………………………… 25,000.00
Litigation expenses …………………………………. 15,000.00
Attorney’s fees ……………………………………… 25,000.00
₱
250,000.00
For damages to property:
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against defendant
Jose Guballa:

1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to
defendant-cross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by
Br. 9, RTC-Malolos, Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G-
Tapales); hence, cannot recover twice.
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at ₱ 150.00
per day) and for two (2) months jeepney stayed
at the repair ₱ appearing in the prayer of the Complaint was NEVER
shop………………………………………. 9,000.00
3. Moral damages ………………………... 10,000.00
4. Exemplary damages …………………. 10,000.00
5. Attorney’s fees………………………… 15,000.00
₱
or a total of
44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party plaintiff by way of
3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in the amount of ₱
50,000.00 undertaking plus ₱ 10,000.00 as and for attorney’s
fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court
that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party
plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims as specified
above, respectively. Totality of evidence preponderance in their
favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr………………………………………….₱ 250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his
passenger jeepney …………. ₱ 44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
09527………………………………… ₱ 60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per
annum from date of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs.
Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.3
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set
aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees
pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v. CA.4 In
addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in,
petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision
but it was denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994. 6 Hence,
this appeal, anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING
of the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages
PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN
THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT) NOR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more
substantial issue as to the negligence of the private
respondents and their culpability to petitioners."7
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not
have been applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed
prior to the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987.
They plead that though this Court stated that failure to state the
correct amount of damages would lead to the dismissal of the
complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.
Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of
the complaint in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of
damages they were entitled to, because the amount of the lost
income would still be finally determined in the course of the trial
of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial court
remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as
long as the correct amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never
put in issue either in the RTC or in the CA.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory.8 In Manchester v. Court of
Appeals,9 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The
strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,10 wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on
the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness
to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required.11 Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas
Bank v. Ros,12 the Court explained that where the party does
not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
by paying additional docket fees when required by the court,
the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It
has been on record that the Court, in several instances,
allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket
fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette
College v. Pilotin,13 the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.14
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one
hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving
genuine disputes fairly and equitably,15 for it is far better to
dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather
than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated
before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a
decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment
of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA
which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict
application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to
fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the
appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a
technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is
not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. 16
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was
filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling
could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to
the petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling.
Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases
of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals17 and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of
Zamboanga.18 In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan),19 it was stated that the "intent
of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in
view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new
rules." In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also
failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular
case from its operation.20
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between
the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be
assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which
provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment
awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more
than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay
the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment
in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and
collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly
unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict
application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action,
under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to
remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the
case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and
the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of
the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its
resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to
spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the
case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso,
the jeepney passenger, died as a result of the collision of
a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 o’clock
in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was
established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was
the negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very
fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot report of the police
authorities and the narration of the jeepneydriver and his
passengers, the collision was brought about because the truck
driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side
portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade,
hitting the passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis
of the RTC appears in its decision as follows:
Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as
proper consideration of all the circumstances and factors
bearing on the issue as to who is responsible for the instant
vehicular mishap convince and persuade this Court that
preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant
Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on
the records and its influence support plaintiffs’ plaint including
that of defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136),
reads as follows:
"Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the
security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable
difficulty of operation in compliance therewith, every person
operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on
highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or
vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking
persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning
to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle
shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection
of the highway."
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is
convinced of the veracity of the version of the passenger
jeepney driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs’ and Tapales’
witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward bound
towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-
64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984) the "sand & gravel" truck from the
opposite direction driven by Mariano Geronimo, the headlights
of which the former had seen while still at a distance of about
30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1 and 2,
upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left
into lanes 3 and 4 at high speed "napakabilis po ng dating ng
truck." (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985) in the process hitting them
(Jeepney passenger) at the left side up to where the reserve
tire was in an oblique manner "pahilis" (57 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985).
The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due to the strong
impact was thrown "resting on its right side while the left side
was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)". The passengers of
the jeepney and its driver were injured including two
passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney suffered
considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-
Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair
shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect
that the "gravel & sand" truck was running in high speed on the
good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the
wooden barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered
its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the
same in a manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by
forthwith swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4).
At the time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on its right
