Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force
with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason
thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed
against an authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal
Code or under the Libel Law.

I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do
not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the
performance of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

 Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in expression,
has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis
for the challenge hurled against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or
allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized group of whatever nature
shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support
directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election: ..."1 It is with regret then that I
dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and
other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives
and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution.
This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963 article,
that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly
and of petition "that provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute
to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
"liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech."4

Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the scope of
the right of association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by
affiliation with it or by other lawful means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not
extremely included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful."5 Thus
is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the instrument" and the guarantee and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty"6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form
of freedom."7

2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged
provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus curiae, to the
effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be
represented as such of any political party or any other organization as well as of such political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in his nomination, in the filing of
his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in
question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same section of the
Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political, religious, professional,
trade organizations or organized groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the
forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of
the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail the right of their members, as long as they act
individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention."8 It is regrettable that such an
explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and
freedom of association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as they are
precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out whatever
constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I
entertain as to its lack of validity is further strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a
limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As repression is
permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For "[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go
further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal
envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those
extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in
every case is whether the words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The
majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due respect, I
find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship running
riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved. The Convention
might not be able to live up to the high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though
that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in the
political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a Convention truly responsive to the needs
of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency was won
by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a
complete sweep of the field by the then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably
the prevailing dominant political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people can, if so
minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels would automatically
insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban
is called for, still no such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of
whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running
for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could
hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see
through such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that whatever work the
Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard against
such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is
minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of an
existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their
choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential
process one step farther to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by
their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in
keeping with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized
civic groups making their influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for
the nation? What is decisive of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it be
successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such legislative
determination. This is merely to stress that however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference.
Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in
effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is concerned, but not necessarily so
in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the commendable admission by Senator Tolentino,
appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to assert their
influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus
favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing
could very well be doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people,
intellectuals and workers, may not be realized. The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the
character of a tease, an illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem possibly tainted
with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a fresh and untried
solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down
the exercise of what otherwise are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations.
Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being
persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men
in whom they can repose their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards, magnified by the
probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the
imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v.
Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision. What
survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political
party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than
150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding such
election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test,
although the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the
solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by
the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free
speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as
election campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or
indirectly as well as the holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies, with a similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality.
What emerges clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and
thereafter working for them in effect were considered by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of
press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization or
organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my
mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of
liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was
indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what otherwise are invasions of vital
constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends support to the decision reached by the
majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is in
agreement with the views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the provisions of
Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political
parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439)
With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly and
speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of
the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or
non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the
same time crippling completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the law of
equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to maintain said ban only
as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members
have made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage unless they
are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding
methods of campaign nor its other provisions intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes
of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less connected
with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right to form other associations and the right of
these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering particularly the shortness of the time that is left
between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights and liberties
of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the people against political
parties which may be inclined towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed
strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in the use
of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are important, but
unrelated to each other, each of them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because
the issues in this election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the freedoms
enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who are minded to actively battle for them and any
attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a new constitutional convention has been conceived.

Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 and
for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is
meaningless when the right to campaign in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or
hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as Section 8(a)
stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against other associations within
the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons,
groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in expression,
has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion that there is no basis
for the challenge hurled against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or
allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization or organized group of whatever nature
shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support
directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election: ..." 1 It is with regret then that I
dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic, professional and
other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives
and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution.
This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963 article,
that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, of assembly
and of petition "that provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable and continue to contribute
to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme Court had already declared: "It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
"liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech."4

Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the scope of
the right of association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by
affiliation with it or by other lawful means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not
extremely included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful." 5 Thus
is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the instrument" and the guarantee and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty"6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form
of freedom."7

2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged
provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus curiae, to the
effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing himself to be
represented as such of any political party or any other organization as well as of such political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in his nomination, in the filing of
his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in
question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same section of the
Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political, religious, professional,
trade organizations or organized groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or arouse public interest in, the
forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment of
the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail the right of their members, as long as they act
individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention." 8 It is regrettable that such an
explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and
freedom of association falls short of according full respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as they are
precluded by the very same Act from giving aid or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out whatever
constitutional reforms, programs, policies or proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I
entertain as to its lack of validity is further strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a
limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As repression is
permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is to
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For "[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go
further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal
envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those
extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in
every case is whether the words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The
majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due respect, I
find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship running
riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved. The Convention
might not be able to live up to the high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It would appear though
that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to play its dominant role in the
political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a Convention truly responsive to the needs
of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency was won
by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only one instance, saw a
complete sweep of the field by the then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to believe to assume that inevitably
the prevailing dominant political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people can, if so
minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels would automatically
insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party spirit carried to excess, such a ban
is called for, still no such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any other organization or organized group of
whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running
for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could
hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see
through such schemes and can emphatically register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that whatever work the
Convention may propose is ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard against
such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution ordains is
minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of an
existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy of their
choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential
process one step farther to recognize and to implement the right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by
their election, could translate into actuality their hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in
keeping with the rights to intellectual freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized
civic groups making their influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for
the nation? What is decisive of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it be
successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such legislative
determination. This is merely to stress that however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be paid deference.
Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded as not lacking in
effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is concerned, but not necessarily so
in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the commendable admission by Senator Tolentino,
appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their individual capacity, could continue to assert their
influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases, assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus
favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing
could very well be doomed to futility. The high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people,
intellectuals and workers, may not be realized. The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the
character of a tease, an illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem possibly tainted
with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a fresh and untried
solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely different matter to cut down
the exercise of what otherwise are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the outcome might belie expectations.
Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the end can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being
persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men
in whom they can repose their trust is consistent with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of
expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards, magnified by the
probability that the result would be the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the
imprimatur of judicial approval to the challenged provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v.
Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision. What
survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for any political
party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than
150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding such
election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods successfully hurdled, the constitutional test,
although the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the
solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by
the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this Court unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free
speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as
election campaign or partisan political activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a party or candidate or, the giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or
indirectly as well as the holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies, with a similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality.
What emerges clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and
thereafter working for them in effect were considered by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of speech, of
press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization or
organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. To my
mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed to be within the sphere of
liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections which already was
indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what otherwise are invasions of vital
constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends support to the decision reached by the
majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is in
agreement with the views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the provisions of
Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section 8(a) referring to political
parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others. (G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439)
With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on the freedoms of association, assembly and
speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of
the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or
non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the
same time crippling completely the other kinds of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the law of
equalizing the forces that will campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to maintain said ban only
as against political parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members
have made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage unless they
are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act 6132 regarding
methods of campaign nor its other provisions intended to minimize the participation of political parties in the electorate processes
of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of candidates more or less connected
with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right to form other associations and the right of
these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering particularly the shortness of the time that is left
between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights and liberties
of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the people against political
parties which may be inclined towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize themselves to gain much needed
strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in the use
of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are important, but
unrelated to each other, each of them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by organization. Precisely because
the issues in this election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it is imperative that all of the freedoms
enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who are minded to actively battle for them and any
attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a new constitutional convention has been conceived.

Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 and
for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy like ours is
meaningless when the right to campaign in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or
hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as Section 8(a)
stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against other associations within
the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the application thereof to any "persons,
groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.
Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some additional observations in connection with my
concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4913 provide:

Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior
to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial
office building and in every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall
remain posted therein until after the election. At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling
place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in
the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling
place. The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval of said amendments shall be printed in English
and Pilipino and shall be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections: Provided, however, That at
the back of said ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three,
both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That
the questionnaire appearing on the face of the ballot shall be as follows:

Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this
ballot?

Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of
this ballot?

To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino
or in the local dialect in the blank space after each question; to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the word
"No" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect.

I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to extraneous factors and circumstances, the manner
prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people
for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been
required by the Act to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement. Certainly it would have been out of place to
provide, for instance, that government officials and employees should go out and explain the amendments to the people, or that
they should be the subject of any particular means or form of public discussion.

The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to me predicated on the fact that there are so many
other issues at stake in the coming general election that the attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely focused on the proposed
amendments, such that there is a failure to properly submit them for ratification within the intendment of the Constitution. If that
is so, then the defect is not intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same manner of submitting the proposed
amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its provisions. For a
law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the Constitution.
Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid, according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the zeal with
which they are carried out. To such a thesis I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative, and dependent upon
individual opinions that at best are subjective. What one may regard as sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission
to the people, within the context of the same law, may not be so to another. The question is susceptible of as many views as there
are viewers; and I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the matter is the correct one, to the
exclusion of the opinions of others.

On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the
petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it means only a special election.

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:

It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can exercise any authority over the rights and
interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners Ramon A.
Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) come to this Court in separate petitions.

Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country,
filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections, Director of Printing and
Auditor General from implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as unconstitutional.

Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act
4913 but also of Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.

Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3,
adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed
amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and
3 propose two amendments to the Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the
House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress shall
by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by
allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.

Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered together herein.

Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, in submitting the proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for approval, at the general election of
1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose; (2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution,
since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution, said
Republic Act being a step in or part of the process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913
violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed
amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, such as by
stating the provisions before and after said amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed
amendments.

Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the Constitution is concerned, the issue is
cognizable by this Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress to determine its conformity to the fundamental law. For
though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that
the substance or content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and thus a political question, the
Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths
vote requirement. Said procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and
wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments
followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.

Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does not bear him on the point. It nowhere requires
that the ratification be thru an election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it
concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification. To prohibition being found in the plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the
framers of requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they
could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would not have been better to provide for a separate
election exclusively for the ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however is that such separate and exclusive
election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again, is not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure required by
the Constitution to amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of legislation".2 It is limited to determining whether the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated the Constitution
or not. On this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.

Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not having been passed by Congress in joint session
by 3/4 vote.

Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election to which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the term "propose amendment" is meant to determine
WHAT said amendment shall be, then Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3 already did that. If, on
the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for how, when, and by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the
people for approval, then it does.

A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it
requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And then in the second sentence, it provides that
"such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose
amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the substance or the content or the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it
is this and this alone that is submitted to the people for their ratification. The details of when the election shall be held for
approval or rejection of the proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not submitted for ratification to form part of
the Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows that the act of proposing amendments is
distinct from — albeit related to — that of submitting the amendments to the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting
requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second one.

It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an ordinary statute passed by Congress. The
Constitution does not expressly state by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged elsewhere
under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body, under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore
validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people
for their ratification. Since it does not "propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but
merely provides for how and when the amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the
3/4 vote in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution. Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation
measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that
"All appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not
have been validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure providing
for the holding of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.

Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against substantive due process. An examination of the
provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in the Official Gazette at
least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until
after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at the
back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only
to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the
voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due
process clause is not infringed.

Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of
the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The
present wording of the Constitution is not being veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and
they are available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed to know. Should the voters choose to remain
ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the
Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would have been more convenient for the voters if the
present wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same however is a matter of policy. As long as the
method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case,
it is not constitutionally defective.

Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are for the people in
their sovereign capacity to decide, not for this Court.

Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a convention and propose amendments; second, that
the present Congress is a de facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted within three years from the last census of 1960,
so that the Representatives elected in 1961 are de facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose amendments, it is
argued.

As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose amendments or call a convention for that purpose". The
term "or", however, is frequently used as having the same meaning as "and" particularly in permissive, affirmative sentences so
that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R.
Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be pointed out that the resolutions proposing amendments
(R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise
to amend the Constitution before a convention called for is elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes in
this case, suffice it to note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.

As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by
law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise". It however further states
in the next sentence: "Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number
of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
assembly districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was
adopted, does not render the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its continuance
in such case, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.

For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief
Justice.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the matter with a
fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few words may however be added.

We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to be solved by public opinion or where the matter
has been left by the Constitution to the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as was so clearly stated by the then Justice
Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing on the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present
question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress may be entrusted with the full and uncontrolled
discretion on the procedure leading to proposals for an amendment of the Constitution.

It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller,3 in its
holding that certain aspects of the amending process may be considered political. His opinion quoted with approval the view of
Justice Black, to which three other members of the United States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its
entirety, "from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control
or interference at any point." In a sense that would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous
and in every case soul-searching process of determining whether the procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has
been followed.

At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that judicial
intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy
might under certain circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late Justice Tuason, would no longer be controlling.
There is comfort in the thought that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of the times. It could very well be that
considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the Constitution,
the parity rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic situation then confronting the country would
be to avoid the existence of any obstacle to its being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old,
American Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions were-invariably accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach
followed by Justice Tuason is not difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less propensity now, which is all to the good,
for this Court to accord that much deference to constitutional views coming from the quarter.

Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his memory. For as he stated in another major
opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency Powers Act, 5 one should not ignore
what would ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed. As he so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."

The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the economic survival of the country, an erroneous
appraisal it turned out later, constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then consider the question political and
let the people decide? That assumption could have been indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For
many it did bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.

The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this date and in the foreseeable future judicial inquiry to
assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional requirement would be a more appropriate response.

SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:

Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
for their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of the opinion which follows.

Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967.
This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives on March 16, 1967
with the end in view of amending vital portions of the Constitution.

Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of both houses of Congress, it may just as well be that
we recite in brief the salient features thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the House of Representatives from
120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160 seats. A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators
and Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be members of the Constitutional Convention 1 to be
convened, as provided in another resolution — Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution (Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution No.
2 just adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the Constitution. The delegates thereto are
to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970; the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed by
the convention to be submitted to the people thereafter for their ratification.

Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of members of the House of representatives under
Resolution No. 1, and that in Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as members of the
constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971. Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the people
in the general elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which
reads:

The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of
both Houses Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be
submitted to the people for approval at the general election which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us — the manner in which the amendments proposed by
Congress just adverted to be brought to the people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed amendments to the Constitution may become effective,
Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such amendments must be "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
at which amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words complementing each other,
namely, "submitted" and "ratification."

1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us. And this, because the amendments submitted are
transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number of Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180 members;
and Senators and Congressmen may run in constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These certainly affect the
people as a whole. The increase in the number of Congressmen has its proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They
may not look at this with favor, what with the constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make
an apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the present constitutionally provided number of Congressmen. People in
Quezon City, for instance, may balk at the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a
Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal representation. And then, people may question the propriety of permitting the
increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that
they may dominate its proceedings. They may entertain the belief that, if at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be
a proper topic for deliberation in a constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place. They probably would ask:
Why the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close scrutiny.

2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the constitutional directive that constitutional amendments
be submitted to the people for their ratification.

A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which may suffer amendments three or more times in
the same year, it is intended to stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's sovereign will.

And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for ratification of amendments is that reasoning on the basis
of the spirit of the Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the phraseology thereof. We underscore
this, because it is within the realm of possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the
Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important; Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be
beyond debate that in some such situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than a legislative
proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be adopted
by a constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids that proposals therefor be
initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to the people for their ratification.

In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the people for their ratification", if construed in the
light of the nature of the Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an — expression of their
sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions
compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from
the incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word "submitted" can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if
one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and
another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent, consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still
approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree their own fate.

Aptly had it been said:

. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution
voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution should beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the
whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if
the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. . . . Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit
is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people are not sufficiently informed of the amendments
to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can it be said that in accordance
with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our answer is "No".

We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 — the statute that submits to the people the constitutional
amendments proposed by Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of the nature
of the amendments throughout the country. There are five parts in said Section 2, viz:

(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to
the election.

(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office
building and in every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain
posted therein until after the election.

(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination
by the qualified electors during election day.

(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections,
shall be kept in each polling place.

(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.

A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of information regarding the amendments effectively
brings the matter to the people. A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the Official Gazette is not widely
read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all under stand
English? Second, it should be conceded that many citizens, especially those in the outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city
and/or provincial office buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding to court summonses. And if they
do, will they notice the printed amendments posted on the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is in English
(sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does not require that it be in any other language
or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified electors
during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time is not study time. And then, who can enter the polling place, except those
who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the principal native languages shall be kept in each polling place. But this is not, as
Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command because such copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as
may be determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are available before election, a citizen may not
intrude into the school building where the polling places are usually located without disturbing the school classes being held
there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is not required to actively distribute them
to the people. This is significant as to people in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely
unmindful of the discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of population on the merits and demerits of the
amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available, but which copies may notbe
distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has more than its hands full in these pre-election days. They
cannot possibly make extensive distribution.

Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample ballot submitted to this Court would show
that only the amendments are printed at the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.

Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the proposed amendments thru dissemination by
publication in extenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits and demerits of
said amendments.

We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed constitutional amendments within the meaning and
intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.

4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election campaign the focus is on the election of candidates.
The constitutional amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and their leaders as well as the voters, gear their
undivided efforts to the election of officials; the constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that even in the
ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote would give one the impression that the constitutional
amendments are but a bootstrap to the electoral ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and
local levels, are inextricably intertwined with the results of the votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate
and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments, we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be
dented.

5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the
constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had been amended thrice — in
1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter
fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have been referred to either as
an "election" or "general election". At no time, however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held
simultaneously with the election officials, national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows
that the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and the special elections simultaneously held in only three provinces, Iloilo,
Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.

In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against indiscriminate changes in the Constitution that is theirs.
Is it too much to ask that reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of the land, their true voice
be heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the
people's enactment. No proposed change can become effective unless they will it so through the compelling force of need of it and
desire for it."4

For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down as in violation of the Constitution.

Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend the Constitution
requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of each legislative chamber, the highest majority ever demanded
by the fundamental charter, one higher even than that required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire
consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was evidently exacted in order to impress upon all and sundry the
seriousness of every constitutional amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it impossible to believe
that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's
attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could
have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted upon at an election wherein the people
could devote undivided attention to the subject. That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in the
case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that were submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively
devoted to the issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.

Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —

I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be
sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature
of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and
the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also
considered and ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we
do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here because
it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.

We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to be
superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless
appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.

Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the
people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed amendment in
question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election
is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially
agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment. This is what he said:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We
believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100
citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we
have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection." .

The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following
words:

I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be
submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be
diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is
practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject. 4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to
vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may
turn out not to be so simple after all.

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age be
lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or
even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle
him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-
year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the
Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional
Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the
Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this
amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities
of the 21-year old? Will he be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old,
come 1973? .

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which
are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers cannot
be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.

Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the
meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to deliberate
thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits
and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot
thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.

Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been met.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies the
topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to
its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by
the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is
indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any
objection to the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.

I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the
answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a
constitutional convention are dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed.
It has to look to the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.

It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute
sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high
import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of
the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot
bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed
constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence,
subject in either case to popular approval.

The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the
Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call
to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A
contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme
within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the
appropriate principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under
American law is that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The
convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited
in decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the
legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its
constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4

2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any
limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in
joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid
as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification."

Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus
as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein provided, and a
constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the
Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would
have the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever
amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are agencies
for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for
such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.

Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled
to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches that could,
whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote,
but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable constitutional
provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions
on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as
vested in a constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time
inevitably brings in its wake.

From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of
the convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising the legitimate
scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended
by such grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be valid
when submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to the proposed
submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must
be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification.
That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word
"election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a
compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the
mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction
does not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at
which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.

It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in
this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to consult the wishes
of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of
course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a
view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent
but silently vocal. What I deem the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their
sovereign powers by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent
with the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws
relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution. 5 It is not
precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in
this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied
that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions.6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no
alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the conclusion
arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —

I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which to be
sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the validity of the premises
postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However, considering the urgent nature
of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and
the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also
considered and ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like him, we
do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue here because
it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to be
superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion, nevertheless
appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.

Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the
people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed amendment in
question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election
is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with which we essentially
agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment. This is what he said:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We
believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100
citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we
have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection." .

The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following
words:

I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be
submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is to be
diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is
practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject. 4

True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be allowed to
vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may
turn out not to be so simple after all.

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age be
lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why not 17? Or
even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an educational qualification to entitle
him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-
year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the
Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional
Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the
Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this
amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities
of the 21-year old? Will he be required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual
consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old,
come 1973? .

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds of which
are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And the answers cannot
be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of the
meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded ample time to deliberate
thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits
and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot
thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.

Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, has not been met.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution occupies the
topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than this Court, must bow to
its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is allowable, if not indeed required by
the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the conclusion reached. The question presented is
indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any
objection to the validity of its action there being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the
more commends itself to me considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according
to our Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.

I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition and the
answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by petitioner on the one
hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is gratifying to note that during the oral
argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted
by this Court, should be controlling on both Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one
American state, that is Pennsylvania, there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a
constitutional convention are dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the
fundamental law. The result is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed.
It has to look to the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal. 1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.

It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute
sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty
resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high
import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to
yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of
the people. It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced cannot
bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed
constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence,
subject in either case to popular approval.

The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the
Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call
to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A
contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme
within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the
appropriate principle that should govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under
American law is that found in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The
convention was sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited
in decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the
legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the extent of its
constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4

2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court, that any
limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads: "The Congress in
joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid
as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification."

Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter ratification. Thus
as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode therein provided, and a
constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional convention, like the Congress of the
Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would
have the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever
amendments it seeks to introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me
that to view the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are agencies
for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other. No justification for
such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.

Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could be enabled
to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive branches that could,
whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit that such likelihood is remote,
but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling force of an applicable constitutional
provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions
on the powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as
vested in a constitutional convention. There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable
interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to
accommodate a constitution to the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time
inevitably brings in its wake.

From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of
the convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of appraising the legitimate
scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of authority vested in it, attended
by such grave and awesome responsibility.

3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be valid
when submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to the proposed
submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that therefore the petition must
be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments proposed be submitted for ratification.
That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is true that the Constitution uses the word
"election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a
compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the
mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction
does not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at
which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.

It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was contemplated in
this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did seek to consult the wishes
of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an argument for its validity. It might be said of
course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a
view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent
but silently vocal. What I deem the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his
source of authority in either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their
sovereign powers by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent
with the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit respondent
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the Commission on
Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency to take charge of all laws
relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article X of the Constitution. 5 It is not
precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in
this case, to submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied
that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it in the
legitimate discharge of its functions.6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave me no
alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises, the conclusion
arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining the
plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.

1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals
to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof, as
restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977
referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from
the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as
to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been withheld by the
Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National
Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional
amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the
mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the
prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII
which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom
such constituent power has been withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976 constitutional
amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled
by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the
fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon
the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand in Sanidad that the
doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to
the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and
subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then)
in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments
of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally
inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion in Gonzales bears repeating as
follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of
the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it
can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps.
They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with
the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards
the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own
fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of our state in this
respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be
beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to
the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second
thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless
benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining the
plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.

1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments proposals
to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof, as
restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977
referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from
the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as
to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been withheld by the
Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National
Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional
amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the
mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the
prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII
which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom
such constituent power has been withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976 constitutional
amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled
by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the
fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon
the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand in Sanidad that the
doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to
the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and
subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then)
in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments
of our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally
inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion in Gonzales bears repeating as
follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of
the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it
can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps.
They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with
the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards
the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own
fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of our state in this
respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be
beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to
the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second
thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless
benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse."'
 SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.

Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada

After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments -- both oral and written --
as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present
Petition must be dismissed.

I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions and votes on the two
extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.

In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient

__________________

'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.'

"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the
whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative
correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against
its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.

Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,

the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives

"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to
cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent
with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."

"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely
empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative
and referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed
of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo

authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________

E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile
motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.

"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.

"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate
and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.

Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa

Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled

"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of
initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in the
first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help
them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of
initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free
assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others
to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'

Epilogue

"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty.
They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as

Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec, 3 I
joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by

__________________

Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the
Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the immediate
subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in
rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it,
too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest
Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal
to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735

"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the Constitution, and that
whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec
Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
 an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral
body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735
specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Act."

"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right
reason." Let me explain further.

The Right Thing

"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail themselves of to
articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly
conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in
the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court
unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing
popular

PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.

__________________

sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote
their legitimate exercise."

The Right Way

"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." Let me now demonstrate
the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the
Constitution through a people's initiative.

"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which shall contain the
proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:

'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;

c.2 the proposition [in full text];

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];

c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'

"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal designation of the
duly authorized representatives of the signatories.

"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the
petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
 "Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence file the petition with
the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry
list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is sufficient, the
Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a
revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from notice.

I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso

__________________

"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec shall
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date
of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90)
days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of
Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to
amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching
issues:

1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere amendment and not
a revision of the Constitution?

2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is relevant considering
that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay
elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.

3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition
for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own
political self-interest?

4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein?

"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while
important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and memoranda. However,
Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the
crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving --
not just alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on earth
can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or Congress.

facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that
PIRMA must show the following, among others:

__________________

"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations of the
martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that
they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let
them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification process conducted under our open system of
legal advocacy.

"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this country, would like to
seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the
majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
 The Right Reason

"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec
Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really
emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are in
fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the
right to initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?

"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of the
people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the
work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to
amend through initiative belongs only to the people – not to the government and its minions. This principle finds
clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:

"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the National Assembly x x x
[and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople

"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature is not as responsive
to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon

(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a revision of
the Constitution."

_________________

"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which] should not be
frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo

"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter itself provides them
other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a constituent
assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.

"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are they merely fronts for
incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot
be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is
inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority
effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed
that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient
to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional
right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed –
short of abrogating the right itself. On the other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles the
four issues I outlined earlier – by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory
inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial determination of such legitimacy
or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.

The Right Time

"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII
precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is
now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.

"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no more time to lift term limits to enable
incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and the next national

(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at
__________________

elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was
resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the motion for reconsideration. The
instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for
reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all parties be
given sufficient time to file their pleadings.

"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and allow the
Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I
mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on any of
these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues
may again be sought.

"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously time-consuming,
considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every signature, initially before the election
registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the
plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety
(90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.

"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions may start selecting
their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for filing
certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national officials
start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by
the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever – for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been
overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998
elections.

"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does not detract one whit
from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more
important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In
fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be
free from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but,
more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of
our people's right to initiative.

least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein."

__________________

Epilogue

"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.

"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their
history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the
people – as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that
Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely,
and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.

"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or group of officials in
power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law
implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition or of
any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such
constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only
to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters'
identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their
 machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted,
fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide
verification process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to
review by this Court.

"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet they
changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the National Capital Region but
from all over the country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's
majority has stifled the only legal method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a
popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to
their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to
PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it
burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic constitutional right.

In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the right time and for the
right reason."

In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the present
Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in
the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.

No Grave Abuse

of Discretion by Comelec

As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission
merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently

____________________

"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This mission is undertaken not
only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire
process of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this
mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier
noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."

enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice,
arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this Court's
jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled
question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action. 6

The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences pointed out by Justice
Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain
verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the
verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions
contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.

Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the Commission had "only
complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in
PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because
the signatures were unverified.

To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a
condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. 7 Without those signatures, the Comelec shall motu
proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right are
substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's pronouncements. Respondent
Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the
poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous,
but also contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse
of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.

Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA),
that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling
in question.

Only Amendments,

Not Revisions

I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change the Constitution. This
principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law. 9

I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the legislature from
bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia has amply demonstrated that
the merger of the legislative and the executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under
any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed
changes have an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions.
The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."

In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments) may be proposed only
through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third mode -- people's initiative -- only
amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their
respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.

Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the Constitution itself: a
revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon
after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must
necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.

Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend many months of
purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the wordings covering the
philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government of our Republic.

Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several weeks or even months of
drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How much more when it comes to constitutional changes?

A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-unicameral is monumental.
Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our people's throats without the benefit
of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?

Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for initiative
from "embracing more than one subject matter."10 The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift from a
presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. 11 Thus, even
under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves
dismissal.

12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds

Not Proven by Petitioners

The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that it be supported by at
least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the registered voters in every legislative district
must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet
the minimum percentages required.12

Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve "contentious facts," which have
not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the Comelec.

But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the said requisites of an
initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is fatally defective and must be
dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.

Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and unconstitutional. It points out that the
Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people.
Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.

So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission, the Petition must still be
dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes
more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.

Summation

Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno who supports them, the
"people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."

I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a democratic method
of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity
to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity."

This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution, because the present
Petition violates the following:

· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires definite percentages of
verified signatures)

· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)

· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration on the ground that, by
following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).

I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-
washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head on, because
the people expect no less from this august and venerable institution of supreme justice.

Epilogue

At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a treasured feature of the
Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse
must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.

The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between each individual and the
rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by laws, and
their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the
rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful,
just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes in the
Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far
greater majority almost twenty years ago.14 I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the
loftiest perch, because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.

Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution. Being the
protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any
attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court
must single-mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.

The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant voices from the more
powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of
the Court becomes its strength when it speaks independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the
Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to
perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15

During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn
by those interested in the outcome of this case.16 There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not comment on them
for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret
that will not be known and come to light."17

Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its members shall be judged
by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how
each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate,
the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.

Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and the world for
its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is
not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735)
be held as sufficient law for the purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case
must nonetheless be dismissed.

There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke the said law to justify
their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution
must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c) 2 of
the same law requires that the petition should state, among others, the proposition 3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the
Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a
text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the proposed
changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for
attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew
whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely
assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this
requirement.

The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably establish that the full text of
the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was the general proposition
and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.

The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be signed by the
people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that
"[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein." Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they
must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the
proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct" proposal by the people.

Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might
be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown to
the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus –

MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition of at least 10 percent of the
registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire,
is it by signature?

MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.

MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is
the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed changes must
necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity to fully
comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed choice
on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a
safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition,
intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people and
that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.

If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum process, such
provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal. 5 The failure of
petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.

The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A.
6735:

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x

The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one
bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to
do away with the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would be
compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured,
when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.

As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is
meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the
proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed
amendment.

Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to one subject matter, that is – the
shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are
merely incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary thereto. 8An examination of the text of the
proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.

The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the petitioners.
Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one
House of Congress,9 and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution. 10 Also
included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are
inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.

It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually
seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a
shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A
parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or may not embrace
unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the other.

I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system of government. As a
subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed
from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to
the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has already taken place. This only goes to show that the
convening of the constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.

The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary
system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not specify what these
inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by
the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is
thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the
Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, as follows:

"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration
of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect."12

The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout our
constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past
constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it
was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority
to either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two
terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as
material because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.

However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress constituting
itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes
to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a
petition for initiative.

Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not determinative of
what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or revision. The changes
introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the
authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the
1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must
consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining
whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.

In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a constitutional convention.
The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as
determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent
nor prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.

It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part of the Constitution. The part need
not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions. For as
long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution "to determine
which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one," the
proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.

Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be considered as either an amendment or
revision. In so determining, another overriding factor is the "original intention and plan authorized to be carried out" by the
proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it
has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a mere amendment of the
Constitution.

From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in assessing what
may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed
changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish
the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in
assessing the impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of
the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.

In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of quantitative and
qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely
amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained
in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four new topics would be
introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on California's
basic plan of government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent in such plan, by
delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the
proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a substantive
effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.

The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v.
Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court all
judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that
although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the
substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court said:

". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many constitutional
articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the
Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number
of existing articles or sections affected by such change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)

Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the quantitative and qualitative effects of a
proposed measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision. 17

I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of the courts in California is not far
removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is
actually consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers
when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18 We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in
this case affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.

The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or substantial, amount to a
revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose amendments to the fundamental law?

As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the proposed changes. These tests
are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision
"may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In
any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.

It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of
the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive
Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-
unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not
affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.

However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The
initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as
citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation
of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a people's
initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system.
An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into one
parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional representation. No term limits are set for the members of parliament
except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by law. There will be a President
who shall be the head of state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from
among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.

The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and legislature shall be one and the same, such
that parliament will be the paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there will be no separation between the law-
making and enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a
presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style
presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics
prevailing in the parliament.

Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of government. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws.
This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error
or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of
powers is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency. 19

In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the legislative and executive
powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no
effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes against
the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of government and provides for
counteraction among the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent
with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic
change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that
govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any
standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the
guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should
be altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)

The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more
far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the form of government to the
parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further
amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and replace any
constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion
of such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its
provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's initiative. The proposal to convene a
constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place
it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government
from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a
democratic and republican state."

To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined
effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII
indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty.
Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed
changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through a people's initiative and not a
revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative examination
of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

xxxx

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to amendments and does not
include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the
rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a revision of
the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other
hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.

To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision obliterates the clear distinction in
scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide
differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent
of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a
discerning regard for this distinction. Again, McFadden22 is instructive:

". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and
between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative procedure
in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but
also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when
they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a
constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that
there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the
initiative amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction
appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose
and vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving
unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it
will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that
any change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully
erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the
Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments
and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited people's initiative to
mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect
to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.

Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the constitutional meaning
of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their
sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign
people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign power. 23 They are thus bound by
the constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means
prescribed by the Constitution itself.24

It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people's initiative because their
representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a
provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-
limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:

x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several
departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as
they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments are
responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be
exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity,
can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed
and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out
for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the
regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law,
either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the
officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government. 25 (Underscoring supplied)

Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where the people's sovereign power has
been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a
fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power. The people
have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they
themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced
with a revolutionary situation.26

It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.27 Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of
direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy
at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly
beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. NO. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F.
BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO
SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-
intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND
AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M.
LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND
RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-
intervenor;

G.R. NO. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND
COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE
V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:

Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's battlecry, lest it
does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the
opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec
audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those
people should not be listened to who keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of
the crowd is always very close to madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed
upon petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."

History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and
oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same
rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God."
After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected
the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution which reads:
 Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled
"Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997,
this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight
(8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to
rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the
other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six
(6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion. 3

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it appearing that
that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC)
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-
examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the different
premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.

This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form
of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and
cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified
voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-
list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which
shall read, as follows:
 Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by
a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent
Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of
both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18
and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as
Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as
Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be
deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any
and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all
references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of
the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim
Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may
be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue
to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the
term of the incumbent President and Vice President.

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed
amendments, quoted as follows:
 Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the
petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the
signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets,
constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented
by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.

Several organizations opposed the petition. 6

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court's ruling
in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct
the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 4 x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.

I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R.
No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not
be punished for contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.

I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion

Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges on this
singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of "grave
abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when
the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility.8

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago)
decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and
despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently
enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient
law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As
succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case
of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9

x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its
 obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open
to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck
down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.

It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is
the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court,
in People v. Santos,11 held:

Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a
doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his
opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think
that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a
principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and
expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings,
then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to
render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely
followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.

Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established
doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.

Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the pronouncement of
this Court in Santiago.

II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago

It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices)
concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided
Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster
enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company
Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground
relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a
modification of the judgment or final order.

With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.

I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same as in the earlier controversy."16

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually
justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and
fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:
 It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross
injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was
a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling
of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-
handed administration of justice in the courts.17

That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation of American
philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:

The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and
one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the
responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all
between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged. 18

Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a
fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered
anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty,
predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to
regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly,
a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of
factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or
inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.

Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time,
the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have
recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of
PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to
cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al.
Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.

III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments

Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(2) A Constitutional Convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly propose changes
to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was
no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not
so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only
amendments are allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:

The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.

 MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members
felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?

MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision"

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20

Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners'
proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.

The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987
Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The
Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition
from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary;
conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of Members of
Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.

Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a "people's
initiative."

I disagree.

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document,
 or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered.21

Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of
change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:

"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are sometimes
used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.

"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form,
scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a
convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from
the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with
corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a
correction of detail.

Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished by a
process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally
new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment"
and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by
revision of the city charter, not by its amendment."24

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a
"revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.

Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon
careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create
multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple
effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution includes the
power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to
one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to
the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."25 This is clearly not the case here.

Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of
powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a
Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the
Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven
in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.

In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:

It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a
revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the
proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of
our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.

Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision,
as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:

The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature
affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative
branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation,
except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a
House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole
 pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect
the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the
following "omnibus provision":

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of
Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections
of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .

xxxxxxxxx

Section 4. (1) x x x

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.

The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform
to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed
provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the
Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its
ruling, thus:

There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present
Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers
found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection,
sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section,
subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope
of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial revision of
our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. 28

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections
sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution
resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are
connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes
attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan
would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a
convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."29

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be
the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:

But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the
rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other
words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is
nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the
structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be
found to be unclear?
 In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate.
And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an
authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is
important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen. 30

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation.
Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated,
this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a
new law to supply its deficiencies.

Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No.
6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:

1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;

2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to
implement the people's initiative; and

3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument
to implement people's initiative.

I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.

A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local legislation. Its
references to initiatives on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local
legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation, 31 however, as
regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:

(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32

(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
Section 3;33

(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved
or rejected by the people;34

(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; 35 and

(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not
the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since
the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for
a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:

· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;

· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed
amendment;

· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political party or
coalition with members in the congressional district;

· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;

· Signature stations to be provided for;

· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the
Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls
where the signatures were obtained;

· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the
COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.

None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.

V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative

VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6735

I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are
proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether
they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)

The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the following
requisites must be present:

1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the Constitution;

2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters;" and
 3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."

In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.

The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As
shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under
oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as representatives"
of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3
million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2.
Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the
signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people.
Certainly, that is not the petition for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as representatives" of the alleged 6.3
million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that
amendments to the Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any
person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon
the people the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise
of being the people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people"
(comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is
not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.

Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless and misleading. There is no
people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado and their allies.

VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.

Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of the right of
the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters
indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments
to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise
their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a
political question."

The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the difficult
question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US
Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in the
people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled
by the political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative
and executive branches of the government.

The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration brought about
by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which
served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-
apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for their disenfranchisement from
the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or
abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional
convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The
State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there
were two opposing state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.

The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter.
He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's
archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic processes, the people of Rhode
Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive
government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.

In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations where Federal
courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide.
In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a
political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater
than that sought to be remedied."

While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of
the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." In Tañada and
Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in determining whether a question
before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:

1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or

2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or

3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or

4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due the coordinate branches of government; or

5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or

6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.

None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is
at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded from
resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v.
Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the
political departments to decide.

CONCLUSION

In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called people's initiative to amend our
Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative
of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million
registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional
provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there
will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and their group
asked them to sign.

Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect,"
although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people
in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens'
Assemblies "was and is null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared
of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should
allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves
in power.

At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure. Consequent1y, we must
not change it. America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then
safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive
government.

Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as members and leaders of the
unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with
limitless terms?

Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for
the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?

This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And history will
judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and
revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's initiative?

Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino
people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members of a
Constitutional Convention.

Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its
discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended petition are for
the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in
substance.

The Antecedents

On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE
MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A
SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY
AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August
30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.

Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with those who have affixed
their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the
Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to propose
amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which
provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,1are sufficient
enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:

Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

 c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.

xxxx

Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for initiative, in
compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."2

Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and
prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:

1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by this
Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will
on the proposition.

Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.

The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course and dismissing the petition for
initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:

We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.

This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.

Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x
x.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."

The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its
implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution,
Congress enacted RA 6735.

However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said law
for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned
 The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people under a system of
initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a
valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (Citations omitted.)

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

The Petitioners' Case

In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:

I.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE,
BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE
MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS
RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO
DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.

II.

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING
APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE
EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND
COMPLETE.

III.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

A.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.

1.

THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING
VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
 2.

PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF

THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL
HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD

3.

THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL

QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.

4.

BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE

DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO
PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.

B.

THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS

C.

THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE

DELFIN PETITION.

1.

IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS

IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.

IV.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY

MANDATED BY LAW.

A.

THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE. 3

Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential

Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
 The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and established:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x 4

The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there
must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. 5

There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. 6 The only
question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.7 An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.8

In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in
obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc permanently
enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC
denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the
system.

It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as "capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the
COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its
implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc
interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. 10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En
Banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc
modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same. 12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13

Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by the
judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court
cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to
any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it
further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme
Court….

The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any further
departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and
produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule allowing the
 inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution
would be repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.14

At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like
petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to
issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said
order and their petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in all regions
all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order
prayed for.

Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it
declared:

1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned";

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative; and

3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of registered voters.

The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.16

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.17 The said petitioners,
undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter
alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that
it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the
Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment to the
Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.

The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its
Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order issued against it by the Court
in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution.

The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court
declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be
held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other
members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no
need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is
not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-examination. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring supplied.)

In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should
not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the
Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18,
1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.

The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing
that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms
a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be
considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof.19

The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive portion. The
ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in
denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in
Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of
hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition
based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.

As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings."20 This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions
applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of
those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto." 21

Petitioners Cannot Ascribe

Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago

It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a
corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration therein
on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional
amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.

Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually
took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices, 23 while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on
the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to
implement the system of initiative.

Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement
therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.

In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only
six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration
failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977."24 In fine, the
pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.

It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine its ruling
as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the
Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-
examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on
petitioners.

If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have resolved to
set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court
did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court
in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the
Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely
on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.

That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional amendments through the
system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several
lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of
Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.

In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate
Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P.
Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to
Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.

In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen
Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes,
and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for
People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.

The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern
the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10)
years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the
system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein,
it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown,
Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with respect to its own
ruling.

Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual
opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's composition. 26 Indeed, it is vital that
there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should not be
encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the
expounders of it.27

Proposals to Revise the Constitution,

As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments

Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken
together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot
prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the revision of the
Constitution.

Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be
composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative
districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified
voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-
list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total
membership coming from the parliamentary districts."

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a
Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the
Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by
a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent
Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of
both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18
 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as
Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of Congress,"
"Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to
read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be
changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as
Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be
deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any
and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or
"Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall
be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of
the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim
Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.

"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may
be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized
and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member
of Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of
electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The
duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President. 28

Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the
petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented
by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC
Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The
verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the
immediately preceding election.

The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for the said
purpose reads:
 DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?29

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and
more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive
branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for proposals for the amendment and
revision of the Constitution:

1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –

a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

b. A constitutional convention.

2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people
through initiative.

The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their respective
modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts.
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:

MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.

We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to
use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the
substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came
up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by
Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an
existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of
amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to
the needs of the times.
 The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the
Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.30

Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional
convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the system
of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional convention.

It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:

SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution. 31

However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision on the system
of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the
provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system
of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members
felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. x x x32

The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the system of initiative was
reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:

MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is
presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day periods.

MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution
which would further require the process of submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.

MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
 MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?

MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33

Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the observation of
Commissioner Regalado Maambong:

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."34

After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:

AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE

THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT.

Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:

Article XVII

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(4) A constitutional convention.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only between the two
terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not to a revision –
thereof.

As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different modes of changing
the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by
Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial decision which gave
imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:

There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a
rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of
the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental
charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts. 36

Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,
an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or
whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.37

In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had the occasion to make the distinction
between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained
the term "amendment:"

"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds
something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or
taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to
accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or purpose. 39

On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:

x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed,
repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used
again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another
or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an
amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution. 40

Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the distinction between the
two terms thus:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the
guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of the
 document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings
of the document) – to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.

It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather,
it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of
the plural form of "amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of
amendments!41

Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the framers
thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present
Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by
the venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, "gradually and
painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected
all dimensions of the national life."42

Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the same
extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the people would
directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the
Congress or Constituent Assembly.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is founded, and
regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in
which it is to be exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the sense that the
term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are
both conferred and circumscribed.44

The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes
cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing that will, the
Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the
electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then
any course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law. 46

Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional amendment or
revision depends upon whether such provisions have been complied with, such question presents for consideration and
determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine
such question.47

Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a differentiation
not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case
of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to
the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be
enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208
subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State Constitution and add at
least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize
gaming, completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also
included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.

The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for ratification because it was
not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of the
proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed
initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the
California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but
does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must
be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between amendment
and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields
of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a
substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be
understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49

Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves – they must not be so
adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party
passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also
to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole
system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for safety. 50

Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its
revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory
provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous
provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the President. These powers
would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one
hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:

1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes;

2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;

3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;

4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;

5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):

- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;

- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts;

- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of Congress as
ex officio members and on the power of the President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts;

- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and Congress.

6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);

- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and Congress;

- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of
government officials;

- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the consent of Congress,
any present, emolument, etc. x x x"

- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;
 - (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures to minimize election
spending x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;

- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress a report on the
conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;

- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations;

- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered under party-list
system;

- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system;

- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of Appointments;

- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.

7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;

- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local government units
(LGUs);

- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as
Congress may provide;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political subdivisions;

- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x x x;

- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over autonomous regions;

- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region as well as the power
of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative commission;

- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the organic act for
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):

- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);

- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate complaint and sole power
of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);

- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;

- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-
President, etc.
 - Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including the President, Vice-
President, etc.

9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural resources and power
of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of
every contract;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;

- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning agency to be headed
by the President;

- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60%
Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;

- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;

- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of cooperatives;

- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private corporations;

- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the
same;

- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.

10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):

- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of people x x x

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform;

- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to Congress effective
measures to promote human rights;

- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Human Rights.

11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):

- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in educational institutions;

- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall sustain the
use of Filipino as medium of official communication;

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;

 - Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific research.

12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):

- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national anthem, etc.;

- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the President in times of
war or national emergency declared by Congress;

- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media;

- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on indigenous
cultural communities.

13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):

- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;

- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of initiative;

- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution.

14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).

The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected."51Petitioners'
proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory provisions,
will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects,
however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental
law.

I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a
consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular
provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution. 52

For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the
terms:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or
whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.53

A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following the above distinction,
entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire document" and "may result in
the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."

More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and substance
of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental powers into three
distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral
body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at discretion.
Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed
and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when
controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks
and balances which guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.

Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a fusion between
the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime
Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament.
The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of
government, does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this
form of government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.

Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the Constitution's basic
plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be
altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would
constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed." 54 As has been shown, the
effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain
objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast."55

To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble
of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would
be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.

As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision
from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects
revision."56

The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a
proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

The Petition for Initiative on

Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance

Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is
valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and
substance.

Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:

1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be;

2. The proposition;

3. The reason or reasons therefor;

4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

 5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.

Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on
the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures
made by persons other than the election registrars has no legal effect.

In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was
made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan,
Lanao del Sur reads in full:

LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as
attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of the 2nd Legislative District of the Province
of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on
Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the
names found in the official list of registered voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or
voters' identification cards.

It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of
LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).

April 2, 2006

IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer

(Underscoring supplied)

The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone
is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao; 58 Cotabato
City (Special Province);59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61 Parang, Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan,
Maguindanao;63 Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira, Maguindanao;65 Sultan, Mastura;66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan,
Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan,
Maguindanao;72Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay,
Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao;77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;78 Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80 Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo, Sulu;83Maimbung,
Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;88 Luuk, Sulu;89 Panamao,
Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;94 Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96

Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and by no one else,
including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the
outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the above-
mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply with the requisite number
of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves submitted the same to the
COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied
with and that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial
admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.97 This being the case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal
of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication
entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases. 98

It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is
inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The fact
that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution,
which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the particles of sovereignty
must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution
via a writ of mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public duty most
especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary
on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100

To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.

Remand of the Case to the

COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has complied with the requisite number of
signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion
cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this
claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors
have alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they were misled into signing the signature
sheets.

According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the requirements of RA
6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus
remands the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.

To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind
of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.

Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted under the control and supervision
of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said
implementing rules provide as follows:

Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
 If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated
and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.

If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or
referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.

Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition
for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any
evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to
determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes
submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The remand of the case to
the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the
abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.

The Present Petition Presents a

Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.102 A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some other department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act.103

In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the
doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:

In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power
is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question
defense.

xxxx

To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by
allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."

Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million registered
voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable
controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided
for the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question, therefore, of whether there has been
compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon. 105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition
questioning the result of the general election holding that "an examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost
uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional
amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v. Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among other
cases.

There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them."111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that the people
through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the very
least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people."112 In effect, it is
theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from
the system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision.

I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a
view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from
whom springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of
their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate
body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the
protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury by the people." 114 This is the
essence of constitutionalism:

Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies,
historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just.
So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not
displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word. 115

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the Constitution,
and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect the
changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the
revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the
electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in
favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the
Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.116

The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.117

The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article XVII of the Constitution. The
Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes
thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed
that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:

x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in
excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations
shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse. 118

Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached and grappled
with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the
earnest attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard.
I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 "it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed.
Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in
times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular
excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become
mere 'ropes of sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can
sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which
a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the
observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it
consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the
amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of
republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those
already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be
'voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution."120

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and

G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.).

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

AZCUNA, J.:

"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."

-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.

Article XVII of the Constitution states:

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
 Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.

This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.

Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution of
Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty,
which provides how the Constitution may be changed.

Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.

As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as
a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.

The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under
Article XVII.

Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of the people's right
directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a
legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.

As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the right to propose a law or
amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent measure,
not a mere legislative one.

The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is
that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and should not strictly apply.
As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be
sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the Constitution.

Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for proposing amendments to the
Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.

For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-examined and, after doing so, that the
pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.

And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the
Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.

This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative herein involved complies with the
requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.

True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to emphasize precisely that there are
instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features
set forth in this People Power Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.

Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the rule of law. This equally important point is
emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which states:
 ". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."

Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power is subject to limitations under the
Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised for the first five years after the Constitution took effect and thereafter
can only be exercised once every five years; the power only extends to proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power
needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.

The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative herein
involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.

Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.

The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one, namely,
there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive
document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not
be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent
Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for
such deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases
of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the record of their proceedings.

Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein involved will show on its face that
the proposed changes constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government from that
which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.

While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the proposed changes
themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform to the nature of a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII
on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and
thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.

Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the changes be worded? The proposed
initiative does not say who nor how.

Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also suffers from being incomplete and
insufficient on its very face.

It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power under the Constitution.

Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more than one subject shall be proposed
as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very least two subjects – a
unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that
provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.

This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.

For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature – a unicameral legislature is one; a
parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is
clearly a revision that affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could at
present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as
yet know exactly what.

The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-
chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes needed to carry it out are
perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the
wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would read if we were to change
Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of the House of
Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive
Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions. These are
mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only amendments, and they address only one subject matter.

Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present initiative, which is to provide for
simplicity and economy in government and reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.

For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a change. Rather,
such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its
implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them to decide in their sovereign
capacity. After all is said and done, this is what democracy under the rule of law is about.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1

– Chief Justice John Marshall

DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical understanding of the first and
foremost of our constitutional principles — "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected with
deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures thereon,
and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the
sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the
provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.

The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would be formally filed with
the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country. It thus
sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor and
setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing
the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for
initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the regions of
the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the
purpose.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil
action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition. They
impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature
gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative
may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act
No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to
amend the Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.3

Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the
Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The Court ruled that the constitutional
provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling
law is necessary to implement the exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8)
members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned," 4 and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that even if R.A.
6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin
Petition should still be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least
twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three
per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. The decision stated:

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

 a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5

Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan,
Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.

While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation 6 agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for
lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V.
Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the
people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details
for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to
resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on initiative, and there
was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.

The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision.

After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8) majority members maintained their position that
R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an
inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A. 6735
sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in
the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo
and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter
was not ripe for judicial adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to
modify or reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.8

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution
(PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in
Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the
signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where
the following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:

Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for another term,
similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of
six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the
freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of
Article X, respectively?

The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v.
COMELEC.

PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing
its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting
on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and
because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine
its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other
members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was
no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at
bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x9

In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.

Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.

On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked
on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country
through charter change. They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:

A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be
composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province
must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected
by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal
to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.

B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised
by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of
all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the
program of government.

C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which
shall read, as follows:

Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution
unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
 (2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that
any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8,
9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in
which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting
President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall
continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall
be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially
convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime
Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day
of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President. 10

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed
amendments, to wit:
 Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?

The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan,
as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the
local officials and multi-sectoral groups.

Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the
people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for
signing.

The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the voters' registration record.
Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election officers issued certifications to attest that the
signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan
for the counting of the signatures.

On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a
People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI
and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System." They filed
an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people.
They alleged that they were filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have
affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the
signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and
allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section
7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that
the COMELEC issue an Order:

1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.

Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative, among them
ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and
Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña
III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical
Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo
Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma.
Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the
August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the
Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the petition:

I.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of,
and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be
considered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and final
voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and
insufficient in standard.

II.

The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC
provide for sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people's initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are
adequate and complete.

III.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of,
and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and
disregarding and contravening the will of the people.

A.

Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the
sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for initiative.

1.

The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to propose amendments and
the people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this constitutional provision.

2.

Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the people to exercise the
sovereign power of initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.

3.

The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which shall be
determined solely by the sovereign people.

4.

By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly verified by the election
officers, the people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign power.

B.

The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for initiative filed by the
petitioners.

C.
 The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.

1.

It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the body of the decision that
governs the rights in controversy.

IV.

The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty mandated by law.

A.

The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for plebiscite. 12

The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T.
Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical
Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo
Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio
Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-
Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong
moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.

The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu
Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines,
represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-
Intervention.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel
Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to
intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.

The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case
of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and
the details for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed changes to the Constitution are
actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed
amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition
for initiative, if indeed there was; that the verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached
to the petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in
the petition for initiative.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment
to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render
judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the
provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside
the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to
R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.

The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does
not adequately implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent
injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not
only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.

On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the following issues:13

1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than
six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution.

3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present
petition.

4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law
implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the COMELEC have complied with
its provisions.

5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.

5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.

6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.

6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.

7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a political question to be
determined solely by the sovereign people.

8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative
filed before it.

With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six
million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as
they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve
per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all
the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was
accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the filing of said
petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:

x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my
support for the filing thereof.14

There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize petitioners to file
the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus
before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.

Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for
initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.

II

The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started
with the English Courts.15 Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents where the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision;
not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."17

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.18 According to Hamilton,
"strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." 19 Madison agreed but stressed that "x x
x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon
a precedent."21 He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and
the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for
over two centuries."22

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisisdeveloped its own
life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves
interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined:
"the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."27 In contrast, the
application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute
has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." 28 This stance reflects both respect
for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it
promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare
decisis rule where30 (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate
but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation.
In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine
setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should
be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and
changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior
decision and its merits.36

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to
be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.

Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor
of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC
in issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down as
unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It improperly assails the ability of legislators
to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should
be crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell
courts how to write literate decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking
domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6) justices
that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people to amend the
Constitution via an initiative.

On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation from the people. On the
contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance
is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private rights are
adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.

On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust
certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only point of
contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people's
initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the Constitution
through people's initiative and that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who
ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through an
initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all
government authority emanates. New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings
demand the reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to step
into the future with a blindfold.

III

A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative.

When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735,
it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from the following:

First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:

The policy statement declares:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis
supplied)

It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."

It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:

(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;"38 and

(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39

It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."

Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to
implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now
R.A. No. 6735.

Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship
remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative
as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks: 41

SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO

MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497,
entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum
Act of 1989.

As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative
power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the
principle that any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of
powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment
6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.

Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the executive.

Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that he
Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.

In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating through the right of suffrage and
indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.

Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize direct action
of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical recognition of what we refer to as people's
sovereign power. This is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.

Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved
legislative power given to the people expressly.

Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I quote:

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by
at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative power, there are reserved powers
given to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and
initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress with the people.

Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision
on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.

We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the exercise by the people of the right
of initiative and referendum.

House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988,
Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.

Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under Philippine law
has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent, the system is provided for in
our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay
assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the sangguniang barangay.
There are variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons who have been
actual residents of the barangay for at least six months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines.
The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.

Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary to be
incorporated as part of my speech.

To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it is now
mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar to what is now
contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of
the states in the United States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to reject
any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.

In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also without ay limitation,
except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.

The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors – is substantially similar to those of many American laws.
Mr. Speaker, those among us who may have been in the United States, particularly in California, during election time
or last November during the election would have noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were
propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during the voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr.
Speaker.

Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in
a great respect.

What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The
bill has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative and
referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people.
That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to
pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at this time,
and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws
need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to spur economic development, safeguard individual
rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the people.

With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the Senators when they are minded to agree
with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.

Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.

First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It means that
the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill or a
piece of legislation.

Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to amend the Constitution. This can
occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an
existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the barangays in the Philippines would
have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.
 The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives
a definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.

On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve or reject something that Congress
has already approved.

For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into two or three, we must first get the
consent of the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.

Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for
instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had
already become a law, then the people could petition that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can be
appropriately approved or rebuffed.

The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from the
people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that the people can then submit a petition,
which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have been citing is whether
there should be direct elections during the barangay elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency
and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have direct democracy operates.

Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have referendum or initiative
petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to
exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These
numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement
of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The same requirement is mutatis mutandis or
appropriately modified and applied to the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or
referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a
district, there is also a certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a
province then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutional mandate.

The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon the call of the Commission on
Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days
but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so,
Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution
requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an
initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be
allowed. In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative
or referendum is approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days following
the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to
enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.

Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for
initiative and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but
that too had already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this year at least to
respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the work of legislation.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated
in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together with the footnotes since they
contain many references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the Record for future
purposes.

Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador Escudero
III, viz:42
 SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO

MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a
truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who actively participated in the parliament of the streets,
some of whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the population feel
increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not the reality or substance of democracy because of
the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There
have been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their campaign promises to the
people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in
case their chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly
recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the same article,
Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of these three
articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.

These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for an implementing law that will give
meaning and substance to the process of initiative and referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to
representative democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably open the door to
strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers,
the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.

Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill we can hasten the politization
of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce
better and more responsive and acceptable legislations.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an opportunity
to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress will
hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear to all Filipinos,
and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation
filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that
our people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.

However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it took sometime before the
committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of
this bill therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal and political
consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately
approved.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as legislated and when
possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and history." 43

The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for
the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does
not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution.

To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the sovereign people to amend the
Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the people's
initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere
details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing details of a law can be
delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it
down as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution.

IV

The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be undertaken through
people's initiative.

Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people's
initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and
thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through people's initiative.

In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial amendments amounting to revision, the
oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44

MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to
the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view: 45

MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only,
not for revision, only once every five years x x x x

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment."
Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision?"

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this point 46 -
 MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR
REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."

MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.

MR. OPLE. How is that again?

MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.

MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.

MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.

MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.

The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the very system of government from
presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral," among others. They allegedly seek
other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a term of a
Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the
executive power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution
effect major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the government,
the political rights of the people, and the modes by which political rights may be exercised." 48 They conclude that they are
substantial amendments which cannot be done through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple
but not substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.

With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not subject to any accurate quantitative or
qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some
one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change
basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and
Article VII (Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential
bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected including
Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V
(Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public
Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are
"simple" or "substantial."

Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the said changes
are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says
that a good constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the
fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the
enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals with the framework of government and its powers, laying
down certain rules for its administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the
mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution. 49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only
the constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes
will not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state." 50 It is self-evident that a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less democratic or any less republican in character.
Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or
"substantial."

For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an
"amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they provide that "substantial" amendments are beyond the power
of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between
"amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including complex changes while "revision" means complete
change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between
"amendment" and "revision." Black's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or
made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or
correction."51 Black's also refers to "amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is
defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."53 In parliamentary law, it is described as "[a]
general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire document is open to
amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" – as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to
correct errors or better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of proposing, passing, and
ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution),
"contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a
new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57

One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of
the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of
1971) similarly spelled out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a constitution, in its
strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution." 58

Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In
1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral
structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year
term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together with the complementary constitutional provisions to
effect the changes, were considered amendments only, not a revision.

The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however, considered a revision since the 1973
Constitution was "a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts."59 Among
those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the presidential system, with the leadership
in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking
body instead of the two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the enfranchisement
of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other
substantial requirements to widen the basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil
service system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and management of mass media;
the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own educational
institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the masses. 60

The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant
innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National
Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form
part of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the
presidential system with parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private land for use as residence to natural-born
citizens who had lost their citizenship was also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was
reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created
while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing programs were strengthened. 61 These
substantial changes were simply considered as mere amendments.

In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed under
Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.

In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom
Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of
eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of
the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have
been restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The
independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an increase in its authority,
which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were
retained, like those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a
revision of the 1973 Constitution.

It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It
is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a
Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the people's
right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose
substantial amendments amounting to revision.

With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely on the
opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of
an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the
constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who
have ratified and adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion
that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision." For during the
debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:65

MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee
finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-
President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our
research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the
decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment"
and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other
hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to
amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of
provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete
or unresponsive to the needs of the times.

The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the
Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.

To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an analogy – "When a house is completely
demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new
house? Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but
this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house."67

Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision," they had in mind the "rewriting of
the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or just "a change of
specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific
parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still
"amendments" and thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.

As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners on the difference between
"simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are covered by people's
initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to
the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz:68

x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it,
the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or
abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the
common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These
proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings
of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the
former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion and deliberations of their
representatives. The history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues
 before the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as
anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.

Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to
accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of government – not to defeat them.69 One of
these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.

Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start
with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed of the nation" 70 as it "lays
down the policies that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II
of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and
delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a republican
state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the people,
by the people, and for the people' – a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."72

In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or to a convention, the power to amend
or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused
particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power requirements of the
regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
A conspiracy of circumstances from above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra
constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the people's revolution was the failure of
the representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly
or by calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in using this last peaceful
process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and
replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.

It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people
to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives
of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring cannot rise above its
source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic," in our
first Declaration of Principles, viz:

MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now adopting which are covering
consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in
lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's organizations x x x x 73

MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first sentence
states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x x x

May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional
framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of
emphasis?

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize people power and the many
provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the
like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances x x x x

MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is understood as participatory
democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)

The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75
 MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative democracy?

MR. AZCUNA. That is right.

MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used
the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to a democratic state where people choose their
representatives?

MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.

MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the participation of the people x x x x
So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction of the
aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic
portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to
emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through
their representatives. (emphasis supplied)

Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the provision on people's initiative said:76

MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce an innovative mode of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their organizations the right to formulate
and propose their own amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon the
government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for amending a constitution will be needed
frequently in the future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the
people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or revision to the
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way for the people to change
their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:77

MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are providing a channel for
the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this initiative system.

MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people,
particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20 years under the
Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the
Prime Minister or the President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could not be obtained, we would
have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for
amendment to the Constitution.

It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National Assembly to constitute itself as a
constituent assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed the people's
desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is now popularly
known as people's power. (emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a revolution, viz:78

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually avert a revolution by providing
a safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what
political law authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of Congress to
amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to
be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum."

Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the
democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who they claim
can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not "substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to
Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law.79 Legal
sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies
the absence of any other party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author
and source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80

To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's will over the state which they
themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of all political power.
Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism.
Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant
to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern."81

James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid
down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787 Constitution of the
United States:82

There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may
be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.

x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer
that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step
nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are
superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over
our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)

I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not
the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in
any organ of government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people delegated to Congress
the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to
amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power has no power to
substantially amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to make substantial
amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to
substantially amend the Constitution when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo
jumbo to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point: 83

But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and
agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily
functions. However ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any
time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:

Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a
right to control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable
occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is
conceded to be founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those
mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative
autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is shared with the people. We should
accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose substantial amendments to the
Constitution especially when the proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of Congress. A
contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to
frustrate the power of the people to determine their destiny (the principal).

All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative and
referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly
construed to maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v.
Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to depart from it.

The issues at bar are not political questions.

Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will,
as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely
political question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether or not
the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the people alone must resolve in their sovereign
capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the
sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of
initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a 'political question.'"88

The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:89

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to
the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If
the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare
whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the
President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not
that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process
when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed
or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves – of course – who exercise no power of
judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes
the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this
inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter."90Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and
not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to them and to them alone.

VI

Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the COMELEC.

Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper verification of signatures was done in
several legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the
signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.

Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S.
Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his office has not
verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:

This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the
signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by the proponents of the People's Initiative.
Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORSused as
basis for such verification of signatures.91

Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B.
Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of the City
Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the signature sheets, 92 the certifications reveal that the office
had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of
the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the
signature sheets.

Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at least three per cent
(3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District of South
Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for
Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered voters of said district. Antonino,
however, submitted to this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8,
2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was
in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato. 93 Excluding the
signatures from Polomolok from the total number of signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total
of 8,676 signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.

Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued
by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of names appearing on the
signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified the
signatures.94

The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted
copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur 95 and from Compostela
Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the verification process as it alleged that verification in
some areas were conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with this Court copies of
certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC
personnel.97

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election officers sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.

Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City and in Polomolok, South
Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors also issued
certifications showing that they have verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. He presented
copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative Districts of Davao City
stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative. His certification for the Second District states:

This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in the Signature Sheets of the
Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong
Barangay, Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-
TWO (30,662) signatures.
 Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED
VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY. 98

It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification process conducted in
Davao City. It reads:

Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously issued two (2) separate
certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically
relating to the voters who supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted, comprising
22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469 individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered
voters of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based on the Computerized List of Voters.

It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by mistake for the reason that the
signature verification has not been fully completed as of that date.

I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature sheets and
has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99

Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory
D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The certification states:

This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections,
10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate
voters as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered voters of
this Municipality.100

In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:

(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office
that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification." The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness
the "verification process" only because of their pro-active stance;

(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for verification. 36,219 alleged voters'
signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed"
COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the
said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word
"OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the
COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not less than 55 letters of
"signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken thereon;

(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of those
submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny,
some more will surely fail upon closer examination;

(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not know how to treat the
objections and other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go
for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections and other observations. As
mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many "letters of signature
withdrawal" submitted to it;

(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature
Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;

(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;

 (7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature Sheets. 101

Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they were merely misled into
signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature on a document raises
the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have recognized that there is
great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless
she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him. 102 In the same vein, we have held that a person
is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed. 103 But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot
resolve the issue.

In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative be
signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution will
require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC according to its rules. During the oral argument
on this case, the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the
documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the oppositors to
buttress their claim that the required number of signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral argument likewise
clearly show the need for further clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104

The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. I
respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full
opportunity to prove their allegations.

For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance with the requirements of R.A.
6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is
the body that is mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105

VII

COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.

In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling in Santiagopermanently
enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the
constitutional provision allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in
the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices107 voted that said law
was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading
is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication.109

Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the
motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself. 110 Of the original majority of eight
(8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of
the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any
equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:

It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire – to think for action upon
which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my
concurrence to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation" and now to
interpose my dissent thereto.

xxx
 WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.

I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of
their right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to
amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)

Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735
is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue
was not ripe for adjudication.

It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine
that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority
cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:

As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for
reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr.
Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug
"maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the
other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its
failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards" tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations" which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to
declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997
ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on
June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required
"majority." The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in
my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer"
nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's pronouncement from
constitutional infirmity.

The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an
affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other cases,
either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpusstate proceeding by a state
prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's state court conviction was not an
"actual adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding
effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally
divided Court:"

In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court." On what was
apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply
affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during
the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the principles of law which have been
argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of
United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or
petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had,
for no order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled
practice in such case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact
that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to
enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v.
Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to
precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708
(1960).xxx"

This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent
cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a putative father sought to set aside a
decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which lacked
majority opinion supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's would be governed by the state's one-year
statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a
common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice
concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming
justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he
reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue. 115 The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-
year statute of limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue. 116 Because a majority
of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by
the state Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to plurality decisions in which
no majority of the justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative interpretations binding on the
Supreme Court.117

In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the matter,119 held that
chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:

In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor
operation judicially interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court
sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial relief sought against its
enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.

Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in holding unconstitutional said
chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and
accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo
warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded
as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter
15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.

Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on question of constitutionality of
statute involved.

In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of a decision of the
New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the
Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing their assets, while
conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative
"precedent."

In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which had the
same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not
binding upon it, viz:

Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by authority, an affirmance by an
equally divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts. 123

In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was unable to reach a
decision because two judges recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was impossible to
secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for
review. The affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not
authority for the determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential
weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as
between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not
having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of
other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.

After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court
merely disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the
principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res
judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in other
actions.

Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will
prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More importantly,
the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the required number of registered voters under the Constitution: the
requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each legislative district is represented
by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously
that it was not the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast, the present petition
appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed
that an Order be issued fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado
petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.

Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to the
Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an
insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks precedential status and is
non-binding on the present petitioners.

The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the
principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:

The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:

First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except
for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in
the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.

The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION
(PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock,
non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman
Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as
among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.

The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in
the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a
founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that
said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.

No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining
them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)

Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:

 The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.127

Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our
Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration
thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by this Court which
had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered
only after considering the evidence presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of their respective
claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject
of the present petition, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the instant case as some
of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the
parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding
member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made parties to the petition. In other
words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct
group by removing some of the parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in
Geralde v. Sabido128-

A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply including additional parties in the
subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit.
The joining of new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if the party
against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, the parties might
renew the litigation by simply joining new parties.

The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but were not parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were
likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.

Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the
petitioners.

VIII

Finally, let the people speak.

"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States in the
1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our
Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the
commands of our Constitution to underrule us.

The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with this
first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its
abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly
and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of the
people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this
Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the
people to decide.

This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or
destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their
brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and author of our Constitution.
Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the
people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that it "must be signed by at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein" is but the first step in a long journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar
involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by the people and at this time, there is yet
no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment
which is the ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the
proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the
way, we cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our
Constitution.

The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the
people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to let the people speak.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated August 31,
2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the
Commission on Elections for further proceedings.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP),
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN
M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE
MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M.
LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA.
TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 SEPARATE OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter
before us in this petition as one mainly involving a complex political question. 1 While admittedly the present Constitution lays
down certain numerical requirements for the conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages of signatures – being 12%
of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative district is represented by at least 3% – they are not the main
points of controversy. Stated in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the Constitution directly to the vote of the
sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration
before coming to us, are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the
issues concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's Initiative.

2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to "directly" propose amendments
through their own "initiative." The subject of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order to change our
form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a
democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and that all government authority
emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the present
Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People's
Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the
ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.2

3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC was just
relying on precedents, with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC3 and PIRMA v.
COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution by no less than this Court. In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not
hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course,
the Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But
until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to respect and obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.

4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327
million voters, for further examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of the assailed
Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if the signatures in
the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters", the COMELEC
could not give the Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by
Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear
task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to
give due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a
parliamentary system of government should replace the present presidential system.

5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of government as a political question
soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion that our judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus
I vote for the remand of the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in
form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor
later than ninety days from said certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring
closure to the instant political controversy.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DISSENTING OPINION

CORONA, J.:

The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as a nation breathes life to our system of laws,
especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to
the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves
this Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of introducing changes to their fundamental law.
These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the
people.

I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale for upholding the people's
initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.

Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition

The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2)
the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the initiative
provision.

However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable to make it
apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition alone.

Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative claim
that Santiago barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The
argument is flawed.

The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to stare decisis. Hence, I will address the argument
from the viewpoint of res judicata.

Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action.3 It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits
and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second actions. 4

There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent in Santiago, the
petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the two
cases. Santiago involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was
barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.

The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other. They are not based on the same facts. There is
thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing
changes to their fundamental law.

People's Initiative Should Not

Be Subjected to Conditions

People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the
power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power
be made subject to any conditions, as some would have us accept.

Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose changes to the
Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.

The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and dangerously
transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.

While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the
constitution,5 that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same vein, this Court cannot
unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law
inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional
intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.

People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be Unreasonably Curtailed

If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the
Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself – the people – may not do so directly.

Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct democracy" as opposed to "representative
democracy." The system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general electorate to
adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations,"7 the exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by
providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes. 8 Efforts of the represented
to control their representatives through initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more
democracy.9

The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be nothing
but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to empower.

The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a fundamental right and must be
jealously guarded.11 The people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society and representative
democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for their use alone.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

____________________
 EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153

RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-
QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,
LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN
P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO
R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I.
CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-
Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299 entitled

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J:

I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship
are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to express my deep
admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty
resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice
Puno's opinion will in the short term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the
political passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they are to be
trusted to chart the course of their future.

Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to highlight a few other points which also
inform my vote to grant the petitions.

I.

I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not acquired value as precedent and
should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not
merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the members of this Court as they
deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released
for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court
did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was "inadequate". Since this "inadequate"
law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books. 3

I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in Santiago should not have simply let the insufficiency
stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." 4As explained by the Court recently
in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open
spaces in the law.'"6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the
law is "inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open
spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an unfortunate aberration.

I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded
to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly say so.7 Yet the principle is not immutable.8The passionate words of Chief
Justice Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:

Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with
its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I
submit, however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of
jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct
itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all,
the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions. 10 It
should do no less in the present case.11

Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to
accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be
perpetuated.

II.

Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected as precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's
failure to take cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible
through the petitions before this Court.

The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC12, Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and Sambarani v.
COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in
nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the
enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional
mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17

Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is
to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent
duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is administrative in character. By
any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

III.

It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly embrace more
than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition submitted to the electorate that
embraces more than one subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which are to be affected
by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.

Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that the laws passed by Congress
"shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof". 19 The one-subject requirement under the
Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 20 An act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general object.21

The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply as well in the interpretation of
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single general subject,
the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are
germane to the subject of the petition.

Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of government from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the
reorganization of the executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single
general subject still.

The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into several general spheres. To cite the
broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of Rights;
Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI
enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative
petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition
sought not only to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said
petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each
subject bearing no functional relation to the other. But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.

Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the proposed amendments seek to affect
two separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and
legislative branches of government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects the two
branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from presidential to parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII
(Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a different petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI
(Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitions ─ both subject to separate authentications, consideration
and even plebiscites, all to effect one general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would
ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without
transferring executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.

I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably grants the
people the right to seek amendment of the charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right." In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in
the Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain provisions of the Constitution may not be
amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the
restriction of the right to initiative.

The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment under the Constitution. Arguments can
be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness when the vital question of
amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to
vote for the amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact that the one-subject requirement
imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the
requirement, a better course of action would be to insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently
adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule.22 There is no cause to adopt a stricter interpretative rule with
regard to the one-subject rule under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.

IV.

During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution amended through initiative would
not have the benefit of a reference source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional convention.
It was submitted that this consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which
expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of initiative petitions.

This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations of a constitutional
convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a
flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process
authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like to point out that resort to the
records of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the provision
under study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides
fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons
for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."24

Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does not provide
the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling by
itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive.
The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the
proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the
latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives."26 The proper interpretation of a constitution depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof. 27

If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any amendments adopted via initiative, such
absence would not preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how courts generally
construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a
harmonized and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning
of the Constitution.

V.

I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the petitions,
including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three percent (3%) of registered
voters in every legislative district have indeed signed the initiative petitions.28 It should be remembered that the COMELEC had
dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as required by law.

It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the Court may at this juncture pronounce
the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering
that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise has
been floated that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that purportedly established the petitions are
insufficient.

That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I submit, is whether it serves well on the
Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions
as insufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower court trial had began.

Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of facts, and
resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:

[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new evidence before this Court,
which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of
the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal, and documents
forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.
This is true whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an administrative agency or
quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.30
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the Justices of the
Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.

VI.

The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice whether to amend the
Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the people to
make the choice for them.

A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the people to directly
exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I share would not even guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng
Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine the
sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by the poll body in considering the sufficiency
of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered
voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions. 31

And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the Constitution should be amended
would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or
the imputed motives behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow
them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal.
The campaign period alone would allow the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should
take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the
Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its
most elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the hallowed
chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet
blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike.

The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a people who are actually
empowered in having a say whether these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure democracy, as
formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his
famed Funeral Oration, "We differ from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from public life not as 'private' but as
useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill
together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."32

Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act or vote that assists the initiative
process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should of course properly
play its course in the public debates and deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the
temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by
simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense
of the people's will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it
may gain the admiration of those who do not want to see the Constitution amended.

Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our rule
of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the
centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of
tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited
rights to self-determination and self-governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended
to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the states for
voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have already been within the first few years of the American
Union, met resistance from no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn
attributes these disconcerting words:

The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and
believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give
therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government… Can a democratic assembly who annually
revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can
check the imprudence of democracy…33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern democracy where a person's poverty,
color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the
right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance for a means by which the people have a direct
choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution may seem incompatible with
representative democracy, yet it embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to
grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.

By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process should be
acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be
denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.

I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC

G. R. No. 174153

RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-
QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,
LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN
P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO
R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I.
CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-
Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DISSENTING OPINION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 "The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But
this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of
them."

-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.

I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S.
Puno. However, I make some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.

While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law of
the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate – the
will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble,1expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be
because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies
raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.

If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the people change their will, so
must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the Constitution
inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself, under Article
XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.

Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and the constitutional convention possess the
power to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so provides, but because
the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right to make such proposals to their representatives either through
Congress or through a constitutional convention.

On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People Power Revolution of 1986, reserved
to themselves the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit –

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 2

The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the Constitution because, as previously
discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to the
Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall exercise this right: (a) through the
filing of a petition; (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters nationwide; (c) with
each legislative district represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that
no such petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years
thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal requirements and other details for the
implementation of the right.

It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express their collective will, and when the people
speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's
right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said
provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would render
the people's option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to
the other constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section
1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on
initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to the conclusions, in
support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of
discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign people's inherent right to propose changes to the Constitution, regardless of whether they
constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the oppositors
before this Court.

The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and Aumentado's
petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a sufficient law.

After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this
Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent
petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.

The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to
have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it
issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative. 5 It was this restraining order,
more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly made permanent by the Court. It would
seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted
significance and weight to the first paragraph of the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the
Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the definite orders of the
Court for implementation are found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that –

The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the subject of
execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for such
a resolution. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text of
the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the
opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more particularly to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6

Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of the Santiago case? Apparently,
there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On the other
hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While
the permanent injunction contemplated in the Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the Court as it is stated
in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.

Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this Court's Resolution,
dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission
on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in the Santiago case.

It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res judicata because PIRMA
participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court
therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case
–

First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except
for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in
the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.

The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION
(PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock,
non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman
Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as
among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.

The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in
the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a
founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that
said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.

No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining
them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.9

While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata
is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes
of action.10

Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not been complied with. Undoubtedly,
the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of action, and the former should
not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His petition does not qualify
as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of
registered voters, and actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the case before us,
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered
voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an
Order –

1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and

3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.

Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution, the personalities concerned and
the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the
parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court. For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC
to accord due course to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in
summarily dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is
characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously
copped out of its duty and responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven
decision in the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly
expanded the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it actually states, which is
surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to
understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements made by the
Court in the Santiago case and the permanent injunction issued therein.

No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the COMELEC the
mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, viz –

SEC. 4. x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.

As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the
presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is mandatory. 11 Under the above-quoted constitutional provision, it is the
mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition is found to be sufficient, to
set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its certification.
The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4,
through the summary dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is supported by
6.3 million signatures of registered voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required
percentages of registered voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate
expression of the will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing their
voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.

II

We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision in the Santiago case,
especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling law for the
implementation of the people's right to initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather
than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency
or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in
the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –

Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to Constitutional
initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and sufficient standard tests" with respect to permissible
delegation of legislative power or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in
Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.

It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735
was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express
finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide
to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other members of the Court.

Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is
already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory
construction, which state that –

[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54
[19741). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised
and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).

First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by
ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an initiatory pleading over
which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been
adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the
provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago case
reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in the Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all
presumptions should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.

The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case and again open to judicial review the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, having satisfied
the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion
made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in the Santiago case, that reads –

R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The
power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the
standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved,
when a plebiscite may be held, when the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any
initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.

III

The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference between an "amendment" and a "revision" of
the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional thoughts on the matter.

Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to the provisions of the
Constitution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done through people's initiative; Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution on people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the
traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment referring to isolated or piecemeal change only,
while revision as a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.13

However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative test that can establish with
definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the
Constitution.

The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative basically affect only Article VI on
the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the
constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President as
the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power; they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles
of the Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted
mostly of the nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As
eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican
state. It will still be a representative government where officials continue to be accountable to the people and the people maintain
control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.

Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the whole of the Constitution, what or
who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their right to
initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who, according to their
deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction
to interpret the provision? Bearing in mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is
nothing or no one that can preclude them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the
Constitution is supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the people's will, and should the people's will clamor for a
revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution,
including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of their
inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision
thereof, for their actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision imposes
upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.

IV

Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take cognizance of Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such petition which
is ostensibly supported by the required number of registered voters all over the country, be summarily dismissed.

Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the same would be found sufficient and
set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it complies with the
requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the
authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite number of registered voters for every legislative
district, are already factual in nature and require the reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such questions are best
presented and resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.

In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying due course to
the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.

In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

____________________

EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

SEPARATE OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Introduction

The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of the people, depends
on the choices it makes between these opposite principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on
the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
—John Acton

In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno
upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my own.

The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once discussed in the landmark case of Santiago
v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the
pronouncements made in that case.

The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and opponents will understandably
take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not
concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of Charter
Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It determined that
Congress had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No.
6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation." 2

With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.

Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should not have been considered
inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the
law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but
disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an
afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult
construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the
power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the
controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared
inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA
6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.

It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory
construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line with the purpose for
which they have been enacted.4 The reading of the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of
upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.

Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with
the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go unheard,
especially when the Constitution itself grants them that power.

The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the fallo in the Santiago case is limited to
the Delfin petition.

The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al.,
which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following
conclusion, viz:

This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to
have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict between the
dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former
prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.5 The dispositive
portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to
determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must
conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. 6

A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot
prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the
judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute
its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a
decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often
encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are
apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so
called, of the decision.7

Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that the disposition in the latter case
categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin
petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the perpetual proscription against the
COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a
conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under
Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the
petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred
from entertaining any such petition.

In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule
on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for certiorari.
COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not
been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate in the Santiago case.

Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on Elections8confirmed the
statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution
which reads:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the
DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.

Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in
the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the COMELEC but
do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or
even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became
permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but
certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be
considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.

Amendment or Revision

One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since only amendments to the
Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.

The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it. The term
amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:

Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration
of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.

In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the
whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.

When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people's political rights, courts must
lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.

Conclusion

Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even from the courts.
It is not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or
vague provisions of the law.

As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No.
174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is sufficient under
RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA 6735.

It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a change in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Separate Opinions

CASTRO, C.J.:, concurring:

From the challenge as formulated in the three petitions at bar and the grounds advanced be the Solicitor General in opposition
thereto, as well as the arguments adduced by the counsels of the parties at the hearing had on October 7 and 8, 1976, three vital
issues readily project themselves as the centers of controversy, namely:

(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?

(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the
President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machineries and prescribe the
procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?

(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper,
submission"

First Issue

The threshold question is not at all one of first impression Specifically on the matter of proposals to amend the Constitution, this
Court, in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), inceptively announced the dictum that-

Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charges by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even
independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of
a proposal than into that of a ratification.

In time, however, the validity of the said pronouncement was eroded. In the assessment of the Court itself-

The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino
vs. Cuenco (L-2581, March 4 and 14, 1949), Tanada vs. Cuenco (L-10520, February 28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on
Elections (L-18684, September 14, 1961).

xxx xxx xxx

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assembly-violates the Constitution is
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent this view may be inconsistent with
the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point." (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, et al, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 786-787).

The abandonment of the Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito doctrine appears to have been completed when, in Javellana vs. Secretary, et al.
(L-36142, March 3l, 1973, 50 SCRA 30), six members of the Court concurred in the view that the question of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV (Amendments) of the 1935 Constitution is inherently
and essentially justiciable.

