Constitutional Law Ii Cases Oshikosh

People v Vasquez (Warrantless searches and seizures: validity)
Facts: Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it was consolidated
with the case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The pre-trial conference of the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the parties
entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case the prosecution stated the events.
There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo
form a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested.
RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the
police officers was not overcome. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the
appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a
warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers
allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal,
the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court.
Issue: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.
Ruling: No. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must
be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of
the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s
jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls
within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of
(1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected
with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation
omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the
subsequent search upon his person.
Stonehill v Diokno (Search warrant: validity, Art III Sec 2)

Facts: Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the
corporations of which they were officers, who have prior deportation cases pending, they form were
alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code”. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners
and/or their premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES
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records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the
offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.
Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.
Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible
in evidence against petitioners herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.
Ruling: The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the
petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is
because corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
their officers, directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal
cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and
(2) if the answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points
must be stressed in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if
based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and
(2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of
the offenses committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine
the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance
of a valid search warrant.

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The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate
general warrants, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of
the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and
void.
Allado vs Diokno (Probable Cause)

Facts: On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and
Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them
as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of
the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant
issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the
perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
cause for him to issue the warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.
Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient finding of probable cause.
Ruling: No, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief
by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered.
We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one
witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we
emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the
judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any),
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and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting
the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether
or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is a function of the
prosecutor.
The extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In Lim v. Felix, where we
reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said - The Judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
Comerciante v People (Art III, Sec 2; Exclusionary rule; Fruit of the poisonous tree; Stop and Frisk)
Facts: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo
Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a
motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a
distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla.
Standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance ofaround five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced
himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence,
the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers
claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their
release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to

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undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue: WON PO3 Carag effected a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante.
Ruling: No.The evidence against Comerciante is inadmissible as it was procured through an unlawful
search (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). The same should result in his acquittal.
a. The OSG's argument, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, was that the warrantless arrest
was valid pursuant to the stop and frisk rule, and hence Comerciante's conviction should be
upheld.
b. However, the SC held that: 1) There was no lawful arrest; 2) Because it is highly implausible that
PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify from 10 meters,
while moving at a speed of 30 km/hr on the motorcycle, miniscule amounts of shabu inside two
(2) very small plastic sachets as held by Comerciante; 3) There is no overt act that could be
properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the
former had just committed, was currently committing, or was about to commit a crime; 4) The
acts of standing around with a companion handing over something cannot be considered as a
criminal act.
c. Hence, there being no lawful arrest, the evidence procured is inadmissible, being a fruit of the
poisonous tree.
The Exclusionary Rule doctrine protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained
and confiscated during unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded
for being the fruit of a poisonous tree. Such pieces of evidence are therefore inadmissible.
The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and this process cannot
be done in the reverse. While the stop and frisk is an instance wherein a warrantless is allowed, the
same cannot be done without probable cause based on the circumstances.
For a warrantless arrest to operate the following elements must be met:

 Person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit a crime; and
 Such act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer (there is personal
knowledge on the part of the officer).
People v Enojas (Evidence; Electronic Evidence; Admissibility [exception]; Text Messages)

