PANEL

PLURAL REASON FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

There is a hegemonic thinking path marked by a set of conceptions about what is a

sound decision. However it would be a mistake to assume automatically that
formal reasoning (namely logics and mathematics) is the distinctive feature of this
hegemonic path. The study of cognition from a cognitive science has shown from
the second part of the last century that “People may deviate systematically from
theoretical standards, but may still be behaving optimally when broader concerns
are taken into account”[CITATION Kla95 \p 386 \t \l 10250 ]. But only in this new
century, with some exceptions, scholars started to pay attention to the relation
between formal reasoning and cognitive science. One example of this connection is
the still recent book of Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Formal Languages in Logic. A
Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis [CITATION Dut12 \n \t \l 10250 ], where she
applies non classical logics (which can be regarded as a species of formal
reasoning) to give an account of an interesting set of experiments from cognitive
science.

Other important example is given by the renown philosopher, the late Patrick
Suppes (1922-2014), who with a group of researchers among them Andrei
Khrennikov, Emmanuel Haven, Jerome Busemeyer, Peter Bruza, met in 2007, in a
special session during the Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence’s Spring Symposium at Stanford University, to discuss applications of
the quantum mechanical formalism to the social sciences. Such that “the area of
research spawned from this became known as Quantum Interactions, and the
application of the quantum-mathematical formalism to psychology as Quantum
Cognition (QC)” [CITATION deB171 \p 196 \l 10250 ].

In Perú, our Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias in his 2004 paper claimed that
several philosophical areas (mainly the ones known as continental philosophy) can
be successfully grasped by the means of several non-classical logics.

Thus, our approach claims the following: (1) the classical or standard path of
formal reasoning is not a universal cannon to judge human decisions, but only a
local which is used mainly in basic sciences (v.g., physics), (2) then there is other
paths of sound reasoning which despite of their deviation from the standards they
are optimal for other concerns, (3) from 1 an 2 arises the question about the unity
of reasoning, that is, in the face of several deviant kinds of reasoning, ¿can it be still
legitimate to refer the unity of reason?

First paper: “Abduction, fallibilism and the limits of reason”

Richard A. Orozco C.
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
richard.orozco@unmsm.edu.pe

It is not proved yet that reason is just a metaphysical dream. However what indeed
it can be said that it more evident day to day that canons of reason, its parameters,
its methods, and its goals can be regarded excessive o over dimensioned. For
example, as well in some time it has been thought that the only one way of being
faithful to reason was by deductive reasoning, but today it has been recognized
reasoning paths much more real in relation with human being and its capacity to
make decisions. It is clear nowadays that induction is not the only alternative path.
Abductive reasoning can be regarded as a closer expression of what really happens
in decision-making, not just in practical matters, but in the scientific realm too.
How abduction applies in mathematics, physics or social sciences? This set of
questions is more liberating than the claim to make human and scientific reasoning
fit with the usual reason parameters. But, this change of methods and parameters
lead us to necessarily change regarding our point of view about the goals of
science, a fact that Popper had foreseen already in the first half of twentieth
century. Therefore, must be a fallibilistic science, far away from the over
dimensioned model of science which is very common among who do not have
enough knowledge of this field. To accept that science is fallible and abductive is,
however, not just a resigned conclusion to the limits of our reason, but indeed it an
opportunity of rethinking our way of a rational life.

Second paper: Distinction and correlation meet the challenge of unity and
complexity of the real
Ángel Gómez Navarro
Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazón
agomez@unife.edu.pe

Recognizing the limits of reason requires taking on the challenge of the complexity
of the real. Hence, the tendency of the current pragmatist epistemology is to
recognize that knowledge built by particular sciences only play a role within the
frames of convergence and fallibility. Although the sciences have achieved certainty
in various areas, according to their objectives, aims and methods, we still know
that in others there are only fallible knowledge. But we must take into account that
the new knowledge is built from mere probabilities which provides a better
approach that that would lead us to better approach to the truth of phenomena not
always observable.

This situation requires to assume a holistic and open rationality in order to fit
other dimensions of reality, willing to recognize and value the identity of each of
the respective sciences or kinds of knowledge involved in a second order of
knowledge (as a whole) of these dimensions and their constant interrelations.
Because of this, we do not need just to interact with the various specialists in each
of the areas of knowledge involved, but also distinguish and correlate their
respective cognitive contributions from an epistemological point of view, and thus
to avoid reductionism, extrapolation and confusion. Hence, our contribution
intends to interpret how to understand the distinction and the epistemological
correlation between the various particular sciences and, on the other hand, to
understand them in relation to philosophy and social sciences in the face of the
constant challenge of the unity and complexity of reality.