As elucidated therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)-

... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinarily parlance, namely, a
question of policy in matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.'
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -
particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught." (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, supra).

So it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validity of the presidential acts of proposing
amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendum-plebiscite for the ratification of the proposals made. Evidently, the
question does not concern itself with the wisdom of the exercise of the authority claimed or of the specific amendments proposed.
Instead the inquiry vel non is focused solely on the existence of the said power in the President - a question purely of legality
determinable thru interpretation and construction of the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the Court as the final arbiter in the
delineation of constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.

For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous years, would be to abdicate its
constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and deny the people their ultimate recourse for judicial
determination.

I have thus no hesitancy in concluding that the question here presented is well within the periphery of judicial inquiry.

II

Second Issue

The main question stands on a different footing; it appears unprecedented both here and elsewhere. Its solution, I believe, can be
found and unraveled only by a critical assessment of the existing legal order in the light of the prevailing political and factual
milieu.

To be sure, there is an impressive array of consistent jurisprudence on the proposition that, normally or under normal conditions,
a Constitution may be amended only in accord with the procedure set forth therein. Hence, if there be any such prescription for
the amendatory process as invariable there is because one of the essential parts of a Constitution is the so-called "constitution of
sovereignty" which comprises the provision or provisions on the modes in accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be effected the same would ordinarily be the controlling criterion for the validity of the amendments
sought.

Unfortunately, however, during the present transition period of our political development, no express provision is extant in the
Constitution regarding the agency or agent by whom and the procedure by which amendments thereto may be proposed and
ratified fact overlooked by those who challenge the validity of the presidential acts in the premises. This is so because there are at
least two distinctly in the transition from the old system of government under the 1935 Constitution to the new one established by
the 1973 Constitution.

The first stage comprises the period from the effectivity of the Constitution on January 17, 1973 to the time the National
Assembly is convened by the incumbent President and the interim President and the interim Prime Minister are chosen Article
XVII, Sections 1 and 3[1]. The existence of this stage as an obvious fact of the nation's political life was recognized by the Court
in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275), when it rejected the claim that, under
the 1973 Constitution, the President was in duty bound to convene the interim National Assembly soon after the Constitution
took effect.

The second stage embraces the period from the date the interim National Assembly is convened to the date the Government
described in Articles VII to IX of the Constitution is inaugurated, following the election of the members of the regular National
Assembly (Article XVII, Section 1) and the election of the regular President and Prime Minister,. This is as it should be because
it is recognized that the President has been accorded the discretion to determine when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, and his decision to defer the convocation thereof has found overwhelming support by the sovereign people in
two previous referenda, therein giving reality to an interregnum between the effectivity of the Constitution and the initial
convocation of the interim National Assembly, which interregnum, as aforesaid, constitutes the first stage in the transition period.

Against this factual backdrop, it is readily discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions embodied in the Constitution on
the amendatory process applied during the said first stage. Thus, Section 15, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) provides-
"Sec. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof."

Patently, the reference to the "interim National Assembly" and the "interim Prime Minister" limits the application thereof to the
second stage of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interim? National Assembly shall have been convened and the interim Prime
Minister shall have been chosen.

Upon the other hand, the provisions of Article XVI (Amendments), to wit-

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.

(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention
or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of ceiling such a convention to the electorate in
an election.

SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision.

unequivocally contemplate amendments after the regular Government shall have become fully operative, referring as they do to
the National Assembly which will come into being only at that time.

In the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilemma whether amendments to the Constitution may be
effected during the aforesaid first stage and, if in the affirmative, by whom and in what manner such amendments may be
proposed and ratified.

Susceptibility to change is one of the hallmarks of an Ideal Constitution. Not being a mere declaration of the traditions of a nation
but more the embodiment of a people's hopes and aspirations, its strictures are not unalterable. They are, instead, dynamic
precepts intended to keep in stride with and attuned to the living social organism they seek to fashion and govern. If it is
conceded that "the political or philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next and entirely discarded by the
third," then a Constitution must be able to adjust to the changing needs and demands of society so that the latter may survive,
progress and endure. On these verities, there can be no debate.

During the first stage of the transition period in which the Government is at present - which is understandably the most critical -
the need for change may be most pressing and imperative, and to disavow the existence of the right to amend the Constitution
would be sheer political heresy. Such view would deny the people a mechanism for effecting peaceful change, and belie the
organic conception of the Constitution by depriving it of its means of growth. Such a result obviously could not have been
intended by the framers of the fundamental law.

It seems, however, that the happenstance that the first period would come to pass before the convocation of the interim National
Assembly was not anticipated, hence, the omission of an express mandate to govern the said situation in so far as amendments
are concerned. But such omission through inadvertence should not, because it cannot, negate the sovereign power of the people to
amend the fundamental charter that governs their lives and their future and perhaps even the very survival of the nation.

Upon the other hand, it is clear from the afore-quoted provisions on the amendatory process that the intent was, instead, to
provide a simpler and more expeditious mode of amending the Constitution during the transition period. For, while under Article
XVI thereof, proposals for amendment may be made directly by the regular National Assembly by a vote of at least three-fourths
of all its members, under Section 15 of Article XVII, a bare majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly would
suffice for the purpose. The relaxation and the disparity in the vote requirement are revealing. The can only signify a recognition
of the need to facilitate the adoption of amendments during the second stage of the transition period so that the interim National
Assembly will be able, in a manner of speaking, to iron out the kinks in the new Constitution, remove imperfections therein, and
provide for changed or changing circumstances before the establishment of the regular Government. In this contest, therefore, it
is inutile speculation to assume that the Constitution was intended to render impotent or ar the effectuation of needful change at
an even more critical period - the first stage. With greater reason, therefore, must the right and power to amend the Constitution
during the first stage of te transition period be upheld, albeit within its express and implied constraints.
Neither can it be successfully argued, in the same context and in the present posture, that the Constitution may be amended
during the said first stage only by convening the interim National Assembly. That is to say and require that he said stage must
first be brought to an end before any amendment may be proposed and ratified. Settled jurisprudence does not square with such a
proposition. As aptly noted in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al., supra, the framers of the Constitution set no deadline
for the convening of the interim National Assembly because they could not have foreseen how long the crises which impelled the
proclamation and justify the continued state of martial law would last. Indeed, the framers committed to the sound judgment is
not subject to judicial review, save possibly to determine whether arbitrariness has infected such exercise; absent such a taint, the
matter is solely in the keeping of the President. To thus content that only by convening the interim National Assembly may the
Constitution be amended at this time would effectively override the judgement vested in the President, even in default of any he
has acted arbitrarily or gravely abuse his discretion. Furthermore, to sustain such a contention would not only negate the mandate
so resoundingly expressed by the people in two national referenda against the immediate convening of the interim National
Assembly, but as well deride their overwhelming approval of the manner in which the President has exercised the legislative
power to issue proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions having the stature and force of law.

Given the constitutional stalemate or impasse spawned by these supervening developments, the logical query that compels itself
for resolution is: By whom, then, may proposals for the amendment of the Constitution be made and in what manner may said
proposals be ratified by the people?

It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative power in general because
the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution is not in any sense embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making.
Hence, there is much to recommend the proposition that, in default of an express grant thereof, the legislature - traditionally the
delegated repository thereof - may not claim it under a general grant of legislative authority. In the same vein, neither would it be
altogether unassailable to say that because by constitutional tradition and express allocation the constituent power under the
Constitution is locate in the law-making agency and at this stage of the transition period the law-making authority is firmly
recognized as being lodged in the President, the said constituent power should now logically be in the hands of te President who
may thus exercise it in place of the interim National Assembly. Instead,, as pointed out in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
et al., supra, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto

... is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as
ours - t o make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.

As such, it is undoubtedly a power that only the sovereign people, either directly by themselves or through their chosen delegate,
can wield. Since it has been shown that the people, inadvertently or otherwise, have not delegated that power to inadvertently or
otherwise, have not delegated that power to any instrumentality during the current stage of our hegira from crisis to normalcy, it
follows of necessity that the same remains with them for them to exercise in the manner they see fit and through the agency they
choose. And, even if it were conceded that - as it is reputedly the rule in some jurisdictions - a delegation of the constituent
authority amounts to a complete divestiture from the people of the power delegated which they may not thereafter unilaterally
reclaim from the delegate, there would be no violence donde to such rule, assuming it to be applicable here, inasmuch as that
power, under the environmental circumstance adverted to, has not been delegated to anyone in the first place. The constituent
power during the first stage of the transition period belongs to and remains with the people, and accordingly may be exercised by
them - how and when - at their pleasure.

At this juncture, a flashback to the recent and contemporary political ferment in the country proves revelatory. The people,
shocked and revolted by the "obvious immorality" of the unabashed manner by which the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention virtually legislated themselves into office as ipso facto members of the interim National Assembly by the mere fiat of
voting for the transitory provisions of the Constitution. and the stark reality that the unwieldy political monstrosity that the
interim Assembly portended to be would have proven to be a veritable drain on the meager financial resources of a nation
struggling for survival, have unequivocally put their foot down, as it were, on the convocation thereof. But this patently salutary
decision of the people proved to be double-edged. It likewise bound the political machinery of the Government in a virtual
straight-jacket and consigned the political evolution of the nation into a state of suspended animation. Faced with the ensuing
dilemma, the people understandably agitated for a solution. Through consultations in the barangays and sanggunian assemblies,
the instrumentalities through which the people's voice is articulated in the unique system of participatory democracy in the
country today, the underpinnings for the hastening of the return to constitutional normalcy quickly evolved into an overwhelming
sentiment to amend the Constitution in order to replace the discredited interim National Assembly with what the people believe
will be an appropriate agency to eventually take over the law-making power and thus pave the way for the early lifting of martial
rule. In pursuit of this sentiment, and to translate its constraints into concrete action, the Pambansang Katipunan ng Barangay, the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, and
finally the Batasang Bayan, to a man and as one voice, have come forward with definitive proposals for the amendment of the
Constitution, and, choosing the President the only political arm of the State at this time through which that decision could be
implemented and the end in view attained as their spokesman, proposed the amendments under challenge in the cases at bar.

In the light of this milieu and its imperatives, one thing is inescapable: the proposals now submitted to the people for their
ratification in the forthcoming referendum-plebiscite are factually not of the President; they are directly those of the people
themselves speaking thru their authorized instrumentalities. The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential
Decree No. 1033. It being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been demonstrated that
their constituent power to amend the Constitution has not been delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government
during the present stage of the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that their exertion of
that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as being ultra vires. Accordingly, without venturing to
rule on whether or not the President is vested with constituent power as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises the
proposals here challenged, being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A
fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only because
the President, in exercising said authority has acted as a mere alter ego of the people who made the proposals, but likewise
because the said authority is legislative in nature rather than constituent.

III

Third Issue

Little need be said of the claimed insufficiency and impropriety of the submission of the proposed amendments for ratification
from the standpoint of time. The thesis cannot be disputed that a fair submission presupposes an adequate time lapse to enable the
people to be sufficiently enlightened on the merits or demerits of the amendments presented for their ratification or rejection.
However, circumstances there are which unmistakably demonstrated that the is met. Even if the proposal appear to have been
formalized only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976, they are actually the
crystallization of sentiments that for so long have preoccupied the minds of the people and their authorized representatives, from
the very lowest level of the political hierarchy. Hence, unlike proposals emanating from a legislative body, the same cannot but
be said to have been mulled over, pondered upon, debated, discussed and sufficiently understood by the great masses of the
nation long before they ripened into formal proposals.

Besides. it is a fact of which judicial notice may well be taken that in the not so distant past when the 1973 Constitution was
submitted to the people for ratification, an all-out campaign, in which all the delegates of the Constitutional Convention
reportedly participated, was launched to acquaint the people with the ramifications and working of the new system of government
sought to be inaugurated thereunder. It may thus well be assumed that the people in general have since acquired, in the least, a
working knowledge of the entirety of the Constitution. The changes now proposed the most substantial of which being merely the
replacement of the interim National assembly with another legislative arm for the Government during the transition period until
the regular National Assembly shall have been constituted do not appear to be of such complexity as to require considerable time
to be brought home to the full understanding of the people. And, in fact, the massive and wide-ranging informational and
educational campaign to this end has been and still is in full swing, with all the media the barangay, the civic and sectoral groups,
and even the religious all over the land in acting and often enthusiastic if not frenetic involvement.

Indeed, when the people cast their votes on October 16, a negative vote could very well mean an understanding of the proposals
which they reject; while an affirmative vote could equally be indicative Of such understanding and/or an abiding credence in the
fidelity with which the President has kept the trust they have confided to him as President and administrator of martial rule

IV

Conclusion

It is thus my considered view that no question viable for this court to pass judgment upon is posed. Accordingly, I vote for the
outright dismissal of the three petitions at bar.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

These three petitions, the latest in a series of cases starting from Planas v. Commission on Elections continuing with the epochal
resolution in Javellana v. Executive Secretary and followed successively in three crucial decisions, Aquino v. Ponce Enrile
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, and Aquino v Military Commission, 5 manifest to the same degree the delicate and awesome
character of the function of judicial review. While previous rulings supply guidance and enlightenment, care is to be taken to
avoid doctrinaire rigidity unmindful of altered circumstances and the urgencies of the times. It is inappropriate to resolve the
complex problems of a critical period without full awareness of the consequences that flow from whatever decision is reached.
Jural norms must be read in the context of social facts, There is need therefore of adjusting inherited principles to new needs. For
law, much more so constitutional law, is simultaneously a reflection of and a force in the society that it controls. No quality then
can be more desirable in constitutional adjudication than that intellectual and imaginative insight which goes into the heart of the
matter. The judiciary must survey things as they are in the light of what they must become It must inquire into the specific
problem posed not only in terms of the teaching of the past but also of the emerging political and legal theory, especially so under
a leadership notable for its innovative approach to social problems and the vigor of its implementation. This, on the one side. It
must equally be borne in mind through that this Court must be conscious of the risk inherent in its being considered as a mere
subservient instrument of government policy however admittedly salutary or desirable. There is still the need to demonstrate that
the conclusion reached by it in cases appropriate for its determination has support in the law that must be applied. To my mind
that was the norm followed, the conclusion reached being that the three petitions be dismissed. I am in agreement. It is with
regret however that based on my reading of past decisions, both Philippine and American, and more specifically my concurring
opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, I must dissent from the proposition set forth in the able and scholarly opinion of Justice
Martin that there is concentration of power in the President during a crisis government. Consequently, I cannot see my way clear
to accepting the view that the authority to propose amendments is not open to question. At the very least, serious doubts could be
entertained on the matter.

1. With due respect then, I have to dissociate myself from my brethren who would rule that governmental powers in a crisis
government, following Rossiter, "are more or less concentrated in the President." Adherence to my concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile leaves me no choice.

It must be stated at the outset that with the sufficiency of doctrines supplied by our past decisions to point the way to what I did
consider the appropriate response to the basic issue raised in the Aquino and the other habeas corpus petitions resolved jointly, it
was only in the latter portion of my opinion that reference was made to United States Supreme Court pronouncements on martial
law, at the most persuasive in character and rather few in number "due no doubt to the, absence in the American Constitution of
any provision concerning it." 7 It was understandable then that it was only after the landmark Ex parte Milligan case, that
commentators like Cooley in 1868 and Watson in 1910 paid attention, minimal by that, to the subject." It was next set forth that
in the works on American constitutional law published in this century specially after the leading cases of cases Sterling v.
Constant in and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, "there was a fuller treatment of the question of martial law While it is the formulation
of Willoughby that for me is most acceptable, my opinion did take note that another commentator, Burdick, came out earlier with
a similar appraisal.10 Thus: "So called martial law, except in occupied territory of an enemy is merely the calling in of the aid of
military forces by the executive, who is charged with the enforcement of the law, with or without special authorization by the
legislature. Such declaration of martial law does not suspend the civil law, though it may interfere with the exercise of one's
ordinary rights. The right to call out the military forces to maintain order and enforce the law is simply part of the Police power,
It is only justified when it reasonably appears necessary, and only justifies such acts as reasonably appear necessarily to meet the
exigency, including the arrest, or in extreme cases the. killing of those who create the disorder or oppose the authorities. When
the exigency is over the members of the military forces are criminally and civilly habit for acts done beyond the scope of
reasonable necessity. When honestly and reasonably coping with a situation of insurrection or riot a member of the military
forces cannot be made liable for his acts, and persons reasonably arrested under such circumstances will not, during the
insurrection or riot, be free by writ of habeas corpus." 11 When the opinion cited Willoughby's concept of martial law, stress was
laid on his being "Partial to the claims of liberty."12 This is evident in the explicit statement from his work quoted by me: "There
is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in American law as a declaration of martial law whereby military law is substituted for
civil law. So-called declarations of martial law are, indeed, often made but their legal effect goes no further than to warn citizens
that the military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while
the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. Some of the authorities stating substantially this doctrine are quoted
in the footnote below Nor did I stop there. The words of Willis were likewise cited: "Martial law proper, that is, military law in
case of insurrection, riots, and invasions, is not a substitute for the civil law, but is rather an aid to the execution of civil law.
Declarations of martial law go no further than to warn citizens that the executive has called upon the military power to assist him
in the maintenance of law and order. While martial law is in force, no new powers are given to the executive and no civil rights
of the individual, other than the writ of habeas corpus, are suspended. The relations between the citizen and his stature
unchanged."14

The conclusion reached by me as to the state of American federal law on the question of martial law was expressed thus: 4'1 It is
readily evident that even when Milligan supplied the only authoritative doctrine, Burdick and Willoughby did not ignore the
primacy of civil liberties. Willis wrote after Sterling. It would indeed be surprising if his opinion were otherwise. After Duncan,
such an approach becomes even more strongly fortified. Schwartz, whose treatise is the latest to be published, has this summary
of what he considers the present state of American law: 'The Milligan and Duncan cases show plainly that martial law is the
public law of necessity. Necessities alone calls it forth, necessity justifies its exercise; and necessities measures the extended
degree to which it may be It is, the high Court has affirmed, an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where
the rights of the citizen are concerned, may, never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. If martial law rule survive the
necessities on which alone it rests, for even a single minute it becomes a mere exercise of lawless violence.' Further: Sterling v.
Constantin is of basic importance. Before it, a number of decisions, including one the highest Court, went or on the theory that
the executive had a free hand in taking martial law measures. Under them, it has been widely supposed that in proclamation was
so far conclusive that any action taken under it was immune from judicial scrutiny. Sterling v. Constantin definitely discredits
these earlier decisions and the doctrine of conclusiveness derived from them. Under Sterling v. Constantin, where martial law
measures impinge upon personal or property rights-normally beyond the scope of military power, whose intervention is lawful
only because an abnormal Actuation has made it necessary the executive's ipse dixit is not of itself conclusive of the necessity.'"15

There was likewise an effort on my part to show what for me is the legal effect of martial law being expressly provided for in the
Constitution rather than being solely predicated on the common law power based on the urgent need for it because of compelling
circumstances incident to the state of actual clash of arms: "It is not to be lost sight of that the basis for the declaration of martial
law in the Philippines is not mere necessity but an explicit constitutional provision. On the other hand, Milligan, which furnished
the foundation for Sterling and Duncan had its roots in the English common law. There is pertinence therefore in ascertaining its
significance under that system. According to the noted English author, Dicey: 'Martial law,' in the proper sense of that term, , in
which - it means the suspension of ordinary law and the temporary government of a country or parts of it be military tribunals, is
unknown to the law of England. We have nothing equivalent to what is called in France the "Declaration of the State of Siege,"
under which the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police passes entirely to the army
(autorite militaire). This is an unmistakable proof of the permanent supremacy of the law under our constitution. There was this
qualification: 'Martial law is sometimes employed as a name for the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel
force by force in the case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance to the law. This right, or power, is
essential to the very existence of orderly government, and is most assuredly recognized in the most ample manner by the law of
England. It is a power which has in itself no special connection with the existence of an armed force. The Crown has the right to
put down breaches of the peace. Every subject, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether what is called a servant of the
government,' such for example as a policeman, or a person in no way connected with the administration, not only has the right,
but is, as a matter of legal duty, bound to assist in putting down breaches of the peace. No doubt policemen or soldiers are the
persons who, as being specially employed in the maintenance of order, are most generally called upon to suppress a riot, but it is
clear that all loyal subjects are bound to take their part in the suppression of riots." 16

Commitment to such an approach results in my inability to subscribe to the belief that martial law in terms of what is provided
both in the 1935 and the present Constitution, affords sufficient justification for the concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis. The better view, considering the juristic theory on which our fundamental law rests is that expressed by
Justice Black in Duncan v. Kahanamoku: "Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are
indispensable to our government. 17 If there has been no observance of such a cardinal concept at the present, it is due to the fact
that before the former Congress could meet in regular session anew, the present Constitution was adopted, abolishing it and
providing for an interim National Assembly, which has not been convened. 18 So I did view the matter.

2. Nor did I ignore Rossiter in my Aquino v. Ponce Enrile opinion. Reference was made to the first chapter on his work on
Constitutional Dictatorship where he spoke of martial rule as "a device designed for use in the crisis of invasion or rebellion. It
may be most precisely defined as an extension of military government to the civilian population, the substitution of the will of a
military commander for the will of the people's elected government."19Since, for me at least, the Rossiter characterization of
martial law has in it more of the common law connotation, less than duly mindful of the jural effects of its inclusion in the
Constitution itself as a legitimate device for coping with emergency conditions in times of grave danger, but always subject to
attendant limitations in accordance with the fundamental postulate of a charter's supremacy, I felt justified in concluding:
"Happily for the Philippines, the declaration of martial law lends itself to the interpretation that the Burdick, Willoughby, Willis,
Schwartz formulations paying due regard to the primacy of liberty possess relevance. lt cannot be said that the martial rule
concept of Rossiter, latitudinarian in scope, has been adopted, even on the assumption that it can be reconciled with our
Constitution. What is undeniable is that President Marcos has repeatedly maintained that Proclamation No. 1081 was precisely
based on the Constitution and that the validity of acts taken there under could be passed upon by the Supreme court. For me that
is quite reassuring, persuaded as I am likewise that the week- of Rossiter is opposed to the fundamental concept of our polity,
which puts a premium on freedom."20

3. Candor and accuracy compel the admission that such a conclusion his to be qualified. For in the opinion of the Court in the
aforecited Aquino v. Commission on Elections, penned by Justice Makasiar, the proposition was expressly affirmed "that as
Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can reclamations,
orders and decrees during the period Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or
secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which
presently threatens all nations including highly developed countries." 21 To that extent, Rossiter's view mainly relied upon, now
possesses Juristic significant in this jurisdiction. What, for me at least, gives caused for concern is that with the opinion of the
Court this intrusion of what I would consider an alien element in the limited concept of martial law as set forth in the Constitution
would be allowed further incursion into the corpus of the law, with the invocation of the view expressed in the last chapter of his
work approving tile "concentration of governmental power in a democracy [as] a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in
the doctrine of the separation of powers." 22 It is to the credit of the late Professor Rossiter as an objective scholar that in the very
same last chapter, just three pages later, he touched explicitly on the undesirable aspect of a constitutional dictatorship. Thus:
"Constitutional Dictatorship is a dangerous thing. A declaration of martial law or the passage of an enabling act is a step which
must always be feared and sometimes bitterly resisted, for it is at once an admission of the incapacity of democratic institutions to
defend the order within which they function and a too conscious employment of powers and methods long ago outlawed as
destructive of constitutional government. Executive legislation, state control of popular liberties, military courts, and arbitrary
executive action were governmental features attacked by the men who fought for freedom not because they were inefficient or
unsuccessful, but because they were dangerous and oppressive. The reinstitution of any of these features is a perilous matter, a
step to be taken only when the dangers to a free state will be greater if the dictatorial institution is not adopted." 23

4. It is by virtue of such considerations that I find myself unable to share the view of those of my brethren who would accord
recognition to the Rossiter concept of concentration of governmental power in the Executive during periods of crisis. This is not
to lose sight of the undeniable fact that in this country through the zeal, vigor, and energy lavished on projects conducive to the
general welfare, considerable progress has been achieved under martial rule. A fair summary may be found in a recent address of
the First Lady before the delegates to the 1976 international Monetary Fund-World Bank Joint Annual Meeting: "The wonder is
that so much has been done in so brief a time. Since September 1972, when President Marcos established the crisis government,
peace and order have been restored in a country once avoided as one of the most unsafe in the world. We have liberated millions
of Filipino farmers from the bondage of tenancy, in the most vigorous and extensive implementation of agrarian
reform."24Further, she said: "A dynamic economy has replaced a stagnant order, and its rewards are distributed among the many,
not hoarded by a few. Our foreign policy, once confined by fear and suspicion to a narrow alley of self-imposed isolation, now
travels the broad expressways of friendship and constructive interaction with the whole world, these in a new spirit of confidence
and self-reliance. And finally, forced to work out our own salvation, the Filipino has re-discovered the well-springs of his
strength and resilience As Filipinos, we have found our true Identity. And having broken our crisis of Identity, we are no longer
apologetic and afraid. "25 The very Idea of a crisis, however, signifies a transitory, certainly not a permanent, state of things.
President Marcos accordingly has not been hesitant in giving utterance to his conviction that full implementation of the modified
parliamentary system under the present Constitution should not be further delayed. The full restoration of civilian rule can thus be
expected. That is more in accord with the imperatives of a constitutional order. It should not go unnoticed either that the
President has referred to the present regime as one of "constitutional authoritarianism." That has a less objectionable ring,
authority being more Identified with the Idea of law, as based on right, the very antithesis of naked force, which to the popular
mind is associated with dictatorship, even if referred to as "constitutional."

For me likewise, that equally eminent scholar Corwin, also invoked in the opinion of the Court, while no doubt a partisan of d
strong Presidency, was not averse to constitutional restraints even during periods of crisis. So I would interpret this excerpt from
the fourth edition of his classic treatise on the Presidency: "A regime of martial law may be compendiously, if not altogether
accurately, defined as one in which the ordinary law, as administered by the ordinary courts, is superseded for the time being by
the will of a military commander. It follows that, when martial law is instituted under national authority, it rests ultimately on the
will of the President of the United States in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. It should be added at once, nevertheless, that
the subject is one in which the record of actual practice fails often to support the niceties of theory. Thus, the employment of the
military arm in the enforcement of the civil law does not invariably, or even usually, involve martial law in the strict sense, for, as
was noted in the preceding section, soldiers are often placed simply at the disposal and direction of the civil authorities as a kind
of supplementary police, or posse comitatus on the other hand be reason of the discretion that the civil authorities themselves are
apt to vest in the military in any emergency requiring its assistance, the line between such an employment of the military and a
regime of martial law is frequently any but a hard and fast one. And partly because of these ambiguities the conception itself of
martial law today bifurcates into two conceptions, one of which shades off into military government and the other into the
situation just described, in which the civil authority remains theoretically in control although dependent on military aid. Finally,
there is the situation that obtained throughout the North during the Civil War, when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended as to certain classes of suspects, although other characteristics of martial law were generally absent."26

It is by virtue of the above considerations that, with due respect to the opinion of my brethren, I cannot yield assent to the
Rossiter view of concentration of governmental powers in the Executive during martial law.

5 There is necessity then, for me at least, that the specific question raised in all three petitions be squarely faced. It is to the credit
of the opinion of the Court that it did so. The basic issue posed concerns the boundaries of the power of the President during this
period of martial law, more precisely whether it covers proposing amendments to the Constitution. There is the further
qualification if the stand of respondents be taken into account that the interim National Assembly has not been convened and is
not likely to be called into session in deference to the wishes of the people as expressed in three previous referenda. It is the
ruling of the majority that the answer be in the affirmative, such authority being well within the area of presidential competence.
Again I find myself unable to join readily in that conviction. It does seem to me that the metes and bounds of the executive
domain, while still recognizable, do appear blurred. This is not to assert that there is absolutely no basis for such a conclusion,
sustained as it is by a liberal construction of the principle that underlies Aquino v. Commission on Elections as to the validity of
the exercise of the legislative prerogative by the President as long as the interim National Assembly is not For me, the stage of
certitude has not been reached. I cannot simply ignore the vigorous plea of petitioners that there is a constitutional deficiency
consisting in the absence of any constituent power on the part of the President, the express provision of the Constitution
conferring it on the by team National Assembly.27 The learned advocacy reflected in the pleadings as well as the oral discourse of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 21 failed to erase the grave doubts in my mind that the Aquino doctrine as to the
possession of legislative competence by the President during this period of transition with the interim lawmaking body not called
into session be thus expanded. The majority of my brethren took that step. I am not prepared to go that far. I will explain why.

The way for me, is beset with obstacles. In the first place, such an approach would lose sight of the distinction between matters
legislative and constituent. That is implicit in the treatise on the 1935 Constitution by Justices Malcolm and Laurel In their
casebook published the same year, one of the four decisions on the subject of constitutional amendments is Ellingham v. Dye 31
which categorically distinguished between constituent and legislative powers. Dean Sinco, a well-known authority on the subject,
was quite explicit. Thus: "If there had been no express provision in the Constitution granting Congress the power to propose
amendments, it would be outside its authority to assume that power. Congress may not claim it under the general grant of
legislative power for such grant does not carry with it the right 'to erect the state, institute the form of its government,' which is
considered a function inherent in the people. Congressional law- making authority is limited to the power of approving the laws
'of civil conduct relating to the details and particulars of the government instituted,' the government established by the people."12
If that distinction be preserved, then for me the aforecited Aquino decision does not reach the heart of the matter. Nor is this all.
In the main opinion of Justice Makasiar as well as that of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro, support for the ruling that
the President cannot be deemed as devoid of legislative power during this transition stage is supplied by implications from
explicit constitutional provisions.13 That is not the case with the power to propose amendments. It is solely the interim National
Assembly that is mentioned. That is the barrier that for me is well-nigh insurmountable. If I limit myself to entertaining doubts
rather than registering a dissent on this point, it is solely because of the consideration, possessed of weight and significance, that
there may be indeed in this far-from-quiescent and static period a need for al. amendments. I do not feel confident therefore that a
negative vote on my part would be warranted. What would justify the step taken by the President, even if no complete acceptance
be accorded to the view that he was a mere conduit of the barangays on this matter, is that as noted in both qualified concurrences
by Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma in Aquino, as far as the legislative and appropriately powers are concerned, is the
necessity that unless such authority be recognized, there may be paralyzation of governmental activities, While not squarely
applicable, such an approach has, to my mind, a persuasive quality as far as the power to propose amendments is concerned.

Thus I would confine myself to the expression of serious doubts on the question rather than a dissent.

6. The constitutional issue posed as thus viewed leaves me free to concur in the result that the petitions be dismissed. That is to
accord respect to the principle that judicial review goes no further than to checking clear infractions of the fundamental law,
except in the field of human rights where a much greater vigilance is required, That is to make of the Constitution a pathway to
rather than a barrier against a desirable objective. -As shown by my concurring and dissenting opinion in Tolentino Commission
on Elections '34 a pre-martial law decision, the fundamental postulate that sovereignty resides in the people exerts a compelling
force requiring the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from denying the people the opportunity to make known their wishes
on matters of the utmost import for the life of the nation, Constitutional amendments fall in that category. I am fortified in that
conviction by the teaching of persuasive American decisions There is reinforcement to such a conclusion from retired Chief
Justice Concepcion's concurring and dissenting opinion in Aytona v. Castillo,17 Which I consider applicable to the present
situation. These are his words: "It is well settled that the granting of writs of prohibition and mandamus is ordinarily within the
sound discretion of the courts, to be exercised on equitable principles, and that said writs should be issued when the right to the
relief is clear * * by As he noted in his ponencia in the later case of Gonzales v. Hechanova,19 an action for prohibition, while
petitioner was sustained in his stand, no injunction was issued. This was evident in the dispositive portion where judgment was
rendered "declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he
exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied." 40 With the
illumination thus supplied, it does not necessarily follow that even a dissent on my part would necessarily compel that I vote for
the relief prayed for. Certainly this is not to belittle in any way the action taken by petitioners in filing these suits. That, for me, is
commendable. It attests to their belief in the rule of law. Even if their contention as to lack of presidential power be accepted in
their entirety, however, there is still discretion that may be exercised on the matter, prohibition being an equitable remedy. There
are, for me, potent considerations that argue against acceding to the plea. With the prospect of the interim National Assembly
being convened being dim, if not non- existent, if only because of the results in three previous referenda, there would be no
constitutional agency other than the Executive who could propose amendments, which, as noted. may urgently press for adoption.
Of even greater weight, to my mind, is the pronouncement by the President that the plebiscite is intended not only to solve a
constitutional anomaly with the country devoid of a legislative body but also to provide. the machinery be which the termination
of martial law could be hastened. That is a consummation devoutly to be wished. That does militate strongly against the stand of
petitioners. The obstruction they would pose may be fraught with pernicious consequences. It may not be amiss to refer anew to
what I deem the cardinal character of the jural postulate explicitly affirmed in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions that
sovereignty resides in the people. So I made clear in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and thereafter in my dissent in
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary" and my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on Elections. 42 The destiny of the country
lies in their keeping. The role of leadership is not to be minimized. It is crucial it is of the essence. Nonetheless, it is their will, if
given expression in a manner sanctioned by law and with due care that there be no mistake in its appraisal, that should be
controlling. There is all the more reason then to encourage their participation in the power process. That is to make the regime
truly democratic. Constitutional orthodoxy requires, however, that the fundamental law be followed. So I would interpret
Laski, 43 Corwin, 44 Lerner,45, Bryn-Jones, 46 and McIver.47

7. There is reassurance in the thought that this Court has affirmed its commitment to the principle that the amending process
gives rise to a justiciable rather than a political question. So, it has been since the leading case of Gonzales v. Commission on
Election S.48 It has since then been followed in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections 49 Planas v. Commission on Elections,"
and lastly, in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary This Court did not heed the vigorous plea of the Solicitor General to resurrect
the political question doctrine announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 52 This is not to deny that the federal rule in the United
States as set forth in the leading case of Coleman v. Miller , 53 a 1939 decision, and relatively recent State court decisions, supply
ammunition to such a contention.,51 That may be the case in the United States, but certainly not in this jurisdiction. Philippine
constitutional tradition is to the contrary. It can trace its origin to these words in the valedictory address before the 1934-35
Constitutional Convention by the illustrious Claro M. Recto: "It is one of the paradoxes a democracy that the people of times
place more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them for the exercise of their
sovereignty It can be said with truth, therefore, that there has invariably been a judicial predisposition to activism rather than self-
restraint. The thinking all these years has been that it goes to the heart of constitutionalism. It may be said that this Court has
shunned the role of a mere interpreter; it did exercise at times creative power. It has to that extent participated in the molding of
policy, It has always recognized that in the large and undefined field of constitutional law, adjudication partakes of the quality of
statecraft. The assumption has been that just because it cannot by itself guarantee the formation, much less the perpetuation of
democratic values or, realistically, it cannot prevail against the pressure of political forces if they are bent in other directions. it
does not follow that it should not contribute its thinking to the extent that it can. It has been asked, it will continue to be asked, to
decide momentous questions at each critical stage of this nation's life.

There must be, however, this caveat. Judicial activism gives rise to difficulties in an era of transformation and change. A society
in flux calls for dynamism in "he law, which must be responsive to the social forces at work. It cannot remain static. It must be
sensitive to life. This Court then must avoid the rigidity of legal Ideas. It must resist the temptation of allowing in the wasteland
of meaningless abstractions. It must face stubborn reality. It has to have a feel for the complexities of the times. This is not to
discount the risk that it may be swept too far and too fast in the surge of novel concepts. The past too is entitled to a hearing; it
cannot just be summarily ignored. History still has its uses. It is not for this Court to renounce the virtue of systematic jural
consistency. It cannot simply yield to the sovereign sway of the accomplished fact. It must be deaf to the dissonant dialectic of
what appears to be a splintered society. It should strive to be a factor for unity under a rule of law. There must be, on its part,
awareness of the truth that a new juridical age born before its appointed time may be the cause of unprecedented travail that may
not end at birth. It is by virtue of such considerations that I did strive for a confluence of principle and practicality. I must confess
that I did approach the matter with some misgivings and certainly without any illusion of omniscience. I am comforted by the
thought that immortality does not inhere in judicial opinions. 8. 1 am thus led by my studies on the subject of constitutional law
and, much more so, by previous judicial opinions to concur in the dismissal of the petitions. If I gave expression to byes not
currently fashionable, it is solely due to deeply-ingrained beliefs. Certainly, I am the first to recognize the worth of' the social and
economic reforms so needed by the troubled present that have been introduced and implemented. There is no thought then of
minimizing, much less of refusing to concede, the considerable progress that has been made and the benefits that have been
achieved under this Administration. Again, to reiterate one of my cherished convictions, I certainly approve of the adherence to
the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty which, to be meaningful however, requires both freedom in its manifestation
and accuracy in ascertaining what it wills. Then, too, it is fitting and proper that a distinction was made between two aspects of
the coming poll, the referendum and the plebiscite. It is only the latter that is impressed with authoritative force. So the
Constitution requires. Lastly, there should be, as I did mention in my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,56 full
respect for free speech and press, free assembly and free association. There should be no thought of branding the opposition as
the enemy and the expression of its views as anathema, Dissent, it is fortunate to note, has been encouraged. It has not been
Identified with disloyalty. That ought to be the case, and not solely due to presidential decrees. Constructive criticism is to be
welcomed not so much because of the right to be heard but because there may be something worth hearing. That is to ensure a
true ferment of Ideas, an interplay of knowledgeable minds. There are though well- defined limits, One may not advocate
disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.. What I mean to stress is that except on a
showing of clear and present danger, there must be respect for the traditional liberties that make a society truly free.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

1. On the merits: I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit and vote to grant the petitions for the
following reasons and considerations: 1. It is undisputed that neither the 1935 Constitution nor the 1973 Constitution grants to the
incumbent President the constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution to be submitted to the people
for ratification in a plebiscite. The 1935 Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in Congress, be a three-fourths vote of
all its members, to propose amendments or call a constitutional convention for the purpose The 1973 Constitution expressly vests
the constituent power in the regular National Assembly to propose amendments (by a three-fourths vote of all its members) or
"call a constitutional convention" (by a two-thirds vote of all its members) or "submit the question of calling such convention to
the electorate in an election" (by a majority vote of all its members ) .2

The transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution expressing vest the constituent power during the period of transition in the
interim National Assembly "upon special call be the Prime Minister (the incumbent President 3)... by a majority ore of all its
members (to) propose amendments."

Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers
of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been
withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrease proposing and submitting
constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power
is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis.

2. The doctrine in the leading case of Tolentino vs. Comelec is controlling in the case at bar In therein declaring null and void the
acts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention and of the Comelec in calling a plebiscite with the general elections scheduled for
November 8, 1971 for the purpose of submitting for the people's ratification an advance amendment reducing the voting age from
21 years to 18 years, and issuing writs of prohibition and injunction against the holding of the plebiscite, this Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Barredo ruled that --The Constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of
amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government, (land) are no less
binding upon the people

As long as an amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter, any proposal
for such amendment which is not in conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the Charter for effecting
amendments, cannot receive the sanction of this Court ;8

The real issue here cannot be whether or not the amending process delineated by the present Constitution may be disregarded in
favor of allowing the sovereign people to express their decision on the proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that
the very Idea of departing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the
essence of the rule of law,"; 9 and

-Accordingly barred the plebiscite as improper and premature, since "the provisional nature of the proposed amendments and the
manner of its submission to the people for ratification or rejection" did not "conform with the mandate of the people themselves
in such regard, as expressed in the Constitution itself', 10 i.e. the mandatory requirements of the amending process as set forth in
the Article on Amendments.

3. Applying the above rulings of Tolentino to the case at bar, mutatis, mutandis, it is clear that where the proposed amendments
are violative of the Constitutional mandate on the amending process not merely for being a "partial amendment" of a "temporary
or provisional character" (as in Tolentino) but more so for not being proposed and approved by the department vested by the
Constitution with the constituent power to do so, and hence transgressing the substantive provision that it is only the interim
National Assembly, upon special call of the interim Prime Minister, bu a majority vote of all its members that may propose the
amendments, the Court must declare the amendments proposals null and void.

4. This is so because the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" 11 but only by the
particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people. As stressed by Cooley, "by the Constitution which they establish,
(the people) not only tie up the hands of their official agencies but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State,
nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law." 12

The vesting of the constituent power to propose amendments in the legislative body (the regular National Assembly) or the
interim National Assembly during the transition period) or in a constitutional convention called for the purpose is in accordance
with universal practice. "From the very necessity of the case" Cooley points out "amendments to an existing constitution, or
entire revisions of it, must be prepared and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. It is obviously
impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode by
which an expression of their will can be obtained, except by asking it upon the single point of assent or disapproval." This body
of representatives vested with the constituent - power "submits the result of their deliberations" and "puts in proper form the
questions of amendment upon which the people are to pass"-for ratification or rejection.13
5. The Court in Tolentino thus rejected the argument "that the end sought to be achieved is to be desired" and in denying
reconsideration in paraphrase of the late Claro M. Recto declared that "let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best
controversial, any mandate of the fundamental purportedly in order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday
somehow others with purportedly more laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent and continue the destruction of
the Constitution, making those who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the Constitution the
victims of their own folly."

This same apprehension was echoed by now retired Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar in his dissenting opinion in the Ratification
cases 14 that "we will be opening the gates for a similar disregard to the Constitution in the future. What I mean is that if this
Court now declares that a new Constitution is now in force because the members of the citizens assemblies had approved said
new Constitution, although that approval was not in accordance with the procedure and the requirements prescribed in the 1935
Constitution, it can happen again in some future time that some amendments to the Constitution may be adopted, even in a
manner contrary to the existing Constitution and the law, and then said proposed amendments is submitted to the people in any
manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed that there was approval by the people. There will not be stability in our
constitutional system, and necessarily no stability in our government."

6. It is not legally tenable for the majority, without overruling the controlling precedent of Tolentino (and without mustering the
required majority vote to so overrule) to accept the proposed; amendments as valid notwithstanding their being "not in
conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the provision of the Charter for effecting amendments" on the reasoning that "If the
President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim National Assembly, there is no reason why he
cannot validly discharge the functions."15

In the earlier leading case of Gonzales vs. Comelec16, this Court speaking through now retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
pointer out that "Indeed, the power to Congress"17 or to the National Assembly.18 Where it not for the express grant in the
Transitory Provisions of the constituent power to the interim National Assembly, the interim National Assembly could not claim
the power under the general grant of legislative power during the transition period.

The majority's ruling in the Referendum cases19 that the Transitory Provision in section 3(2) recognized the existence of the
authority to legislate in favor of the incumbent President during the period of martial law manifestly cannot be stretched to
encompass the constituent power as expressly vested in the interim National Assembly in derogation of the allotment of powers
defined in the Constitution.

Paraphrasing Cooley on the non-delegation of legislative power as one of the settled maxims of constitutional law, 20the
contituent power has been lodged by the sovereign power of the people with the interim National Assembly during the transition
period and there it must remain as the sole constitutional agency until the Constitution itself is changed.

As was aptly stated by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmak case of Angara vs. Electoral Commissioner 21, "(T)he
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language and restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution
are real as they should be in any living Constitution".

7. Neither is the justification of "constitutional impasses" tenable. The sentiment of the people against the convening of the
interim National Assembly and to have no elections for "at least seven (7) years" Concededly could not ament the Constitution
insofar as the interim National Assembly is concerned (since it admittendly came into existence "immediately" upon the
proclamation of ratification of the 1973 Constitution), much less remove the constituent power from said interim National
Assembly.

As stressed in the writer's separate opinion in the Referendum cases22, "(W)hile it has been advanced that the decision to defer the
initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the results of the referendum in January, 1973 when the
people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly for at least seven years, such sentiment cannot be given any
legal force and effect in the light of the State's admission at the hearing that such referendums are merely consultative and cannot
amend the Constitution or Provisions which call for the 'immediate existence' and 'initial convening of the interim National
Assembly to 'give priority to measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system' and the other
urgent measures enumerated in section 5 thereof".

While the people reportedly expressed their mandate against the convening of the interim National Assembly to dischange its
legislative tasks during the period of transition under martial law, they certainly had no opportunity and did not express
themselves against convening the interim National Assembly to discharge the constituent power to propose amendments likewise
vested in it by the people's mandate in the Constitution.

In point of fact, when the holding of the October 16, 1976 referendum was first announced, the newspapers reported that among
the seven questions proposed by the sanggunian and barangay national executive committies for the referendum was the
convening of the interim National Assembly.23

It was further reported that the proposals which were termed tentative "will be discussed and studied by (the President), the
members of the cabinet, and the security council" and that the barangays felt, notwithstanding the previous referenda on the
convening of the interim National Assembly that "it is time to again ask the people's opinion of this matter " 24

8. If proposals for constitutional amendments are now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people,
strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied
with. This means, under the teaching of Tolentino that the proposed amendments must validly come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent power to do so, namely, the interim National Assembly, and not from the executive power as
vested in the Prime Minister (the incumbent President) with the assistance of the Cabinet 25 from whom such power has been
withheld.

It will not do to contend that these proposals represent the voice of the people for as was aptly stated by Cooley "Me voice of the
people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which
they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution. ... ."26

The same argument was put forward and rejected by this Court in Tolentino which rejected the contention that the "Convention
being a legislative body of the highest order (and directly elected by the people to speak their voice) is sovereign, in as such, its
acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of Congress and the Courts" and ruled that the constitutional article on the
amending process" is nothing more than a part of the Constitution thus ordained by the people. Hence, in continuing said section,
We must read it as if the people said, "The Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that the amendment must be proposed
and submitted to Us for ratification only in the manner herein provided'".27

This Court therein stressed that "This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the
process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our
founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country
and those subject to its sovereignity, ever constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste
without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation;"
and that "written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as
they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions
motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them
limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment."28

9. The convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to proposed amendments is the only way to
fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution.

As Mr. Justice Fernando emphasized for this Court in Mutuc vs. Comelec 29 in the setting as in of a Comelec resolution banning
the use of political taped jingles by candidates for Constitutional Convention delegates int he special 1970 elections, "the concept
of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from
the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to amnifst fealty to the rule of
law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal heirarchy. The three departments of government
in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guart lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore of disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon the maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law."

This is but to give meaning to the plan and clear mandate of section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (which allows of no other
interpretation) that during the stage of transition the interim National Assembly alone exercises the constituent power to propose
amendments, upon special call therefor. This is reinforced by the fact that the cited section does not grant to the regular National
Assembly of calling a constitutional convention, thus expressing the will of the Convention (and presumably of the people upon
ratification) that if ever the need to propose amendments arose during the limited period of transition, the interim National
Assembly alone would discharge the task and no constitutional convention could be call for the purpose.

As to the alleged costs involved in convening the interim National Assembly to propose amendments, among them its own
abolition, (P24 million annually in salaries alone for its 400 members at P600,000.00 per annum per member, assuming that its
deliberations could last for one year), suffice it to recall this Court's pronouncement in Tolentino (in reflecting a similar argument
on the costs of holding a plebiscite separately from the general elections for elective officials) that "it is a matter of public
knowledge that bigger amounts have been spent or thrown to waste for many lesser objectives. ... Surely, the amount of
seventeen million pesos or even more is not too much a price to pay for fealty and loyalty to the Constitution ... " 30 and that
"while the financial costs of a separate plebiscite may be high, it can never be as much as the dangers involved in disregarding
clear mandate of the Constitution, no matter how laudable the objective" and "no consideration of financial costs shall deter Us
from adherence to the requirements of the Constitution".11

10. The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation and economic crisis
a crisis greater than war") 32 cited by the majority opinion as justifying the concentration of powers in the President, and the
recognition now of his exercising the constituent power to propose amendments to the Fundamental Law "as agent for and in
behalf of the people"33 has no constitutional basis.

In the post-war Emergency Powers 33*, former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras reaffirmed for the Court the principle that emergency
in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish
patriotism of all officials and in their faithful 'Adherence to the Constitution".

The martial law clause of the 1973 Constitution found in Article IX, section 12 , as stressed by the writer in his separate opinion in
the Referendum Cases,14 "is a verbatim reproduction of Article VII, section 10 (2) of the 1935 Constitution and provides for the
imposition of martial law only 'in case of invasion, resurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requires it and hence the use of the legislative power or more accurately 'military power' under martial rule is limited to such
necessary measures as will safeguard the Republic and suppress the rebellion (or invasion)". 35

11. Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which has been held by the majority in the Referendum Cases to be the
recognition or warrant for the exercise of legislative power by the President during the period of martial law is but a transitory
provision. Together with the martial law clause, they constitute but two provisions which are not to be considered in isolation
from the Constitution but as mere integral parts thereof which must be harmonized consistently with the entire Constitution.

As Cooley restated the rule: "effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every section and clause. If
different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words Idle and nugatory.

This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed to
have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the
powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication. It is scarcelly conceivable that a case can arise
where a court would bye justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of
ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural
construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together. 36

The transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals has been withheld from the President (Prime Minister) as sole
repository of the Executive Power, presumably in view of the immense powers already vested in him by the Constitution but just
as importantly, because by the very nature of the constituent power, such amendments proposals have to be prepared, deliberated
and matured by a deliberative assembly of representatives such as the interim National Assembly and hence may not be
antithetically entrusted to one man.

Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion had observed before the elevation of the l971 Constitutional Convention that the
records of past plebiscites show that the constitutional agency vested with the exercise of the constituent power (Congress or the
Constitutional Convention) really determined the amendments to the Constitution since the proposals were invariably ratified by
the people 37 thus: "although the people have the reserved power to ratify or reject the action taken by the Convention, such
power is not, in view of the circumstances attending its exercise, as effective as one might otherwise think: that, despite the
requisite ratification by the people, the actual contents of our fundamental law will really be determined by the Convention; that,
accordingly the people should exercise the greatest possible degree of circumspection in the election of delegates thereto ... "38

12. Martial law concededly does not abrogate the Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional boundaries and allocation of
powers among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments. 39

It has thus been aptly observed that "Martial law is an emergency regime, authorized by and subject to the Constitution. Its basic
premise is to preserve and to maintain the Republic against the dangers that threaten it. Such premise imposes constraints and
limitations. For the martial law regime fulfills the constitutional purpose only if, by reason of martial law measures, the Republic
is preserved. If by reason of such measures the Republic is so transformed that it is changed in its nature and becomes a State
other than republican, then martial law is a failure; worse, martial law would have become the enemy of the Republic rather than
its defender and preserver."40

II. On the question of the Court's jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the questioned presidential decrees: let it be
underscored that the Court has long set at rest the question.

The trail was blazed for the Court since the benchmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission when Justice Jose P. Laurel
echoed U.S. Chief Justice Marshall's "climactic phrase" that "we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding"
and declared the Court's "solemn and sacred" constitutional obligation of judicial review and laid down the doctrine that the
Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the powers of government" placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining
the nature, scope and extent of such powers" and stressed that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and sacred obliteration entrusted to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them".

At the same time, the Court likewise adhered to the constitutional tenet that political questions, i.e. questions which are intended
by the Constitutional and relevant laws to be conclusively determined by the "political", i.e. branches of government (namely, the
Executive and the Legislative) are outside the Court's jurisdiction. 41

Thus, in Gonzales,42 (by a unanimous Court) and in Tolentino43 (by the required constitutional majority), the Court has since
consistently ruled that when proposing and approving amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress. acting as a
constituent assembly or the members of the Constitutional Convention elected directly for the purpose by not have the final say
on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that outs is it government of lawsom not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.
Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power".44

As amplified by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Javellana vs Executive Secretary 45 (by a majority vote), "when the grant of
power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations. the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met, or the limitations by expected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or
validity of the contested act, not its wisdom Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions and limitations-particularly those
prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught".

The fact that the proposed amendments are to be submitted to the people for ratification by no means makes the question political
and non- justiciable since as stressed even in Javellana the issue of validity of the President's proclamation of ratification of the
Constitution presented a justiciable and non-political question

Stated otherwise, the question of whether the Legislative acting as a constituent assembly or the Constitutional Convention called
fol- the purpose, in proposing amendments to the people for ratification followed the constitutional procedure and on the
amending process is perforce a justiciable question and does not raise a political question of police or wisdom of the proposed
amendments, which if Submitted, are reserved for the people's decision.

The substantive question presented in the case at bar of whether the President may legally exercise the constituent power vested
in the interim National Assembly (which has not been granted to his office) and propose constitutional amendments is
preeminently a justiciable issue.

Justice Laurel in Angara had duly enjoined that "in times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof".

To follow the easy way out by disclaiming jurisdiction over the issue as a political question would be judicial abdication.

III. On the question of whether there is a sufficient and proper submittal of the proposed amendments to the people: Prescinding
from the writer's view of the nullity of the questioned decree of lack of authority on the President's part to excercise the
constituent power, I hold that the doctrine of fair and proper submission first enunciated by a simple majority of by Justices in
Gonzales and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority of the Court in is controlling in
the case at bar.

1. There cannot be said to be fair and proper submission of the proposed amendments. As ruled by this Court in Tolentino where
"the proposed amendment in question is expressly saddled with reservations which naturally impair, in great measures, its very
essence as a proposed constitutional amendment" and where "the way the proposal is worded, read together with the reservations
tacked to it by the Convention thru Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is too much of a speculation to assume what exactly
the amendment would really amount lo in the end. All in all, as already pointed out in our discussion of movants' first ground, if
this kind of amendment is allowed, the Philippines will appear before the world to be in the absurd position of being the only
country with a constitution containing a provision so ephemeral no one knows until when it will bet actually in force", there can
be no proper submission.

In Tolentino a solitary amendment reducing the voting age to 18 years was struck down by this Court which ruled that "in order
that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole," and that there was no proper Submission wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on

2. The now Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Makasiar with two other members 46 graphically pointed out in their joint separate
opinion that the solitary question "would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all".47

They further expressed "essential agreement" with Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez' separate opinion in Gonzales "on the
minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional
amendment" which reads thus:

... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification', if construed in the light of
the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of
their sovereign will - is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the
procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must
be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed
amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus
of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word submitted' can only mean that the
government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the
provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By
this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be
reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the
people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one
thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent. consent or
rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is
to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate.48

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that " ... " The great men who builded the structure of our state in
this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be
beyond the reach of temporary excitement and. popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield
to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober
second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. xxx xxx xxx Changes in government are
to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil ;another evil may succeed and a worse'." 49

Justice Sanchez thus stated the rule that has been adopted by the Court in Tolentino that there is no proper submission "if the
people are not sufficiently affirmed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their
will in a genuine manner. ... .." 50

3. From the complex and complicated proposed amendments set forth in the challenged decree and the plethora of confused and
confusing clarifications reported in the daily newspapers, it is manifest that there is no proper submission of the proposed
amendments. Nine (9) proposed constitutional amendments were officially proposed and made known as per Presidential Decree
No. 1033 dated, September 22, 1976 for submittal at the "referendum-plebiscite" called for this coming Saturday, October 16,
1976 wherein the 15-year and under 18-year- olds are enjoined to vote notwithstanding their lack of qualification under Article
VI of the Constitution. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino, an acknowledged parliamentarian of the highest order, was reported by
the newspapers last October 3 to have observed that "there is no urgency in approving the proposed amendments to the
Constitution and suggested that the question regarding charter changes be modified instead of asking the people to vote on
hurriedly prepared amendments". He further pointed out that "apart from lacking the parliamentary style in the body of the
Constitution, they do not indicate what particular provisions are being repealed or amended".52

As of this writing, October 11, 1976, the paper today reported his seven-page analysis questioning among others the proposed
granting of dual legislative powers to both the President and the Batasang Pambansa and remarking that "This dual legislative
authority can give rise to confusion and serious constitutional questions". 53

Aside from the inadequacy of the limited time given for the people's consideration of the proposed amendments, there can be no
proper submission because the proposed amendments are not in proper form and violate the cardinal rule of amendments of
written constitutions that the specific provisions of the Constitution being repealed or amended as well as how the specific
provisions as amended would read, should be clearly stated in careful and measured terms. There can be no proper submission
because the vagueness and ambiguity of the proposals do not sufficiently inform the people of the amendments for, conscientious
deliberation and intelligent consent or rejection.

4. While the press and the Solicitor General at the hearing have stated that the principal thrust of the proposals is to substitute the
interim National Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa, a serious study thereof in detail would lead to the conclusion that
the whole context of the 1973 Constitution proper would be affected and grave amendments and modifications thereof -would
apparently be made, among others, as follows:

Under Amendment No. 1, the qualification age of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa is reduced to 18 years;

Under Amendment No. 2, the treaty-concurring power of the Legislature is withheld from the interim Batasang Pambansa;

Under Amendment No 3, not withstanding the convening of the interim Batasang Pambansa within 30 days from the election and
selection of the members (for which there is no fixed date) the incumbent President apparently becomes a regular President and
Prime Minister (not ad interim);

Under Amendment No. 4, the disqualifications imposed on members of the Cabinet in the Constitution such as the prohibition
against the holding of more than one office in the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations would
appear to be eliminated, if not prescribed by the President;

Under Amendment No. 5, the President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law is lifted;

Under Amendment No. 6, there is a duality of legislative authority given the President and the interim Batasang Pambansa as
well as the regular National Assembly, as pointed out by Senator Tolentino, with the President continuing to exercise legislative
powers in case of "grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof" (without definition of terms) or when said Assemblies "fail
or are unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action", thus radically
affecting provisions of the Constitution governing the said departments;

Under Amendment No. 7, the barangays and Sanggunians would apparently be constitutionalized, although their functions,
power and composition may be altered by law. Referendums (which are not authorized in the present 1973 Constitution) would
also be constitutionalized, giving rise to the possibility fraught with grave consequences, as acknowledged at the hearing, that
amendments to the Constitution may thereafter be effected by referendum, rather than by the rigid and strict amending process
provided presently in Article XVI of the Constitution;

Under Amendment No. 8, there is a general statement in general that the unspecified provisions of the Constitution "not
inconsistent with any of these amendments" shall continue in full force and effect; and Under Amendment No. 9. the incumbent
President is authorized to proclaim the ratification of the amendments by the majority of votes cast. It has likewise been stressed
by the officials concerned that the proposed amendments come in a package and may not be voted upon separately but on an "all
or nothing" basis.

5. Whether the people can normally express their will in a genuine manner and with due circumspection on the proposed
amendments amidst the constraints of martial law is yet another question. That a period of free debate and discussion has to be
declared of itself shows the limitations on free debate and discussion. The facilities for free debate and discussion over the mass
media, print and otherwise are wanting. The President himself is reported to have observed the timidity of the media under
martial law and to have directed the press to air the views of the opposition.54

Indeed, the voice of the studentry as reflected in the editorial of the Philippine Collegian issue of September 23, 1976 comes as a
welcome and refreshing model of conscientious deliberation, as our youth analyzes the issues "which will affect generations yet
to come" and urge the people to mull over the pros and cons very carefully", as follows:

THE REFERENDUM ISSUES

On October 16, the people may be asked to decide on two important national issues - the creation of a new
legislative body and the lifting of martial law.

On the first issue, it is almost sure that the interim National Assembly will not be convened, primarily
because of its membership. Majority of the members of the defunct Congress, who are mandated by the
Constitution to become members of the interim National Assembly, have gained so widespread a notoriety
that the mere mention of Congress conjures the image of a den of thieves who are out to fool the people most
of the time. Among the three branches of government, it was the most discredited. In fact, upon the
declaration of martial law, some people were heard to mutter that a 'regime that has finally put an end to such
congressional shenanigans could not be all that bad'.

A substitute legislative body is contemplated to help the President in promulgating laws, and perhaps
minimize the issuance of ill-drafted decrees which necessitate constant amendments. But care should be
taken that this new legislative body would not become a mere rubber stamp akin to those of other totalitarian
countries. It should be given real powers, otherwise we will just have another nebulous creation having the
form but lacking the substance. Already the President has expressed the desire that among the powers he
would like to have with regard to the proposed legislative body is that of abolishing it in case 'there is a need
to do so'. As to what would occasion such a need, only the President himself can determine. This would
afford the Chief Executive almost total power over the legislature, for he could always offer the members
thereof a carrot and a stick.

On the matter of lifting martial law the people have expressed ambivalent attitudes. Some of them,
remembering the turmoil that prevailed before the declaration of martial law, have expressed the fear that its
lifting might precipitate the revival of the abuses of the past, and provide an occasion for evil elements to
resurface with their usual tricks. Others say that it is about time martial law was lifted since the peace and
order situation has already stabilized and the economy seems to have been parked up.

The regime of martial law has been with us for four years now. No doubt, martial law has initially secured
some reforms for the country The people were quite willing to participate in the new experiment, thrilled by
the novelty of it all. After the euphoria, however, the people seem to have gone back to the old ways, with the
exception that some of our freedoms were taken away, and an authoritarian regime established.

We must bear in mind that martial law was envisioned only to cope with an existing national crisis, It was not
meant to be availed of for a long period of time, otherwise it would undermine our adherence to a democratic
form of government. In the words of the Constitution. martial law shall only be declared in times of
'rebellion, insurrection,. invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it'. Since we no
longer suffer from internal disturbances of a gargantuan scale, it is about time we seriously rethink the
'necessity' of prolonging the martial law regime. If we justify the continuance of martial by economic or other
 reasons other than the foregoing constitutional grounds, then our faith in the Constitution might be
questioned. Even without martial law,. the incumbent Chief Executive still holds vast powers under the
constitution. After all, the gains of the New Society can be secured without sacrificing the freedom of our
people. If the converse is true, then we might have to conclude that the Filipinos deserve a dictatorial form of
government. The referendum results will show whether the people themselves have adopted this sad
conclusion.

The response of the people to the foregoing issues will affect generations yet to come, so they should mull
over the pros and cons very carefully."

6. This opinion by written in the same spirit as the President's exhortations on the first anniversary of proclamation of the 1973
Constitution that we "let the Constitution remain firm and stable" so that it may "guide the people", and that we "remain steadfast
on the rule of law and the Constitution" as he recalled his rejection of the "exercise (of) power that can be Identified merely with
a revolutionary government" that makes its own law, thus:

. . . Whoever he may be and whatever position he may happen to have, whether in government or outside
government, it is absolutely necessary now that we look solemnly and perceptively into the Constitution and
try to discover for ourselves what our role is in the successful implementation of that Constitution. With this
thought, therefore, we can agree on one thing and that is: Let all of us age, let all of us then pass away as a
pace in the development of our country. but let the Constitution remain firm and stable and let institutions
grow in strength from day to day, from achievement to achievement, and so long as that Constitution stands,
whoever may the man in power be, whatever may his purpose be, that Constitution will guide the people and
no man, however, powerful he may be, will dare to destroy and wreck the foundation of such a Constitution.

These are the reasons why I personally, having proclaimed martial law, having been often induced to exercise
power that can be Identified merely with a revolutionary government, have remained steadfast or the rule of
law and the Constitution. 54*

IV. A final word on the Court's resolution of October 5, 1976 which in reply to the Comelec query allowed by a vote of 7 to 3,
judges of all courts, after office hours, "to accept invitations to act as resource speakers under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 991, as amended, as well as to take sides in discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions under Section 7
of the same Decree."55

The writer with Mr. Justice Makasiar and Madame Justice Munoz Palma had dissented from the majority resolution, with all due
respect, on the ground that the non-participation of judges in such public discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite
questions would preserve the traditional non-involvement of the judiciary in public discussions of controversial issues. This is
essential for the maintenance and enhancement of the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. The questions of the validity
of the scheduled referendum- plebiscite and of whether there is proper submission of the proposed amendments were precisely
subjudice by virtue of the cases at bar.

The lifting of the traditional inhibition of judges from public discussion and debate might blemish the image and independence of
the judiciary. Aside from the fact that the fixing of a time limit for the acceptance of their courtesy resignations to avoid an
indefinite state of insecurity of their tenure in office still spends litigants and their relatives and friends as well as a good sector of
the public would be hesitant to air views contrary to that of the.

Judge. Justices Makasiar and Munoz Palma who share these views have agreed that we make them of record here, since we
understand that the permission given in the resolution is nevertheless addressed to the personal decision and conscience of each
judge, and these views may he of some guidance to them.

BARREDO, J.,: concurring:

While I am in full agreement with the majority of my brethren that the herein petitions should be dismissed, as in fact I vote for
their dismissal, I deem it imperative that I should state separately the considerations that have impelled me to do so.

Perhaps, it is best that I should start by trying to disabuse the minds of those who have doubts as to whether or not I should have
taken part in the consideration and resolution of these cases. Indeed, it would not be befitting my position in this Highest Tribunal
of the land for me to leave unmentioned the circumstances which have given cause, I presume, for others to feel apprehensive
that my participation in these proceedings might detract from that degree of faith in the impartiality that the Court's judgment
herein should ordinarily command. In a way, it can be said, of course, that I am the one most responsible for such a rather
problematical situation, and it is precisely for this reason that I have decided to begin this opinion with a discussion of why I have
not inhibited myself, trusting most confidently that what I have to say will be taken in the same spirit of good faith, sincerity and
purity of purpose in which I am resolved to offer the same.

Plain honesty dictates that I should make of record here the pertinent contents of the official report of the Executive Committee
of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian submitted to the Katipunan itself about the proceedings held on August 14, 1976. It is
stated in that public document that:

THE ISSUE WITH REGARDS To THE CONVENING OF A LEGISLATIVE body came out when the
President express his desire to share his powers with other people.

Aware of this, a five-man Committee members of the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) headed by Supreme
Court Justice Antonio Barredo proposed on July 28, the establishment of 'Sangguniang Pambansa' or 'Batasang Pambansa' which
would help the President in the performance of his legislative functions. The proposed new body will take the place of the interim
National Assembly which is considered not practical to convene at this time considering the constitution of its membership.

Upon learning the proposal of Justice Barredo, the country's 42,000 barangay assemblies on August 1 suggested that the people
be consulted on a proposal to create a new legislative body to replace the interim assembly provided for by the Constitution. The
suggestion of the barangay units was made through their national association, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay headed
by Mrs. Nora Z. Patines. She said that the people have shown in at least six instances including in the two past referenda that they
are against the convening of the interim National Assembly. She also said that since the people had ruled out the calling of such
assembly and that they have once proposed that the President create instead the Sangguniang Pambansa or a legislative advisory
body, then the proposal to create a new legislative must necessarily be referred to the people.

The federation of Kabataang Barangay, also numbering 42,000 units like their elder counterparts in the Katipunan ng mga
Barangay also asserted their own right to be heard on whatever plans are afoot to convene a new legislative body.

On August 6, a meeting of the national directorate of PKB was held to discuss matters pertaining to the stand of the PKB with
regards to the convening of a new legislative body. The stand of the PKB is to create a legislative advisory council in place of the
old assembly. Two days after, August 8, the Kabataang Barangay held a symposium and made a stand which is the creation of a
body with full legislative powers.

A nationwide clamor for the holding of meeting in their respective localities to discuss more intellegently the proposal to create a
new legislative body was made by various urban and rural Sangguniang Bayans.

Numerous requests made by some members coming from 75 provincial and 61 city SB assemblies, were forwarded to the
Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD).

On August 7, Local Government Secretary, Jose A. Rono granted the request by convening the 91 member National Executive
Committee of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian on August 14 which was held at Session Hall, Quezon City.
Invited also to participate were 13 Regional Federation Presidents each coming from the PKB and the PKKB

Actually, the extent of my active participation in the events and deliberations that have culminated in the holding of the proposed
referendum- plebiscite on October 16, 1976, which petitioners are here seeking to enjoin, has been more substantial and
meaningful than the above report imparts. Most importantly, aside from being probably the first person to publicly articulate the
need for the creation of an interim legislative body to take the place of. the interim National Assembly provided for in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, as suggested in the above report, I might say that I was the one most vehement and
persistent in publicly advocating and urging the authorities concerned to directly submit to the people in a plebiscite whatever
amendments of the Constitution might be considered necessary for the establishment of such substitute interim legislature. In the
aforementioned session of the Executive Committee of the Katipunan, I discourse on the indispensability of a new interim
legislative body as the initial step towards the early lifting of martial law and on the fundamental considerations why in our
present situation a constitutional convention would be superfluous in amending the Constitution.

Moreover, it is a matter of public knowledge that in a speech I delivered at the Coral Ballroom of the Hilton Hotel in the evening
of August 17, 1976, I denounced in no uncertain terms the plan to call a constitutional convention. I reiterated the same views on
September 7, 1976 at the initial conference called by the Comelec in the course of the information and educational campaign it
was enjoined to conduct on the subject. And looking back at the subsequent developments up to September 22, 1976, when the
Batasang Bayan approved and the President signed the now impugned Presidential Decree No. 1033, it is but human for me to
want to believe that to a certain extent my strong criticisms and resolute stand against any other alternative procedure of
amending the Constitution for the purpose intended had borne fruit.

I must hasten to add at this point, however, that in a larger sense, the initiative for all I have done, was not altogether mine alone.
The truth of the matter is that throughout the four years of this martial law government, it has always been my faith, as a result of
casual and occasional exchanges of thought with President Marcos, that when the appropriate time does come, the President
would somehow make it known that in his judgment, the situation has already so improved as to permit the implementation, if
gradual, of the constitutionally envisioned evolution of our government from its present state to a parliamentary one. Naturally,
this would inevitably involve the establishment of a legislative body to replace the abortive interim National Assembly. I have
kept tract of all the public and private pronouncements of the President, and it was the result of my reading thereof that furnished
the immediate basis for my virtually precipitating, in one way or another, the materialization of the forthcoming referendum-
plebiscite. In other words, in the final analysis, it was the President's own attitude on the matter that made it opportune for me to
articulate my own feelings and Ideas as to how the nation can move meaningfully towards normalization and to publicly raise the
issues that have been ventilated by the parties in the instant cases.

I would not be human, if I did not consider myself privileged in having been afforded by Divine Providence the opportunity to
contribute a modest share in the formulation of the steps that should lead ultimately to the lifting of martial law in our country.
Indeed, I am certain every true Filipino is anxiously looking forward to that eventuality. And if for having voiced the sentiments
of our people, where others would have preferred to be comfortably silent, and if for having made public what every Filipino
must have been feeling in his heart all these years, I should be singled out as entertaining such preconceived opinions regarding
the issues before the Court in the cases at bar as to preclude me from taking part in their disposition, I can only say that I do not
believe there is any other Filipino in and out of the Court today who is not equally situated as I am .

The matters that concern the Court in the instant petitions do not involve merely the individual interests of any single person or
group of persons. Besides, the stakes in these cases affect everyone commonly, not individually. The current of history that has
passed through the whole country in the wake of martial law has swept all of us, sparing none, and the problem of national
survival and of restoring democratic institutions and Ideals is seeking solution in the minds of all of us. That I have preferred to
discuss publicly my own thoughts on the matter cannot mean that my colleagues in the Court have been indifferent and apathetic
about it, for they too are Filipinos. Articulated or not, all of us must have our own preconceived Ideas and notions in respect to
the situation that confronts the country. To be sure, our votes and opinions in the- major political cases in the recent past should
more or less indicate our respective basic positions relevant to the issues now before Us. Certainly, contending counsels cannot
be entirely in the dark in this regard. I feel that it must have been precisely because of such awareness that despite my known
public participation in the discussion of the questions herein involved, none of the parties have sought my inhibition or
disqualification.

Actually, although it may be difficult for others to believe it, I have never allowed my preconceptions and personal inclinations to
affect the objectivity needed in the resolution of any judicial question before the Court. I feel I have always been able to
appreciate, fully consider and duly weigh arguments and points raised by all counsels, even when they conflict with my previous
views. I am never beyond being convinced by good and substantial ratiocination. Nothing has delighted me more than to discover
that somebody else has thought of more weighty arguments refuting my own, regardless of what or whose interests are at stake. I
would not have accepted my position in the Court had I felt I would not be able to be above my personal prejudices. To my mind,
it is not that a judge has preconceptions that counts, it is his capacity and readiness to absorb contrary views that are
indispensable for justice to prevail. That suspicions of prejudgment may likely arise is unavoidable; but I have always maintained
that whatever improper factors might influence a judge will unavoidably always appear on the face of the decision. In any event,
is there better guarantee of justice when the preconceptions of a judge are concealed?

Withal, in point of law, I belong to the school of thought that regards members of the Supreme Court as not covered by the
general rules relative to disqualification and inhibition of judges in cases before them. If I have in practice actually refrained from
participating in some cases, it has not been because of any legal ground founded on said rules, but for purely personal reasons,
specially because, anyway, my vote would not have altered the results therein.

It is my considered opinion that unlike in the cases of judges in the lower courts, the Constitution does not envisage compulsory
disqualification or inhibition in any case by any member of the Supreme Court. The Charter establishes a Supreme Court
"composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices", with the particular qualifications therein set forth and to be
appointed in the manner therein provided. Nowhere in the Constitution is there any indication that the legislature may designate
by law instances wherein any of the justices should not or may not take part in the resolution of any case, much less who should
take his place. Members of the Supreme Court are definite constitutional officers; it is not within the power of the lawmaking
body to replace them even temporarily for any reason. To put it the other way, nobody who has not been duly appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court can sit in it at any time or for any reason. The Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court
composed as the Constitution ordains - that power cannot be exercised by a Supreme Court constituted otherwise. And so, when
as in the instant where, if any of the member of Court is to abstain from taking part, there would be no quorum - and no court to
render the decision - it is the includible duty of all the incumbent justices to participate in the proceedings and to cast their votes,
considering that for the reasons stated above, the provisions of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act do not appear to conform with the
concept of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.

The very nature of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court as the tribunal of last resort and bulwark of the rights and liberties
of all the people demands that only one of dependable and trustworthy probity should occupy the same. Absolute integrity,
mental and otherwise, must be by everyone who is appointed thereto. The moral character of every member of the Court must be
assumed to be such that in no case whatsoever. regardless of the issues and the parties involved, may it be feared that anyone's
life, liberty or property, much less the national interests, would ever be in jeopardy of being unjustly and improperly subjected to
any kind of judicial sanction. In sum, every Justice of the Supreme Court is expected to be capable of rising above himself in
every case and of having full control of his emotions and prejudices, such that with the legal training and experience he must of
necessity be adequately equipped with, it would be indubitable that his judgment cannot be but objectively impartial, Indeed,
even the appointing power, to whom the Justices owe their positions, should never hope to be unduly favored by any action of the
Supreme Court. All appointments to the Court are based on these considerations, hence the ordinary rules on inhibition and
disqualification do not have to be applied to its members.

With the preliminary matter of my individual circumstances out of the way, I shall now address myself to the grave issues
submitted for Our resolution.

-I-

In regard to the first issue as to whether the questions posed in the petitions herein are political or justiciable, suffice it for me to
reiterate the fundamental position I took in the Martial Law cases,1 thus

As We enter the extremely delicate task of resolving the grave issues thus thrust upon Us. We are
immediately encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the way. The first and most important of them is
that the Constitution (Unless expressly stated otherwise, all references to the Constitution in this discussion
are to both the 1935 and 1973 charters, since, after all, the pertinent provisions are practically Identical in
both is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all the powers of the government and
of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from it. None of them may exercise any
power unless it can be traced thereto either textually or by natural and logical implication. "The second is that
it is settled that the Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter
of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. While the other Departments may adopt
their own construction thereof, when such construction is challenged by the proper party in an appropriate
case wherein a decision would be impossible without determining the correct construction, the Supreme
Court's word on the matter controls.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The fifth is that in the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the
Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the
inferior courts, is the very whole of that power, without any limitation or qualification.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

From these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the main question before Us is not in reality
one of jurisdiction, for there can be no conceivable controversy, especially one involving a conflict as to the
correct construction of the Constitution, that is not contemplated to be within the judicial authority of the
courts to hear and decide. The judicial power of the courts being unlimited and unqualified, it extends over all
situations that call for the as certainment and protection of the rights of any party allegedly violated, even
when the alleged violator is the highest official of the land or the government itself. It is, therefore, evidence
 that the Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to decide the instant petitions on their merits is beyond
challenge.

In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that in the form of government envisaged by the
framers of the Constitution and adopted by our people, the Court's indisputable and plenary authority to
decide does not necessarily impose upon it the duty to interpose its fiat as the only means of settling the
conflicting claims of the parties before it. It is ingrained in the distribution of powers in the fundamental law
that hand in hand with the vesting of the judicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has coevally
conferred upon it the discretion to determine, in consideration of the constitutional prerogatives granted to the
other Departments, when to refrain from imposing judicial solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the
latter. It is in the very nature of republican governments that certain matters are left in the residual power of
the people themselves to resolve, either directly at the polls or thru their elected representatives in the
political Departments of the government. And these reserved matters are easily distinguishable by their very
nature, when one studiously considers the basic functions and responsibilities entrusted by the charter to each
of the great Departments of the government. To cite an obvious example, the protection, defense and
preservation of the state against internal or external aggression threatening its very existence is far from being
within the ambit of judicial responsibility. The distinct role then of the Supreme Court of being the final
arbiter in the determination of constitutional controversies does not have to be asserted in such contemplated
situations, thereby to give way to the ultimate prerogative of the people articulated thru suffrage or thru the
acts of their political representatives they have elected for the purpose.

Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in American constitutional law as the
political question doctrine, which in that jurisdiction is unquestionably deemed to be part and parcel of the rule of law, exactly
like its apparently more attractive or popular opposite, judicial activism, which is the fullest exertion of judicial power, upon the
theory that unless the courts intervene injustice might prevail. It has been invoked and applied by this Court in varied forms and
mode of projection in several momentous instances in the past, (Barcelona vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87; Severino vs. Governor-General,
16 Phil. 366; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 85; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Cabin vs. Francisco, 88 Phil. 654; Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882, Santos vs. Yatco, 55 O.G.
8641 [Minute Resolution of Nov. 6, 19591 Osmena vs. Pendatun, Oct. 28, 1960.) and it is the main support of the stand of the
Solicitor General on the issue of jurisdiction in the cases at bar. It is also referred to as the doctrine of judicial self-restraint or
abstention. But as the nomenclatures themselves imply, activism and self- restraint are both subjective attitudes, not inherent
imperatives. The choice of alternatives in any particular eventuality is naturally dictated by what in the Court's considered
opinion is what the Constitution envisions should be by in order to accomplish the objectives of government and of nationhood.
And perhaps it may be added here to avoid confusion of concepts, that We are not losing sight of the traditional approach based
on the doctrine of separation of powers. In truth, We perceive that even under such mode of rationalization, the existence of
power is secondary, respect for the acts of a co-ordinate, co-equal and independent Department being the general rule,
particularly when the issue is not encroachment of delimited areas of functions but alleged abuse of a Department's own basic
prerogatives. (59 SCRA, pp. 379-383.)

Applying the foregoing considerations to the cases at bar, I hold that the Court has jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the various
claims of petitioners. At the same time, however, I maintain that the basic nature of the issues herein raised requires that the
Court should exercise its constitutionally endowed prerogative to refrain from exerting its judicial authority in the premises.

Stripped of incidental aspects, the constitutional problem that confronts Us stems from the absence of any clear and definite
express provision in the Charter applicable to the factual milieu herein involved. The primary issue is, to whom, under the
circumstances, does the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution property belong? To say, in the light of Section 15
of Article XVII of the Charter, that that faculty lies in the interim National Assembly is to beg the main question. Indeed, there
could be no occasion for doubt or debate, if it could ' only be assumed that the interim National Assembly envisaged in Sections
1 and 2 of the same Article XVII may be convoked. But precisely, the fundamental issue We are called upon to decide is whether
or not it is still constitutionally possible to convene that body. And relative to that question, the inquiry centers on whether or not
the political developments since the ratification of the Constitution indicate that the people have in effect enjoined the convening
of the interim National Assembly altogether. On this score, it is my assessment that the results of the referenda of January 10-15,
1973, July 27-28, 1973 and February 27, 1975 clearly show that the great majority of our people, for reasons plainly obvious to
anyone who would consider the composition of that Assembly, what with its more than 400 members automatically voted into it
by the Constitutional Convention together with its own members, are against its being convoked at all.

Whether or not such a manifest determination of the sentiments of the people should be given effect without a formal amendment
of the Constitution is something that constitutional scholars may endlessly debate on. What cannot be disputed, however, is that
the government and the nation have acquiesced to, it and have actually operated on the basis thereof. Proclamation 1103 which,
on the predicate that the overwhelming majority of the people desire that the interim Assembly be not convened, has ordained the
suspension of its convocation, has not been assailed either judicially or otherwise since the date of its promulgation on January
17, 1973.

In these premises, it is consequently the task of the Court to determine what, under these circumstances, is the constitutional
relevance of the interim National Assembly to any proposal to amend the Constitution at this time. It is my considered opinion
that in resolving that question, the Court must have to grapple with the problem of what to do with the will of the people, which
although manifested in a manner not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, was nevertheless official, and reliable, and what
is more important clear and unmistakable, despite the known existence of well-meaning, if insufficiently substantial dissent. Such
being the situation, I hold that it is not proper for the Court to interpose its judicial authority against the evident decision of the
people and should leave it to the political department of the government to devise the ways and means of resolving the resulting
problem of how to amend the Constitution, so long as in choosing the same, the ultimate constituent power is left to be exercised
by the people themselves in a well- ordered plebiscite as required by the fundamental law.

-2-

Assuming We have to inquire into the merits of the issue relative to the constitutional authority behind the projected amendment
of the Charter in the manner provided in Presidential Decree 1033, I hold that in the peculiar situation in which the government is
today, it is not incompatible with the Constitution for the President to propose the subject amendments for ratification by the
people in a formal plebiscite under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. On the contrary, in the absence of any
express prohibition in the letter of the Charter, the Presidential Decree in question is entirely consistent with the spirit and the
principles underlying the Constitution. The correctness of this conclusion should become even more patent, when one considers
the political developments that the people have brought about since the ratification of the Constitution on January 17,1973.

I consider it apropos at this juncture to repeat my own words in a speech I delivered on the occasion of the celebration of Law
Day on September 18, 1975 before the members of the Philippine Constitution Association and their guests:

To fully comprehend the constitutional situation in the Philippines today, one has to bear in mind that, as I
have mentioned earlier, the martial law proclaimed under the 1935 Constitution overtook the drafting of the
new charter by the Constitutional Convention of 1971. It was inevitable, therefore, that the delegates had to
take into account not only the developments under it but, most of all, its declared objectives and what the
President, as its administrator, was doing to achieve them. In this connection, it is worthy of mention that an
attempt to adjourn the convention was roundly voted down to signify the determination of the delegates to
finish earliest their work, thereby to accomplish the mission entrusted to them by the people to introduce
meaningful reforms in our government and society. Indeed, the constituent labors gained rapid tempo, but in
the process, the delegates were to realize that the reforms they were formulating could be best implemented if
the martial law powers of the President were to be allowed to subsist even after the ratification of the
Constitution they were approving. This denouement was unusual. Ordinarily, a constitution born out of a
crisis is supposed to provide all the needed cures and can, therefore, be immediately in full force and effect
after ratification. Not so, with our 1973 Constitution, Yes, according to the Supreme Court, 'there is no more
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect', but in truth, it is not yet so in
full. Let me explain.

To begin with, in analyzing the new Constitution, we must be careful to distinguish between the body or main part thereof and its
transitory provisions. It is imperative to do so because the transitory provisions of our Constitution are extraordinary in the sense
that obviously they have been designed to provide not only for the transition of our government from the presidential form under
the past charter to a parliamentary one as envisaged in the new fundamental law, but also to institutionalize, according to the
President, the reforms introduced thru the exercise of his martial law powers. Stated differently, the transitory provisions, as it
has turned out, has in effect established a transition government, not, I am sure, perceived by many. It is a government that is
neither presidential nor parliamentary. It is headed, of course, by President Marcos who not on retains all his powers under the
1935 Constitution but enjoys as well those of the President and the Prime Minister under the new Constitution. Most importantly,
he can and does legislate alone. But to be more accurate, I should say that he legislates alone in spite of the existence of the
interim National Assembly unequivocally ordained by the Constitution, for the simple reason that he has suspended the
convening of said assembly by issuing Proclamation No. 1103 purportedly 'in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino
people' expressed in the January 10-15, 1973 referendum.