Facts: PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August
29, 2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota
Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers
approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The
latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further questioning.
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11
convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down
to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected
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robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running
towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-
Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take
a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car,
he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they
searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins.
Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the
accused pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and
since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction
of the accused. The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed
from the CA to this Court.
Issue: WON the text messages are admissible as evidence against the accused
Ruling: As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. [A.M. No. 01-7-
01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002.] Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. [Id., Rule 11, Section 2] Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged
text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this
was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence
that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest,
a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2
Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left
at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
People v Chi Chan Liu (Warrantless arrest; Warrantless searches and seizures; Plain view doctrine)
Facts: On Dec. 3, 1998 SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon received a radio message from
Barangay Captain of AmbilIsland,Looc, Oriental Mindoro saying that there is a suspicious looking boat
somewhere w/in the vicinity of the island and they responded by heading towards the location and
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spotted 2 boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a
speedboat.
They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were
transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat
hurriedly sped away but due to the strong waves the officers were only able to reach the speedboat,
which had some engine problems, and found Respondents with 45 transparent plastic bags (weighing
1kilo each) containing a white, crystalline substance which they later found out and tested to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu). In the course of the arrest, the officers asked the
respondents for their identification papers but respondents failed to do so. The officers directed
respondents to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed respondent’s speed boat to the shore
behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental, Mindoro. Respondents repeatedly offered them “big, big
amount of money” which they ignored.
Since the respondents do not know how to speak in English the officers had to get an interpreter to tell
them (respondents) of their Miranda rights. An information was filed against the respondents for
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. The respondents plead not guilty.
Trial Court found respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt and the CA affirmed in toto the decision
of the Trial Court.
The petitioners contended that they had witnesses which said that the bags of shabu was not recovered
from the speed boat but rather from the house of the Barangay captain. They further alleged a violation
of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Due to the absence of
probable cause, their warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons and
possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of regulated drugs therefrom are inadmissible
against them.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of respondents’ constitutional right on unreasonable search and if
the warrantless arrest and search and seizure of their persons and possession was unjustified so as to
make the confiscated bags inadmissible as evidence against them?
Ruling: In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending
officers in flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the
apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted appellants
transferring cargo from one boat to another. However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they
drew closer to the appellants, naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers.
Soon after, the police officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the
officers. When they requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as
their purpose for being there, appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of
their questions. In fact, when the officers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to the
shore, the appellant Chi Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers “big, big amount of
money.” Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of appellants clearly show that
they were arrested when they were actually committing a crime within the view of the arresting
officers, who had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted on
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appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain
view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining
a search warrant.
Doctrines: Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right
to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It
applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides: Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A settled exception,
however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does
not require a previously issued warrant, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer of a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This Court has ruled that for an arrest to
fall under the above exception, two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
1-UTAK v Comelec (Art III, Sec 4; Freedom of speech; equal protection clause)
Facts: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
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5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n)
of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public
utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615.
Issue: 1. WON Resolution No. 9615 violates the right to speech of the owners of PUVs and Transport
terminals
2. WON the constitutional objective to give an equal opportunity to inform the electorate is not
impaired by posting political advertisements on PUVs and transport terminals
Ruling: 1) Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during
an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public
utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
2) Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates
the equal protection clause.

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Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but
also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is
not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and
private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from
the government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the
prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership
per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise
or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of
private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred
right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners
of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any
election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by
many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against
posting of election campaign materials.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission
on Elections are hereby declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
Zulueta v CA (Art III, Sec 3(a)(b))Privacy of Communication and Correspondence)

Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use
in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and
OshiKosh Page 10
papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial,
the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return
the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence
Ruling: No. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
Gaanan vs IAC (Art III, Sec 3; “requires otherwise as prescribed by law”)

Facts: In the morning of 22 October 1975, Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of Pintor's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning,
Laconico telephoned Eduardo A. Gaanan, who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business
trip. According to the request, Gaanan went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem.
When Pintor called up, Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. 20
minutes later, Pintor called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered "Yes." Pintor then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Pintor
called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
OshiKosh Page 11
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that Pintor himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, Pintor was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary. Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Pintor.
Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Pintor's consent, Pintor charged Gaanan
and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a
decision dated 22 November 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act 4200. The two were each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with
the decision, Gaanan appealed to the appellate court. On 16 August 1984, the Intermediate Appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its
use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication
between two parties using a telephone line.
Ruling: There is no question that the telephone conversation between Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico
was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the
parties gave Gaanan the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an
extension telephone line. Obviously, Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed
the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault
charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was
also listening.
However, an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension herein was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction
that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements. Gaanan thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Ebralinag v Division Superintendent of Cebu (Art III, Sec. 5; Religious freedom; Freedom of speech)
Facts: In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to
the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