Third paper: “Fallibilism and its paradox”

Miguel Ángel León Untiveros
miguel.leon.u@gmail.com
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos

According to C.S. Pierce human knowledge in the meantime is fallible, that is

sooner or later we will learn that some or all of our knowledge is incorrect. The
same claim is made by K. Popper (1962). Nowadays fallibilism is generally
accepted as a distinctive feature of empirical science. Its history has many
examples how successful theories decay against new ones which are more
powerful. And, Thomas Kuhn showed that the dynamic of theories are not civilized
but he did not deny fallibilism. So, fallibilism seems to be a quiet aspect of
empirical science. However, there something contradictory (even paradoxical) in
fallibilism, namely: ¿is it rational to believe in something (i.e., science) if after all,
sooner or later, it will be shown its falsity? This paradoxical question is a version of
the preface paradox, which was noted by Rescher [CITATION Res98 \n \t \m
Res03 \n \t \l 10250 ]. In this paper we will provide a solution for fallibilism
based on recent formal solution of preface paradox (Leitgeb, 2014; 2017; Celovani,
2016; Cevolani & Schurz, 2016; Cevolani G. , 2017; Williamson, 2017). According to
Gustavo Cevolani preface paradox has the following assumptions:

A0. (Rationality) The author of the book is (ideally) rational.

A1. (Conjunctive closure) The beliefs of a rational author are closed under
conjunction; i.e., if the author accepts φ1, φ2,… φn then he accepts
φ≔φ1∧φ2∧…∧φn.
A2. (Consistency) The beliefs of a rational author are (logically) consistent.
[CITATION Cel16 \p 155-156 \t \l 10250 ]

We will show that some recent solution follow strictly the three assumtions, for
example, Williamson’s solution [CITATION Wil17 \n \t \l 10250 ], but other, like
the Leitgebt’s [CITATION Lei14 \n \t \m Lei17 \n \t \l 10250 ] does not
accomplish assumtion A1, as Tajer noted [CITATION Taj14 \n \t \l 10250 ],
nevertheless it must be considered an authentic solution of the paradox because
preface paradox can be stated in diferente ways. Despite of divergence of solutions
of preface paradox the applications of these formal devices to fallibilism has very
interesting results. The most relevant is that, as Rescher [CITATION Res98 \n \t \l
10250 ] ackowledged, fallibilism rightly understood bloks truth as a regulative
idea.

Referencias
Celovani, G. (2016). Another Way Out of the Preface Paradox? In L. Felline, A. Ledda, F. Paoli, & E.
Rossanese (Eds.), New Directions in Logic and the Philosophy of Science (pp. 155-164).
Milton Keynes: College Publications.
Cevolani, G. (2017, February). Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox. Erkenntnis,
82(1), 169-183.
Cevolani, G., & Schurz, G. (2016, October 2). Probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness: More
ways out of the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 209-225.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1224265
de Barros, J. A., & Oas, G. (2017). Quantum Cognition, Neural Oscillators, and Negative Probabilities.
In E. Haven, & A. Khrennikov (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Quantum Models in Social
Science. Applications and Grand Challenges (pp. 195-228). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dutilh Novaes, C. (2012). Formal Languages in Logic. A Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis.
Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.
Klayman, J. (1995). Varieties of Confirmation Bias. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 32,
385-419.
Leitgeb, H. (2014, January). A way out of the preface paradox? Analysis, 74(1), 11-15.
Leitgeb, H. (2017). The Stability of Belief. How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability. Oxford et
al.: Oxford University Press.
Miró Quesada Cantuarias, F. (2004). Does Metaphysics Need a Non-Classical Logic? In P.
Weingartner (Ed.), Alternative Logics. Do Sciences Need Them? (pp. 27-39). Berlin:
Springer.
Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Second ed.).
New York and London: Basic Books.
Rescher, N. (1998). Fallibilism. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London &
New York: Routledge.
Rescher, N. (2003). Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Tajer, D. (2014). La paradoja del prefacio. En E. Barrio (Ed.), Paradojas, Paradojas y más paradojas
(págs. 115-125). Milton Keynes: College Publications.
Williamson, J. (2017). Lectures on Inductive Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press