Thus, we have here the unique case of a qualified ratification. The whole Constitution was submitted for approval or disapproval
of the people, and after the votes were counted and the affirmative majority known, we were told that the resulting ratification
was subject to the condition that the interim National Assembly evidently established in the Constitution as the distinctive and
indispensable element of a parliamentary form of government should nevertheless be not convened and that no elections should
be held for about seven years, with the consequence that we have now a parliamentary government without a parliament and a
republic without any regular election of its officials. And as you can see, this phenomenon came into being not by virtue of the
Constitution but of the direct mandate of the sovereign people expressed in a referendum. In other words, in an unprecedented
extra-constitutional way, we have established, wittingly or unwittingly, a direct democracy through the Citizens Assemblies
created by Presidential Decree No. 86, which later on have been transformed into barangays, a system of government proclaimed
by the President as 'a real achievement in participatory democracy.' What I am trying to say, my friends, is that as I perceive it,
what is now known as constitutional authoritarianism means, in the final analysis, that the fundamental source of authority of our
existing government may not be necessarily found within the four corners of the Constitution but rather in the results of periodic
referendums conducted by the Commission on Elections in a manner well known to all of us This, as I see it, is perhaps what the
President means by saying that under the new Constitution he has extra-ordinary powers independently of martial law - powers
sanctioned directly by the people which may not even be read in the language of the Constitution. in brief, when we talk of the
rule of law nowadays, our frame of reference should not necessarily be the Constitution but the outcome of referendums called
from time to time by the President. The sooner we imbibe this vital concept the more intelligent will our perspective be in giving
our support and loyalty to the existing government. What is more, the clearer will it be that except for the fact that all the powers
of government are being exercised by the President, we - do not in reality have a dictatorship but an experimental type of direct
democracy."

In the foregoing disquisition, I purposely made no mention of the referendum of February 27, 1975. It is important to note,
relative to the main issue now before Us, that it was originally planned to ask the people in that referendum whether or not they
would like the interim National Assembly to convene, but the Comelec to whom the task of preparing the questions was assigned
was prevailed upon not to include any -such question anymore, precisely because it was the prevalent view even among the
delegates to the Convention as well as the members of the old Congress concerned that that matter had already been finally
resolved in the previous referenda of January and July 1973 in the sense that. the Assembly should not be convened comparable
to res adjudicata.

It is my position that as a result of the political developments since January 17, 1973 the transitory provisions envisioning the
convening of the interim National Assembly have been rendered legally inoperative. There is no doubt in my mind that for the
President to convoke the interim National Assembly as such would be to disregard the will of the people - something no head of a
democratic republican state like ours should do. And I find it simply logical that the reasons that motivated the people to enjoin
the convening of the Assembly - the unusually large and unmanageable number of its members and the controversial morality of
its automatic composition consisting of all the incumbent elective national executive and legislative officials under the Old
Constitution who would agree to join it and the delegates themselves to the Convention who had voted in favor of the Transitory
Provisions - apply not only to the Assembly as an ordinary legislature but perhaps more to its being a constituent body. And to be
more realistic, it is but natural to conclude that since the people are against politicians in the old order having anything to do with
the formulation of national policies, there must be more reasons for them to frown on said politicians taking part in amendment of
the fundamental law, specially because the particular amendment herein involved calls for the abolition of the interim National
Assembly to which they belong and its substitution by the Batasang Pambansa.

It is argued that in law, the qualified or conditional ratification of a constitution is not contemplated. I disagree. It is inconsistent
with the plenary power of the people to give or withhold their assent to a proposed Constitution to maintain that they can do so
only wholly. I cannot imagine any sound principle that can be invoked to support the theory that the proposing authority can limit
the power of ratification of the people. As long as there are reliable means by which only partial approval can be manifested, no
cogent reason exists why the sovereign people may not do so. True it is that no proposed Constitution can be perfect and it may
therefore be taken with the good and the bad in it, but when there are feasible ways by which it can be determined which portions
of it, the people disapprove. it would be stretching technicality beyond its purported office to render the final authority - the
people impotent to act according to what they deem best suitable to their interests.

In any event, I feel it would be of no consequence to debate at length regarding the legal feasibility of qualified ratification.
Proclamation 1103 categorically declares that:

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976.561)
members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred
forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; but a majority of those
who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that the interim National
Assembly provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be convened.

and in consequence, the President has acted accordingly by not convening the Assembly. The above factual premises of
Proclamation 1103 is not disputed by petitioners. Actually, it is binding on the Court, the same being a political act of a
coordinate department of the government not properly assailed as arbitrary or whimsical. At this point, it must be emphasized in
relation to the contention that a referendum is only consultative, that Proclamation 1103, taken together with Proclamation 1102
which proclaimed the ratification of the Constitution, must be accorded the same legal significance as the latter proclamation, as
indeed it is part and parcel if the Act of ratification of the Constitution, hence not only persuasive but mandatory. In the face of
the incontrovertible fact that the sovereign people have voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly, and faced
with the problem of amending the Constitution in order precisely to implement the people's rejection of that Assembly, the
problem of constitutional dimension that confronts Us, is how can any such amendment be proposed for ratification by the
people?

To start with, it may not be supposed that just because the office or body designed by the constitutional convention to perform the
constituent function of formulating proposed amendments has been rendered inoperative by the people themselves, the people
have thereby foreclosed the possibility of amending the Constitution no matter how desirable or necessary this might be. In this
connection, I submit that by the very nature of the office of the Presidency in the prevailing scheme of government we have - it
being the only political department of the government in existence - it is consistent with basic principles of constitutionalism to
acknowledge the President's authority to perform the constituent function, there being no other entity or body lodged with the
prerogative to exercise such function.

There is another consideration that leads to the same conclusion. It is conceded by petitioners that with the non-convening of the
interim Assembly, the legislative authority has perforce fallen into the hands of the President, if only to avoid a complete
paralysis of law-making and resulting anarchy and chaos. It is likewise conceded that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of Article
XVII invest the President with legislative power for the duration of the transition period. From these premises, it is safe to
conclude that in effect the President has been substituted by the people themselves in place of the interim Assembly. Such being
the case, the President should be deemed as having been granted also the cognate prerogative of proposing amendments to the
Constitution. In other words, the force of necessity and the cognate nature of the act justify that the department exercising the
legislative faculty be the one to likewise perform the constituent function that was attached to the body rendered impotent by the
people's mandate. Incidentally, I reject most vehemently the proposition that the President may propose amendments to the
Constitution in the exercise of his martial law powers. Under any standards, such a suggestion cannot be reconciled with the Ideal
that a Constitution is the free act of the people.

It was suggested during the oral, argument that instead of extending his legislative powers by proposing the amendment to create
a new legislative body, the President should issue a decree providing for the necessary apportionment of the seats in the Regular
National Assembly and call for an election of the members thereof and thus effect the immediate normalization of the
parliamentary government envisaged in the Constitution. While indeed procedurally feasible, the suggestion overlooks the
imperative need recognized by the constitutional convention as may be inferred from the obvious purpose of the transitory
provisions, for a period of preparation and acquaintance by all concerned with the unfamiliar distinctive features and practices of
the parliamentary system. Accustomed as we are to the presidential system, the Convention has seen to it that there should be an
interim parliament under the present leadership, which will take the corresponding measures to effectuate the efficient and
smooth transition from the present system to the new one. I do not believe this pattern set by the convention should be
abandoned.

The alternative of calling a constitutional convention has also been mentioned. But, in the first place, when it is considered that
whereas, under Section 1 (1) and (2) of Article XVI, the regular National Assembly may call a Constitutional Convention or
submit such a call for approval of the people, Section 15 of Article XVII, in reference to interim National Assembly, does not
grant said body the prerogative of calling a convention, one can readily appreciate that the spirit of the Constitution does not
countenance or favor the calling of a convention during the transition, if only because such a procedure would be time
consuming, cumbersome and expensive. And when it is further noted that the requirement as to the number of votes needed for a
proposal is only a majority, whereas it is three-fourths in respect to regular Assembly, and, relating this point to the provision of
Section 2 of Article XVI to the effect that all ratification plebiscites must be held "not later than three months after the approval"
of the proposed amendment by the proposing authority, the adoption of the most simple manner of amending the charter, as that
provided for in the assailed Presidential Decree 1033 suggests itself as the one most in accord with the intent of the fundamental
law.

There is nothing strange in adopting steps not directly based on the letter of the Constitution for the purpose of amending or
changing the same. To cite but one important precedent, as explained by Mr. Justice Makasiar in his concurring opinion in
Javellana 2, the present Constitution of the United States was neither proposed nor ratified in the manner ordained by the original
charter of that country, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.

In brief. if the convening and operation of the interim National Assembly has been effectuated through a referendum-plebiscite in
January, 1973, and ratified expressly and impliedly in two subsequent referenda, those of July, 1973 and February, 1975, why
may not a duly held plebiscite suffice for the purpose of creating a substitute for that Assembly? It should be borne in mind that
after all, as indicated in the whereas of the impugned Presidential Decree, actually, the proposed amendments were initiated by
the barangays and sanggunian members. In other words, in submitting the amendments for ratification, the President is merely
acting as the conduit thru whom a substantial portion of the people, represented in the Katipunan ng Mga Sanggunian, Barangay
at Kabataang Barangay, seek the approval of the people as a whole of the amendments in question. If all these mean that the
sovereign people have arrogated unto themselves the functions relative to the amendment to the Constitution, I would regard
myself as totally devoid of legal standing to question it, having in mind that the most fundamental tenet on which our whole
political structure rests is that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I hold that Presidential Decree No. 1033 does not infringe the Constitution, if only
because the specific provision it is supposed to infringe does not exist in legal contemplation since it was coevally made
inoperative when the people ratified the Constitution on January 17, 1973. I am fully convinced that there is nothing in the
procedure of amendment contained in said decree that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of constitutionalism. On the
contrary, I find that the Decree, in issue conforms admirably with the underlying tenet of our government - the sovereignty and
plenary power of the people.

On the issue of whether or not October 16, 1976 is too proximate to enable the people to sufficiently comprehend the issues and
intelligently vote in the referendum and plebiscite set by Presidential Decree 1033, all I can say is that while perhaps my other
colleagues are right in holding that the period given to the people is adequate, I would leave it to the President to consider
whether or not it would be wiser to extend the same. Just to avoid adverse comments later I wish the President orders a
postponement. But whether such postponement is ordered or not, date of the referendum- plebiscite anywhere from October 16,
1976 to any other later date, would be of no vital import.

In conclusion, I vote to dismiss all the three petitions before Us.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

Since the validity or effectivity of the proposed amendments is to be decided ultimately by the people in their sovereign capacity,
the question is political as the term is defined in Tanada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al. (103 Phil. 1051), which is a bar to any judicial
inquiry, for the reasons stated in Our opinion in Javellana, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36142); Tan, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary, et al. (L,36164); Roxas, et al. vs Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36165); Monteclaro, etc., et al. vs' Executive
Secretary, et al. (@36236); and Ditag et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-W283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 204-283). The
procedure for amendment is not important Ratification by the people is all that is indispensable to validate an amendment. Once
ratified, the method of making the proposal and the period for submission become relevant.

The contrary view negates the very essence of a republican democracy - that the people are sovereign - and renders meaningless
the emphatic declaration in the very first provision of Article II of the 1973 Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state,
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. It is axiomatic that sovereignty is illimitable
The representatives cannot dictate to the sovereign people. They may guide them; but they cannot supplant their judgment, Such
an opposite view likewise distrusts the wisdom of the people as much as it despises their intelligence. It evinces a presumptuous
pretension to intellectual superiority. There are thousands upon thousands among the citizenry, who are not in the public service,
who are more learned and better skilled than many of their elected representatives.

Moreover, WE already ruled in Aquino, et al. vs- Comelec, et al. (L 40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275, 298-302) that the
President as enforcer or administrator of martial rule during the period of martial law can legislate; and that he has the discretion
as to when the convene the interim National Assembly depending on prevailing conditions of peace and order. In view of the fact
that the interim National Assembly has not been convoked in obedience to the desire of the people clearly expressed in the 1973
referenda, the President therefore remains the lone law-making authority while martial law subsists. Consequently, he can also
exercise the power of the interim National Assembly to propose amendments to the New Constitution (Sec. 15,,Art. XVII If, as
conceded by petitioner Vicente Guzman (L-44684), former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which drafted the
1973 Constitution. the President, during the period of martial law, can call a constitutional convention for the purpose, admittedly
a constituent power, it stands to reason that the President can likewise legally propose amendments to the fundamental law.

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question". It must be noted that this device has been utilized by the
judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to determine or that could be settled in any event only with the
effective support of the political branches."1 According to Weston, judges, whether "personal representatives of a truly sovereign
king, or taking their seats as the creatures of a largely popular sovereignty speaking through a written constitution, derive their
power by a delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case may be, deliminates and delimits their delegated jurisdiction.* * *
Judicial questions * * * are those which the sovereign has set to be decided in the courts. Political questions, similarly, are those
which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own
extra-government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action."2 Reflecting a similar concept, this Court
has defined a "political question" as a "matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity or that has
been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act."3 In
other words, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. 4

In determining whether an issue falls within the political question category, the absence of satisfactory creterion for a judicial
determination or the appropriateness of attributing finality to the action of the political departments of government is a dominant
consideration. This was explained by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 5 thus :

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional lack of judicially discoverrable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. . . .

To decide whether a matter has in a measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government or retained be
the people to be decided by them in their sovereign capacity, or whether that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is indeed a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation.

In Coleman v. Miller, 6 the United States Supreme Court held that the efficacy of the ratification by state legislatures of a
constitutional amendment is a political question. On the question of whether the State Legislature could constitutionally relative
an amendment, after the same had been previously rejected by it, it was held that the ultimate authority over the question was in
Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. And in connection with the
second question of whether the amendment has lost its, vitality through the lapse of time, the Court held that the question was
likewise political, involving "as it does ... an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic,
which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would
be an extravagant extension of juridical authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with respect to
the validity of an amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these conditions are appropriate for the consideration of the
political departments of the Government. The questions they involve are essentially political and not justiciable." '

In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas stressed that:

The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission off constitutional amendments.
Final determination by Congress their ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is conclusive
upon the courts.' In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution.
However, A whether submission, intervening procedure for Congressional determination of ratification
conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by apolitical department of questions of a
t@ which this Court has frequently designated 'political.' And decision of a 'political question' by the political
department' to which the Constitution has committed it 'conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of ... government. Proclamation under authority of Congress that an
amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken
place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a
part of the Constitution, learning to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that
the Court's opinion in the present case even by implieding assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of
the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and by ratification of amendments, we are
unable to agree.

Relying on this doctrine enunciated in Coleman v. Miller supra this Court, in Mabanag v. Lopez Vitol, 7 speaking through Mr.
Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled that the process of constitutional amendment, involving proposal and ratification, is a political
question. In the Mabang case, the petitioners sought to prevent the enforcement of a resolution of Congress proposing the "Parity
Amendment" to the Philippine Constitution on the ground that it had not been approved by the three-fourths vote of all the
members of each house as required be Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. It was claimed that three (3) Senators and eight (8)
members of the House of Representatives had been suspended and that their membership was not considered in the determination
of the three- fourths %- ore In dismissing the petition on the ground that the question of the validity of the proposal was political,
the Court stated:
"If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The
question to steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that amendatory
process as provided in Section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution 'consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification.' There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. ..." (At pages 4-5, Italics supplied.)

It is true that in Gonzales v. Comelec, 8 this Court held that "the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly - violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review."
What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a proposed What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a proposed
amendment to the Constitution but an act of Congress,9 submitting proposed amendments to the Constitution. Similarly, in
Tolentino v. Commission an Elections, 10 what was involved was not the validity of the proposal to lower the voting age but
rather that of the resolution of the Constitutional Convention submitting the proposal for ratification. The question was whether
piecemeal amendments to the Constitution could submitted to the people for approval or rejection.

II

Here, the point has been stressed that the President is acting as agent for and in behalf of the people in proposing the amendment.
there can be no question that in the referendums of January, 1973 and in the subsequent referendums the people had clearly and
categorically rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. As stated in the main opinion, the Lupang Tagapagpaganap
of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, the
Kabataang Barangay organizations and the various sectoral groups had proposed the replacement of the interim National
Assembly. These barangays and the Sanggunian assemblies are effective instrumentalities through which the desires of the
people are articulated and expressed. The Batasang Bayan (Legislative Council), composed of nineteen (19) cabinet members and
nine (9) officials with cabinet rank, and ninety-one (91) members of the Lupang Tagapagpaganap (Executive Committee) of the
Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayani voted in their special session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October
16, 1976 the afore-mentioned constitutional amendments. Through the Pambansang Katipunan by Barangay and the Pampurok
ng Katipunan Sangguniang Bayan, the people have expressed their desire not only to abolish the interim National Assembly, but
to replace it with a more representative body acceptable to them in order to effect the desirable constitutional changes necessary
to hasten the political evolution of the government towards the parliamentary system, while at the same time ensuring that the
gains of the New Society, which are vital to the welfare of the people, shall be safeguarded. The proposed constitutional
amendments, therefore, represent a consensus of the people.

It would be futile to insist that the intemi National Assembly should have been convened to propose those amendments pursuant
to Section 15 of Article XVII of the Constitution. This Court, in the case of Aquino v. Commission or Elections, 11 took judicial
notice of the fact that in the referendum of January, 1973, a majority of those who approved the new Constitution conditioned
their votes on the demand that the interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Provisions should not be and the
President "in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people" declared that the convening of said body shall be
suspended.12 As this Court observed in the Aquino case:

His decision to defer the initial convocation of the byiitttit National Assembly was supported by the
sovereign people at the by referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted to postpone the convening of
the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution.
And the reason why the same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at the referendum
on February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who are already byjso ofitto members of the intetini National Assembly are against such
inclusion; because the issue was already bycciled in the January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people
indicating thereby their disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize
the reforms they demanded and wasted public funds through endless debates without relieving the suffering
of the general mass of citizenry (p. 302.) The action of the President in suspending the convening of the
interim National Assembly has met the overwhelming approval of the people in subsequent referenda.

Since it was the action by the people that gave binding force and effect to the new Constitution, then it must be accepted as a
necessary consequence that their objection against the immediate convening of the interim National Assembly must be respected
as a positive mandate of the sovereign.

In the Philippines, which is a unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."13 The term "People" as sovereign is comprehensive in its context. The people, as sovereign creator of all political reality,
is not merely the enfranchised citizens but the political unity of the people. 14 It connotes, therefore, a people which exists not
only in the urgent present but in the continuum of history. The assumption that the opinion of The People as voters can be treated
as the expression of the interests of the People as a historic community was, to the distinguished American journalist and public
philosopher, Walter Lipunan, unwarranted.

Because of the discrepancy between The People as Voters and the People as the corporate nation, the voters
have no title to consider themselves the proprietors of the commonwealth and to claim that their interests are
Identical to the public interest. A prevailing plurality of the voters are not The People. The claim that they are
is a bogus title invoked to justify the usurpation of the executive power by representative assemblies and the
intimidation of public men by demagogue politicians. In fact demagoguery can be described as the sleight of
hand by which a faction of The People as voters are invested with the authority of The People. That is why so
many crimes are committed in the People's name 15

In Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, the Court clearly emphasized that the power to propose amendments or to amend the Constitution
is part of the inherent power of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. While Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution, it acts pursuant to authority granted to it by the people through the Constitution. Both the power
to propose and the authority to approve, therefore, inhere in the people as the bearer of the Constitution making power.

Absent an interim National Assembly upon whom the people, through the Constitution, have delegated the authority to exercise
constituent powers, it follows from necessity that either the people should exercise that power themselves or through any other
instrumentality they may choose. For Law, like Nature, abhors a vacuum (natural vacuum abhorret).

The question then is whether the President has authority to act for the people in submitting such proposals for ratification at the
plebiscite of October 16. The political character of the question is, therefore, particularly manifest, considering that ultimately it
is the people who will decide whether the President has such authority. It certainly involves a matter which is to be exercised by
the people in their sovereign capacity, hence, it is essentially political, not judicial.

While it is true that the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative power in general because the prerogative to
propose amendments is not embraced within the context of ordinary lawmaking, it must be noted that the proposals to be
submitted for ratification in the forthcoming referendum are, in the final analysis, actually not of the President but directly of the
people themselves, speaking through their authorized instrumentalities.

As the Chief Justice aptly stated in his concurring opinion in this case:

... The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No. 1033. It being conceded in
all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been demonstrated that their constituent
power to amend the Constitution has not been delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government
during the present stage of the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable
that their exertion of that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as
beingultravires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not the President is vested with
constituent power - as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises - the proposals here challenged,
being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori,
the concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not
only because the President, in exercising said authority, has acted as a mere ofiffet byf of the people who
made the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is legislative in nature rather than constituent.

This is but a recognition that the People of the Philippines have the inherent, sole and exclusive right of
regulating their own government, and of altering or abolishing their Constitution whenever it may be
necessary to their safety or happiness. There appears to be no justification, under the existing, circumstances,
for a Court to create by implication a limitation on - the sovereign power of the people. As has been clearly
explained in a previous case:

There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital
force from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an
established form to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law The means
provided for the exercise of their Sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against
tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their
constitution in the mode prescribed by the instrument.
 III

The paramount consideration that impelled Us to arrive at the foregoing opinion is the necessity of ensuring popular control over
the constituent power. "If the people are to control the constituent power - the power to make and change the fundamental law of
the State," observed Wheeler," "the process of Constitutional change must not be based too heavily upon existing agencies of
government." Indeed, the basic premise of republicanism is that the ordinary citizen, the common man. can be trusted to
determine his political destiny. Therefore, it is time that the people should be accorded the fullest opportunity to decide the laws
that shall provide for their governance. For in the ultimate analysis, the success of the national endeavor shall depend on the
vision, discipline and I by ininess of the moqqqtai will of every Filipino.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We vote to dismiss the petitions.

Aquino, J., concur.

MUNOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

I concur fully with the remarkably frank (so characteristic of him) dissenting opinion of my distinguished colleague, Justice
Claudio Teehankee. If I am writing this brief statement it is only to unburden myself of some thoughts which trouble my mind
and leave my conscience with no rest nor peace.

Generally, one who dissents from a majority view of the Court takes a lonely and at times precarious road, the burden byeing
lightened only by the thought that in this grave task of administering justice, when matters of conscience are at issue, one must be
prepared to espouse and embrace a rightful cause however unpopular it may be.

1. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a fundamental, basic principle of
government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have opted to govern themselves under the mantle of a written
Constitution, each and every citizen, from the highest to the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Character they
have so ordained.

By the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up he hands of their official agencies, but their
own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at
liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p.
56, Italics Our).

The afore-quoted passage from the eminent jurist and author Judge Cooley although based on declarations of law of more than a
century ago, lays down a principle which to my mind is one of the enduring cornerstones of the Rule of Law. it is a principle with
which I have been familiar as a student of law under the tutelage of revered Professors, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco and Justice Jose P.
Laurel, and which I pray will prevail at all times to ensure the existence of a free, stable, and civilized society.

The Filipino people,. wanting to ensure to themselves a democratic republican form of government, have promulgated a
Constitution whereby the power to govern themselves has been entrusted to and distributed among three branches of government;
they have also mandated in clear and unmistakable terms the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may be
amended or revised. Having done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations. For while there is no surrender or
abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revise, or adopt a new Constitution, sound reason demands that they keep
themselves within the procedural bounds of the existing fundamental law. The right of the people to amend or change their
Constitution if and when the need arises is not to be denied, but we assert that absent a revolutionary state or condition in the
country the change must be accomplished through the ordinary, regular and legitimate processes provided for in the Constitution.'

I cannot subscribe therefore to the view taken by the Solicitor General that the people, being sovereign, have the authority to
amend the Constitution even in a manner different from and contrary to that expressly provided for in that instrument, and that
the amendatory process is intended more as a limitation of a power rather than a grant of power to a particular agency and it
should not be construed as limiting the ultimate sovereign will of the people to decide on amendments to the Constitution .2 Such
a view will seriously undermine the very existence of a constitutional government and will permit anarchy and/or mob rule to set
afoot and prevail. Was it the Greek philosopher Plato who warned that the rule of the mob is a prelude to the rule of the tyrant?

I would use the following excerpt from Bernas, S.J. 'The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases" as relevant to my point:
 . . . the amendatory provisions are called a 'constitution of sovereighty' because they define the constitutional
meaning of 'sovereignty of the people.' Popular sovereignty, as embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is
not extreme popular sovereignty. As one American writer put it:

A constitution like the American one serves as a basic check upon the popular will at any given time. It is the
distinctive function of such written document to classify certain things as legal fundamentals; these
fundamentals may not be changed except by the slow and cumbersome process of amendment. The people
themselves have decided, in constitutional convention assembled, to limit themselves ana future generations
in the exercise of the sovereign power which they would otherwise possess. And it is precisely such
limitation that enables those subject to governmental authority to appeal from the people drunk to the people
sober in time of excitement and hysteria. The Constitution, in the neat phrase of the Iowa court, is the
protector of the people against injury by the .people. *

Truly, what need is there for providing in the Constitution a process by which the fundamental law may be amended if, after all,
the people by themselves can set the same at naught even in times of peace when civil authority reigns supreme? To go along
with the respondents' theory in this regard is to render written Constitutions useless or mere "ropes of sand allowing for a
government of men instead of one of laws. For it cannot be discounted that a situation may arise where the people are heralded to
action at a point of a gun or by the fiery eloquence of a demagogue, and where passion overpowers reason, and mass action
overthrows legal processes. History has recorded such instances, and I can think of no better example than that of Jesus Christ of
Judea who was followed and loved by the people while curing the sick, making the lame walk and the blind see, but shortly was
condemned by the same people turned into fanatic rabble crying out "Crucify Him, Crucify Him" upon being incited into action
by chief priests and elders of Jerusalem. Yes, to quote once more from Judge Cooley:

A good Constitution should be beyond the reason of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It
is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people,
or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be sale can be allowed efficiency. .... Changes in government are to be feared unless the
benefit is certain." (quoted in Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 15,) 3

Crawford v. Gilchrist 64 Fla. 41., 59., So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 916; State v. Hall, 159 N.W., 281; Opinion of Marshall, J. in
State ex. rel. Poster v. Marcus, 152 N.W., 419;

From Kochier v. Hill, Vol. 15, N.W., 609, we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

It has been said that changes in the constitution may be introduced in disregard of its provisions; that if the
majority of the people desire a change the majority must be respected, no matter how the change may be
effected; and that the change, if revolution, is peaceful resolution. ...

We fear that the advocates of this new doctrine, in a zeal to accomplish an end which the majority of the
people desire, have looked at but one phase of the question, and have not fully considered the terrible
consequences which would almost certainly follow a recognition of the doctrine for which they contend. It
may be that the incorporation of this amendment in the constitution, even if the constitution has to be broken
to accomplish it, would not of itself produce any serious results. But if it should be done by sanctioning the
doctrine contended for, a precedent would be set which would plague the state for all future time. A Banquo's
ghost would arise at our incantation which would not down at our bidding.

xxx xxx xxx

We ought to ponder long before we adopt a doctrine so fraught with danger to republican institutions. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Appellants' counsel cite and rely upon section 2, art. 1, of the constitution of the staff This section is a portion of the bill of rights,
and is as follows: 'All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit
of of the people; and they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require.'
Abstractly considered, there can bye no doubt of the correctness of the propositions embraced in this suction. These principles are
older than constitutions and older than governments. The people did not derive the rights referred to by on the constitution. and,
in their nature, thee are such that the people cannot surrender them ... .

2. Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 which call for a national referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976 for the purpose,
among other things, of amending certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution are null and void as they contravene the express
provisions on the amending process of the 1973 Constitution laid down in Article XVI, Section 1 (1) and Article XVII, Section
15, more particularly the latter which applies during the present transition period. The Opinion of Justice Teehankee discusses in
detail this particular matter.

I would just wish to stress the point that although at present there is no by tterint National Assembly which may propose
amendments to the Constitution, the existence of a so-called "vacuum" or "hiatus" does not justify a transgression of the
constitutional provisions on the manner of amending the fundamental law. We cannot cure one infirmity - the existence of a
"vacuum" caused by the non-convening of the interim National Assembly - with another infirmity, that is, doing violence to the
Charter.

All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may
succeed and a worse. (Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 311., quoted in Ellingham v. Dye, supra, p. 15)

Respondents contend that the calling of the referendum-plebiscite for the purpose indicated is a step necessary to restore the state
of normalcy in the country. To my mind, the only possible measure that will lead our country and people to a condition of
normalcy is the lifting or ending of the state of martial law. If I am constrained to make this statement it is because so much stress
was given during the hearings of these cases on this particular point, leaving one with the impression that for petitioners to
contest the holding of the October 16 referendum-plebiscite is for them to assume a position of blocking or installing the lifting
of martial law, which I believe is unfair to the petitioners. Frankly, I cannot see the connection between the two. My esteemed
colleagues should pardon me therefore if I had ventured to state that the simple solution to the simple solution to the present
dilemma is the lifting of martial law and the implementation of the constitutional provisions which will usher in the
parliamentary form of government ordained in the Constitution, which, as proclaimed in Proclamation 1102, the people
themselves have ratified.

If the people have indeed ratified the 1973 Constitution, then they are bound by their act and cannot escape from the pretended
unfavorable consequences thereof, the only y being to set in motion the constitutional machinery by which the supposed desired
amendments may properly be adopted and submitted to the electorate for ratification. Constitutional processes are to be observed
strictly, if we have to maintain and preserve the system of government decreed under the fundamental Charter. As said by Justice
Enrique Fernando in Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections

... The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any
public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest funcitonary, is a postulate of our system
of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. ... (36 SCRA, 228, 234, italics Ours)

A contrary view would lead to disastrous consequences for, in the words of Chief Justice Cox of the Supreme Court of Indiana in
Ellingham v. Dye, (supra, p. 7) liberty and popular sovereignty are not meant to give rein to passion or thoughtless impulse but to
allow the exercise of power by the people for the general good by tistlercoitaitt restraints of law. 3 . The true question before Us is
is one of power. Does the incumbent President of the Philippines possess constituent powers? Again, the negative answer is
explained in detail in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee.

Respondents would justify the incumbent President's exercise of constituent powers on theory that he is vested with legislative
powers as held by this Court in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., L-40004, January 31, 1975. 1
wish to stress that although in my separate opinion in said case I agreed that Section 3 (2) of the Transitory provisions grants to
the incumbent President legislative powers, I qualified my statement as follows:

.... As to, whether, or not, this unlimited legislative qqqjwwel of the President continues by exist even after
the ratification of the Constitution is a matter which I am not ready to concede at the moment, and which at
any rate I believe is not essential in resolving this Petition for reasons to be given later. Nonetheless, I hold
the view that the President is empowered to issue proclamations, orders, decrees, etc. to carry out and
implement the objectives of the proclamation of martial law be it under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution, and
for the orderly and efficient functioning of the government, its instrumentalities, and agencies. This grant of
legislative power is necessary to fill up a vacuum during the transition period when the interim National
 Assembly is not yet convened and functioning, for otherwise, there will be a disruption of official functions
resulting in a collapse of the government and of the existing social order. (62 SCRA, pp. 275,347)

I believe it is not disputed that legislative power is essentially different from constituent power; one does not encompass the other
unless so specified in the Charter, and the 1973 Constitution contains provisions in this regard. This is well-explained in Justice
Teehankee's Opinion. The state of necessity brought about by the current political situation, invoked by the respondents, provides
no source of power to propose amendments to the existing Constitution. Must we "bend the Constitution to suit the law of the
hour or cure its defects "by inflicting upon it a wound which nothing can heal commit one assault after the other "until all respect
for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of government are just what those in authority please to call them?'" 5 Or can we
now ignore what this Court, speaking through Justice Barredo, said in Tolentino vs. Comelec:

... let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the fundamental law
purportedly by order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with
purportedly more laudable objectives may take advantages of the precedent in continue the destruction of the
Constitution, making those who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the
Constitution the victims of their own folly. 6

Respondents emphatically assert that the final word is the people's word and that ultimately it is in the hands of the people where
the final decision rests. (Comment, pp. 18, 19, 22) Granting in gratia argument that it is so, let it be an expression of the will of
the people a normal political situation and not under the aegis of martial rule for as I have stated in Aquino vs. Comelec, et al.,
supra, a referendum (and now a plebiscite) held under a regime of martial law can be of no far reaching significance because it is
being accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear as it entails a wide area of curtailment and infringement of individual
rights, such as, human liberty, property rights, rights of free expression and assembly, protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, liberty of abode and of travel, and so on.

4. The other issues such as the sufficiency and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people are
expounded in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. I wish to stress indeed that it is incorrect to state that the thrust of the proposed
amendments is the abolition of the interim National Assembly and its substitution with an "interim Batasang Pambansa their in
by in Proposed amendment No. 6 will permit or allow the concentration of power in one man - the Executive - Prime Minister or
President or whatever you may call him - for it gives him expressly (which the 1973 Constitution or the 1935 Constitution does
not) legislative powers even during the existence of the appropriate legislative body, dependent solely on the executive's
judgment on the existence of a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof **

I must be forgiven if, not concerned with the present, I am haunted however by what can happen in the future, when we shall all
be gone. Verily, this is a matter of grave concern which necessitates full, mature, sober deliberation of the people but which they
can do only in a climate of freedom without the restraints of martial law. I close, remembering what Claro M. Recto, President of
the Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1935 Philippine Constitution, once said: .

... Nor is it enough that our people possess a written constitution in order that their government may be called
constitutional. To be deserving of this name, and to drive away all lanirer of anarchy as well as of
dictatorship whether by one man or a few, it is necessary that both the government authorities and the people
faithfully observe and obey the constitution, and that the citizens be duly conversant not only with their rights
but also with their duties...7

Jose P. Laurel who served his people as Justice of the Supreme Court of this country gave this reminder; the grave and perilous
task of halting transgressions and vindicating cherished rights is reposed mainly oil the Judiciary and therefore let the Courts be
the vestal keepers of the purity and sanctity of our Constitution.' On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to declare Presidential
Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 unconstitutional and enjoin the implementation thereof.

CONCEPCION JR., J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

1. The issue is not political and therefore justiciable.

The term "political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions which, under the constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.1

Here, the question raised is whether the President has authority to propose to the people amendments to the Constitution which
the petitioners claim is vested solely upon the National Assembly, the constitutional convention called for the purpose, and the by
the National Assembly. This is not a political question since it involves the determination of conflicting claims of authority under
the constitution.

In Gonzales vs. Comelec, 2 this Court, resolving the issue of whether or not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution, ruled that the question is essentially justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial
review.

In Tolentino vs. Comelec 3 this Court finally dispelled all doubts as to its position regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, as well as those of a constitutional convention called
for the purpose of proposing amendments to the constitution. Insofar as observance of constitutional provisions on the procedure
for amending the constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers of judicial review.

2. As to the merits, a brief backdrop of the decision to hold the referendum-plebiscite will help resolve the issue. It is to be noted
that under the 1973 Constitution, an interim National Assembly was organized to bring about an orderly transition from the
presidential to the parliamentary system of government.' The people, however, probably distrustful of the members who are old
time politicians and constitutional delegates who had voted themselves by to membership in the interim National Assembly,
voted against the convening of the said interim assembly for at least seven years thus creating a political stalemate and a
consequent delay' in the transformation of the government into the parliamentary system. To resolve the impasse, the President,
at the instance of the barangays and sanggunian assemblies through their duly authorized instrumentalities who recommended a
study of the feasibility of abolishing and replacing the by interim National Assembly with another interim body truly
representative of the people in a reformed society, issued Presidential Decree No. 991, on September 2, 1976, calling for a
national referendum on October -16, 1976 to ascertain the wishes of the people as to the ways and means that may be available to
attain the objective; providing for a period of educational and information campaign on the issues; and establishing the mechanics
and manner for holding thereof. But the people, through their barangays, addressed resolutions to the Batasang Bayan, expressing
their desire to have the constitution amended, thus prompting the President to issue Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to @ submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,1976.

As will be seen, the authority to amend the Constitution was removed from the interim National Assembly and transferred to the
seat of sovereignty itself. Since the Constitution emanates from the people who are the repository of all political powers, their
authority to amend the Constitution through the means they have adopted, aside from those mentioned in the Constitution, cannot
be gainsaid. Not much reflection is also needed to show that the President did not exercise his martial law legislative powers
when he proposed the amendments to the Constitution. He was merely acting as an instrument to carry out the will of the people.
Neither could he convene the interim National Assembly, as suggested by the petitioners, without doing violence to the people's
will expressed overwhelmingly when they decided against convening the interim assembly for at least seven years.

3. The period granted to the people to consider the proposed amendments is reasonably long and enough to afford intelligent
discussion of the issues to be voted upon. PD 991 has required the barangays to hold assemblies or meetings to discuss and
debate on the referendum questions, which in fact they have been doing. Considering that the proposed amendments came from
the representatives of the people themselves, the people must have already formed a decision by this time on what stand to take
on the proposed amendments come the day for the plebiscite. Besides, the Constitution itself requires the holding of a plebiscite
for the ratification of an amendment not later than three (3) months after the approval of such amendment or revision but without
setting a definite period within which such plebiscite shall not be held. From this I can only conclude that the framers of the
Constitution desired that only a short period shall elapse from the approval of such amendment or resolution to its ratification by
the people.

ANNEX A

PERTINENT PORTIONS

OF THE
MINNESSOTA SUPREME COURT

DECISION

ON THE CASE

IN RE McCONAUGHY

"(a) An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the
validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially determined whether a
proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes (Dayton v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 400; Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark.
432, 96 S.W. 396; Bott v. Wurtz, 63 N.J. Law, 289, 43 Atl. 744, 881, 45 L.R.A. 251; State v. Foraker, 46 Ohio St. 677, 23 N.E.
49l; 6 L.R.A. 422; Tecumseh National Bank V. Saunders, 51 Neb. 801, 71 N.W. 779; Green v. State Board, 5 Idaho, 130, 47 Pac.
259, 95 Am. St. Rep. 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. 722; Knight v. Shelton [C.C.] 134 Fed. 423);
whether a proposed amendment is a single amendment, within the constitutional requirement that every amendment must be
separately submitted (State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 South. 927; Gabbert v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 171 Mo. 84, 70 S.W. 891;
State v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. 722; Lobaugh v. Cook, 127 Iowa,
181, 102 N.W. 1121; People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34; State v. Board, 34 Mont. 426, 87 Pac.
450; State v. Winnett [Neb.] 110 N.W. 1113, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 149); whether the failure to enter the resolution of submission
upon the legislative journals invalidates the amendment (Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543,14 N.W. 738,15 N.W. 609; Oakland
Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3; West v. State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 South. 412; Durfee v. Harper, 22 Mont. 354, 56 Pac.
56; State v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, 12 Pac. 835, 3 Am. St. Rep. 895); whether the description of the amendment and the form of the
ballot are sufficient (Russell v. Croy, 164 M 69, 63 S.W. 849; State v. Winnett [ Neb.] 110 N.W. 1113, L.R.A. [N.S.] 149;
Murphy Chair Co. v. Attorney General [Mich.] 112 N.W. 127); whether the method of submission sufficient (Lovett v.
Ferguson,, 10 S.D. 44, 71 N.W. 765; Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.W. 849); whether the publication of the amendment or of
a notice relative to it is sufficient (Com. v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L.R.A. 568; Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.W.
849); whether the submission may be well by resolution as by a legislative act approved by the executive (Com. v. Griest, 196 Pa.
396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L.R. 568; Warfield vi Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 60 Atl. 538; Edward Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 33 S.W. 1130, 31
L.R.A. 815; Hays v. Hays, 5 Idaho, 154, 47 Pac. 732; State v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 6 N.W. 418, 34 L.R.A. 97); at what election the
amendment be submitted (People v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516).

In Rich v. Board of Canvassers, 100 Mich. 458, 59 N.W. 183, the court said: "It is contended that the determination of the
question whether an amendment to the Constitution has been carried involves the exercise of political, and not judicial, power. If
this be so, it follows that the promulgation of any purported amendment by the executive or any executive department is final,
and that the action cannot be questioned by the judiciary; but, with reference to the conditions precedent to submitting a proposed
amendment to a vote of the people, it has been repeatedly held, by courts of the highest respectability, that it is within the power
of the judiciary to inquire into the question, even in a collateral proceeding. ... It is to be noted that under section 1 of article 20
of the Constitution of the state no amendment can become a part of the Constitution until ratified by a vote of the people. One
prerequisite is equally as essential as the other. The amendment must first receive the requisite majority in the Legislature, and
afterwards be adopted by the requisite vote. ... It is the fact of a majority vote which makes the amendment a part of the
Constitution."

"In considering the cases it is necessary to note whether in the particular case the court was called upon to determine
between rival governments, or whether the Legislature, or some board or official, had legally performed the duty imposed by the
Constitution or statutes. In re State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303, 29 Am. Dec. 636, it was held that the General Assembly, under the
power granted by the Constitution, could change the Constitution only in the manner prescribed by it, and that it was the duty of
the court to determine whether all prerequisites had been complied with. In Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, it was held that a
Constitution can be changes only by the people in convention or in a mode described by the Constitution itself, and that if the
latter mode is adopted every requisite of the Constitution must be observed. 'It has been said," says the court, "that certain acts are
to be done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected; but to what purpose are these acts required, or
these requisitions enjoined, if the Legislature or any other department of the government can dispense with them. To do so would
be to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support; and every principle of public law and sound constitutional policy
requires the court to pronounce against every amendment which is shown not to have been made in accordance with the rules
prescribed by the fundamental law.'

"In State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505, it was said that: 'The people of a state may form an original Constitution, or abrogate an old one
and form a new one, at any time, without any political restriction, except the Constitution of the United States, but if they
undertake to add an amendment, by the authority of legislation to a Constitution already in existence, they can do it only by the
method pointed out by the Constitution to which the amendment is added. The power to amend a Constitution by legislative
action does not confer the power to break it, any more than it confers the power to legislate on any other subject contrary to its
prohibitions.' So, in State v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785, it was held that no amendments can be made to the Constitution
of the state without a compliance with the provisions thereof, both in the passage of such amendment by the Legislature and the
manner of submitting it to the people. The courts have not all agreed as to the strictness of compliance which should be required.

"In the Prohibition and Amendment Case, 24 Kan. 700, the court determined judicially whether an amendment to the
Constitution had been legally adopted. After approving the statement quoted from Collier v. Frierson, supra, that 'we entertain no
doubt that, to change the Constitution in an other mode than by a convention, every requisite which is demanded by the
instrument itself must be observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment,' the court held that, 'as substance of
right is grander and more potent than methods of form,' there had been substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement
that a proposed amendment to the Constitution must be entered at length on the legislative journal. It appears that the joint
resolution making submission simply provided that a proposition should be submitted to the electors at the general election of
1880. It did not declare that the machinery of the general election law should control, or that any particular officers or board
would receive, count, or canvass the votes cast. But the existing election machinery was adequate, and the votes were received,
counted, and canvassed, and the result declared as fully as though it had been in terms so ordered. These methods had been
followed in the adoption of previous amendments, and was held that, conceding the irregularity of the proceedings the Legislature
and the doubtful scope of the provisions for the election, yet in view of the very uncertainty of such provision the past legislative
history of similar propositions, the universal prior acquiescence in the same forms of procedure and the popular
and unchallenged acceptance of the legal pendency before the people of the question of the amendment for decision, and in view
of the duty cast upon the court taking judicial knowledge of anything affecting the existence and validity of any law or portion of
the Constitution, it must be adjudged that the proposed amendment became part of the Constitution. The effect was to hold that a
provision of the Constitution requiring the proposed amendment to be entered in full on the journals was directory, and not
mandatory. This liberal view was approved in State v. Winnett (Neb.) 110 N. 1113, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 149, and People v. Sours,
31 Colo. 369, Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34. But it has not been universally accepted.

"In Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3, the court, in commenting upon the Kansas case said: 'The reasoning by
which the learned court reached the conclusion it did is not based on any sound legal principles, but contrary to them. Neither the
argument nor the conclusion can command our assent or approval. The argument is illogical, and based on premises which
are without any sound foundation, and rests merely on assumption.' See, also, the well-considered case of Kadderly v. Portland,
44 Or. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222. All these cases concede the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether, in submitting a
proposed amendment to the people, the Legislature legally observed the constitutional provisions as to the manner of procedure.
In Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424, 25 L.R.A. 312, the court, at the instance of a citizen and a taxpayer, restrained
the Secretary of State from taking steps to submit to the people a proposed amendment to the Constitution agreed to by the
Legislature on the ground that the Legislature had not acted in conformity with the Constitution and that the proposed
amendment was of such a character that it could not properly become a part of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
in People v. Sours, supra, refused to exercise this authority.

"The entire question received elaborate consideration in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N.W. 738, 15 N.W. 609. The
amendment, which concededly had been adopted by the people, had not, before its submission, been entered in full upon the
legislative journals, as required by the Constitution, and it was held that this was a material variance in both form and substance
from the constitutional requirements, and that the amendment did not, therefore, become a part of the Constitution. As to the
claim that the question was political, and not judicial, it was said that, while it is not competent for courts to inquire into the
validity of the Constitution and the form of government under which they themselves exist, and from which they derive their
powers, yet, where the existing Constitution prescribes a method for its own amendment, an amendment thereto, to be valid, must
be adopted in strict conformity to that method; and it is the duty of the courts in a proper case, when an amendment does not
relate to their own power or functions, to inquire whether, in the adoption of the amendment, the provisions of the existing
Constitution have been observed, and, if not, to declare the amendment invalid and of no force. This case was followed in State v.
Brookhart, 113 Iowa, 250, 84 N.W. 1064.

"In University v. McIver, 72 N.C. 76, the question whether a proposed amendment to the Constitution had been legally adopted
was treated as a judicial question. By the Constitution a proposed amendment was required to be approved by Legislatures before
its submission to the people. In this instance a bill was passed which contained 17 amendments. The next Legislature rejected
9 and adopted 8 of the amendments, and submitted them to the people. The majority of the people voted for their adoption; but it
was contended that the Constitution contemplated and required that the same bill and the same amendments, without change,
should approved by both Legislatures, and that it did not follow because the second Legislature adopted separately 8 out of
17 amendments adopted by the first Legislature, it would have adopted the 17, or any of them, if they had been voted upon the
second in the form adopted by the first body. The substance of the contention was that there had not been a concurrence of
the twoLegislatures on the same amendments, according to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The court held that the power
of the Legislature in submitting amendments could not be distinguished from the powers of convention, and that, as the people
had spoken and ratified the amendments, they became a part of the Constitution.
"In Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265, 6 N.W. 641, it was held that prior to 1876 a proposed amendment to Constitution
could not be submitted to the people at any other than a general election; but, as the amendment under consideration had been
submitted after the Constitution been changed, it had been legally submitted and adopted.

"In State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 South. 927, the question whether an amendment to the Constitution had been legally
submitted and adopted by the people was held to be judicial, and not political, in its nature. The amendment under
consideration changed the Constitution by providing for an elective, instead of an appointive, judiciary. It was contented that the
amendments had been improperly submitted and adopted by a majority of the qualified voters voting at election, as required by
the Constitution. The law did direct how the result of the election should be determined. The Legislature by joint resolution
recited that the election had been duly held throughout the state, and, as it appeared from the returns made to the Secretary of
State, that 21,169 votes were cast in favor of, and 8,643 votes against, the amendment, it resolved 'that said amendment be, and
hereby is, inserted into the Constitution of the state of Mississippi as a part of the Constitution.' In fact, the amendment
was not submitted in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, and it did not receive a majority of all the qualified voters voting
at the election. It was argued that the rules prescribed by the Constitution "are all for the guidance of the Legislature, and from
the very nature of the thing the Legislature must be the exclusive judge of all questions to be measured or determined by these
rules. Whether the question be political, and certainly a legislative one, or judicial, to be determined by the courts, this section of
rules, not only of procedure, but of final judgment as well, confides to the separate magistracy of
the legislative department full power to hear, consider, and adjudge that question. The Legislature puts the question to
the qualified electors. The qualified electors answer back to the Legislature. "If it shall appear" to the Legislature that its question
has been answered in the affirmative, the amendment is inserted and made a part of the Constitution. The Governor and the
courts have no authority to speak at any stage of the proceedings between the sovereign and the Legislature, and when the matter
is thus concluded it is closed, and the judiciary is as powerless to interfere as the executive.' But it was held that the question
whether the proposition submitted to the voters constituted one, or more than one, amendment, whether the submission was
according to the requirements of the Constitution, and whether the proposition was in fact adopted, were all judicial, and not
political, questions. 'We do not,' said Chief Justice Whitfield, 'seek a jurisdiction not imposed upon us by the Constitution. We
could not, if we would, escape the exercise of that jurisdiction which the Constitution has imposed upon us. In the particular
instance in which we are now acting, our duty to know what the Constitution of the state is, and in accordance with our oaths to
support and maintain it in its integrity, imposed on us a most difficult and embarrassing duty, one which we have not sought, but
one which, like all others, must be discharged."

"In Bott v. Wurtz, 63 N.J. Law, 289, 43 Atl. 744, 881, 45 L.R.A. 251, it was held that it was the duty of the judicial department of
the government to determine whether the legislative department or its officers had observed the constitutional injunctions in
attempting to amend the Constitution, and to annul their acts if they had not done so. The case is an interesting and well-
considered one. The Constitution provided the manner in which proposed amendments should be submitted to the people, but did
not provide a method for canvassing the votes. The Legislature having agreed to certain proposed amendments, passed an act for
submitting the same to the people. This statute provided for the transmission to the Secretary of State of certificate showing the
result of the voting throughout the state, and made it the duty of the Governor at the designated time summon four or more
Senators, who, with the Governor, should constitute a board of state canvassers to canvass and estimate the votes for and against
each amendment. This board was to determine and declare which of the proposed amendments had been adopted and to deliver a
statement of the results to the Secretary of State, and "any proposed amendment, which by said certificate and determination of
the board of canvassers shall appear to have received in its favor the majority of all the votes cast in the state for and against said
proposed amendment, shall from the time of filing such certificate be and become an amendment to and a part of the Constitution
of the state; and it shall be the duty of the Governor of the state forthwith, after such a determination, to issue a proclamation
declaring which of the said proposed amendments have been adopted by the people." This board was required to file a statement
of the result of the election, and the Governor to issue his proclamation declaring that the amendment had been adopted and
become a part of the Constitution. At the instance of a taxpayer the Supreme Court allowed a writ of certiorari to remove into the
court for review the statement of the results of the election made by the canvassing board, in order that it might be judicially
determined whether on the facts shown in that statement the board had legally determined that the proposed amendment had been
adopted. The Supreme Court decided that the concurrence of the board of state canvassers and the executive department of the
government in their respective official functions placed the subject-matter beyond the cognizance of the judicial department of
the state. The Court of Appeals, after a full review of the authorities, reversed this decision, and held that the questions were of a
judicial nature, and properly determinable by the court on their merits. Mr. Justice Dixon, after stating the facts, said: 'It thus
becomes manifest that there was present in the Supreme Court, and is now pending in this court, every element tending to
maintain jurisdiction over the subject-matter, unless it be true, as insisted, that the judicial department of the government has not
the right to consider whether the legislative department and its agencies have observed constitutional injunctions in attempting to
amend the Constitution, and to annul their acts in case that they have not done so. That such a proposition is not true seems to be
indicated by the whole history of jurisprudence in this country.' The court, after considering the case on the merits, held that the
proper conclusion had been drawn therefrom, and that the amendment in question was legally submitted and adopted.

"The recent case of Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark. 432, 96 S.W. 396, presented the identical question which we have under
consideration. In reference to the contention that the Constitution intended to delegate to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives the power to determine whether an amendment had been adopted, and that the question was political, and not
judicial, the court observed: "The argument has often been made in similar cases to the courts, and it is found in many dissenting
opinions; but, with probably a few exceptions, it is not found in any prevailing opinion."

"In State v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840, 25 L.R.A. 560, it was held that the constitutional requirement of publication of a
proposed constitutional provision for three months prior to the election at which it is to be submitted to the people
is mandatory and that noncompliance therewith renders the adoption of an amendment of no effect."

ANNEX B

MALACAÑANG

MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-B

Defining Further the Role of Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)

WHEREAS, since their creation pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December 31, 1972, the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) have petitioned the Office of the President to submit to them for resolution important national issues;

WHEREAS, one of the questions persistently mention refers to the ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention;

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said petitions, it is evident that the people believe that the submission of the proposed
Constitution to the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays should taken as a plebiscite in itself in view of the fact that freedom of
debate has always been limited to the leadership in political, economic and social fields, and that it is now necessary to bring this
down to the level of the people themselves through the Barangays or Citizens Assemblies;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby order that important national issues shall from time to time be referred to the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 86-A dated January 5, 1973 an that the initial referendum
shall include the matter of ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

The Secretary of the Department of Local Government and Community Development shall insure the implementation of this
Order.

Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of January in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS

By the President:

(SGD.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR

Executive Secretary
Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:

CASTRO, J., concurring:

The preliminary question before this Court was whether or not the petitioners had made out a sufficient prima faciecase in their
petitions to justify their being given due course. Considering on the one hand the urgency of the matter and on the other hand its
transcendental importance, which suggested the need for hearing the side of the respondents before that preliminary question was
resolved, We required them to submit their comments on the petitions. After the comments were filed We considered them as
motions to dismiss so that they could be orally argued. As it turned out, the hearing lasted five days, morning and afternoon, and
could not have been more exhaustive if the petitions had been given due course from the beginning.

The major thrust of the petitions is that the act of the Citizens Assemblies as certified and proclaimed by the President on January
17, 1973 (Proclamation No. 1102) was not an act of ratification, let alone a valid one, of the proposed Constitution, because it
was not in accordance with the existing Constitution (of 1935) and the Election Code of 1971. Other grounds are relied upon by
the petitioners in support of their basic proposition, but to our mind they are merely subordinate and peripheral.

Article XV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution provides that amendments (proposed either by Congress in joint session or by a
Convention called by it for the purpose) "shall be valid part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of votes cast at
an election at which the amendments submitted to the people for their ratification." At the time Constitution was approved by the
Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935, and ratified in a plebiscite held on following May 14, the word "election" had
already a definite meaning in our law and jurisprudence. It was not a vague and amorphous concept, but a procedure prescribed
by statute ascertaining the people's choices among candidates for public offices, or their will on important matters submitted to
the pursuant to law, for approval. It was in this sense that word was used by the framers in Article XV (also in Articles VI and
VII), and in accordance with such procedure that plebiscites were held to ratify the very same Constitution in 1935 as well as the
subsequent amendments thereto, thus: in 1939 (Ordinance appended to the Constitution); 1940 (establishment of a bicameral
legislature; eligibility of the President and the Vice President for re election; creation of the Commission of Elections); 1947
(Parity Amendment); and 1967 (increase in membership of the House of Representatives and eligibility of members of Congress
to run for the Constitutional Convention without forfeiture of their offices).

The Election Code of 1971, in its Section 2, states that "all elections of public officers except barrio officials andplebiscites shall
be conducted in the manner provided by this Code." This is a statutory requirement designed, as were the other election laws
previously in force, to carry out the constitutional mandate relative to the exercise of the right suffrage, and with specific
reference to the term "plebiscites," the provision of Article XV regarding ratification of constitutional amendments.

The manner of conducting elections and plebiscites provided by the Code is spelled out in other sections thereof. Section 99
requires that qualified voters be registered in a permanent list, the qualifications being those set forth in Article V, Section 1, of
the 1935 Constitution on the basis of age (21), literacy and residence. These qualifications are reiterated in Section 101 of the
Election Code. Section 102 enumerates the classes of persons disqualified to vote. Succeeding sections prescribe the election
paraphernalia to be used, the procedure for registering voters, the records, of registration and the custody thereof, the description
and printing of official ballots, the actual casting of votes and their subsequent counting by the boards of inspectors, the rules for
appreciation of ballots, and then the canvass and proclamation of the results.

With specific reference to the ratification of the 1972 draft Constitution, several additional circumstances should be considered:

(1) This draft was prepared and approved by a Convention which had been convened pursuant to Resolution No. 2 passed by
Congress on March 16, 1967, which provides:

Sec. 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for
their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

(2) Article XVII, Section 16, of the draft itself states:

 Sec. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five and all amendments thereto.

The same procedure is prescribed in Article XVI, Section 2, for the ratification of any future amendment to or revision of the said
Constitution.

(3) After the draft Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 the said body adopted
Resolution No. 5843, proposing "to President Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling aplebiscite for the ratification
of the proposed New Constitution on such appropriate date as he shall determine and providing for the necessary funds therefor."
Pursuant to said Resolution the President issued Decree No. 73 on the same day, calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15,
1973, at which the proposed Constitution "shall be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection." The Decree had eighteen
(18) sections in all, prescribing in detail the different steps to be taken to carry out the process of ratification, such as: (a)
publication of the proposed Constitution in English and Pilipino; (b) freedom of information and discussion; (c) registration of
voters: (d) appointment of boards of election inspectors and designation of watchers in each precinct; (e) printing of official
ballots; (f) manner of voting to insure freedom and secrecy thereof; (g) canvass of plebiscite returns; and (h) in general,
compliance with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971, with the Commission on Elections exercising its constitutional and
statutory powers of supervision of the entire process.

There can hardly be any doubt that in everybody's view — from the framers of the 1935 Constitution through all the Congresses
since then to the 1971 Constitutional Convention — amendments to the Constitution should be ratified in only one way, that is, in
an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Indeed, so
concerned was this Court with the importance and indispensability of complying with the mandate of the (1935) Constitution in
this respect that in the recent case of Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, No. L-34150, October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 702), a
resolution of the (1971) Constitutional Convention submitting a proposed amendment for ratification to a plebiscite to be held in
November 1971 was declared null and void. The amendment sought to reduce the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen years
and was approved by the Convention for submission to a plebiscite ahead of and separately from other amendments still being or
to be considered by it, so as to enable the youth to be thus enfranchised to participate in the plebiscite for the ratification of such
other amendments later. This Court held that such separate submission was violative of Article XV, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which contemplated that "all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite." * Thus a grammatical construction based on a singular, instead of plural, rendition of
the word "election" was considered a sufficient ground to rule out the plebiscite which had been called to ratify a proposed
amendment in accordance with the procedure and under all the safeguards provided in the Election Law.

In the cases now before Us what is at issue is not merely the ratification of just one amendment, as in Tolentino vs. COMELEC,
but the ratification of an entire charter setting up a new form of government; and the issue has arisen not because of a disputed
construction of one word or one provision in the 1935 Constitution but because no election or plebiscite in accordance with that
Constitution and with the Election Code of 1971 was held for the purpose of such ratification.

The Citizens Assemblies which purportedly ratified the draft Constitution were created by Presidential Decree No. 86 dated
December 31, 1972, "to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for
the citizenry to express their views on important national issues." The Assemblies "shall consist of all persons who are residents
of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are
registered in the lists of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary." By Presidential Decree No. 86-
A, dated January 5, 1973, the Assemblies were convened for a referendum between January 10 and 15, to "consider vital national
issues now confronting the country, like the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution, the continuation of martial rule, the
convening of Congress on January 22, 1973, and the holding of elections in November 1973."

On January 5, 1973 the newspapers came out with a list of four questions to be submitted to the Citizens Assemblies, the fourth
one being as follows: "How soon would you like plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?" It should be noted in this
connection that the President had previously announced that he had ordered the postponement of plebiscite which he had called
for January 15, 1973 (Presidential Decree No. 73) for the ratification of the Constitution, and that he was considering two new
dates for the purpose — February 19 or March 5; that he had ordered that the registration of voters (pursuant to Decree No. 73)
be extended to accommodate new voters; and that copies of the new Constitution would be distributed in eight dialects the
people. (Bulletin Today, December 24, 1972.)

On January 10, 1973 it was reported that one more question would be added to the original four which were to be submitted to
the Citizens Assemblies. The question concerning plebiscite was reworded as follows: "Do you like the plebiscite to be held
later?" The implication, it may likewise be noted, was that the Assemblies should express their views as to the plebiscite should
be held, not as to whether or not it should be held at all.
The next day, January 11, it was reported that six additional questions would be submitted, namely:

(1) Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national
interest?

(2) Do you approve of the new Constitution?

(3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

(4) Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Constitution?

(5) If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?

(6) Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973; emphasis supplied].

Appended to the six additional questions above quoted were the suggested answers, thus:

COMMENTS ON

QUESTION No. 1

In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government.

QUESTION No. 2

But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be convened at

all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the
New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.

QUESTION No. 3

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new Constitution
should be deemed ratified.

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the
New Constitution.

QUESTION No. 4

We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so many
debates and so much expenses.

QUESTION No. 5

Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough for
stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to return.

QUESTION No. 6

We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can
accomplish all his reform program and establish normalcy in the country. If all other
measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government along the
lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly.
So it was that on January 11, 1973, the second day of the purported referendum, the suggestion was broached, for the first time,
that the plebiscite should be done away with and a favorable vote by the Assemblies deemed equivalent ratification. This was
done, not in the questionnaire itself, but in the suggested answer to question No. 3. Strangely, however, it was not similarly
suggested that an unfavorable vote be considered as rejection.

There should be no serious dispute as to the fact that the manner in which the voting was conducted in the Citizen Assemblies,
assuming that such voting was held, was not within the intendment of Article XV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution nor in
accordance with the Election Code of 1971. The referendum can by no means be considered as the plebiscite contemplated in
Section 2 of said Code and in Article XVII, Section 16, of the draft Constitution itself, or as the election intended by Congress
when it passed Resolution No. 2 on March 16, 1967 calling a Convention for the revision of the 1935 Constitution. The Citizens
Assemblies were not limited to qualified, let alone registered voters, but included all citizens from the age of fifteen, and
regardless of whether or not they were illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex convicts * — these being the classes of persons expressly
disqualified from voting by Section 102 of the Election Code. In short, the constitutional and statutory qualifications were not
considered in the determination of who should participate. No official ballots were used in the voting; it was done mostly by
acclamation or open show of hands. Secrecy, which is one of the essential features of the election process, was not therefore
observed. No set of rules for counting the votes or of tabulating them and reporting the figures was prescribed or followed. The
Commission on Elections, which is the constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections, took no part at all, either by way of supervision or in the assessment of the results.

It has been suggested that since according to Proclamation No. 1102 the overwhelming majority of all the members of the
Citizens Assemblies had voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution there was a substantial compliance with Article XV,
Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution and with the Election Code of 1971. The suggestion misses the point entirely. It is of the
essence of a valid exercise of the right of suffrage that not only must a majority or plurality of the voters carry the day but that the
same must be duly ascertained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other words the very existence of such
majority or plurality depends upon the manner of its ascertainment, and to conclude that it exists even if it has not been
ascertained according to law is simply to beg the issue, or to assume the very fact to be established. Otherwise no election or
plebiscite could be questioned for non-compliance with the provisions of the Election Law as long as it is certified that a majority
of the citizens had voted favorably or adversely on whatever it was that was submitted to them to vote upon.

However, a finding that the ratification of the draft Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies, as certified by the President in
Proclamation No. 1102, was not in accordance with the constitutional and statutory procedure laid down for the purpose does not
quite resolve the questions raised in these cases. Such a finding, in our opinion, is on a matter which is essentially justiciable, that
is, within the power of this Court to inquire into. It imports nothing more than a simple reading and application of the pertinent
provisions of the 1935 Constitution, of the Election Code and of other related laws and official acts. No question of wisdom or of
policy is involved. But from this finding it does not necessarily follow that this Court may justifiably declare that the Constitution
has not become effective, and for that reason give due course to these petitions or grant the writs herein prayed for. The
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases, to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable.

Several theories have been advanced respectively by the parties. The petitioners lay stress on the invalidity of the ratification
process adopted by the Citizens Assemblies and on that premise would have this Court grant the reliefs they seek. The
respondents represented by the Solicitor General, whose theory may be taken as the official position of the Government,
challenge the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the petitions are political and therefore non-
justiciable, and that in any case popular acquiescence in the new Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in reliance
thereon should caution against interposition of the power of judicial review. Respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy (in L-36165),
in their respective capacities as President and President Pro Tempore of the Senate of the Philippines, and through their counsel,
Senator Arturo Tolentino, likewise invoke the political question doctrine, but on a ground not concurred in by the Solicitor
General, namely, that approval of the 1973 Constitution by the people was made under a revolutionary government, in the course
of a successful political revolution, which was converted by act of the people to the present de jure government under the 1973
Constitution."

Heretofore, constitutional disputes which have come before this Court for adjudication proceeded on the assumption, conceded
by all, that the Constitution was in full force and effect, with the power and authority of the entire Government behind it; and the
task of this Court was simply to determine whether or not the particular act or statute that was being challenged contravened
some rule or mandate of that Constitution. The process employed was one of interpretation and synthesis. In the cases at bar there
is no such assumption: the Constitution (1935) has been derogated and its continued existence as well as the validity of the act of
derogation is issue. The legal problem posed by the situation is aggravated by the fact that the political arms of the Government
— the Executive Departments and the two Houses of Congress — have accepted the new Constitution as effective: the former by
organizing themselves and discharging their functions under it, and the latter by not convening on January 22, 1973 or at any
time thereafter, as ordained by the 1935 Constitution, and in the case of a majority of the members by expressing their option to
serve in the Interim National Assembly in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the 1973 Constitution. *

The theory advanced by Senator Tolentino, as counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy, may be taken up and restated at same
length if only because it would constitute, if sustained, the most convenient ground for the invocation of the political-question
doctrine. In support of his theory, Senator Tolentino contends that after President Marcos declared martial law on September 21,
1972 (Proclamation No. 1081) he established a revolutionary government when he issued General Order No. 1 the next day,
wherein he proclaimed "that I shall govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire government, including all its agencies
and instrumentalities, in my capacity, and shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to my position
as such Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines." By this order, it is pointed out, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces assumed all the powers of government — executive, legislative, and judicial; and thereafter proceeded
to exercise such powers by a series of Orders and Decrees which amounted to legislative enactments not justified under martial
law and, in some instances, trenched upon the domain of the judiciary, by removing from its jurisdiction certain classes of cases,
such as "those involving the validity, legality, or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1081, or of any decree, order or act issued,
promulgated or performed by me or by my duly designated representative pursuant thereto." (General Order No. 3 as amended by
General Order No. 3-A, dated September 24, 1972.) The ratification by the Citizens Assemblies, it is averred, was the
culminating act of the revolution, which thereupon converted the government into a de jure one under the 1973 Constitution.

If indeed it be accepted that the Citizens Assemblies had ratified the 1973 Constitution and that such ratification as well as the
establishment of the government thereunder formed part of a revolution, albeit peaceful, then the issue of whether or not that
Constitution has become effective and, as necessary corollary, whether or not the government legitimately functions under it
instead of under the 1935 Constitution, is political and therefore non-judicial in nature. Under such a postulate what the people
did in the Citizen Assemblies should be taken as an exercise of the ultimate sovereign power. If they had risen up in arms and by
force deposed the then existing government and set up a new government in its place, there could not be the least doubt that their
act would be political and not subject to judicial review but only to the judgment of the same body politic act, in the context just
set forth, is based on realities. If a new government gains authority and dominance through force, it can be effectively challenged
only by a stronger force; judicial dictum can prevail against it. We do not see that situation would be any different, as far as the
doctrine of judicial review is concerned, if no force had been resorted to and the people, in defiance of the existing Constitution
but peacefully because of the absence of any appreciable opposition, ordained a new Constitution and succeeded in having the
government operate under it. Against such a reality there can be no adequate judicial relief; and so courts forbear to take
cognizance of the question but leave it to be decided through political means.

The logic of the political-question doctrine is illustrated in statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case * relied upon, curiously
enough, by the Solicitor General, who disagrees with the revolutionary government theory of Senator Tolentino. The case
involved the issue of which of two opposing governments struggling for supremacy in the State of Rhode Island was the lawful
one. The issue had previously come up in several other cases before the courts of the State, which uniformly held that the inquiry
belonged to the political power and not to the judicial. Commenting on the ruling thus arrived at, the U.S. Supreme Court said:
"And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and incapable of
pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the
existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising judicial power." In other words, since the court would
have no choice but to decide in one way alone in order to be able to decide at all, the question could not be considered proper for
judicial determination.

It should be noted that the above statement from Luther vs. Borden would be applicable in the cases at bar only on the premise
that the ratification of the Constitution was a revolutionary act and that the government now functioning it is the product of such
revolution. However, we are not prepared to agree that the premise is justified.

In the first, place, with specific reference to the questioned ratification, several significant circumstances may be noted. (1) The
Citizens Assemblies were created, according to Presidential Decree No. 86, "to broaden the base of citizen participation in the
democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues." (2)
The President announced, according to the Daily Express of January 2, 1973, that "the referendum will be in the nature of a loose
consultation with the people." (3) The question, as submitted to them on the particular point at issue here, was "Do you a approve
of the Constitution?" (4) President Marcos, in proclaiming that the Constitution had been ratified, stated as follows: "(S)ince the
referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in
favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should
already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people." (5) There was not enough time for the Citizens Assemblies to really
familiarize themselves with the Constitution, much less with the many other subjects that were submitted to them. In fact the
plebiscite planned for January 15, 1973 under Presidential Decree No. 73 had been postponed to an indefinite date, the reasons
for the postponement being, as attributed to the President in the newspapers, that "there was little time to campaign for or against
ratification" (Daily Express, Dec. 22, 1972); that he would base his decision (as to the date, of the plebiscite) on the compliance
by the Commission (on Elections) on the publication requirement of the new Charter and on the position taken by national
leaders" (Daily Express, Dec. 23, 1972); and that "the postponement would give us more time to debate on the merits of the
Charter." (Bulletin Today, Dec. 24, 1972.)

The circumstances above enumerated lead us to the conclusion that the Citizens Assemblies could not have understood the
referendum to be for the ratification of the Constitution, but only for the expression of their views on a consultative basis. Indeed,
if the expression of those views had been intended as an act of ratification (or of rejection as a logical corollary) — there would
have been no need for the Katipunan ng mga Barangay to recommend that the Constitution should already be deemed ratified,
for recommendation imports recognition of some higher authority in whom the final decision rests.

But then the President, pursuant to such recommendation, did proclaim that the Constitution had been ratified and had come into
effect. The more relevant consideration, therefore, as far as we can see, should be as to what the President had in mind in
convening the Citizens Assemblies, submitting the Constitution to them and proclaiming that the favorable expression of their
views was an act of ratification. In this respect subjective factors, which defy judicial analysis and adjudication, are necessarily
involved.

In positing the problem within an identifiable frame of reference we find no need to consider whether or not the regime
established by President Marcos since he declared martial law and under which the new Constitution was submitted to the
Citizens Assemblies was a revolutionary one. The pivotal question is rather whether or not the effectivity of the said Constitution
by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, upon the recommendation of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, was intended to
be definite and irrevocable, regardless of non-compliance with the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions prescribing
the procedure for ratification. We must confess that after considering all the available evidence and all the relevant circumstances
we have found no reasonably reliable answer to the question. On one hand we read, for instance, the following public statements
of the President:

Speaking about the proclamation of martial law, he said:

I reiterate what I have said in the past: there is no turning back for our people.

We have committed ourselves to this revolution. We have pledged to it our future, our fortunes, our lives, our
destiny. We have burned our bridges behind us. Let no man misunderstand the strength of our resolution. (A
Report to the Nation, Jan. 7, 1973.)

On the occasion of the signing of Proclamation No. 1102 on January 17, 1973, the President said the following, among other
things:

... We can, perhaps delimit the power of the people to speak on legal matters, on justiciable matters, on
matters that may come before the experts and interpreters of the law. But we cannot disqualify the people
from speaking on what we and the people consider purely political matters especially those that affect the
fundamental law of the land.

... The political questions that were presented to the people are exactly those that refer to the form of
government which the people want ... The implications of disregarding the people's will are too awesome to
be even considered. For if any power in government should even dare to disregard the people's will there
would be valid ground for revolt.

... Let it be known to everybody that the people have spoken and they will no longer tolerate any attempt to
undermine the stability of their Republic; they will rise up in arms not in revolt against the Republic but in
protection of the Republic which they have installed. It is quite clear when the people say, we ratify the
Constitution, that they mean they will not discard, the Constitution.

On January 19, 1973 the Daily Express published statement of the President made the day before, from which the following
portion is quoted:

... the times are too grave and the stakes too high for us permit the customary concessions to traditional
democratic process to hold back our people's clear and unequivocal resolve and mandate to meet and
overcome the extraordinary challenges presented by these extraordinary times.
On the same occasion of the signing of Proclamation No. 1102 the President made pointed reference to "the demand of some of
our citizens ... that when all other measures should fail, that the President be directed to organize and establish a Revolutionary
Government," but in the next breath added: "... if we do ratify the Constitution, how can we speak of Revolutionary Government?
They cannot be compatible ..." "(I)t is my feeling," he said, "that the Citizens' Assemblies which submitted this recommendation
merely sought articulate their impatience with the status quo that has brought about anarchy, confusion and misery to the masses
..." The only alternatives which the President clearly implied by the foregoing statements were the ratification of the new
Constitution and the establishment of a revolutionary government, the latter being unnecessary, in his opinion, because precisely
the Constitution had been ratified. The third obvious alternative was entirely ruled out, namely, a return to the 1935 Constitution,
for it was the status quo under that Constitution that had caused "anarchy, confusion and misery." The message seems clear:
rather than return to such status quo, he would heed the recommendation of the Citizens' Assemblies to establish a revolutionary
government, because that would be the only other way to carry out the reforms he had envisioned and initiated — reforms which,
in all fairness and honesty, must be given credit for the improved quality of life in its many aspects, except only in the field of
civil liberties.

If there is any significance, both explicit and implicit, and certainly unmistakable, in the foregoing pronouncements, it is that the
step taken in connection with the ratification of the Constitution was meant to be irreversible, and that nothing anyone could say
would make the least difference. And if this is a correct and accurate assessment of the situation, then we would say that since it
has been brought about by political action and is now maintained by the government that is in undisputed authority and
dominance, the matter lies beyond the power of judicial review.

On the other hand, by avowals no less significant if not so emphatic in terms, President Marcos has professed fealty to the
Constitution. In "Today's Revolution: Democracy" he says:

I believe, therefore, in the necessity of Revolution as an instrument of individual and social change ... but that
in a democratic society, revolution is of necessity, constitutional, peaceful, and legal.

In his TV address of September 23, 1972, President Marcos told the nation:

I have proclaimed martial law in accordance with the powers vested in the President by the Constitution of
the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

I repeat, this is not a military takeover of civil government functions. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines which was established by our people in 1946 continues.

xxx xxx xxx

I assure you that I am utilizing this power vested in me by the Constitution to save the Republic and reform
our society...

I have had to use this constitutional power in order that we may not completely lose the civil rights and
freedom which we cherish...

... We are against the wall. We must now defend the Republic with the stronger powers of the Constitution.

(Vital Documents, pp. 1-12; emphasis supplied).

In the report of an interview granted by the President to the Newsweek Magazine (published in the issue of January 29, 1973), the
following appears:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now that you have gotten off the constitutional track, won't you be in serious trouble
if you run into critical problems with your programs?
 R. I have never gotten off the constitutional track. Everything I am doing is in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution. The only thing is that instead of 18-year-olds voting, we have
allowed 15-year-olds the right to vote. But the 15-year-olds of today are high-school
students, if not graduates, and they are better informed than my contemporaries at that
age. On the matter of whether it is constitutional to proclaim martial law, it is
constitutional because the Constitution provides for it in the event of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or immediate danger thereof. We may quarrel about whether what
we have gone through is sufficient cause to proclaim martial law but at the very least
there is a danger of rebellion because so many of our soldiers have been killed. You must
remember this (martial law provision) was lifted from the American legislation that was
the fundamental law of our country.

xxx xxx xxx

In the light of this seeming ambivalence, the choice of what course of action to pursue belongs to the President. We have earlier
made reference to subjective factors on which this Court, to our mind, is in no position to pass judgment. Among them is the
President's own assessment of the will of the people as expressed through the Citizens Assemblies and of the importance of the
1973 Constitution to the successful implementation of the social and economic reforms he has started or envisioned. If he should
decide that there is no turning back, that what the people recommended through the Citizens Assemblies, as they were reported to
him, demand that the action he took pursuant thereto be final and irrevocable, then judicial review is out of the question.

In articulating our view that the procedure of ratification that was followed was not in accordance with the 1935 Constitution and
related statutes, we have discharged our sworn duty as we conceive it to be. The President should now perhaps decide, if he has
not already decided, whether adherence to such procedure is weighty enough a consideration, if only to dispel any cloud of doubt
that may now and in the future shroud the nation's Charter.

In the deliberations of this Court one of the issues formulated for resolution is whether or not the new Constitution, since its
submission to the Citizens Assemblies, has found acceptance among the people, such issue being related to the political question
theory propounded by the respondents. We have not tarried on the point at all since we find no reliable basis on which to form a
judgment. Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles restricted, we
have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution. In any event, we
do not find the issue decisive insofar as our vote in these cases is concerned. To interpret the Constitution — that is judicial. That
the Constitution should be deemed in effect because of popular acquiescence — that is political, and therefore beyond the domain
of judicial review.

We therefore vote not to give due course to the instant petitions.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

As far as I am concerned, I regard the present petitions as no more than mere reiterations of the Supplemental Petitions filed by
Counsel Lorenzo M. Tañada on January 15, 1973 in the so called Plebiscite Cases decided by this Court on January 22, 1978. Of
course, there are amplifications of some of the grounds previously alleged and in the course of the unprecedented five-day
hearing that was held from February 12 to 16 last, more extensive and illuminating arguments were heard by Us, but, in my
estimation, and with due recognition of the sincerety, brilliance and eloquence of counsels, nothing more cogent and compelling
than what had already been previously presented by Counsel Tañada is before Us now. Accordingly, I cannot see any reason why
I should change the position I took in regard to the earlier cases. I reiterate, therefore, the vote I cast when these petitions were
initially considered by the Court; namely, to dismiss them.

In view, however, of the transcendental importance of the issues before the Court and the significance to our people and in
history of the individual stands of the members of the Court in relation to said issues and to the final outcome of these cases, and
considering that I reserved before the filing of a more extended opinion, I will take this opportunity to explain further why I hold
that the 1973 Constitution is already in force, if only to clarify that apart from the people's right of revolution to which I made
pointed reference in my previous opinion, I can see now, after further reflection, that the vote of the people in the referendum in
the Citizens Assemblies held on January 10 to 15, 1973, upon the result of which Proclamation 1102 is based, may be viewed
more importantly as a political act than as a purely legal one with the result that such vote to consider the 1973 Constitution as
ratified without the necessity of holding a plebiscite in the form followed in the previous ratification plebiscites in 1935 of the
Constitution itself, 1937 of women's suffrage, 1939 of the amendments to the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, 1940 of
the re-election of the President, the bicameral legislature and the Commission on Elections, 1947 of the parity amendment and
1967, rejecting the proposed increase in the members of the House of Representatives and eligibility of members of Congress to
the Constitutional Convention, may be deemed as a valid ratification substantially in compliance with the basic intent of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution. If indeed this explanation may be considered as a modification of my rationalization then, I wish to
emphasize that my position as to the fundamental issue regarding the enforceability of the new Constitution is even firmer now
than ever before. As I shall elucidate anon, paramount considerations of national import have led me to the conviction that the
best interests of all concerned would be best served by the Supreme Court holding that the 1973 Constitution is now in force, not
necessarily as a consequence of the revolutionary concept previously suggested by me, but upon the ground that as a political,
more than as a legal, act of the people, the result of the referendum may be construed as a compliance with the substantiality of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.

The facts that gave rise to these proceedings are historical and well known. Generally, they may be taken judicial notice of. They
revolve around the purported ratification of the Constitution of 1973 declared in Proclamation 1102 issued by the President on
January 17, 1973.

Pursuant to a joint resolution of the Congress sitting as a constituent assembly approved on March 16, 1967, delegates to a
constitutional convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of 1935 were elected in accordance with the implementing
law, Republic Act 6132, on November 10, 1970. Known as the Constitutional Convention of 1971, the assembly began its
sessions on June 1, 1971. After encountering a lot of difficulties, due to bitter rivalries over important positions and committees
and an incomprehensible fear of overconcentrating powers in their officers, the delegates went about their work in comparatively
slow pace, and by the third quarter of 1972 had finished deliberations and second-reading voting only on an insignificant number
of proposals — until September 21, 1972, when the President, not altogether unexpectedly, yet abruptly, issued Proclamation
1081 declaring martial law throughout the country. An attempt was made to have the Convention recessed until after the lifting of
martial law, and not long after the motion of Delegate Kalaw to such effect was turned down, the activities within the assembly
shifted to high gear. As if unmindful of the arrest and continued detention of several of its members, the convention gathered
swift momentum in its work, and on November 30, 1972, it approved by overwhelming vote the draft of a complete constitution,
instead of mere specific amendments of particular portions of the Constitution of 1935. Needless to say, before martial law was
declared, there was full and unlimited coverage of the workings in the convention by the mass media. At the same time, public
debates and discussions on various aspects of proposed amendments were not uncommon.

Earlier, on November 22, 1972, the Convention had Resolution No. 5843 proposing "to President Ferdinand Marcos that a decree
be issued calling a plebiscite for ratification of the proposed new Constitution on appropriate date as he shall determine and
providing for necessary funds therefor." Acting under this authority, December 1, 1972, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 73 submitting the draft constitution for ratification by the people at a plebiscite set for January 15, 1973. This order contained
provisions more or less similar to the plebiscite laws passed by Congress relative to the past plebiscites held in connection with
previous proposed amendments.

In connection with the plebiscite thus contemplated, General Order No. 17 was issued ordering and enjoining the authorities to
allow and encourage public and free discussions on proposed constitution. Not only this, subsequently, under date of December
17, 1972, the President ordered the suspension the effects of martial law and lifted the suspension of privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus insofar as activities connected with the ratification of the draft constitution were concerned. These two orders
were not, however, to last very long. On January 7, 1973, the President, invoking information related to him that the area of
public debate and discussion had opened by his previous orders was being taken advantage of by subversive elements to defeat
the purposes for which they were issued and to foment public confusion, withdrew said orders and enjoined full and stricter
implementation of martial law.

In the meantime, the President had issued on December 3, 1972 Presidential Decree No. 86 creating Citizens Assemblies "so as
to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues" and one of the questions
presented to said assemblies was: "Do you like the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution to be held later" So, the same order of
January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20, the President ordered, "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held January 15, 1973, be
postponed until further notice".

In the meanwhile also, on January 5, 1973, the President issued Presidential Decree, No. 86-A providing as follows:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-A

STRENGTHENING AND DEFINING THE ROLE OF

BARANGAYS (CITIZENS ASSEMBLIES)
 WHEREAS, on the basis of preliminary and initial reports from the field as gathered from barangays
(citizens assemblies) that have so far been established, the people would like to decide for themselves
questions or issues, both local and national, affecting their day-to-day lives and their future;

WHEREAS, the barangays (citizens assemblies) would like themselves to be the vehicle for expressing the
views of the people on important national issues;

WHEREAS, such barangays (citizens assemblies) desire that they be given legal status and due recognition
as constituting the genuine, legitimate and valid expression of the popular will; and

WHEREAS, the people would like the citizens assemblies to conduct immediately a referendum on certain
specified questions such as the ratification of the new Constitution, continuance of martial law, the convening
of Congress on January 22, 1973, and the elections in November 1973 pursuant to the 1935 Constitution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby
declare as part of the law of the land the following:

1. The present barangays (citizens assemblies) are created under Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December
31, 1972, shall constitute the base for citizen participation in governmental affairs and their collective views
shall be considered in the formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be
translated into concrete and specific decision;

2. Such barangays (citizens assemblies) shall consider vital national issues now confronting the country, like
the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution, the continuation of martial rule, the convening of
Congress on January 22, 1973, and the holding of elections in November 1973, and others in the future,
which shall serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the national government;

3. The barangays (citizens assemblies) shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on
important national issues, including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit results thereof to the
Department of Local Governments Community Development immediately thereafter, pursuant to express will
of the people as reflected in the reports gathered from the many thousands of barangays (citizens assemblies)
throughout the country.

4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy
three.

And on January 7, 1973, this was followed by Presidential Decree No. 86-B reading thus:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-B

DEFINING FURTHER THE ROLE OF BARANGAYS (CITIZENS

ASSEMBLIES)

WHEREAS, since their creation pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December 31, 1972, the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) have petitioned the Office of the President to submit them for resolution
important national issues;

WHEREAS, one of the questions persistently mentioned refers to the ratification of the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention;

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said petitions, it is evident that the people believe that the submission of the
proposed Constitution to the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays should be taken as a plebiscite in itself in
view of the fact that freedom of debate has always been limited to the leadership in political, economic and
 social fields, and that it is now necessary to bring this down to the level of the people themselves through the
Barangays or Citizens Assemblies;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order that important national issues shall from time to time be
referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No.
86-A dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum shall include the matter of ratification of the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

The Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the
implementation of this Order.

Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of January in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three.

And so it was that by January 10, 1973, when the Citizens Assemblies thus created started the referendum which was held from
said date to January 15, 1973, the following questions were submitted to them:

(1) Do you like the New Society?

(2) Do you like the reforms under martial law?