OshiKosh Page 12
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant
issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process,
teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public
education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief
and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let
them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order
was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the
‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1
to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a
chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind. Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the
Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of
their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of speech,
religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the
rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from
classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order
their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding
the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their
love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue: WON the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
Ruling: Yes. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right
to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act
on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing
their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. Ie. they stand quietly during the
ceremony.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
OshiKosh Page 13
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent.
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the
national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a
"small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of
country and admiration for national heroes.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this
Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country
or respect for dully constituted authorities.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country — assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at
the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. Moreover,
the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty
of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
education accessible to all.
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those
beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non
vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion,
"this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they
should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do
not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.
Marcos v Manglapus
Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

OshiKosh Page 14
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer.
This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt
8. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He
also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.
Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present
danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due process been complied with
in the making of the finding?
Ruling: The right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is the Court's well considered view
that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law, and
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right
to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.
against being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered
in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or not.
Silverio vs CA (Art III, Sec. 5; Liberty of Abode; Right to travel; exemption)

Facts: Silverio was charged with violation of Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty. After more than 2 years after filing the information, respondent filed an urgent ex
parte motion to cancel the passport of Silverio on the ground that he had gone abroad several times
without necessary court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
hearings.
OshiKosh Page 15
RTC then issued an order directing the DFA to cancel the passport or to deny his application and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This RTC finding that Silverio
has not been arraigned and never appeared in court on the scheduled date of his arraignment, and
Silverio has been going out of the country without the court's knowledge and permission.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April
and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled
arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2)
finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other
than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
Issue: WON the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court
Ruling: YES. Art. III, Sec 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court order the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on
the basis of “national security, public safety or public health” and “as may be provided by law”, a limited
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.
Article III, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them.
The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. An accused on bail may
be re-arrested without the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to depart from the Philippine
without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. Holding an accused in a criminal case
within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippine must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may dealt with in accordance with law.
Villavicencio v Lukban (Right of domicile; liberty of abode; Habeas Corpus)

Facts: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170
prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He
claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo.
The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the
dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that
the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief
of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be
issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported
to Mindanao against their will.

OshiKosh Page 16
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect,
Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing
Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
Issue: 1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao
Ruling: The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish official
transgressors. The essential object and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the
chief of police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not
be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The Court held that the respondent, Lukban had no authority to commence such business agreement.
He violated certain laws based on his act of compelling these women to change their domicile. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just
as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued
until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived
this right. The respondent’s intention to suppress the social evil was commendable, however, his
methods were unlawful.
Occena v Comelec, GR L-60258 (Art III, Sec 8; Right to form associations and societies)
Facts: Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be declared as
unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of 17 May 1982 "from
representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or prohibits a
political party, political group, political committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in
the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or
indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is
also prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void ab initio,
for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the
involvement of political parties, political committees, political organizations and other political group."
Issue: Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is
violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not
contrary to law.
Ruling: The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute
nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may
constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests (Gonzales
vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835; Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a restriction imposed is
constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. Examining Section 4 of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed
OshiKosh Page 17
although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of barangay
officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or
group action of political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be construed as in any
manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any
candidate for any barangay office."
Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered
voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their
candidate. There are reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a
partisan political campaign.
The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers,
also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an
instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members
of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay
conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or
helps settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would
definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be
shielded from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the
barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in
the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our
political and social structure.
Valmonte v Belmonte (Art III, Sec 7; Right to information)

Facts: Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General
Manager, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang
Pambansa including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2
million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to those said
documents. Apart from Valmonte’s letter, he is stressing the premise of the request on the present
provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request
contains serious legal implications seek the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In
Mr. Tiro’s reply letter, a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from
it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and
that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel,
Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now
considering themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue their
desired objective in pursuance of public interest.
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed
a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

OshiKosh Page 18
In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions
of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However,
did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted that since administrative
remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
Issue: WON Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents sought, by
virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Ruling: Yes. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the
people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the
limits of the authority conferred by the people. The public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern.
However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
or matters of public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that
the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific. The request of the petitioners fails to meet this
standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
The "constituent —ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. The Court said that the government whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently,
that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. The Court
is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant
to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
Disposition: The instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing
loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not
incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
Lozano v Martinez (Art III, Sec 20; Sec 10; Sec 1; Police power)
Facts: Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended
that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22
is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the
drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is
the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a
veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