lane No. 4 and even during the moments before said bumping,
moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then
somewhat rough because being repaired also according to
Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one
of those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and
Mondalia are convincing and consistent in depicting the true
facts of the case untainted by vacillation and therefore, worthy
to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and confirmed by the
sketch drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic
Division, NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the
mishap (Vide: Resolution of Asst fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes
marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166-168, records;
the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the
attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-
Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy of which is on page
594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping indeed occurred
at lane No. 4 and showing how the ‘gavel & sand’ truck is
positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch
having been made right after the accident is a piece of
evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the
bumping-occurrence. The rule that official duty had been
performed (Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev.
Rules of Court) – there being no evidence adduced and made
of record to the contrary – is that said circumstance involving
the two vehicles had been the result of an official investigation
and must be taken as true by this Court.211awphi1
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of
fault in automobile collisions,22 the position of the two vehicles,
as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows
that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary
records disclosed that the truck was speeding along E.
Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the
passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite direction.
When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco Post
No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit the left middle side
portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of
the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more careful,
because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue was
under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle
thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the
truck owner, Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence in the hiring and supervision of his employee.
Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury
to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection or supervision of his employee.23 Thus,
in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience
and service record. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must
be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.24 Thus, the RTC committed no error in finding that
the evidence presented by respondent Guballa was wanting. It
ruled:
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to
overthrow this presumption of negligence by showing that he
had exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it
that the driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is
assigned to before he leaves the compound like the oil, water,
brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that
Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the
collision in litigation came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever
his trucks gets out of the compound to make deliveries, it is
always accompanied with two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This
was all which he considered as selection and supervision in
compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility.
This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to
an exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his driver Mariano Geronimo."25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994
Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March 22, 1988
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila, is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003]
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR.
ROMEO GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of
Student Services, petitioners, vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice of
Appeal that has been served on the adverse party. The docket
fees must likewise be paid within the reglementary period.
Petitioners have failed to show why they merit an exception to
these stringent rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the November 16, 2000[2] and
the June 22, 2001 Resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR CV UDK No. 0236C. The November 16, 2000
Resolution disposed as follows:
In view of the foregoing, Appellees Motion for Reconsideration
is GRANTED. The Resolution, dated March 14, 2000, is
hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE and the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED.[4]
The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court[5] as
follows:
[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner] College
dating back [to] the school year 1988-1989 taking up the
degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce. In the enrollment
period for the second semester held on October 22 to
November 5, 1993, [respondent] was denied re-enrollment,
despite repeated pleas by x x x himself and by other interested
parties and his lawyer.
On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and asked for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
compel [petitioner college to] re-admit him. On December 28,
1993, an Order was issued directing [petitioner college] to
admit [respondent] for the second semester but still [petitioner
college] refused to re-admit [respondent], despite
implementation of said order and the pleas of [respondent] thru
his counsel so that he could catch up with the bulk of the
school days of the semester and could graduate.
Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school in re-
admitting him and his defiance to the order and because the
period of the second semester [was] already about to close,
[respondent] amended his complaint and concentrate[d] on
damages, hence, this case.
On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it
opened its enrollment period for the second semester of school
year 1993-1994 on 11 October 1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to
05 November, 1993. However, classes for the second
semester of that school year commenced on 25 October, 1993.
During these periods for enrolment, [respondent] never
enrolled with the x x x College and neither did he accomplish
the basic requirements for enrolment. However, on 05
November, 1993, the x x x College was in receipt of a letter
from Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on that same date requesting
for a reconsideration of an alleged decision denying enrolment
to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of the said letter, it was
endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua who in turn wrote Atty.
Pilotin explaining among others that was not denied enrolment
but rather [the] latter did not enroll with the said College.
Considering, however, that the x x x College started its regular
classes on 25 October, 1993, in the event [respondent] was
able to enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have then
exceeded the required absences for his supposed enrolled
subjects.
Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for enrolment, there
is no reason why the x x x College should relax its rules to
accommodate [respondent]. The x x x College merely imposed
its disciplining authority when it sets dates for the period to
enrol and the matter of admission of students is within the
ambit of academic freedom and beyond the province of the
Courts to decide.[6]
On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondent.[7] Petitioners received the Decision on
November 26, 1998. On the same date, they filed a Notice of
Appeal, which the RTC approved on December 2, 1998.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the ground
of petitioners failure to pay the docket fees within the
reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied the
Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order.[8]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the
appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the required
docketing fee within the period for filing an appeal.[9] But, upon
their motion, the CA granted, in a Resolution dated March 14,
2000, reconsideration of their appeal, which it reinstated in the
interest of substantial justice and considering that [petitioners]
already paid the docket fees.[10] Respondent moved for a
reconsideration on March 29, 2000.
After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the
challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution, dismissed the
appeal filed by petitioners, because the docket fees were only
paid after one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the filing of
the notice of appeal.[11] It deemed it imperative to reverse the
March 14, 2000 Resolution to conform with the law and long
settled jurisprudence[12] on the matter. Thus, in the June 22,
2001 Resolution, it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably filed;
2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did not have the
authority to dismiss the appeal.[14]
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of the
payment of the docket fees.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Timeliness of Payment of
Appellate Court Docket Fees
The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These fees
are necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of
cases.[15] For this reason, and to secure a just and speedy
disposition of every action and proceeding,[16] the Rules on
Civil Procedure[17] mandates the payment of docket and other
lawful fees within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the
jurisdiction of the proper court to handle a case is adversely
affected.[18]
The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which the
judgment issued by the RTC, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA for review. Rule 41 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure provides the essential requirements
for making such an appeal, as follows:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. x x x.
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the
clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing
of the notice of appeal in due time.
x x x x x x x x x.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
x x x x x x x x x.

Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the following requirements must be complied with. First, within
15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that
rendered the judgment or final order sought to be appealed;
second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and
third, within the same 15-day period, the full amount of
appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the
clerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final order.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory,[19] even
jurisdictional,[20] for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise,
the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject
matter of the action,[21] and the decision or final order sought
to be appealed from would become final and executory.[22]
In the present case, petitioners insist that they seasonably paid
the docket fees. After resolving thrice the timeliness of the
payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found that these had
been paid one (1) year and 11 days from the filing of their
notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners received
the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision. Consequently, they had
15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on November
26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the
records shows that they paid these only on July 8, 1999,[23] or
after almost seven (7) months from the mandated last day for
payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the
November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners sought to
appeal, had long become final and executory.
Relaxation of the Rule on
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.[24]
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[25]
the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six (6) days,
but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed
willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those
fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals[26] saw us again relaxing
the Rules when we declared therein that the appellate court
may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if
appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x
x x the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within
the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on
the part of the appellant.[27]
In the present case, petitioners have not shown any
satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. In
fact, the manner in which they presented their case before us
leaves too much to be desired. Indeed, we are almost tempted
to say that they tried to mislead -- nay, deceive -- this Court as
well as the appellate court.
The present case calls for the adjudication of whether
petitioners paid the docket fees on time. Hence, it is essential
that they specify the exact dates when they filed their notice of
appeal and paid the corresponding docket fees. But nowhere in
their pleadings did they do so. All they said was that the appeal
had been seasonably filed.
In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an
appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed
a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, within 15
days from the issuance of the trial court Decision being
appealed; (2) paid the docket fees within the same period; and
(3) served the notice to the adverse party.
True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the
prescribed period, but they paid the docket fees only seven (7)
months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page 6 of their
Petition[28] that the appeal was seasonably filed, but later said
that the the appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April
1999 when the court a quo denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the
foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed
with the payment of docket fees on time.[29]
They admitted, though, that because of the excusable
negligence or mistake of their counsel, the official receipts for
the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They reasoned
that they had failed to transmit the proof of payment of the
docket fees to the CA, because such provision of civil
procedure was relatively new x x x at that time.[30] At any
event, respondent denies being served such notice.[31]
Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted
by respondents motion for reconsideration of the RTCs
approval of petitioners notice of appeal, the required docket
fees for the latter were still not paid on time. From November
23, 1998, when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, until
April 23, 1999, when the trial court approved it with finality, they
made no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than two
(2) months to immediately pay the docket fees after being
informed of the April 23, 1999 Order denying respondents
motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order approving
petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected
sincere willingness to abide by the Rules, especially when
respondent had raised the very issue of nonpayment of docket
fees as early as December 28, 1998.

On this point, petitioners counsel is reminded of the role that

lawyers play in the dispensation of justice. Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan[32] held thus:

Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties but, first

and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties
-- assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
-- is more significant than that of [the cause of] their client,
rightly or wrongly. x x x. We stress that candor in all dealings is
the very essence of membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good
faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[33]

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere

technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement
for the perfection of an appeal.[34] Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to
be appealed from becomes final and executory.[35] As laid
down in Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v. Imperial:[36]

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due

process. It is purely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders
the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much
less to entertain the appeal.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.