(3) Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?

(4) Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?

(5) Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?.

but on January 11, 1973, six questions were added as follows:

(1) Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national
interests?

(2) Do you approve of the New Constitution?

(3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

(4) Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Constitution?

(5) If the elections would not be held, when do you want it to be called?

(6) Do you want martial law to continue?

It is not seriously denied that together with the question the voters were furnished "comments" on the said questions more or less
suggestive of the answer desired. It may assumed that the said "comments" came from official sources, albeit specifically
unidentified. As petitioners point out, the most relevant of these "comments" were the following:

COMMENTS ON

xxx xxx xxx

QUESTION No. 2
 But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoke. Or if it is to be convened at
all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the
New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.

QUESTION No. 3

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the
New Constitution.

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the new Constitution then the new Constitution
should be deemed ratified.

The Solicitor General claims, and there seems to be showing otherwise, that the results of the referendum were determined in the
following manner:

Thereafter, the results of the voting were collated and sent to the Department of Local Governments. The
transmission of the results was made by telegram, telephone, the provincial government SSB System in each
province connecting all towns; the SSB communication of the PACD connecting most provinces; the
Department of Public Information Network System; the Weather Bureau Communication System connecting
all provincial capitals and the National Civil Defense Network connecting all provincial capitals. The
certificates of results were then flown to Manila to confirm the previous figures received by the
aforementioned means of transmission. The certificates of results tallied with the previous figures taken with
the exception of few cases of clerical errors.

The Department adopted a system of regionalizing the receiving section of the Citizens Assemblies operation
at the Department wherein the identity of the barrio and the province was immediately given to a staff in
charge of each region. Every afternoon at 2:00 o'clock, the 11 regions submitted the figures they received
from the field to the central committee to tabulate the returns. The last figures were tabulated at 12 midnight
of January 16, 1973 and early morning of January 17, 1973 and were then communicated to the President by
the Department of Local Governments.

The development culminated in the issuance by the President of Proclamation 1102 on January 17, 1973. Said proclamation
reads:

PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF

THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is
subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered
cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 6, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are
residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the
Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or
ward secretary;

WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were establish precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation
in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizen to express their views on important
national issues;

WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people an pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated
January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before Citizens' Assemblies or Barangays: Do you
approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as
against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection;
while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
 Constitution fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814)
answered that there was no need for plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) percent of the members of the
Barangays (Citizen Assemblies) are in favor of the New Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has
strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen
hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelmingly majority
of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines,
and has thereby come into effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three.

The first attempt to question the steps just enumerated taken by the President was in the so-called Plebiscite Cases, ten in number,
which were filed by different petitioners during the first half of December 1972. 1 Their common target then was Presidential
Decree No. 73, but before the said cases could be decided, the series of moves tending in effect to make them moot and academic
insofar as they referred exclusively to the said Presidential Decree began to take shape upon the issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 86-A, quoted above. And when Presidential Decree No. 86-B, also above quoted, was issued and the six additional questions
which were first publicized on January 11, 1973 were known, together with the "comments", petitioners sensed that a new and
unorthodox procedure was being adopted to secure approval by the people of the new Constitution, hence Counsel Tañada, not
being satisfied with the fate of his urgent motion for early decision of the above ten cases dated January 12, 1973, filed on
January 15, 1973, his supplemental motion seeking the prohibition against and injunction of the proceedings going on. Principal
objective was to prevent that the President be furnished the report of the results of the referendum and thereby disable him from
carrying out what petitioners were apprehensively foreseeing would be done — the issuance of some kind of proclamation, order
or decree, declaring that the new Constitution had been ratified. Reacting swiftly, the Court resolved on the same day, January
15, which was Monday, to consider the supplemental motion as a supplemental petition and to require the respondents to answer
the same the next Wednesday, January 17th, before the hour of the hearing of the petition which set for 9:30 o'clock in the
morning of that day. The details what happened that morning form part of the recital of facts the decision rendered by this Court
in the ten cases on January 22, 1973 and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to state no that before the hearing could be closed
and while Counsel Tañada was still insisting on his prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order, the Secretary of Justice
arrived and personally handed to the Chief Justice a copy Proclamation 1102 which had been issued at about 11:00 o'clock that
same morning. In other words, the valiant and persistent efforts of petitioners and their counsels were overtaken by adverse
developments, and in the mind of the majority of the members of the Court, the cases had become academic. For my part, I took
the view that even on the basis of the supplemental petition and the answer thereto filed by respondents, the Court could already
decide on the fundamental issue of the validity Proclamation 1102, as Justices Zaldivar, Antonio and Esguerra also believed,
inasmuch as Counsel Tañada's pleading and argument had anticipated its issuance, but the majority felt it was not ready to
resolve the matter, for lack, according them, of full ventilation, and so, the decision reserved petitioners the filing of the
"appropriate" cases, evidently, the present ones.

II

At the threshold, I find myself confronted by a matter which, although believed to be inconsequential by my learned brethren, I
strongly feel needs special attention. I refer to the point raised by Counsel Arturo M. Tolentino for respondent Gil J. Puyat and
Jose Roy, who have been sued as President and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, to the effect that change in the composition
of the Supreme Court provided for the 1973 Constitution, from the 11-man tribunal under the 1935 Constitution to a 15-man
Court, makes of these cases which were filed after January 17, 1973 the date when Proclamation 1102 declared the new
Constitution as ratified, political nature and beyond our jurisdiction. The main consideration submitted in this connection is that
inasmuch as the number votes needed for a decision of this Court has been increased from six to eight in ordinary cases and from
eight to ten for the declaration of unconstitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement2 or law, the Court would have to resolve
first as a prejudicial question whether the Court is acting in these cases as the 15-man or the 11-man Court, in which event, it
would be faced with the dilemma that if it acts either as the former or as the latter, it would be prejudging the very matter in issue
one way or the other, and, in effect, it would be choosing between two constitutions, which is a political determination not within
the Court's competence.
While I agree that the problem is at first blush rather involved, I do not share the view that the premises laid down by counsel
necessarily preclude this Court from taking a definite stand on whether the Court is acting in these cases as the 15-Man or the 11-
man Court. I feel very strongly that the issue should not be ignored or dodged, if only to make the world know that the Supreme
Court of the Philippines is never incognizant of the capacity in which it is acting, much less lacking in courage or wisdom to
resolve an issue that relates directly to its own composition. What a disgrace it would be to admit that this Supreme Court does
not know, to use a common apt expression, whether it is fish or fowl. Withal, scholars and researchers who might go over our
records in the future will inevitably examine minutely how each of us voted and upon what considerations we have individually
acted, and, indeed, doubts may arise as to whether or not, despite the general result we might announce, there had been the
requisite number of votes for a valid collegiate action.

For instance, it may be argued that the present cases do not involve an issue of unconstitutionality, hence, if we are acting as the
11-man Court, only six votes would suffice to declare Proclamation 1102 ineffective, and if upon analysis of our respective
opinions it should be inferable therefrom that six of us have considered the matter before the Court as justiciable and at the same
time have found the procedure of ratification adopted in Presidential Decrees 86-A and 86-B and related orders of the President
as not being in conformity with Article XV of the old Constitution, a cloud would exist as to efficacy of the dispositive portion of
Our decision dismiss these cases, even if we have it understood that by the vote of justices in favor of such dismissal, We
intended to mean the implementation or enforcement of the new Constitution now being done could continue.

Be that as it may, I am against leaving such an important point open to speculation. By nature I am averse to ambiguity and
equivocation and as a member of the Supreme Court, last thing I should knowingly countenance is uncertainty as to the juridical
significance of any decision of the Court which is precisely being looked upon as the haven in which doubts are supposed to be
authoritatively dispelled. Besides, from very nature of things, one thing is indubitably beyond dispute — we cannot act in both
capacities of a 15-man and an 11-man Court at the same time, in like manner that it is inconceivable that the 1935 and 1973
Constitution can be considered by Us both in force. Our inescapable duty is to make a choice between them, according to what
law and other considerations inherent to our function dictate. I cannot bear the thought that someone may someday say that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines once decided a case without knowing the basis of its author to act or that it was ever wanting in
judicial courage to define the same.

Accordingly, with full consciousness of my limitations but compelled by my sense of duty and propriety to straighten out this
grave of issue touching on the capacity in which the Court acting in these cases, I hold that we have no alternative but adopt in
the present situation the orthodox rule that when validity of an act or law is challenged as being repugnant constitutional
mandate, the same is allowed to have effect until the Supreme Court rules that it is unconstitutional. Stated differently, We have
to proceed on the assumption that the new Constitution is in force and that We are acting in these cases as the 15-man Supreme
Court provided for there Contrary to counsel's contention, there is here no prejudgment for or against any of the two
constitutions. The truth of matter is simply that in the normal and logical conduct governmental activities, it is neither practical
nor wise to defer the course of any action until after the courts have ascertained their legality, not only because if that were to be
the rule, the functioning of government would correspondingly be undesirably hesitative and cumbersome, but more importantly,
because the courts must at the first instance accord due respect to the acts of the other departments, as otherwise, the smooth
running of the government would have to depend entirely on the unanimity of opinions among all its departments, which is
hardly possible, unless it is assumed that only the judges have the exclusive prerogative of making and enforcing the law, aside
from being its sole interpreter, which is contrary to all norms of juridical and political thinking. To my knowledge, there is yet no
country in the world that has recognized judicial supremacy as its basic governmental principle, no matter how desirable we
might believe the idea to be.

Indeed, it is not hard to visualize the difficulty if not absurdity of Our acting on the assumption that this Court is still functioning
under the 1935 Constitution. It is undeniable that the whole government, including the provincial, municipal and barrio units and
not excluding the lower courts up to the Court of Appeals, is operating under the 1973 Constitution. Almost daily, presidential
orders and decrees of the most legislative character affecting practically every aspect of governmental and private activity as well
as the relations between the government and the citizenry are pouring out from Malacañang under the authority of said
Constitution. On the other hand, taxes are being exacted and penalties in connection therewith are being imposed under said
orders and decrees. Obligations have been contracted and business and industrial plans have been and are being projected
pursuant to them. Displacements of public officials and employees in big numbers are going on in obedience to them. For the ten
justices of the Supreme Court to constitute an island of resistance in the midst of these developments, which even unreasoning
obstinacy cannot ignore, much less impede, is unimaginable, let alone the absurd and complicated consequences such a position
entails in the internal workings within the judiciary amount its different components, what with the lower courts considering such
orders and decrees as forming part of the law of the land in making their orders and decisions, whereas the Supreme Court is
holding, as it were, their effectivity at bay if it is not being indifferent to or ignoring them.

It is suggested that the President, being a man of law, committed to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court, and if the Court
feels that it cannot in the meantime consider the enforcement of the new Constitution, he can wait for its decision. Accepting the
truth of this assertion, it does necessarily follow that by this attitude of the President, considers the Supreme Court as still
operating under the Constitution. Quite on the contrary, it is a fact that he has given instructions for the payment of the justices in
accordance with the rate fixed in the New Constitution. Not only that, official alter ego, the Secretary of Justice, has been
shoving this Court, since January 18, 1973, all matters related to the administrative supervision of the lower courts which by the
new charter has been transferred from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court, and as far as I know, President has not
countermanded the Secretary's steps in that direction. That, on the other hand, the President has not augmented the justices of the
Court to complete the prescribed number of fifteen is, in my appraisal, of no consequence considering that with the presence of
ten justices who are the Court now, there is a working quorum, and the addition of new justices cannot in anyway affect the
voting on the constitutional questions now before Us because, while there sufficient justices to declare by their unanimous vote
illegality of Proclamation 1102, the votes of the justices to added would only be committed to upholding the same, since they
cannot by any standard be expected to vote against legality of the very Constitution under which they would be appointed.

Moreover, what makes the premise of presumptive valid preferable and, even imperative, is that We are dealing here with a
whole constitution that radically modifies or alters only the form of our government from presidential parliamentary but also
other constitutionally institutions vitally affecting all levels of society. It is, to mind, unrealistic to insist on that, fundamentally,
the 1973 Constitution is the same 1935 Constitution, with a few improvements. A cursory perusal of the former should convince
anyone that it is in essence a new one. While it does retain republicanism as the basic governmental tenet, the institutional
changes introduced thereby are rather radical and its social orientation is decidedly more socialistic, just as its nationalistic
features are somewhat different in certain respects. One cannot but note that the change embraces practically every part of the old
charter, from its preamble down to its amending and effectivity clauses, involving as they do the statement of general principles,
the citizenship and suffrage qualifications, the articles on the form of government, the judiciary provisions, the spelling out of the
duties and responsibilities not only of citizens but also of officers of the government and the provisions on the national economy
as well as the patrimony of the nation, not to mention the distinctive features of the general provisions. What is more, the
transitory provisions notably depart from traditional and orthodox views in that, in general, the powers of government during the
interim period are more or less concentrated in the President, to the extent that the continuation or discontinuance of what is now
practically a one-man-rule, is even left to his discretion. Notably, the express ratification of all proclamations, orders, decrees and
acts previously issued or done by the President, obviously meant to encompass those issued during martial law, is a commitment
to the concept of martial law powers being implemented by President Marcos, in defiance of traditional views and prevailing
jurisprudence, to the effect that the Executive's power of legislation during a regime of martial law is all inclusive and is not
limited to the matters demanded by military necessity. In other words, the new constitution unlike any other constitution
countenances the institution by the executive of reforms which normally is the exclusive attribute of the legislature.

Withal, the best proofs that by its expressed and implied intent, the Constitution of 1973 is a new one, are that (1) Section 16 of
its Article XVII which provides that this constitution shall "supersede the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five and all
amendments thereto" and (2) its transitory provisions expressly continue the effectivity of existing laws, offices and courts as
well as the tenure of all incumbent officials, not adversely affected by it, which would have been unnecessary if the old
constitution were being merely amended.

The new Constitution, in its Section 10, Article XVII, provides that "(T)he incumbent members of the Judiciary (which include
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of Supreme Court) may continue in office (under the constitution) until they reach the
age of seventy years, etc." By virtue of the presumptive validity of the new charter, all of form part of the 15-man-Court provided
for therein correspondingly, We have in legal contemplation, ceased in the meanwhile to be members of the 11-man-Court in the
1935 Constitution. Should the Court finally decide that the Constitution is invalid, then We would automatically revert to our
positions in the 11-man- Court, otherwise, We would just continue to be in our membership in the 15-man-Court, unless We feel
We cannot in conscience accept the legality of existence. On the other hand, if it is assumed that We are the 11-man-Court and it
happens that Our collective decision is in favor of the new constitution, it would be problematical for any dissenting justice to
consider himself as included automatically in the 15-man-Court, since that would tantamount to accepting a position he does not
honestly believe exists.

III

In brief, the main contention of the petitioners is that Proclamation 1102 is invalid because the ratification of the 1973
Constitution it purports to declare as having taken place as a result of the referendum above-referred to is ineffective since it
cannot be said on the basis of the said referendum that said Constitution has been "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election" in the manner prescribed by Article XV the Constitution of 1935. More specifically, they maintain that the word
"election" in the said Article has already acquired a definite accepted meaning out of the consistent holding in the past of
ratification plebiscites, and accordingly, no other form of ratification can be considered contemplated by the framers of the Old
Constitution than that which had been followed 1935, 1937, 1939, 1940, 1946 and 1967, the last three or four which were held
under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. Furthermore, they emphatically deny the veracity of the proclaimed
results of the referendum because, according to them the referendum was a farce and its results were manufactured or
prefabricated, considering that Mr. Francisco Cruz, who is supposed to have submitted the final report to the President, which
served as basis for Proclamation 1102, had no official authority to render the same, and it is inconceivable and humanly
impossible for anyone to have been able to gather, tabulate and canvass the 15 million votes allegedly reported within the short
period of time employed. Of course, they also contend that in any event, there was no proper submission because martial law per
se creates constructive duress which deprives the voters of the complete freedom needed for the exercise of their right of choice
and actually, there was neither time nor opportunity for real debate before they voted.

On the other hand, the position of the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondents is that the matter raised in the petitions is a
political one which the courts are not supposed to inquire into, and, anyway, there has been a substantial compliance with Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution, inasmuch as, disregarding unessential matters of form, the undeniable fact is that the voting in the
referendum resulted in the approval by the people of the New Constitution.

I need not dwell at length on these variant positions of the parties. In my separate opinion in the Plebiscite Cases, I already made
the observation that in view of the lack of solemnity and regularity in the voting as well as in the manner of reporting and
canvassing conducted in connection with the referendum, I cannot say that Article XV of the Old Constitution has been complied
with, albeit I held that nonetheless, the Constitution of 1973 is already in force. In order, however, to make myself clearer on
some relevant points, I would like to add a few considerations to what I have already said in the former cases.

In my opinion in those cases, the most important point I took into account was that in the face of the Presidential certification
through Proclamation 1102 itself that the New Constitution has been approved by a majority of the people and having in mind
facts of general knowledge which I have judicial notice of, I am in no position to deny that the result of the referendum was as the
President had stated. I can believe that the figures referred to in the proclamation may not accurate, but I cannot say in conscience
that all of them are manufactured or prefabricated, simply because I saw with own eyes that people did actually gather and listen
discussions, if brief and inadequate for those who are abreast of current events and general occurrences, and that they did vote. I
believe I can safely say that what I have seen have also been seen by many others throughout the country and unless it can be
assumed, which honestly, I do not believe to be possible, that in fact there were actually no meetings held and no voting done in
more places than those wherein there were such meetings and votings, I am not prepared to discredit entirely the declaration that
there was voting and that the majority of the votes were in favor of the New Constitution. If in fact there were substantially less
than 14 million votes of approval, the real figure, in my estimate, could still be significant enough and legally sufficient to serve
as basis for a valid ratification.

It is contended, however, that the understanding was that the referendum among the Citizens Assemblies was to be in the nature
merely of a loose consultation and not an outright submission for purposes of ratification. I can see that at the outset, when the
first set of questions was released, such may have been the idea. It must not be lost sight of, however, that if the newspaper
reports are to be believed, and I say this only because petitioners would consider the newspapers as the official gazettes of the
administration, the last set of six questions were included precisely because the reaction to the idea of mere consultation was that
the people wanted greater direct participation, thru the Citizens Assemblies, in decision-making regarding matters of vital
national interest. Thus, looking at things more understandingly and realistically the two questions emphasized by counsel,
namely, (1) Do yo approve of the New Constitution? and (2) Do you want plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
should be considered no longer as loose consultations but as direct inquiries about the desire of the voters regarding the matters
mentioned. Accordingly, I take it that if the majority had expressed disapproval of the new Constitution, the logical consequence
would have been the complete abandonment of the idea of holding any plebiscite at all. On the other hand, it is very plain to see
that since the majority has already approved the new Constitution, a plebiscite would be superfluous. Clear as these
rationalizations may be, it must have been thought that if the holding of a plebiscite was to be abandoned, there should be a direct
and expressed desire of the people to such effect in order to forestall as much as possible any serious controversy regarding the
non-holding of the plebiscite required by the letter of Section 16 of Article XVII, the effectivity clause, of the new Constitution.
Oddly enough, the "comments" accompanying the questions do strongly suggest this view. And as it turned out, the majority
found no necessity in holding a plebiscite.

In connection with the question, Do you approve of the New Constitution? capital is being made of the point that as so framed,
the thrust of the said question does not seek an answer of fact but of opinion. It is argued that it would have been factual were it
worded categorically thus — Do you approve the New Constitution? The contention would have been weighty were it not
unrealistic. I remember distinctly that the observation regarding the construction of the subject question was not originally made
by any of the talented counsels for petitioners. It came from Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro whose mastery of the English language
can rightly be the cause of envy of even professors of English. None of the other members of the Court, as far as I can recall, ever
noticed how the said question is phrased, or if anyone of Us did, I am not aware that he gave it more than passing attention. What
I mean is that if neither any of the distinguished and learned counsels nor any member of the Court understood the said question
otherwise than calling for a factual answer instead of a mere opinion, how could anyone expect the millions of unlettered
members of the Citizens Assemblies to have noticed the point brought out by Justice Castro? Truth to tell, I myself did not realize
the difference until Justice Castro gave it emphasis. Besides, reading the question in the light of the accompanying "comment"
corresponding to it in particular, I am certain that any one who answered the same understood it in no other sense than a direct
inquiry as to whether or not, as a matter of fact, he approves the New Constitution, and naturally, affirmative answer must be
taken as a categorical vote of approval thereof, considering, particularly, that according to the reported result of the referendum
said answer was even coupled with the request that the President defer the convening of the Interim National Assembly.

It is also contended that because of this reference in answer to that question to the deferment of the convening of the interim
assembly, the said answer is at best a conditional approval not proper nor acceptable for purposes of ratification plebiscite. The
contention has no basis. In interest of accuracy, the additional answer proposed in pertinent "comment" reads as follows: "But we
do not want Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked etc." On the assumption that the actual answer, as reported, was of similar
tenor, it is not fair to ascribe to it the imposition of a condition. At most, the intention is no more than a suggestion or a wish.

As regards said "comments", it must be considered that a martial law was declared, the circumstances surrounding making of the
Constitution acquired a different and more meaningful aspect, namely, the formation of a new society. From the point of view of
the President and on the basis of intelligence reports available to him, the only way to meet situation created by the subversive
elements was to introduce immediately effective reforms calculated to redeem the people from the depth of retrogression and
stagnation caused by rampant graft and corruption in high places, influence peddling, oligarchic political practices, private
armies, anarchy, deteriorating conditions of peace and order, the so inequalities widening the gap between the rich and the poor,
and many other deplorable long standing maladies crying for early relief and solution. Definitely, as in the case of rebellious
movement that threatened the Quirino Administration, the remedy was far from using bullets alone. If a constitution was to be
approved as an effective instrument towards the eradication of such grave problems, it had to be approved without loss of time
and sans the cumbersome processes that, from the realistic viewpoint, have in the past obstructed rather than hastened the
progress of the people. Stated otherwise, in the context of actualities, the evident objective in having a new constitution is to
establish new directions in the pursuit of the national aspirations and the carrying out of national policies. Only by bearing these
considerations in mind can the "comments" already referred to be properly appreciated. To others said "comments" may appear
as evidence of corruption of the will of those who attended the assemblies, but actually, they may also be viewed in the same
light as the sample ballots commonly resorted to in the elections of officials, which no one can contend are per se means of
coercion. Let us not forget that the times are abnormal, and prolonged dialogue and exchange of ideas are not generally possible,
nor practical, considering the need for faster decisions and more resolute action. After all voting on a whole new constitution is
different from voting on one, two or three specific proposed amendments, the former calls for nothing more than a collective
view of all the provisions of the whole charter, for necessarily, one has to take the good together with the bad in it. It is rare for
anyone to reject a constitution only because of a few specific objectionable features, no matter how substantial, considering the
ever present possibility that after all it may be cured by subsequent amendment. Accordingly, there was need to indicate to the
people the paths open to them in their quest for the betterment of their conditions, and as long as it is not shown that those who
did not agree to the suggestions in the "comments" were actually compelled to vote against their will, I am not convinced that the
existence of said "comments" should make any appreciable difference in the court's appraisal of the result of the referendum.

I must confess that the fact that the referendum was held during martial law detracts somehow from the value that the referendum
would otherwise have had. As I intimated, however, in my former opinion, it is not fair to condemn and disregard the result of the
referendum barely because of martial law per se. For one thing, many of the objectionable features of martial law have not
actually materialized, if only because the implementation of martial law since its inception has been generally characterized by
restraint and consideration, thanks to the expressed wishes of the President that the same be made "Philippine style", which
means without the rigor that has attended it in other lands and other times. Moreover, although the restrictions on the freedom of
speech, the press and movement during martial law do have their corresponding adverse effects on the area of information which
should be open to a voter, in its real sense what "chills" his freedom of choice and mars his exercise of discretion is suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reason is simply that a man may freely and correctly vote even if the needed
information he possesses as to the candidates or issues being voted upon is more or less incomplete, but when he is subject to
arrest and detention without investigation and without being informed of the cause thereof, that is something else which may
actually cause him to cast a captive vote. Thus it is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus accompanying martial law that
can cause possible restraint on the freedom choice in an election held during martial law. It is a fact, however, borne by history
and actual experience, that in the Philippines, the suspension of the privilege of the writ habeas corpus has never produced any
chilling effect upon the voters, since it is known by all that only those who run afoul the law, saving inconsequential instances,
have any cause for apprehension in regard to the conduct by them of the normal activities of life. And so it is recorded that in the
elections 1951 and 1971, held while the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was under suspension, the Filipino voters gave the
then opposition parties overwhelming if not sweeping victories, in defiance of the respective administrations that ordered the
suspensions.

At this juncture, I think it is fit to make it clear that I am not trying to show that the result of the referendum may considered as
sufficient basis for declaring that the New Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the amending clause of the 1935
Constitution. I reiterate that in point of law, I find neither strict nor substantial compliance. The foregoing discussion is only to
counter, if I may, certain impression regarding the general conditions obtaining during and in relation to the referendum which
could have in one way or another affected the exercise of the freedom of choice and the use of discretion by the members of the
Citizens Assemblies, to the end that as far as the same conditions may be relevant in my subsequent discussions of the acceptance
by the people of the New Constitution they may also be considered.

IV

It is my sincere conviction that the Constitution of 1973 has been accepted or adopted by the people. And on this premise, my
considered opinion is that the Court may no longer decide these cases on the basis of purely legal considerations. Factors which
are non-legal but nevertheless ponderous and compelling cannot be ignored, for their relevancy is inherent in the issue itself to be
resolved.

In my opinion in the Plebiscite Cases, I joined my colleagues in holding that the question of whether or not there was proper
submission under Presidential Decree No. 73 is justiciable, and I still hold that the propriety of submission under any other law or
in any other form is constitutionally a fit subject for inquiry by the courts. The ruling in the decided cases relied upon by
petitioners are to this effect. In view, however, of the factual background of the cases at bar which include ratification itself, it is
necessary for me to point out that when it comes to ratification, I am persuaded that there should be a boundary beyond which the
competence of the courts no longer has any reason for being, because the other side is exclusively political territory reserved for
their own dominion by the people.

The main basis of my opinion in the previous cases was acceptance by the people. Others may feel there is not enough indication
of such acceptance in the record and in the circumstances the Court can take judicial notice of. For my part, I consider it
unnecessary to be strictly judicial in inquiring into such fact. Being personally aware, as I have already stated, that the Citizens
Assemblies did meet and vote, if irregularly and crudely, it is not for me to resort, for the purposes of these cases, to judicial tape
and measure, to find out with absolute precision the veracity of the total number of votes actually cast. After all, the claims that
upon a comparison of conflicting reports, cases of excess votes may be found, even if extrapolated will not, as far as I can figure
out, suffice to overcome the outcome officially announced. Rather than try to form a conclusion out of the raw evidence before
Us which the parties did not care to really complete, I feel safer by referring to the results announced in the proclamation itself.
Giving substantial allowances for possible error and downright manipulation, it must not be overlooked that, after all, their
having been accepted and adopted by the President, based on official reports submitted to him in due course of performance of
duty of appropriate subordinate officials, elevated them to the category of an act of a coordinate department of the government
which under the principle separation of powers is clothed with presumptive correctness or at least entitled to a high degree of
acceptability, until overcome by better evidence, which in these cases does not exist. In any event, considering that due to the
unorthodoxy of the procedure adopted and the difficulty of an accurate checking of all the figures, I am unable to conceive of any
manageable means of acquiring information upon which to predicate a denial, I have no alternative but to rely on what has been
officially declared. At this point, I would venture to express the feeling that if it were not generally conceded that there has been
sufficient showing of the acceptance in question by this time, there would have been already demonstrative and significant
indications of a rather widespread, if not organized resistance in one form or another. Much as they are to be given due
recognition as magnificent manifestations of loyalty and devotion to principles, I cannot accord to the filing of these cases as
indicative enough of the general attitude of the people.

It is true that in the opinion I had the privilege of penning the Court in Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702, I made strong and
unequivocal pronouncements to the effect that any amendment to the Constitution of 1935, to be valid, must appear to have been
made in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV thereof. What is more, that decision asserted judicial competence
to inquire into the matter of compliance or non compliance as a justiciable matter. I still believe in the correctness of those views
and I would even add that I sincerely feel it reflects the spirit of the said constitutional provision. Without trying to strain any
point however, I, submit the following considerations in the context of the peculiar circumstances of the cases now at bar, which
are entirely different from those in the backdrop of the Tolentino rulings I have referred to.

1. Consider that in the present case what is involved is not just an amendment of a particular provision of an existing
Constitution; here, it is, as I have discussed earlier above, an entirely new Constitution that is being proposed. This important
circumstance makes a great deal of difference.

No less than counsel Tolentino for herein respondents Puyat and Roy, who was himself the petitioner in the case I have just
referred to is, now inviting Our attention to the exact language of Article XV and suggesting that the said Article may be strictly
applied to proposed amendments but may hardly govern the ratification of a new Constitution. It is particularly stressed that the
Article specifically refers to nothing else but "amendments to this Constitution" which if ratified "shall be valid as part of this
Constitution." Indeed, how can a whole new constitution be by any manner of reasoning an amendment to any other constitution
and how can it, if ratified, form part of such other constitution? In fact, in the Tolentino case I already somehow hinted this point
when I made reference in the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration to the fact that Article XV must be followed "as
long as any amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter." Said resolution even added. "(T)his
is not to say that the people may not, in the exercise of their inherent revolutionary powers, amend the Constitution or promulgate
an entirely new one otherwise.".

It is not strange at all to think that the amending clause of a constitution should be confined in its application only to proposed
changes in any part of the same constitution itself, for the very fact that a new constitution is being adopted implies a general
intent to put aside the whole of the old one, and what would be really incongrous is the idea that in such an eventuality, the new
Constitution would subject its going into effect to any provision of the constitution it is to supersede, to use the language
precisely of Section 6, Article XVII, the effectivity clause, of the New Constitution. My understanding is that generally,
constitutions are self-born, they very rarely, if at all, come into being, by virtue of any provision of another constitution. 3 This
must be the reason why every constitution has its own effectivity clause, so that if, the Constitutional Convention had only
anticipated the idea of the referendum and provided for such a method to be used in the ratification of the New Constitution, I
would have had serious doubts as to whether Article XV could have had priority of application.

2. When an entirely new constitution is proposed to supersede the existing one, we cannot but take into consideration the forces
and the circumstances dictating the replacement. From the very nature of things, the proposal to ordain a new constitution must
be viewed as the most eloquent expression of a people's resolute determination to bring about a massive change of the existing
order, a meaningful transformation of the old society and a responsive reformation of the contemporary institutions and
principles. Accordingly, should any question arise as to its effectivity and there is some reasonable indication that the new charter
has already received in one way or another the sanction of the people, I would hold that the better rule is for the courts to defer to
the people's judgment, so long as they are convinced of the fact of their approval, regardless of the form by which it is expressed
provided it be reasonably feasible and reliable. Otherwise stated, in such instances, the courts should not bother about inquiring
into compliance with technical requisites, and as a matter of policy should consider the matter non-justiciable.

3. There is still another circumstance which I consider to be of great relevancy. I refer to the ostensible reaction of the component
elements, both collective and individual, of the Congress of the Philippines. Neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
has been reported to have even made any appreciable effort or attempt to convene as they were supposed to do under the
Constitution of 1935 on January 22, 1973 for the regular session. It must be assumed that being composed of experienced,
knowledgeable and courageous members, it would not have been difficult for said parliamentary bodies to have conceived some
ingenious way of giving evidence of their determined adherence to the Constitution under which they were elected. Frankly,
much as I admire the efforts of the handful of senators who had their picture taken in front of the padlocked portals of the Senate
chamber, I do not feel warranted to accord such act as enough token of resistance. As counsel Tolentino has informed the court,
there was noting to stop the senators and the congressmen to meet in any other convenient place and somehow officially organize
themselves in a way that can logically be considered as a session, even if nothing were done than to merely call the roll and
disperse. Counsel Tolentino even pointed out that if there were not enough members to form a quorum, any smaller group could
have ordered the arrest of the absent members. And with particular relevance to the present cases, it was not constitutionally
indispensable for the presiding officers to issue any call to the members to convene, hence the present prayers
for mandamus have no legal and factual bases. And to top it all, quite to the contrary, the records of the Commission on Elections
show that at least 15 of 24 senators and over 95 out of less than 120 members of the House of Representatives, have officially
and in writing exercised the option given to them to join the Interim National Assembly under the New Constitution, thereby
manifesting their acceptance of the new charter.

Now, having these facts in mind, and it being obvious that of the three great departments of the government under the 1935
Constitution, two, the Executive and the Legislative, have already accepted the New Constitution and recognized its
enforceability and enforcement, I cannot see how this Supreme Court can by judicial fiat hold back the political developments
taking place and for the sake of being the guardian of the Constitution and the defender of its integrity and supremacy make its
judicial power prevail against the decision of those who were duly chosen by the people to be their authorized spokesmen and
representatives. It is not alone the physical futility of such a gesture that concerns me. More than that, there is the stark reality
that the Senators and the Congressmen, no less than the President, have taken the same oath of loyalty to the Constitution that we,
the Justices, have taken and they are, therefore, equally bound with Us to preserve and protect the Constitution. If as the
representatives of the people, they have already opted to accept the New Constitution as the more effective instrument for
fulfillment of the national destiny, I really wonder if there is even any idealistic worth in our desperately clinging by Ourselves
alone to Our sworn duty vis-a-vis the 1935 Constitution. Conscious of the declared objectives of the new dispensation and
cognizant of the decisive steps being with the least loss of time, towards their accomplishment, cannot but feel apprehensive that
instead of serving the best interests of our people, which to me is in reality the real meaning of our oath of office, the Court might
be standing in the way of the very thing our beloved country needs to retrieve its past glory and greatness. In other words, it is my
conviction that what these cases demand most of all is not a decision demonstrative of our legal erudition and Solomonic wisdom
but an all rounded judgment resulting from the consideration of all relevant circumstances, principally the political, or, in brief, a
decision more political than legal, which a court can render only by deferring to the apparent judgment of the people and the
announcement thereof by the political departments of the government and declaring the matter non-justiciable.
4. Viewed from the strictly legal angle and in the light of judicial methods of ascertainment, I cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that in the legal sense, there has been at least substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, but what I
can see is that in a political sense, the answers to the referendum questions were not given by the people as legal conclusions. I
take it that when they answered that by their signified approval of the New Constitution, they do not consider it necessary to hold
a plebiscite, they could not have had in mind any intent to do what was constitutionally improper. Basically accustomed to
proceed along constitutional channels, they must have acted in the honest conviction that what was being done was in conformity
with prevailing constitutional standards. We are not to assume that the sovereign people were indulging in a futile exercise of
their supreme political right to choose the fundamental charter by which their lives, their liberties and their fortunes shall be
safeguarded. In other words, we must perforce infer that they meant their decision to count, and it behooves this Court to render
judgment herein in that context. It is my considered opinion that viewed understandingly and realistically, there is more than
sufficient ground to hold that, judged by such intent and, particularly, from the political standpoint, the ratification of the 1973
Constitution declared in Proclamation 1102 complies substantially with Article XV of the 1935 Charter, specially when it is
considered that the most important element of the ratification therein contemplated is not in the word "election", which
conceivably can be in many feasible and manageable forms but in the word "approved" which may be said to constitute the
substantiality of the whole article, so long as such approval is reasonably ascertained. In the last analysis, therefore, it can be
rightly said, even if only in a broad sense, that the ratification here in question was constitutionally justified and justifiable.

5. Finally, if any doubt should still linger as to the legitimacy of the New Constitution on legal grounds, the same should be
dispelled by viewing the situation in the manner suggested by Counsel Tolentino and by the writer of this opinion in his separate
opinion, oft-referred to above, in the Plebiscite Cases — that is, as an extra constitutional exercise by the people, under the
leadership of President Marcos, of their inalienable right to change their fundamental charter by any means they may deem
appropriate, the moment they are convinced that the existing one is no longer responsive to their fundamental, political and social
needs nor conducive to the timely attainment of their national destiny. This is not only the teaching of the American Declaration
of Independence but is indeed, a truth that is self-evident. More, it should be regarded as implied in every constitution that
regardless of the language of its amending clause, once the people have given their sanction to a new charter, the latter may be
deemed as constitutionally permissible even from the point of view of the preceding constitution. Those who may feel restrained
to consider this view out of respect to the import of Tolentino vs. Comelec, supra., would be well advised to bear in mind that the
case was decided in the context of submission, not accomplished ratification.

The language of the disputed amending clause of the 1935 Constitution should not be deemed as the be all and end all the nation.
More important than even the Constitution itself with all its excellent features, are the people living under it — their happiness,
their posterity and their national destiny. There is nothing that cannot be sacrificed in the pursuit of these objectives, which
constitute the totality of the reasons for national existence. The sacred liberties and freedom enshrined in it and the commitment
and consecration thereof to the forms of democracy we have hitherto observed are mere integral parts of this totality; they are less
important by themselves.

What seems to me to be bothering many of our countrymen now is that by denying the present petitions, the Court would be
deemed as sanctioning, not only the deviations from traditional democratic concepts and principles but also the qualified
curtailment of individual liberties now being practiced, and this would amount, it is feared, to a repudiation of our oath to support
and defend the Constitution of 1935. This is certainly something one must gravely ponder upon. When I consider, however, that
the President, the Vice President, the members of both Houses of Congress, not to speak of all executive departments and bureaus
under them as well as all the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals have already accepted the New Constitution as an
instrument of a meaningful nationwide-all-level change in our government and society purported to make more realistic and
feasible, rather than idealistic and cumbersomely deliberative, the attainment of our national aspirations, I am led to wonder
whether or not we, as members of the Supreme Court are being true to our duty to our people by refusing to follow suit and
accept the realities of the moment, despite our being convinced of the sincerity and laudableness of their objectives, only because
we feel that by the people's own act of ratifying the Constitution of 1935, they have so encased themselves within its provisions
and may, therefore, no longer take measures to redeem themselves from the situation brought about by the deficiencies of the old
order, unless they act in strict conformity therewith. I cannot believe that any people can be so stifled and enchained. In any
event, I consider it a God-given attribute of the people to disengage themselves, if necessary, from any covenant that would
obstruct their taking what subsequently appears to them to be the better road to the promotion and protection of their welfare.
And once they have made their decision in that respect, whether sophisticatedly or crudely, whether in legal form or otherwise,
certainly, there can be no court or power on earth that can reverse them.

I would not be human if I should be insensitive to the passionate and eloquent appeals of Counsels Tañada and Salonga that these
cases be decided on the basis of conscience. That is exactly what I am doing. But if counsel mean that only by granting their
petitions can this Court be worthily the bulwark of the people's faith in the government, I cannot agree, albeit my admiration and
respect are all theirs for their zeal and tenacity, their industry and wisdom, their patriotism and devotion to principle. Verily, they
have brought out everything in the Filipino that these cases demand.

In times of national emergencies and crises, not arising from foreign invasion, we need not fear playing opposite roles, as long as
we are all animated by sincere love of country and aim exclusively at the attainment of the national destiny. Our heroes of the
past, Rizal, Bonifacio, Aguinaldo, Antonio Luna, Mabini and so also with our patriots of the recent generations, Quezon,
Osmeña, Roxas, Laurel and Recto, to mention only some of them, had their differences of views — and they did not hesitate to
take diametrically opposing sides — that even reached tragic proportions, but all of them are admired and venerated.

It is my faith that to act with absolute loyalty to our country and people is more important than loyalty to any particular precept or
provision of the Constitution or to the Constitution itself. My oath to abide by the Constitution binds me to whatever course of
action I feel sincerely is demanded by the welfare and best interests of the people.

In this momentous juncture of our history, what is imperative is national unity. May God grant that the controversies the events
leading to these cases have entail will heal after the decision herein is promulgated, so that all us Filipinos may forever join hands
in the pursuit of our national destiny.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss these petitions for mandamus and prohibition without costs.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Assuming, without conceding, that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribes a procedure for the ratification of
constitutional amendments or of a new Constitution and that such procedure was no complied with, the validity of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1102 is a political, not a justiciable, issue; for it is inseparably or inextricably link with and strikes at, because it
is decisive of, the validity of ratification and adoption of, as well as acquiescence of people in, the 1973 Constitution and the
legitimacy of the government organized and operating thereunder. And being political, it is beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry,
tested by the definition of a political question enunciated in Tañada, et. al. vs. Cuenco, et al. (103 Phil. 1051), aside from the fact
the this view will not do violence to rights vested under the new Constitution, to international commitments forged pursuant
thereto and to decisions rendered by the judicial as well as quasi-judicial tribunals organized and functioning or whose
jurisdiction has been altered by the 1973 Constitution and the government established thereunder, and will dissipate any
confusion in the minds of the citizenry, who have been obeying the mandates of the new Constitution, as well as exercising the
rights and performing the obligations defined by the new Constitution, and decrees and orders issued in implementation of the
same and cooperating with the administration in the renovation of our social, economic and political system as re-structured by
the 1973 Constitution and by the implementing decrees and orders (see Miller vs. Johnson, 18 SW 522, 522-526, 1892).

In 1957, Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, in behalf of the Court, defined a political question as one
which, under the Constitution, is "to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority had been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the government." (Tañada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al., supra).

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provides: "Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification." Under Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution, the power to propose constitutional amendments is vested in Congress or in a constitutional convention;
while the power to ratify or reject such proposed amendments or new Constitution is reserved by the sovereign people. The
nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 would inevitably render inoperative the 1973 Constitution, which is in fact the express
prayer of the petitioners in G.R. No. L-36164. Regardless of the modality of submission or ratification or adoption — even if it
deviates from or violates the procedure delineated therefore by the old Constitution — once the new Constitution is ratified,
adopted and/or acquiesced in by the people or ratified even by a body or agency not duly authorized therefor but is subsequently
adopted or recognized by the people and by the other official organs and functionaries of the government established under such
a new Constitution, this Court is precluded from inquiring into the validity of such ratification, adoption or acquiescence and of
the consequent effectivity of the new Constitution. This is as it should be in a democracy, for the people are the repository of all
sovereign powers as well as the source of all governmental authority (Pole vs. Gray, 104 SO 2nd 841 [1958]). This basic
democratic concept is expressly restated in Section 1 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, thus: "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

The legality of the submission is no longer relevant; because the ratification, adoption and/or acquiescence by the people cures
any infirmity in its submission or any other irregularities therein which are deemed mandatory before submission as they are
considered merely directory after such ratification or adoption or acquiescence by the people. As Mr. Justice Brewer, then of the
Kansas State Supreme Court and later Associate Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, stated in re Prohibitory Amendment Cases
(24 Kansas 700 & 710 Reprint 499, 506): "The two important, vital elements of the Legislature and a majority of the popular
vote. Beyond these, other provisions are mere machineries and forms. They may not be disregarded, because by them certainty as
to the essentials is secured. But they are not themselves the essentials." (Cited in Larken vs. Gronna, 285 NW 59, 61-64, 1939).

This was the ruling by the American Supreme Court in the 1939 case of Coleman vs. Miller (307 U.S. 433, 83 L.ed. 1385), where
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority, stated that:

... Thus the political departments of the government dealt with the effect of both previous rejection and
attempted withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification ... .
This decision by the political departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the
Fourteenth amendment has been accepted.

We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state
legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political
question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of
its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.

This view was likewise emphasized by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas join, thus:

The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon
the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However,
whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which
this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political
department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of...government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment
has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the
Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the
Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to
agree... (American Constitutional Issues, by Pritchett, 1962 Ed., p. 44).

The doctrine in the aforesaid case of Coleman vs. Miller was adopted by Our Supreme Court in toto in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito (78 Phil. 1).

The ruling in the cases of Gonzales vs. Comelec, et al. (L-28224, Nov. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 774) and Tolentino vs. Comelec, et al.
(L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702) on which petitioners place great reliance — that the courts may review the propriety of a
submission of a proposed constitutional amendment before the ratification or adoption of such proposed amendment by the
sovereign people, hardly applies to the cases at bar; because the issue involved in the aforesaid cases refers to only the propriety
of the submission of a proposed constitutional amendment to the people for ratification, unlike the present petitions, which
challenge inevitably the validity of the 1973 Constitution after its ratification or adoption thru acquiescence by the sovereign
people. As heretofore stated, it is specious and pure sophistry to advance the reasoning that the present petitions pray only for the
nullification of the 1973 Constitution and the government operating thereunder.

It should be stressed that even in the Gonzales case, supra, We held that:

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government, including
the Constitution itself. (21 SCRA 787)
We did not categorically and entirely overturn the doctrine in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1) that both the proposal to
amend and the ratification of such a constitutional amendment are political in nature forming as they do the essential parts of one
political scheme — the amending process. WE merely stated therein that the force of the ruling in the said case of Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito has been weakened by subsequent cases. Thus, We pronounced therein:

It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification —
satisfied the three fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco
and Macias vs. Commission on Elections. In the first, we held the officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, claimed by the latter; in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in
the third we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in
said chamber purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of
two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not
been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the
theory advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial review. (21 SCRA pp. 785-786);

for which reason We concluded

In short, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress before acting as a constituent assembly — violates
the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and to the extent
that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. (p. 787, emphasis supplied.)

In the Tolentino case, supra, We reiterated the foregoing statements (41 SCRA 703-714).

The inevitable consequence therefore is that the validity of the ratification or adoption of or acquiescence by the people in the
1973 Constitution, remains a political issue removed from the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

One more word about the Gonzales and Tolentino cases. Both primarily stressed on the impropriety of the submission of a
proposed constitutional amendment. Courts do not deal with propriety or wisdom or absence of either of an official act or of a
law. Judicial power concerns only with the legality or illegality, constitutionality or unconstitutionality of an act: it inquires into
the existence of power or lack of it. Judicial wisdom is not to be pitted against the wisdom of the political department of the
government.

The classic example of an illegal submission that did not impair the validity of the ratification or adoption of a new Constitution
is the case of the Federal Constitution of the United States. It should be recalled that the thirteen (13) original states of the
American Union — which succeeded in liberating themselves from England after the revolution which began on April 19, 1775
with the skirmish at Lexington, Massachusetts and ended with the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, on
October 19, 1781(Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. I, 1933 Ed., p. 776) — adopted their Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union,
that was written from 1776 to 1777 and ratified on March 1, 1781 (Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. II, 1966 Ed., p. 525). About six
thereafter, the Congress of the Confederation passed a resolution on February 21, 1787 calling for a Federal Constitutional
Convention "for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation ... ." (Appendix I, Federalist, Modern
Library ed., p. 577, emphasis supplied).

The Convention convened at Philadelphia on May 14, 1787. Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union
stated specifically:

The articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed in every state, and the union shall be
perpetual; nor shall any alterations at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be
agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
(See the Federalist, Appendix II, Modern Library Ed., 1937, p. 584; emphasis supplied.)
But the foregoing requirements prescribed by the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for the alteration for the
ratification of the Federal Constitution as drafted by the Philadelphia Convention were not followed. Fearful the said Federal
Constitution would not be ratified by the legislatures as prescribed, the Philadelphia Convention adopted a resolution requesting
the Congress of the Confederation to pass a resolution providing that the Constitution should be submitted to elected state
conventions and if ratified by the conventions in nine (9) states, not necessarily in all thirteen (13) states, the said Constitution
shall take effect.

Thus, history Professor Edward Earle Mead of Princeton University recorded that:

It would have been a counsel of perfection to consign the new constitution to the tender mercies of the
legislatures of each and all of the 13 states. Experience clearly indicated that ratification then would have had
the same chance as the scriptural camel passing through the eye of a needle. It was therefore determined to
recommend to Congress that the new Constitution be submitted to conventions in the several states especially
elected to pass upon it and that, furthermore, the new government should go into effect if and when it should
be ratified by nine of the thirteen states ... . (The Federalist, Modern Library Ed., 1937, Introduction by
Edward Earle Mead, pp. viii-ix; emphasis supplied)

Historian Samuel Eliot Morison similarly recounted:

The Convention, anticipating that the influence of many state politicians would be Antifederalist, provided
for ratification of the Constitution by popularly elected conventions in each state. Suspecting that Rhode
Island, at least, would prove recalcitrant, it declared that the Constitution would go into effect as soon as nine
states ratified. The convention method had the further advantage that judges, ministers, and others ineligible
to state legislatures, could be elected to a convention. The nine-state provision was, of course, mildly
revolutionary. But the Congress of the Confederation, still sitting in New York to carry on federal
government until relieved, formally submitted the new constitution to the states and politely faded out before
the first presidential inauguration. (The Oxford History of the Am. People, by Samuel Eliot Morison, 1965
ed., p. 312).

And so the American Constitution was ratified by nine (9) states on June 21, 1788 and by the last four states on May 29, 1790 (12
C.J. p. 679 footnote, 16 C.J.S., 27. — by the state conventions and not by all thirteen (13) state legislatures as required by Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union aforequoted — and in spite of the fact that the Federal Constitution as
originally adopted suffers from two basic infirmities, namely, the absence of a bill of Rights and of a provision affirming the
power of judicial review.

The liberties of the American people were guaranteed by subsequent amendments to the Federal Constitution. The doctrine of
judicial review has become part of American constitutional law only by virtue of a judicial pronouncement by Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison (1803, 1 Cranch 137).

Until this date, no challenge has been launched against the validity of the ratification of the American Constitution, nor against
the legitimacy of the government organized and functioning thereunder.

In the 1946 case of Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees (37 SE 2nd 322, 326-330), which enunciated the principle that the validity of a
new or revised Constitution does not depend on the method of its submission or ratification by the people, but on the fact or fiat
or approval or adoption or acquiescence by the people which fact of ratification or adoption or acquiescence is all that is
essential, the Court cited precisely the case of the irregular revision and ratification by state conventions of the Federal
Constitution, thus:

No case identical in its facts with the case now under consideration has been called to our attention, and we
have found none. We think that the principle which we apply in the instant case was very clearly applied in
the creation of the constitution of the United States. The convention created by a resolution of Congress had
authority to do one thing, and one only, to wit, amend the articles of confederation. This they did not do, but
submitted to the sovereign power, the people, a new constitution. In this manner was the constitution of the
United States submitted to the people and it became operative as the organic law of this nation when it had
been properly adopted by the people.

Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, p. 55, discussing the convention that formulated the constitution of the United
States, has this to say: "The convention proceeded to do, and did accomplish, what they were not authorized
to do by a resolution of Congress that called them together. That resolution plainly contemplated
 amendments to the articles of confederation, to be submitted to and passed by the Congress, and afterwards
ratified by all the State legislatures, in the manner pointed out by the existing organic law. But the convention
soon became convinced that any amendments were powerless to effect a cure; that the disease was too deeply
seated to be reached such tentative means. They saw that the system they were called to improve must be
totally abandoned, and that the national idea must be re-established at the center of their political society. It
was objected by some members, that they had no power, no authority, to construct a new government. They
had no authority, if their decisions were to be final; and no authority whatsoever, under the articles of
confederation, to adopt the course they did. But they knew that their labors were only to be suggestions; and
that they as well as any private individuals, and any private individuals as well as they, had a right to propose
a plan of government to the people for their adoption. They were, in fact, a mere assemblage of private
citizens, and their work had no more binding sanction than a constitution drafted by Mr. Hamilton in his
office would have had. The people, by their expressed will, transformed this suggestion, this proposal, into an
organic law, and the people might have done the same with a constitution submitted to them by a single
citizen."

xxx xxx xxx

... When the people adopt a completely revised or new constitution, the framing or submission of the
instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. The fiat of the people and only the fiat of the people,
can breathe life into a constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

... We do not hesitate to say that a court is never justified in placing by implication a limitation upon the
sovereign. This would be an authorized exercise of sovereign power by the court. In State v. Swift, 69 Ind.
505, 519, the Indiana Supreme Court said: "The people of a State may form an original constitution, or
abrogate an old one and form a new one, at any time, without any political restriction except the constitution
of the United States; ... ." (37 SE 327-328, 329, emphasis supplied.)

In the 1903 case of Weston vs. Ryan, the Court held:

It remains to be said that if we felt at liberty to pass upon this question, and were compelled to hold that the
act of February 23, 1887, is unconstitutional and void, it would not, in our opinion, by any means follow that
the amendment is not a part of our state Constitution. In the recent case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth (Va.) 44
S.E. 754, the Supreme Court of Virginia hold that their state Constitution of 1902, having been acknowledged
and accepted by the officers administering the state government, and by the people, and being in force
without opposition, must be regarded as an existing Constitution irrespective of the question as to whether or
not the convention which promulgated it had authority so to do without submitting it to a vote of the people.
In Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, is a similar holding as to certain provisions of the Nebraska Constitution of
1886, which were added by the Legislature at the requirement of Congress, though never submitted to the
people for their approval." (97 NW 349-350; emphasis supplied).

Against the decision in the Wheeler case, supra, confirming the validity of the ratification and adoption of the American
Constitution, in spite of the fact that such ratification was in clear violation of the prescription on alteration and ratification of the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, petitioners in G.R. No. L-36165 dismissed this most significant historical fact by
calling the Federal Constitution of the United States as a revolutionary one, invoking the opinion expressed in Vol. 16, Corpus
Juris Secundum, p. 27, that it was a revolutionary constitution because it did not obey the requirement that the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union can be amended only with the consent of all thirteen (13) state legislatures. This opinion does
not cite any decided case, but merely refers to the footnotes on the brief historic account of the United States Constitution on p.
679 of Vol. 12, CJS. Petitioners, on p. 18 of their main Notes, refer US to pp. 270-316 of the Oxford History of the American
People, 1965 Ed. by Samuel Eliot Morison, who discusses the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union in Chapter XVIII
captioned "Revolutionary Constitution Making, 1775 1781" (pp. 270-281). In Chapter XX on "The Creative Period in Politics,
1785-1788," Professor Morison delineates the genesis of the Federal Constitution, but does not refer to it even implicitly as
revolutionary constitution (pp. 297-316). However, the Federal Constitution may be considered revolutionary from the view point
of McIver if the term revolution is understood in "its wider sense to embrace decisive changes in the character of government,
even though they do not involve the violent overthrow of an established order, ... ." (R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government,
1965 ed., p. 203).
It is rather ridiculous to refer to the American Constitution as a revolutionary constitution. The Articles of Confederation and
Perpetual Union that was in force from July 12, 1776 to 1788, forged as it was during the war of independence was a
revolutionary constitution of the thirteen (13) states. In the existing Federal Constitution of the United States which was adopted
seven (7) or nine (9) years after the thirteen (13) states won their independence and long after popular support for the government
of the Confederation had stabilized was not a product of a revolution. The Federal Constitution was a "creation of the brain and
purpose of man" in an era of peace. It can only be considered revolutionary in the sense that it is a radical departure from its
predecessor, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.

It is equally absurd to affirm that the present Federal Constitution of the United States is not the successor to the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union. The fallacy of the statement is so obvious that no further refutation is needed.

As heretofore stated, the issue as to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 strikes at the validity and enforceability of the 1973
Constitution and of the government established and operating thereunder. Petitioners pray for a declaration that the 1973
Constitution is inoperative (L-36164). If Proclamation No. 1102 is nullified, then there is no valid ratification of the 1973
Constitution and the inevitable conclusion is that the government organized and functioning thereunder is not a legitimate
government.

That the issue of the legitimacy of a government is likewise political and not justiciable, had long been decided as early as the
1849 case of Luther vs. Borden (7 How. 1, 12 L.ed., 581), affirmed in the 1900 case of Taylor vs. Beckham (178 U.S. 548, 44
L.ed. 1187) and re-enunciated in 1912 in the case of Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company vs. Oregon (223 U.S. 118,
133-151, 56 L.ed. 377-386). Because it reaffirmed the pronouncements in both Borden and Beckham cases, it is sufficient for us
to quote the decision in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra, penned by Mr. Chief Justice White, who re-stated:

In view of the importance of the subject, the apparent misapprehension on one side and seeming
misconception on the other, suggested by the argument as to the full significance of the previous doctrine, we
do not content ourselves with a mere citation of the cases, but state more at length than we otherwise would
the issues and the doctrine expounded in the leading and absolutely controlling case — Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 12 L.ed. 581.

xxx xxx xxx

... On this subject it was said (p. 38):

"For if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry, proposed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided
that the character government had no legal existence during the period of time above mentioned, — if it had
been annulled by the adoption of the opposing government, — then the laws passed by its legislature during
that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected, its salaries and compensations to its officers illegally
paid ; its public accounts improperly settled and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and
criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into operation answerable as
trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals."

xxx xxx xxx

"The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States shall guarantee to every state
in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the
application of the Legislature or of the Executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence.

"Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is established one in
a state. For, as the United State guarantee to each state a republican government, Congress must necessarily
decide what government is established in the state before it can determine whether it is republican or not.
And when the senators and representatives of a state are admitted into the Councils of the Union, the
authority of the government under which they were appointed, as well as its republican character, is
recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of
the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did
not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and as no senators or representatives were elected under
the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the
controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there and not in the courts."
 xxx xxx xxx

... We do not stop to cite other cases which indirectly or incidentally refer to the subject, but conclude by
directing attention to the statement by the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in Taylor vs.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 44 L.ed. 1187, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890, 1009, where, after disposing of a contention
made concerning the 14th Amendment, and coming to consider a proposition which was necessary to be
decided concerning the nature and effect of the guaranty of S 4 of article 4, it was said (p. 578):

"But it is said that the 14th Amendment must be read with S 4 of article 4, of the Constitution, providing that
the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall
protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or the Executive (when the
legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence."

xxx xxx xxx

"It was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guaranty belonged to the political department. Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.ed. 581. In that case it was held that the question, which of the two opposing
governments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or the government established by a voluntary
convention, was the legitimate one, was a question for the determination of the political department; and
when that department had decided, the courts were bound to take notice of the decision and follow it."

xxx xxx xxx

As the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have long since by this Court been, definitely
determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of the scope of the powers
conferred upon Congress, and not, therefore within the reach of judicial power, it follows that the case
presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. (223 U.S. pp. 142-151; emphasis supplied).

Even a constitutional amendment that is only promulgated by the Constitutional Convention without authority therefor and
without submitting the same to the people for ratification, becomes valid, when recognized, accepted and acted upon the by Chief
of State and other government functionaries, as well as by the people. In the 1903 case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth (44 SE 754-
755), the Court ruled:

The sole ground urged in support of the contention that Constitution proclaimed in 1902 is invalid is that it
was ordained and promulgated by the convention without being submitted for ratification or rejection by the
people of the commonwealth.

The Constitution of 1902 was ordained and proclaimed by convention duly called by direct vote of the people
of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the work that the convention has been
recognized, accepted, and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the state by the Governor in swearing
fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby; by the Legislature in its formal official act adopting a
joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by the convention which assembled in
the city of Richmond on the 12th day of June 1901, as the Constitution of Virginia; by the individual oaths of
members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a year in legislating under it and putting its
provisions into operation but the judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support and by enforcing
its provisions; and by the people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it,
registering as voters under it to the extent of thousands through the state, and by voting, under its provisions,
at a general election for their representatives in the Congress of the United States. (p. 755).

The Court in the Taylor case above-mentioned further said:

While constitutional procedure for adoption or proposal to amend the constitution must be duly followed,
without omitting any requisite steps, courts should uphold amendment, unless satisfied that the Constitution
was violated in submitting the proposal. ... Substance more than form must be regarded in considering
whether the complete constitutional system for submitting the proposal to amend the constitution was
observed.
In the 1925 case of Taylor vs. King (130 A 407, 408 410), the Court stated:

There may be technical error in the manner in which a proposed amendment is adopted, or in its
advertisement, yet, if followed, unobjected to, by approval of the electors, it becomes part of the Constitution.
Legal complaints to the submission may be made prior to taking the vote, but, if once sanctioned, the
amendment is embodied therein, and cannot be attacked, either directly or collaterally, because of any
mistake antecedent thereto. Even though it be submitted at an improper time, it is effective for all purposes
when accepted by the majority. Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263. (130 A 409).

Even if the act of the Constitutional Convention is beyond its authority, such act becomes valid upon ratification or adoption or
acquiescence by the people. Thus, in the 1905 case of Ex parte Birmingham and A.R. Company (42 SO pp. 118 & 123), the
Alabama Supreme Court upheld this principle and stated that: "The authorities are almost uniform that this ratification of an
unauthorized act by the people (and the people are the principal in this instance) renders the act valid and binding."

It has likewise been held that it is not necessary that voters ratifying the new Constitution are registered in the book of voters; it
is enough that they are electors voting on the new Constitution. (Bott vs. Wurts, 40 A 740 [1899]; 45 LRA 251, emphasis
supplied).

In the 1956 case of Thomson vs. Peoples State Bank (75 NW 2nd 370, 375), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that
"irregularity in the procedure for the submission of the proposed constitutional amendment will not defeat the ratification by the
people."

Again, in the 1958 case of Swaim vs. Tuscaloosa County (103 SO 2nd 769), the Alabama Supreme Court pronounced that "the
irregularity in failing to publish the proposed constitutional amendment once in each of the 4 calendar weeks next preceding the
calendar week in which the election was held or once in each of the 7-day periods immediately preceding the day of the election
as required by the Constitution, did not invalidate the amendment which was ratified by the people."

The same principle was reiterated in 1961 by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Barnes, et al. v. Ladner (131) SO 2nd 45 462),
where they admitted irregularities or illegalities committed in the procedure for submission of the proposed constitutional
amendment to the people for ratification consisted of: "(a) the alleged failure of the county election commissioners of the several
counties to provide a sufficient number of ballot boxes 'secured by good and substantial locks,' as provided by Section 3249,
Code of 1942, Rec., to be used in the holding of the special election on the constitutional amendment, and (b) the alleged failure
of the State Election Commissioners to comply with the requirements of Code Sections 3204 and 3205 in the appointment of
election commissioners in each of the 82 counties. The irregularities complained of, even if proved, were not such irregularities
would have invalidated the election." (Emphasis supplied; see also Sylvester vs. Tindall, 8 SO 2nd 892; 154 Fla. 663).

Even prior to the election in November, 1970 of delegates of the Constitutional Convention and during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention from June 1, 1971 until martial law was proclaimed on Sept. 21, 1972, the salient reforms contained in
the 1973 Constitution which have long been desired by the people, had been thoroughly discussed in the various committees of
the Constitutional Convention, on the floor of the Convention itself, in civic forums and in all the media of information. Many of
the decrees promulgated by the Chief Executive from Sept. 22, 1972 to Jan. 17, 1973 implement some of the reforms and had
been ratified in Sec. 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

Petitioners cannot safely state that during martial law the majority of the people cannot freely vote for these reforms and are not
complying with the implementing decrees promulgated by the President.

Free election is not inevitably incompatible with martial law. We had free elections in 1951 and 1971 when the opposition won
six out of eight senatorial seats despite the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus(see Lansang vs. Garcia, et
al., Dec. 14, 1971, 42 SCRA 448), which suspension implies constraint on individual freedom as the proclamation of martial law.
In both situations, there is no total blackout of human rights and civil liberties.

All the local governments, dominated either by Nacionalistas or Liberals, as well as officials of the Legislative and Executive
branches of the government elected and/or appointed under the 1935 Constitution have either recognized or are now functioning
under the 1973 Constitution, aside from the fact of its ratification by the sovereign people through the Citizens Assemblies.
Ninety-five (95) of a total of one hundred ten (110) members of the House of Representatives including the Speaker and the
Speaker Pro Tempore as well as about eleven (11) Congressmen who belong to the Liberal Party and fifteen (15) of a total of
twenty-four (24) senators including Liberal senators Edgar U. Ilarde and John Osmeña opted to serve in the Interim Assembly,
according to the certification of the Commission on Elections dated February 19, 1973 (Annex Rejoinder-3 to Consolidated
Rejoinder of petitioners in L-36165). Only the five (5) petitioners in L-36165 close their eyes to a fait accompli. All the other
functionaries recognize the new government and are performing their duties and exercising their powers under the 1973
Constitution, including the lower courts. The civil courts, military tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies created by presidential
decrees have decided some criminal, civil and administrative cases pursuant to such decrees. The foreign ambassadors who were
accredited to the Republic of the Philippines before martial law continue to serve as such in our country; while two new
ambassadors have been accepted by the Philippines after the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Copies of
the 1973 Constitution had been furnished the United Nations Organization and practically all the other countries with which the
Philippines has diplomatic relations. No adverse reaction from the United Nations or from the foreign states has been manifested.
On the contrary, our permanent delegate to the United Nations Organization and our diplomatic representatives abroad appointed
before martial law continue to remain in their posts and are performing their functions as such under the 1973 Constitution.

Even the Commission on Elections is now implementing the provisions of the 1973 Constitution by requiring all election
registrars to register 18-year olds and above whether literates or not, who are qualified electors under the 1973 Constitution (see
pars. 1-A(c), (d), & (e) of Annex A to Notes of respondents Puyat and Roy in L-36165).

In brief, it cannot be said that the people are ignoring the 1973 Constitution and the government which is enforcing the same for
over 10 weeks now With the petitioners herein, secessionists, rebels and subversives as the only possible exceptions, the rest of
the citizenry are complying with decrees, orders and circulars issued by the incumbent President implementing the 1973
Constitution.

Of happy relevance on this point is the holding in Miller vs. Johnson 18 SW 522:

If a set of men, not selected by the people according to the forms of law, were to formulate an instrument and
declare it the constitution, it would undoubtedly be the duty of the courts declare its work a nullity. This
would be revolution, and this the courts of the existing government must resist until they are overturned by
power, and a new government established. The convention, however, was the offspring of law. The instrument
which we are asked to declare invalid as a constitution has been made and promulgated according to the
forms of law. It is a matter of current history that both the executive and legislative branches of the
government have recognized its validity as a constitution, and are now daily doing so. Is the
question, therefore, one of a judicial character? It is our undoubted duty, if a statute be unconstitutional to so
declare it; also, if a provision of the state constitution be in conflict with the federal constitution, to hold the
former invalid. But this is a very different case. It may be said, however, that, for every violation of or non-
compliance with the law, there should be a remedy in the courts. This is not, however, always the case. For
instance, the power of a court as to the acts of the other departments of the government is not an absolute
one, but merely to determine whether they have kept within constitutional limits, it is a duty rather than a
power, The judiciary cannot compel a co-equal department to perform a duty. It is responsible to the people;
but if it does act, then, when the question is properly presented, it is the duty of the court to say whether it has
conformed to the organic law. While the judiciary should protect the rights of the people with great care and
jealousy, because this is its duty, and also because, in times of great popular excitement, it is usually their
last resort, yet it should at the same time be careful to overstep the proper bounds of its power, as being
perhaps equally dangerous; and especially where such momentous results might follow as would be likely in
this instance, if the power of the judiciary permitted, and its duty required, the overthrow of the work of the
convention.

After the American Revolution the state of Rhode Island retained its colonial character as its constitution, and
no law existed providing for the making of a new one. In 1841 public meetings were held, resulting in the
election of a convention to form a new one, — to be submitted to a popular vote. The convention framed one,
submitted it to a vote, and declared it adopted. Elections were held for state officers, who proceeded to
organize a new government. The charter government did not acquiesce in these proceedings, and finally
declared the state under martial law. It called another convention, which in 1843 formed a new
constitution. Whether the charter government, or the one established by the voluntary convention, was the
legitimate one, was uniformly held by the courts of the state not to be a judicial, but a political question; and
the political department having recognized the one, it was held to be the duty of the judiciary to follow its
decision. The supreme court of the United States, in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, while not expressly deciding
the principle, as it held the federal court, yet in the argument approves it, and in substance says that where
the political department has decided such a matter the judiciary should abide by it.

Let us illustrate the difficulty of a court deciding the question: Suppose this court were to hold that the
convention, when it reassembled, had no power to make any material amendment, and that such as were
made are void by reason of the people having theretofore approved the instrument. Then, next, this court
must determine what amendments were material; and we find the court, in effect, making a constitution. This
 would be arrogating sovereignty to itself. Perhaps the members of the court might differ as to what
amendments are material, and the result would be confusion and anarchy. One judge might say that all the
amendments, material and immaterial, were void; another, that the convention had then the implied power to
correct palpable errors, and then the court might differ as to what amendments are material. If the instrument
as ratified by the people could not be corrected or altered at all, or if the court must determine what changes
were material, then the instrument, as passed upon by the people or as fixed by the court would be lacking a
promulgation by the convention; and, if this be essential, then the question would arise, what constitution are
we now living under, and what is the organic law of the state? A suggestion of these matters shows what
endless confusion and harm to the state might and likely would arise. If, through error of opinion, the
convention exceeded its power, and the people are dissatisfied, they have ample remedy, without the judiciary
being asked to overstep the proper limits of its power. The instrument provides for amendment and change. If
a wrong has been done, it can, in the proper way in which it should be remedied, is by the people acting as a
body politic. It is not a question of whether merely an amendment to a constitution, made without calling a
convention, has been adopted, as required by that constitution. If it provides how it is to be done, then, unless
the manner be followed, the judiciary, as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment
invalid. Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N.W. Rep. 738, and 15 N.W. Rep. 609; State v. Tuffy, 1 Nev. 391,
12 Pac. Rep. 835. But it is a case where a new constitution has been formed and promulgated according to
the forms of law. Great interests have already arisen under it; important rights exist by virtue of it; persons
have been convicted of the highest crime known to the law, according to its provisions; the political power of
the government has in many ways recognized it; and, under such circumstances, it is our duty to treat and
regard it as a valid constitution, and now the organic law of our commonwealth.

We need not consider the validity of the amendments made after the convention reassembled. If the making
of them was in excess of its powers, yet, as the entire instrument has been recognized as valid in the manner
suggested, it would be equally an abuse of power by the judiciary and violative of the rights of the people, —
who can and properly should remedy the matter, if not to their liking, — if it were to declare the instrument
of a portion invalid, and bring confusion and anarchy upon the state. (emphasis supplied).

If this Court inquires into the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 and consequently of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution it
would be exercising a veto power on the act of the sovereign people, of whom this Court is merely an agent, which to say the
least, would be anomalous. This Court cannot dictate to our principal, the sovereign people, as to how the approval of the new
Constitution should be manifested or expressed. The sovereign people have spoken and we must abide by their decision,
regardless of our notion as to what is the proper method of giving assent to the new Charter. In this respect, WE cannot presume
to know better than the incumbent Chief Executive, who, unlike the members of this Court, only last January 8, 1973, We
affirmed in Osmeña vs. Marcos (Pres. Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973), was re-elected by the vote of over 5 million electors
in 1969 for another term of four years until noon of December 30, 1973 under the 1935 Constitution. This Court, not having a
similar mandate by direct fiat from the sovereign people, to execute the law and administer the affairs of government, must
restrain its enthusiasm to sally forth into the domain of political action expressly and exclusively reserved by the sovereign
people themselves.

The people in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution did not intend to tie their hands to a specific procedure for popular ratification
of their organic law. That would be incompatible with their sovereign character of which We are reminded by Section 1, of
Article II of both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.

The opinion of Judge Thomas McIntire Cooley that the sovereign people cannot violate the procedure for ratification which they
themselves define in their Constitution, cannot apply to a unitary state like the Republic of the Philippines. His opinion expressed
in 1868 may apply to a Federal State like the United States, in order to secure and preserve the existence of the Federal Republic
of the United States against any radical innovation initiated by the citizens of the fifty (50) different states of the American
Union, which states may be jealous of the powers of the Federal government presently granted by the American Constitution.
This dangerous possibility does not obtain in the case of our Republic.

Then again, Judge Cooley advanced the aforesaid opinion in 1868 when he wrote his opus "Constitutional Limitations." * (Vol.
6, Encyclopedia Brit., 1969 ed. pp. 445 446). It is possible that, were he live today, in a milieu vastly different from 1868 to
1898, he might have altered his views on the matter.

Even if conclusiveness is to be denied to the truth of the declaration by the President in Proclamation No. 1102 that the people
through their Citizens' Assemblies had overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution due regard to a separate, coordinate and
co-equal branch of the government demands adherence to the presumption of correctness of the President's declaration. Such
presumption is accorded under the law and jurisprudence to officials in the lower levels of the Executive branch, there is no over-
riding reason to deny the same to the Chief of State as head of the Executive Branch. WE cannot reverse the rule on
presumptions, without being presumptuous, in the face of the certifications by the Office the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government and Community Development. (Annexes 1, to 1-E, Annexes 2 to 2-O to the compliance with manifestation
filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents public officers dated March 7, 1973). There is nothing in the records
that contradicts, much less overthrow the results of the referendum as certified. Much less are We justified in reversing the
burden of proof — by shifting it from the petitioners to the respondents. Under the rules on pleadings, the petitioners have the
duty to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence their claim that the people did not ratify through the Citizens' Assemblies
nor adopt by acquiescence the 1973 Constitution. And have failed to do so.

No member of this Tribunal is justified in resolving the issues posed by the cases at bar on the basis of reports relayed to him
from private sources which could be biased and hearsay, aside from the fact that such reports are not contained in the record.
Proclamation No. 1102 is not just an ordinary act of the Chief Executive. It is a well-nigh solemn declaration which announces
the highest act of the sovereign people — their imprimatur to the basic Charter that shall govern their lives hereafter — may be
for decades, if not for generations.

Petitioners decry that even 15-year olds, ex convicts and illiterates were allowed to vote in the Citizens' Assemblies, despite their
admission that the term "Filipino people" in the preamble as well as "people" in Sections 1 and 5 of Article II of the 1935
Constitution and in Section 1(3) of Article III of the Bill of Rights includes all Filipino citizens of all ages, of both sexes, whether
literate or illiterate, whether peaceful citizens, rebels, secessionists, convicts or ex-convicts. Without admitting that ex-convicts
voted in the referendum, about which no proof was even offered, these sectors of our citizenry, whom petitioners seem to regard
with contempt or decision and whom petitioners would deny their sovereign right to pass upon the basic Charter that shall govern
their lives and the lives of their progenies, are entitled as much as the educated, the law abiding, and those who are 21 years of
age or above to express their conformity or non conformity to the proposed Constitution, because their stake under the new
Charter is not any less than the stake of the more fortunate among us. As a matter of fact, these citizens, whose juridical
personality or capacity to act is limited by age, civil interdiction or ignorance deserve more solicitude from the State than the rest
of the citizenry. In the ultimate analysis, the inclusion of those from 15 years up to below 21 years old, the ex-convicts and the
ignorant, is more democratic as it broadens the base of democracy and therefore more faithful to the express affirmation in
Section 1 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."

Moreover, ex-convicts granted absolute pardon are qualified to vote. Not all ex-convicts are banned from voting. Only those who
had been sentenced to at least one year imprisonment are disenfranchised but they recover their right of suffrage upon expiration
of ten years after service of sentence (Sec. 102, 1971 Rev. Elec. Code). Furthermore, ex-convicts and imbeciles constitute a very
negligible number in any locality or barrio, including the localities of petitioners.

Included likewise in the delegated authority of the President, is the prerogative to proclaim the results of the plebiscite or the
voting the Citizens' Assemblies. Petitioners deny the accuracy or correctness of Proclamation No. 1102 that the 1973 Constitution
was ratified by the overwhelming vote of close to 15 million citizens because there was no official certification to the results of
the same from the Department of Local Governments. But there was such certification as per Annex 1 to 1-A to the Notes
submitted by the Solicitor General counsel for respondents public officers. This should suffice to dispose of this point. Even in
the absence of such certification, in much the same way that in passing law, Congress or the legislative body is presumed to be in
possession of the facts upon which such laws are predicated (Justice Fernando, The Power of Judicial Review, 1967 Ed., pp. 112-
11 citing Lorenzo vs. Dir., etc., [1927] 50 Phil. 595 and O'Gonmore, et al: vs. Hartford, etc., [1931] 282 U.S. 251), it should
likewise be presumed that the President was in possession of the fact upon which Proclamation No. 1102 was based. This
presumption is further strengthened by the fact that the Department of Local Governments, the Department National Defense and
the Philippine Constabulary as well the Bureau of Posts are all under the President, which offices as his alter ego, are
presumptively acting for and in behalf of the President and their acts are valid until disapproved or reprobated by the President
(Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62; Villen vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451). To deny the truth or the proclamation of the President
as to the overwhelming majority vote in the Citizens' Assemblies in favor of the new Constitution, is to charge the President with
falsification, which is a most grievous accusation. Under the, rules of pleadings and evidence, the petitioners have the burden of
proof by preponderance of evidence in civil cases and by proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions, where the
accused is always presumed to be innocent. Must this constitutional right be reversed simply because the petitioner all assert the
contrary? Is the rule of law they pretend invoke only valid as long as it favors them?

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is accorded by the law and jurisprudence to acts of public
officers whose category in the official hierarchy is very much lower than that of the Chief of State. What reason is there to
withhold such a presumption in favor of the President? Does the fact that the President belong to the party in power and that four
(4) of the five (5) senators who are petitioners in L-36165 belong to the opposition party, justify a discrimination against the
President in matters of this nature? Unsupported as their word is by any credible and competent evidence under the rules of
evidence, must the word of the petitioners prevail over that of the Chief Executive, because they happen to be former senators
and delegates to the Constitutional Convention? More than any of the petitioners herein in all these cases, the incumbent
President realizes that he risks the wrath of his people being visited upon him and the adverse or hostile verdict of history;
because of the restrictions on the civil liberties of his people, inevitable concomitants of martial law, which necessarily entail
some degree of sacrifice on the part of the citizenry. Until the contrary is established or demonstrated, herein petitioners should
grant that the Chief Executive is motivated by what is good for the security and stability of the country, for the progress and
happiness of the people. All the petitioners herein cannot stand on the proposition that the rights under the 1935 Constitution are
absolute and invulnerable to limitations that may be needed for the purpose of bringing about the reforms for which the
petitioners pretend to be clamoring for and in behalf of the people. The five (5) petitioners in L-36165 and four (4) of the seven
(7) petitioners in L-36164 were all participants in the political drama of this country since 1946. They are witness to the
frustrations of well-meaning Presidents who wanted to effect the reforms, especially for the benefit of the landless and the
laboring class — how politics and political bargaining had stymied the effectuation of such reforms thru legislation. The eight (8)
petitioners in L-36164 and L-36165 may not have participated in the systematic blocking of the desired reforms in Congress or
outside of it; but the question may be asked as to what exactly they did to support such reforms. For the last seven (7) decades
since the turn of the century, for the last thirty-five (35) years since the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1935
and for the last twenty seven (27) years since the inauguration of the Republic on July 4, 1946, no tangible substantial reform had
been effected, funded and seriously implemented, despite the violent uprisings in the thirties, and from 1946 to 1952, and the
violent demonstrations of recent memory. Congress and the oligarchs acted like ostriches, "burying their heads in timeless sand.
"Now the hopes for the long-awaited reforms to be within a year or to are brighter. It would seem therefore to the duty of
everyone including herein petitioners to give the present leadership the opportunity to institute and carry out the needed reforms
as provided for in the new or 1973 Constitution and thru the means prescribed in that same Constitution.

As stated in Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees, "a court is never justified in placing by implication a limitation upon the sovereign."

This Court in the Gonzales and Tolentino cases transcended its proper sphere and encroached upon the province exclusively
reserved to and by the sovereign people. This Court did not heed to the principle that the courts are not the fountain of all
remedies for all wrongs. WE cannot presume that we alone can speak with wisdom as against the judgment of the people on the
basic instrument which affects their very lives. WE cannot determine what is good for the people or ought to be their fundamental
law. WE can only exercise the power delegated to Us by the sovereign people, to apply and interpret the Constitution and the
laws for the benefit of the people, not against them nor to prejudice them. WE cannot perform an act inimical to the interest of
Our principal, who at any time may directly exercise their sovereign power ratifying a new Constitution in the manner convenient
to them.

It is pertinent to ask whether the present Supreme Court can function under the 1935 Constitution without being a part of the
government established pursuant thereto. Unlike in the Borden case, supra, where there was at least another government claiming
to be the legitimate organ of the state of Rhode Island (although only on paper as it had no established organ except Dorr who
represented himself to be its head; in the cases at bar there is no other government distinct from and maintaining a position
against the existing government headed by the incumbent Chief Executive. (See Taylor vs. Commonwealth, supra). There is not
even a rebel government duly organized as such even only for domestic purposes, let alone a rebel government engaged in
international negotiations. As heretofore stated, both the executive branch and the legislative branch established under the 1935
Constitution had been supplanted by the government functioning under the 1973 Constitution as of January 17, 1973. The vice
president elected under the 1935 Constitution does not asset any claim to the leadership of the Republic of the Philippines. Can
this Supreme Court legally exist without being part of any government?

Brilliant counsel for petitioners in L-36165 has been quite extravagant in his appraisal of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
whom he calls the "hero of the American Bar," because during the American civil war he apparently had the courage to nullify
the proclamation of President Lincoln suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus in Ex parte Merryman (Federal
Case No. 9487 [1861]). But who exactly was Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney? The Editorial Board of Vol. 21 of the
Encyclopedia Brit., 1966 ed. (pp. 778-779, 1969 ed., pp. 654-657), briefly recounts that he was born in 1777 in Calvert County,
Maryland, of parents who were landed aristocrats as well as slave owners. Inheriting the traditional conservatism of his parents
who belonged to the landed aristocracy, Taney became a lawyer in 1799, practiced law and was later appointed Attorney General
of Maryland. He also was a member of the Maryland state legislature for several terms. He was a leader of the Federalist Party,
which disintegrated after the war of 1812, compelling him to join the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson, also a slave owner
and landed aristocrat, who later appointed him first as Attorney General of the United States, then Secretary of the Treasury and
in 1836 Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to succeed Chief Justice John Marshall, in which position he continued
for 28 years until he died on October 21, 1864. His death "went largely unnoticed and unregretted." Because he himself was a
slave owner and a landed aristocrat, Chief Justice Taney sympathized with the Southern States and, even while Chief Justice,
hoped that the Southern States would be allowed to secede peacefully from the Union. That he had no sympathy for the Negroes
was revealed by his decision in Dred Scott vs. Sandford (19 How. 398 [1857]) where he pronounced that the American Negro is
not entitled to the rights of an American citizen and that his status as a slave is determined by his returning to a slave state. One
can therefore discern his hostility towards President Lincoln when he decided Ex parte Merryman, which animosity to say the
least does no befit a judicial mind. Such a man could hardly be spoken of as a hero of the American Bar, least of all of the
American nation. The choice of heroes should not be expressed indiscriminately just to embellish one's rhetoric.
Distinguished counsel in L-36165 appears to have committed another historical error, which may be due to his rhetorical in the
Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 9, 1969 ed., pp. 508-509) to this effect. On the contrary, Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 17
Encyclopedia Brit., 1966 & 1969 eds., 732-733), refers to Marshal Henri Philippe Petain as the genuine hero or "Savior of
Verdun"; because he held Verdun against the 1916 offensive of the German army at the cost of 350,000 of his French soldiers,
who were then demoralized and plotting mutiny. Certainly, the surviving members of the family of Marshal Petain would not
relish the error. And neither would the members of the clan of Marshal Foch acknowledge the undeserved accolade, although
Marshal Foch has a distinct place in history on his own merits. The foregoing clarification is offered in the interest of true
scholarship and historical accuracy, so that the historians, researchers and students may not be led astray or be confused by
esteemed counsel's eloquence and mastery of the spoken and written word as well as by his eminence as law professor, author of
law books, political leader, and member of the newly integrated Philippine Bar.

It is quite intriguing why the eminent counsel and co-petitioner in L-36164 did not address likewise his challenge to the five (5)
senators who are petitioners in L-36165 to also act as "heroes and idealists," to defy the President by holding sessions by
themselves alone in a hotel or in their houses if they can muster a quorum or by causing the arrest of other senators to secure a
quorum and thereafter remove respondents Puyat and Roy (Avelino, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al. [1949] 83 Phil. 17), if they believe
most vehemently in the justice and correctness of their position that the 1973 Constitution has not been validly ratified, adopted
or acquiesced in by the people since January 18, 1973 until the present. The proclaimed conviction of petitioners in L-36165 on
this issue would have a ring of credibility, if they proceeded first to hold a rump session outside the legislative building; because
it is not unreasonable to demand or to exact that he who exhorts others to be brave must first demonstrate his own courage.
Surely, they will not affirm that the mere filing of their petition in L-36165 already made them "heroes and idealists." The
challenge likewise seems to insinuate that the members of this Court who disagree with petitioners' views are materialistic
cowards or mercenary fence-sitters. The Court need not be reminded of its solemn duty and how to perform it. WE refuse to
believe that petitioners and their learned as well as illustrious counsels, scholars and liberal thinkers that they are, do not
recognize the sincerity of those who entertain opinions that clash with their own. Such an attitude does not sit well with the
dictum that "We can differ without being difficult; we can disagree without being disagreeable," which distinguished counsel in
L-36165 is wont to quote.