OshiKosh Page 19
The defendant in these cases moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have
come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the
following ground:
1. it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2. it impairs freedom of contract;
3. it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4. it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5. its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in
the Third Reading
Issues: 1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to

debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Ruling:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22
is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful”
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem
day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or
is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of
OshiKosh Page 20
the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Enrile v Sandiganbayan (Right to bail)

Facts: Petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions issued
by the Sandiganbayan where he has been charged with plunder along with several others.
Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition praying, among others, that
he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and was
later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination
Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail and argued that he should be allowed to post bail because the
[rosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua. He
further contended that he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it
is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof... showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing.
Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence... of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Issue: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?
Ruling: Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of
the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit

OshiKosh Page 21
a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes,
and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
N.B.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Canceran v People (Double jeopardy)

Facts: On or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Canceran approach one of the counters in Ororama.
Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00
Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked. Upon inspection by Ompoc and
the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14
smaller boxes of Pond’s White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20. Canceran hurriedly left and a chase
ensued and upon reaching the Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney
OshiKosh Page 22
After being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay
for the items he tried to take. However, Arcenio refused to settle and that his personal belongings were
deposited in the office of Arcenio.
Canceran vehemently denied the allegations and claimed that an earlier Information for theft was
already filed on October 9, 2002 which was eventually dismissed. A second Information was filed for the
same offense over the same incident and became the subject of the present case. RTC found Canceran
guilty of consummated Theft in line with the ruling in Valenzuela v. People that there is no crime of
Frustrated Theft. Canceran appealed and raise the issue of double jeopardy which the CA found
unmeritorious.
Issue: Whether or not there was double jeopardy
Ruling: No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached. The rule of double jeopardy means
that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon
a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Canceran never raised the issue of double jeopardy before the RTC. Even assuming that he was able to
raise the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same must still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach.
First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he was just about to enter a plea, but the
first case was dismissed even before he was able to do so. Second, there was no unconditional dismissal
of the complaint. The case was not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because
he posted bail. Absent these two elements, there can be no double jeopardy.
Alejano, et al. v Cabuay, et al. (Writ of Habeas Corpus; Privacy of Communication and
correspondence)
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security
officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers
publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their
barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center On 1 August
OshiKosh Page 23
2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etatwith the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The trial
court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued
a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their
command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to
remain under the custody of ISAFP. On August 11, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
with SC. The Supreme Court issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the
writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. On the same date, the
detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
The Court of appeals dismissed the petition. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in
charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of
the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court
pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid
indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question. The Court of
Appeals recognized that habeas corpus mayalso be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of
detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the
constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees’
liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees’ right to confer with their counsels
is reasonable under the circumstances. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading
of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the
proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
Issue: 1. WON the detainees in the case at bar can avail of the remedy under the petition for issuance of
the writ habeas corpus
2. WON the detainees have the regulations imposed in the ISAFP Detention Center is a violation of the
right to privacy of the detainees
Ruling: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy
to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention
Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of
habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is deprivation
of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary.
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a
OshiKosh Page 24
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentenceis void as
to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of
constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that
the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. We accord respect
to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are not
inhuman, degrading and cruel.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and
prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged
is the fact or duration of confinement.
In re: Marcial Edillion (Police power; liberty and property)

Facts: Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On 29 November 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution 75-65 in
Administrative Case MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On 21 January 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP. On 27 January 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on 23 February 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.
On 2 March 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on 24 March 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing on 3 June 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent.
Ruling: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
OshiKosh Page 25
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers.
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
When, therefore, Congress enacted RA 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on 9 January 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through PD 181 dated 4 May
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to
meet the demands of pressing public necessity. But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads that the Supreme Court shall have the power to (5) "promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar." Thus, when Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and
his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were and are subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.
If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
OshiKosh Page 26
power of the state. The provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Mesina v People (Art III, Sec 12; Miranda right; Custodial Investigation)
Facts: On July 6, 1998, accused Bernardo Mesina then Local Treasurer Officer I went to the so called
Mini City Hall in Caloocan City for purposes of collection. While thereat, Ms. Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-In-
Charge of collection at said office, turned over/remitted to Mesina the weeks' collection for the period
covering the month of June 1998 the Market Fees' collection, Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes,
Community Tax Receipts (cedula) and the 'Patubig' (local water system) collection all amounting to
₱468,394.46. The cash money were bundled and placed inside thirteen (13) separate envelopes
together with their respective liquidation statements signed by both Ms. Irene Manalang, OIC of the
Cash Receipt Division, and Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof. Thereafter, Bernardo
Mesina together with his driver left the Mini City I-Jail and proceeded to City Hall Main.
Later, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main City Hall confirming the collection of
the 'Patubig' by Mr. Bernardo Mesina. After thirty (30) minutes, Mrs. Elvira Coleto, Local Treasurer
Operation Officer II informed Ms. Baclit that the supposed 'Patubig' collection amounting to
P167,870.90 was not remitted. Also, Bernardo Mesina phoned Ms. Baclit telling the latter that he did
not receive the 'Patubig' collection. Alarmed, Ms. Baclit then immediately consulted the
documents/liquidation statements supposedly signed by Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection
thereof, however, all efforts to locate and retrieved such records proved futile at that moment.
On July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo called for an immediate probe of the matter.
Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same; Ms. Baclit on the other hand positively
asserted the remittance and collection thereof by Bernardo Mesina. They all proceeded to the cashier's
room where Mesina had his safe. Mesina's vault was opened and a cash count and/or physical count of
the contents thereof was conducted. Found inside were coins, cash with tape, spoiled bills, bundled bills
and Reports of Collection. The total cash money audited against accused Mesina amounted to
₱89,965.72.
Thereafter, a joint sworn affidavit was executed in preparation for the filing of appropriate criminal
charge against Bernardo Mesina. Meanwhile, the statement of collection supposedly signed by accused
Mesina was finally recovered at Rosalinda Baclit's desk hidden under a pile of other documents.
The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence. He admitted
collecting the total amount of ₱468,394.46 from Baclit, including the subject patubig collection totalling
to ₱167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating, misapplying, and embezzling the patubig
collection, maintaining that the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during the inspection.
He explained that he deliberately kept the collection in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered
a heart attack and had been rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that
he did not yet need to remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be
re-counted. He claimed that when he returned to the Main City Hall that same day his vault was already
sealed. He said that the accusation was politically motivated. In support of his claim of innocence, he
cited his numerous awards and citations for honesty and dedicated public service.
Issue: WON petitioner was deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed rights (Miranda rights) during the
investigation as he was under custodial investigation

OshiKosh Page 27
Ruling: No. According to People v. Marra, custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation begin to operate as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation
is then focused on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would
then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements. The situation
contemplated is more precisely described as one where –
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees
are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms
them into silence x x x.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by itself
define the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry
to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve
persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the
representative from different concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not
an investigation that already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into
the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law
enforcement office.
People v. Marti (Art III, Secs 2 and 3)

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended
to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number,
the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in
Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated
box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape.
Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.

OshiKosh Page 28
At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's
packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The
NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but
to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the
decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Marti appealed.
Issue: WON the evidence obtained against Marti is in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication
Ruling: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. xxx (Villanueva v. Querubin.)
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the government w/o the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the Court sees no
cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure
of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of appellant stands to fall on its
own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was
Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the search/ inspection. Such
inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. delivery
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Constitution merely to observe and look at that which is plain
sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