WE reserve the right to prepare an extensive discussion of the other points raised by petitioners, which We do not find now
necessary to deal with in view of Our opinion on the main issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, ALL THE PETITIONS IN THESE FIVE CASES SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Pursuant to Our reservation, We now discuss the other issues raised by the petitioners.

II

EVEN IF ISSUE IS JUSTICIABLE, PEOPLE'S RATIFICATION, ADOPTION OR ACQUIESCENCE CREATES STRONG

PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF 1973 CONSTITUTION.

As intimated in the aforecited cases, even the courts, which affirm the proposition that the question as to whether a constitutional
amendment or the revised or new Constitution has been validly submitted to the people for ratification in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the existing Constitution, is a justiciable question, accord all presumption of validity to the constitutional
amendment or the revised or new Constitution after the government officials or the people have adopted or ratified or acquiesced
in the new Constitution or amendment, although there was an illegal or irregular or no submission at all to the people. (Collier
vs. Gray, 4th Dec. Dig. 935 [1934], Hammond vs. Clark, 71 SE 482-483; People vs. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 34; Thompson vs. Winneth, 78 Neb. 379, 110 NW 1113, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 149; State vs. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. Rep. 1, 68
NE 574; Weston vs. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 NW 347; Combs vs. State, 81 Ga. 780, 8 SE 318; Woodward vs. State, 103 Ga. 496,
30 SE 522; Corre vs. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 225 P 1007, 1009). As late as 1971, the courts stressed that the constitutional
amendment or the new Constitution should not be condemned "unless our judgment its nullity is manifest beyond reasonable
doubt" (1971 case of Moore vs. Shanahan, 486 Pac. 2d 506, 207 Kan. 1, 645; and the 1956 case of Tipton vs. Smith, et
al., supra).

Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, pronounced that the presumption of constitutionality must persist in the
absence of factual foundation of record to overthrow such presumption (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. vs. City Mayor, L-24698, July
31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849).

III
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION — CO-EQUAL WITH AND INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIARY.

The Constitutional Convention is co-ordinate and co-equal with, as well as independent of, the three grand departments of the
Government, namely, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. As a fourth separate and distinct branch, to emphasize its
independence, the Convention cannot be dictated to by either of the other three departments as to the content as well as the form
of the Charter that it proposes. It enjoys the same immunity from interference or supervision by any of the aforesaid branches of
the Government in its proceedings, including the printing of its own journals (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, 1952 ed., Vol. I, pp. 8 9; Malcolm and Laurel, Phil. Const. Law, p. 22; Frantz vs. Autry, 91 Pac. 193). Implicit in that
independence, for the purpose of maintaining the same unimpaired and in order that its work will not be frustrated, the
Convention has the power to fix the date for the plebiscite and to provide funds therefor. To deny the Convention such
prerogative, would leave it at the tender mercy of both legislative and executive branches of the Government. An unsympathetic
Congress would not be disposed to submit the proposed Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention to the people for
ratification, much less appropriate the necessary funds therefor. That could have been the fate of the 1973 Constitution, because
the same abolished the Senate by creating a unicameral National Assembly to be presided by a Prime Minister who wields both
legislative and executive powers and is the actual Chief Executive, for the President contemplated in the new Constitution
exercises primarily ceremonial prerogatives. The new Constitution likewise shortened abruptly the terms of the members of the
present Congress (whose terms end on December 31, 1973, 1975 and 1977) which provides that the new Constitution shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification (Sec. 16, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution). The fact that Section 2 of the same Article
XVIII secures to the members of Congress membership in the interim National Assembly as long as they opt to serve therein
within thirty (30) days after the ratification of the proposed Constitution, affords them little comfort; because the convening of
the interim National Assembly depends upon the incumbent President (under Sec. 3[1], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution). Under the
foregoing circumstances, the members of Congress, who were elected under the 1935 Constitution, would not be disposed to call
a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor to enable the people to pass upon the 1973 Constitution, ratification of which means
their elimination from the political scene. They will not provide the means for their own liquidation.

Because the Constitutional Convention, by necessary implication as it is indispensable to its independence and effectiveness,
possesses the power to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds for the purpose, it inescapably must have the power to delegate
the same to the President, who, in estimation of the Convention can better determine appropriate time for such a referendum as
well as the amount necessary to effect the same; for which reason the Convention thru Resolution No. 29 approved on November
22, 1972, which superseded Resolution No. 5843 adopted on November 16, 1972, proposed to the President "that a decree be
issued calling a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution such appropriate date as he shall determine and
providing for the necessary funds therefor, ...," after stating in "whereas" clauses that the 1971 Constitutional Convention
expected to complete its work by the end of November, 1972 that the urgency of instituting reforms rendered imperative the early
approval of the new Constitution, and that the national and local leaders desire that there be continuity in the immediate transition
from the old to the new Constitution.

If Congress can legally delegate to the Chief Executive or his subaltern the power to promulgate subordinate rules and
regulations to implement the law, this authority to delegate implementing rules should not be denied to the Constitutional
Convention, a co-equal body.

Apart from the delegation to the Chief Executive of the power to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor by the
Constitutional Convention thru its Resolution No. 29, the organization of the Citizens' Assemblies for consultation on national
issues, is comprehended within the ordinance-making power of the President under Section 63 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which expressly confers on the Chief Executive the power to promulgate administrative acts and commands touching on
the organization or mode of operation of the government or re-arranging or re-adjusting any district, division or part of the
Philippines "or disposing of issues of general concern ... ." (Emphasis supplied). Hence, as consultative bodies representing the
localities including the barrios, their creation by the President thru Presidential Decree No. 86 of December 31, 1972, cannot be
successfully challenged.

The employment by the President of these Citizens' Assemblies for consultation on the 1973 Constitution or on whether there
was further need of a plebiscite thereon, — both issues of national concern — is still within the delegated authority reposed in
him by the Constitutional Convention as aforesaid.

It should be noted that Resolution No. 29, which superseded Resolution No. 5843, does not prescribe that the plebiscite must be
conducted by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Revised Election Code. If that were the
intention of the Constitutional Convention in making the delegation, it could have easily included the necessary phrase for the
purpose, some such phrase like "to call a plebiscite to be supervised by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the
provisions of the 1971 Revised Election Code (or with existing laws)." That the Constitutional Convention omitted such phrase,
can only mean that it left to the President the determination of the manner by which the plebiscite should be conducted, who shall
supervise the plebiscite, and who can participate in the plebiscite. The fact that said Resolution No. 29 expressly states "that
copies of this resolution as approved in plenary session be transmitted to the President of the Philippines and the Commission on
Elections for implementation," did not in effect designate the Commission on Elections as supervisor of the plebiscite. The copies
of said resolution that were transmitted to the Commission on Elections at best serve merely to notify the Commission on
Elections about said resolution, but not to direct said body to supervise the plebiscite. The calling as well as conduct of the
plebiscite was left to the discretion of the President, who, because he is in possession of all the facts funnelled to him by his
intelligence services, was in the superior position to decide when the plebiscite shall be held, how it shall be conducted and who
shall oversee it.

It should be noted that in approving said Resolution No. 29, the Constitutional Convention itself recognized the validity of, or
validated Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law by resolving to "propose to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling a plebiscite ... ." The use of the term "decree" is significant for the basic
orders regulating the conduct of all inhabitants are issued in that form and nomenclature by the President as the Commander in
Chief and enforcer of martial law. Consequently, the issuance by the President of Presidential Decree No. 73 on December 1,
1972 setting the plebiscite on January 15, 1973 and appropriating funds therefor pursuant to said Resolution No. 29, is a valid
exercise of such delegated authority.

Such delegation, unlike the delegation by Congress of the rule-making power to the Chief Executive or to any of his subalterns,
does not need sufficient standards to circumscribe the exercise of the power delegated, and is beyond the competence of this
Court to nullify. But even if adequate criteria should be required, the same are contained in the "Whereas" clauses of the
Constitutional Convention Resolution No. 29, thus:

WHEREAS, the 1971 Constitutional Convention is expected to complete its work of drafting a proposed new
Constitution for the Republic by the end of November, 1972;

WHEREAS, in view of the urgency of instituting reforms, the early approval of the New Constitution has
become imperative;

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the national and local leaders that there be continuity in the immediate political
transition from the old to the New Constitution;" (Annex "1" of Answer, Res. No. 29, Constitutional
Convention).

As Mr. Justice Fernando, with whom Messrs. Justices Barredo, Antonio and the writer concurred in the Plebiscite Cases, stated:

... Once this work of drafting has been completed, it could itself direct the submission to the people for
ratification as contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution. Here it did not do so. With Congress not being
in session, could the President, by the decree under question, call for such a plebiscite? Under such
circumstances, a negative answer certainly could result in the work of the Convention being rendered
nugatory. The view has been repeatedly expressed in many American state court decisions that to avoid such
undesirable consequence the task of submission becomes ministerial, with the political branches devoid of
any discretion as to the holding of an election for that purpose. Nor is the appropriation by him of the amount
necessary to be considered as offensive to the Constitution. If it were done by him in his capacity as
President, such an objection would indeed have been formidable, not to say insurmountable. If the
appropriation were made in his capacity as agent of the Convention to assure that there be submission to the
people, then such an argument loses force. The Convention itself could have done so. It is understandable
why it should be thus. If it were otherwise, then a legislative body, the appropriating arm of the government,
could conceivably make use of such authority to compel the Convention to submit to its wishes, on pain of
being rendered financially distraught. The President then, if performing his role as its agent, could be held as
not devoid of such competence. (pp. 2-3, concurring opinion of J. Fernando in L-35925, etc., emphasis
supplied).

IV

VAGUENESS OR AMBIGUITY DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE

1973 CONSTITUTION

(1) Petitions challenge the 1973 draft as vague and incomplete, and alluded to their arguments during the hearings on December
18 and 19, 1972 on the Plebiscite Cases. But the inclusion of questionable or ambiguous provisions does not affect the validity of
the ratification or adoption of the 1973 Constitution itself (Pope vs. Gray, 104 SO, 2d 841; 7th Dec. pp. 212-219, 1956-1966).
Alexander Hamilton, one of the leading founders and defenders of the American Constitution, answering the critics of the Federal
Constitution, stated that: "I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective
bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals
of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union,
must necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?" (The Federalist, Modern Library Ed., pp. xx-xxi).

(2) The 1973 Constitution is likewise impugned on the ground that it contains provisions which are ultra vires or beyond the
power of the Constitutional Convention to propose.

This objection relates to the wisdom of changing the form of government from Presidential to Parliamentary and including such
provisions as Section 3 of Article IV, Section 15 of Article XIV and Sections 3(2) and 12 of Article XVII in the 1973
Constitution.

Article IV —

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Article XIV —

Sec. 15. Any provision of paragraph one, Section fourteen, Article Eight and of this Article notwithstanding,
the Prime Minister may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may
require." (Without the consent of the National Assembly.)

Article XVII —

Sec. 3(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective
even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. All treaties, executive agreements, and contracts entered into by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby
recognized as legal, valid and binding. When the national interest so requires, the incumbent President of the
Philippines or the interim Prime Minister may review all contracts, concessions, permits, or other forms of
privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into,
granted, issued or acquired before the ratification of this Constitution.

In the Plebiscite Cases (L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965, & L-35979), Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, concurred in by Justices Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and the writer, overruled this objection, thus:

... Regardless of the wisdom and moral aspects of the contested provisions of the
proposed Constitution, it is my considered view that the Convention was legally deemed
fit to propose — save perhaps what is or may be insistent with what is now known,
particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens — not only because the Convention
exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as
the determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is concerned
— but also, because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law
unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes cast at an election which" said
 proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in Section 1 of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. (Pp. 17-18, Decision in L-35925, etc.).

This Court likewise enunciated in Del Rosario vs. Comelec (L-32476, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 367) that the Constitutional
Convention has the authority to "entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
ideology foreign to the democratic system ...; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by
the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution."

Mr. Justice Fernando, concurring in the same Plebiscite Cases, cited the foregoing pronouncement in the Del Rosario case, supra,
and added: "... it seems to me a sufficient answer that once convened, the area open for deliberation to a constitutional convention
..., is practically limitless" (citing Cf. Koehler vs. Hill, 14 NW 738, 60 Iowa 543 [1883]; Hatch Stoneman, 6 P 734, 66 Cal. 632
[1885]; MacMillan v. Blattner, 25 NW 245, 67 Iowa 287 [1895]; State v. Powell, 27 SO 297, 77 Miss. 543 [1900]; Hammond v.
Clark, 71 SE 479, 136 Ga. 313 [1911]; Hamilton v. Vaughan, 179 NW 533, 212 Mich. 31 [1920]; State v. Smith, 138 NE 881,
105 Ohio St. 570 [1922]; Looney vs. Leeper, 292 P 365, 145 Okl. 202 [1930]; School District vs. City of Pontiac, 247 NW 474,
262 Mich. 338 [1933]).

Mr. Justice Barredo, in his concurring opinion in said Plebiscite Cases, expressed the view "that when the people elected the
delegates to the Convention and when the delegates themselves were campaigning, such limitation of the scope of their function
and objective was not in their minds."

1973 CONSTITUTION DULY ADOPTED AND

PROMULGATED.

Petitioners next claim that the 1971 Constitutional Convention adjourned on November 30, 1972 without officially promulgating
the said Constitution in Filipino as required by Sections 3(1) of Article XV on General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution. This
claim is without merit because their Annex "M" is the Filipino version of the 1973 Constitution, like the English version, contains
the certification by President Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, duly attested by its Secretary, that the
proposed Constitution, approved on second reading on the 27th day of November, 1972 and on third reading in the Convention's
291st plenary session on November 29, 1972 and accordingly signed on November 1972 by the delegates whose signatures are
thereunder affixed. It should be recalled that Constitutional Convention President Diosdado Macapagal was, as President of the
Republic 1962 to 1965, then the titular head of the Liberal Party to which four (4) of the petitioners in L-36165 including their
counsel, former Senator Jovito Salonga, belong. Are they repudiating and disowning their former party leader and benefactor?

VI

ARTICLE XV OF 1935 CONSTITUTION DOES NOT

PRESCRIBE ANY PROCEDURE FOR RATIFICATION OF
1973 CONSTITUTION.

(1) Article XV of the 1935 Constitution simply provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification."

But petitioners construe the aforesaid provision to read: "Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election called by Congress at which the amendments are submitted for ratification
by the qualified electors defined in Article V hereof, supervised by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the existing
election law and after such amendments shall have been published in all the newspapers of general circulation for at least four
months prior to such election."

This position certainly imposes limitation on the sovereign people, who have the sole power of ratification, which imposition by
the Court is never justified (Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees, supra).

In effect, petitioners and their counsels are amending by a strained and tortured construction Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.
This is a clear case of usurpation of sovereign power they do not possess — through some kind of escamotage. This Court should
not commit such a grave error in the guise of judicial interpretation.
In all the cases where the court held that illegal or irregular submission, due to absence of substantial compliance with the
procedure prescribed by the Constitution and/or the law, nullifies the proposed amendment or the new Constitution, the
procedure prescribed by the state Constitution is so detailed that it specifies that the submission should be at a general or special
election, or at the election for members of the State legislature only or of all state officials only or of local officials only, or of
both state and local officials; fixes the date of the election or plebiscite limits the submission to only electors or qualified electors;
prescribes the publication of the proposed amendment or a new Constitution for a specific period prior to the election or
plebiscite; and designates the officer to conduct the plebiscite, to canvass and to certify the results, including the form of the
ballot which should so state the substance of the proposed amendments to enable the voter to vote on each amendment separately
or authorizes expressly the Constitutional Convention or the legislature to determine the procedure or certain details thereof. See
the State Constitutions of Alabama [1901]; Arizona [1912]; Arkansas [1874]; Colorado [1976]; Connecticut [1818]; Florida
[1887]; Georgia [1945]; Illinois [1970]; Indiana [1851]; Iowa [1857]; Kansas [1861]; Kentucky [1891]; Louisiana [1921];
Maryland [1867]; Massachusetts [1790]; Michigan [1909]; Minnesota [1857]; Mississippi [1890]; and Missouri [1945]).

As typical examples:
Constitution of Alabama (1901):

Article XVIII. Mode of Amending the Constitution

Sec. 284. Legislative Proposals. Amendments may be proposed to this Constitution by the legislature in the
manner following: The proposed amendments shall be read in the house in which they originate on three
several days, and, if upon the third reading, three-fifths of all the members elected to that house shall vote in
favor thereof, the proposed amendments shall be sent to the other house, in which they shall likewise be read
on three several days, and if upon the third reading, three-fifths of all the members elected that house shall
vote in favor of the proposed amendments, the legislature shall order an election by the qualified electors of
the state upon such proposed amendments, to be held either at the general election next succeeding the
session of the legislature at which the amendments are proposed or upon another day appointed by the
legislature, not less than three months after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature at which
the amendments were proposed. Notice of such election, together with the proposed amendments, shall be
given by proclamation of the governor, which shall be published in every county in such manner as the
legislature shall direct, for at least eight successive weeks next preceding the day appointed for such election.
On the day so appointed an election shall be held for the vote of the qualified electors of the state upon the
proposed amendments. If such election be held on the day of the general election, the officers of such general
election shall open a poll for the vote of the qualified electors upon the proposed amendments; if it be held on
a day other than that of a general election, officers for such election shall be appointed; and the election shall
be held in all things in accordance with the law governing general elections. In all elections upon such
proposed amendments, the votes cast thereat shall be canvassed, tabulated, and returns thereof be made to
the secretary of state, and counted, in the same manner as in elections for representatives to the legislature;
and if it shall thereupon appear that a majority of the qualified electors who voted at such election upon the
proposed amendments voted in favor of the same, such amendments shall be valid to all intents and purposes
as parts of this Constitution. The result of such election shall be made known by proclamation of the
governor. Representation in the legislature shall be based upon population, and such basis of representation
shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.

Sec. 285. Form of ballot for amendment. Upon the ballots used at all elections provided for in section 284 of
this Constitution, the substance or subject matter of each proposed amendment shall be so printed that the
nature thereof shall be clearly indicated. Following each proposed amendment on the ballot shall be printed
the word "Yes" and immediately under that shall be printed the word "No". The choice of the elector shall be
indicated by a cross mark made by him or under his direction, opposite the word expressing his desire, and no
amendment shall be adopted unless it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of all the qualified electors
who vote at such election.

Constitution of Arkansas (1874):

Article XIX. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 22. Constitutional amendments. Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may
propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to by a majority of all the members,
elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journal with the yeas and nays, and
published in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for six months
immediately preceding the next general election for Senators and Representatives, at which time the same
 shall be submitted to the electors of the State for approval or rejection, and if a majority of the electors
voting at such election adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part of this Constitution; but no
more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so submitted as
to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.

Constitution of Kansas (1861):

Article XIV. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Proposal of amendments; publications; elections. Propositions for the amendment of this constitution
may be made by either branch of the legislature; and if two thirds of all the members elected to each house
shall concur therein, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and nays, shall be entered on the
journal; and the secretary of state shall cause the same to be published in at least one newspaper in each
county of the state where a newspaper is published, for three months preceding the next election for
representatives, at which time, the same shall be submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection; and
if a majority of the electors voting on said amendments, at said election, shall adopt the amendments, the
same shall become a part of the constitution. When more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same
time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendments separately; and not
more than three propositions to amend shall be submitted at the same election.

Constitution of Maryland (1867):

Article XIV. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Proposal in general assembly; publication; submission to voters; governor's proclamation. The
General Assembly may propose Amendments to this Constitution; provided that each Amendment shall be
embraced in a separate bill, embodying the Article or Section, as the same will stand when amended and
passed by three fifths of all the members elected to each of the two Houses, by yeas and nays, to be entered
on the Journals with the proposed Amendment. The bill or bills proposing amendment or amendments shall
be published by order of the Governor, in at least two newspapers, in each County, where so many may be
published, and where not more than one may be published, then in the newspaper, and in three newspapers
published in the City of Baltimore, once a week for four weeks immediately preceding the next ensuing
general election, at which the proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted, in a form to be
prescribed by the General Assembly, to the qualified voters of the State for adoption or rejection. The votes
cast for and against said proposed amendment or amendments, severally, shall be returned to the Governor, in
the manner prescribed in other cases, and if it shall appear to the Governor that a majority of the votes cast at
said election on said amendment or amendments, severally, were cast in favor thereof, the Governor shall, by
his proclamation, declare the said amendment or amendments having received said majority of votes, to have
been adopted by the people of Maryland as part of the Constitution thereof, and henceforth said amendment
or amendments shall be part of the said Constitution. When two or more amendments shall be submitted in
the manner aforesaid, to the voters of this State at the same election, they shall be so submitted as that each
amendment shall be voted on separately.

Constitution of Missouri (1945):

Article XII. Amending the Constitution.

Sec. 2(b). Submission of amendments proposed by general assembly or by the initiative. All amendments
proposed by the general assembly or by the initiative shall be submitted to the electors for their approval or
rejection by official ballot title as may be provided by law, on a separate ballot without party designation, at
the next general election, or at a special election called by the governor prior thereto, at which he may submit
any of the amendments. No such proposed amendment shall contain more than one amended and revised
article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject and matters
properly connected therewith. If possible, each proposed amendment shall be published once a week for two
consecutive weeks in two newspapers of different political faith in each county, the last publication to be not
more than thirty nor less than fifteen days next preceding the election. If there be but one newspaper in any
county, publication of four consecutive weeks shall be made. If a majority of the votes cast thereon is in favor
of any amendment, the same shall take effect at the end of thirty days after the election. More than one
 amendment at the same election shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment
separately.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not require a specific procedure, much less a detailed procedure for submission or
ratification. As heretofore stated, it does not specify what kind of election at which the new Constitution shall be submitted; nor
does it designate the Commission on Elections to supervise the plebiscite. Neither does it limit the ratification to the qualified
electors as defined in Article V of the 1935 Constitution. Much less does it require the publication of the proposed Constitution
for any specific period before the plebiscite nor does it even insinuate that the plebiscite should be supervised in accordance with
the existing election law.

(2) As aforequoted, Article XV does not indicate the procedure for submission of the proposed Constitution to the people for
ratification. It does not make any reference to the Commission on Elections as the body that shall supervise the plebiscite. And
Article XV could not make any reference to the Commission on Elections because the original 1935 Constitution as ratified on
May 14, 1935 by the people did not contain Article X on the Commission on Elections, which article was included therein
pursuant to an amendment by that National Assembly proposed only about five (5) years later — on April 11, 1940, ratified by
the people on June 18, 1940 as approved by the President of the United States on December 1940 (see Sumulong vs.
Commission, 70 Phil. 703, 713, 715; Gonzales, Phil. Const. Law, 1966 ed., p. 13). So it cannot be said that the original framers of
the 1935 Constitution as ratified May 14, 1935 intended that a body known as the Commission on Elections should be the one to
supervise the plebiscite, because the Commission on Elections was not in existence then as was created only by Commonwealth
Act No. 607 approved on August 22, 1940 and amended by Commonwealth Act No. 657 approved on June 21, 1941 (see Tañada
& Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1961 ed., pp. 475-476; Sumulong vs. Commission, 170 Phil. 703, 708-715;
73 Phil. 288, 290-300; Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p. 5, Vol. II,
pp. 11-19).

Because before August, 1940 the Commission on Election was not yet in existence, the former Department of Interior (now
Department of Local Governments and Community Development) supervised the plebiscites on the 1937 amendment on
woman's suffrage, the 1939 amendment to the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution (Tydings-Kocialkowski Act of the
U.S. Congress) and the three 1940 amendments on the establishment of a bicameral Congress, the re-election of the President and
the Vice-President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections (ratified on June 18, 1940). The supervision of said
plebiscites by the then Department of Interior was not automatic, but by virtue of an express authorization in Commonwealth Act
Nos. 34, 49 and 517.

If the National Assembly then intended that the Commission on Elections should also supervise the plebiscite for ratification of
constitutional amendments or revision, it should have likewise proposed the corresponding amendment to Article XV by
providing therein that the plebiscite on amendments shall be supervised by the Commission on Elections.

3) If the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the people in ratifying the same on May 14, 1935 wanted that only the qualified
voters under Article V of the 1935 Constitution should participate in the referendum on any amendment or revision thereof, they
could have provided the same in 1935 or in the 1940 amendment by just adding a few words to Article XV by changing the last
phrase to "submitted for ratification to the qualified electors as defined in Article V hereof," or some such similar phrases.

Then again, the term "people" in Article XV cannot be understood to exclusively refer to the qualified electors under Article V of
the 1935 Constitution because the said term "people" as used in several provisions of the 1935 Constitution, does not have a
uniform meaning. Thus in the preamble, the term "Filipino people" refer, to all Filipino citizens of all ages of both sexes. In
Section 1 of Article II on the Declaration of Principles, the term "people" in whom sovereignty resides and from whom all
government authority emanates, can only refer also to Filipino citizens of all ages and of both sexes. But in Section 5 of the same
Article II on social justice, the term "people" comprehends not only Filipino citizens but also all aliens residing in the country of
all ages and of both sexes. Likewise, that is the same connotation of the term "people" employed in Section 1(3) of Article III on
the Bill of Rights concerning searches and seizures.

When the 1935 Constitution wants to limit action or the exercise of a right to the electorate, it does so expressly as the case of the
election of senators and congressmen. Section 2 Article VI expressly provides that the senators "shall be chosen at large by the
qualified electors of the Philippines as may provided by law." Section 5 of the same Article VI specifically provides that
congressmen shall "be elected by the qualified electors." The only provision that seems to sustain the theory of petitioners that the
term "people" in Article XV should refer to the qualified electors as defined in Article V of the 1935 Constitution is the provision
that the President and Vice-President shall be elected "by direct vote of the people." (Sec. 2 of Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution).
But this alone cannot be conclusive as to such construction, because of explicit provisions of Sections 2 and 5 of Article VI,
which specifically prescribes that the senators and congressmen shall be elected by the qualified electors.
As aforesaid, most of the constitutions of the various states of the United States, specifically delineate in detail procedure of
ratification of amendments to or revision of said Constitutions and expressly require ratification by qualified electors, not by the
generic term "people".

The proposal submitted to the Ozamis Committee on the Amending Process of the 1934-35 Constitutional Convention satisfied
that the amendment shall be submitted to qualified election for ratification. This proposal was not accepted indicating that the
1934-35 Constitutional Convention did intend to limit the term "people" in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution to qualified
electors only. As above demonstrated, the 1934-35 Constitutional Convention limits the use of the term "qualified electors" to
elections of public officials. It did not want to tie the hands of succeeding future constitutional conventions as to who should
ratify the proposed amendment or revision.

(4) It is not exactly correct to opine that Article XV of 1935 Constitution on constitutional amendment contemplates the
automatic applicability of election laws to plebiscites on proposed constitutional amendments or revision.

The very phraseology of the specific laws enacted by the National Assembly and later by Congress, indicates that there is need of
a statute expressly authorizing the application of the election laws to plebiscites of this nature. Thus, Com. Act No. 34 on the
woman's suffrage amendment enacted on September 30, 1936, consists of 12 sections and, aside from providing that "there shall
be held a plebiscite on Friday, April 30, 1937, on the question of woman's suffrage ... and that said amendment shall be
published in the Official Gazette in English and Spanish for three consecutive issues at least fifteen (15) days prior to said
election, ... and shall be posted in a conspicuous place in its municipal and provincial office building and in its polling place not
later than April 22, 1937" (Sec. 12, Com. Act No. 34), specifies that the provisions of the Election Law regarding, the holding of
a special election, insofar as said provisions are not in conflict with it, should apply to the said plebiscite (Sec. 3, Com. Act No.
34)1; and, that the votes cast according to the returns of the board of inspectors shall be counted by the National Assembly (Sec.
10, Com. Act No. 34).

The election laws then in force before 1938 were found in Sections 392-483 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Sec. 1 of Com. Act No. 357, the previous Election Code enacted on August 22, 1938, makes it expressly applicable to plebiscites.
Yet the subsequent laws, namely, Com. Act Nos. 492 and 517 and Rep. Act No. 73 calling for the plebiscite on the constitutional
amendments in 1939, 1940 and 1946, including the amendment creating the Commission on Elections, specifically provided that
the provisions of the existing election law shall apply to such plebiscites insofar as they are not inconsistent with the aforesaid
Com. Act Nos. 492 and 517, as well as Rep. Act No. 73. Thus —

Commonwealth Act No. 492, enacted on September 19, 1939, calling for a plebiscite on the proposed amendments to the
Constitution adopted by the National Assembly on September 15, 1939, consists of 8 sections and provides that the proposed
amendments to the Constitution adopted in Resolution No. 39 on September 15, 1939 "shall be submitted to the Filipino people
for approval or disapproval at a general election to be held throughout the Philippines on Tuesday, October 24, 1939"; that the
amendments to said Constitution proposed in "Res. No. 38, adopted on the same date, shall be submitted at following election of
local officials," (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 492) that the said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least ten (10) days prior to the elections; that copies thereof shall be posted not later
than October 20, 1939 (Sec. 2, Com. Act 492); that the election shall be conducted according to provisions of the Election Code
insofar as the same may be applicable; that within thirty (30) days after the election, Speaker of the National Assembly shall
request the President to call a special session of the Assembly for the purpose of canvassing the returns and certify the results
thereof (Sec. 6, Com. Act No. 492).

Commonwealth Act No. 517, consisting of 11 sections, was approved on April 25, 1940 and provided, among others: that the
plebiscite on the constitutional amendments providing bicameral Congress, re-election of the President and Vice-President, and
the creation of a Commission on Elections shall be held at a general election on June 18, 1940 (Sec. 1); that said amendments
shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette in English and Spanish at least 20 days prior to the election
and posted in every local government office building and polling place not later than May 18, 1940 (Sec. 2); that the election
shall be conducted in conformity with the Election Code insofar as the same may be applicable (Sec. 3) that copies of the returns
shall be forwarded to the Secretary of National Assembly and the Secretary of Interior (Sec. 7); that the National Assembly shall
canvass the returns to certify the results at a special session to be called by President (Sec. 8).

Republic Act No. 73 approved on October 21, 1946 calling for a plebiscite on the parity amendment consists of 8 sections
provides that the Amendment "shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be
held on March 11, 1947, in accordance with the provisions of this Act" (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 73); that the said amendment shall
be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least 20 days prior to the election; that
copies of the same shall be posted in a conspicuous place and in every polling place not later than February 11, 1947 (Section 2,
R.A. No. 73); that the provisions of Com. Act No. 357 (Election Code) and Com. Act No. 657 creating the Commission on
Elections, shall apply to the election insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 73); and that within 30
days after the election, the Senate and House of Representatives shall hold a joint session to canvass the returns and certify the
results thereof (Section 6, R.A. No. 73).

From the foregoing provisions, it is patent that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not contemplate nor envision the
automatic application of the election law; and even at that, not all the provisions of the election law were made applicable
because the various laws aforecited contain several provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Revised Election
Code (Com. Act No. 357). Moreover, it should be noted that the period for the publication of the copies of the proposed
amendments was about 10 days, 15 days or 20 days, and for posting at least 4 days, 8 days or 30 days.

Republic Acts Nos. 180 and 6388 likewise expressly provide that the Election Code shall apply to plebiscites (See. 2, R.A. No.
180, as amended, and Section 2, Rep. Act No. 6388).

If the Election Code ipso facto applies to plebiscites under Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, there would be no need for
Congress to expressly provide therefor in the election laws enacted after the inauguration of the Commonwealth government
under the 1935 Constitution.

(5) Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not specify who can vote and how they shall vote. Unlike the various State
Constitutions of the American Union (with few exceptions), Article XV does not state that only qualified electors can vote in the
plebiscite. As above-intimated, most of the Constitutions of the various states of the United States provide for very detailed
amending process and specify that only qualified electors can vote at such plebiscite or election.

Congress itself, in enacting Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, which was approved on June 17,
1967 and superseded Republic Act No. 2370, expanded the membership of the barrio assembly to include citizens who are at
least 18 years of age, whether literate or not, provided they are also residents of the barrio for at least 6 months (Sec. 4, R.A. No.
3590).

Sec. 4. The barrio assembly. — The barrio assembly shall consist of all persons who are residents of the
barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over, citizens of the Republic of the Philippines and
who are duly registered in the list of barrio assembly members kept by the Barrio Secretary.

The barrio assembly shall meet at least once a year to hear the annual report of the barrio council
concerning the activities and finances of the barrio.

It shall meet also at the case of the barrio council or upon written petition of at least One-Tenth of the
members of the barrio assembly.

No meeting of the barrio assembly shall take place unless notice is given one week prior to the meeting
except in matters involving public safety or security in which case notice within a reasonable time shall be
sufficient. The barrio captain, or in his absence, the councilman acting as barrio captain, or any assembly
member selected during the meeting, shall act as presiding officer at all meetings of the barrio assembly. The
barrio secretary or in his absence, any member designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary shall
discharge the duties of secretary of the barrio assembly.

For the purpose of conducting business and taking any official action in the barrio assembly, it is necessary
that at least one-fifth of the members of the barrio assembly be present to constitute a quorum. All actions
shall require a majority vote of these present at the meeting there being a quorum.

Sec. 5. Powers of the barrio assembly. — The powers of the barrio assembly shall be as follows:

a. To recommend to the barrio council the adoption of measures for the welfare of the
barrio;

b. To decide on the holding of a plebiscite as provided for in Section 6 of this Act;

 c. To act on budgetary and supplemental appropriations and special tax ordinances
submitted for its approval by the barrio council; and

d. To hear the annual report council concerning the activities and finances of the
assembly.

Sec. 6. Plebiscite. — A plebiscite may be held in the barrio when authorized by a majority vote of the
members present in the barrio assembly, there being a quorum, or when called by at least four members of
the barrio council; Provided, however, That no plebiscite shall be held until after thirty days from its approval
by either body, and such plebiscite has been given the widest publicity in the barrio, stating the date, time,
and place thereof, the questions or issues to be decided, action to be taken by the voters, and such other
information relevant to the holding of the plebiscite.

All duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote may vote in the plebiscite. Voting procedures
may be made either in writing as in regular election, and/or declaration by the voters to the board of election
tellers. The board of election tellers shall be the same board envisioned by section 8, paragraph 2 of this Act,
in case of vacancies in this body, the barrio council may fill the same.

A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council. A plebiscite shall be
called to approve any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax ordinances.

For taking action on any of the above enumerated measures, majority vote of all the barrio assembly
members registered in the list of barrio secretary is necessary.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec 10. Qualifications of voters and candidates. — Every citizen of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age
or over, able to read and write, who has been a resident of the barrio during the six months immediately
preceding the election, duly registered in the list of voters kept by the barrio secretary, who is not otherwise
disqualified, may vote or be a candidate in the barrio elections.

The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of
imprisonment, within two years after service of his sentence;

b. Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

c. Insane or feeble-minded persons.

All these barrio assembly members, who are at least 18 years of age, although illiterate, may vote at the plebiscite on the recall of
any member of the barrio council or on a budgetary, supplemental appropriation, or special ordinances, a valid action on which
requires "a majority vote of all of the barrio assembly members registered in the list of the barrio secretary" (par. 5, Sec. 6, R.A.
No. 3590). Such plebiscite may be authorized by a majority vote of the members present in the barrio assembly, there being a
quorum (par. 1, Sec. 6).

However, in the case of election of barrio officials, only Filipino citizens, who are at least 21 years of age, able to read and write,
residents of the barrio during the 6 months immediately preceding the election and duly registered in the list of voters kept by the
barrio secretary, not otherwise disqualified, may vote (Sec. 10, R.A. No. 3590).

Paragraph 2 of Section 6 likewise authorizes open voting as it provides that "voting procedures may be made ... either in writing
as in regular elections, and/or declaration by the voters to the board of election tellers."

That said paragraph 2 of Section 6 provides that "all duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote may vote in the
plebiscite," cannot sustain the position of petitioners in G.R. No. L-36165 that only those who are 21 years of age and above and
who possess all other qualifications of a voter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 3590, can vote on the plebiscites referred to in
Section 6; because paragraph 3 of Section 6 does not expressly limit the voting to those with the qualifications under Section 10
as said Section 6 does not distinguish between those who are 21 or above on the one hand and those 18 or above but below 21 on
the other, and whether literate or not, to constitute a quorum of the barrio assembly.

Consequently, on questions submitted for plebiscite, all the registered members of the barrio assembly can vote as long as they
are 18 years of age or above; and that only those who are 21 years of age or over and can read and write, can vote in the elections
of barrio officials.

Otherwise there was no sense in extending membership in the barrio assembly to those who are at least 18 years of age, whether
literate or not. Republic Act No. 3590 could simply have restated Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2370, the old Barrio Charter,
which provided that only those who are 21 and above can be members of the barrio assembly.

Counsels Salonga and Tañada as well as all the petitioners in L-36165 and two of the petitioners in L-36164 participated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3590 and should have known the intendment of Congress in expanding the membership of the
barrio assembly to include all those 18 years of age and above, whether literate or not.

If Congress in the exercise of its ordinary legislative power, not as a constituent assembly, can include 18-year olds as qualified
electors for barrio plebiscites, this prerogative can also be exercised by the Chief Executive as delegate of the Constitutional
Convention in regard to the plebiscite on the 1973 Constitution.

As heretofore stated, the statement by the President in Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 that the 1973 Constitution was
overwhelmingly ratified by the people through the Citizens' Assemblies in a referendum conducted from January 10 to 15, 1973,
should be accorded the presumption of correctness; because the same was based on the certification by the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government and Community Development who tabulated the results of the referendum all over the country.
The accuracy of such tabulation and certification by the said Department Secretary should likewise be presumed; because it was
done in the regular performance of his official functions aside from the fact that the act of the Department Secretary, as an alter
ego of the President, is presumptively the act of the President himself unless the latter disapproves or reprobates the same
(Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 ). The truth of the certification by the Department Secretary and the Chief
Executive on the results of the referendum, is further strengthened by the affidavits and certifications of Governor Isidro
Rodriguez of Rizal, Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto of Quezon City and Councilor Eduardo T. Parades of Quezon City.

The procedure for the ratification of the 1937 amendment on woman suffrage, the 1939 amendment to the ordinance appended to
the 1935 Constitution, the 1940 amendments establishing the bicameral Congress, creating the Commission on Elections and
providing for two consecutive terms for the President, and the 1947 parity amendment, cannot be invoked; because those
amendments were proposed by the National Assembly as expressly authorized by Article V of the 1935 Constitution respecting
woman suffrage and as a constituent assembly in all the other amendments aforementioned and therefore as such, Congress had
also the authority to prescribe the procedure for the submission of the proposed amendments to the 1935 Constitution.

In the cases at bar, the 1973 Constitution was proposed by an independent Constitutional Convention, which as heretofore
discussed, has the equal power to prescribe the modality for the submission of the 1973 Constitution to the people for ratification
or delegate the same to the President of the Republic.

The certification of Governor Isidro Rodriguez of Rizal and Mayor Norberto Amoranto could be utilized as the basis for the
extrapolation of the Citizens' Assemblies in all the other provinces, cities and municipalities in all the other provinces, cities and
municipalities, and the affirmative votes in the Citizens' Assemblies resulting from such extrapolation would still constitute a
majority of the total votes cast in favor of the 1973 Constitution.

As claimed by petitioners in L-36165, against the certification of the Department of Local Government and Community
Development that in Rizal there were 1,126,000 Yes votes and 100,310 No votes, the certification of Governor Isidro Rodriguez
of Rizal, shows only 614,157 Yes votes against 292,530 No votes. In Cavite province, there were 249,882 Yes votes against
12,269 No votes as disclosed in Annex 1-A of respondents' Compliance (the certification by the Department of Local
Government and Community Development), while the alleged certification of Governor Lino Bocalan of Cavite shows only
126,163 Yes votes and 5,577 No votes. If such a ratio is extended by way of extrapolation to the other provinces, cities and towns
of the country, the result would still be an overwhelming vote in favor of the 1973 Constitution.

The alleged certification by Governor Lino Bocalan of Cavite, is not true; because in his duly acknowledged certification dated
March 16, 1973, he states that since the declaration of martial law and up to the present time, he has been under house arrest in
his residence in Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal; that he never participated in the conduct of the Citizens' Assemblies on January
10 15, 1973 in the province of Cavite; that the acting chairman and coordinator of the Citizens' Assemblies at that time was Vice-
Governor Dominador Camerino; and that he was shown a letter for his signature during the conduct of the Citizens' Assemblies,
which he did not sign but which he referred to Vice-Governor Camerino (Annex 1-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen. dated March 20,
1973).

Mayor Pablo Cuneta likewise executed an affidavit dated March 16, 1973 stating that on January 15, 1973, he caused the
preparation of a letter addressed to Secretary Jose Roño of the Department of Local Government and Community Development
showing the results of the referendum in Pasay City; that on the same day, there were still in any Citizens' Assemblies holding
referendum in Pasay City, for which reason he did not send the aforesaid letter pending submittal of the other results from the
said Citizens' Assemblies; and that in the afternoon of January 15, 1973, he indorsed the complete certificate of results on the
referendum in Pasay City to the Office of the President (Annex 5-Rejoinder of Sol. Gen. dated March 20, 1973).

Pablo F. Samonte, Assistant City Treasurer and Officer in Charge of Pasay City also issued an affidavit dated March 15, 1973
stating that a certain Atty. Delia Sutton of the Salonga Law Office asked him for the results of the referendum; that he informed
her that he had in his possession unsigned copies of such results which may not be considered official as they had then no
knowledge whether the original thereof had been signed by the mayor; and that in spite of his advice that said unsigned copies
were not official, she requested him if she could give her the unofficial copies thereof, which he gave in good faith (Annex C-
Rejoinder to the Sol. Gen.).

There were 118,010 Yes votes as against 5,588 No votes in the Citizens' Assemblies of Quezon city (Annex V to Petitioners'
Notes in L-36165). The fact that a certain Mrs. Remedio Gutierrez, wife of alleged barrio treasurer Faustino Gutierrez, of barrio
South Triangle, Quezon City, states that "as far as we know, there has been no Citizens' Assembly meeting in our Area,
particularly in January of this year," does not necessarily mean that there was no such meeting in said barrio; for she may not
have been notified thereof and as a result she was not able to attend said meeting. Much less can it be a basis for the claim that
there was no meeting at all in the other barrios of Quezon City. The barrio captain or the secretary of the barrio assembly could
have been a credible witness.

Councilor Eduardo T. Paredes, chairman of the Secretariat of Quezon City Ratification and Coordinating Council, certified on
March 12, 1973 that as such chairman he was in charge of the compilation and tabulation of the results of the referendum among
the Citizens' Assemblies in Quezon City based on the results submitted to the Secretariat by the different Citizens' Assemblies;
but many results of the referendum were submitted direct to the national agencies having to do with such activity and all of which
he has no knowledge, participation and control (Annex 4 Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.).

Governor Isidro Rodriguez of Rizal issued a certification dated March 16, 1973 that he prepared a letter to the President dated
January 15, 1973 informing him of the results of the referendum in Rizal, in compliance with the instruction of the National
Secretariat to submit such letter 2 or 3 days from January 10 to show the trend of voting in the Citizens' Assemblies; that the
figures 614,157 and 292,530 mentioned in said letter were based on the certificates of results in his possession as of January 14,
1973, which results were made the basis of the computation of the percentage of voting trend in the province; that his letter was
never intended to show the final or complete result in the referendum in the province as said referendum was then still going on
from January 14-17, 1973, for which reason the said letter merely stated that it was only a "summary result"; and that after
January 15, 1973, he sent to the National Secretariat all the certificates of results in 26 municipalities of Rizal for final tabulation
(Annex 3-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.; emphasis supplied).

Lydia M. Encarnacion, acting chief of the Records Section, Department of Local Government and Community Development,
issued a certificate dated March 16, 1973 that she was shown xerox copies of unsigned letters allegedly coming from Governor
Lino Bocalan dated January 15, 1973 and marked "Rejoinder Annex Cavite" addressed to the President of the Philippines through
the Secretary of the Department of Local Government and Community Development and another unsigned letter reportedly from
Mayor Pablo Cuneta dated January 15, 1973 and marked "Rejoinder Annex Pasay City" addressed to the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government and Community Development; that both xerox copies of the unsigned letters contain figures
showing the results of the referendum of the Citizens' Assemblies in those areas; and that the said letters were not received by her
office and that her records do not show any such documents received by her office (Annex 2-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.).

Thus it would seem that petitioners in L-36165 have attempted to deceive this Court by representing said unsigned letters and/or
certificates as duly signed and/or containing the complete returns of the voting in the Citizens' Assemblies.

The observation We made with respect to the discrepancy between the number of Yes votes and No votes contained in the
summary report of Governor Rodriguez of Rizal as well as those contained in the alleged report of Governor Lino Bocalan of
Cavite who repudiated the same as not having been signed by him for he was then under house arrest, on the one hand, and the
number of votes certified by the Department of Local Government and Community Development, on the other, to the effect that
even assuming the correctness of the figures insisted on by counsel for petitioners in L-36165, if they were extrapolated and
applied to the other provinces and cities of the country, the Yes votes would still be overwhelmingly greater than the No votes,
applies equally to the alleged discrepancy between the figures contained in the certification of the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government and Community Development and the figures furnished to counsel for petitioners in L-36165 concerning the
referendum in Camarines Sur, Bataan and Negros Occidental.

The fact that the referendum in the municipality of Pasacao, Camarines Sur, shows that there were more votes in favor of the
plebiscite to be held later than those against, only serve to emphasize that there was freedom of voting among the members of the
Citizens' Assemblies all over the country during the referendum from January 10 to 15, 1973 (Annex-6 Camarines Sur to
Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165). If there was no such freedom of choice, those who wanted a plebiscite would not
outnumber those against holding such plebiscite.

The letter of Governor Felix O. Alfelor, Sr. dated January 1973 confirms the "strong manifestation of approval of the new
Constitution by almost 97% by the members of the Citizens' Assemblies in Camarines Sur" (Annex-Camarines Sur to Rejoinder
of Petitioners in L-36165).

The report of Governor Efren B. Pascual of Bataan shows that the members of the Citizens' Assemblies voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the new Constitution despite the fact that the second set of questions including the question "Do you approve of the new
Constitution?" was received only on January 10. Provincial Governor Pascual stated that "orderly conduct and favorable results
of the referendum" were due not only to the coordinated efforts and cooperation of all teachers and government employees in the
area but also to the enthusiastic participation by the people, showing "their preference and readiness to accept this new method of
government to people consultation in shaping up government policies." (Annex-Bataan to Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165).

As heretofore stated, it is not necessary that voters ratifying the new Constitution are registered in the book of voters; it is enough
that they are electors voting on the new Constitution (Bott vs. Wurts, 40 A 740 [1898]; 43 A 744, 881 [1899]; 45 LRA 251). The
fact that the number of actual voters in the referendum in certain localities may exceed the number of voters actually registered
for the 1971 elections, can only mean that the excess represents the qualified voters who are not yet registered including those
who are at least 15 years of age and the illiterates. Although ex-convicts may have voted also in the referendum, some of them
might have been granted absolute pardon or were sentenced to less than one year imprisonment to qualify them to vote (Sec. 201,
1971 Rev. Election Code). At any rate, the ex-convicts constitute a negligible number, discounting which would not tilt the scale
in favor of the negative votes.

Similarly, the fact that Mayor Marcial F. Samson of Caloocan City, who belongs to the Liberal Party, stated in his letter dated
March 13, 1973 that he does not "feel authorized by the proper authorities to confirm or deny the data" concerning the number of
participants, the Yes votes and No votes in the referendum on the new Constitution among the members of the Citizens'
Assemblies in Caloocan City, does not necessarily give rise to the inference that Mayor Samson of Caloocan City is being
intimidated, having been recently released from detention; because in the same letter of Mayor Samson, he suggested to counsel
for petitioners in L-36165 that he can secure "the true and legitimate results of the referendum" from the Office of the President
(Annex Caloocan-B to Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165). Why did not learned and eminent counsel heed such suggestion?

Counsel for petitioners in L-36165, to sustain their position, relies heavily on the computation of the estimated turnover in the
Citizens' Assemblies referendum on January 10 to 15, 1973 by a certain Professor Benjamin R. Salonga, of the Mapua Institute of
Technology, ostensibly a close relative of former Senator Jovito R. Salonga, eminent counsel for petitioners in L-36165 (Annex
M-as amended, to Consolidated Rejoinder of petitioners in L-36165 to the Notes of Arguments and Memorandum of
respondents). Professor Salonga is not a qualified statistician, which all the more impairs his credibility. Director Tito A. Mijares
of the Bureau of Census and Statistics, in his letter dated March 16, 1973 address to the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government and Community Development, refutes the said computation of Professor Benjamin R. Salonga, thus:

1) I do not quite understand why (Problem 1) all qualified registered voters and the 15-20-year-old youths
(1972) will have to be estimated in order to give a 101.9% estimate of the percentage participation of the "15-
20 year old plus total number of qualified voters" which does not deem to answer the problem. This
computation apparently fails to account for some 5.6 million persons "21 years old and over" who were not
registered voters (COMELEC), but who might be qualified to participate at the Citizen's Assembly.

2) The official population projection of this office (medium assumption) for "15 year olds and over" as of
January 1, 1973 is 22.506 million. If total number of participants at the Citizens' Assembly Referendum held
on January 10-15, 1973 was 16.702 million, participation rate will therefore be the ratio of the latter figure to
the former which gives 74.2%.

3) 1 cannot also understand c-2 "Solution to Problem 11." The "difference or implied number of 15-20 year
olds" of 5,039,906 would represent really not only all 15-year olds and over who participated at the Citizens'
 Assembly but might not have been registered voters at the time, assuming that all the 11,661,909 registered
voted at Citizens' Assembly. Hence, the "estimate percentage participation of 15-20 years olds" of 105.6%
does not seem to provide any meaningful information.

To obtain the participation rate of "15-20 years old" one must divide the number in this age group, which was
estimated to be 4.721 million as of January 1, 1973 by the population of "15 years old and over" for the same
period which was estimated to be 22.506 million, giving 21.0%.

In Problem III, it should be observed that registered voters also include names of voters who are already
dead. It cannot therefore be assumed that all of them participated at the Citizens' Assembly. It can therefore
be inferred that "a total number of persons 15 and over unqualified/disqualified to vote" will be more than
10,548,197 and hence the "difference or implied number of registered voters that participated" will be less
than 6,153,618.

I have reservations on whether an "appropriate number of qualified voters that supposedly voted" could be
meaningfully estimated.

5) The last remark will therefore make the ratio (a) [Solution to Problem] more than 1.71 and that for (b),
accordingly, will also be less than 36.8%." (Annex F Rejoinder).

From the foregoing analysis of the Director of Census and Statistics as of January 21, 1973, the official population projection for
15-year olds and over is 22,506,000. If 16,702,000 voted in the referendum, the participation ratio would be 74.2% of
22,506,000.

If the registered electors as of the election of November 8, 1971 numbered 11,661,909, the difference between 16,702,000 who
participated in the referendum and the registered electors of 11,661,909 for the November 8, 1971 elections, is 5,040,091, which
may include not only the 15-year olds and above but below 21 but also the qualified electors who were not registered before the
November 8, 1971 elections as well as illiterates who are 15 years old and above but below 21.

Moreover, in the last Presidential election in November, 1969, We found that the incumbent President obtained over 5,000,000
votes as against about 3,000,000 votes for his rival LP Senator Sergio Osmeña, Jr., garnering a majority of from about 896,498 to
1,436,118 (Osmeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973).

The petitioners in all the cases at bar cannot state with justification that those who voted for the incumbent President in 1969 did
not vote in favor of the 1973 Constitution during the referendum from January 10 to 15, 1973. It should also be stressed that
many of the partisans of the President in the 1969 Presidential elections, have several members in their families and relatives who
are qualified to participate in the referendum because they are 15 years or above including illiterates, which fact should
necessarily augment the number of votes who voted for the 1973 Constitution.

(6) It is also urged that martial law being the rule of force, is necessarily inconsistent with freedom of choice, because the people
fear to disagree with the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore cannot voice
views opposite to or critical of the position of the President on the 1973 Constitution and on the mode of its ratification.

It is also claimed or urged that there can be no free choice during martial law which inevitably generates fear in the individual.
Even without martial law, the penal, civil or administrative sanction provided for the violation of ordinarily engenders fear in the
individual which persuades the individual to comply with or obey the law. But before martial law was proclaimed, many
individuals fear such sanctions of the law because of lack of effective equal enforcement or implementation thereof — in brief,
compartmentalized justice and extraneous pressures and influences frustrated the firm and just enforcement of the laws. The fear
that is generated by martial law is merely the fear of immediate execution and swift enforcement of the law and therefore
immediate infliction of the punishment or sanction prescribed by the law whenever it is transgressed during the period of martial
law. This is not the fear that affects the voters' freedom of choice or freedom to vote for or against the 1973 Constitution. Those
who cringe in fear are the criminals or the law violators. Surely, petitioners do not come under such category.

(7) Petitioners likewise claim that open voting by viva voce or raising of hands violates the secrecy of the ballot as by the election
laws. But the 1935 Constitution does not require secret voting. We search in vain for such guarantee or prescription in said
organic law. The Commission on Elections under the 1940 Amendment, embodied as Article X is merely mandated to insure
"free, orderly and honest election." Congress, under its plenary law-making authority, could have validly prescribed in the
election law open voting in the election of public officers, without trenching upon the Constitution. Any objection to such a
statute concerns its wisdom or propriety, not its legality or constitutionality. Secret balloting was demanded by partisan strife in
elections for elective officials. Partisanship based on party or personal loyalties does not generally obtain in a plebiscite on
proposed constitutional amendments or on a new Constitution. We have seen even before and during martial law that voting in
meetings of government agencies or private organizations is usually done openly. This is specially true in sessions of Congress,
provincial boards, city councils, municipal boards and barrio councils when voting on national or local issues, not on
personalities.

Then again, open voting was not a universal phenomenon in the Citizens' Assemblies. It might have been true in certain areas, but
that does not necessarily mean that it was done throughout the country.

The recent example of an open voting is the last election on March 3, 1973 of the National Press Club officers who were elected
by acclamation presided over by its former president, petitioner Eduardo Monteclaro in L-36236 (see Bulletin Today, p. 8, March
3, 1973 issue). There can be no more hardboiled group of persons than newspapermen, who cannot say that voting among them
by acclamation was characterized by fear among the members of the National Press Club.

Moreover, petitioners would not be willing to affirm that all the members of the citizenry of this country are against the new
Constitution. They will not deny that there are those who favor the same, even among the 400,000 teachers among whom officers
of the Department of Education campaigned for the ratification of the new Constitution.

Not one of the petitioners can say that the common man — farmer, laborer, fisherman, lowly employee, jeepney driver, taxi
driver, bus driver, pedestrian, salesman, or salesgirl — does not want the new Constitution, or the reforms provided for therein.

(8) Petitioners likewise claim that there was no sufficient publicity given to the new Constitution. This is quite inaccurate;
because even before the election in November, 1970 of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, the proposed reforms were
already discussed in various forums and through the press as well as other media of information. Then after the Constitutional
Convention convened in June, 1971, specific reforms advanced by the delegates were discussed both in committee hearings as
well as in the tri-media — the press, radio and television. Printed materials on the proposed reforms were circulated by their
proponents. From June, 1971 to November 29, 1972, reforms were openly discussed and debated except for a few days after the
proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972. From the time the Constitutional Convention reconvened in October, 1972
until January 7, 1973, the provisions of the new Constitution were debated and discussed in forums sponsored by private
organizations universities and debated over the radio and on television. The Philippines is a literate country, second only to Japan
in the Far East, and more literate perhaps than many of mid-western and southern states of the American Union and Spain. Many
residents in about 1,500 towns and 33,000 barrios of the country have radios. Even the illiterates listened to radio broadcasts on
and discussed the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.

As reported by the eminent and widely read columnist, Teodoro Valencia in his column in Bulletin Today, March 4, 1973 issue,
"Otto Lang, Hollywood producer director (Tora, Tora, Tora) went around the country doing a 30-minute documentary on the
Philippines for American television stated that what impressed him most in his travel throughout the country was the general
acceptance of the New Society by the people which he saw in his 6-week travel from Aparri to Jolo."

The report of Frank Valeo (Bulletin Today, March 3 and 4, 1973 and Daily Express, March 3, and Sunday Express, March 4),
Secretary of the United States Senate, who conducted a personal survey of the country as delegate of Senator Mike Mansfield,
Chairman, Committee on US-Philippine relations, states:

Martial law has paved the way for a re-ordering of the basic social structure of the Philippines. President
Marcos has been prompt and sure-footed in using the power of presidential decree under martial law for this
purpose. He has zeroed in on areas which have been widely recognized as prime sources of the nation's
difficulties — land tenancy, official corruption, tax evasion and abuse of oligarchic economic power. Clearly,
he knows the targets. What is not yet certain is how accurate have been his shots. Nevertheless, there is
marked public support for his leadership and tangible alternatives have not been forthcoming. That would
suggest that he may not be striking too far from the mark.

The United States business community in Manila seems to have been re-assured by recent developments ... .
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners cannot safely assume that all the peaceful citizens of the country, who constitute the majority of the population, do not
like the reforms stipulated in the new Constitution, as well as the decrees, orders and circulars issued to implement the same. It
should be recalled, as hereinbefore stated, that all these reforms were the subject of discussion both in the committee hearings and
on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, as well as in public forums sponsored by concerned citizens or civic organizations
at which Con-Con delegates as well as other knowledgeable personages expounded their views thereon and in all the media of
information before the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972. This is the reason why the Constitutional Convention,
after spending close to P30 million during the period from June 1, 1971 to November 29, 1972, found it expedient to accelerate
their proceedings in November, 1972 because all views that could possibly be said on the proposed provisions of the 1973
Constitution were already expressed and circulated. The 1973 Constitution may contain some unwise provisions. But this
objection to such unwise or vague provisions, as heretofore stated, refers to the wisdom of the aforesaid provisions, which issue
is not for this Court to decide; otherwise We will be substituting Our judgment for the judgment of the Constitutional Convention
and in effect acting as a constituent assembly.

VI

PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF EXERCISES

LEGISLATIVE POWERS DURING MARTIAL LAW.

The position of the respondent public officers that undermartial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief is vested with
legislative powers, is sustained by the ruling in the 1949 case of Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, et al. (83 Phil. 171, 177-178) which
reiterates the 1945 case of Yamashita vs. Styer (75 Phil. 563, 571-72). The trial of General Kuroda was after the surrender of
Japan on October 2, 1945 (23 Encyc. Brit. 1969 ed., p. 799) and hence no more martial law in the Philippines.

... Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law
which are part of our Constitution.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in
Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styver (L-129, 42 Off.
Gaz., 664) when we said —

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time
of war. "An important incident to a conduct of war is the adoption measures by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war." (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war
criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military
commission "has jurisdiction so long as the technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of
treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement." (Cowles, Trial of War
Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944).

Consequently, the President as Commander-in-Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished

aspect of war, namely the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68. (83 Phil. 177-178; emphasis supplied).

Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court likewise appears to subscribe to this view, when, in his concurring
opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (327 U.S. 304 [1946]), he defined martial law as "the exercise of the power which resides in
the executive branch of the government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of emergency, when other
branches of the government are unable to function, or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety." (Emphasis
supplied). There is an implied recognition in the aforesaid definition of martial law that even in places where the courts can
function, such operation of the courts may be affected by martial law should their "functioning ... threaten the public safety." It is
possible that the courts, in asserting their authority to pass upon questions which may adversely affect the conduct of the punitive
campaign against rebels, secessionists, dissidents as well as subversives, martial law may restrict such judicial function until the
danger to the security of the state and of the people shall have been decimated.

The foregoing view appears to be shared by Rossiter when he stated:

Finally, this strong government, which in some instances might become an outright dictatorship, can have no
other purposes than the preservation of the independence of the state, the maintenance of the existing
constitutional order, and the defense of the political and social liberties of the people. It is important to
 recognize the true and limited ends of any practical application of the principle of constitutional dictatorship.
Perhaps the matter may be most clearly stated in this way: the government of a free state is proceeding on its
way and meeting the usual problems of peace and normal times within the limiting framework of its
established constitutional order. The functions of government are parceled out among a number of mutually
independent offices and institutions; the power to exercise those functions is circumscribed by well-
established laws, customs, and constitutional prescriptions; and the people for whom this government was
instituted are in possession of a lengthy catalogue of economic, political, and social rights which their leaders
recognize as inherent and inalienable. A severe crisis arises — the country is invaded by a hostile power, or a
dissident segment of the citizenry revolts, or the impact of a world-wide depression threatens to bring the
nation's economy in ruins. The government meets the crisis by assuming more powers and respecting fewer
rights. The result is a regime which can act arbitrarily and even dictatorially in the swift adaption of
measures designed to save the state and its people from the destructive effects of the particular crisis. And
the narrow duty to be pursued by this strong government, this constitutional dictatorship? Simply this and
nothing more: to end the crisis and restore normal times. The government assumes no power and abridges no
right unless plainly indispensable to that end; it extends no further in time than the attainment of that end;
and it makes no alteration in the political, social and economic structure of the nation which cannot be
eradicated with the restoration of normal times. In short, the aim of constitutional dictatorship is the complete
restoration of the status quo ante bellum. This historical fact does not comport with philosophical theory, that
there never has been a perfect constitutional dictatorship, is an assertion that can be made without fear of
contradiction. But this is true of all institutions of government, and the principle of constitutional dictatorship
remains eternally valid no matter how often and seriously it may have been violated in practice.
(Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 ed., by Clinton L. Rossiter, p. 7; emphasis supplied.)

Finally, Rossiter expressly recognizes that during martial law, the Chief Executive exercises legislative power, whether of
temporary or permanent character, thus:

The measures adopted in the prosecution of a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in
character or effect. Emergency powers are strictly conditioned by their purpose and this purpose is the
restoration of normal conditions. The actions directed to this end should therefore be provisional. For
example, measures of a legislative nature which work a lasting change in the structure of the state or
constitute permanent derogations from existing law should not be adopted under an emergency enabling
act, at least not without the positively registered approval of the legislature. Permanent laws, whether
adopted in regular or irregular times, are for parliaments to enact. By this same token, the decisions and
sentences of extraordinary courts should be reviewed by the regular courts after the termination of the crisis.

But what if a radical act of permanent character, one working lasting changes in the political and social
fabric, is indispensable to the successful prosecution of the particular constitutional dictatorship? The only
answer can be: it must be resolutely taken and openly acknowledged. President Lincoln found it necessary to
proceed to the revolutionary step of emancipation in aid of his conservative purpose of preserving the Union;
as a constitutional dictator he had a moral right to take this radical action. Nevertheless, it is imperative that
any action with such lasting effects should eventually receive the positive approval of the people or of their
representatives in the legislature. (P. 303, emphasis supplied).

From the foregoing citations, under martial law occasioned by severe crisis generated by revolution, insurrection or economic
depression or dislocation, the government exercises more powers and respects fewer rights in order "to end the crisis and restore
normal times." The government can assume additional powers indispensable to the attainment of that end — the complete
restoration of peace. In our particular case, eradication of the causes that incited rebellion and subversion as secession, is the sine
qua non to the complete restoration of normalcy. Exercise of legislative power by the President as Commander in Chief, upon his
proclamation of martial law, is justified because, as he professes, it is directed towards the institution of radical reforms essential
to the elimination of the causes of rebellious, insurgent or subversive conspiracies and the consequent dismantling of the
rebellious, insurgent or subversive apparatus.

Hence, the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 86 and 86-A as well as Proclamation No. 1102 is indispensable to the
effectuation of the reforms within the shortest possible time to hasten the restoration of normalcy.

"Must the government be too strong for the liberties of the people; or must it be too weak to maintain its existence?" That was the
dilemma that vexed President Lincoln during the American Civil War, when without express authority in the Constitution and the
laws of the United States, he suspended one basic human freedom — the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — in order to
preserve with permanence the American Union, the Federal Constitution of the United States and all the civil liberties of the
American people. This is the same dilemma that presently confronts the Chief Executive of the Republic of the Philippines, who,
more than the Courts and Congress, must, by express constitutional mandate, secure the safety of our Republic and the rights as
well as lives of the people against open rebellion, insidious subversion secession. The Chief Executive announced repeatedly that
in choosing to proclaim martial law, the power expressly vested in him by the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 10[2], Art. VII, 1935
Constitution) to insure our national and individual survival in peace and freedom, he is in effect waging a peaceful, democratic
revolution from the center against the violent revolution and subversion being mounted by the economic oligarchs of the extreme
right, who resist reforms to maintain their economic hegemony, and the communist rebels a Maoist oriented secessionists of the
extreme left who demand swift institution of reforms. In the exercise of his constitutional and statutory powers, to save the state
and to protect the citizenry against actual and threatened assaults from insurgents, secessionists and subversives, doctrinaire
concepts and principles, no matter how revered they may be by jurisprudence and time, should not be regarded as peremptory
commands; otherwise the dead hand of the past will regulate and control the security and happiness of the living present. A
contrary view would be to deny the self-evident proposition that constitutions and laws are mere instruments for the well-being,
peace, security and prosperity of the country and its citizenry. The law as a means of social control is not static but dynamic.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Constitution is neither a printed finality nor the imprisonment of the past, but the
enfolding of the future. In the vein of Mr. Justice Holmes, the meaning of the words of the Constitution is not to be determined
by merely opening a dictionary. Its terms must be construed in the context of the realities in the life of a nation it is intended to
serve. Because experience may teach one generation to doubt the validity and efficacy of the concepts embodied in the existing
Constitution and persuade another generation to abandon them entirely, heed should be paid to the wise counsel of some learned
jurists that in the resolution of constitutional questions — like those posed before Us — the blending of idealism and practical
wisdom or progressive legal realism should be applied (see Alexander M. Bickel, the Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress,
1970 ed., pp. 19-21). To Justice Frankfurter, law is "a vital agency for human betterment" and constitutional law "is applied
politics using the word in its noble sense." (Frankfurter, Law and Politics, 1939 ed., pp. 3 & 6; emphasis supplied). Justice
Brandeis gave utterance to the truth that "Our Constitution is not a straight jacket. It is a living organism. As such, it is capable
of growth — or expansion and adaptation to new conditions. Growth implies changes, political, economic and social." (Brandeis
Papers, Harvard Law School; emphasis supplied). Harvard Professor Thomas Reed Powell emphasizes "practical wisdom," for
"the logic of constitutional law is the common sense of the Supreme Court." (Powell, the Validity of State Legislation, under the
Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 Southern Law Quarterly, pp. 112, 138-139, cited in Bickel's Opus, supra; emphasis supplied).

The eternal paradox in this finite world of mortal and fallible men is that nothing is permanent except change. Living organisms
as well as man-made institutions are not immutable. Civilized men organize themselves into a State only for the purpose of
serving their supreme interest — their welfare. To achieve such end, they created an agency known as the government. From the
savage era thru ancient times, the Middle Ages, the Dark Ages and the Renaissance to this era of sophisticated electronics and
nuclear weaponry, states and governments have mutated in their search for the magic instrument for their well-being. It was trial
and error then as it is still now. Political philosophies and constitutional concepts, forms and kinds of government, had been
adopted, overturned, discarded, re-adopted or modified to suit the needs of a given society at a particular given epoch. This is true
of constitutions and laws because they are not "the infallible instruments of a manifest destiny." No matter how we want the law
to be stable, it cannot stand still. As Mr. Justice Holmes aptly observed, every "constitution is an experiment as all life is an
experiment," (Abrahms vs. U.S., 250 US 616, 631) for "the life of the law is not logic, but experience." In the pontifical tones of
Mr. Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, "so long as society is inconstant, there can be no constancy in law," and "there will be
change whether we will it or not." As Justice Jose P. Laurel was wont to say, "We cannot, Canute-like, command the waves of
progress to halt."

Thus, political scientists and jurists no longer exalt with vehemence a "government that governs least." Adherents there are to the
poetic dictum of Alexander Pope: "For forms of government let fools contest; whatever is best administered is best." (Poems of
Pope, 1931 Cambridge ed., p. 750). In between, the shades vary from direct democracy, representative democracy, welfare states,
socialist democracy, mitigated socialism, to outright communism which degenerated in some countries into totalitarianism or
authoritarianism.

Hence, even the scholar, who advances academic opinions unrelated to factual situations in the seclusion of his ivory tower, must
perforce submit to the inexorable law of change in his views, concepts, methods and techniques when brought into the actual
arena of conflict as a public functionary — face to face with the practical problems of state, government and public
administration. And so it is that some learned jurists, in the resolution of constitutional issues that immediately affect the lives,
liberties and fortunes of the citizens and the nation, recommend the blending of idealism with practical wisdom which legal
thinkers prefer to identify as progressive legal realism. The national leader, who wields the powers of government, must and has
to innovate if he must govern effectively to serve the supreme interests of the people. This is especially true in times of great
crises where the need for a leader with vision, imagination, capacity for decision and courageous action is greater, to preserve the
unity of people, to promote their well-being, and to insure the safety and stability of the Republic. When the methods of rebellion
and subversion have become covert, subtle and insidious, there should be a recognition of the corresponding authority on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to utilize all the available techniques to suppress the peril to the security of the
government and the State.
Over a century and a half ago, Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the American Constitution and former President
of the United States, who personifies the progressive liberal, spoke the truth when he said that some men "ascribe men of the
preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. ... But I know also, that laws
and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must also advance, and keep pace with the times." (Vol. 12, Encyclopedia Britanica, 1969 ed., p. 989).

The wisdom of the decision of the Chief Executive can only be judged in the perspective of history. It cannot be adequately and
fairly appraised within the present ambience, charged as it is with so much tension and emotion, if not partisan passion. The
analytical, objective historians will write the final verdict in the same way that they pronounced judgment on President Abraham
Lincoln who suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswithout any constitutional or statutory authority therefor and of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt who approved the proclamation of martial law in 1941 by the governor of Hawaii
throughout the Hawaiian territory. President Lincoln not only emancipated the Negro slaves in America, but also saved the
Federal Republic of the United States from disintegration by his suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which
power the American Constitution and Congress did not then expressly vest in him. No one can deny that the successful defense
and preservation of the territorial integrity of the United States was due in part, if not to a great extent, to the proclamation of
martial law over the territory of Hawaii — main bastion of the outer periphery or the outpost of the American defense perimeter
in the Pacific — which protected the United States mainland not only from actual invasion but also from aerial or naval
bombardment by the enemy. Parenthetically, the impartial observer cannot accurately conclude that the American Supreme Court
acted with courage in its decision in the cases of Ex parte Milligan and Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (filed on May 10, 1865 argued
on March 5 to 13, 1866, decided on April 3, 1866, and opinion delivered on December 17, 1866) after the lifting of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, long after the Civil War and the Second World ended
respectively on April 9 or 26, 18-65 (Vol. 1, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969 ed., pp. 730, 742) and on September 2, 1945 (Vol.
23, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969 ed., p. 799). Was the delay on the part of the American Supreme Court in deciding these cases
against the position of the United States President — in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in one case and
approving the proclamation of martial law in the other — deliberate as an act of judicial statesmanship and recognition on their
part that an adverse court ruling during the period of such a grave crisis might jeopardize the survival of the Federal Republic of
the United States in its life-and-death struggle against an organized and well armed rebellion within its own borders and against a
formidable enemy from without its territorial confines during the last global armageddon?

VIII

DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES

MANDAMUS AGAINST SENATORS.

In G.R. No. L-36165, mandamus will not lie to compel respondents Gil Puyat and Jose Roy to convene the Senate of the
Philippines even on the assumption that the 1935 Constitution still subsists; because pursuant to the doctrine of separation of
powers under the 1935 Constitution, the processes of this Court cannot legally reach a coordinate branch of the government or its
head. This is a problem that is addressed to the Senate itself for resolution; for it is purely an internal problem of the Senate. If a
majority of the senators can convene, they can elect a new Senate President and a new Senate President Pro Tempore. But if they
have no quorum, those present can order the arrest of the absent members (Sec. 10[2], Art. VI, 1935 Constitution). If this fails,
then there is no remedy except an appeal to the people. The dictum ubi jus, ubi remedium, is not absolute and certainly does not
justify the invocation of the power of this Court to compel action on the part of a co-equal body or its leadership. This was
emphasized with sufficient clarity by this Court in the 1949 case of Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil. 17, 22,24), with which the
distinguished counsels for the petitioners in L-36164 and L-36165 are familiar. We stress that the doctrine of separation of
powers and the political nature of the controversy such as this, preclude the interposition of the Judiciary to nullify an act of a
coordinate body or to command performance by the head of such a co-ordinate body of his functions..

Mystifying is the posture taken by counsels for petitioners in referring to the political question doctrine — almost in mockery —
as a magic formula which should be disregarded by this Court, forgetting that this magic formula constitutes an essential skein in
the constitutional fabric of our government, which, together with other basic constitutional precepts, conserves the unity of our
people, strengthens the structure of the government and assures the continued stability of the country against the forces of
division, if not of anarchy.

Moreover, if they have a quorum, the senators can meet anywhere. Validity of the acts of the Senate does not depend on the place
of session; for the Constitution does not designate the place of such a meeting. Section 9 of Article VI imposes upon Congress to
convene in regular session every year on the 4th Monday of January, unless a different date is fixed by law, or on special session
called by the President. As former Senator Arturo Tolentino, counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy in L-36165, stated, the duty
to convene is addressed to all members of Congress, not merely to its presiding officers. The fact that the doors of Congress are
padlocked, will not prevent the senators — especially the petitioners in L-36165 — if they are minded to do so, from meeting
elsewhere — at the Sunken Gardens, at the Luneta Independence Grandstand, in any of the big hotels or theaters, in their own
houses, or at the Araneta Coliseum, which is owned by the father-in-law of petitioner Gerardo Roxas in L-36165.

However, a session by the Senate alone would be purely an exercise in futility, for it cannot validly meet without the lower House
(Sec. 10[5], Art. VI, 1935 Constitution). Hence, this petition by five former senators for mandamus in L-36165 is useless.

And as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino, counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy, mandamus will lie only if there
is a law imposing on the respondents the duty to convene the body. The rule imposing such a duty invoked by petitioners in L-
36165 is purely an internal rule of the Senate; it is not a law because it is not enacted by both Houses and approved by the
President.

The Constitutional provision on the convening of Congress, is addressed to the individual members of the legislative body (Sec.
9, Art. VI of 1935 Constitution).

IX

TO NULLIFY PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 AND 1973

CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EIGHT OR TEN VOTES OF
SUPREME COURT.

The petitioners in L-36164 and L-36236 specifically pray for a declaration that the alleged ratification of the 1973 Constitution is
null and void and that the said 1973 Constitution be declared unenforceable and inoperative.

As heretofore stated, Proclamation No. 1102 is an enactment of the President as Commander-in-Chief during martial law as
directly delegated to him by Section 10(2) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.

A declaration that the 1973 Constitution is unenforceable and inoperative is practically deciding that the same is unconstitutional.
The proposed Constitution is an act of the Constitutional Convention, which is co-equal and coordinate with as well as
independent of either Congress or the Chief Executive. Hence, its final act, the 1973 Constitution, must have the same category at
the very least as the act of Congress itself.

Consequently, the required vote to nullify Proclamation No. 1102 and the 1973 Constitution should be eight (8) under Section 10
of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution in relation to Section 9 of the Judiciary Act or Republic Act No. 296, as amended, or
should be ten (10) under Section 2(2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Should the required vote of eight (8) or ten (10), as
the case may be, for the declaration of invalidity or unconstitutionality be not achieved, the 1973 Constitution must be deemed to
be valid, in force and operative.

ARTICLE OF FAITH

WE yield to no man as devotees of human rights and civil liberties. Like Thomas Jefferson, We swear "eternal hostility towards
any form of tyranny over the mind of man" as well as towards bigotry and intolerance, which are anathema to a free spirit. But
human rights and civil liberties under a democratic or republican state are never absolute and never immune to restrictions
essential to the common weal. A civilized society cannot long endure without peace and order, the maintenance of which is the
primary function of the government. Neither can civilized society survive without the natural right to defend itself against all
dangers that may destroy its life, whether in the form of invasion from without or rebellion and subversion from within. This is
the first law of nature and ranks second to none in the hierarchy of all values, whether human or governmental. Every citizen,
who prides himself in being a member or a civilized society under an established government, impliedly submits to certain
constraints on his freedom for the general welfare and the preservation of the State itself, even as he reserves to himself certain
rights which constitute limitations on the powers of government. But when there is an inevitable clash between an exertion of
governmental authority and the assertion of individual freedom, the exercise of which freedom imperils the State and the
civilized society to which the individual belongs, there can be no alternative but to submit to the superior right of the government
to defend and preserve the State. In the language of Mr. Justice Holmes — often invoked by herein petitioners — "when it comes
to a decision involving its (state life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities
of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. (See Keely vs. Sanders, 99 U.S.
441, 446, 25 L ed. 327, 328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms. And we think it is obvious,
although it was disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm." (Moyer vs. Peabody, 212
U.S. 77, 85, 53 L ed., 411, 417).

The rhetoric of freedom alone is not enough. It must be the rhetoric of freedom with order and security for all, that should be the
shibboleth; for freedom cannot be enjoyed in an environment of disorder and anarchy.

The incumbent Chief Executive who was trying to gain the support for his reform program long before September 21, 1972,
realized almost too late that he was being deceived by his partymates as well as by the opposition, who promised him
cooperation, which promises were either offered as a bargaining leverage to secure concessions from him or to delay the
institution of the needed reforms. The people have been victimized by such bargaining and dilly-dallying. To vert a terrifying
blood bath and the breakdown of the Republic, the incumbent President proclaimed martial law to save the Republic from being
overrun by communists, secessionists and rebels by effecting the desired reforms in order to eradicate the evils that plague our
society, which evils have been employed by the communists, the rebels and secessionists to exhort the citizenry to rise against the
government. By eliminating the evils, the enemies of the Republic will be decimated. How many of the petitioners and their
counsels have been utilizing the rebels, secessionists and communists for their own personal or political purposes and how many
of them are being used in turn by the aforesaid enemies of the State for their own purposes?

If the petitioners are sincere in their expression of concern for the greater mass of the populace, more than for their own selves,
they should be willing to give the incumbent Chief Executive a chance to implement the desired reforms. The incumbent
President assured the nation that he will govern within the framework of the Constitution and if at any time, before normalcy is
restored, the people thru their Citizens' Assemblies, cease to believe in his leadership, he will step down voluntarily from the
Presidency. But if, as apprehended by the petitioners, he abuses and brutalizes the people, then to the battlements we must go to
man the ramparts against tyranny. This, it is believed, he knows only too well; because he is aware that he who rides the tiger will
eventually end inside the tiger's stomach. He who toys with revolution will be swallowed by that same revolution. History is
replete with examples of libertarians who turned tyrants and were burned at stake or beheaded or hanged or guillotined by the
very people whom they at first championed and later deceived. The most bloody of such mass executions by the wrath of a
wronged people, was the decapitation by guillotine of about 15,000 Frenchmen including the leaders of the French revolution,
like Robespierre, Danton, Desmoulins and Marat. He is fully cognizant of the lessons of history.

HENCE, THE DISMISSAL OF THESE FIVE CASES IS JUSTIFIED.

ESGUERRA, J., concurring:

These petitions seek to stop and prohibit the respondents Executive Officers from implementing the Constitution signed on
November 30, 1972; in L-36165, to compel respondents Gil Puyat and Jose J. Roy, President and President Pro-Tempore,
respectively, of the Senate under the 1935 Constitution, to convene the Senate in regular session which should have started on
January 22, 1973; to nullify Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, issued on January 17, 1973, which declared the ratification
of the Constitution on November 30, 1972, by the Filipino people, through the barangays or Citizens Assemblies established
under Presidential Decree No. 86 issued on December 31, 1972, which were empowered under Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
issued on January 5, 1973, to act in connection with the ratification of said Constitution.

Grounds for the petitions are as follows:

1. That the Constitutional Convention was not a free forum for the making of a Constitution after the declaration of Martial Law
on September 21, 1972.

2. The Convention was not empowered to incorporate certain provisions in the 1972 Constitution because they are highly unwise
and objectionable and the people were not sufficiently informed about them.

3. The President had no authority to create and empower the Citizens' Assemblies to ratify the new Constitution at the
referendum conducted in connection therewith, as said assemblies were merely for consultative purposes, and

4. The provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribing the manner of amending the same were not duly observed.

The petitions were not given due course immediately but were referred to the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondents for
comment, with three members of the Court, including the undersigned, voting to dismiss them outright. The comments were
considered motions to dismiss which were set for hearing and extensively argued. Thereafter both parties submitted their notes
and memoranda on their oral arguments.
I.

The issues raised for determination, on which the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss hinges, are as follows:

1. Is the question presented political and, hence, beyond the competence of this Court to decide, or is it justiciable and fit for
judicial determination?

2. Was the new Constitution of November 30, 1972, ratified in accordance with the amending process prescribed by Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution?

3. Has the new Constitution been accepted and acquiesced in by the Filipino people?

4. Is the new Constitution actually in force and effect?

5. If the answers to questions Nos. 3 and 4 be in the affirmative, are petitioners entitled to the reliefs prayed for?

II.

The pivotal question in these cases is whether the issue raised is highly political and, therefore, not justiciable. I maintain that this
Court should abstain from assuming jurisdiction, but, instead, as an act of judicial statesmanship, should dismiss the petitions. In
resolving whether or not the question presented is political, joint discussion of issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 is necessary so as to arrive
at a logical conclusion. For after the acceptance of a new Constitution and acquiescence therein by the people by putting it into
practical operation, any question regarding its validity should be foreclosed and all debates on whether it was duly or lawfully
ushered into existence as the organic law of the state become political and not judicial in character.

The undisputed facts that led to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A are fully set
forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Plebiscite cases decided on January 22, 1973, and need not be repeated here.

Petitioners seek to set at naught Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, claiming that the ratification
of the new Constitution pursuant to the said decrees is invalid and of no effect. Presidential Decree No. 86 organized the
barangays or Citizens Assemblies composed of all citizens at least fifteen years of age, and through these assemblies the
proposed 1972 Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification. Proclamation No. 1102 of the President announced or
declared the result of the referendum or plebiscite conducted through the Citizens Assemblies, and that 14,976,561 members
thereof voted for the ratification of the new Constitution and 743,869 voted against it. Petitioners assail these two acts of the
President as unauthorized and devoid of legal effect.

But looking through the veneer of judicial conformity with which the petitions have been adroitly contrived, what is sought to be
invalidated is the new Constitution itself — the very framework of the present Government since January 17, 1973. The reason is
obvious. The Presidential decrees set up the means for the ratification and acceptance of the new Constitution and Proclamation
No. 1102 simply announced the result of the referendum or plebiscite by the people through the Citizens Assemblies. The
Government under the new Constitution has been running on its tracks normally and apparently without obstruction in the form
of organized resistance capable of jeopardizing its existence and disrupting its operation. Ultimately the issue is whether the new
Constitution may be set aside by this Court. But has it the power and authority to assume such a stupendous task when the result
of such invalidation would be to subject this nation to divisive controversies that may totally destroy the social order which the
Government under the new Constitution has been admirably protecting and promoting under Martial Law? That the new
Constitution has taken deep root and the people are happy and contended with it is a living reality which the most articulate
critics of the new order cannot deny. 95 out of 108 members of the House of Representatives have opted to serve in the interim
National Assembly provided for under the new Constitution. 15 out of 24 Senators have done likewise. The members of the
Congress did not meet anymore last January 22, 1973, not because they were really prevented from so doing but because of no
serious effort on their parts to assert their offices under the 1935 Constitution. In brief, the Legislative Department under the 1935
Constitution is a thing of the past. The Executive Department has been fully reorganized; the appointments of key executive
officers including those of the Armed Forces were extended and they took an oath to support and defend the new Constitution.
The courts, except the Supreme Court by reason of these cases, have administered justice under the new constitution. All
government offices have dealt with the public and performed their functions according to the new Constitution and laws
promulgated thereunder.

If the real purpose of the petitions is to set aside the new Constitution, how can this Court justify its assumption of jurisdiction
when no power has ... conferred upon it the jurisdiction to declare the Constitution or any part thereof null and void? It is the
height of absurdity and impudence for a court to wage open war against the organic act to which it owes its existence. The
situation in which this Court finds itself does not permit it to pass upon the question whether or not the new Constitution has
entered into force and has superseded the 1935 Constitution. If it declares that the present Constitution has not been validly
ratified, it has to uphold the 1935 Constitution as still the prevailing organic law. The result would be too anomalous to describe,
for then this Court would have to declare that it is governed by one Constitution or the 1935 Constitution, and the legislative and
executive branches by another or the 1972 Constitution.

If it declares that the 1972 Constitution is now operative, how can it exercise judicial discretion in these cases when it would have
no other choice but to uphold the new Constitution as against any other one? In the circumstances it would be bereft of judicial
attributes as the matter would then be not meet for judicial determination, but one addressed to the sovereign power of the people
who have already spoken and delivered their mandate by accepting the fundamental law on which the government of this
Republic is now functioning. To deny that the new Constitution has been accepted and actually is in operation would be flying in
the face of reason and pounding one's bare head against a veritable stone wall or a heavily reinforced concrete, or simply "kicking
the deadly pricks" with one's bare foot in an effort to eliminate the lethal points.

When a Constitution has been in operation for sometime, even without popular ratification at that, submission of the people
thereto by the organization of the government provided therein and observance of its prescriptions by public officers chosen
thereunder, is indicative of approval. Courts should be slow in nullifying a Constitution claimed to have been adopted not in
accordance with constitutional or statutory directives [Miller vs. Johnson, 92 Ky. 589; 189 S.W. 522; Taylor vs Commonwealth,
101; Va. 829; 44 S.E. 754; Smith vs. Good, 34 F 204, 207; Wiston vs. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211; 97 N.W. 347].

In Miller vs. Johnson, supra, the Court said:

... But it is a case where a new constitution has been formed and promulgated according to the forms of law.
Great interests have already arisen under it; important rights exist by virtue of it; persons have been convicted
of the highest crimes known to the law, according to its provisions; the political power of the government has
in many ways recognized it; and, under such circumstances, it is our duty to treat and regard it as a valid
constitution, and now the organic law of our state. We need not consider the validity of the amendments
made after the convention reassembled. If the making of them was in excess of its power, yet as the entire
instrument has been recognized as valid in the manner suggested, it would be equally an abuse of power by
the judiciary, and violative of the rights of the people, — who can and properly should remedy the matter, if
not to their liking, — if it were to declare the instrument or a portion invalid, and bring confusion and
anarchy upon the state. (Emphasis supplied)

In Smith vs. Good, supra, the Court said:

It is said that a state court is forbidden from entering upon such an inquiry when applied to a new
constitution, and not an amendment, because the judicial power presupposes an established government, and
if the authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts is annulled with it;
therefore, if a state court should enter upon such an inquiry, come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and it
would be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question before it; but, if it decides at all, it
must necessarily affirm the existence of the government under which it exercises its judicial powers.
(Emphasis supplied)

These rules are all traceable to Luther vs. Borden, 48 U.S (7 How.), 12 L. Ed. 581, 598 (1849) where it was held:

Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their
execution, and appointing judges to expound and administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a
recognition of the authority of government from which it is derived. And if the authority of the government is
annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it. And if a State court
should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government it would cease to be a
court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides
at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it is
exercising judicial power.

The foreign relations of the Republic of the Philippines have been normally conducted on the basis of the new Constitution and
no state with which we maintain diplomatic relations has withdrawn its recognition of our government. (For particulars about
executive acts done under the new Constitution, see pages 22-25 of the Comments of the Solicitor General, dated February 3,
1973.)

Certainly the invalidation of Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A by this Court would smack of
plain political meddling which is described by the United States Supreme Court as "entering a political thicket" in Colegrove vs.
Green, 328 U.S. p. 549. At this juncture it would be the part of wisdom for this Court to adopt the proper attitude towards
political upheavals and realize that the question before Us is political and not fit for judicial determination. For a political
question is one entrusted to the people for judgment in their sovereign capacity (Tañada vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, Feb.
28,1967; 100 Phil. 1101), or to a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government (Vera vs. Arellano, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 35; Cabili vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 4638, May 8, 1931). A case
involves a political question when there would be "the impossibility of undertaking independent resolutions without expressing a
lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government", or when there is "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."

To preserve the prestige and eminence that this Court has long enjoyed as the "ultimate organ of the "Supreme Law of the Land"
in that vast range of legal problems often strongly entangled in popular feeling on which this Court must pronounce", let us
harken to the following admonition of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Baker vs. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; 82 S. Ct. 691; 7 L. Ed.
2d. 663:

The Court's authority — possessed neither of the purse nor the sword — ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact
and appearance, from political entanglements and abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political
forces in political settlement. ..." (Emphasis supplied)

The people have accepted and submitted to a Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution. The new organic law is now in the
plenitude of its efficacy and vigor. We are now living under its aegis and protection and only the cynics will deny this. This Court
should not in the least attempt to act as a super-legislature or a super-board of canvassers and sow confusion and discord among
our people by pontificating there was no valid ratification of the new Constitution. The sober realization of its proper role and
delicate function and its consciousness of the limitations on its competence, especially situations like this, are more in keeping
with the preservation of our democratic tradition than the blatant declamations of those who wish the Court to engage in their
brand of activism and would not mind plunging it into the whirlpool of passion and emotion in an effort to capture the
intoxicating applause of the multitude.

For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss all petitions.

ZALDIVAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

In these five cases, the main issue to be resolved by Court is whether or not the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 had been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. In the plebiscite
cases, which were decided by this Court on January 22, 1973 1, I held the view that this issue could be properly resolved by this
Court, and that it was in the public interest that this Court should declare then whether or not the proposed Constitution had been
validly ratified. The majority of this Court, however, was of the view that the issue was not squarely raised in those cases, and so
the Court, as a body, did make any categorical pronouncement on the question of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Convention was validly ratified. I was the only one who expressed the opinion that the proposed Constitution was not
validly ratified and therefore "it should not be given force and effect."

The Court is now called upon to declare, and to inform the people of this country, whether or not that proposed Constitution had
been validly ratified and had come into effect.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the issue that we have mentioned because
that issue is a political question that cannot be decided by this Court. This contention by the Solicitor General is untenable. A
political question relates to "those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative, or to the executive, branch of the
government.2 The courts have the power to determine whether the acts of the executive are authorized by the Constitution and the
laws whenever they are brought before the court in a judicial proceeding. The judicial department of the government exercises a
sort of controlling, or rather restraining, power over the two other departments of the government. Each of the three departments,
within its proper constitutional sphere, acts independently of the other, and restraint is only placed on one department when that
sphere is actually transcended. While a court may not restrain the executive from committing an unlawful act, it may, when the
legality of such an act is brought before it in a judicial proceeding, declare it to be void, the same as it may declare a law enacted
by the legislature to be unconstitutional.3 It is a settled doctrine that every officer under a constitutional government must act
according to law and subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom, or disregard thereof, must subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary. It must be remembered that the people
act through the courts, as well as through the executive or the legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon
all official actions4 . In the case of Gonzales v. Commission on Elections5, this Court ruled that the issue as to whether or not a
resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is not a political question and is therefore
subject to judicial review. In the case of Avelino v. Cuenco6, this Court held that the exception to the rule that courts will not
interfere with a political question affecting another department is when such political question involves an issue as to the
construction and interpretation of the provision of the constitution. And so, it has been held that the question of whether a
constitution shall be amended or not is a political question which is not in the power of the court to decide, but whether or not the
constitution has been legally amended is a justiciable question.7

My study on the subject of whether a question before the court is political or judicial, based on decisions of the courts in the
United States — where, after all, our constitutional system has been patterned to a large extent — made me arrive at the
considered view that it is in the power of this Court, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, to determine the validity of the
proposal, the submission, and the ratification of any change in the Constitution. Ratification or non-ratification of a constitutional
amendment is a vital element in the procedure to amend the constitution, and I believe that the Court can inquire into, and decide
on, the question of whether or not an amendment to the constitution, as in the present cases, has been ratified in accordance with
the requirements prescribed in the Constitution that was amended. And so, in the cases now before Us, I believe that the question
of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been validly ratified or not is a justiciable
question.

The Chief Justice, in his opinion, has discussed lengthily the subject on whether or not, the cases, before Us involve a political, or
a judicial, question. I fully concur with his conclusion that the question involved in these cases is justiciable.

On the question now of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been validly ratified,
I am reproducing herein pertinent portions of my dissenting opinion in the plebiscite cases:

The ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention must be done in
accordance with the provisions of Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:

"Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."

It is in consonance with the abovequoted provision of the 1935 Constitution that on March 16, 1967, the
Congress of the Philippines Resolution No. 2 calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines. Sec. 7 of said Resolution No. 2 reads as follows:

"Section 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered
part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.

It follows that from the very resolution of the Congress of the Philippines which called for the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was a clear mandate that the amendments proposed by the 1971 Convention,
in order to be valid and considered part of the Constitution, must be approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election at which they are submitted to the people for the ratification as provided in the Constitution.

This Court, in the case of Tolentino vs. Commission Elections, L-35140, October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 715),
speaking through Mr. Justice Barredo, said:

"The Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same

nature, owes its existence and all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of
 the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case
of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of revolution
against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to
such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without
restraint and omnipotent all wise, and it as to such conventions that the remarks of
Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator
Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention
came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress
acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present
Constitution ... ."

xxx xxx xxx

"As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned
mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and
members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now we hold
that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to
the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV."

In Proclamation No. 1102, issued on January 17, 1973, the President of the Philippines certified that as a
result of the voting before the barangays (Citizens Assemblies) 14,976,561 members of the barangays voted
for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against 743,869 who voted for its rejection, and on the basis
of the overwhelming majority of the votes cast by the members of all the barangays throughout the
Philippines, the President proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention has been
ratified and has thereby come into effect.

It is very plain from the very wordings of Proclamation No. 1102 that the provisions of Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution of 1935 were not complied with. It is not necessary that evidence be produced before
this Court to show that no elections were held in accordance with the provisions of the Election Code.
Proclamation No. 1102 unequivocally states that the proposed Constitution of 1972 was voted upon by the
barangays. It is very clear, therefore, that the voting held in these barangays is not the election contemplated
in the provisions of Section 1, Article XV, of the 1935 Constitution. The election contemplated in said
constitutional provision is an election held in accordance with the provisions of the election law, where only
the qualified and registered voters of the country would cast their votes, where official ballots prepared for
the purpose are used, where the voters would prepare their ballots in secret inside the voting booths in the
polling places established in the different election precincts throughout the country, where the election is
conducted by election inspectors duly appointed in accordance with the election law, where the votes are
canvassed and reported in a manner provided for in the election law. It was this kind of election that was held
on May 14, 1935, when the Constitution of 1935 was ratified; on April 30, 1937, when the amendment to the
Constitution providing for Women's Suffrage was ratified; on June 18, 1940, when the 1940 Amendments to
the Constitution were ratified; on March 11, 1947 when the Parity Amendment to the Constitution was
ratified; and on November 14, 1967 when the amendments to the Constitution to increase the number of
Members of the House of Representatives and to allow the Members of Congress to run in the elections for
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1971 were rejected.

I cannot see any valid reason why the practice or procedure in the past, in implementing the constitutional
provision requiring the holding, of an election to ratify or reject an amendment to the Constitution, has not
been followed in the case of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

It is my view that the President of the Philippines cannot by decree order the ratification of the proposed 1972
Constitution thru a voting in the barangays and make said result the basis for proclaiming the ratification of
the proposed constitution. It is very clear, to me, that Proclamation No. 1102 was issued in complete
disregard or in violation, of the provisions of Section 1 of Article X of the 1935 Constitution.

Proclamation No. 1102 mentions, furthermore, that on the question as to whether or not the people would still
like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, 14,298,814 members of the barangays answered
that there was no need for a plebiscite but that the vote of the barangays should be considered a vote in a
plebiscite. It would thus appear that the barangays assumed the power to determine whether a plebiscite as
ordained in the Constitution be held or not. Indeed, the provision of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
was completely disregarded.

The affirmative votes cast in the barangays are not the votes contemplated in Section 1 of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution. The votes contemplated in said constitutional provision are votes obtained through the
election processes as provided by law.

"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. In common parlance, an election is the act of casting and receiving
the ballots, counting them, and making the return." (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632,
637).

"Election" implies a choice by an electoral body at the time and substantially in the
manner and with the safeguards provided by law with respect to some question or issue.
(Leffel v. Brown, Com. P1., 159 N.E. 2d 807, 808 cited in 29 C.J.S. 13 at footnote 6.5).

"... the statutory method whereby qualified voters or electors pass on various public
matters submitted to them — the election of officers, national, state, county, township —
the passing on various other questions submitted for their determination." (29 C.J.S. 13,
citing Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 41 N.W. 2d 1, 5, 241 Iowa
358).

"Election" is expression of choice by voters of body politic. (Ginsburg v. Giles, 72 S.W.

2d 438, 254 Ky. 720, in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 234).

"The right to vote may be exercised only on compliance with such statutory requirements
as have been set by the legislature." (People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E. 2d 642, 327
III. App. 63; Rothfels v. Southworth, 356 P. 2d 612, 11 Utah 2d 169 in 29 C.J.S. 38).
(Emphasis supplied).

In this connection I herein quote the pertinent provisions of the Election Code of 1971:

"Sec. 2. Applicability of this Act. — All elections of public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites
shall be conducted in the manner provided by this Code."

"Sec 99. Necessity of registration to be entitled to vote. — In order that a qualified voter may vote in any
regular or special election or in any plebiscite, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for the
city, municipality or municipal district in which he resides: Provided, that no person shall register more than
once without first applying for cancellation of his previous registration." (Emphasis supplied). (Please see
also Sections 100-102, Election Code of 1971, R.A. No. 6388)

It is stated in Proclamation No. 1102 that the voting was done by the members of citizens assemblies who are
15 years of age or over. Under the provision of Section I of Article V of the 1935 Constitution, the age
requirement to be a qualified voter is 21 years or over.

But what is more noteworthy is the fact that the voting in the barangays, except in very few instances, was
done by the raising of hands by the persons indiscriminately gathered to participate in the voting, where even
children below 15 years of age were included. This is a matter of common observation, or of common
knowledge, which the Court may take judicial notice of. To consider the votes in the barangays as expressive
of the popular will and use them as the basis in declaring whether a Constitution is ratified or rejected is to
resort to a voting by demonstrations, which is would mean the rule of the crowd, which is only one degree
higher than the rule by the mob. Certainly, so important a question as to whether the Constitution, which is
the supreme law of the land, should be ratified or not, must not be decided by simply gathering people and
asking them to raise their hands in answer to the question of whether the vote for or against a proposed
Constitution. The election as provided by law should be strictly observed in determining the will of the
sovereign people in a democracy. In our Republic, the will of the people must be expressed through the ballot
in a manner that is provided by law.
It is said that in a democracy, the will of the people is the supreme law. Indeed, the people are sovereign, but
the will of the people must be expressed in a manner as the law and the demands a well-ordered society
require. The rule of law must prevail even over the apparent will of the majority of the people, if that will had
not been expressed, or obtained, in accordance with the law. Under the rule of law, public questions must be
decided in accordance with the Constitution and the law. This is specially true in the case of adoption of a
constitution or in the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution.

The following citations are, to me, very relevant in the effort to determine whether the proposed Constitution
of 1972 had been validly ratified, or not:

"When it is said that "the people" have the right to alter or amend the constitution, it must
not be understood that term necessarily includes all the inhabitants of the state. Since the
question of the adoption or rejection of a proposed new constitution or constitutional
amendment must be answered a vote, the determination of it rests with those who, by
existing constitution, are accorded the right of suffrage. But the qualified electors must be
understood in this, as in many other cases, as representing those who have not the right to
participate in the ballot. If a constitution should be abrogated and a new one adopted, by
the whole mass of people in a state acting through representatives not chosen by the
"people" in political sense of the term, but by the general body of the populace, the
movement would be extra-legal." (BIack's Constitutional Law, Second Edition, pp. 47-
48).

"The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from
whom springs all legitimate authority. The people of the Union created a national
constitution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty on certain subjects, and the
people of each State created a State government, to exercise the remaining powers of
sovereignty so far as they were disposed to allow them to be exercised at all. By the
constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies,
but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as
an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol. I, p. 81 cited in Graham v. Jones,
3 So. 2d. 761, 782).

"The theory that a favorable vote by the electorate, however unanimous, on a proposal to
amend a constitution, may cure, render innocuous, all or any antecedent failures to
observe commands of that Constitution in respect of the formulation or submission of
proposed amendments thereto, does not prevail in Alabama, where the doctrine of the
stated theory was denied, in obvious effect, by the pronouncement 60 years ago of broad,
wholesome constitutional principles in Collier v. Frierson, supra, as quoted in the
original opinion, ante. The people themselves are bound by the Constitution; and, being
so bound, are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates,
except through the peaceful means of a constitutional convention, or of an amendment
according to the mode therein prescribed, or through the exertion of the original right of
revolution. "The Constitution may be set aside by revolution, but it can only be amended
in the way it provides," said Hobson, C.J., in McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 791, 162
S.W. 99, 103. (Johnson vs. Craft, et al., 87 So. 375, 385, 387, On Rehearing).

"The fact that a majority voted for the amendment, unless the vote was taken as provided
by the Constitution, is not sufficient to make a change in that instrument. Whether a
proposed amendment has been legally adopted is a judicial question, for the court must
uphold and enforce the Constitution as written until it is amended in the way which it
provides for." Wood v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac 840, 25 L.R.A. 560; McConaughty v.
State, 106 Minn. 409, 119 N.W. 408; Oakland Paving Company v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 499,
11 Pac. 3; Utter v. Mosely, 16 Idaho 274, 100 Pac. 1958, 133 Am. St. Rep. 94, 18 Ann.
Cas. 723. (McCreary v. Speer, 162 S.W. 99, 104).

"Provisions of a constitution regulating its own amendment, ... are not merely directory,
but are mandatory; and a strict observance of every substantial mandatory; and a strict
observance of every substantial requirement is essential to the validity of the proposed
amendment. These provisions are as binding on the people as on the legislature, and the
 former are powerless by vote of acceptance to give legal sanction to an amendment the
submission of which was made in disregard of the limitations contained in the
constitution." (16 C.J.S. 35-36. cited in Graham v. Jones, 3 So. 2d 761, 782).

"It is said that chaos and confusion in the government affairs of the State will result from
the Court's action in declaring the proposed constitutional amendment void. This
statement is grossly and manifestly inaccurate. If confusion and chaos should ensue, it
will not be due to the action of the Court but will be the result of the failure of the drafters
joint resolution to observe, follow and obey the plain essential provisions of the
Constitution. Furthermore, to say that, the Court disregards its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution, chaos and confusion will result, is an inherently weak argument in favor of
the alleged constitutionality of the proposed amendment. It is obvious that, if the Court
were to countenance the violations of the sacramental provisions Constitution, those who
would thereafter desire to violate it disregard its clear mandatory provisions would resort
to the scheme of involving and confusing the affairs of the State then simply tell the
Court that it was powerless to exercise one of its primary functions by rendering the
proper decree to make the Constitution effective." (Graham v. Jones, 3 So. 2d. 761, 793-
794).

In our jurisprudence I find an instance where this Court did not allow the will of the majority to prevail,
because the requirements of the law were not complied with. In the case of Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil. 758,
Monsale and Nico were both candidates for the office of Municipal Mayor of Miagao, Iloilo, in the elections
of November 11, 1947. Monsale had duly filed his certificate of candidacy before the expiration of the period
for the filing of the same. However, on October 10, 1947, after the period for the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy. But on November 7, 1947 Monsale attempted to
revive his certificate of candidacy by withdrawing the withdrawal of certificate of candidacy. The
Commission on Elections, November 8, 1947, ruled that Monsale could no longer be a candidate. Monsale
nevertheless proceeded with his candidacy. The boards of inspectors in Miagao, however, did not count the
votes cast for Monsale upon the ground that the votes cast for him were stray votes, because he was
considered as having no certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, the boards of inspectors credited Nico
with 2,291 votes, and Nico was proclaimed elected. Monsale filed a protest against the election of Nico in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo. In the count of the ballots during the proceedings in the trial court, it
appeared that Monsale had obtained 2,877 votes while Nico obtained 2,276 votes, or a margin of 601 votes in
favor of Monsale. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo decided the election protest in favor of Monsale. Upon
appeal by Nico, this Court reversed the decision of the lower court. This Court declared that because Monsale
withdrew his certificate of candidacy, his attempt to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal of his certificate
of candidacy did not restore the effectiveness of his certificate of candidacy, and this Court declared Nico the
winner in spite of the fact that Monsale had obtained more votes than he.

We have cited this Monsale case to show that the will of the majority of the voters would not be given effect,
as declared by this Court, if certain legal requirements have not been complied with in order to render the
votes valid and effective to decide the result of an election.

And so, in the cases now before this Court, the fact that the voting in the citizens assemblies (barangays) is
not the election that is provided for in the 1935 Constitution for the ratification of the amendment to the
Constitution, the affirmative votes cast in those assemblies can not be made the basis for declaring the
ratification of the proposed 1972 Constitution, in spite of the fact that it was reported that 14,976,561
members of the citizens assemblies voted for the adoption as against 743,869 for the rejection, because the
votes thus obtained were not in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines. The rule of law mast be upheld.

My last observation: One of the valid grounds against the holding of the plebiscite on January 15, 1973, as
provided in Presidential Decree No. 73, is that there is no freedom on the part of the people to exercise their
right of choice because of the existence of martial law in our country. The same ground holds true as regards
to the voting of the barangays on January 10 to 15, 1973. More so, because by General Order No. 20, issued
on January 7, 1973, the President of the Philippines ordered "that the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 73 in so far as they allow free public discussion of the proposed constitution, as well as my order
of December 17, 1972 temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purpose of free
and open debate on the proposed constitution, be suspended in the meantime." It is, therefore, my view that
voting in the barangays on January 10, 1973 was not free, and so this is one added reason why the results of
 the voting in the barangays should not be made the basis for proclamation of the ratification of the proposed
Constitution.

It is my view, therefore, that Proclamation No. 1102 repugnant to the 1935 Constitution, and so it is invalid,
and should not be given effect. The Constitution of 1972 proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
should be considered as not yet ratified by the people of this Republic, and so it should not be given force and
effect.

It is urged by the Solicitor General, however, that the voting in the citizens assemblies was a substantial compliance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the primary thrust of the provision of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is that "to be valid, amendments must gain the approval of the majority recognition of the
democratic postulate that sovereign resides in the people." It is not disputed that in a democratic sovereignty resides in the
people. But the term "people" must be understood in its constitutional meaning, and they are "those persons who are permitted by
the Constitution to exercise the elective franchise."8Thus, in Section 2 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that
"the President shall hold his office during a term of four years and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same term,
shall be elected by direct vote of the people..." Certainly under that constitutional provision, the "people" who elect directly the
President and the Vice-President are no other than the persons who, under the provisions of the same Constitution, are granted the
right to vote. In like manner the provision in Section 1 of Article II of the 1935 Constitution which says "Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them", the "people" who exercise the sovereign power are no other than
the persons who have the right to vote under the Constitution. In the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini9, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Johnson, said, "In democracies, the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the State. Their
sovereign authority is expressed through the ballot, of the qualified voters, in duly appointed elections held from time to time, by
means of which they choose their officials for definite fixed periods, and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their
representatives, the exercise of the powers of government." In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, 10 this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Laurel, said, "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." And in the case of Abanil v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolod, 11 this Court said: "In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed
to have a voice therein through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribed
qualifications. The people, in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in
that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed exclusively
for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit
and welfare of the state. (U.S. v. Cruikshauk, 92 U.S. 588)..." There is no question, therefore, that when we talk of sovereign
people, what is meant are the people who act through the duly qualified and registered voters who vote during an election that is
held as provided in the Constitution or in the law.

The term "election" as used in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution should be construed along with the term
"election" as used in the Provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Independence Act of the Congress of the United States,
popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law (Public Act No. 127). Said Section 4 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law provides as
follows:

Section 4. After the President of the United States certified that the constitution conforms with the provisions
of this act, it shall be submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands for their ratification or rejection at an
election to he held within months after the date of such certification, on a date to be fixed by the Philippine
Legislature at which election, the qualified voters of the Philippine Islands shall have an opportunity to vote
directly or against the proposed constitution and ordinances append thereto. Such election shall be held in
such manner as may prescribed by the Philippine Legislature to which the return of the election shall be
made. The Philippine Legislature shall certify the result to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
together with a statement of the votes cast, and a copy of said constitution ordinances. If a majority of the
votes cast shall be for the constitution, such vote shall be deemed an expression of the will of the people of
the Philippine Independence, and the Governor-General shall, within thirty days after receipt of the
certification from the Philippine Legislature, issue a proclamation for the election of officers of the
government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands provided for in the Constitution...

It can safely be said, therefore, that when the framers of the 1935 Constitution used, the word "election" in Section I Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution they had no other idea in mind except the elections that were periodically held in the Philippines for the
choice of public officials prior to the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, and also the "election" mentioned in the Independence
Act at which "the qualified voters of the Philippine Islands shall have an opportunity to vote directly for or against the proposed
constitution..." It is but logical to expect that the framers of the 1935 Constitution would provide a mode of ratifying an
amendment to that Constitution similar to the mode of ratifying the original Constitution itself.

It is clear therefore, that the ratification or any amendment to the 1935 Constitution could only be done by holding an election, as
the term "election" was understood, and practiced, when the 1935 Constitution as drafted. The alleged referendum in the citizens
assemblies — participated in by persons aged 15 years or more, regardless of whether they were qualified voters or not, voting by
raising their hands, and the results of the voting reported by the barrio or ward captain, to the municipal mayor, who in turn
submitted the report to the provincial Governor, and the latter forwarding the reports to the Department of Local Governments,
all without the intervention of the Commission on Elections which is the constitutional body which has exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws, relative to the conduct of elections — was not only a non-substantial compliance with
the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution but a downright violation of said constitutional provision. It
would be indulging in sophistry to maintain that the voting in the citizens assemblies amounted to a substantial compliance with
the requirements prescribed in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.

It is further contended by the Solicitor General, that even if the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
not ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, the fact is that after the
President of the Philippines had issued Proclamation No. 1102 declaring that the said proposed Constitution "has been ratified by
overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the barangays (citizens assemblies) throughout the Philippines
and had thereby come into effect" the people have accepted the new Constitution. What appears to me, however, is that
practically it is only the officials and employees under the executive department of the Government who have been performing
their duties apparently in observance of the provisions of the new Constitution. It could not be otherwise, because the President of
the Philippines, who is the head of the executive department, had proclaimed that the new Constitution had come into effect, and
his office had taken the steps to implement the provisions of the new Constitution. True it is, that some 92 members of the House
of Representatives and 15 members of the Senate, of the Congress of the Philippines had expressed their option to serve in the
interim National Assembly that is provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution. It must be noted,
however, that of the 15 senators who expressed their option to serve in the interim National Assembly only one them took his
oath of office; and of the 92 members of the House of Representatives who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly, only
22 took their oath of office. The fact that only one Senator out of 24, and only 22 Representative out of 110, took their oath of
office, is an indication that only a small portion of the members of Congress had manifested the acceptance of the new
Constitution. It is in the taking of the oath of office where the affiant says that he swears to "support and defend the Constitution"
that the acceptance of the Constitution is made manifest. I agree with counsel petitioners in L-36165 (Gerardo Roxas, et al. v.
Alejandro Melchor, et al.) when he said that the members of Congress who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly did
only ex abundante cautela, or by way of a precaution, making sure, that in the event the new Constitution becomes definitely
effective and the interim National Assembly convened, they can participate in legislative work in the capacity as duly elected
representatives of the people, which otherwise they could not do if they did not manifest their option to serve, and that option had
to be made within 30 day from January 17, 1973, the date when Proclamation No. 110 was issued. Of course, if the proposed
Constitution does not become effective, they continue to be members of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. Let it be
considered that the members of the House of Representatives were elected in 1969 to serve a term which will yet expire on
December 31, 1973. Whereas, of the Senators who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly, the term of some of them
will yet expire on December 31, 1973, some on December 31, 1975, and the rest on December 31, 1977. Let if be noted that 9
Senators did not opt to serve in the interim National Assembly, and 18 members of the House of Representatives also did not opt
to serve in the interim National Assembly.

Neither can it be said that the people have accepted the new Constitution. I cannot, in conscience, accept the reported affirmative
votes in the citizens assemblies as a true and correct expression by the people of their approval, or acceptance, of the proposed
Constitution. I have my serious doubts regarding the freedom of the people to express their views regarding the proposed
Constitution during the voting in the citizens assemblies, and I have also my serious doubts regarding the truthfulness and
accuracy of the reports of the voting in the citizens assemblies. This doubt has been engendered in my mind after a careful
examination and study of the records of these cases, particularly with respect to the reports of the voting in the citizens
assemblies. Perhaps, it may be said that the people, or the inhabitants of this country, have acquiesced to the new Constitution, in
the sense that they have continued to live peacefully and orderly under the government that has been existing since January 17,
1973 when it was proclaimed that the new Constitution came into effect. But what could the people do? In the same way that the
people have lived under martial law since September 23, 1972, they also have to live under the government as it now exists, and
as it has existed since the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972, regardless of what Constitution is operative —
whether it is the 1935 Constitution or the new Constitution. Indeed, there is nothing that the people can do under the
circumstances actually prevailing in our country today — circumstances, known to all, and which I do not consider necessary to
state in this opinion. I cannot agree, therefore, with my worthy colleagues in the Court who hold the view that the people have
accepted the new Constitution, and that because the people have accepted it, the new Constitution should be considered as in
force, regardless of the fact that it was not ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution.
It is my honest view that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has not come into effect. I do not say,
however, that the proposed Constitution is invalid. To me, the validity of the proposed Constitution is not in issue in the cases
before Us. What the petitioners assail is not the validity of the proposed Constitution but the validity of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1102 which declares the proposed Constitution as having been ratified and has come into effect. It being my considered view
that the ratification of the proposed Constitution, as proclaimed in Proclamation No. 1102, is not in accordance with the
provisions of Section 1 of Article XV, of the 1935 Constitution, I hold that Proclamation No. 1102 is invalid and should not be
given force and effect. Their proposed Constitution, therefore, should be considered as not yet validly ratified, and so it is not in
force. The proposed Constitution may still be submitted to a plebiscite in conformity with Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution. Incidentally, I must state that the Constitution is still in force, and this Court is still functioning under the 1935
Constitution.

I sincerely believe that the proposed Constitution may still be submitted to the people in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, as we have adverted to in this
opinion, this was the mandate of Congress when, on March 16, 1967, it passed Resolution No. 2 calling a convention to propose
amendments to the 1935 Constitution. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the President of the Philippines has
reassured the nation that the government of our Republic since the declaration of martial law is not a revolutionary government,
and that he has been acting all the way in consonance with his powers under the Constitution. The people of this Republic has
reason to be happy because, according to the President, we still have a constitutional government. It being my view that the 1935
Constitution is still in force, I believe Congress may still convene and pass a law calling for an election at which the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention will be submitted to the people their ratification or rejection. A plebiscite called
pursuant to Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is an assurance to our people that we still have in our country the
Rule of Law and that the democratic system of government that has been implanted in our country by the Americans, and which
has become part of our social and political fabric, is still a reality.

The views that I have expressed in this opinion are inspired by a desire on my part to bring about stability in democratic and
constitutional system in our country. I feel that if this Court would give its imprimatur to the ratification of the proposed
Constitution, as announced in Proclamation No. 1102, it being very clear that the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution had not been complied with, We will be opening the gates for a similar disregard of the Constitution in the
future. What I mean is that if this Court now declares that a new Constitution is now in force because the members of the citizens
assemblies had approved the said new Constitution, although that approval was not in accordance with the procedure and the
requirements prescribed in the 1935 Constitution, it can happen again in some future time that some amendments to the
Constitution may be adopted, even in a manner contrary to the existing Constitution and the law, and then said proposed
amendment is submitted to the people in any manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed that there was approval by the
people. There will not be stability in our constitutional system, and necessarily no stability in our government. As a member of
this Court I only wish to contribute my humble efforts to prevent the happening of such a situation in the future.

It appearing to me that the announced ratification of the proposed Constitution through the voting in the citizens assemblies is a
clear violation of the 1935 Constitution, what I say in this opinion is simply an endeavor on my part to be true to my oath of
office to defend and support the 1935 Constitution. I am inspired by what the great jurist and statesman, Jose P. Laurel, said:

Let our judges be as it were the vestal keepers of the purity and sanctity of our Constitution, and the
protection and vindication of popular rights will be safe and secure in their reverential guardianship.

I only wish to help prevent, if I can, democracy and the liberties of our people from vanishing in our land, because, as Justice
George Sutherland of the U. S. Supreme Court said:

(t)he saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its
possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time.

I concur fully with the personal views expressed by the Chief Justice in the opinion that he has written in these cases. Along with
him, I vote to deny the motion to dismiss and give due course to the petitions in these cases.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

No question more momentous, none impressed with such transcendental significance is likely to confront this Court in the near or
distant future as that posed by these petitions. For while the specific substantive issue is the validity of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1102, an adverse judgment may be fraught with consequences that, to say the least, are far-reaching in its implications. As
stressed by respondents, "what petitioners really seek to invalidate is the new Constitution." 1 Strict accuracy would of course
qualify such statement that what is in dispute, as noted in the opinion of the Chief Justice, goes only as far as the validity of its
ratification. It could very well be though that the ultimate outcome is not confined within such limit, and this is not to deny that
under its aegis, there have been marked gains in the social and economic sphere, but given the premise of continuity in a regime
under a fundamental law, which itself explicitly recognizes the need for change and the process for bringing it about,2 it seems to
me that the more appropriate course is this Court to give heed to the plea of petitioners that the most serious attention be paid to
their submission that the challenged executive act fails to meet the test of constitutionality. Under the circumstances, with regret
and with due respect for the opinion of my brethren, I must perforce dissent. It would follow therefore that the legal position
taken by the Chief Justice as set forth with his usual lucidity and thoroughness has, on the whole, my concurrence, subject, of
course, to reservations insofar as it contains views and nuances to which I have in the past expressed doubts. Nonetheless, I feel
that a brief expression of the reasons for the stand I take would not be amiss.

In coping with its responsibility arising from the function of judicial review, this Court is not expected to be an oracle given to
utterances of eternal verities, but certainly it is more than just a keen but passive observer of the contemporary scene. It is, by
virtue of its role under the separation of powers concept, involved not necessarily as a participant in the formation of government
policy, but as an arbiter of its legality. Even then, there is realism in what Lerner did say about the American Supreme Court as
"the focal point of a set of dynamic forces which [could play] havoc with the landmarks of the American state and determine the
power configuration of the day."3 That is why there is this caveat. In the United States as here, the exercise of the power of
judicial review is conditioned on the necessity that the decision of a case or controversy before it so requires. To repeat, the
Justices of the highest tribunal are not, as Justice Frankfurter made clear, "architects of policy. They can nullify the policy of
others, they are incapable of fashioning their own solutions for social problems."4 Nonetheless, as was stressed by Professors
Black5 and Murphy,6 a Supreme Court by the conclusion it reaches and the decision it renders does not merely check the
coordinate branches, but also by its approval stamps with legitimacy the action taken. Thus in affirming constitutional
supremacy, the political departments could seek the aid of the judiciary. For the assent it gives to what has been done conduces to
its support in a regime where the rule of law holds sway. In discharging such a role, this Court must necessarily take in account
not only what the exigent needs of the present demand but what may lie ahead in the unexplored and unknown vistas of the
future. It must guard against the pitfall of lack of understanding of the dominant forces at work to seek a better life for all,
especially those suffering from the pangs of poverty and disease, by a blind determination to adhere to the status quo. It would be
tragic, and a clear case of its being recreant to its trust, if the suspicion can with reason be entertained that its approach amounts
merely to a militant vigilantism that is violently opposed to any form of social change. It follows then that it does not suffice that
recourse be had only to what passes for scholarship in the law that could be marred by inapplicable erudition and narrow
legalism. Even with due recognition, such factors, however, I cannot, for reasons to be set more lengthily and in the light of the
opinion of the Chief Justice, reach the same result as the majority of my brethren. For, in the last analysis, it is my firm
conviction that the institution of judicial review speaks too clearly for the point to be missed that official action, even with due
allowance made for the good faith that invariably inspires the step taken, has to face the gauntlet of a court suit whenever there is
a proper case with the appropriate parties.

1. Respondents are acting in the soundest constitutional tradition when, at the outset, they would seek a dismissal of these
petitions. For them, the question raised is political and thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Such an approach cannot be
indicted for unorthodoxy. It is implicit in the concept of the rule of law that rights belong to the people and the government
possesses powers only. Essentially then, unless such an authority may either be predicated on express or implied grant in the
Constitution or the statutes, an exercise thereof cannot survive an inquiry as to its validity. Respondents through Solicitor-
General Mendoza would deny our competence to proceed further. It is their view, vigorously pressed and plausibly asserted, that
since what is involved is not merely the effectivity of an amendment but the actual coming into effect of a new constitution, the
matter is not justiciable. The immediate reaction is that such a contention is to be tested in the light of the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers that it is not only the function but the solemn duty of the judiciary to determine what the law is and to apply
it in cases and controversies that call for decision.7 Since the Constitution pre-eminently occupies the highest rung in the
hierarchy of legal norms, it is in the judiciary, ultimately this Tribunal, that such a responsibility is vested. With the 1935
Constitution containing, as above noted, an explicit article on the subject of amendments, it would follow that the presumption to
be indulged in is that the question of whether there has been deference to its terms is for this Court to pass upon. What is more,
the Gonzales,8 Tolentino9 and Planas 10 cases speak unequivocally to that effect. Nor is it a valid objection to this conclusion that
what was involved in those cases was the legality of the submission and not ratification, for from the very language of the
controlling article, the two vital steps are proposal and ratification, which as pointed out in Dillon v. Gloss, 11 "cannot be treated
as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor." 12 Once an aspect thereof is viewed as judicial, there would be no
justification for considering the rest as devoid of that character. It would be for me then an indefensible retreat, deriving no
justification from circumstances of weight and gravity, if this Court were to accede to what is sought by respondents and rule that
the question before us is political.

On this point, it may not be inappropriate to refer to a separate opinion of mine in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 Thus: "The term has
been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case
appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which
deference must be paid. It has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the
President or Congress, or any branch thereof. If to be delimited with accuracy, "political questions" should refer to such as would
under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to full discretionary authority is vested
either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. Unless clearly falling within
the formulation, the decision reached by the political branches whether in the form of a congressional act or an executive order
could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has no choice but to look into its validity. It is not to be
lost sight of that such a power comes into play if there be an appropriate proceeding that may be filed only after each coordinate
branch has acted. Even when the Presidency or Congress possesses plenary powers, its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof,
if shown, may give rise to a justiciable controversy. For the constitutional grant of authority is usually unrestricted. There are
limits to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished. Necessarily then, the courts in the proper exercise of judicial review
could inquire into the question of whether or not either of the two coordinate branches has adhered to what is laid down by the
Constitution. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political." 14 The view entertained by Professor Dodd is not too
dissimilar. For him such a term "is employed to designate certain types of functions committed to the political organs of
government (the legislative and executive departments, or either of them) and not subject to judicial investigation." 15 After a
thorough study of American judicial decisions, both federal and state, he could conclude: "The field of judicial nonenforceability
is important, but is not large when contrasted with the whole body of written constitutional texts. The exceptions from judicial
enforceability fall primarily within the field of public or governmental interests." 16 Nor was Professor Weston's formulation any
different. As was expressed by him: "Judicial questions, in what may be thought the more useful sense, are those which the
sovereign has set to be decided in the courts. Political questions, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-
called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." 17 What appears
undeniable then both from the standpoint of Philippine as well as American decisions is the care and circumspection required
before the conclusion is warranted that the matter at issue is beyond judicial cognizance, a political question being raised.

2. The submission of respondents on this subject of political question, admittedly one of complexity and importance, deserves to
be pursued further. They would derive much aid and comfort from the writings of both Professor Bickel 18 of Yale and Professor
Freund 19 of Harvard, both of whom in turn are unabashed admirers of Justice Brandeis. Whatever be the merit inherent in their
lack of enthusiasm for a more active and positive role that must be played by the United States Supreme Court in constitutional
litigation, it must be judged in the light of our own history. It cannot be denied that from the well nigh four decades of
constitutionalism in the Philippines, even discounting an almost similar period of time dating from the inception of American
sovereignty, there has sprung a tradition of what has been aptly termed as judicial activism. Such an approach could be traced to
the valedictory address before the 1935 Constitutional Convention of Claro M. Recto. He spoke of the trust reposed in the
judiciary in these words: "It is one of the paradoxes of democracy that the people at times place more confidence in
instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them for the exercise of their sovereignty." 20 It would thus
appear that even then this Court was expected not to assume an attitude of timidity and hesitancy when a constitutional question
is posed. There was the assumption of course that it would face up to such a task, without regard to political considerations and
with no thought except that of discharging its trust. Witness these words Justice Laurel in an early landmark case, People v.
Vera, 21 decided in 1937: "If it is ever necessary for us to make vehement affirmance during this formative period of political
history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it." 22 The hope of course
was that such assertion of independence impartiality was not mere rhetoric. That is a matter more appropriately left to others to
determine. It suffices to stake that what elicits approval on the part of our people of a judiciary ever alert to inquire into alleged
breaches of the fundamental law is the realization that to do so is merely to do what is expected of it and that thereby there is no
invasion of spheres appropriately belonging to the political branches. For it needs to be kept in kind always that it can act only
when there is a suit with proper parties before it, wherein rights appropriate for judicial enforcement are sought to be vindicated.
Then, too, it does not approach constitutional questions with dogmatism or apodictic certainty nor view them from the shining
cliffs of perfection. This is not to say though that it is satisfied with an empiricism untroubled by the search for jural consistency
and rational coherence. A balance has to be struck. So juridical realism requires. Once allowance made that for all its care and
circumspection this Court manned by human beings fettered by fallibility, nonetheless earnestly and sincerely striving to do right,
the public acceptance of its vigorous pursuit of the task of assuring that the Constitution be obeyed is easy to understand. It has
not in the past shirked its responsibility to ascertain whether there has been compliance with and fidelity to constitutional
requirements. Such is the teaching of a host of cases from Angara v. Electoral
Commission 23 to Planas v. Commission on Elections. 24 It should continue to exercise its jurisdiction, even in the face of a
plausible but not sufficiently persuasive insistence that the matter before it is political.

Nor am I persuaded that the reading of the current drift in American legal scholarship by the Solicitor-General and his equally
able associates presents the whole picture. On the question of judicial review, it is not a case of black and white; there are shaded
areas. It goes too far, in my view, if the perspective is one of dissatisfaction, with its overtones of distrust. This expression of
disapproval has not escaped Dean Rostow of Yale, who began one of his most celebrated legal essays. The Democratic Character
of Judicial Review, thus: "A theme of uneasiness, and even of guilt, colors the literature about judicial review. Many of those
who have talked, lectured, and written about the Constitution have been troubled by a sense that judicial review is
undemocratic." 25 He went on to state: "Judicial review, they have urged, is an undemocratic shoot on an otherwise respectable
tree. It should be cut off, or at least kept pruned and
inconspicuous." 26 His view was precisely the opposite. Thus: "The power of constitutional review, to be exercised by some part
of the government, is implicit in the conception of a written constitution delegating limited powers. A written constitution would
promote discord rather than order in society if there were no accepted authority to construe it, at the least in case of conflicting
action by different branches of government or of constitutionally unauthorized governmental action against individuals. The
limitation and separation of powers, if they are to survive, require a procedure for independent mediation and construction to
reconcile the inevitable disputes over the boundaries of constitutional power which arise in the process of government." 27 More
than that, he took pains to emphasize: "Whether another method of enforcing the Constitution could have been devised, the short
answer is that no such method developed. The argument over the constitutionality of judicial review has long since been settled
by history. The power and duty of the Supreme Court to declare statutes or executive action unconstitutional in appropriate cases
is part of the living Constitution. 'The course of constitutional history,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter recently remarked, 'has cast
responsibilities upon the Supreme Court which it would be "stultification" for it to evade.' " 28 Nor is it only Dean Rostow who
could point Frankfurter, reputed to belong to the same school of thought opposed to judicial activism, if not its leading advocate
during his long stay in the United States Supreme Court, as one fully cognizant of the stigma that attaches to a tribunal which
neglects to meet the demands of judicial review. There is a statement of similar importance from Professor Mason: "In Stein v.
New York Frankfurter remarked, somewhat self-consciously perhaps, that the 'duty of deference cannot be allowed imperceptibly
to slide into abdication.' " 29 Professor Konefsky, like Dean Rostow, could not accept characterization of judicial review as
undemocratic. Thus his study of Holmes and Brandeis, the following appears: "When it is said that judicial review is an
undemocratic feature of our political system, it ought also to be remembered that architects of that system did not equate
constitutional government with unbridled majority rule. Out of their concern for political stability and security for private rights,
..., they designed a structure whose keystone was to consist of barriers to the untrammeled exercise of power by any group. They
perceived no contradiction between effective government and constitutional checks. To James Madison, who may legitimately be
regarded as the philosopher of the Constitution, the scheme of mutual restraints was the best answer to what he viewed as the
chief problem in erecting a system of free representative government: 'In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.' " 30

There is thus an inevitability to the flowering of judicial review. Could it be that the tone of discontent apparent in the writings of
eminent authorities on the subject evince at the most fears that the American Supreme Court might overstep the bounds allotted
to the judiciary? It cannot be a denial of the fitness of such competence being vested in judges and of their being called upon to
fulfill such a trust whenever appropriate to the decision of a case before them. That is why it has been correctly maintained that
notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision in the fundamental law of the United States Constitution, that distinguished
American constitutional historian, Professor Corwin, could rightfully state that judicial review "is simply incidental to the power
of courts to interpret the law, of which the Constitution is part, in connection with the decision of cases." 31 This is not to deny
that there are those who would place the blame or the credit, depending upon one's predilection, on Marshall's epochal opinion
in Marbury v. Madison. 32 Curtis belonged to that persuasion. As he put it: "The problem was given no answer by the
Constitution. A hole was left where the Court might drive in the peg of judicial supremacy, if it could. And that is what John
Marshall did." 33 At any rate there was something in the soil of American juristic thought resulting in this tree of judicial power
so precariously planted by Marshall striking deep roots and showing wonderful vitality and hardiness. It now dominates the
American legal scene. Through it, Chief Justice Hughes, before occupying that exalted position, could state in a lecture: "We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is ... ." 34 The above statement is more than just an aphorism
that lends itself to inclusion in judicial anthologies or bar association speeches. It could and did provoke from Justice Jackson, an
exponent of the judicial restraint school of thought, this meaningful query: "The Constitution nowhere provides that it shall be
what the judges say it is. How, did it come about that the statement not only could be but could become current as the most
understandable comprehensive summary of American Constitutional law?" 35 It is no wonder that Professor Haines could pithily
and succinctly sum up the place of the highest American tribunal in the scheme of things in this wise: "The Supreme Court of the
United States has come to be regarded as the unique feature of the American governmental system." 36Let me not be
misunderstood. There is here no attempt to close one's eyes to a discernible tendency on the part of some distinguished faculty
minds to look askance at what for them may be inadvisable extension of judicial authority. For such indeed is the case as
reflected in two leading cases of recent vintage, Baker v. Carr, 37 decided in 1962 and Powell v. MacCormack, 38 in 1969, both
noted in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The former disregarded the warning of Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green 39
about the American Supreme Court declining jurisdiction on the question of apportionment as to do so would cut very deep into
the very being of Congress." 40 For him, the judiciary "ought not to enter this political thicket." Baker has since then been
followed; it has spawned a host of cases. 41 Powell, on the question of the power of a legislative body to exclude from its ranks a
person whose qualifications are uncontested, for many the very staple of what is essentially political, certainly goes even further
than the authoritative Philippine decision of Vera v. Avelino, 42 It does look then that even in the United States, the plea for
judicial self-restraint, even if given voice by those competent in the field of constitutional law, has fallen on deaf ears. There is in
the comments of respondents an excerpt from Professor Freund quoting from one of his essays appearing in a volume published
in 1968. It is not without interest to note that in another paper, also included therein, he was less than assertive about the necessity
for self-restraint and apparently mindful of the claims of judicial activism. Thus: "First of all, the Court has a responsibility to
maintain the constitutional order, the distribution of public power, and the limitations on that power." 43 As for Professor Bickel,
it has been said that as counsel for the New York Times in the famous Vietnam papers case, 44 he was less than insistent on the
American Supreme Court exercising judicial self-restraint. There are signs that the contending forces on such question, for some
an unequal contest, are now quiescent. The fervor that characterized the expression of their respective points of view appears to
have been minimized. Not that it is to be expected that it will entirely disappear, considering how dearly cherished are, for each
group, the convictions, prejudices one might even say, entertained. At least what once was fitly characterized as the booming
guns of rhetoric, coming from both directions, have been muted. Of late, scholarly disputations have been centered on the
standards that should govern the exercise of the power of judicial review. In his celebrated Holmes lecture in 1959 at the Harvard
Law School, Professor Wechsler advocated as basis for decision what he termed neutral principles of constitutional law. 45 It has
brought forth a plethora of law review articles, the reaction ranging from guarded conformity to caustic criticism. 46 There was, to
be sure, no clear call to a court in effect abandoning the responsibility incumbent on it to keep governmental agencies within
constitutional channels. The matter has been put in temperate terms by Professor Frank thus: "When allowance has been made for
all factors, it nevertheless seems to me that the doctrine of political questions ought to be very sharply confined to where the
functional reasons justify it and that in a give involving its expansion there should be careful consideration also of the social
considerations which may militate against it. The doctrine has a certain specious charm because of its nice intellectualism and
because of the fine deference it permits to expertise, to secret knowledge, and to the prerogatives of others. It should not be
allowed to grow as a merely intellectual plant." 47

It is difficult for me at least, not to be swayed by appraisal, coming from such impeccable sources of the worth and significance
of judicial review in the United States. I cannot resist the conclusion then that the views advanced on this subject by distinguished
counsel for petitioners, with Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Jovito Salonga at the van, rather than the advocacy of the Solicitor-
General, possess the greater weight and carry persuasion. So much then for the invocation of the political question principle as a
bar to the exercise of our jurisdiction.

3. That brings me to the issue of the validity of the ratification. The crucial point that had to be met is whether Proclamation No.
1102 manifests fidelity to the explicit terms of Article XV. There is, of course, the view not offensive to reason that a sense of the
realities should temper the rigidity of devotion to the strict letter of the text to allow deference to its spirit to control. With due
recognition of its force in constitutional litigation, 48 if my reading of the events and the process that led to such proclamation, so
clearly set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice, is not inaccurate, then it cannot be confidently asserted that there was such
compliance. It would be to rely on conjectural assumptions that did founder on the rock of the undisputed facts. Any other
conclusion would, for me, require an interpretation that borders on the strained. So it has to be if one does not lose sight of how
the article on amendments is phrased. A word, to paraphrase Justice Holmes may not be a crystal, transparent and unchanged, but
it is not, to borrow from Learned Hand, that eminent jurist, a rubber band either. It would be unwarranted in my view then to
assert that the requirements of the 1935 Constitution have been met. There are American decisions, 49and they are not few in
number, which require that there be obedience to the literal terms of the applicable provision. It is understandable why it should
be thus. If the Constitution is the supreme law, then its mandate must be fulfilled. No evasion is tolerated. Submission to its
commands can be shown only if each and every word is given meaning rather than ignored or disregarded. This is not to deny
that a recognition conclusive effect attached to the electorate manifesting its will to vote affirmatively on the amendments
proposed poses an obstacle to the judiciary being insistent on the utmost regularity. Briefly stated, substantial compliance is
enough. A great many American State decisions may be cited in support of such a doctrine. 50

Even if the assumption be indulged in that Article XV is not phrased in terms too clear to be misread, so that this Court is called
upon to give meaning and perspective to what could be considered words of vague generality, pregnant with uncertainty, still
whatever obscurity it possesses is illumined when the light of the previous legislation is thrown on it. In the first Commonwealth
Act, 51 submitting to the Filipino people for approval or disapproval certain amendments to the original ordinance appended to
the 1935 Constitution, it was made that the election for such purpose was to "be conducted in conformity with the provisions of
the Election Code insofar as the same may be applicable." 52 Then came the statute, 53 calling for the plebiscite on the three 1940
amendments providing for the plebiscite on the three 1930 amendments providing for a bicameral Congress or a Senate and a
House of Representatives to take the place of a unicameral National Assembly, 54 reducing the term of the President to four years
but allowing his re-election with the limitation that he cannot serve more than eight consecutive years, 55 and creating an
independent Commission on Elections. 56 Again, it was expressly provided that the election "shall be conducted in conformity
with the provisions of the Election Code in so far as the same may be applicable." 57 The approval of the present parity
amendment was by virtue of a Republic Act 58 which specifically made applicable the then Election Code. 59 There is a similar
provision in the
legislation, 60 which in cotemplation of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, saw to it that there be an increase in the membership
of the House of Representatives a maximum of one hundred eighty and assured the eligibility of senators and representatives to
become members of such constituent body without forfeiting their seats, as proposed amendments to be voted on in the 1967
elections. 61 That is the consistent course of interpretation followed by the legislative branch. It is most persuasive, if not
controlling. The restraints thus imposed would set limits to the Presidential action taken, even on the assumption that either as an
agent of the Constitutional Convention or under his martial law prerogatives, he was not devoid of power to specify the mode of
ratification. On two vital points, who can vote and how they register their will, Article XV had been given a definitive
construction. That is why I fail to see sufficient justification for this Court affixing the imprimatur of its approval on the mode
employed for the ratification of the revised Constitution as reflected in Proclamation No. 1102.
4. Nor is the matter before us solely to be determined by the failure to comply with the requirements of Article XV.
Independently of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in whom
sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, 62 then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision of the
utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect. Such a fundamental principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow Laski, that the
nation as a whole constitutes the "single center of ultimate reference," necessarily the possessor of that "power that is able to
resolve disputes by saying the last word." 63 If the origins of the democratic polity enshrined in the 1935 Constitution with the
declaration that the Philippines is a republican state could be traced back to Athens and to Rome, it is no doubt true, as McIver
pointed out, that only with the recognition of the nation as the separate political unit in public law is there the juridical
recognition of the people composing it "as the source of political authority." 64 From them, as Corwin did stress, emanate "the
highest possible embodiment of human will," 65 which is supreme and must be obeyed. To avoid any confusion and in the interest
of clarity, it should be expressed in the manner ordained by law. Even if such is not the case, however, once it is manifested, it is
to be accepted as final and authoritative. The government which is merely an agency to register its commands has no choice but
to submit. Its officials must act accordingly. No agency is exempt such a duty, not even this Court. In that sense, the lack of
regularity in the method employed to register its wishes is fatal in its consequences. Once the fact of acceptance by people of a
new fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The obligation to render it
obeisance falls on the courts as well.

There are American State decisions that enunciate such a doctrine. While certainly not controlling, they are not entirely bereft of
persuasive significance. In Miller v. Johnson, 66 decided in 1892, it was set forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Holt that on May
3, 1890, an act was passed in Kentucky, providing for the calling of a convention for the purpose of framing a new constitution
and the election of delegates. It provided that before any form of constitution made by them should become operative, it should
be submitted to the vote of the state and ratified by a majority of those voting. The constitution then in force authorized the
legislature, the preliminary steps having been taken, to call a convention "for the purpose of readopting, amending, or changing"
it contained no provision giving the legislature the power to require a submission of its work to a vote of the people. The
convention met in September, 1890. By April, 1891, it completed a draft of a constitution, submitted it to a popular vote, and then
adjourned until September following. When the convention reassembled, the delegates made numerous changes in instrument. As
thus amended, it was promulgated by the convention of September 28, 1891, as the new constitution. An action was brought to
challenge its validity. It failed in the lower court. In affirming such judgment dismissing the action, Chief Justice Holt stated: "If
a set of men, not selected by the people according to the forms of law, were to formulate an instrument and declare it the
constitution, it would undoubtedly be the duty of the courts to declare its work a nullity. This would be revolution, and this the
courts of the existing government must resist until they are overturned by power, and a new government established. The
convention, however, was the offspring of law. The instrument which we are asked to declare invalid as a constitution has been
made and promulgated according to the forms of law. It is a matter of current history that both the executive and legislative
branches of the government have recognized its validity as a constitution, and are now daily doing so. ... While the judiciary
should protect the rights of the people with great care and jealousy, because this is its duty, and also because; in times of great
popular excitement, it is usually their last resort, yet it should at the same time be careful not to overstep the proper bounds of its
power, as being perhaps equally dangerous; and especially where such momentous results might follow as would be likely in this
instance, if the power of the judiciary permitted, and its duty requires, the overthrow of the work of the convention." 67 In Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 68 a 1903 decision, it was contended that the Virginia Constitution reclaimed in 1902 is invalid as it was
ordained and promulgated by the convention without being submitted for ratification or rejection by the people. The Court
rejected such a view. As stated in the opinion of Justice Harrison: "The Constitution of 1902 was ordained and proclaimed by a
convention duly called by direct vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the
work of the convention has been recognized, accepted, and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the state by the Governor
in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby; by the Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint
resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by the convention which assembled in the city of Richmond on
the 12th day of June, 1901, as the Constitution of Virginia; by the individual oaths of members to support it, and by enforcing its
provisions; and the people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by registering as voters
under it to the extent of thousands throughout the state, and by voting, under its provisions, at a general election for their
representatives in the Congress of the United States. The Constitution having been thus acknowledged and accepted by the office
administering the government and by the people of the state, and there being no government in existence under the Constitution
of 1869 opposing or denying its validity, we have no difficulty in holding that the Constitution in question, which went into effect
at noon on the 10th day of July, 1902, is the only rightful, valid, and existing Constitution of this state, and that to it all the
citizens of Virginia owe their obedience and loyal allegiance." 69

It cannot be plausibly asserted then that premises valid in law are lacking for the claim that the revised Constitution has been
accepted by the Filipino people. What is more, so it has been argued, it is not merely a case of its being implied. Through the
Citizens Assemblies, there was a plebiscite with the result as indicated in Proclamation No. 1102. From the standpoint of
respondents then, they could allege that there was more than just mere acquiescence by the sovereign people. Its will was thus
expressed formally and unmistakably. It may be added that there was nothing inherently objectionable in the informal method
followed in ascertaining its preference. Nor is the fact that Filipinos of both sexes above the age of fifteen were given the
opportunity to vote to be deplored. The greater the base of mass participation, the more there is fealty to the democratic concept.
It does logically follow likewise that such circumstances being conceded, then no justifiable question may be raised. This Court
is to respect what had thus received the people's sanction. That is not for me though whole of it. Further scrutiny even then is not
entirely foreclosed. There is still an aspect that is judicial, an inquiry may be had as to whether such indeed was the result. This is
no more than what the courts do in election cases. There are other factors to bear in mind. The fact that the President so certified
is well-nigh conclusive. There is in addition the evidence flowing from the conditions of peace and stability. There thus appears
to be conformity to the existing order of things. The daily course of events yields such a conclusion. What is more, the officials
under the 1935 Constitution, including practically all Representatives and a majority of the Senators, have signified their assent to
it. The thought persists, however, that as yet sufficient time has not elapsed to be really certain.

Nor is this all. There is for me an obstacle to the petitions being dismissed for such ascertainment of popular will did take place
during a period of martial law. It would have been different had there been that freedom of debate with the least interference, thus
allowing a free market of ideas. If it were thus, it could be truly said that there was no barrier to liberty of choice. It would be a
clear-cut decision either way. One could be certain as to the fact of the acceptance of the new or of adherence to the old. This is
not to deny that votes are cast by individuals with their personal concerns uppermost in mind, worried about their immediate
needs and captive to their existing moods. That is inherent in any human institution, much more so in a democratic polity. Nor is
it open to any valid objection because in the final analysis the state exists for the individuals who in their collectivity compose it.
Whatever be their views, they are entitled to respect. It is difficult for me, however, at this stage to feel secure in the conviction
that they did utilize the occasion afforded to give expression to what was really in their hearts. This is not to imply that such
doubt could not be dispelled by evidence to the contrary. If the petitions be dismissed however, then such opportunity is forever
lost.

5. With the foregoing legal principles in mind, I find myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed brethren who vote for the
dismissal of these petitions. I cannot yield an affirmative response to the plea of respondents to consider the matter closed, the
proceedings terminated once and for all. It is not an easy decision to reach. It has occasioned deep thought and considerable soul-
searching. For there are countervailing considerations that exert a compulsion not easy to resist. It can be asserted with truth,
especially in the field of social and economic rights, that with the revised Constitution, there is an auspicious beginning for
further progress. Then too it could resolve what appeared to be the deepening contradictions of political life, reducing at times
governmental authority to near impotence and imparting a sense of disillusionment in democratic processes. It is not too much to
say therefore that there had indeed been the revision of a fundamental law to vitalize the very values out of which democracy
grows. It is one which has all the earmarks of being responsive to the dominant needs of the times. It represents an outlook
cognizant of the tensions of a turbulent era that is the present. That is why for some what was done represented an act of courage
and faith, coupled with the hope that the solution arrived at is a harbinger of a bright and rosy future.

It is such a comfort then that even if my appraisal of the situation had commanded a majority, there is not, while these lawsuits
are being further considered, the least interference, with the executive department. The President in the discharge of all his
functions is entitled to obedience. He remains commander-in-chief with all the constitutional powers it implies. Public officials
can go about their accustomed tasks in accordance with the revised Constitution. They can pursue even the tenor of their ways.
They are free to act according to its tenets. That was so these past few weeks, even petitions were filed. There was not at any time
any thought of any restraining order. So it was before. That is how things are expected to remain even if the motions to dismiss
were not granted. It might be asked though, suppose the petitions should prevail? What then? Even so, the decision of this Court
need not be executory right away. Such a disposition of a case before this Court is not novel. That was how it was done in the
Emergency Powers Act controversy. 70 Once compliance is had with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, to
assure that the coming force of the revised charter is free from any taint of infirmity, then all doubts are set at rest.

For some, to so view the question before us is to be caught in a web of unreality, to cherish illusions that cannot stand the test of
actuality. What is more, it may give the impression of reliance on what may, for the practical man of affairs, be no more than
gossamer distinctions and sterile refinements unrelated to events. That may be so, but I find it impossible to transcend what for
me are the implications of traditional constitutionalism. This is not to assert that an occupant of the bench is bound to apply with
undeviating rigidity doctrines which may have served their day. He could at times even look upon them as mere scribblings in the
sands to be washed away by the advancing tides of the present. The introduction of novel concepts may be carried only so far
though. As Cardozo put the matter: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He
is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial necessity of
order in the social life." Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains." 71Moreover what made it difficult
for this Court to apply settled principles, which for me have not lost their validity, is traceable to the fact that the revised
Constitution was made to take effect immediately upon ratification. If a period of time were allowed to elapse precisely to enable
the judicial power to be exercised, no complication would have arisen. Likewise, had there been only one or two amendments, no
such problem would be before us. That is why I do not see sufficient justification for the orthodoxies of constitutional law not to
operate.
Even with full realization then that the approach pursued is not all that it ought to have been and the process of reasoning not
without its shortcomings, the basic premises of a constitutional democracy, as I understand them and as set forth in the preceding
pages, compel me to vote the way I did.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The masterly opinion of the Chief Justice wherein he painstakingly deals with the momentous issues of the cases at bar in all their
complexity commands my concurrence.

I would herein make an exposition of the fundamental reasons and considerations for my stand.

The unprecedented and precedent-setting issue submitted by petitioners for the Court's resolution is the validity and
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 issued on January 17, 1973, certifying and proclaiming that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention "has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes
cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect."

More specifically, the issue submitted is whether the purported ratification of the proposed Constitution by means of the Citizens
Assemblies has substantially complied with the mandate of Article XV of the existing Constitution of 1935 that duly proposed
amendments thereto, in toto or parts thereof, "shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the peoplefor their ratification."1

A necessary corollary issue is whether the purported ratification of the proposed Constitution as signed on November 30, 1972 by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention may be said also to have substantially complied with its own mandate that "(T)his
Constitution shall take immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite called for the purpose and
except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of Nineteen hundred and thirty-five and all amendments thereto."2

Respondents contend that "(A)lthough apparently what is sought to be annulled is Proclamation No. 1102,
what petitioners really seek to invalidate is the new Constitution", and their actions must be
dismissed, because:

— "the Court may not inquire into the validity of the procedure for ratification" which is "political in
character" and that "what is sought to be invalidated is not an act of the President but of the people;

— "(T)he fact of approval of the new Constitution by an overwhelming majority of the votes cast as declared
and certified in Proclamation No. 1102 is conclusive on the courts;

— "Proclamation No. 1102 was issued by the President in the exercise of legislative power under martial law.
... Alternatively, or contemporaneously, he did so as "agent" of the Constitutional Convention;"

— "alleged defects, such as absence of secret voting, enfranchisement of persons less than 21 years, non
supervision (by) the Comelec are matters not required by Article XV of the 1935 Constitution"; (sic)

— "after ratification, whatever defects there might have been in the procedure are overcome
and mooted (and muted) by the fact of ratification"; and

— "(A)ssuming finally that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution was not strictly followed, the ratification of
the new Constitution must nonetheless be respected. For the procedure outlined in Article XV
was not intended to be exclusive of other procedures, especially one which contemplates popular and direct
participation of the citizenry ... ."3

To test the validity of respondents' submittal that the Court, in annulling Proclamation No. 1102 would really be "invalidating the
new Constitution", the terms and premises of the issues have to be defined.

— Respondents themselves assert that "Proclamation No. 1102 ... is plainly merely declaratory of the fact
that the 1973 Constitution has been ratified and has come into force.4
 — The measure of the fact of ratification is Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. This has been consistently
held by the Court in the Gonzales:5 and Tolentino6 cases.

— In the Tolentino case, this Court emphasized "that the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the
Convention and the other departments of the government. It must be added that ... they are no
less binding upon the people."7

— In the same Tolentino case, this Court further proclaimed that "as long as any amendment is formulated
and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter, any proposal for such amendment which is not in
conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the Charter for effecting amendments, cannot receive the
sanction of this Court."8

— As continues to be held by a majority of this Court, proposed amendments to the Constitution "should be
ratified in only one way, that is, in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in
only by qualified and duly registered voters"9 and under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. 10

— Hence, if the Court declares Proclamation 1102 null and void because on its face, the purported
ratification of the proposed Constitution has not faithfully nor substantially observed nor complied with the
mandatory requirements of Article XV of the (1935) Constitution, it would not be "invalidating" the proposed
new Constitution but would be simply declaring that the announced fact of ratification thereof by means of
the Citizens Assemblies referendums does not pass the constitutional test and that the proposed new
Constitution has not constitutionally come into existence.

— Since Proclamation 1102 is acknowledged by respondent to be "plainly merely declaratory" of the

disputed fact of ratification, they cannot assume the very fact to be established and beg the issue by citing the
self-same declaration as proof of the purported ratification therein declared.

What complicates the cases at bar is the fact that the proposed 1972 Constitution was enforced as having immediately taken
effect upon the issuance on January 17, 1973 of Proclamation 1102 and the question of whether "confusion and disorder in
government affairs would (not) result" from a judicial declaration of nullity of the purported ratification is raised by the Solicitor-
General on behalf of respondents.

A comparable precedent of great crisis proportions is found in the Emergency Powers cases, 11 wherein the Court in its
Resolution of September 16, 1949 after judgment was initially not obtained on August 26, 1949 for lack of the required six (6)
votes, finally declared in effect that the pre-war emergency powers delegated by Congress to the President, under Commonwealth
Act 671 in pursuance of Article VI, section 26 of the Constitution, had ceased and became inoperative at the latest in May, 1946
when Congress met in its first regular session on May 25, 1946.

Then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran recited the great interests and important rights that had arisen under executive orders
"issued in good faith and with the best of intentions by three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced
extensive effects on the life of the nation" — in the same manner as may have arisen under the bona fide acts of the President
now in the honest belief that the 1972 Constitution had been validly ratified by means of the Citizens Assemblies referendums —
and indicated the proper course and solution therefor, which were duly abided by and confusion and disorder as well as harm to
public interest and innocent parties thereby avoided as follows:

Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared
to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and void.
It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been issued in good faith and with the best of
intentions by three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive effects in
the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945,
appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7,
1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89,
issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on
November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders appropriating
funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of all these executive orders will be
unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before nullifying them, other important
circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been ratified by Congress
expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in
 the last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contracts of parties
acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive order must be viewed in the light of its peculiar
circumstances, and, if necessary and possible, nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid
harm to public interest and innocent parties. 12

Initially, then Chief Justice Moran voted with a majority of the Court to grant the Araneta and Guerrero petitions holding null and
void the executive orders on rentals and export control but to defer judgment on the Rodriguez and Barredo petitions for judicial
declarations of nullity of the executive orders appropriating the 1949-1950 fiscal year budget for the government and P6 million
for the holding of the 1949 national elections. After rehearsing, he further voted to also declare null and void the last two
executive orders appropriating funds for the 1949 budget and elections, completing the "sufficient majority" of six against four
dissenting justices "to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter." 13

Then Chief Justice Moran, who penned the Court's majority resolution, explained his vote for annulment despite the great
difficulties and possible "harmful consequences" in the following passage, which bears re-reading:

However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the nullity of
the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give my
unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two executive
orders were issued without authority of law.

While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that positive
compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all
these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the opposite result because it would
legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion,
repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way or practices which may
undermine our constitutional structure.

The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass should the
said executive orders be immediately declared null and void are still real. They have not disappeared by
reason of the fact that a special session of Congress is not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in
the hands of the Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a
special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriations act.

That Congress may again fail to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under the
circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and
furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so desires, compel Congress
to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the country.

Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in
this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated sphere, complies with
its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.

Our Republic is still young, and the vital principles underlying its organic structure should be maintained
firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a
stable and vigorous democracy. 14

The late Justice Pedro Tuason who penned the initial majority judgment (declaring null and void the rental and export control
executive orders) likewise observed that "(T)he truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances 'the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are
called upon 'to perform the duties discharge the responsibilities committed to respectively.' " 15

It should be duly acknowledged that the Court's task of discharging its duty and responsibility has been considerably lightened by
the President's public manifestation of adherence to constitutional processes and of working within the proper constitutional
framework as per his press conference of January 20,1973, wherein he stated that "(T)he Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the
Constitution. It can and will probably determine the validity of this Constitution. I did not want to talk about this because actually
there is a case pending before the Supreme Court. But suffice it to say that I recognize the power of the Supreme Court. With
respect to appointments, the matter falls under a general provision which authorizes the Prime Minister to appoint additional
members to the Supreme Court. Until the matter of the new Constitution is decided, I have no intention of utilizing that
power." 16
Thus, it is that as in an analogous situation wherein the state Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the questions of whether the
submission of the proposed constitutional amendment of the State Constitution providing for an elective, instead of an
appointive, judiciary and whether the proposition was in fact adopted, were justifiable and not political questions, we may echo
the words therein of Chief Justice Whitfield that "(W)e do not seek a jurisdiction not imposed upon us by the Constitution. We
could not, if we would, escape the exercise of that jurisdiction which the Constitution has imposed upon us. In the particular
instance in which we are now acting, our duty to know what the Constitution of the state is, and in accordance with our oaths to
support and maintain it in its integrity, imposed on us a most difficult and embarrassing duty, one which we have not sought, but
one which, like all others, must be discharged." 17

In confronting the issues at bar, then, with due regard for my colleagues' contrary views, we are faced with the hard choice of
maintaining a firm and strict — perhaps, even rigid — stand that the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means" save in the particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people, who, in Cooley's words, so "tied up
(not only) the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well" 18 in the exercise of their sovereign will or a liberal
and flexible stand that would consider compliance with the constitutional article on the amending process as merely directory
rather than mandatory.

The first choice of a strict stand, as applied to the cases at bar, signifies that the Constitution may be amended in toto or
otherwise exclusively "by approval by a majority of the votes cast an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", 19 participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters twenty-one years of age or over 20 and
duly supervised by the Commission on Elections, 21 in accordance with the cited mandatory constitutional requirements.

The alternative choice of a liberal stand would permit a disregard of said requirements on the theory urged by respondents that
"the procedure outlined in Article XV was not intended to be exclusive of other procedures especially one which contemplates
popular and direct participation of the citizenry", 22 that the constitutional age and literacy requirements and other statutory
safeguards for ascertaining the will of the majority of the people may likewise be changed as "suggested, if not prescribed, by the
people (through the Citizens Assemblies) themselves", 23 and that the Comelec is constitutionally "mandated to oversee ...
elections (of public officers) and not plebiscites." 24

To paraphrase U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall who first declared in the historic 1803 case of Marbury vs. Madison25 the U.S.
Supreme Court's power of judicial review and to declare void laws repugnant to the Constitution, there is no middle ground
between these two alternatives. As Marshall expounded it: "(T)he Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act, contrary to the Constitution, is not law; if the latter
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of a people, to limit a power, in its own nature, illimitable."

As was to be restated by Justice Jose P. Laurel a century and a third later in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 26 "(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations of good government and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living Constitution."

Justice Laurel pointed out that in contrast to the United States Constitution, the Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the
powers of government" placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers"
and stressed that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments ... but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument
secures and guarantees to them."

II

Marshall was to utter much later in the equally historic 1819 case of McCulloch vs. Maryland 27 the "climactic phrase," 28 "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding," — termed by Justice Frankfurter as "the single most important
utterance in the literature of constitutional law — most important because most comprehensive and comprehending." 29 This
enduring concept to my mind permeated to this Court's exposition and rationale in the hallmark case of Tolentino, wherein we
rejected the contentions on the Convention's behalf "that the issue ... is a political question and that the Convention being a
legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of Congress
and the Courts." 30
This Court therein made its unequivocal choice of strictly requiring faithful (which really includes substantial) compliance with
the mandatory requirements of the amending process.

1. In denying reconsideration of our judgment of October 16, 1971 prohibiting the submittal in an advance election of 1971
Constitutional Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 proposing to amend Article V, section 1 of the Constitution by lowering
the voting age to 18 years (vice 21 years) 30a "without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future ... on
other portions of the amended section", this Court stated that "the constitutional provision in question (as proposed) presents no
doubt which may be resolved in favor of respondents and intervenors. We do not believe such doubt can exist only because it is
urged that the end sought to be achieved is to be desired. Paraphrasing no less than the President of Constitutional Convention of
1934, Claro M. Recto, let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the fundamental
law purportedly in order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with purportedly more
laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent and continue the destruction of the Constitution, making those who laid
down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the Constitution the victims of their own folly." 31

2. This Court held in Tolentino that:

... as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the
provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments
to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV. This must be so, because it is
plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be
undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the
most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding
fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And
because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives
of all the people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in
preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution
itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature
of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations,
restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of
subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it
that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the
people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing
political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of
their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it
does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such
conditions because they are powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts. 32

3. This Court in Tolentino likewise formally adopted the doctrine of proper submission first advanced in Gonzales vs. Comelec33,
thus:

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basisfor
an intelligent appraisal of the nature of amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things,
where the Convention hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, proposals to amend
the existing Constitution, to present to people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for
the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to
enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted
by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez,
speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, 'no proper submission.' " 34
4. Four other members of the Court 35 in a separate concurrence in Tolentino, expressed their "essential agreement" with Justice
Sanchez' separate opinion in Gonzales on the need for "fair submission (and) intelligent rejection" as "minimum requirements that
must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" thus:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We
believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and
the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or
100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word
as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government,
in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For as
we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection. 36

They stressed further the need for undivided attention, sufficient information and full debate, conformably to the intendment of
Article XV, section 1 of the Constitution, in this wise:

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the
voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not
19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old, so that there is
no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can
the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not
performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional
Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional
Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval
this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should
not also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to compulsory
military service under the colors? Will the contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against the
amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973?

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the
bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already
long litany. And the answers cannot except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully,
and accorded undivided attention.

Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been
afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from
a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their
traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the
need for and the wisdom proposed
amendment. 37

5. This Court therein dismissed the plea of disregarding mandatory requirements of the amending process "in favor of allowing
the sovereign people to express their decision on the proposed amendments" as "anachronistic in the real constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law," in the following terms:

... The preamble of the Constitution says that the Constitution has been ordained by the 'Filipino people,
imploring the aid of Divine Providence.' Section 1 of Article XV is nothing than a part of the Constitution
thus ordained by the people. Hence, in construing said section, We must read it as if thepeople had said, 'This
Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that the amendment must beproposed and submitted to Us for
ratification only in the manner herein provided.' ... Accordingly, the real issue here cannot be whether or not
the amending process delineated by the present Constitution may be disregarded in favor of allowing the
sovereign people to express their decision on the proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that the
very idea of departing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of
 constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law; rather, it is whether or not the provisional
nature of the proposed amendment and the manner of its submission to the people for ratification or
rejection conform with the mandate of the people themselves in such regard, as expressed in, the Constitution
itself. 38

6. This Court, in not heeding the popular clamor, thus stated its position: "(I)t would be tragic and contrary to the plain
compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations
other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger
measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the
Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate
cases with the proper parties and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved
to discharge that duty. 39

7. The Chief Justice, in his separate opinion in Tolentino concurring with this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration,
succinctly restated this Court's position on the fundamentals, as follows:

— On the premature submission of a partial amendment proposal, with a "temporary provisional or tentative
character": — "... a partial amendment would deprive the voters of the context which is usually necessary for
them to make a reasonably intelligent appraisal of the issue submitted for their ratification or rejection. ...
Then, too, the submission to a plebiscite of a partial amendment, without a definite frame of reference, is
fraught with possibilities which may jeopardize the social fabric. For one thing, it opens the door to wild
speculations. It offers ample opportunities for overzealous leaders and members of opposing political camps
to unduly exaggerate the pros and cons of the partial amendment proposed. In short, it is apt to breed false
hopes and create wrong impressions. As a consequence, it is bound to unduly strain the people's faith in the
soundness and validity of democratic processes and institutions.

— On the plea to allow submission to the sovereign people of the "fragmentary and incomplete" proposal,
although inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution: "The view, has, also, advanced that the
foregoing considerations are not decisive on the issue before Us, inasmuch as thepeople are sovereign, and
the partial amendment involved in this case is being submitted to them. The issue before Us is whether or not
said partial amendment may be validly submitted to the people for ratification "in a plebiscite coincide with
the local elections in November 1971," and this particular issue will not be submitted to the people. What is
more, the Constitution does not permit its submission to the people. The question sought to be settled in the
scheduled plebiscite is whether or not the people are in favor of the reduction of the voting age.

— On a "political" rather than "legalistic" approach: "Is this approach to the problem too "legalistic?" This
term has possible connotations. It may mean strict adherence to the law, which in the case at bar is
the Supreme Law of the land. On point, suffice it to say that, in compliance with the specific man of such
Supreme Law, the members of the Supreme Court taken the requisite "oath to support and defend the
Constitution." ... Then, again, the term "legalistic" may be used to suggest inversely that the somewhat
strained interpretation of the Constitution being urged upon this Court be tolerated or, at least, overlooked,
upon the theory that the partial amendment on voting age is badly needed and reflects the will of the people,
specially the youth. This course of action favors, in effect, adoption of apolitical approach, inasmuch as the
advisability of the amendment and an appraisal of the people's feeling thereon political matters. In fact, apart
from the obvious message of the mass media, and, at times, of the pulpit, the Court has been literally
bombarded with scores of handwritten letters, almost all of which bear the penmanship and the signature of
girls, as well as letterhead of some sectarian educational institutions, generally stating that the writer is 18
years of age and urging that she or he be allowed to vote. Thus, the pressure of public opinion has brought to
bear heavily upon the Court for a reconsideration of its decision in the case at bar.

As above stated, however, the wisdom of the amendment and the popularity thereof are political questions
beyond our province. In fact, respondents and the intervenors originally maintained that We have no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition herein, upon the ground that the issue therein raised is a political one.
Aside from the absence of authority to pass upon political question, it is obviously improper and unwise for
the bench to develop into such questions owing to the danger of getting involved in politics, more likely of a
partisan nature, and, hence, of impairing the image and the usefulness of courts of justice as objective and
impartial arbiters of justiciable controversies.

Then, too, the suggested course of action, if adopted, would constitute a grievous disservice to the people and
the very Convention itself. Indeed, the latter and the Constitution it is in the process of drafting stand
 essentially for the Rule of Law. However, as the Supreme Law of the land, a Constitution would not be
worthy of its name, and the Convention called upon to draft it would be engaged in a futile undertaking, if we
did not exact faithful adherence to the fundamental tenets set forth in the Constitution and compliance with
its provisions were not obligatory. If we, in effect, approved, consented to or even overlooked a
circumvention of said tenets and provisions, because of the good intention with which Resolution No. 1 is
animated, the Court would thereby become the Judge of the good or bad intentions of the Convention and
thus be involved in a question essentially political in nature.

This is confirmed by the plea made in the motions for reconsideration in favor of the exercise of judicial
statesmanship in deciding the present case. Indeed, "politics" is the word commonly used to epitomize
compromise, even with principles, for the sake of political expediency or the advancement of the bid for
power of a given political party. Upon the other hand, statesmanship is the expression usually availed of to
refer to high politics or politics on the highest level. In any event, politics, political approach, political
expediency and statesmanship are generally associated, and often identified, with the dictum that "the end
justifies the means." I earnestly hope that the administration of justice in this country and the Supreme Court,
in particular, will adhere to or approve or indorse such dictum." 40

Tolentino, he pointed out that although "(M)ovants' submittal that "(T)he primary purpose for the submission of the proposed
amendment lowering the voting age to the plebiscite on November 8, 1971 is to enable the youth 18 to 20 years who comprise
more than three (3) million of our population to participate in the ratification of the new Constitution in so far as "to allow young
people who would be governed by the Constitution to be given a say on what kind of Constitution they will have" is a laudable
end, ... those urging the vitality and importance of the proposed constitutional amendment and its approval ahead of the complete
and final draft of the Constitution must seek a valid solution to achieve it in a manner sanctioned by the amendatory process
ordained by our people in the present Constitution" 41 — so that there may be "submitted, not piece-meal, but by way of complete
and final amendments as an integrated whole (integrated either with the subsisting Constitution or with the new proposed
Constitution)..."

9. The universal validity of the vital constitutional precepts and principles above-enunciated can hardly be gainsaid. I fail to see
the attempted distinction of restricting their application to proposals for amendments of particular provisions of the Constitution
and not to so-called entirely new Constitutions. Amendments to an existing Constitution presumably may be only of certain parts
or in toto, and in the latter case would rise to an entirely new Constitution. Where this Court held in Tolentino that
"any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself and perforce must be conceived
and prepared with as much care and deliberation", it would appeal that the reverse would equally be true; which is to say, that the
adoption of a whole new Constitution would be of no less importance than any particular amendment and therefore the necessary
care and deliberation as well as the mandatory restrictions and safeguards in the amending process ordained by the people
themselves so that "they (may) be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political
moods or fancies" must necessarily equally apply thereto.

III

1. To restate the basic premises, the people provided in Article XV of the Constitution for the amending process only"by approval
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the (duly proposed) amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."

The people ordained in Article V, section 1 that only those thereby enfranchised and granted the right of suffrage may speak the
"will of the body politic", viz, qualified literate voters twenty one years of age or over with one year's residence in the
municipality where they have registered.

The people, not as yet satisfied, further provided by amendment duly approved in 1940 in accordance with Article XV, for the
creation of an independent Commission on Elections with "exclusive charge" for the purpose of "insuring free, orderly and
honest elections" and ascertaining the true will of the electorate — and more, as ruled by this Court in Tolentino, in the case of
proposed constitutional amendments, insuring proper submission to the electorate of such proposals. 42

2. A Massachussets case 43 with a constitutional system and provisions analogous to ours, best defined the uses of the
term "people" as a body politic and "people" in the political sense who are synonymous with the qualified voters granted the
right to vote by the existing Constitution and who therefore are "the sole organs through which the will of the body politic can be
expressed."
It was pointed out therein that "(T)he word 'people' may have somewhat varying significations dependent upon the connection in
which it is used. In some connections in the Constitution it is confined to citizens and means the same as citizens. It excludes
aliens. It includes men, women and children. It comprehends not only the sane, competent, law-abiding and educated, but also
those who are wholly or in part dependents and charges upon society by reason of immaturity, mental or moral deficiency or lack
of the common essentials of education. All these persons are secured fundamental guarantees of the Constitution in life, liberty
and property and the pursuit of happiness, except as these may be limited for the protection of society."