OshiKosh Page 29
If the search is made at the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals, not law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
People v Andan (Art III, Sec 12; confession; right to counsel; inadmissible as evidence)
Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at
Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in Valenzuela. Marianne was walking along the
subdivision when Pablito Andan invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the
old woman was her distant relative and did not know that nobody was inside the house. Andan then
punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged
the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark.
Night came and Andan pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a
pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan
stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer
it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her
moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the
fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest
down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary
napkin. Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of
Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with
what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were
identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains
on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned
from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there but that he, his wife
and son left without a word.
Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short
pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were
found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to
locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan.
On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., Andan was traced in his parents' house by the police. He was taken
aboard the patrol jeep and was brought to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially,
Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the
concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said
that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout.
He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne.
Immediately, the police took Andan, Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were brought to
Andan’s house by the police. Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower
pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to
OshiKosh Page 30
Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other suspects holding the bags.
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation.
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, Andan
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of
the Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were
gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the investigation. The mayor opened the door of
the room to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first
asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to
the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because
of ill-feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he
was at his father’s house at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to
admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
Issue: WON the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of the
constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
Ruling: Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In
fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It
was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting.
The mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence. The interviews that were recorded on video showed that Andan made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives.. Andan's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting under
the direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's confession to the mayor. They
did not force Andan to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did
Andan protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all
the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the
news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
OshiKosh Page 31
protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to
protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies.
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (Due process; Speedy disposition of cases)

Facts: On October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department
of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal
report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging Francisco S. Tatad, who was
then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic
Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act where no action was taken on
said report.
Five (5) years later, it became publicly known that Tatad had submitted his resignation as Minister of
Public Information, and 2 months after, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
against Tatad, accusing him of graft and corrupt. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the
previous report filed by complaint before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC). In 1980,
Tatad’s resignation was accepted by President Marcos.
The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of De los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for
fact-finding investigation where such Investigation Report concluded: "evidence gathered indicates that
former Minister Tatad had violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. Mr. Antonio L. Cantero
is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter. Tatad
filed a motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
of PD 1791 but both were denied.
On 25 October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.
On 5 July 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated 1 April 1985, five (5) informations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan (3 informations for failure to file SALN, the other two relate to bribery and
giving undue advantage to a private corporation).
On 22 July 1985, Tatad filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the information on
the ground that, "the prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a
speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction of file the
informations."
The Sandiganbayan dismissed this by saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by Tatad to the
case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed
for at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify
acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural
right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of
denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully
threshed out at the trial.
Issue: WON the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
violated Tatad’s rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.

OshiKosh Page 32
Ruling: Yes. Tatad was deprived of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of
cases. In a number of cases, the SC has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare
the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the
accused has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course,
it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A review of the facts at hand cannot
but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. First, the complaint came to life only after Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Second, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and
the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report.
SC held that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was politically motivated.
Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being
used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive
of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or
favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by
strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the
basis of the facts on record. PD 911 prescribes a10 day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately
intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee
of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of
close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation
can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for
setting back time.
Galman v Sandiganbayan (Due process clause; Rights of the accused; Double jeopardy)
Facts: On 21 August 1983, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was killed while being escorted by soldiers from his
plane at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
OshiKosh Page 33
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him
down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the
soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the
product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of
them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate
comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the
petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not
served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people
are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that
with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic.
Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

OshiKosh Page 34
Ruling: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.
President Marcos misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers
to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura), since the
resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for
the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the
demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel,
the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacañang
conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of
double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified; and declared the sham trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. The cardinal precept is that
where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such
violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the present cases where the sham
trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined
final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the accused. Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment.
Therefore, no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void.