In the sense of "body politic (as) formed by voluntary association of individuals" governed by a constitution and common laws in
a "social compact ... for the common good" and in another sense of "people" in a "practical sense" for "political purposes" it was
therein fittingly stated that in this sense, "people" comprises many who, by reason of want of years, of capacity or of the
educational requirements of Article 20 of the amendments of the Constitution, can have no voice in any government and who yet
are entitled to all the immunities and protection established by the Constitution. 'People' in this aspect is coextensive with
the body politic. But it is obvious that 'people' cannot be used with this broad meaning of political signification. The 'people' in
this connection means that part of the entire body of inhabitants who under the Constitution are intrusted with the exercise of the
sovereign power and the conduct of government. The 'people' in the Constitution in a practical sense means those who under the
existing Constitution possess the right to exercise the elective franchise and who, while that instrument remains in force
unchanged, will be the sole organs through which the will of the body politic can be expressed. 'People' for political
purposes must be considered synonymous with qualified voters.' "

As was also ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, "... While the people are thus the source of political power, their governments,
national and state, have been limited by constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as against
the sudden impulse of mere majorities." 44

From the text of Article XV of our Constitution, requiring approval of amendment proposals "by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification", it seems obvious as above-stated that
"people" as therein used must be considered synonymous with "qualified voters" as enfranchised under Article V, section 1 of the
Constitution — since only "people" who are qualified voters can exercise the right of suffrage and cast their votes.

3. Sound constitutional policy and the sheer necessity of adequate safeguards as ordained by the Constitution and implementing
statutes to ascertain and record the will of the people in free, orderly and honest elections supervised by the Comelec make it
imperative that there be strict adherence to the constitutional requirements laid down for the process of amending in toto or in
part the supreme law of the land.

Even at barrio level 45 the Revised Barrio Charter fixes certain safeguards for the holding of barrio plebiscites thus: "SEC.
6. Plebiscite. — A plebiscite may be held in the barrio when authorized by a majority vote of the members present in the barrio
assembly, there being a quorum, or when called by at least four members of the barrio council: Provided, however, That no
plebiscite shall be held until after thirty days from its approval by either body, and such plebiscite has been given the widest
publicity in the barrio, stating the date, time and place thereof, the questions or issues to be decided, action to be taken by the
voters, and such other information relevant to the holding of the plebiscite." 46

As to voting at such barrio plebiscites, the Charter further requires that "(A)ll duly registered barrio assembly members qualified
to vote may vote in the plebiscite. Voting procedures may be made either in writing as in regular elections, and/or declaration by
the voters to the board of election tellers." 47

The subjects of the barrio plebiscites are likewise delimited thus: "A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any
member of the barrio council. A plebiscite shall be called to approve any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax
ordinances" and the required majority vote is specified: "(F)or taking action on any of the above enumerated measures, majority
vote of all the barrio assembly members registered in the list of the barrio secretary is necessary." 48

The qualifications for voters in such barrio plebiscites and elections of barrio officials 49 comply with the suffrage qualifications
of Article V, section 1 of the Constitution and provide that "(S)EC. 10. Qualifications of Voters and Candidates. — Every citizen
of the Philippines, twenty one years of age or over, able to read and write, who has been a resident of the barrio during the six
months immediately preceding the election, duly registered in the list of voters by the barrio secretary, who is not otherwise
disqualified, may vote or be a candidate in the barrio elections." 50

IV
1. Since it appears on the face of Proclamation 1102 that the mandatory requirements under the above-cited constitutional articles
have not been complied with and that no election or plebiscite for ratification as therein provided as well as in section 16 of
Article XVII of the proposed Constitution itself 51 has been called or held, there cannot be said to have been a valid ratification.

2. Petitioners raised serious questions as to the veracity and genuineness of the reports or certificates of results purportedly
showing unaccountable discrepancies in seven figures in just five provinces 52 between the reports as certified by the Department
of Local Governments and the reports as directly submitted by the provincial and city executives, which latter reports
respondents disclaimed inter alia as not final and complete or as not signed; 53whether the reported votes of approval of the
proposed Constitution conditioned upon the non-convening of the interim National Assembly provided in Article XVII, section 1
thereof, 54 may be considered as valid; the allegedly huge and uniform votes reported; and many others.

3. These questions only serve to justify and show the basic validity of the universal principle governing written constitutions that
proposed amendments thereto or in replacement thereof may be ratified only in the particular mode or manner prescribed therein
by the people. Under Article XV, section 1 of our Constitution, amendments thereto may be ratified only in the one way therein
provided, i.e. in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and duly supervised by the Commission on Elections, and
which is participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. In this manner, the safeguards provided by the election code
generally assure the true ascertainment of the results of the vote and interested parties would have an opportunity to thresh out
properly before the Comelec all such questions in pre-proclamation proceedings.

4. At any rate, unless respondents seriously intend to question the very statements and pronouncements in Proclamation 1102
itself which shows on its face, as already stated, that the mandatory amending process required by the (1935) Constitution was
not observed, the cases at bar need not reach the stage of answering the host of questions, raised by petitioners against the
procedure observed by the Citizens Assemblies and the reported referendum results — since the purported ratification is rendered
nugatory by virtue of such non-observance.

5. Finally, as to respondents' argument that the President issued Proclamation 1102 "as "agent" of the Constitutional
Convention" 55 under Resolution No. 5844 approved on November 22, 1973, and "as agent of the Convention the President could
devise other forms of plebiscite to determine the will of the majority vis-a-vis the ratification of the proposed Constitution." 56

The minutes of November 22, 1972, of the Convention, however, do not at all support this contention. On the contrary, the said
minutes fully show that the Convention's proposal and "agency" was that the President issue a decree precisely calling
a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution on an appropriate date, under the charge of the Comelec, and
with a reasonable period for an information campaign, as follows:

12. Upon recognition by the Chair, Delegate Duavit moved for the approval of the resolution, the resolution
portion of which read as follows:

"RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the 1971 Constitutional

Convention propose to President Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed New Constitution on such appropriate date
as he shall determine and providing for the necessary funds therefor, and that copies of
this resolution as approved in plenary session be transmitted to the President of the
Philippines and the Commission on Elections for implementation."

He suggested that in view of the expected approval of the final draft of the new Constitution by the end of
November 1972 according to the Convention's timetable, it would be necessary to lay the groundwork for the
appropriate agencies of the government to undertake the necessary preparation for the plebiscite.

xxx xxx xxx

12.2 Interpellating, Delegate Pimentel (V.) contended that the resolution was unnecessary because section 15,
Article XVII on the Transitory Provision, which had already been approved on second and third readings,
provided that the new constitution should be ratified in a plebiscite called for the purpose by the incumbent
President. Delegate Duavit replied that the provision referred to did not include the appropriation of funds for
the plebiscite and that, moreover, the resolution was intended to serve formal notice to the President and the
Commission on Elections to initiate the necessary preparations.

xxx xxx xxx

 12.4 Interpellating, Delegate Madarang suggested that a reasonable period for an information campaign was
necessary in order to properly apprise the people of the implications and significance of the new charter.
Delegate Duavit agreed, adding that this was precisely why the resolution was modified to give the President
the discretion to choose the most appropriate date for the plebiscite.

12.5 Delegate Laggui asked whether a formal communication to the President informing him of the adoption
of the new Constitution would not suffice considering that under Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions, the
President would be duty-bound to call a plebiscite for its ratification. Delegate Duavit replied in the negative,
adding that the resolution was necessary to serve notice to the proper authorities to prepare everything
necessary for the plebiscite.

12.6 In reply to Delegate Britanico, Delegate Duavit stated that the mechanics for the holding of
theplebiscite would be laid down by the Commission on Elections in coordination with the President.

12.7 Delegate Catan inquired if such mechanics for the plebiscite could include a partial lifting of martial
law in order to allow the people to assemble peaceably to discuss the new Constitution. Delegate Duavit
suggested that the Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification could coordinate with the COMELEC on the
matter.

12.8 Delegate Guzman moved for the previous question. The Chair declared that there was one more
interpellant and that a prior reservation had been made for the presentation of such a motion.

1.8a Delegate Guzman withdrew his motion.

12.9 Delegate Astilla suggested in his interpellation that there was actually no need for such a resolution in
view of the provision of section 15, Article XVII on the Transitory Provisions. Delegate Duavit disagreed,
pointing out that the said provision did not provide for the funds necessary for the purpose.

13. Delegate Ozamiz then moved to close the debate and proceed to the period of amendment.

13.1 Floor Leader Montejo stated that there were no reservations to amend the resolution.

13.2 Delegate Ozamiz then moved for the previous question. Submitted to a vote, the motion was approved.

Upon request of the Chair, Delegate Duavit restated the resolution for voting.

14.1. Delegate Ordoñez moved for nominal voting. Submitted to a vote, the motion was lost.

57
14.2. Thereupon, the Chair submitted the resolution to a vote. It was approved by a show of hands.

I, therefore, vote to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

Promulga
ted: June
4, 1973 *

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

In conformity with my reservation, I shall discuss the grounds for my concurrence.

It is my view that to preserve the independence of the State, the maintenance of the existing constitutional order and the defense
of the political and social liberties of the people, in times of a grave emergency, when the legislative branch of the government is
unable to function or its functioning would itself threaten the public safety, the Chief Executive may promulgate measures
legislative in character, for the successful prosecution of such objectives. For the "President's power as Commander- in-chief has
been transformed from a simple power of military command to a vast reservoir of indeterminate powers in time of emergency. ...
In other words, the principal canons of constitutional interpretation are ... set aside so far as concerns both the scope of the
national power and the capacity of the President to gather unto himself all constitutionally available powers in order the more
effectively to focus them upon the task of the hour." (Corwin, The President: Office & Powers, pp. 317, 318, [1948]).

1. The proclamation of martial rule, ushered the commencement of a crisis government in this country. In terms of power, crisis
government in a constitutional democracy entails the concentration of governmental power. "The more complete the separation
of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult, and yet the more necessary" according to Rossiter, "will be their fusion in
time of crisis... The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded, it must be freed from the normal
system of constitutional and legal limitations. One of the basic features of emergency powers is the release of the government
from the paralysis of constitutional restraints" (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 290).

It is clearly recognized that in moments of peril the effective action of the government is channeled through the person of the
Chief Executive. "Energy in the executive," according to Hamilton, "is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks ... to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt
the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy." (The Federalist, Number 70). "The entire strength of the nation", said Justice Brewer in the Debs case (158 U.S. 564;
39 L. ed. 1092), "may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security
of all rights entrusted by the constitution to its care." The marshalling and employment of the "strength of the nation" are matters
for the discretion of the Chief Executive. The President's powers in time of emergency defy precise definition since their extent
and limitations are largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances.

2. The power of the President to act decisively in a crisis has been grounded on the broad conferment upon the Presidency of the
Executive power, with the added specific grant of power under the "Commander-in-Chief" clause of the constitution. The
contours of such powers have been shaped more by a long line of historical precedents of Presidential action in times of crisis,
rather than judicial interpretation. Lincoln wedded his powers under the "commander-in-chief" clause with his duty "to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," to justify the series of extraordinary measures which he took — the calling of volunteers for
military service, the augmentation of the regular army and navy, the payment of two million dollars from unappropriated funds in
the Treasury to persons unauthorized to receive it, the closing of the Post Office to "treasonable correspondence", the blockade of
southern ports, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the arrest and detention of persons "who were represented to him" as
being engaged in or contemplating "treasonable practices" — all this for the most part without the least statutory authorization.
Those actions were justified by the imperatives of his logic, that the President may, in an emergency thought by him to require it,
partially suspend the constitution. Thus his famous question: "Are all laws but one to be unexecuted, and the Government itself
go to pieces lest that one be violated?" The actions of Lincoln "assert for the President", according to Corwin, "an initiative of
indefinite scope and legislative in effect in meeting the domestic aspects of a war emergency." (Corwin, The President: Office &
Powers, p. 280 [1948]). The facts of the civil war have shown conclusively that in meeting the domestic problems as a
consequence of a great war, an indefinite power must be attributed to the President to take emergency measures. The concept of
"emergency" under which the Chief Executive exercised extraordinary powers underwent correlative enlargement during the first
and second World Wars. From its narrow concept as an "emergency" in time of war during the Civil War and World War I, the
concept has been expanded in World War II to include the "emergency" preceding the war and even after it. "The Second World
War" observed Corwin and Koenig, was the First World War writ large, and the quasi-legislative powers of Franklin Roosevelt
as "Commander-in-Chief in wartime"... burgeoned correspondingly. The precedents were there to be sure, most of them from the
First World War, but they proliferated amazingly. What is more, Roosevelt took his first step toward war some fifteen months
before our entrance into shooting war. This step occurred in September, 1940, when he handed over fifty so-called overage
destroyers to Great Britain. The truth is, they were not overage, but had been recently reconditioned and recommissioned. ...
Actually, what President Roosevelt did was to take over for the nonce Congress's power to dispose of property of the United
States (Article IV, Section 3) and to repeal at least two statutes." (Corwin & Koenig, The Presidency Today, New York
University Press, 1956; sf Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1948.)

The creation of public offices is a power confided by the constitution to Congress. And yet President Wilson, during World War I
on the basis of his powers under the "Commander-in-Chief" clause created "offices" which were copied in lavish scale by
President Roosevelt in World War II. In April 1942, thirty-five "executive agencies" were purely of Presidential creation. On
June 7, 1941 on the basis of his powers as "Commander-in-Chief", he issued an executive order seizing the North American
Aviation plant of Inglewood, California, where production stopped as a consequence of a strike. This was justified by the
government as the exercise of presidential power growing out of the "duty constitutionally and inherently resting upon the
President to exert his civil and military as well as his moral authority to keep the defense efforts of the United States a going
concern" as well as "to obtain supplies for which Congress has appropriated money, and which it has directed the President to
obtain." On a similar justification, other plants and industries were taken over by the government. It is true that in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube vs. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579; 72 S. Ct. 863; 96 L. Ed. 1153, [1952]), the Supreme Court of the United States did not
sustain the claims that the President could, as the Nation's Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, validly
order the seizure of most of the country's steel mills. The Court however did not face the naked question of the President's power
to seize steel plants in the absence of any congressional enactment or expressions of policy. The majority of the Court found that
this legislative occupation of the field made untenable the President's claim of authority to seize the plants as an exercise of
inherent executive power or as Commander-in-Chief. Justice Clark, in his concurrence to the main opinion of the Court,
explicitly asserted that the President does possess, in the absence of restrictive legislation, a residual or resultant power above or
in consequence of his granted powers, to deal with emergencies that he regards as threatening the national security. The same
view was shared with vague qualification by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, two of the concurring Justices. The three
dissenting Justices, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, apparently went further by quoting with approval a passage extracted
from the brief of the government in the case of United States vs. Midwest Oil Co., (236 U.S. 459 59 L. Ed. 673, 35 S. Ct. 309)
where the court sustained the power of the President to order withdrawals from the public domain not only without Congressional
sanction but even contrary to Congressional statutes.

It is evident therefore that the Steel Seizure Case, cannot be invoked as an authority to support the view that the President in
times of a grave crisis does not possess a residual power above or in consequence of his granted powers, to deal with emergencies
that he regards as threatening the national security. The lesson of the Steel Seizure case, according to Corwin and Koenig,
"Unquestionably ... tends to supplement presidential emergency power to adopt temporary remedial legislation when Congress
has been, in the judgment of the President, unduly remiss in taking cognizance of and acting on a given situation." (Corwin and
Koenig, The Presidency Today, New York University Press, 1956).

The accumulation of precedents has thus built up the presidential power under emergency conditions to "dimensions of executive
prerogative as described by John Locke, of a power to wit, to fill needed gaps in the law, or even to supersede it so far as may be
requisite to realize the fundamental law of nature and government, namely, that as much as may be all the members of society are
to be preserved." (Corwin and Koenig, The Presidency Today).

In the light of the accumulated precedents, how could it be reasonably argued therefore, that the President had no power to issue
Presidential Decree Nos. 86 and 86-A as well as Proclamation No. 1102, since these measures were considered indispensable to
effect the desired reforms at the shortest time possible and hasten the restoration of normalcy? It is unavailing for petitioners to
contend that we are not faced by an actual "shooting war" for today's concept of the emergency which justified the exercise of
those powers has of necessity been expanded to meet the exigencies of new dangers and crisis that directly threaten the nation's
continued and constitutional existence. For as Corwin observed: "... today the concept of 'war' as a special type of emergency
warranting the realization of constitutional limitations tends to spread, as it were, in both directions, so that there is not only "the
war before the war," but the 'war after the war.' Indeed, in the economic crisis from which the New Deal may be said to have
issued, the nation was confronted in the opinion of the late President with an 'emergency greater than war'; and in sustaining
certain of the New Deal measures the Court invoked the justification of 'emergency.' In the final result constitutional practices of
wartime have moulded the Constitution to greater or less extent for peacetime as well, seem likely to do so still more
pronouncedly under fresh conditions of crisis." (Corwin, Ibid. p. 318.)

The same view was expressed by Rossiter thus:

The second crisis is rebellion, when the authority of a constitutional government is resisted openly by large
numbers of citizens who are engaged in violent insurrection against enforcement of its laws or are bent on
capturing it illegally or destroying it altogether. The third crisis, one recognized particularly in modern times
as sanctioning emergency action by constitutional governments, is economic depression. The economic
troubles which plagued all the countries of the world in the early thirties involved governmental methods of
an unquestionably dictatorial character in many democracies. It was thereby acknowledged that an economic
existence as a war or a rebellion. And these are not the only cases which have justified extraordinary
governmental action in nations like the United States. Fire, flood, drought, earthquake, riots, great strikes
have all been dealt with by unusual and of dictatorial methods. Wars are not won by debating societies,
rebellions are not suppressed by judicial injunctions, reemployment of twelve million jobless citizens will not
be effected through a scrupulous regard for the tenets of free enterprise, hardships caused by the eruptions of
nature cannot be mitigated letting nature take its course. The Civil War, the depression of 1933 and the recent
global conflict were not and could not have been successfully resolved by governments similar to those of
James Buchanan, William Howard Taft, or Calvin Coolidge. (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship — Crisis
of Government in the Modern Democracies, p. 6 [1948).

II

We are next confronted with the insistence of Petitioners that the referendum in question not having been done inaccordance with
the provisions of existing election laws, which only qualified voters who are allowed to participate, under the supervision of the
Commission on Elections, the new Constitution, should therefore be a nullity. Such an argument is predicated upon an
assumption, that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provides the method for the revision of the constitution, and automatically
apply in the final approval of such proposed new Constitution the provisions of the election law and those of Article V and X of
the old Constitution. We search in vain for any provision in the old charter specifically providing for such procedure in the case
of a total revision or a rewriting of the whole constitution.

1. There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of
the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing
constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new constitutions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. 1 The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the
1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

According to an eminent authority on Political Law, "The Constitution of the Philippines and that of the United States expressly
provide merely for methods of amendment. They are silent on the subject of revision. But this is not a fatal omission. There is
nothing that can legally prevent a convention from actually revising the Constitution of the Philippines or of the United States
even were such conventions called merely for the purpose of proposing and submitting amendments to the people. For in the final
analysis, it is the approval of the people that gives validity to any proposal of amendment or revision." (Sinco, Philippine Political
Law, p. 49).

Since the 1935 Constitution does not specifically provide for the method or procedure for the revision or for the approval of a
new constitution, should it now be held, that the people have placed such restrictions on themselves that they are not disabled
from exercising their right as the ultimate source of political power from changing the old constitution which, in their view, was
not responsive to their needs and in adopting a new charter of government to enable them to rid themselves from the shackles of
traditional norms and to pursue with new dynamism the realization of their true longings and aspirations, except in the manner
and form provided by Congress for previous plebiscites? Was not the expansion of the base of political participation, by the
inclusion of the youth in the process of ratification who after all constitute the preponderant majority more in accord with the
spirit and philosophy of the constitution that political power is inherent in the people collectively? As clearly expounded by
Justice Makasiar, in his opinion, in all the cases cited where the Courts held that the submission of the proposed amendment was
illegal due to the absence of substantial compliance with the procedure prescribed by the constitution, the procedure prescribed
by the state Constitution, is so detailed, that specified the manner in which such submission shall be made, the persons qualified
to vote for the same, the date of election and other definite standards, from which the court could safely ascertain whether or not
the submission was in accordance with the Constitution. Thus the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.E. 408) relied upon in one of
the dissenting opinions involved in the application of the provisions of the state Constitution of Minnesota which clearly
prescribed in detail the procedure under which the Constitution may be amended or revised. 2 This is not true with our
Constitution. In the case of revision there are no "standards meet for judicial judgment."3

The framers of our Constitution were free to provide in the Constitution the method or procedure for the revision or rewriting of
the entire constitution, and if such was their intention, they could and should have so provided. Precedents were not wanting. The
constitutions of the various states of the American Union did provide for procedures for their amendment and methods for
their revision.4

Certainly We cannot, under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, remodel or rewrite the 1935 Charter. To declare
what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power, but to declare what the law shall be is not within Our judicial competence and
authority.

Upon the other hand, since our fundamental charter has not provided the method or procedure for the revision or complete
change of the Constitution, it is evident that the people have reserved such power in themselves. They decided to exercise it not
through their legislature, but through a Convention expressly chosen for that purpose. The Convention as an independent and
sovereign body has drafted not an amendment but a completely new Constitution, which decided to submit to the people for
approval, not through an act of Congress, but by means of decrees to be promulgated by the President. In view of the inability of
Congress to act, it was within the constitutional powers of the President, either as agent of the Constitutional Convention, or
under his authority under martial law, to promulgate the necessary measures for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution.
The adoption the new Charter was considered as a necessary basis for all the reforms set in motion under the new society, to root
out the causes of unrest. The imperatives of the emergency underscored the urgency of its adoption. The people in accepting such
procedure and in voting overwhelmingly for the approval of the new Constitution have, in effect, ratified the method and
procedure taken. "When the people adopt completely revised or new constitution," said the Court in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees
(37 SE 2nd 322, 326-330), "the framing or submission of the instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. The fiat of
the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution."

This has to be so because, in our political system, all political power is inherent in the people and free governments are founded
on their authority and instituted for their benefit. Thus Section 1 of Article II of the 1935 Constitution declares that: "Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanate from them." Evidently the term people refers to the
entire citizenry and not merely to the electorate, for the latter is only a fraction of the people and is only an organ of government
for the election of government officials.

III

The more compelling question, however is: Has this Court the authority to nullify an entire Constitution that is
already effective as it has been accepted and acquiesced in by the people as shown by their compliance with the decree
promulgated thereunder, their cooperation in its implementation, and is now maintained by the Government that is in undisputed
authority and dominance?

Of course it is argued that acquiescence by the people can be deduced from their acts of conformity, because under a regime of
martial law the people are bound to obey and act in conformity with the orders of the President, and has absolutely no other
choice. The flaw of this argument lies in its application of a mere theoretical assumption based on the experiences of other
nations on an entirely different factual setting. Such an assumption flounders on the rock of reality. It is true that as a general rule
martial law is the use of military forces to perform the functions of civil government. Some courts have viewed it as a military
regime which can be imposed in emergency situations. In other words, martial rule exists when the military rises superior to the
civil power in the exercise of some or all the functions of government. Such is not the case in this country. The government
functions thru its civilian officials. The supremacy of the civil over the military authority is manifest. Except for the imposition of
curfew hours and other restrictions required for the security of the State, the people are free to pursue their ordinary concerns.

In short, the existing regime in this Country, does not contain the oppressive features, generally associated with a regime of
Martial law in other countries. "Upon the other hand the masses of our people have accepted it, because of its manifold blessings.
The once downtrodden rice tenant has at long last been emancipated — a consummation devoutly wished by every Philippine
President since the 1930's. The laborer now holds his head high because his rights are amply protected and respected." * A new
sense of discipline has swiftly spread beyond the corridors of government into the social order. Responding to the challenges of
the New Society, the people have turned in half a million loose firearms, paid their taxes on undeclared goods and income in
unprecedented numbers and amount, lent their labors in massive cooperation — in land reform, in the repair of dikes, irrigation
ditches, roads and bridges, in reforestation, in the physical transformation of the environment to make ours a cleaner and greener
land. "The entire country is turning into one vast garden growing food for the body, for thought and for the soul." * More
important the common man has at long last been freed from the incubus of fear.

"Martial law has paved the way for a re-ordering of the basic social structure of the Philippines" reported Frank Valeo to the
United States Senate. "President Marcos has been prompt and sure-footed in using the power of presidential decree under martial
law for this purpose. He has zeroed in on areas which have been widely recognized as prime sources of the nation's
difficulties — land tenancy, official corruption, tax evasion and abuse of oligarchic economic power. Clearly he knows his targets
... there is marked public support for his leadership..." (Bulletin Today, March 3 and 4, 1973)..

In a similar vein, C.L. Sulzberger, a foreign affairs columnist wrote, in the April 11 issue of The New York Times:

During his first Presidential term (1965-1969), Mr. Marcos was discouraged by the failure of legislators to
approve urgently needed reforms. He found his second term further frustrated by spread riots, a Maoist
uprising in Luzon and a much more serious Moslem insurrection in the southern islands from Mindanao
across the Sulu archipelago to the frontier regions of Malaysia and Indonesia. Manila claims this war is
Maoist-coordinated.

Mr. Marcos has now in effect taken all the reins of power and makes no promise as to when he will relinquish
them. But, while fettering a free press, terminating Congress and locking up some opponents (many of whom
were later amnestied), he has hauled the Philippines out of stagnation.

Sharecropping is being ended as more than three million acres of arable land are redistributed with state
funds. New roads have been started. The educational system is undergoing revision, a corruption is
diminished. In non-communist Asia it is virtually impossible to wholly end it and this disagreeable
phenomenon still reaches very high.

Mr. Marcos, an imaginative, gifted man, hopes to reshape society by creating an agrarian middle-class to
replace the archaic sharecropper-absentee landlord relationship. He is even pushing for a birth control
program with the tacit acceptance of the Catholic Church. He has started labor reforms and increased wages.
(Daily Express, April 15, 1973)
As explained in this writer's opinion of April 24, 1973 on the "Constancia" and "Manifestation" of counsel for petitioners:

The new Constitution is considered effective "if the norms created in conformity with it are by and large applied and obeyed. As
soon as the old Constitution loses its effectiveness and the new Constitution has become effective, the acts that appear with the
subjective meaning of creating or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by presupposing the old basic norm, but by
presupposing the new one. The statutes issued under the old Constitution and not taken over are no longer regarded as valid, and
the organs authorized by the old Constitution no longer competent." (Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, [1967].)

The essentially political nature of the question is at once made manifest by understanding that in the final analysis, what is
assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of approval
or ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is addressed more to the framework and political character of this
Government which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already effective.

In such a situation, We do not see how the question posed by petitioners could be judicially decided. "Judicial power presupposes
an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and
administer them. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it
is exercising judicial power." (Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. [7 How.] 1, 12 L. Ed. 598.)

In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political action, the Court whose
existence is affected by such change is, in the words of Mr. Melville Fuller Weston, "precluded from passing upon the fact of
change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted."5 Such change in the organic law relates to the existence of a prior
point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of
powers."6 It involves in essence a matter which "the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments of government
or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action."7

The non-judicial character of such a question has been recognized in American law. "From its earliest opinions this Court has
consistently recognized," said Justice Frankfurter, in his illuminating dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d. 633,
722, 726, 727), "a class of controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies. To classify the
various instances as "political questions" is rather a form of stating this conclusion than revealing of analysis ... The crux of the
matter is that courts are not fit instruments of decision where what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests
of policy traditionally fought out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the actions of governments are made and
unmade."

The diversity of views contained in the opinions of the members of this Court, in the cases at bar, cannot be a case on "right" or
"wrong" views of the Constitution. It is one of attitudes and values. For there is scarcely any principle, authority or interpretation
which has not been countered by the opposite. At bottom, it is the degree of one's faith — in the nation's leadership and in the
maturity of judgment of our people.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dismissal of these five cases, and the conclusion of this Court in its
judgment of March question becomes wholly moot except for this consideration, that, when the judges as
individuals or as a body of individuals come to decide which king or which constitution they will support and
assert to represent, it may often be good judgment for them to follow the lead of the men who as a practical
matter are likely to be looked to by the people as more representative of themselves and conversely are likely
to be more directly in touch with popular sentiment. If, however, the judges hold too strong views of their
own to be able to take this course, they may follow their own leads at their own hazard. No question of law is
involved. (Political Questions, 38 Harvard Law Review [1924-25], pp. 305-309.)

31, 1973 are fully justified.

Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX TO OPINION

(G.R. Nos. L-36142, 36164, 36165, 36236 & 36283)

PROVISIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS SPECIFICALLY

PROVIDING FOR AMENDMENT AND REVISION @
1. Alaska (1959) — Art. XIII. Amendment and Revision.

Sec. 1. Amendments. Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. The
secretary of state shall prepare a ballot title and proposition summarizing each proposed amendment, and shall place them on the
ballot for the next statewide election. If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition favor the amendment, it becomes effective
thirty days after the certification of the election returns by the secretary of state.

Sec. 2. Convention. The legislature may call constitutional conventions at any time.

Sec. 3. Call by referendum. If during any ten-year period a constitutional convention has not been held, the secretary of state shall
place on the ballot for the next general election the question: "Shall there be a Constitutional Convention?" If a majority of the
votes cast on the question are in the negative, the question need not be placed on the ballot until the end of the next ten-year
period. If a majority of the votes cast on the question are in the affirmative, delegates to the convention shall be chosen at the next
regular statewide election, unless the legislature provides for the election of the election delegates at a special election. The
secretary of state shall issue the call for the convention. Unless other provisions have been made by law, the call shall conform as
nearly as possible to the act calling the Alaska Constitutional Convention of 1955, including, but not limited to, number of
members, districts, election and certification of delegates, and submission and ratification of revisions and ordinances. ... .

Sec. 4. Powers. Constitutional conventions shall have plenary power to amend or revise the constitution, subject only to
ratification by the people. No call for a constitutional convention shall limit these powers of the convention.

2. California (1879) — Art. XVIII. Amending and Revising the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Constitutional amendments. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or
Assembly, and if two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the houses shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be entered in their Journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon; and it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner, and at such time, and after such
publication as may be deemed expedient. Should more amendments than one be submitted at the same election they shall be so
prepared and distinguished, by numbers or otherwise, that each can be voted on separately. If the people shall approve and ratify
such amendment or amendments, or any of them, by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon such amendment or
amendments shall become a part of this constitution.

Sec. 2. Constitutional convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature shall deem it
necessary to revise this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general for or against a Convention
for that purpose, and if a majority of the electors voting at such election on the proposition for a Convention shall vote in favor
thereof, the Legislature shall, at its next session, provide by law for calling the same. The Convention shall consist of a number of
delegates not to exceed that of both branches of the Legislature, who shall be chosen in the same manner, and have the same
qualifications, as Members of the Legislature. The delegates so elected shall meet within three months after their election at such
place as the Legislature may direct. At a special election to be provided for by law, the Constitution that may be agreed upon by
such Convention shall be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection, in such manner as the Convention may
determine. The returns of such election shall, in such manner as the Convention shall direct, be certified to the Executive of the
State, who shall call to his assistance the Controller, Treasurer, and Secretary of State, and compare the returns so certified to
him; and it shall be the duty of the Executive to declare, by his proclamation, such Constitution, as may have been ratified by a
majority of all the votes cast at such special election, to be the Constitution of the State of California.

3. Colorado (1876) — Art. XIX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Constitutional convention; how called. The general assembly may at any time be a vote of two-thirds of the members
elected to each house, recommend to the electors of the state, to vote at the next general election for or against a convention
to revise, alter and amend this constitution; and if a majority of those voting on the question shall declare in favor of such
convention, the general assembly shall, at the next session, provide for the calling thereof. The number of members of the
convention shall be twice that of the senate and they shall be elected in the same manner, at the same places, and in the same
districts. The general assembly shall, in the act calling the convention, designate the day, hour and place of its meeting; fix the
pay of its members and officers, and provide for the payment of the same, together with the necessary expenses of the
convention. Before proceeding, the members shall take an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and of the state of
Colorado, and to faithfully discharge their duties as members of the convention. The qualifications of members shall be the same
as of members of the senate; and vacancies occurring shall be filled in the manner provided for filling vacancies in the general
assembly. Said convention shall meet within three months after such election and prepare such revisions, alterations or
amendments to the constitution as may be deemed necessary; which shall be submitted to the electors for their ratification or
rejection at an election appointed by the convention for that purpose, not less than two nor more than six months after
adjournment thereof; and unless so submitted and approved by a majority of the electors voting at the election, no such revision,
alteration or amendment shall take effect.

Sec. 2. Amendments to constitution; how adopted. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either
house of the general assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, such
proposed amendment or amendments, together with the ayes and noes of each house hereon, shall be entered in full on their
respective journals; the proposed amendment or amendments shall be published with the laws of that session of the general
assembly, and the secretary of state shall also cause the said amendment or amendments to be published in full in not more than
one newspaper of general circulation in each county, for four successive weeks previous to the next general election for members
of the general assembly; and at said election the said amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of
the state for their approval or rejection, and such as are approved by a majority of those voting thereon shall become part of this
constitution.

Provided, that if more than one amendment be submitted at any general election, each of said amendments shall be voted upon
separately and votes thereon cast shall be separately counted the same as though but one amendment was submitted. But the
general assembly shall have no power to propose amendments to more than six articles of this constitution at the same session.

4. Delaware (1897) — Art. XVI. Amendments and Conventions.

Sec. 1. Proposal of constitutional amendments in general assembly; procedure. Any amendment or amendments to this
Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all
the members elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas
and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of State shall cause such proposed amendment or amendments to be published three
months before the next general election in at least three newspapers in each County in which such newspaper shall be published;
and if in the General Assembly next after the said election such proposed amendment or amendments shall upon yea and nay
vote be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, the same shall thereupon become part of the
Constitution.

Sec. 2. Constitutional conventions; procedure; compensation of delegates; quorum; powers and duties; vacancies. The General
Assembly by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each House may from time to time provide for the submission to the
qualified electors of the State at the general election next thereafter the question, "Shall there be a Convention to revise the
Constitution and amend the same?;" and upon such submission, if a majority of those voting on said question shall decide in
favor of a Convention for such purpose, the General Assembly at its next session shall provide for the election of delegates to
such convention at the next general election. Such Convention shall be composed of forty-one delegates, one of whom shall be
chosen from each Representative District by the qualified electors thereof, and two of whom shall be chosen from New Castle
County, two from Kent County and two from Sussex County by the qualified electors thereof respectively. The delegates so
chosen shall convene at the Capital of the State on the first Tuesday in September next after their election. Every delegate shall
receive for his services such compensation as shall be provided by law. A majority of the Convention shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business. The Convention shall have the power to appoint such officers, employees and assistants as it may
be deem necessary, and fix their compensation, and provide for the printing of its documents, journals, debates and proceedings.
The Convention shall determine the rules of its proceedings, and be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members. Whenever there shall be a vacancy in the office of delegate from any district or county by reason of failure to elect,
ineligibility, death, resignation or otherwise, a writ of election to fill such vacancy shall be issued by the Governor, and such
vacancy shall be filled by the qualified electors of such district or county.

5. Florida (1887) — Art. XVII. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Method of amending constitution. Either branch of the Legislature, at any regular session, or at any special or extra-
ordinary session thereof called for such purpose either in the governor's original call or any amendment thereof, may propose the
revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this Constitution. Any such revision or amendment may relate to one subject
or any number of subjects, but no amendment shall consist of more than one revised article of the Constitution.

If the proposed revision or amendment is agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, it shall be entered upon
their respective journals with the yeas and nays and published in one newspaper in each county where a newspaper is published
for two times, one publication to be made not earlier than ten weeks and the other not later than six weeks, immediately
preceding the election at which the same is to be voted upon, and thereupon submitted to the electors of the State for approval or
rejection at the next general election, provided, however, that such revision or amendment may be submitted for approval or
rejection in a special election under the conditions described in and in the manner provided by Section 3 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. If a majority of the electors voting upon the amendment adopt such amendment the same shall become a part of this
Constitution.

Sec. 2. Method of revising constitution. If at any time the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of both Houses,
shall determine that a revision of this Constitution is necessary, such determination shall be entered upon their respective
Journals, with yea's and nay's thereon. Notice of said action shall be published weekly in one newspaper in every county in which
a newspaper is published, for three months preceding the next general election of Representatives, and in those countries where
no newspaper is published, notice shall be given by posting at the several polling precincts in such counties for six weeks next
preceding said election. The electors at said election may vote for or against the revision in question. If a majority of the electors
so voting be in favor of revision, the Legislature chosen at such election shall provide by law for a Convention to revise the
Constitution, said Convention to be held within six months after the passage of such law. The Convention shall consist of a
number equal to the membership of the House of Representatives, and shall be apportioned among the several counties in the
same manner as members of said House.

6. Idaho (1890) — Art. XIX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. How amendments may be proposed. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either
branch of the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two houses, voting
separately, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it
shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general
election, and cause the same to be published without delay for at least six consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in not less
than one newspaper of the general circulation published in each county; and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same,
such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution.

Sec. 3. Revision or amendments by convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at
the next general election, for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have voted
for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session provide by law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist of
a number of members, not less than double the number of the most numerous branch of the legislature.

7. Iowa (1857) — Art. X. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 3. Convention. At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and in each tenth year
thereafter, and also at such times as the General Assembly may, by law, provide, the question, "Shall there be a Convention
to revise the Constitution, and amend the same?" shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members of the General
Assembly; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting at such election, for and against such proposition, shall
decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by law for the election
of delegates to such Convention.

8. Michigan (1909) — Art. XVII. Amendments and Revision.

Sec. 1. Amendments to constitution; proposal by legislature; submission to electors. Any amendment or amendments to this
constitution may be proposed in the senate or house of representatives. If the same shall be agreed to by 2/3 of the members
elected to each house, such amendment or amendments shall be entered on the journals, respectively, with the yeas and nays
taken thereon; and the same shall be submitted to the electors at the next spring or autumn election thereafter, as the legislature
shall direct; and, if a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the legislature voting thereon shall ratify and
approve such amendment or amendments, the same shall become part of the constitution.

Sec. 4. General revision; convention; procedure. At the Biennial Spring Election to be held in the year 1961, in each sixteenth
year thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a General Revision of the Constitution shall be
submitted to the Electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature. In case a majority of the Electors voting on the
question shall decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, at an Election to be held not later than four months after the
Proposal shall have been certified as approved, the Electors of each House of Representatives District as then organized shall
Elect One Delegate for each Electors of each Senatorial District as then organized shall Elect One Delegate for each State Senator
to which the District is entitled. The Delegates so elected shall convene at the Capital City on the First Tuesday in October next
succeeding such election, and shall continue their sessions until the business of the convention shall be completed. A majority of
the delegates elected shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. ... No proposed constitution or amendment adopted
by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for approval as hereinafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all
the delegates elected to the convention, the yeas and nays being entered on the journal. Any proposed constitution or amendments
adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the qualified electors in the manner provided by such convention on the first
Monday in April following the final adjournment of the convention; but, in case an interval of at least 90 days shall not intervene
between such final adjournment and the date of such election. Upon the approval of such constitution or amendments by a
majority of the qualified electors voting thereon such constitution or amendments shall take effect on the first day of January
following the approval thereof.

9. Minnesota (1857) — Art. XIV. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Amendments to constitution; majority vote of electors voting makes amendment valid. Whenever a majority of both
houses of the legislature shall deem it necessary to alter or amend this Constitution, they may proposed such alterations
or amendments, which proposed amendments shall be published with the laws which have been passed at the same session, and
said amendments shall be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection at any general election, and if it shall appear, in a
manner to be provided by law, that a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have voted for and ratified such
alterations or amendments, the same shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of this Constitution. If two or more
alterations or amendments shall be submitted at the same time, it shall be so regulated that the voters shall vote for or against each
separately.

Sec. 2. Revision of constitution. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall think it
necessary to call a convention to revise this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general election
for members of the legislature, for or against a convention; and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have
voted for a convention, the legislature shall, at their next session, provide by law for calling the same. The convention shall
consist of as many members as the House of Representatives, who shall be chosen in the same manner, and shall meet within
three months after their election for the purpose aforesaid.

Sec. 3. Submission to people of revised constitution drafted at convention. Any convention called to revise this constitution shall
submit any revision thereof by said convention to the people of the State of Minnesota for their approval or rejection at the next
general election held not less than 90 days after the adoption of such revision, and, if it shall appear in the manner provided by
law that three-fifths of all the electors voting on the question shall have voted for and ratified such revision, the same shall
constitute a new constitution of the State of Minnesota. Without such submission and ratification, said revision shall be of no
force or effect. Section 9 of Article IV of the Constitution shall not apply to election to the convention.

10. Nevada (1864) — Art. 16. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Constitutional amendments; procedure. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the
Senate or Assembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a Majority of all the members elected to each of the two houses, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their respective journals, with the Yeas and Nays taken thereon, and
referred to the Legislature then next to be chosen, and shall be published for three months next preceding the time of making such
choice. And if in the Legislature next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a
majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the Legislature to submit such proposed amendment
or amendments to the people, in such manner and at such time as the Legislature shall prescribe; and if the people shall approve
and ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature voting
thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitution.

Sec. 2. Convention for revision of constitution; procedure. If at any time the Legislature by a vote of two-thirds of the Members
elected to each house, shall determine that it is necessary to cause a revision of this entire Constitution they shall recommend to
the electors at the next election for Members of the Legislature, to vote for or against a convention, and if it shall appear that a
majority of the electors voting at such election, shall have voted in favor of calling a Convention, the Legislature shall, at its next
session provide by law for calling a Convention to be holden within six months after the passage of such law, and such
Convention shall consist of a number of Members not less that of both branches of the legislature. In determining what is a
majority of the electors voting such election, reference shall be had to the highest number of vote cast at such election for the
candidates of any office or on any question.

11. New Hamspire (1784) —

Art. 99. Revision of constitution provided for. It shall be the duty of the selectmen, and assessors, of the several towns and places
in this state, in warning the first annual meetings for the choice of senators, after the expiration of seven years from the adoption
of this constitution, as amended, to insert expressly in the warrant this purpose, among the others for the meeting, to wit, to take
the sense of the qualified voters on the subject of a revision of the constitution; and, the meeting being warned accordingly, and
not otherwise, the moderator shall take the sense of the qualified voters present as to the necessity of a revision; and a return of
the number of votes for and against such necessity, shall be made by the clerk sealed up, and directed to the general court at their
then next session; and if, it shall appear to the general court by such return, that the sense of the people of the state has taken, and
that, in the opinion of the majority of the qualified voters in the state, present and voting at said meetings, there is a necessity for
a revision of the constitution, it shall be the duty of the general court to call a convention for that purpose, otherwise the general
court shall direct the sense of the people to be taken, and then proceed in the manner before mentioned. The delegates to be
chosen in the same manner, and proportioned, as the representatives to the general court; provided that no alterations shall be
made in this constitution, before the same shall be laid before the towns and unincorporated places, and approved by two thirds of
the qualified voters present and voting on the subject.

12. Oklahoma (1907) — Art. XXIV. Constitutional Amendments.

Sec. 1. Amendments proposed by legislature; a submission to vote. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be
proposed in either branch of the Legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of
the two houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and
referred by the Secretary of State to the people for their approval or rejection, at the next regular general election, except when
the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote of each house, shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of all
the electors voting at such election shall vote in favor of any amendment thereto, it shall thereby become a part of this
Constitution.

If two or more amendments are proposed they shall be submitted in such manner that electors may vote for or against them
separately.

No proposal for the amendment or alteration of this Constitution which is submitted to the voters shall embrace more than one
general subject and the voters shall vote separately for or against each proposal submitted; provided, however, that in the
submission of proposals for the amendment of this Constitution by articles, which embrace one general subject, each proposed
article shall be deemed a single proposals or proposition

Sec. 2. Constitutional convention to propose amendments or new constitution. No convention shall be called by the Legislature to
propose alterations, revisions, or amendments to this Constitution, or to propose a new Constitution, unless the law providing for
such convention shall first be approved by the people on a referendum vote at a regular or special election, and any amendments,
alterations, revisions, or new Constitution, proposed by such convention, shall be submitted to the electors of the State at a
general or special election and be approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, before the same shall become effective
Provided, That the question of such proposed convention shall be submitted to the people at least once in every twenty years.

13. Oregon (1859) — Art. XVII. Amendments and Revisions.

Sec. 1. Method of amending constitution. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch
of the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of the two houses,
such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and referred by the
secretary of state to the people for their approval or rejection, at the next regular election, except when the legislative assembly
shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of the electors voting on any such amendment shall vote in favor
thereof, it shall thereby become a part of this Constitution. The votes for and against such amendment, or amendments, severally,
whether proposed by the legislative assembly or by initiative petition, shall be canvassed by the secretary of state in the presence
of the governor, and if it shall appear to the governor that the majority of the votes cast at said election on said amendment, or
amendments, severally, are cast in favor thereof, it shall be his duty forthwith after such canvass, by his proclamation, to declare
the said amendment, or amendments, severally, having received said majority of votes to have been adopted by the people of
Oregon as part of the Constitution thereof, and the same shall be in effect as a part of the Constitution from the date of such
proclamation. When two or more amendments shall be submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same
election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately. No convention shall be called to amend or
propose amendments to this Constitution, or to propose a new Constitution, unless the law providing for such convention shall
first be approved by the people on a referendum vote at a regular general election. This article shall not be construed to impair the
right of the people to amend this Constitution by vote upon an initiative petition therefor.

Sec. 2. Method of revising constitution. (1) In addition to the power to amend this Constitution granted by section 1, Article IV,
and section 1 of this Article, a revision of all or part of this Constitution may be proposed in either house of the Legislative
Assembly and, if the proposed revision is agreed to by at least two-thirds of all the members of each house, the proposed revision
shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and referred by the Secretary of State to the people for their
approval or rejection, notwithstanding section 1, Article IV of this Constitution, at the next regular state-wide primary election,
except when the Legislative Assembly orders a special election for that purpose. A proposed revision may deal with more than
one subject and shall be voted upon as one question. The votes for and against the proposed revision shall be canvassed by the
Secretary of State in the presence of the Governor and, if it appears to the Governor that the majority of the votes cast in the
election on the proposed revision are in favor of the proposed revision, he shall, promptly following the canvass, declare, by his
proclamation, that the proposed revision has received a majority of votes and has been adopted by the people as the Constitution
of the State of Oregon, as the case may be. The revision shall be in effect as the Constitution or as a part of this Constitution from
the date of such proclamation.

14. Utah (1896) — Art. 23. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Amendments; method of proposal and approval. Any amendments to his Constitution may be proposed in either house of
the Legislature, and if two-thirds of all the members elected of the two houses, shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be entered on their respective journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon; and the Legislature
shall cause the same to be published in at least one newspaper in every county of the State, where a newspaper is published, for
two months immediately preceding the next general election, at which time the said amendment or amendments shall be
submitted to the electors of the State, for their approval or rejection, and if a majority of the electors voting thereon shall approve
the same, such amendment or amendments shall become part of this Constitution. If two or more amendments are proposed, they
shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each of them separately.

Sec. 2. Revision of the Constitution by convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members, elected to each branch of the
Legislature, shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the
electors to vote at the next general election, for or against a convention, and, if a majority of all the electors, voting at such
election, shall vote for a convention. The Legislature, at its next session, shall provide by law for calling the same. The
convention shall consist of not less than the number of members in both branches of the Legislature.

15. Wyoming (1890) — Art. XX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Procedure for amendments. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the
legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the two houses, voting separately, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty
of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, in at least one
newspaper of general circulation, published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same, such
amendment or amendments shall become a part of this constitution.

Sec. 2. How voted for. If two or more amendments are proposed, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors shall
vote for or against each of them separately.

Sec. 3. Constitutional convention; provision for. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at
the next general election for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at such election shall have voted
for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session provide by a law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist
of a number of members, not less than double that of the most numerous branch of the legislature.

Sec. 4. New constitution. Any constitution adopted by such convention shall have no validity until it has been submitted to and
adopted by the people.
Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:

CASTRO, J., concurring:

The preliminary question before this Court was whether or not the petitioners had made out a sufficient prima faciecase in their
petitions to justify their being given due course. Considering on the one hand the urgency of the matter and on the other hand its
transcendental importance, which suggested the need for hearing the side of the respondents before that preliminary question was
resolved, We required them to submit their comments on the petitions. After the comments were filed We considered them as
motions to dismiss so that they could be orally argued. As it turned out, the hearing lasted five days, morning and afternoon, and
could not have been more exhaustive if the petitions had been given due course from the beginning.

The major thrust of the petitions is that the act of the Citizens Assemblies as certified and proclaimed by the President on January
17, 1973 (Proclamation No. 1102) was not an act of ratification, let alone a valid one, of the proposed Constitution, because it
was not in accordance with the existing Constitution (of 1935) and the Election Code of 1971. Other grounds are relied upon by
the petitioners in support of their basic proposition, but to our mind they are merely subordinate and peripheral.

Article XV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution provides that amendments (proposed either by Congress in joint session or by a
Convention called by it for the purpose) "shall be valid part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of votes cast at
an election at which the amendments submitted to the people for their ratification." At the time Constitution was approved by the
Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935, and ratified in a plebiscite held on following May 14, the word "election" had
already a definite meaning in our law and jurisprudence. It was not a vague and amorphous concept, but a procedure prescribed
by statute ascertaining the people's choices among candidates for public offices, or their will on important matters submitted to
the pursuant to law, for approval. It was in this sense that word was used by the framers in Article XV (also in Articles VI and
VII), and in accordance with such procedure that plebiscites were held to ratify the very same Constitution in 1935 as well as the
subsequent amendments thereto, thus: in 1939 (Ordinance appended to the Constitution); 1940 (establishment of a bicameral
legislature; eligibility of the President and the Vice President for re election; creation of the Commission of Elections); 1947
(Parity Amendment); and 1967 (increase in membership of the House of Representatives and eligibility of members of Congress
to run for the Constitutional Convention without forfeiture of their offices).

The Election Code of 1971, in its Section 2, states that "all elections of public officers except barrio officials andplebiscites shall
be conducted in the manner provided by this Code." This is a statutory requirement designed, as were the other election laws
previously in force, to carry out the constitutional mandate relative to the exercise of the right suffrage, and with specific
reference to the term "plebiscites," the provision of Article XV regarding ratification of constitutional amendments.

The manner of conducting elections and plebiscites provided by the Code is spelled out in other sections thereof. Section 99
requires that qualified voters be registered in a permanent list, the qualifications being those set forth in Article V, Section 1, of
the 1935 Constitution on the basis of age (21), literacy and residence. These qualifications are reiterated in Section 101 of the
Election Code. Section 102 enumerates the classes of persons disqualified to vote. Succeeding sections prescribe the election
paraphernalia to be used, the procedure for registering voters, the records, of registration and the custody thereof, the description
and printing of official ballots, the actual casting of votes and their subsequent counting by the boards of inspectors, the rules for
appreciation of ballots, and then the canvass and proclamation of the results.

With specific reference to the ratification of the 1972 draft Constitution, several additional circumstances should be considered:

(1) This draft was prepared and approved by a Convention which had been convened pursuant to Resolution No. 2 passed by
Congress on March 16, 1967, which provides:

Sec. 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for
their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

(2) Article XVII, Section 16, of the draft itself states:

Sec. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five and all amendments thereto.
The same procedure is prescribed in Article XVI, Section 2, for the ratification of any future amendment to or revision of the said
Constitution.

(3) After the draft Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 the said body adopted
Resolution No. 5843, proposing "to President Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling aplebiscite for the ratification
of the proposed New Constitution on such appropriate date as he shall determine and providing for the necessary funds therefor."
Pursuant to said Resolution the President issued Decree No. 73 on the same day, calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15,
1973, at which the proposed Constitution "shall be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection." The Decree had eighteen
(18) sections in all, prescribing in detail the different steps to be taken to carry out the process of ratification, such as: (a)
publication of the proposed Constitution in English and Pilipino; (b) freedom of information and discussion; (c) registration of
voters: (d) appointment of boards of election inspectors and designation of watchers in each precinct; (e) printing of official
ballots; (f) manner of voting to insure freedom and secrecy thereof; (g) canvass of plebiscite returns; and (h) in general,
compliance with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971, with the Commission on Elections exercising its constitutional and
statutory powers of supervision of the entire process.

There can hardly be any doubt that in everybody's view — from the framers of the 1935 Constitution through all the Congresses
since then to the 1971 Constitutional Convention — amendments to the Constitution should be ratified in only one way, that is, in
an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Indeed, so
concerned was this Court with the importance and indispensability of complying with the mandate of the (1935) Constitution in
this respect that in the recent case of Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, No. L-34150, October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 702), a
resolution of the (1971) Constitutional Convention submitting a proposed amendment for ratification to a plebiscite to be held in
November 1971 was declared null and void. The amendment sought to reduce the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen years
and was approved by the Convention for submission to a plebiscite ahead of and separately from other amendments still being or
to be considered by it, so as to enable the youth to be thus enfranchised to participate in the plebiscite for the ratification of such
other amendments later. This Court held that such separate submission was violative of Article XV, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which contemplated that "all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite." * Thus a grammatical construction based on a singular, instead of plural, rendition of
the word "election" was considered a sufficient ground to rule out the plebiscite which had been called to ratify a proposed
amendment in accordance with the procedure and under all the safeguards provided in the Election Law.

In the cases now before Us what is at issue is not merely the ratification of just one amendment, as in Tolentino vs. COMELEC,
but the ratification of an entire charter setting up a new form of government; and the issue has arisen not because of a disputed
construction of one word or one provision in the 1935 Constitution but because no election or plebiscite in accordance with that
Constitution and with the Election Code of 1971 was held for the purpose of such ratification.

The Citizens Assemblies which purportedly ratified the draft Constitution were created by Presidential Decree No. 86 dated
December 31, 1972, "to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for
the citizenry to express their views on important national issues." The Assemblies "shall consist of all persons who are residents
of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are
registered in the lists of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary." By Presidential Decree No. 86-
A, dated January 5, 1973, the Assemblies were convened for a referendum between January 10 and 15, to "consider vital national
issues now confronting the country, like the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution, the continuation of martial rule, the
convening of Congress on January 22, 1973, and the holding of elections in November 1973."

On January 5, 1973 the newspapers came out with a list of four questions to be submitted to the Citizens Assemblies, the fourth
one being as follows: "How soon would you like plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?" It should be noted in this
connection that the President had previously announced that he had ordered the postponement of plebiscite which he had called
for January 15, 1973 (Presidential Decree No. 73) for the ratification of the Constitution, and that he was considering two new
dates for the purpose — February 19 or March 5; that he had ordered that the registration of voters (pursuant to Decree No. 73)
be extended to accommodate new voters; and that copies of the new Constitution would be distributed in eight dialects the
people. (Bulletin Today, December 24, 1972.)

On January 10, 1973 it was reported that one more question would be added to the original four which were to be submitted to
the Citizens Assemblies. The question concerning plebiscite was reworded as follows: "Do you like the plebiscite to be held
later?" The implication, it may likewise be noted, was that the Assemblies should express their views as to the plebiscite should
be held, not as to whether or not it should be held at all.

The next day, January 11, it was reported that six additional questions would be submitted, namely:
 (1) Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national
interest?

(2) Do you approve of the new Constitution?

(3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

(4) Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Constitution?

(5) If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?

(6) Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973; emphasis supplied].

Appended to the six additional questions above quoted were the suggested answers, thus:

COMMENTS ON

QUESTION No. 1

In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government.

QUESTION No. 2

But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be convened at

all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the
New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.

QUESTION No. 3

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new Constitution
should be deemed ratified.

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the
New Constitution.

QUESTION No. 4

We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so many
debates and so much expenses.

QUESTION No. 5

Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough for
stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to return.

QUESTION No. 6

We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can
accomplish all his reform program and establish normalcy in the country. If all other
measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government along the
lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly.
So it was that on January 11, 1973, the second day of the purported referendum, the suggestion was broached, for the first time,
that the plebiscite should be done away with and a favorable vote by the Assemblies deemed equivalent ratification. This was
done, not in the questionnaire itself, but in the suggested answer to question No. 3. Strangely, however, it was not similarly
suggested that an unfavorable vote be considered as rejection.

There should be no serious dispute as to the fact that the manner in which the voting was conducted in the Citizen Assemblies,
assuming that such voting was held, was not within the intendment of Article XV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution nor in
accordance with the Election Code of 1971. The referendum can by no means be considered as the plebiscite contemplated in
Section 2 of said Code and in Article XVII, Section 16, of the draft Constitution itself, or as the election intended by Congress
when it passed Resolution No. 2 on March 16, 1967 calling a Convention for the revision of the 1935 Constitution. The Citizens
Assemblies were not limited to qualified, let alone registered voters, but included all citizens from the age of fifteen, and
regardless of whether or not they were illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex convicts * — these being the classes of persons expressly
disqualified from voting by Section 102 of the Election Code. In short, the constitutional and statutory qualifications were not
considered in the determination of who should participate. No official ballots were used in the voting; it was done mostly by
acclamation or open show of hands. Secrecy, which is one of the essential features of the election process, was not therefore
observed. No set of rules for counting the votes or of tabulating them and reporting the figures was prescribed or followed. The
Commission on Elections, which is the constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections, took no part at all, either by way of supervision or in the assessment of the results.

It has been suggested that since according to Proclamation No. 1102 the overwhelming majority of all the members of the
Citizens Assemblies had voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution there was a substantial compliance with Article XV,
Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution and with the Election Code of 1971. The suggestion misses the point entirely. It is of the
essence of a valid exercise of the right of suffrage that not only must a majority or plurality of the voters carry the day but that the
same must be duly ascertained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other words the very existence of such
majority or plurality depends upon the manner of its ascertainment, and to conclude that it exists even if it has not been
ascertained according to law is simply to beg the issue, or to assume the very fact to be established. Otherwise no election or
plebiscite could be questioned for non-compliance with the provisions of the Election Law as long as it is certified that a majority
of the citizens had voted favorably or adversely on whatever it was that was submitted to them to vote upon.

However, a finding that the ratification of the draft Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies, as certified by the President in
Proclamation No. 1102, was not in accordance with the constitutional and statutory procedure laid down for the purpose does not
quite resolve the questions raised in these cases. Such a finding, in our opinion, is on a matter which is essentially justiciable, that
is, within the power of this Court to inquire into. It imports nothing more than a simple reading and application of the pertinent
provisions of the 1935 Constitution, of the Election Code and of other related laws and official acts. No question of wisdom or of
policy is involved. But from this finding it does not necessarily follow that this Court may justifiably declare that the Constitution
has not become effective, and for that reason give due course to these petitions or grant the writs herein prayed for. The
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases, to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable.

Several theories have been advanced respectively by the parties. The petitioners lay stress on the invalidity of the ratification
process adopted by the Citizens Assemblies and on that premise would have this Court grant the reliefs they seek. The
respondents represented by the Solicitor General, whose theory may be taken as the official position of the Government,
challenge the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the petitions are political and therefore non-
justiciable, and that in any case popular acquiescence in the new Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in reliance
thereon should caution against interposition of the power of judicial review. Respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy (in L-36165),
in their respective capacities as President and President Pro Tempore of the Senate of the Philippines, and through their counsel,
Senator Arturo Tolentino, likewise invoke the political question doctrine, but on a ground not concurred in by the Solicitor
General, namely, that approval of the 1973 Constitution by the people was made under a revolutionary government, in the course
of a successful political revolution, which was converted by act of the people to the present de jure government under the 1973
Constitution."

Heretofore, constitutional disputes which have come before this Court for adjudication proceeded on the assumption, conceded
by all, that the Constitution was in full force and effect, with the power and authority of the entire Government behind it; and the
task of this Court was simply to determine whether or not the particular act or statute that was being challenged contravened
some rule or mandate of that Constitution. The process employed was one of interpretation and synthesis. In the cases at bar there
is no such assumption: the Constitution (1935) has been derogated and its continued existence as well as the validity of the act of
derogation is issue. The legal problem posed by the situation is aggravated by the fact that the political arms of the Government
— the Executive Departments and the two Houses of Congress — have accepted the new Constitution as effective: the former by
organizing themselves and discharging their functions under it, and the latter by not convening on January 22, 1973 or at any
time thereafter, as ordained by the 1935 Constitution, and in the case of a majority of the members by expressing their option to
serve in the Interim National Assembly in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the 1973 Constitution. *

The theory advanced by Senator Tolentino, as counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy, may be taken up and restated at same
length if only because it would constitute, if sustained, the most convenient ground for the invocation of the political-question
doctrine. In support of his theory, Senator Tolentino contends that after President Marcos declared martial law on September 21,
1972 (Proclamation No. 1081) he established a revolutionary government when he issued General Order No. 1 the next day,
wherein he proclaimed "that I shall govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire government, including all its agencies
and instrumentalities, in my capacity, and shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to my position
as such Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines." By this order, it is pointed out, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces assumed all the powers of government — executive, legislative, and judicial; and thereafter proceeded
to exercise such powers by a series of Orders and Decrees which amounted to legislative enactments not justified under martial
law and, in some instances, trenched upon the domain of the judiciary, by removing from its jurisdiction certain classes of cases,
such as "those involving the validity, legality, or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1081, or of any decree, order or act issued,
promulgated or performed by me or by my duly designated representative pursuant thereto." (General Order No. 3 as amended by
General Order No. 3-A, dated September 24, 1972.) The ratification by the Citizens Assemblies, it is averred, was the
culminating act of the revolution, which thereupon converted the government into a de jure one under the 1973 Constitution.

If indeed it be accepted that the Citizens Assemblies had ratified the 1973 Constitution and that such ratification as well as the
establishment of the government thereunder formed part of a revolution, albeit peaceful, then the issue of whether or not that
Constitution has become effective and, as necessary corollary, whether or not the government legitimately functions under it
instead of under the 1935 Constitution, is political and therefore non-judicial in nature. Under such a postulate what the people
did in the Citizen Assemblies should be taken as an exercise of the ultimate sovereign power. If they had risen up in arms and by
force deposed the then existing government and set up a new government in its place, there could not be the least doubt that their
act would be political and not subject to judicial review but only to the judgment of the same body politic act, in the context just
set forth, is based on realities. If a new government gains authority and dominance through force, it can be effectively challenged
only by a stronger force; judicial dictum can prevail against it. We do not see that situation would be any different, as far as the
doctrine of judicial review is concerned, if no force had been resorted to and the people, in defiance of the existing Constitution
but peacefully because of the absence of any appreciable opposition, ordained a new Constitution and succeeded in having the
government operate under it. Against such a reality there can be no adequate judicial relief; and so courts forbear to take
cognizance of the question but leave it to be decided through political means.

The logic of the political-question doctrine is illustrated in statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case * relied upon, curiously
enough, by the Solicitor General, who disagrees with the revolutionary government theory of Senator Tolentino. The case
involved the issue of which of two opposing governments struggling for supremacy in the State of Rhode Island was the lawful
one. The issue had previously come up in several other cases before the courts of the State, which uniformly held that the inquiry
belonged to the political power and not to the judicial. Commenting on the ruling thus arrived at, the U.S. Supreme Court said:
"And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and incapable of
pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the
existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising judicial power." In other words, since the court would
have no choice but to decide in one way alone in order to be able to decide at all, the question could not be considered proper for
judicial determination.

It should be noted that the above statement from Luther vs. Borden would be applicable in the cases at bar only on the premise
that the ratification of the Constitution was a revolutionary act and that the government now functioning it is the product of such
revolution. However, we are not prepared to agree that the premise is justified.

In the first, place, with specific reference to the questioned ratification, several significant circumstances may be noted. (1) The
Citizens Assemblies were created, according to Presidential Decree No. 86, "to broaden the base of citizen participation in the
democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues." (2)
The President announced, according to the Daily Express of January 2, 1973, that "the referendum will be in the nature of a loose
consultation with the people." (3) The question, as submitted to them on the particular point at issue here, was "Do you a approve
of the Constitution?" (4) President Marcos, in proclaiming that the Constitution had been ratified, stated as follows: "(S)ince the
referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in
favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should
already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people." (5) There was not enough time for the Citizens Assemblies to really
familiarize themselves with the Constitution, much less with the many other subjects that were submitted to them. In fact the
plebiscite planned for January 15, 1973 under Presidential Decree No. 73 had been postponed to an indefinite date, the reasons
for the postponement being, as attributed to the President in the newspapers, that "there was little time to campaign for or against
ratification" (Daily Express, Dec. 22, 1972); that he would base his decision (as to the date, of the plebiscite) on the compliance
by the Commission (on Elections) on the publication requirement of the new Charter and on the position taken by national
leaders" (Daily Express, Dec. 23, 1972); and that "the postponement would give us more time to debate on the merits of the
Charter." (Bulletin Today, Dec. 24, 1972.)

The circumstances above enumerated lead us to the conclusion that the Citizens Assemblies could not have understood the
referendum to be for the ratification of the Constitution, but only for the expression of their views on a consultative basis. Indeed,
if the expression of those views had been intended as an act of ratification (or of rejection as a logical corollary) — there would
have been no need for the Katipunan ng mga Barangay to recommend that the Constitution should already be deemed ratified,
for recommendation imports recognition of some higher authority in whom the final decision rests.

But then the President, pursuant to such recommendation, did proclaim that the Constitution had been ratified and had come into
effect. The more relevant consideration, therefore, as far as we can see, should be as to what the President had in mind in
convening the Citizens Assemblies, submitting the Constitution to them and proclaiming that the favorable expression of their
views was an act of ratification. In this respect subjective factors, which defy judicial analysis and adjudication, are necessarily
involved.

In positing the problem within an identifiable frame of reference we find no need to consider whether or not the regime
established by President Marcos since he declared martial law and under which the new Constitution was submitted to the
Citizens Assemblies was a revolutionary one. The pivotal question is rather whether or not the effectivity of the said Constitution
by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, upon the recommendation of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, was intended to
be definite and irrevocable, regardless of non-compliance with the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions prescribing
the procedure for ratification. We must confess that after considering all the available evidence and all the relevant circumstances
we have found no reasonably reliable answer to the question. On one hand we read, for instance, the following public statements
of the President:

Speaking about the proclamation of martial law, he said:

I reiterate what I have said in the past: there is no turning back for our people.

We have committed ourselves to this revolution. We have pledged to it our future, our fortunes, our lives, our
destiny. We have burned our bridges behind us. Let no man misunderstand the strength of our resolution. (A
Report to the Nation, Jan. 7, 1973.)

On the occasion of the signing of Proclamation No. 1102 on January 17, 1973, the President said the following, among other
things:

... We can, perhaps delimit the power of the people to speak on legal matters, on justiciable matters, on
matters that may come before the experts and interpreters of the law. But we cannot disqualify the people
from speaking on what we and the people consider purely political matters especially those that affect the
fundamental law of the land.

... The political questions that were presented to the people are exactly those that refer to the form of
government which the people want ... The implications of disregarding the people's will are too awesome to
be even considered. For if any power in government should even dare to disregard the people's will there
would be valid ground for revolt.

... Let it be known to everybody that the people have spoken and they will no longer tolerate any attempt to
undermine the stability of their Republic; they will rise up in arms not in revolt against the Republic but in
protection of the Republic which they have installed. It is quite clear when the people say, we ratify the
Constitution, that they mean they will not discard, the Constitution.

On January 19, 1973 the Daily Express published statement of the President made the day before, from which the following
portion is quoted:

... the times are too grave and the stakes too high for us permit the customary concessions to traditional
democratic process to hold back our people's clear and unequivocal resolve and mandate to meet and
overcome the extraordinary challenges presented by these extraordinary times.
On the same occasion of the signing of Proclamation No. 1102 the President made pointed reference to "the demand of some of
our citizens ... that when all other measures should fail, that the President be directed to organize and establish a Revolutionary
Government," but in the next breath added: "... if we do ratify the Constitution, how can we speak of Revolutionary Government?
They cannot be compatible ..." "(I)t is my feeling," he said, "that the Citizens' Assemblies which submitted this recommendation
merely sought articulate their impatience with the status quo that has brought about anarchy, confusion and misery to the masses
..." The only alternatives which the President clearly implied by the foregoing statements were the ratification of the new
Constitution and the establishment of a revolutionary government, the latter being unnecessary, in his opinion, because precisely
the Constitution had been ratified. The third obvious alternative was entirely ruled out, namely, a return to the 1935 Constitution,
for it was the status quo under that Constitution that had caused "anarchy, confusion and misery." The message seems clear:
rather than return to such status quo, he would heed the recommendation of the Citizens' Assemblies to establish a revolutionary
government, because that would be the only other way to carry out the reforms he had envisioned and initiated — reforms which,
in all fairness and honesty, must be given credit for the improved quality of life in its many aspects, except only in the field of
civil liberties.

If there is any significance, both explicit and implicit, and certainly unmistakable, in the foregoing pronouncements, it is that the
step taken in connection with the ratification of the Constitution was meant to be irreversible, and that nothing anyone could say
would make the least difference. And if this is a correct and accurate assessment of the situation, then we would say that since it
has been brought about by political action and is now maintained by the government that is in undisputed authority and
dominance, the matter lies beyond the power of judicial review.

On the other hand, by avowals no less significant if not so emphatic in terms, President Marcos has professed fealty to the
Constitution. In "Today's Revolution: Democracy" he says:

I believe, therefore, in the necessity of Revolution as an instrument of individual and social change ... but that
in a democratic society, revolution is of necessity, constitutional, peaceful, and legal.

In his TV address of September 23, 1972, President Marcos told the nation:

I have proclaimed martial law in accordance with the powers vested in the President by the Constitution of
the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

I repeat, this is not a military takeover of civil government functions. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines which was established by our people in 1946 continues.

xxx xxx xxx

I assure you that I am utilizing this power vested in me by the Constitution to save the Republic and reform
our society...

I have had to use this constitutional power in order that we may not completely lose the civil rights and
freedom which we cherish...

... We are against the wall. We must now defend the Republic with the stronger powers of the Constitution.

(Vital Documents, pp. 1-12; emphasis supplied).

In the report of an interview granted by the President to the Newsweek Magazine (published in the issue of January 29, 1973), the
following appears:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now that you have gotten off the constitutional track, won't you be in serious trouble
if you run into critical problems with your programs?
 R. I have never gotten off the constitutional track. Everything I am doing is in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution. The only thing is that instead of 18-year-olds voting, we have
allowed 15-year-olds the right to vote. But the 15-year-olds of today are high-school
students, if not graduates, and they are better informed than my contemporaries at that
age. On the matter of whether it is constitutional to proclaim martial law, it is
constitutional because the Constitution provides for it in the event of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or immediate danger thereof. We may quarrel about whether what
we have gone through is sufficient cause to proclaim martial law but at the very least
there is a danger of rebellion because so many of our soldiers have been killed. You must
remember this (martial law provision) was lifted from the American legislation that was
the fundamental law of our country.

xxx xxx xxx

In the light of this seeming ambivalence, the choice of what course of action to pursue belongs to the President. We have earlier
made reference to subjective factors on which this Court, to our mind, is in no position to pass judgment. Among them is the
President's own assessment of the will of the people as expressed through the Citizens Assemblies and of the importance of the
1973 Constitution to the successful implementation of the social and economic reforms he has started or envisioned. If he should
decide that there is no turning back, that what the people recommended through the Citizens Assemblies, as they were reported to
him, demand that the action he took pursuant thereto be final and irrevocable, then judicial review is out of the question.

In articulating our view that the procedure of ratification that was followed was not in accordance with the 1935 Constitution and
related statutes, we have discharged our sworn duty as we conceive it to be. The President should now perhaps decide, if he has
not already decided, whether adherence to such procedure is weighty enough a consideration, if only to dispel any cloud of doubt
that may now and in the future shroud the nation's Charter.

In the deliberations of this Court one of the issues formulated for resolution is whether or not the new Constitution, since its
submission to the Citizens Assemblies, has found acceptance among the people, such issue being related to the political question
theory propounded by the respondents. We have not tarried on the point at all since we find no reliable basis on which to form a
judgment. Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles restricted, we
have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution. In any event, we
do not find the issue decisive insofar as our vote in these cases is concerned. To interpret the Constitution — that is judicial. That
the Constitution should be deemed in effect because of popular acquiescence — that is political, and therefore beyond the domain
of judicial review.

We therefore vote not to give due course to the instant petitions.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

As far as I am concerned, I regard the present petitions as no more than mere reiterations of the Supplemental Petitions filed by
Counsel Lorenzo M. Tañada on January 15, 1973 in the so called Plebiscite Cases decided by this Court on January 22, 1978. Of
course, there are amplifications of some of the grounds previously alleged and in the course of the unprecedented five-day
hearing that was held from February 12 to 16 last, more extensive and illuminating arguments were heard by Us, but, in my
estimation, and with due recognition of the sincerety, brilliance and eloquence of counsels, nothing more cogent and compelling
than what had already been previously presented by Counsel Tañada is before Us now. Accordingly, I cannot see any reason why
I should change the position I took in regard to the earlier cases. I reiterate, therefore, the vote I cast when these petitions were
initially considered by the Court; namely, to dismiss them.

In view, however, of the transcendental importance of the issues before the Court and the significance to our people and in
history of the individual stands of the members of the Court in relation to said issues and to the final outcome of these cases, and
considering that I reserved before the filing of a more extended opinion, I will take this opportunity to explain further why I hold
that the 1973 Constitution is already in force, if only to clarify that apart from the people's right of revolution to which I made
pointed reference in my previous opinion, I can see now, after further reflection, that the vote of the people in the referendum in
the Citizens Assemblies held on January 10 to 15, 1973, upon the result of which Proclamation 1102 is based, may be viewed
more importantly as a political act than as a purely legal one with the result that such vote to consider the 1973 Constitution as
ratified without the necessity of holding a plebiscite in the form followed in the previous ratification plebiscites in 1935 of the
Constitution itself, 1937 of women's suffrage, 1939 of the amendments to the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, 1940 of
the re-election of the President, the bicameral legislature and the Commission on Elections, 1947 of the parity amendment and
1967, rejecting the proposed increase in the members of the House of Representatives and eligibility of members of Congress to
the Constitutional Convention, may be deemed as a valid ratification substantially in compliance with the basic intent of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution. If indeed this explanation may be considered as a modification of my rationalization then, I wish to
emphasize that my position as to the fundamental issue regarding the enforceability of the new Constitution is even firmer now
than ever before. As I shall elucidate anon, paramount considerations of national import have led me to the conviction that the
best interests of all concerned would be best served by the Supreme Court holding that the 1973 Constitution is now in force, not
necessarily as a consequence of the revolutionary concept previously suggested by me, but upon the ground that as a political,
more than as a legal, act of the people, the result of the referendum may be construed as a compliance with the substantiality of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.

The facts that gave rise to these proceedings are historical and well known. Generally, they may be taken judicial notice of. They
revolve around the purported ratification of the Constitution of 1973 declared in Proclamation 1102 issued by the President on
January 17, 1973.

Pursuant to a joint resolution of the Congress sitting as a constituent assembly approved on March 16, 1967, delegates to a
constitutional convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of 1935 were elected in accordance with the implementing
law, Republic Act 6132, on November 10, 1970. Known as the Constitutional Convention of 1971, the assembly began its
sessions on June 1, 1971. After encountering a lot of difficulties, due to bitter rivalries over important positions and committees
and an incomprehensible fear of overconcentrating powers in their officers, the delegates went about their work in comparatively
slow pace, and by the third quarter of 1972 had finished deliberations and second-reading voting only on an insignificant number
of proposals — until September 21, 1972, when the President, not altogether unexpectedly, yet abruptly, issued Proclamation
1081 declaring martial law throughout the country. An attempt was made to have the Convention recessed until after the lifting of
martial law, and not long after the motion of Delegate Kalaw to such effect was turned down, the activities within the assembly
shifted to high gear. As if unmindful of the arrest and continued detention of several of its members, the convention gathered
swift momentum in its work, and on November 30, 1972, it approved by overwhelming vote the draft of a complete constitution,
instead of mere specific amendments of particular portions of the Constitution of 1935. Needless to say, before martial law was
declared, there was full and unlimited coverage of the workings in the convention by the mass media. At the same time, public
debates and discussions on various aspects of proposed amendments were not uncommon.

Earlier, on November 22, 1972, the Convention had Resolution No. 5843 proposing "to President Ferdinand Marcos that a decree
be issued calling a plebiscite for ratification of the proposed new Constitution on appropriate date as he shall determine and
providing for necessary funds therefor." Acting under this authority, December 1, 1972, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 73 submitting the draft constitution for ratification by the people at a plebiscite set for January 15, 1973. This order contained
provisions more or less similar to the plebiscite laws passed by Congress relative to the past plebiscites held in connection with
previous proposed amendments.

In connection with the plebiscite thus contemplated, General Order No. 17 was issued ordering and enjoining the authorities to
allow and encourage public and free discussions on proposed constitution. Not only this, subsequently, under date of December
17, 1972, the President ordered the suspension the effects of martial law and lifted the suspension of privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus insofar as activities connected with the ratification of the draft constitution were concerned. These two orders
were not, however, to last very long. On January 7, 1973, the President, invoking information related to him that the area of
public debate and discussion had opened by his previous orders was being taken advantage of by subversive elements to defeat
the purposes for which they were issued and to foment public confusion, withdrew said orders and enjoined full and stricter
implementation of martial law.

In the meantime, the President had issued on December 3, 1972 Presidential Decree No. 86 creating Citizens Assemblies "so as
to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues" and one of the questions
presented to said assemblies was: "Do you like the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution to be held later" So, the same order of
January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20, the President ordered, "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held January 15, 1973, be
postponed until further notice".

In the meanwhile also, on January 5, 1973, the President issued Presidential Decree, No. 86-A providing as follows:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-A

STRENGTHENING AND DEFINING THE ROLE OF

BARANGAYS (CITIZENS ASSEMBLIES)
 WHEREAS, on the basis of preliminary and initial reports from the field as gathered from barangays
(citizens assemblies) that have so far been established, the people would like to decide for themselves
questions or issues, both local and national, affecting their day-to-day lives and their future;

WHEREAS, the barangays (citizens assemblies) would like themselves to be the vehicle for expressing the
views of the people on important national issues;

WHEREAS, such barangays (citizens assemblies) desire that they be given legal status and due recognition
as constituting the genuine, legitimate and valid expression of the popular will; and

WHEREAS, the people would like the citizens assemblies to conduct immediately a referendum on certain
specified questions such as the ratification of the new Constitution, continuance of martial law, the convening
of Congress on January 22, 1973, and the elections in November 1973 pursuant to the 1935 Constitution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby
declare as part of the law of the land the following:

1. The present barangays (citizens assemblies) are created under Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December
31, 1972, shall constitute the base for citizen participation in governmental affairs and their collective views
shall be considered in the formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be
translated into concrete and specific decision;

2. Such barangays (citizens assemblies) shall consider vital national issues now confronting the country, like
the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution, the continuation of martial rule, the convening of
Congress on January 22, 1973, and the holding of elections in November 1973, and others in the future,
which shall serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the national government;

3. The barangays (citizens assemblies) shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on
important national issues, including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit results thereof to the
Department of Local Governments Community Development immediately thereafter, pursuant to express will
of the people as reflected in the reports gathered from the many thousands of barangays (citizens assemblies)
throughout the country.

4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy
three.

And on January 7, 1973, this was followed by Presidential Decree No. 86-B reading thus:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-B

DEFINING FURTHER THE ROLE OF BARANGAYS (CITIZENS

ASSEMBLIES)

WHEREAS, since their creation pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December 31, 1972, the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) have petitioned the Office of the President to submit them for resolution
important national issues;

WHEREAS, one of the questions persistently mentioned refers to the ratification of the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention;

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said petitions, it is evident that the people believe that the submission of the
proposed Constitution to the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays should be taken as a plebiscite in itself in
view of the fact that freedom of debate has always been limited to the leadership in political, economic and
 social fields, and that it is now necessary to bring this down to the level of the people themselves through the
Barangays or Citizens Assemblies;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order that important national issues shall from time to time be
referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No.
86-A dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum shall include the matter of ratification of the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

The Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the
implementation of this Order.

Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of January in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three.

And so it was that by January 10, 1973, when the Citizens Assemblies thus created started the referendum which was held from
said date to January 15, 1973, the following questions were submitted to them:

(1) Do you like the New Society?

(2) Do you like the reforms under martial law?

(3) Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?

(4) Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?

(5) Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?.

but on January 11, 1973, six questions were added as follows:

(1) Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national
interests?

(2) Do you approve of the New Constitution?

(3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

(4) Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Constitution?

(5) If the elections would not be held, when do you want it to be called?

(6) Do you want martial law to continue?

It is not seriously denied that together with the question the voters were furnished "comments" on the said questions more or less
suggestive of the answer desired. It may assumed that the said "comments" came from official sources, albeit specifically
unidentified. As petitioners point out, the most relevant of these "comments" were the following:

COMMENTS ON

xxx xxx xxx

QUESTION No. 2
 But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoke. Or if it is to be convened at
all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the
New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.

QUESTION No. 3

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the
New Constitution.

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the new Constitution then the new Constitution
should be deemed ratified.

The Solicitor General claims, and there seems to be showing otherwise, that the results of the referendum were determined in the
following manner:

Thereafter, the results of the voting were collated and sent to the Department of Local Governments. The
transmission of the results was made by telegram, telephone, the provincial government SSB System in each
province connecting all towns; the SSB communication of the PACD connecting most provinces; the
Department of Public Information Network System; the Weather Bureau Communication System connecting
all provincial capitals and the National Civil Defense Network connecting all provincial capitals. The
certificates of results were then flown to Manila to confirm the previous figures received by the
aforementioned means of transmission. The certificates of results tallied with the previous figures taken with
the exception of few cases of clerical errors.

The Department adopted a system of regionalizing the receiving section of the Citizens Assemblies operation
at the Department wherein the identity of the barrio and the province was immediately given to a staff in
charge of each region. Every afternoon at 2:00 o'clock, the 11 regions submitted the figures they received
from the field to the central committee to tabulate the returns. The last figures were tabulated at 12 midnight
of January 16, 1973 and early morning of January 17, 1973 and were then communicated to the President by
the Department of Local Governments.

The development culminated in the issuance by the President of Proclamation 1102 on January 17, 1973. Said proclamation
reads:

PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF

THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is
subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered
cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 6, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are
residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the
Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or
ward secretary;

WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were establish precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation
in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizen to express their views on important
national issues;

WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people an pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated
January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before Citizens' Assemblies or Barangays: Do you
approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as
against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection;
while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
 Constitution fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814)
answered that there was no need for plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) percent of the members of the
Barangays (Citizen Assemblies) are in favor of the New Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has
strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen
hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelmingly majority
of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines,
and has thereby come into effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three.

The first attempt to question the steps just enumerated taken by the President was in the so-called Plebiscite Cases, ten in number,
which were filed by different petitioners during the first half of December 1972. 1 Their common target then was Presidential
Decree No. 73, but before the said cases could be decided, the series of moves tending in effect to make them moot and academic
insofar as they referred exclusively to the said Presidential Decree began to take shape upon the issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 86-A, quoted above. And when Presidential Decree No. 86-B, also above quoted, was issued and the six additional questions
which were first publicized on January 11, 1973 were known, together with the "comments", petitioners sensed that a new and
unorthodox procedure was being adopted to secure approval by the people of the new Constitution, hence Counsel Tañada, not
being satisfied with the fate of his urgent motion for early decision of the above ten cases dated January 12, 1973, filed on
January 15, 1973, his supplemental motion seeking the prohibition against and injunction of the proceedings going on. Principal
objective was to prevent that the President be furnished the report of the results of the referendum and thereby disable him from
carrying out what petitioners were apprehensively foreseeing would be done — the issuance of some kind of proclamation, order
or decree, declaring that the new Constitution had been ratified. Reacting swiftly, the Court resolved on the same day, January
15, which was Monday, to consider the supplemental motion as a supplemental petition and to require the respondents to answer
the same the next Wednesday, January 17th, before the hour of the hearing of the petition which set for 9:30 o'clock in the
morning of that day. The details what happened that morning form part of the recital of facts the decision rendered by this Court
in the ten cases on January 22, 1973 and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to state no that before the hearing could be closed
and while Counsel Tañada was still insisting on his prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order, the Secretary of Justice
arrived and personally handed to the Chief Justice a copy Proclamation 1102 which had been issued at about 11:00 o'clock that
same morning. In other words, the valiant and persistent efforts of petitioners and their counsels were overtaken by adverse
developments, and in the mind of the majority of the members of the Court, the cases had become academic. For my part, I took
the view that even on the basis of the supplemental petition and the answer thereto filed by respondents, the Court could already
decide on the fundamental issue of the validity Proclamation 1102, as Justices Zaldivar, Antonio and Esguerra also believed,
inasmuch as Counsel Tañada's pleading and argument had anticipated its issuance, but the majority felt it was not ready to
resolve the matter, for lack, according them, of full ventilation, and so, the decision reserved petitioners the filing of the
"appropriate" cases, evidently, the present ones.