OshiKosh Page 35
Lejano v People/ People v Webb (Art III, Sec 14; Due process; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence;
Witness; Double Jeopardy)
Facts: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police
arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators
remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of
what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after
the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only
seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony.
These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of
Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s
former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United
States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object
evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for
truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all
the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven
years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro
Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was
biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and
Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.
OshiKosh Page 36
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting
the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver,
which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused
and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to
a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the
specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
Issue: 1) Whether or not Webb was indeed denied of due process on the premise that the semen
specimen was lost under the care of the government and must immediately be acquitted? NO.
2) WON Alfaro’s testimony is entitled to belief? NO.
3) WON Webb’s evidences are proven sufficient enough to rebut Alfaro’s testimony? NO.
4) WON judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered. NO
Ruling: 1) Webb cited Brady v. Maryland, and claimed that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willfull suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela. Webb is not
entitled to acquittal for failure to produce the semen specimen at such stage. Brady v. Maryland was
overtaken by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Youngblood which held that due process does
not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless
the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Further, during the
previous appeals made on CA, the appellants expressed lack of interest in having a DNA test done, and
so the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may be required to be produced some
future time.
2) Alfaro’s testimony, was found doubtful. Testified by Atty. Sacaguing, he claimed that Alfaro was an
asset of the NBI since 1994. When the officers one day teased her about being dormant, she became
piqued and suddenly claimed that she know someone who knows about the massacre. But when the
said “someone” was not presented, she told Sacaguing that she might as well assume the role of her
informant. Alfraro never refuted such testimony. It is possible for Alfaro to lie even with such intricate
details, given that she practically lived in the NBI office. Moreover, the media is all over the case that
everything is thoroughly reported. Generally, her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies.
3) Among the accused, it was Webb who presented the strongest alibi. His travel preparations were
confirmed by Rajah Tours and the Philippine immigration, confirming that he indeed left for San
OshiKosh Page 37
Francisco, California with his Aunt Gloria on March 9, 1991 on board United Airlines Flight 808. His
passport was stamped and his name was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest. Upon
reaching US, the US Immigration recorded his entry to the country. Moreover, details of his stay there,
including his logs and paychecks when he worked, documents when he purchased a car and his license
are presented as additional evidence, and he left for Philippines on October 26, 1992. Supreme Court
accused the trial and court of appeals as having a mind that is made cynical by the rule drilled into his
head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the faces of a witness sweaking “I saw him do it.” A
judge, according to the SC, must keep an open mind, and must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. For positive identification to
be credible, two criteria must be met; 1.) the positive identification of the offender must come from a
credible witness 2.) the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. For alibi to be credible and established on the other hand, it must be positive, clear, and
documented. It must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Webb was able to establish his alibi’s credibility with his documents. It is impossible for Webb, despite
his so called power and connections to fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest. Webb’s departure and
arrival were authenticated by the Office of the US Attorney General and the State Department.
4) As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double
jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished
for the crime of which he has already been absolved.
There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same
offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and
repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will
to fight.
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are
exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,
resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail
the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He has not specified the violations of due process or acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed.
Calalang v Williams (Police power; Personal Liberty)

Facts: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of
Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of
animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
OshiKosh Page 38
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11
p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
The Director of Public Works, in his first endorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved the recommendation that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours
as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulations thus adopted.
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the
Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of
Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Ruling: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
OshiKosh Page 39
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”

OshiKosh Page 40

Constitutional Law Ii Cases Oshikosh

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People v Vasquez (Warrantless searches and seizures: validity)

Stonehill v Diokno (Search warrant: validity, Art III Sec 2)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Allado vs Diokno (Probable Cause)

Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient finding of probable cause.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Issue: WON PO3 Carag effected a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante.

For a warrantless arrest to operate the following elements must be met:

People v Enojas (Evidence; Electronic Evidence; Admissibility [exception]; Text Messages)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Zulueta v CA (Art III, Sec 3(a)(b))Privacy of Communication and Correspondence)

Gaanan vs IAC (Art III, Sec 3; “requires otherwise as prescribed by law”)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Issue: WON the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Silverio vs CA (Art III, Sec. 5; Liberty of Abode; Right to travel; exemption)

Villavicencio v Lukban (Right of domicile; liberty of abode; Habeas Corpus)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Valmonte v Belmonte (Art III, Sec 7; Right to information)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

1. it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

Issues: 1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to

Enrile v Sandiganbayan (Right to bail)

Issue: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

Ruling: Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Canceran v People (Double jeopardy)

Issue: Whether or not there was double jeopardy

In re: Marcial Edillion (Police power; liberty and property)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

People v. Marti (Art III, Secs 2 and 3)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (Due process; Speedy disposition of cases)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

2) WON Alfaro’s testimony is entitled to belief? NO.

4) WON judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered. NO

Calalang v Williams (Police power; Personal Liberty)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES

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