II

At the threshold, I find myself confronted by a matter which, although believed to be inconsequential by my learned brethren, I
strongly feel needs special attention. I refer to the point raised by Counsel Arturo M. Tolentino for respondent Gil J. Puyat and
Jose Roy, who have been sued as President and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, to the effect that change in the composition
of the Supreme Court provided for the 1973 Constitution, from the 11-man tribunal under the 1935 Constitution to a 15-man
Court, makes of these cases which were filed after January 17, 1973 the date when Proclamation 1102 declared the new
Constitution as ratified, political nature and beyond our jurisdiction. The main consideration submitted in this connection is that
inasmuch as the number votes needed for a decision of this Court has been increased from six to eight in ordinary cases and from
eight to ten for the declaration of unconstitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement 2 or law, the Court would have to resolve
first as a prejudicial question whether the Court is acting in these cases as the 15-man or the 11-man Court, in which event, it
would be faced with the dilemma that if it acts either as the former or as the latter, it would be prejudging the very matter in issue
one way or the other, and, in effect, it would be choosing between two constitutions, which is a political determination not within
the Court's competence.
While I agree that the problem is at first blush rather involved, I do not share the view that the premises laid down by counsel
necessarily preclude this Court from taking a definite stand on whether the Court is acting in these cases as the 15-Man or the 11-
man Court. I feel very strongly that the issue should not be ignored or dodged, if only to make the world know that the Supreme
Court of the Philippines is never incognizant of the capacity in which it is acting, much less lacking in courage or wisdom to
resolve an issue that relates directly to its own composition. What a disgrace it would be to admit that this Supreme Court does
not know, to use a common apt expression, whether it is fish or fowl. Withal, scholars and researchers who might go over our
records in the future will inevitably examine minutely how each of us voted and upon what considerations we have individually
acted, and, indeed, doubts may arise as to whether or not, despite the general result we might announce, there had been the
requisite number of votes for a valid collegiate action.

For instance, it may be argued that the present cases do not involve an issue of unconstitutionality, hence, if we are acting as the
11-man Court, only six votes would suffice to declare Proclamation 1102 ineffective, and if upon analysis of our respective
opinions it should be inferable therefrom that six of us have considered the matter before the Court as justiciable and at the same
time have found the procedure of ratification adopted in Presidential Decrees 86-A and 86-B and related orders of the President
as not being in conformity with Article XV of the old Constitution, a cloud would exist as to efficacy of the dispositive portion of
Our decision dismiss these cases, even if we have it understood that by the vote of justices in favor of such dismissal, We
intended to mean the implementation or enforcement of the new Constitution now being done could continue.

Be that as it may, I am against leaving such an important point open to speculation. By nature I am averse to ambiguity and
equivocation and as a member of the Supreme Court, last thing I should knowingly countenance is uncertainty as to the juridical
significance of any decision of the Court which is precisely being looked upon as the haven in which doubts are supposed to be
authoritatively dispelled. Besides, from very nature of things, one thing is indubitably beyond dispute — we cannot act in both
capacities of a 15-man and an 11-man Court at the same time, in like manner that it is inconceivable that the 1935 and 1973
Constitution can be considered by Us both in force. Our inescapable duty is to make a choice between them, according to what
law and other considerations inherent to our function dictate. I cannot bear the thought that someone may someday say that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines once decided a case without knowing the basis of its author to act or that it was ever wanting in
judicial courage to define the same.

Accordingly, with full consciousness of my limitations but compelled by my sense of duty and propriety to straighten out this
grave of issue touching on the capacity in which the Court acting in these cases, I hold that we have no alternative but adopt in
the present situation the orthodox rule that when validity of an act or law is challenged as being repugnant constitutional
mandate, the same is allowed to have effect until the Supreme Court rules that it is unconstitutional. Stated differently, We have
to proceed on the assumption that the new Constitution is in force and that We are acting in these cases as the 15-man Supreme
Court provided for there Contrary to counsel's contention, there is here no prejudgment for or against any of the two
constitutions. The truth of matter is simply that in the normal and logical conduct governmental activities, it is neither practical
nor wise to defer the course of any action until after the courts have ascertained their legality, not only because if that were to be
the rule, the functioning of government would correspondingly be undesirably hesitative and cumbersome, but more importantly,
because the courts must at the first instance accord due respect to the acts of the other departments, as otherwise, the smooth
running of the government would have to depend entirely on the unanimity of opinions among all its departments, which is
hardly possible, unless it is assumed that only the judges have the exclusive prerogative of making and enforcing the law, aside
from being its sole interpreter, which is contrary to all norms of juridical and political thinking. To my knowledge, there is yet no
country in the world that has recognized judicial supremacy as its basic governmental principle, no matter how desirable we
might believe the idea to be.

Indeed, it is not hard to visualize the difficulty if not absurdity of Our acting on the assumption that this Court is still functioning
under the 1935 Constitution. It is undeniable that the whole government, including the provincial, municipal and barrio units and
not excluding the lower courts up to the Court of Appeals, is operating under the 1973 Constitution. Almost daily, presidential
orders and decrees of the most legislative character affecting practically every aspect of governmental and private activity as well
as the relations between the government and the citizenry are pouring out from Malacañang under the authority of said
Constitution. On the other hand, taxes are being exacted and penalties in connection therewith are being imposed under said
orders and decrees. Obligations have been contracted and business and industrial plans have been and are being projected
pursuant to them. Displacements of public officials and employees in big numbers are going on in obedience to them. For the ten
justices of the Supreme Court to constitute an island of resistance in the midst of these developments, which even unreasoning
obstinacy cannot ignore, much less impede, is unimaginable, let alone the absurd and complicated consequences such a position
entails in the internal workings within the judiciary amount its different components, what with the lower courts considering such
orders and decrees as forming part of the law of the land in making their orders and decisions, whereas the Supreme Court is
holding, as it were, their effectivity at bay if it is not being indifferent to or ignoring them.

It is suggested that the President, being a man of law, committed to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court, and if the Court
feels that it cannot in the meantime consider the enforcement of the new Constitution, he can wait for its decision. Accepting the
truth of this assertion, it does necessarily follow that by this attitude of the President, considers the Supreme Court as still
operating under the Constitution. Quite on the contrary, it is a fact that he has given instructions for the payment of the justices in
accordance with the rate fixed in the New Constitution. Not only that, official alter ego, the Secretary of Justice, has been
shoving this Court, since January 18, 1973, all matters related to the administrative supervision of the lower courts which by the
new charter has been transferred from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court, and as far as I know, President has not
countermanded the Secretary's steps in that direction. That, on the other hand, the President has not augmented the justices of the
Court to complete the prescribed number of fifteen is, in my appraisal, of no consequence considering that with the presence of
ten justices who are the Court now, there is a working quorum, and the addition of new justices cannot in anyway affect the
voting on the constitutional questions now before Us because, while there sufficient justices to declare by their unanimous vote
illegality of Proclamation 1102, the votes of the justices to added would only be committed to upholding the same, since they
cannot by any standard be expected to vote against legality of the very Constitution under which they would be appointed.

Moreover, what makes the premise of presumptive valid preferable and, even imperative, is that We are dealing here with a
whole constitution that radically modifies or alters only the form of our government from presidential parliamentary but also
other constitutionally institutions vitally affecting all levels of society. It is, to mind, unrealistic to insist on that, fundamentally,
the 1973 Constitution is the same 1935 Constitution, with a few improvements. A cursory perusal of the former should convince
anyone that it is in essence a new one. While it does retain republicanism as the basic governmental tenet, the institutional
changes introduced thereby are rather radical and its social orientation is decidedly more socialistic, just as its nationalistic
features are somewhat different in certain respects. One cannot but note that the change embraces practically every part of the old
charter, from its preamble down to its amending and effectivity clauses, involving as they do the statement of general principles,
the citizenship and suffrage qualifications, the articles on the form of government, the judiciary provisions, the spelling out of the
duties and responsibilities not only of citizens but also of officers of the government and the provisions on the national economy
as well as the patrimony of the nation, not to mention the distinctive features of the general provisions. What is more, the
transitory provisions notably depart from traditional and orthodox views in that, in general, the powers of government during the
interim period are more or less concentrated in the President, to the extent that the continuation or discontinuance of what is now
practically a one-man-rule, is even left to his discretion. Notably, the express ratification of all proclamations, orders, decrees and
acts previously issued or done by the President, obviously meant to encompass those issued during martial law, is a commitment
to the concept of martial law powers being implemented by President Marcos, in defiance of traditional views and prevailing
jurisprudence, to the effect that the Executive's power of legislation during a regime of martial law is all inclusive and is not
limited to the matters demanded by military necessity. In other words, the new constitution unlike any other constitution
countenances the institution by the executive of reforms which normally is the exclusive attribute of the legislature.

Withal, the best proofs that by its expressed and implied intent, the Constitution of 1973 is a new one, are that (1) Section 16 of
its Article XVII which provides that this constitution shall "supersede the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five and all
amendments thereto" and (2) its transitory provisions expressly continue the effectivity of existing laws, offices and courts as
well as the tenure of all incumbent officials, not adversely affected by it, which would have been unnecessary if the old
constitution were being merely amended.

The new Constitution, in its Section 10, Article XVII, provides that "(T)he incumbent members of the Judiciary (which include
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of Supreme Court) may continue in office (under the constitution) until they reach the
age of seventy years, etc." By virtue of the presumptive validity of the new charter, all of form part of the 15-man-Court provided
for therein correspondingly, We have in legal contemplation, ceased in the meanwhile to be members of the 11-man-Court in the
1935 Constitution. Should the Court finally decide that the Constitution is invalid, then We would automatically revert to our
positions in the 11-man- Court, otherwise, We would just continue to be in our membership in the 15-man-Court, unless We feel
We cannot in conscience accept the legality of existence. On the other hand, if it is assumed that We are the 11-man-Court and it
happens that Our collective decision is in favor of the new constitution, it would be problematical for any dissenting justice to
consider himself as included automatically in the 15-man-Court, since that would tantamount to accepting a position he does not
honestly believe exists.

III

In brief, the main contention of the petitioners is that Proclamation 1102 is invalid because the ratification of the 1973
Constitution it purports to declare as having taken place as a result of the referendum above-referred to is ineffective since it
cannot be said on the basis of the said referendum that said Constitution has been "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election" in the manner prescribed by Article XV the Constitution of 1935. More specifically, they maintain that the word
"election" in the said Article has already acquired a definite accepted meaning out of the consistent holding in the past of
ratification plebiscites, and accordingly, no other form of ratification can be considered contemplated by the framers of the Old
Constitution than that which had been followed 1935, 1937, 1939, 1940, 1946 and 1967, the last three or four which were held
under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. Furthermore, they emphatically deny the veracity of the proclaimed
results of the referendum because, according to them the referendum was a farce and its results were manufactured or
prefabricated, considering that Mr. Francisco Cruz, who is supposed to have submitted the final report to the President, which
served as basis for Proclamation 1102, had no official authority to render the same, and it is inconceivable and humanly
impossible for anyone to have been able to gather, tabulate and canvass the 15 million votes allegedly reported within the short
period of time employed. Of course, they also contend that in any event, there was no proper submission because martial law per
se creates constructive duress which deprives the voters of the complete freedom needed for the exercise of their right of choice
and actually, there was neither time nor opportunity for real debate before they voted.

On the other hand, the position of the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondents is that the matter raised in the petitions is a
political one which the courts are not supposed to inquire into, and, anyway, there has been a substantial compliance with Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution, inasmuch as, disregarding unessential matters of form, the undeniable fact is that the voting in the
referendum resulted in the approval by the people of the New Constitution.

I need not dwell at length on these variant positions of the parties. In my separate opinion in the Plebiscite Cases, I already made
the observation that in view of the lack of solemnity and regularity in the voting as well as in the manner of reporting and
canvassing conducted in connection with the referendum, I cannot say that Article XV of the Old Constitution has been complied
with, albeit I held that nonetheless, the Constitution of 1973 is already in force. In order, however, to make myself clearer on
some relevant points, I would like to add a few considerations to what I have already said in the former cases.

In my opinion in those cases, the most important point I took into account was that in the face of the Presidential certification
through Proclamation 1102 itself that the New Constitution has been approved by a majority of the people and having in mind
facts of general knowledge which I have judicial notice of, I am in no position to deny that the result of the referendum was as the
President had stated. I can believe that the figures referred to in the proclamation may not accurate, but I cannot say in conscience
that all of them are manufactured or prefabricated, simply because I saw with own eyes that people did actually gather and listen
discussions, if brief and inadequate for those who are abreast of current events and general occurrences, and that they did vote. I
believe I can safely say that what I have seen have also been seen by many others throughout the country and unless it can be
assumed, which honestly, I do not believe to be possible, that in fact there were actually no meetings held and no voting done in
more places than those wherein there were such meetings and votings, I am not prepared to discredit entirely the declaration that
there was voting and that the majority of the votes were in favor of the New Constitution. If in fact there were substantially less
than 14 million votes of approval, the real figure, in my estimate, could still be significant enough and legally sufficient to serve
as basis for a valid ratification.

It is contended, however, that the understanding was that the referendum among the Citizens Assemblies was to be in the nature
merely of a loose consultation and not an outright submission for purposes of ratification. I can see that at the outset, when the
first set of questions was released, such may have been the idea. It must not be lost sight of, however, that if the newspaper
reports are to be believed, and I say this only because petitioners would consider the newspapers as the official gazettes of the
administration, the last set of six questions were included precisely because the reaction to the idea of mere consultation was that
the people wanted greater direct participation, thru the Citizens Assemblies, in decision-making regarding matters of vital
national interest. Thus, looking at things more understandingly and realistically the two questions emphasized by counsel,
namely, (1) Do yo approve of the New Constitution? and (2) Do you want plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
should be considered no longer as loose consultations but as direct inquiries about the desire of the voters regarding the matters
mentioned. Accordingly, I take it that if the majority had expressed disapproval of the new Constitution, the logical consequence
would have been the complete abandonment of the idea of holding any plebiscite at all. On the other hand, it is very plain to see
that since the majority has already approved the new Constitution, a plebiscite would be superfluous. Clear as these
rationalizations may be, it must have been thought that if the holding of a plebiscite was to be abandoned, there should be a direct
and expressed desire of the people to such effect in order to forestall as much as possible any serious controversy regarding the
non-holding of the plebiscite required by the letter of Section 16 of Article XVII, the effectivity clause, of the new Constitution.
Oddly enough, the "comments" accompanying the questions do strongly suggest this view. And as it turned out, the majority
found no necessity in holding a plebiscite.

In connection with the question, Do you approve of the New Constitution? capital is being made of the point that as so framed,
the thrust of the said question does not seek an answer of fact but of opinion. It is argued that it would have been factual were it
worded categorically thus — Do you approve the New Constitution? The contention would have been weighty were it not
unrealistic. I remember distinctly that the observation regarding the construction of the subject question was not originally made
by any of the talented counsels for petitioners. It came from Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro whose mastery of the English language
can rightly be the cause of envy of even professors of English. None of the other members of the Court, as far as I can recall, ever
noticed how the said question is phrased, or if anyone of Us did, I am not aware that he gave it more than passing attention. What
I mean is that if neither any of the distinguished and learned counsels nor any member of the Court understood the said question
otherwise than calling for a factual answer instead of a mere opinion, how could anyone expect the millions of unlettered
members of the Citizens Assemblies to have noticed the point brought out by Justice Castro? Truth to tell, I myself did not realize
the difference until Justice Castro gave it emphasis. Besides, reading the question in the light of the accompanying "comment"
corresponding to it in particular, I am certain that any one who answered the same understood it in no other sense than a direct
inquiry as to whether or not, as a matter of fact, he approves the New Constitution, and naturally, affirmative answer must be
taken as a categorical vote of approval thereof, considering, particularly, that according to the reported result of the referendum
said answer was even coupled with the request that the President defer the convening of the Interim National Assembly.

It is also contended that because of this reference in answer to that question to the deferment of the convening of the interim
assembly, the said answer is at best a conditional approval not proper nor acceptable for purposes of ratification plebiscite. The
contention has no basis. In interest of accuracy, the additional answer proposed in pertinent "comment" reads as follows: "But we
do not want Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked etc." On the assumption that the actual answer, as reported, was of similar
tenor, it is not fair to ascribe to it the imposition of a condition. At most, the intention is no more than a suggestion or a wish.

As regards said "comments", it must be considered that a martial law was declared, the circumstances surrounding making of the
Constitution acquired a different and more meaningful aspect, namely, the formation of a new society. From the point of view of
the President and on the basis of intelligence reports available to him, the only way to meet situation created by the subversive
elements was to introduce immediately effective reforms calculated to redeem the people from the depth of retrogression and
stagnation caused by rampant graft and corruption in high places, influence peddling, oligarchic political practices, private
armies, anarchy, deteriorating conditions of peace and order, the so inequalities widening the gap between the rich and the poor,
and many other deplorable long standing maladies crying for early relief and solution. Definitely, as in the case of rebellious
movement that threatened the Quirino Administration, the remedy was far from using bullets alone. If a constitution was to be
approved as an effective instrument towards the eradication of such grave problems, it had to be approved without loss of time
and sans the cumbersome processes that, from the realistic viewpoint, have in the past obstructed rather than hastened the
progress of the people. Stated otherwise, in the context of actualities, the evident objective in having a new constitution is to
establish new directions in the pursuit of the national aspirations and the carrying out of national policies. Only by bearing these
considerations in mind can the "comments" already referred to be properly appreciated. To others said "comments" may appear
as evidence of corruption of the will of those who attended the assemblies, but actually, they may also be viewed in the same
light as the sample ballots commonly resorted to in the elections of officials, which no one can contend are per se means of
coercion. Let us not forget that the times are abnormal, and prolonged dialogue and exchange of ideas are not generally possible,
nor practical, considering the need for faster decisions and more resolute action. After all voting on a whole new constitution is
different from voting on one, two or three specific proposed amendments, the former calls for nothing more than a collective
view of all the provisions of the whole charter, for necessarily, one has to take the good together with the bad in it. It is rare for
anyone to reject a constitution only because of a few specific objectionable features, no matter how substantial, considering the
ever present possibility that after all it may be cured by subsequent amendment. Accordingly, there was need to indicate to the
people the paths open to them in their quest for the betterment of their conditions, and as long as it is not shown that those who
did not agree to the suggestions in the "comments" were actually compelled to vote against their will, I am not convinced that the
existence of said "comments" should make any appreciable difference in the court's appraisal of the result of the referendum.

I must confess that the fact that the referendum was held during martial law detracts somehow from the value that the referendum
would otherwise have had. As I intimated, however, in my former opinion, it is not fair to condemn and disregard the result of the
referendum barely because of martial law per se. For one thing, many of the objectionable features of martial law have not
actually materialized, if only because the implementation of martial law since its inception has been generally characterized by
restraint and consideration, thanks to the expressed wishes of the President that the same be made "Philippine style", which
means without the rigor that has attended it in other lands and other times. Moreover, although the restrictions on the freedom of
speech, the press and movement during martial law do have their corresponding adverse effects on the area of information which
should be open to a voter, in its real sense what "chills" his freedom of choice and mars his exercise of discretion is suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reason is simply that a man may freely and correctly vote even if the needed
information he possesses as to the candidates or issues being voted upon is more or less incomplete, but when he is subject to
arrest and detention without investigation and without being informed of the cause thereof, that is something else which may
actually cause him to cast a captive vote. Thus it is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus accompanying martial law that
can cause possible restraint on the freedom choice in an election held during martial law. It is a fact, however, borne by history
and actual experience, that in the Philippines, the suspension of the privilege of the writ habeas corpus has never produced any
chilling effect upon the voters, since it is known by all that only those who run afoul the law, saving inconsequential instances,
have any cause for apprehension in regard to the conduct by them of the normal activities of life. And so it is recorded that in the
elections 1951 and 1971, held while the privilege of writ of habeas corpus was under suspension, the Filipino voters gave the
then opposition parties overwhelming if not sweeping victories, in defiance of the respective administrations that ordered the
suspensions.

At this juncture, I think it is fit to make it clear that I am not trying to show that the result of the referendum may considered as
sufficient basis for declaring that the New Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the amending clause of the 1935
Constitution. I reiterate that in point of law, I find neither strict nor substantial compliance. The foregoing discussion is only to
counter, if I may, certain impression regarding the general conditions obtaining during and in relation to the referendum which
could have in one way or another affected the exercise of the freedom of choice and the use of discretion by the members of the
Citizens Assemblies, to the end that as far as the same conditions may be relevant in my subsequent discussions of the acceptance
by the people of the New Constitution they may also be considered.

IV

It is my sincere conviction that the Constitution of 1973 has been accepted or adopted by the people. And on this premise, my
considered opinion is that the Court may no longer decide these cases on the basis of purely legal considerations. Factors which
are non-legal but nevertheless ponderous and compelling cannot be ignored, for their relevancy is inherent in the issue itself to be
resolved.

In my opinion in the Plebiscite Cases, I joined my colleagues in holding that the question of whether or not there was proper
submission under Presidential Decree No. 73 is justiciable, and I still hold that the propriety of submission under any other law or
in any other form is constitutionally a fit subject for inquiry by the courts. The ruling in the decided cases relied upon by
petitioners are to this effect. In view, however, of the factual background of the cases at bar which include ratification itself, it is
necessary for me to point out that when it comes to ratification, I am persuaded that there should be a boundary beyond which the
competence of the courts no longer has any reason for being, because the other side is exclusively political territory reserved for
their own dominion by the people.

The main basis of my opinion in the previous cases was acceptance by the people. Others may feel there is not enough indication
of such acceptance in the record and in the circumstances the Court can take judicial notice of. For my part, I consider it
unnecessary to be strictly judicial in inquiring into such fact. Being personally aware, as I have already stated, that the Citizens
Assemblies did meet and vote, if irregularly and crudely, it is not for me to resort, for the purposes of these cases, to judicial tape
and measure, to find out with absolute precision the veracity of the total number of votes actually cast. After all, the claims that
upon a comparison of conflicting reports, cases of excess votes may be found, even if extrapolated will not, as far as I can figure
out, suffice to overcome the outcome officially announced. Rather than try to form a conclusion out of the raw evidence before
Us which the parties did not care to really complete, I feel safer by referring to the results announced in the proclamation itself.
Giving substantial allowances for possible error and downright manipulation, it must not be overlooked that, after all, their
having been accepted and adopted by the President, based on official reports submitted to him in due course of performance of
duty of appropriate subordinate officials, elevated them to the category of an act of a coordinate department of the government
which under the principle separation of powers is clothed with presumptive correctness or at least entitled to a high degree of
acceptability, until overcome by better evidence, which in these cases does not exist. In any event, considering that due to the
unorthodoxy of the procedure adopted and the difficulty of an accurate checking of all the figures, I am unable to conceive of any
manageable means of acquiring information upon which to predicate a denial, I have no alternative but to rely on what has been
officially declared. At this point, I would venture to express the feeling that if it were not generally conceded that there has been
sufficient showing of the acceptance in question by this time, there would have been already demonstrative and significant
indications of a rather widespread, if not organized resistance in one form or another. Much as they are to be given due
recognition as magnificent manifestations of loyalty and devotion to principles, I cannot accord to the filing of these cases as
indicative enough of the general attitude of the people.

It is true that in the opinion I had the privilege of penning the Court in Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702, I made strong and
unequivocal pronouncements to the effect that any amendment to the Constitution of 1935, to be valid, must appear to have been
made in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV thereof. What is more, that decision asserted judicial competence
to inquire into the matter of compliance or non compliance as a justiciable matter. I still believe in the correctness of those views
and I would even add that I sincerely feel it reflects the spirit of the said constitutional provision. Without trying to strain any
point however, I, submit the following considerations in the context of the peculiar circumstances of the cases now at bar, which
are entirely different from those in the backdrop of the Tolentino rulings I have referred to.

1. Consider that in the present case what is involved is not just an amendment of a particular provision of an existing
Constitution; here, it is, as I have discussed earlier above, an entirely new Constitution that is being proposed. This important
circumstance makes a great deal of difference.

No less than counsel Tolentino for herein respondents Puyat and Roy, who was himself the petitioner in the case I have just
referred to is, now inviting Our attention to the exact language of Article XV and suggesting that the said Article may be strictly
applied to proposed amendments but may hardly govern the ratification of a new Constitution. It is particularly stressed that the
Article specifically refers to nothing else but "amendments to this Constitution" which if ratified "shall be valid as part of this
Constitution." Indeed, how can a whole new constitution be by any manner of reasoning an amendment to any other constitution
and how can it, if ratified, form part of such other constitution? In fact, in the Tolentino case I already somehow hinted this point
when I made reference in the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration to the fact that Article XV must be followed "as
long as any amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter." Said resolution even added. "(T)his
is not to say that the people may not, in the exercise of their inherent revolutionary powers, amend the Constitution or promulgate
an entirely new one otherwise.".

It is not strange at all to think that the amending clause of a constitution should be confined in its application only to proposed
changes in any part of the same constitution itself, for the very fact that a new constitution is being adopted implies a general
intent to put aside the whole of the old one, and what would be really incongrous is the idea that in such an eventuality, the new
Constitution would subject its going into effect to any provision of the constitution it is to supersede, to use the language
precisely of Section 6, Article XVII, the effectivity clause, of the New Constitution. My understanding is that generally,
constitutions are self-born, they very rarely, if at all, come into being, by virtue of any provision of another constitution. 3 This
must be the reason why every constitution has its own effectivity clause, so that if, the Constitutional Convention had only
anticipated the idea of the referendum and provided for such a method to be used in the ratification of the New Constitution, I
would have had serious doubts as to whether Article XV could have had priority of application.

2. When an entirely new constitution is proposed to supersede the existing one, we cannot but take into consideration the forces
and the circumstances dictating the replacement. From the very nature of things, the proposal to ordain a new constitution must
be viewed as the most eloquent expression of a people's resolute determination to bring about a massive change of the existing
order, a meaningful transformation of the old society and a responsive reformation of the contemporary institutions and
principles. Accordingly, should any question arise as to its effectivity and there is some reasonable indication that the new charter
has already received in one way or another the sanction of the people, I would hold that the better rule is for the courts to defer to
the people's judgment, so long as they are convinced of the fact of their approval, regardless of the form by which it is expressed
provided it be reasonably feasible and reliable. Otherwise stated, in such instances, the courts should not bother about inquiring
into compliance with technical requisites, and as a matter of policy should consider the matter non-justiciable.

3. There is still another circumstance which I consider to be of great relevancy. I refer to the ostensible reaction of the component
elements, both collective and individual, of the Congress of the Philippines. Neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
has been reported to have even made any appreciable effort or attempt to convene as they were supposed to do under the
Constitution of 1935 on January 22, 1973 for the regular session. It must be assumed that being composed of experienced,
knowledgeable and courageous members, it would not have been difficult for said parliamentary bodies to have conceived some
ingenious way of giving evidence of their determined adherence to the Constitution under which they were elected. Frankly,
much as I admire the efforts of the handful of senators who had their picture taken in front of the padlocked portals of the Senate
chamber, I do not feel warranted to accord such act as enough token of resistance. As counsel Tolentino has informed the court,
there was noting to stop the senators and the congressmen to meet in any other convenient place and somehow officially organize
themselves in a way that can logically be considered as a session, even if nothing were done than to merely call the roll and
disperse. Counsel Tolentino even pointed out that if there were not enough members to form a quorum, any smaller group could
have ordered the arrest of the absent members. And with particular relevance to the present cases, it was not constitutionally
indispensable for the presiding officers to issue any call to the members to convene, hence the present prayers
for mandamus have no legal and factual bases. And to top it all, quite to the contrary, the records of the Commission on Elections
show that at least 15 of 24 senators and over 95 out of less than 120 members of the House of Representatives, have officially
and in writing exercised the option given to them to join the Interim National Assembly under the New Constitution, thereby
manifesting their acceptance of the new charter.

Now, having these facts in mind, and it being obvious that of the three great departments of the government under the 1935
Constitution, two, the Executive and the Legislative, have already accepted the New Constitution and recognized its
enforceability and enforcement, I cannot see how this Supreme Court can by judicial fiat hold back the political developments
taking place and for the sake of being the guardian of the Constitution and the defender of its integrity and supremacy make its
judicial power prevail against the decision of those who were duly chosen by the people to be their authorized spokesmen and
representatives. It is not alone the physical futility of such a gesture that concerns me. More than that, there is the stark reality
that the Senators and the Congressmen, no less than the President, have taken the same oath of loyalty to the Constitution that we,
the Justices, have taken and they are, therefore, equally bound with Us to preserve and protect the Constitution. If as the
representatives of the people, they have already opted to accept the New Constitution as the more effective instrument for
fulfillment of the national destiny, I really wonder if there is even any idealistic worth in our desperately clinging by Ourselves
alone to Our sworn duty vis-a-vis the 1935 Constitution. Conscious of the declared objectives of the new dispensation and
cognizant of the decisive steps being with the least loss of time, towards their accomplishment, cannot but feel apprehensive that
instead of serving the best interests of our people, which to me is in reality the real meaning of our oath of office, the Court might
be standing in the way of the very thing our beloved country needs to retrieve its past glory and greatness. In other words, it is my
conviction that what these cases demand most of all is not a decision demonstrative of our legal erudition and Solomonic wisdom
but an all rounded judgment resulting from the consideration of all relevant circumstances, principally the political, or, in brief, a
decision more political than legal, which a court can render only by deferring to the apparent judgment of the people and the
announcement thereof by the political departments of the government and declaring the matter non-justiciable.
4. Viewed from the strictly legal angle and in the light of judicial methods of ascertainment, I cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that in the legal sense, there has been at least substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, but what I
can see is that in a political sense, the answers to the referendum questions were not given by the people as legal conclusions. I
take it that when they answered that by their signified approval of the New Constitution, they do not consider it necessary to hold
a plebiscite, they could not have had in mind any intent to do what was constitutionally improper. Basically accustomed to
proceed along constitutional channels, they must have acted in the honest conviction that what was being done was in conformity
with prevailing constitutional standards. We are not to assume that the sovereign people were indulging in a futile exercise of
their supreme political right to choose the fundamental charter by which their lives, their liberties and their fortunes shall be
safeguarded. In other words, we must perforce infer that they meant their decision to count, and it behooves this Court to render
judgment herein in that context. It is my considered opinion that viewed understandingly and realistically, there is more than
sufficient ground to hold that, judged by such intent and, particularly, from the political standpoint, the ratification of the 1973
Constitution declared in Proclamation 1102 complies substantially with Article XV of the 1935 Charter, specially when it is
considered that the most important element of the ratification therein contemplated is not in the word "election", which
conceivably can be in many feasible and manageable forms but in the word "approved" which may be said to constitute the
substantiality of the whole article, so long as such approval is reasonably ascertained. In the last analysis, therefore, it can be
rightly said, even if only in a broad sense, that the ratification here in question was constitutionally justified and justifiable.

5. Finally, if any doubt should still linger as to the legitimacy of the New Constitution on legal grounds, the same should be
dispelled by viewing the situation in the manner suggested by Counsel Tolentino and by the writer of this opinion in his separate
opinion, oft-referred to above, in the Plebiscite Cases — that is, as an extra constitutional exercise by the people, under the
leadership of President Marcos, of their inalienable right to change their fundamental charter by any means they may deem
appropriate, the moment they are convinced that the existing one is no longer responsive to their fundamental, political and social
needs nor conducive to the timely attainment of their national destiny. This is not only the teaching of the American Declaration
of Independence but is indeed, a truth that is self-evident. More, it should be regarded as implied in every constitution that
regardless of the language of its amending clause, once the people have given their sanction to a new charter, the latter may be
deemed as constitutionally permissible even from the point of view of the preceding constitution. Those who may feel restrained
to consider this view out of respect to the import of Tolentino vs. Comelec, supra., would be well advised to bear in mind that the
case was decided in the context of submission, not accomplished ratification.

The language of the disputed amending clause of the 1935 Constitution should not be deemed as the be all and end all the nation.
More important than even the Constitution itself with all its excellent features, are the people living under it — their happiness,
their posterity and their national destiny. There is nothing that cannot be sacrificed in the pursuit of these objectives, which
constitute the totality of the reasons for national existence. The sacred liberties and freedom enshrined in it and the commitment
and consecration thereof to the forms of democracy we have hitherto observed are mere integral parts of this totality; they are less
important by themselves.

What seems to me to be bothering many of our countrymen now is that by denying the present petitions, the Court would be
deemed as sanctioning, not only the deviations from traditional democratic concepts and principles but also the qualified
curtailment of individual liberties now being practiced, and this would amount, it is feared, to a repudiation of our oath to support
and defend the Constitution of 1935. This is certainly something one must gravely ponder upon. When I consider, however, that
the President, the Vice President, the members of both Houses of Congress, not to speak of all executive departments and bureaus
under them as well as all the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals have already accepted the New Constitution as an
instrument of a meaningful nationwide-all-level change in our government and society purported to make more realistic and
feasible, rather than idealistic and cumbersomely deliberative, the attainment of our national aspirations, I am led to wonder
whether or not we, as members of the Supreme Court are being true to our duty to our people by refusing to follow suit and
accept the realities of the moment, despite our being convinced of the sincerity and laudableness of their objectives, only because
we feel that by the people's own act of ratifying the Constitution of 1935, they have so encased themselves within its provisions
and may, therefore, no longer take measures to redeem themselves from the situation brought about by the deficiencies of the old
order, unless they act in strict conformity therewith. I cannot believe that any people can be so stifled and enchained. In any
event, I consider it a God-given attribute of the people to disengage themselves, if necessary, from any covenant that would
obstruct their taking what subsequently appears to them to be the better road to the promotion and protection of their welfare.
And once they have made their decision in that respect, whether sophisticatedly or crudely, whether in legal form or otherwise,
certainly, there can be no court or power on earth that can reverse them.

I would not be human if I should be insensitive to the passionate and eloquent appeals of Counsels Tañada and Salonga that these
cases be decided on the basis of conscience. That is exactly what I am doing. But if counsel mean that only by granting their
petitions can this Court be worthily the bulwark of the people's faith in the government, I cannot agree, albeit my admiration and
respect are all theirs for their zeal and tenacity, their industry and wisdom, their patriotism and devotion to principle. Verily, they
have brought out everything in the Filipino that these cases demand.

In times of national emergencies and crises, not arising from foreign invasion, we need not fear playing opposite roles, as long as
we are all animated by sincere love of country and aim exclusively at the attainment of the national destiny. Our heroes of the
past, Rizal, Bonifacio, Aguinaldo, Antonio Luna, Mabini and so also with our patriots of the recent generations, Quezon,
Osmeña, Roxas, Laurel and Recto, to mention only some of them, had their differences of views — and they did not hesitate to
take diametrically opposing sides — that even reached tragic proportions, but all of them are admired and venerated.

It is my faith that to act with absolute loyalty to our country and people is more important than loyalty to any particular precept or
provision of the Constitution or to the Constitution itself. My oath to abide by the Constitution binds me to whatever course of
action I feel sincerely is demanded by the welfare and best interests of the people.

In this momentous juncture of our history, what is imperative is national unity. May God grant that the controversies the events
leading to these cases have entail will heal after the decision herein is promulgated, so that all us Filipinos may forever join hands
in the pursuit of our national destiny.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss these petitions for mandamus and prohibition without costs.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Assuming, without conceding, that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribes a procedure for the ratification of
constitutional amendments or of a new Constitution and that such procedure was no complied with, the validity of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1102 is a political, not a justiciable, issue; for it is inseparably or inextricably link with and strikes at, because it
is decisive of, the validity of ratification and adoption of, as well as acquiescence of people in, the 1973 Constitution and the
legitimacy of the government organized and operating thereunder. And being political, it is beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry,
tested by the definition of a political question enunciated in Tañada, et. al. vs. Cuenco, et al. (103 Phil. 1051), aside from the fact
the this view will not do violence to rights vested under the new Constitution, to international commitments forged pursuant
thereto and to decisions rendered by the judicial as well as quasi-judicial tribunals organized and functioning or whose
jurisdiction has been altered by the 1973 Constitution and the government established thereunder, and will dissipate any
confusion in the minds of the citizenry, who have been obeying the mandates of the new Constitution, as well as exercising the
rights and performing the obligations defined by the new Constitution, and decrees and orders issued in implementation of the
same and cooperating with the administration in the renovation of our social, economic and political system as re-structured by
the 1973 Constitution and by the implementing decrees and orders (see Miller vs. Johnson, 18 SW 522, 522-526, 1892).

In 1957, Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, in behalf of the Court, defined a political question as one
which, under the Constitution, is "to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority had been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the government." (Tañada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al., supra).

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provides: "Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification." Under Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution, the power to propose constitutional amendments is vested in Congress or in a constitutional convention;
while the power to ratify or reject such proposed amendments or new Constitution is reserved by the sovereign people. The
nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 would inevitably render inoperative the 1973 Constitution, which is in fact the express
prayer of the petitioners in G.R. No. L-36164. Regardless of the modality of submission or ratification or adoption — even if it
deviates from or violates the procedure delineated therefore by the old Constitution — once the new Constitution is ratified,
adopted and/or acquiesced in by the people or ratified even by a body or agency not duly authorized therefor but is subsequently
adopted or recognized by the people and by the other official organs and functionaries of the government established under such
a new Constitution, this Court is precluded from inquiring into the validity of such ratification, adoption or acquiescence and of
the consequent effectivity of the new Constitution. This is as it should be in a democracy, for the people are the repository of all
sovereign powers as well as the source of all governmental authority (Pole vs. Gray, 104 SO 2nd 841 [1958]). This basic
democratic concept is expressly restated in Section 1 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, thus: "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

The legality of the submission is no longer relevant; because the ratification, adoption and/or acquiescence by the people cures
any infirmity in its submission or any other irregularities therein which are deemed mandatory before submission as they are
considered merely directory after such ratification or adoption or acquiescence by the people. As Mr. Justice Brewer, then of the
Kansas State Supreme Court and later Associate Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, stated in re Prohibitory Amendment Cases
(24 Kansas 700 & 710 Reprint 499, 506): "The two important, vital elements of the Legislature and a majority of the popular
vote. Beyond these, other provisions are mere machineries and forms. They may not be disregarded, because by them certainty as
to the essentials is secured. But they are not themselves the essentials." (Cited in Larken vs. Gronna, 285 NW 59, 61-64, 1939).

This was the ruling by the American Supreme Court in the 1939 case of Coleman vs. Miller (307 U.S. 433, 83 L.ed. 1385), where
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority, stated that:

... Thus the political departments of the government dealt with the effect of both previous rejection and
attempted withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification ... .
This decision by the political departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the
Fourteenth amendment has been accepted.

We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state
legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political
question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of
its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.

This view was likewise emphasized by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas join, thus:

The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon
the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However,
whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, calls for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which
this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political
department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of...government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment
has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the
Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the
Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to
agree... (American Constitutional Issues, by Pritchett, 1962 Ed., p. 44).

The doctrine in the aforesaid case of Coleman vs. Miller was adopted by Our Supreme Court in toto in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito (78 Phil. 1).

The ruling in the cases of Gonzales vs. Comelec, et al. (L-28224, Nov. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 774) and Tolentino vs. Comelec, et al.
(L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702) on which petitioners place great reliance — that the courts may review the propriety of a
submission of a proposed constitutional amendment before the ratification or adoption of such proposed amendment by the
sovereign people, hardly applies to the cases at bar; because the issue involved in the aforesaid cases refers to only the propriety
of the submission of a proposed constitutional amendment to the people for ratification, unlike the present petitions, which
challenge inevitably the validity of the 1973 Constitution after its ratification or adoption thru acquiescence by the sovereign
people. As heretofore stated, it is specious and pure sophistry to advance the reasoning that the present petitions pray only for the
nullification of the 1973 Constitution and the government operating thereunder.

It should be stressed that even in the Gonzales case, supra, We held that:

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government, including
the Constitution itself. (21 SCRA 787)
We did not categorically and entirely overturn the doctrine in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1) that both the proposal to
amend and the ratification of such a constitutional amendment are political in nature forming as they do the essential parts of one
political scheme — the amending process. WE merely stated therein that the force of the ruling in the said case of Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito has been weakened by subsequent cases. Thus, We pronounced therein:

It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification —
satisfied the three fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco
and Macias vs. Commission on Elections. In the first, we held the officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, claimed by the latter; in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in
the third we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in
said chamber purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of
two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not
been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the
theory advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial review. (21 SCRA pp. 785-786);

for which reason We concluded

In short, the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress before acting as a constituent assembly — violates
the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and to the extent
that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. (p. 787, emphasis supplied.)

In the Tolentino case, supra, We reiterated the foregoing statements (41 SCRA 703-714).

The inevitable consequence therefore is that the validity of the ratification or adoption of or acquiescence by the people in the
1973 Constitution, remains a political issue removed from the jurisdiction of this Court to review.

One more word about the Gonzales and Tolentino cases. Both primarily stressed on the impropriety of the submission of a
proposed constitutional amendment. Courts do not deal with propriety or wisdom or absence of either of an official act or of a
law. Judicial power concerns only with the legality or illegality, constitutionality or unconstitutionality of an act: it inquires into
the existence of power or lack of it. Judicial wisdom is not to be pitted against the wisdom of the political department of the
government.

The classic example of an illegal submission that did not impair the validity of the ratification or adoption of a new Constitution
is the case of the Federal Constitution of the United States. It should be recalled that the thirteen (13) original states of the
American Union — which succeeded in liberating themselves from England after the revolution which began on April 19, 1775
with the skirmish at Lexington, Massachusetts and ended with the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, on
October 19, 1781(Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. I, 1933 Ed., p. 776) — adopted their Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union,
that was written from 1776 to 1777 and ratified on March 1, 1781 (Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. II, 1966 Ed., p. 525). About six
thereafter, the Congress of the Confederation passed a resolution on February 21, 1787 calling for a Federal Constitutional
Convention "for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation ... ." (Appendix I, Federalist, Modern
Library ed., p. 577, emphasis supplied).

The Convention convened at Philadelphia on May 14, 1787. Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union
stated specifically:

The articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed in every state, and the union shall be
perpetual; nor shall any alterations at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be
agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
(See the Federalist, Appendix II, Modern Library Ed., 1937, p. 584; emphasis supplied.)
But the foregoing requirements prescribed by the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for the alteration for the
ratification of the Federal Constitution as drafted by the Philadelphia Convention were not followed. Fearful the said Federal
Constitution would not be ratified by the legislatures as prescribed, the Philadelphia Convention adopted a resolution requesting
the Congress of the Confederation to pass a resolution providing that the Constitution should be submitted to elected state
conventions and if ratified by the conventions in nine (9) states, not necessarily in all thirteen (13) states, the said Constitution
shall take effect.

Thus, history Professor Edward Earle Mead of Princeton University recorded that:

It would have been a counsel of perfection to consign the new constitution to the tender mercies of the
legislatures of each and all of the 13 states. Experience clearly indicated that ratification then would have had
the same chance as the scriptural camel passing through the eye of a needle. It was therefore determined to
recommend to Congress that the new Constitution be submitted to conventions in the several states especially
elected to pass upon it and that, furthermore, the new government should go into effect if and when it should
be ratified by nine of the thirteen states ... . (The Federalist, Modern Library Ed., 1937, Introduction by
Edward Earle Mead, pp. viii-ix; emphasis supplied)

Historian Samuel Eliot Morison similarly recounted:

The Convention, anticipating that the influence of many state politicians would be Antifederalist, provided
for ratification of the Constitution by popularly elected conventions in each state. Suspecting that Rhode
Island, at least, would prove recalcitrant, it declared that the Constitution would go into effect as soon as nine
states ratified. The convention method had the further advantage that judges, ministers, and others ineligible
to state legislatures, could be elected to a convention. The nine-state provision was, of course, mildly
revolutionary. But the Congress of the Confederation, still sitting in New York to carry on federal
government until relieved, formally submitted the new constitution to the states and politely faded out before
the first presidential inauguration. (The Oxford History of the Am. People, by Samuel Eliot Morison, 1965
ed., p. 312).

And so the American Constitution was ratified by nine (9) states on June 21, 1788 and by the last four states on May 29, 1790 (12
C.J. p. 679 footnote, 16 C.J.S., 27. — by the state conventions and not by all thirteen (13) state legislatures as required by Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union aforequoted — and in spite of the fact that the Federal Constitution as
originally adopted suffers from two basic infirmities, namely, the absence of a bill of Rights and of a provision affirming the
power of judicial review.

The liberties of the American people were guaranteed by subsequent amendments to the Federal Constitution. The doctrine of
judicial review has become part of American constitutional law only by virtue of a judicial pronouncement by Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison (1803, 1 Cranch 137).

Until this date, no challenge has been launched against the validity of the ratification of the American Constitution, nor against
the legitimacy of the government organized and functioning thereunder.

In the 1946 case of Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees (37 SE 2nd 322, 326-330), which enunciated the principle that the validity of a
new or revised Constitution does not depend on the method of its submission or ratification by the people, but on the fact or fiat
or approval or adoption or acquiescence by the people which fact of ratification or adoption or acquiescence is all that is
essential, the Court cited precisely the case of the irregular revision and ratification by state conventions of the Federal
Constitution, thus:

No case identical in its facts with the case now under consideration has been called to our attention, and we
have found none. We think that the principle which we apply in the instant case was very clearly applied in
the creation of the constitution of the United States. The convention created by a resolution of Congress had
authority to do one thing, and one only, to wit, amend the articles of confederation. This they did not do, but
submitted to the sovereign power, the people, a new constitution. In this manner was the constitution of the
United States submitted to the people and it became operative as the organic law of this nation when it had
been properly adopted by the people.

Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, p. 55, discussing the convention that formulated the constitution of the United
States, has this to say: "The convention proceeded to do, and did accomplish, what they were not authorized
to do by a resolution of Congress that called them together. That resolution plainly contemplated
 amendments to the articles of confederation, to be submitted to and passed by the Congress, and afterwards
ratified by all the State legislatures, in the manner pointed out by the existing organic law. But the convention
soon became convinced that any amendments were powerless to effect a cure; that the disease was too deeply
seated to be reached such tentative means. They saw that the system they were called to improve must be
totally abandoned, and that the national idea must be re-established at the center of their political society. It
was objected by some members, that they had no power, no authority, to construct a new government. They
had no authority, if their decisions were to be final; and no authority whatsoever, under the articles of
confederation, to adopt the course they did. But they knew that their labors were only to be suggestions; and
that they as well as any private individuals, and any private individuals as well as they, had a right to propose
a plan of government to the people for their adoption. They were, in fact, a mere assemblage of private
citizens, and their work had no more binding sanction than a constitution drafted by Mr. Hamilton in his
office would have had. The people, by their expressed will, transformed this suggestion, this proposal, into an
organic law, and the people might have done the same with a constitution submitted to them by a single
citizen."

xxx xxx xxx

... When the people adopt a completely revised or new constitution, the framing or submission of the
instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. The fiat of the people and only the fiat of the people,
can breathe life into a constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

... We do not hesitate to say that a court is never justified in placing by implication a limitation upon the
sovereign. This would be an authorized exercise of sovereign power by the court. In State v. Swift, 69 Ind.
505, 519, the Indiana Supreme Court said: "The people of a State may form an original constitution, or
abrogate an old one and form a new one, at any time, without any political restriction except the constitution
of the United States; ... ." (37 SE 327-328, 329, emphasis supplied.)

In the 1903 case of Weston vs. Ryan, the Court held:

It remains to be said that if we felt at liberty to pass upon this question, and were compelled to hold that the
act of February 23, 1887, is unconstitutional and void, it would not, in our opinion, by any means follow that
the amendment is not a part of our state Constitution. In the recent case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth (Va.) 44
S.E. 754, the Supreme Court of Virginia hold that their state Constitution of 1902, having been acknowledged
and accepted by the officers administering the state government, and by the people, and being in force
without opposition, must be regarded as an existing Constitution irrespective of the question as to whether or
not the convention which promulgated it had authority so to do without submitting it to a vote of the people.
In Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, is a similar holding as to certain provisions of the Nebraska Constitution of
1886, which were added by the Legislature at the requirement of Congress, though never submitted to the
people for their approval." (97 NW 349-350; emphasis supplied).

Against the decision in the Wheeler case, supra, confirming the validity of the ratification and adoption of the American
Constitution, in spite of the fact that such ratification was in clear violation of the prescription on alteration and ratification of the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, petitioners in G.R. No. L-36165 dismissed this most significant historical fact by
calling the Federal Constitution of the United States as a revolutionary one, invoking the opinion expressed in Vol. 16, Corpus
Juris Secundum, p. 27, that it was a revolutionary constitution because it did not obey the requirement that the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union can be amended only with the consent of all thirteen (13) state legislatures. This opinion does
not cite any decided case, but merely refers to the footnotes on the brief historic account of the United States Constitution on p.
679 of Vol. 12, CJS. Petitioners, on p. 18 of their main Notes, refer US to pp. 270-316 of the Oxford History of the American
People, 1965 Ed. by Samuel Eliot Morison, who discusses the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union in Chapter XVIII
captioned "Revolutionary Constitution Making, 1775 1781" (pp. 270-281). In Chapter XX on "The Creative Period in Politics,
1785-1788," Professor Morison delineates the genesis of the Federal Constitution, but does not refer to it even implicitly as
revolutionary constitution (pp. 297-316). However, the Federal Constitution may be considered revolutionary from the view point
of McIver if the term revolution is understood in "its wider sense to embrace decisive changes in the character of government,
even though they do not involve the violent overthrow of an established order, ... ." (R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government,
1965 ed., p. 203).
It is rather ridiculous to refer to the American Constitution as a revolutionary constitution. The Articles of Confederation and
Perpetual Union that was in force from July 12, 1776 to 1788, forged as it was during the war of independence was a
revolutionary constitution of the thirteen (13) states. In the existing Federal Constitution of the United States which was adopted
seven (7) or nine (9) years after the thirteen (13) states won their independence and long after popular support for the government
of the Confederation had stabilized was not a product of a revolution. The Federal Constitution was a "creation of the brain and
purpose of man" in an era of peace. It can only be considered revolutionary in the sense that it is a radical departure from its
predecessor, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.

It is equally absurd to affirm that the present Federal Constitution of the United States is not the successor to the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union. The fallacy of the statement is so obvious that no further refutation is needed.

As heretofore stated, the issue as to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 strikes at the validity and enforceability of the 1973
Constitution and of the government established and operating thereunder. Petitioners pray for a declaration that the 1973
Constitution is inoperative (L-36164). If Proclamation No. 1102 is nullified, then there is no valid ratification of the 1973
Constitution and the inevitable conclusion is that the government organized and functioning thereunder is not a legitimate
government.

That the issue of the legitimacy of a government is likewise political and not justiciable, had long been decided as early as the
1849 case of Luther vs. Borden (7 How. 1, 12 L.ed., 581), affirmed in the 1900 case of Taylor vs. Beckham (178 U.S. 548, 44
L.ed. 1187) and re-enunciated in 1912 in the case of Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company vs. Oregon (223 U.S. 118,
133-151, 56 L.ed. 377-386). Because it reaffirmed the pronouncements in both Borden and Beckham cases, it is sufficient for us
to quote the decision in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra, penned by Mr. Chief Justice White, who re-stated:

In view of the importance of the subject, the apparent misapprehension on one side and seeming
misconception on the other, suggested by the argument as to the full significance of the previous doctrine, we
do not content ourselves with a mere citation of the cases, but state more at length than we otherwise would
the issues and the doctrine expounded in the leading and absolutely controlling case — Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 12 L.ed. 581.

xxx xxx xxx

... On this subject it was said (p. 38):

"For if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry, proposed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided
that the character government had no legal existence during the period of time above mentioned, — if it had
been annulled by the adoption of the opposing government, — then the laws passed by its legislature during
that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected, its salaries and compensations to its officers illegally
paid ; its public accounts improperly settled and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and
criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into operation answerable as
trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals."

xxx xxx xxx

"The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States shall guarantee to every state
in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the
application of the Legislature or of the Executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence.

"Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is established one in
a state. For, as the United State guarantee to each state a republican government, Congress must necessarily
decide what government is established in the state before it can determine whether it is republican or not.
And when the senators and representatives of a state are admitted into the Councils of the Union, the
authority of the government under which they were appointed, as well as its republican character, is
recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of
the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did
not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and as no senators or representatives were elected under
the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the
controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there and not in the courts."
 xxx xxx xxx

... We do not stop to cite other cases which indirectly or incidentally refer to the subject, but conclude by
directing attention to the statement by the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in Taylor vs.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 44 L.ed. 1187, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890, 1009, where, after disposing of a contention
made concerning the 14th Amendment, and coming to consider a proposition which was necessary to be
decided concerning the nature and effect of the guaranty of S 4 of article 4, it was said (p. 578):

"But it is said that the 14th Amendment must be read with S 4 of article 4, of the Constitution, providing that
the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall
protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or the Executive (when the
legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence."

xxx xxx xxx

"It was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guaranty belonged to the political department. Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.ed. 581. In that case it was held that the question, which of the two opposing
governments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or the government established by a voluntary
convention, was the legitimate one, was a question for the determination of the political department; and
when that department had decided, the courts were bound to take notice of the decision and follow it."

xxx xxx xxx

As the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have long since by this Court been, definitely
determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of the scope of the powers
conferred upon Congress, and not, therefore within the reach of judicial power, it follows that the case
presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. (223 U.S. pp. 142-151; emphasis supplied).

Even a constitutional amendment that is only promulgated by the Constitutional Convention without authority therefor and
without submitting the same to the people for ratification, becomes valid, when recognized, accepted and acted upon the by Chief
of State and other government functionaries, as well as by the people. In the 1903 case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth (44 SE 754-
755), the Court ruled:

The sole ground urged in support of the contention that Constitution proclaimed in 1902 is invalid is that it
was ordained and promulgated by the convention without being submitted for ratification or rejection by the
people of the commonwealth.

The Constitution of 1902 was ordained and proclaimed by convention duly called by direct vote of the people
of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the work that the convention has been
recognized, accepted, and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the state by the Governor in swearing
fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby; by the Legislature in its formal official act adopting a
joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by the convention which assembled in
the city of Richmond on the 12th day of June 1901, as the Constitution of Virginia; by the individual oaths of
members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a year in legislating under it and putting its
provisions into operation but the judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support and by enforcing
its provisions; and by the people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it,
registering as voters under it to the extent of thousands through the state, and by voting, under its provisions,
at a general election for their representatives in the Congress of the United States. (p. 755).

The Court in the Taylor case above-mentioned further said:

While constitutional procedure for adoption or proposal to amend the constitution must be duly followed,
without omitting any requisite steps, courts should uphold amendment, unless satisfied that the Constitution
was violated in submitting the proposal. ... Substance more than form must be regarded in considering
whether the complete constitutional system for submitting the proposal to amend the constitution was
observed.
In the 1925 case of Taylor vs. King (130 A 407, 408 410), the Court stated:

There may be technical error in the manner in which a proposed amendment is adopted, or in its
advertisement, yet, if followed, unobjected to, by approval of the electors, it becomes part of the Constitution.
Legal complaints to the submission may be made prior to taking the vote, but, if once sanctioned, the
amendment is embodied therein, and cannot be attacked, either directly or collaterally, because of any
mistake antecedent thereto. Even though it be submitted at an improper time, it is effective for all purposes
when accepted by the majority. Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263. (130 A 409).

Even if the act of the Constitutional Convention is beyond its authority, such act becomes valid upon ratification or adoption or
acquiescence by the people. Thus, in the 1905 case of Ex parte Birmingham and A.R. Company (42 SO pp. 118 & 123), the
Alabama Supreme Court upheld this principle and stated that: "The authorities are almost uniform that this ratification of an
unauthorized act by the people (and the people are the principal in this instance) renders the act valid and binding."

It has likewise been held that it is not necessary that voters ratifying the new Constitution are registered in the book of voters; it
is enough that they are electors voting on the new Constitution. (Bott vs. Wurts, 40 A 740 [1899]; 45 LRA 251, emphasis
supplied).

In the 1956 case of Thomson vs. Peoples State Bank (75 NW 2nd 370, 375), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that
"irregularity in the procedure for the submission of the proposed constitutional amendment will not defeat the ratification by the
people."

Again, in the 1958 case of Swaim vs. Tuscaloosa County (103 SO 2nd 769), the Alabama Supreme Court pronounced that "the
irregularity in failing to publish the proposed constitutional amendment once in each of the 4 calendar weeks next preceding the
calendar week in which the election was held or once in each of the 7-day periods immediately preceding the day of the election
as required by the Constitution, did not invalidate the amendment which was ratified by the people."

The same principle was reiterated in 1961 by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Barnes, et al. v. Ladner (131) SO 2nd 45 462),
where they admitted irregularities or illegalities committed in the procedure for submission of the proposed constitutional
amendment to the people for ratification consisted of: "(a) the alleged failure of the county election commissioners of the several
counties to provide a sufficient number of ballot boxes 'secured by good and substantial locks,' as provided by Section 3249,
Code of 1942, Rec., to be used in the holding of the special election on the constitutional amendment, and (b) the alleged failure
of the State Election Commissioners to comply with the requirements of Code Sections 3204 and 3205 in the appointment of
election commissioners in each of the 82 counties. The irregularities complained of, even if proved, were not such irregularities
would have invalidated the election." (Emphasis supplied; see also Sylvester vs. Tindall, 8 SO 2nd 892; 154 Fla. 663).

Even prior to the election in November, 1970 of delegates of the Constitutional Convention and during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention from June 1, 1971 until martial law was proclaimed on Sept. 21, 1972, the salient reforms contained in
the 1973 Constitution which have long been desired by the people, had been thoroughly discussed in the various committees of
the Constitutional Convention, on the floor of the Convention itself, in civic forums and in all the media of information. Many of
the decrees promulgated by the Chief Executive from Sept. 22, 1972 to Jan. 17, 1973 implement some of the reforms and had
been ratified in Sec. 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

Petitioners cannot safely state that during martial law the majority of the people cannot freely vote for these reforms and are not
complying with the implementing decrees promulgated by the President.

Free election is not inevitably incompatible with martial law. We had free elections in 1951 and 1971 when the opposition won
six out of eight senatorial seats despite the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus(see Lansang vs. Garcia, et
al., Dec. 14, 1971, 42 SCRA 448), which suspension implies constraint on individual freedom as the proclamation of martial law.
In both situations, there is no total blackout of human rights and civil liberties.

All the local governments, dominated either by Nacionalistas or Liberals, as well as officials of the Legislative and Executive
branches of the government elected and/or appointed under the 1935 Constitution have either recognized or are now functioning
under the 1973 Constitution, aside from the fact of its ratification by the sovereign people through the Citizens Assemblies.
Ninety-five (95) of a total of one hundred ten (110) members of the House of Representatives including the Speaker and the
Speaker Pro Tempore as well as about eleven (11) Congressmen who belong to the Liberal Party and fifteen (15) of a total of
twenty-four (24) senators including Liberal senators Edgar U. Ilarde and John Osmeña opted to serve in the Interim Assembly,
according to the certification of the Commission on Elections dated February 19, 1973 (Annex Rejoinder-3 to Consolidated
Rejoinder of petitioners in L-36165). Only the five (5) petitioners in L-36165 close their eyes to a fait accompli. All the other
functionaries recognize the new government and are performing their duties and exercising their powers under the 1973
Constitution, including the lower courts. The civil courts, military tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies created by presidential
decrees have decided some criminal, civil and administrative cases pursuant to such decrees. The foreign ambassadors who were
accredited to the Republic of the Philippines before martial law continue to serve as such in our country; while two new
ambassadors have been accepted by the Philippines after the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Copies of
the 1973 Constitution had been furnished the United Nations Organization and practically all the other countries with which the
Philippines has diplomatic relations. No adverse reaction from the United Nations or from the foreign states has been manifested.
On the contrary, our permanent delegate to the United Nations Organization and our diplomatic representatives abroad appointed
before martial law continue to remain in their posts and are performing their functions as such under the 1973 Constitution.

Even the Commission on Elections is now implementing the provisions of the 1973 Constitution by requiring all election
registrars to register 18-year olds and above whether literates or not, who are qualified electors under the 1973 Constitution (see
pars. 1-A(c), (d), & (e) of Annex A to Notes of respondents Puyat and Roy in L-36165).

In brief, it cannot be said that the people are ignoring the 1973 Constitution and the government which is enforcing the same for
over 10 weeks now With the petitioners herein, secessionists, rebels and subversives as the only possible exceptions, the rest of
the citizenry are complying with decrees, orders and circulars issued by the incumbent President implementing the 1973
Constitution.

Of happy relevance on this point is the holding in Miller vs. Johnson 18 SW 522:

If a set of men, not selected by the people according to the forms of law, were to formulate an instrument and
declare it the constitution, it would undoubtedly be the duty of the courts declare its work a nullity. This
would be revolution, and this the courts of the existing government must resist until they are overturned by
power, and a new government established. The convention, however, was the offspring of law. The instrument
which we are asked to declare invalid as a constitution has been made and promulgated according to the
forms of law. It is a matter of current history that both the executive and legislative branches of the
government have recognized its validity as a constitution, and are now daily doing so. Is the
question, therefore, one of a judicial character? It is our undoubted duty, if a statute be unconstitutional to so
declare it; also, if a provision of the state constitution be in conflict with the federal constitution, to hold the
former invalid. But this is a very different case. It may be said, however, that, for every violation of or non-
compliance with the law, there should be a remedy in the courts. This is not, however, always the case. For
instance, the power of a court as to the acts of the other departments of the government is not an absolute
one, but merely to determine whether they have kept within constitutional limits, it is a duty rather than a
power, The judiciary cannot compel a co-equal department to perform a duty. It is responsible to the people;
but if it does act, then, when the question is properly presented, it is the duty of the court to say whether it has
conformed to the organic law. While the judiciary should protect the rights of the people with great care and
jealousy, because this is its duty, and also because, in times of great popular excitement, it is usually their
last resort, yet it should at the same time be careful to overstep the proper bounds of its power, as being
perhaps equally dangerous; and especially where such momentous results might follow as would be likely in
this instance, if the power of the judiciary permitted, and its duty required, the overthrow of the work of the
convention.

After the American Revolution the state of Rhode Island retained its colonial character as its constitution, and
no law existed providing for the making of a new one. In 1841 public meetings were held, resulting in the
election of a convention to form a new one, — to be submitted to a popular vote. The convention framed one,
submitted it to a vote, and declared it adopted. Elections were held for state officers, who proceeded to
organize a new government. The charter government did not acquiesce in these proceedings, and finally
declared the state under martial law. It called another convention, which in 1843 formed a new
constitution. Whether the charter government, or the one established by the voluntary convention, was the
legitimate one, was uniformly held by the courts of the state not to be a judicial, but a political question; and
the political department having recognized the one, it was held to be the duty of the judiciary to follow its
decision. The supreme court of the United States, in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, while not expressly deciding
the principle, as it held the federal court, yet in the argument approves it, and in substance says that where
the political department has decided such a matter the judiciary should abide by it.

Let us illustrate the difficulty of a court deciding the question: Suppose this court were to hold that the
convention, when it reassembled, had no power to make any material amendment, and that such as were
made are void by reason of the people having theretofore approved the instrument. Then, next, this court
must determine what amendments were material; and we find the court, in effect, making a constitution. This
 would be arrogating sovereignty to itself. Perhaps the members of the court might differ as to what
amendments are material, and the result would be confusion and anarchy. One judge might say that all the
amendments, material and immaterial, were void; another, that the convention had then the implied power to
correct palpable errors, and then the court might differ as to what amendments are material. If the instrument
as ratified by the people could not be corrected or altered at all, or if the court must determine what changes
were material, then the instrument, as passed upon by the people or as fixed by the court would be lacking a
promulgation by the convention; and, if this be essential, then the question would arise, what constitution are
we now living under, and what is the organic law of the state? A suggestion of these matters shows what
endless confusion and harm to the state might and likely would arise. If, through error of opinion, the
convention exceeded its power, and the people are dissatisfied, they have ample remedy, without the judiciary
being asked to overstep the proper limits of its power. The instrument provides for amendment and change. If
a wrong has been done, it can, in the proper way in which it should be remedied, is by the people acting as a
body politic. It is not a question of whether merely an amendment to a constitution, made without calling a
convention, has been adopted, as required by that constitution. If it provides how it is to be done, then, unless
the manner be followed, the judiciary, as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment
invalid. Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N.W. Rep. 738, and 15 N.W. Rep. 609; State v. Tuffy, 1 Nev. 391,
12 Pac. Rep. 835. But it is a case where a new constitution has been formed and promulgated according to
the forms of law. Great interests have already arisen under it; important rights exist by virtue of it; persons
have been convicted of the highest crime known to the law, according to its provisions; the political power of
the government has in many ways recognized it; and, under such circumstances, it is our duty to treat and
regard it as a valid constitution, and now the organic law of our commonwealth.

We need not consider the validity of the amendments made after the convention reassembled. If the making
of them was in excess of its powers, yet, as the entire instrument has been recognized as valid in the manner
suggested, it would be equally an abuse of power by the judiciary and violative of the rights of the people, —
who can and properly should remedy the matter, if not to their liking, — if it were to declare the instrument
of a portion invalid, and bring confusion and anarchy upon the state. (emphasis supplied).

If this Court inquires into the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 and consequently of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution it
would be exercising a veto power on the act of the sovereign people, of whom this Court is merely an agent, which to say the
least, would be anomalous. This Court cannot dictate to our principal, the sovereign people, as to how the approval of the new
Constitution should be manifested or expressed. The sovereign people have spoken and we must abide by their decision,
regardless of our notion as to what is the proper method of giving assent to the new Charter. In this respect, WE cannot presume
to know better than the incumbent Chief Executive, who, unlike the members of this Court, only last January 8, 1973, We
affirmed in Osmeña vs. Marcos (Pres. Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973), was re-elected by the vote of over 5 million electors
in 1969 for another term of four years until noon of December 30, 1973 under the 1935 Constitution. This Court, not having a
similar mandate by direct fiat from the sovereign people, to execute the law and administer the affairs of government, must
restrain its enthusiasm to sally forth into the domain of political action expressly and exclusively reserved by the sovereign
people themselves.

The people in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution did not intend to tie their hands to a specific procedure for popular ratification
of their organic law. That would be incompatible with their sovereign character of which We are reminded by Section 1, of
Article II of both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.

The opinion of Judge Thomas McIntire Cooley that the sovereign people cannot violate the procedure for ratification which they
themselves define in their Constitution, cannot apply to a unitary state like the Republic of the Philippines. His opinion expressed
in 1868 may apply to a Federal State like the United States, in order to secure and preserve the existence of the Federal Republic
of the United States against any radical innovation initiated by the citizens of the fifty (50) different states of the American
Union, which states may be jealous of the powers of the Federal government presently granted by the American Constitution.
This dangerous possibility does not obtain in the case of our Republic.

Then again, Judge Cooley advanced the aforesaid opinion in 1868 when he wrote his opus "Constitutional Limitations." * (Vol.
6, Encyclopedia Brit., 1969 ed. pp. 445 446). It is possible that, were he live today, in a milieu vastly different from 1868 to
1898, he might have altered his views on the matter.

Even if conclusiveness is to be denied to the truth of the declaration by the President in Proclamation No. 1102 that the people
through their Citizens' Assemblies had overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution due regard to a separate, coordinate and
co-equal branch of the government demands adherence to the presumption of correctness of the President's declaration. Such
presumption is accorded under the law and jurisprudence to officials in the lower levels of the Executive branch, there is no over-
riding reason to deny the same to the Chief of State as head of the Executive Branch. WE cannot reverse the rule on
presumptions, without being presumptuous, in the face of the certifications by the Office the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government and Community Development. (Annexes 1, to 1-E, Annexes 2 to 2-O to the compliance with manifestation
filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents public officers dated March 7, 1973). There is nothing in the records
that contradicts, much less overthrow the results of the referendum as certified. Much less are We justified in reversing the
burden of proof — by shifting it from the petitioners to the respondents. Under the rules on pleadings, the petitioners have the
duty to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence their claim that the people did not ratify through the Citizens' Assemblies
nor adopt by acquiescence the 1973 Constitution. And have failed to do so.

No member of this Tribunal is justified in resolving the issues posed by the cases at bar on the basis of reports relayed to him
from private sources which could be biased and hearsay, aside from the fact that such reports are not contained in the record.
Proclamation No. 1102 is not just an ordinary act of the Chief Executive. It is a well-nigh solemn declaration which announces
the highest act of the sovereign people — their imprimatur to the basic Charter that shall govern their lives hereafter — may be
for decades, if not for generations.

Petitioners decry that even 15-year olds, ex convicts and illiterates were allowed to vote in the Citizens' Assemblies, despite their
admission that the term "Filipino people" in the preamble as well as "people" in Sections 1 and 5 of Article II of the 1935
Constitution and in Section 1(3) of Article III of the Bill of Rights includes all Filipino citizens of all ages, of both sexes, whether
literate or illiterate, whether peaceful citizens, rebels, secessionists, convicts or ex-convicts. Without admitting that ex-convicts
voted in the referendum, about which no proof was even offered, these sectors of our citizenry, whom petitioners seem to regard
with contempt or decision and whom petitioners would deny their sovereign right to pass upon the basic Charter that shall govern
their lives and the lives of their progenies, are entitled as much as the educated, the law abiding, and those who are 21 years of
age or above to express their conformity or non conformity to the proposed Constitution, because their stake under the new
Charter is not any less than the stake of the more fortunate among us. As a matter of fact, these citizens, whose juridical
personality or capacity to act is limited by age, civil interdiction or ignorance deserve more solicitude from the State than the rest
of the citizenry. In the ultimate analysis, the inclusion of those from 15 years up to below 21 years old, the ex-convicts and the
ignorant, is more democratic as it broadens the base of democracy and therefore more faithful to the express affirmation in
Section 1 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."

Moreover, ex-convicts granted absolute pardon are qualified to vote. Not all ex-convicts are banned from voting. Only those who
had been sentenced to at least one year imprisonment are disenfranchised but they recover their right of suffrage upon expiration
of ten years after service of sentence (Sec. 102, 1971 Rev. Elec. Code). Furthermore, ex-convicts and imbeciles constitute a very
negligible number in any locality or barrio, including the localities of petitioners.

Included likewise in the delegated authority of the President, is the prerogative to proclaim the results of the plebiscite or the
voting the Citizens' Assemblies. Petitioners deny the accuracy or correctness of Proclamation No. 1102 that the 1973 Constitution
was ratified by the overwhelming vote of close to 15 million citizens because there was no official certification to the results of
the same from the Department of Local Governments. But there was such certification as per Annex 1 to 1-A to the Notes
submitted by the Solicitor General counsel for respondents public officers. This should suffice to dispose of this point. Even in
the absence of such certification, in much the same way that in passing law, Congress or the legislative body is presumed to be in
possession of the facts upon which such laws are predicated (Justice Fernando, The Power of Judicial Review, 1967 Ed., pp. 112-
11 citing Lorenzo vs. Dir., etc., [1927] 50 Phil. 595 and O'Gonmore, et al: vs. Hartford, etc., [1931] 282 U.S. 251), it should
likewise be presumed that the President was in possession of the fact upon which Proclamation No. 1102 was based. This
presumption is further strengthened by the fact that the Department of Local Governments, the Department National Defense and
the Philippine Constabulary as well the Bureau of Posts are all under the President, which offices as his alter ego, are
presumptively acting for and in behalf of the President and their acts are valid until disapproved or reprobated by the President
(Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62; Villen vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451). To deny the truth or the proclamation of the President
as to the overwhelming majority vote in the Citizens' Assemblies in favor of the new Constitution, is to charge the President with
falsification, which is a most grievous accusation. Under the, rules of pleadings and evidence, the petitioners have the burden of
proof by preponderance of evidence in civil cases and by proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions, where the
accused is always presumed to be innocent. Must this constitutional right be reversed simply because the petitioner all assert the
contrary? Is the rule of law they pretend invoke only valid as long as it favors them?

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is accorded by the law and jurisprudence to acts of public
officers whose category in the official hierarchy is very much lower than that of the Chief of State. What reason is there to
withhold such a presumption in favor of the President? Does the fact that the President belong to the party in power and that four
(4) of the five (5) senators who are petitioners in L-36165 belong to the opposition party, justify a discrimination against the
President in matters of this nature? Unsupported as their word is by any credible and competent evidence under the rules of
evidence, must the word of the petitioners prevail over that of the Chief Executive, because they happen to be former senators
and delegates to the Constitutional Convention? More than any of the petitioners herein in all these cases, the incumbent
President realizes that he risks the wrath of his people being visited upon him and the adverse or hostile verdict of history;
because of the restrictions on the civil liberties of his people, inevitable concomitants of martial law, which necessarily entail
some degree of sacrifice on the part of the citizenry. Until the contrary is established or demonstrated, herein petitioners should
grant that the Chief Executive is motivated by what is good for the security and stability of the country, for the progress and
happiness of the people. All the petitioners herein cannot stand on the proposition that the rights under the 1935 Constitution are
absolute and invulnerable to limitations that may be needed for the purpose of bringing about the reforms for which the
petitioners pretend to be clamoring for and in behalf of the people. The five (5) petitioners in L-36165 and four (4) of the seven
(7) petitioners in L-36164 were all participants in the political drama of this country since 1946. They are witness to the
frustrations of well-meaning Presidents who wanted to effect the reforms, especially for the benefit of the landless and the
laboring class — how politics and political bargaining had stymied the effectuation of such reforms thru legislation. The eight (8)
petitioners in L-36164 and L-36165 may not have participated in the systematic blocking of the desired reforms in Congress or
outside of it; but the question may be asked as to what exactly they did to support such reforms. For the last seven (7) decades
since the turn of the century, for the last thirty-five (35) years since the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1935
and for the last twenty seven (27) years since the inauguration of the Republic on July 4, 1946, no tangible substantial reform had
been effected, funded and seriously implemented, despite the violent uprisings in the thirties, and from 1946 to 1952, and the
violent demonstrations of recent memory. Congress and the oligarchs acted like ostriches, "burying their heads in timeless sand.
"Now the hopes for the long-awaited reforms to be within a year or to are brighter. It would seem therefore to the duty of
everyone including herein petitioners to give the present leadership the opportunity to institute and carry out the needed reforms
as provided for in the new or 1973 Constitution and thru the means prescribed in that same Constitution.

As stated in Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees, "a court is never justified in placing by implication a limitation upon the sovereign."

This Court in the Gonzales and Tolentino cases transcended its proper sphere and encroached upon the province exclusively
reserved to and by the sovereign people. This Court did not heed to the principle that the courts are not the fountain of all
remedies for all wrongs. WE cannot presume that we alone can speak with wisdom as against the judgment of the people on the
basic instrument which affects their very lives. WE cannot determine what is good for the people or ought to be their fundamental
law. WE can only exercise the power delegated to Us by the sovereign people, to apply and interpret the Constitution and the
laws for the benefit of the people, not against them nor to prejudice them. WE cannot perform an act inimical to the interest of
Our principal, who at any time may directly exercise their sovereign power ratifying a new Constitution in the manner convenient
to them.

It is pertinent to ask whether the present Supreme Court can function under the 1935 Constitution without being a part of the
government established pursuant thereto. Unlike in the Borden case, supra, where there was at least another government claiming
to be the legitimate organ of the state of Rhode Island (although only on paper as it had no established organ except Dorr who
represented himself to be its head; in the cases at bar there is no other government distinct from and maintaining a position
against the existing government headed by the incumbent Chief Executive. (See Taylor vs. Commonwealth, supra). There is not
even a rebel government duly organized as such even only for domestic purposes, let alone a rebel government engaged in
international negotiations. As heretofore stated, both the executive branch and the legislative branch established under the 1935
Constitution had been supplanted by the government functioning under the 1973 Constitution as of January 17, 1973. The vice
president elected under the 1935 Constitution does not asset any claim to the leadership of the Republic of the Philippines. Can
this Supreme Court legally exist without being part of any government?

Brilliant counsel for petitioners in L-36165 has been quite extravagant in his appraisal of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
whom he calls the "hero of the American Bar," because during the American civil war he apparently had the courage to nullify
the proclamation of President Lincoln suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus in Ex parte Merryman (Federal
Case No. 9487 [1861]). But who exactly was Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney? The Editorial Board of Vol. 21 of the
Encyclopedia Brit., 1966 ed. (pp. 778-779, 1969 ed., pp. 654-657), briefly recounts that he was born in 1777 in Calvert County,
Maryland, of parents who were landed aristocrats as well as slave owners. Inheriting the traditional conservatism of his parents
who belonged to the landed aristocracy, Taney became a lawyer in 1799, practiced law and was later appointed Attorney General
of Maryland. He also was a member of the Maryland state legislature for several terms. He was a leader of the Federalist Party,
which disintegrated after the war of 1812, compelling him to join the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson, also a slave owner
and landed aristocrat, who later appointed him first as Attorney General of the United States, then Secretary of the Treasury and
in 1836 Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to succeed Chief Justice John Marshall, in which position he continued
for 28 years until he died on October 21, 1864. His death "went largely unnoticed and unregretted." Because he himself was a
slave owner and a landed aristocrat, Chief Justice Taney sympathized with the Southern States and, even while Chief Justice,
hoped that the Southern States would be allowed to secede peacefully from the Union. That he had no sympathy for the Negroes
was revealed by his decision in Dred Scott vs. Sandford (19 How. 398 [1857]) where he pronounced that the American Negro is
not entitled to the rights of an American citizen and that his status as a slave is determined by his returning to a slave state. One
can therefore discern his hostility towards President Lincoln when he decided Ex parte Merryman, which animosity to say the
least does no befit a judicial mind. Such a man could hardly be spoken of as a hero of the American Bar, least of all of the
American nation. The choice of heroes should not be expressed indiscriminately just to embellish one's rhetoric.
Distinguished counsel in L-36165 appears to have committed another historical error, which may be due to his rhetorical in the
Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 9, 1969 ed., pp. 508-509) to this effect. On the contrary, Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 17
Encyclopedia Brit., 1966 & 1969 eds., 732-733), refers to Marshal Henri Philippe Petain as the genuine hero or "Savior of
Verdun"; because he held Verdun against the 1916 offensive of the German army at the cost of 350,000 of his French soldiers,
who were then demoralized and plotting mutiny. Certainly, the surviving members of the family of Marshal Petain would not
relish the error. And neither would the members of the clan of Marshal Foch acknowledge the undeserved accolade, although
Marshal Foch has a distinct place in history on his own merits. The foregoing clarification is offered in the interest of true
scholarship and historical accuracy, so that the historians, researchers and students may not be led astray or be confused by
esteemed counsel's eloquence and mastery of the spoken and written word as well as by his eminence as law professor, author of
law books, political leader, and member of the newly integrated Philippine Bar.

It is quite intriguing why the eminent counsel and co-petitioner in L-36164 did not address likewise his challenge to the five (5)
senators who are petitioners in L-36165 to also act as "heroes and idealists," to defy the President by holding sessions by
themselves alone in a hotel or in their houses if they can muster a quorum or by causing the arrest of other senators to secure a
quorum and thereafter remove respondents Puyat and Roy (Avelino, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al. [1949] 83 Phil. 17), if they believe
most vehemently in the justice and correctness of their position that the 1973 Constitution has not been validly ratified, adopted
or acquiesced in by the people since January 18, 1973 until the present. The proclaimed conviction of petitioners in L-36165 on
this issue would have a ring of credibility, if they proceeded first to hold a rump session outside the legislative building; because
it is not unreasonable to demand or to exact that he who exhorts others to be brave must first demonstrate his own courage.
Surely, they will not affirm that the mere filing of their petition in L-36165 already made them "heroes and idealists." The
challenge likewise seems to insinuate that the members of this Court who disagree with petitioners' views are materialistic
cowards or mercenary fence-sitters. The Court need not be reminded of its solemn duty and how to perform it. WE refuse to
believe that petitioners and their learned as well as illustrious counsels, scholars and liberal thinkers that they are, do not
recognize the sincerity of those who entertain opinions that clash with their own. Such an attitude does not sit well with the
dictum that "We can differ without being difficult; we can disagree without being disagreeable," which distinguished counsel in
L-36165 is wont to quote.

WE reserve the right to prepare an extensive discussion of the other points raised by petitioners, which We do not find now
necessary to deal with in view of Our opinion on the main issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, ALL THE PETITIONS IN THESE FIVE CASES SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Pursuant to Our reservation, We now discuss the other issues raised by the petitioners.

II

EVEN IF ISSUE IS JUSTICIABLE, PEOPLE'S RATIFICATION, ADOPTION OR ACQUIESCENCE CREATES STRONG

PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF 1973 CONSTITUTION.

As intimated in the aforecited cases, even the courts, which affirm the proposition that the question as to whether a constitutional
amendment or the revised or new Constitution has been validly submitted to the people for ratification in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the existing Constitution, is a justiciable question, accord all presumption of validity to the constitutional
amendment or the revised or new Constitution after the government officials or the people have adopted or ratified or acquiesced
in the new Constitution or amendment, although there was an illegal or irregular or no submission at all to the people. (Collier
vs. Gray, 4th Dec. Dig. 935 [1934], Hammond vs. Clark, 71 SE 482-483; People vs. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 34; Thompson vs. Winneth, 78 Neb. 379, 110 NW 1113, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 149; State vs. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. Rep. 1, 68
NE 574; Weston vs. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 NW 347; Combs vs. State, 81 Ga. 780, 8 SE 318; Woodward vs. State, 103 Ga. 496,
30 SE 522; Corre vs. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 225 P 1007, 1009). As late as 1971, the courts stressed that the constitutional
amendment or the new Constitution should not be condemned "unless our judgment its nullity is manifest beyond reasonable
doubt" (1971 case of Moore vs. Shanahan, 486 Pac. 2d 506, 207 Kan. 1, 645; and the 1956 case of Tipton vs. Smith, et
al., supra).

Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, pronounced that the presumption of constitutionality must persist in the
absence of factual foundation of record to overthrow such presumption (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. vs. City Mayor, L-24698, July
31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849).

III
 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION — CO-EQUAL WITH AND INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIARY.

The Constitutional Convention is co-ordinate and co-equal with, as well as independent of, the three grand departments of the
Government, namely, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. As a fourth separate and distinct branch, to emphasize its
independence, the Convention cannot be dictated to by either of the other three departments as to the content as well as the form
of the Charter that it proposes. It enjoys the same immunity from interference or supervision by any of the aforesaid branches of
the Government in its proceedings, including the printing of its own journals (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, 1952 ed., Vol. I, pp. 8 9; Malcolm and Laurel, Phil. Const. Law, p. 22; Frantz vs. Autry, 91 Pac. 193). Implicit in that
independence, for the purpose of maintaining the same unimpaired and in order that its work will not be frustrated, the
Convention has the power to fix the date for the plebiscite and to provide funds therefor. To deny the Convention such
prerogative, would leave it at the tender mercy of both legislative and executive branches of the Government. An unsympathetic
Congress would not be disposed to submit the proposed Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention to the people for
ratification, much less appropriate the necessary funds therefor. That could have been the fate of the 1973 Constitution, because
the same abolished the Senate by creating a unicameral National Assembly to be presided by a Prime Minister who wields both
legislative and executive powers and is the actual Chief Executive, for the President contemplated in the new Constitution
exercises primarily ceremonial prerogatives. The new Constitution likewise shortened abruptly the terms of the members of the
present Congress (whose terms end on December 31, 1973, 1975 and 1977) which provides that the new Constitution shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification (Sec. 16, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution). The fact that Section 2 of the same Article
XVIII secures to the members of Congress membership in the interim National Assembly as long as they opt to serve therein
within thirty (30) days after the ratification of the proposed Constitution, affords them little comfort; because the convening of
the interim National Assembly depends upon the incumbent President (under Sec. 3[1], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution). Under the
foregoing circumstances, the members of Congress, who were elected under the 1935 Constitution, would not be disposed to call
a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor to enable the people to pass upon the 1973 Constitution, ratification of which means
their elimination from the political scene. They will not provide the means for their own liquidation.

Because the Constitutional Convention, by necessary implication as it is indispensable to its independence and effectiveness,
possesses the power to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds for the purpose, it inescapably must have the power to delegate
the same to the President, who, in estimation of the Convention can better determine appropriate time for such a referendum as
well as the amount necessary to effect the same; for which reason the Convention thru Resolution No. 29 approved on November
22, 1972, which superseded Resolution No. 5843 adopted on November 16, 1972, proposed to the President "that a decree be
issued calling a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution such appropriate date as he shall determine and
providing for the necessary funds therefor, ...," after stating in "whereas" clauses that the 1971 Constitutional Convention
expected to complete its work by the end of November, 1972 that the urgency of instituting reforms rendered imperative the early
approval of the new Constitution, and that the national and local leaders desire that there be continuity in the immediate transition
from the old to the new Constitution.

If Congress can legally delegate to the Chief Executive or his subaltern the power to promulgate subordinate rules and
regulations to implement the law, this authority to delegate implementing rules should not be denied to the Constitutional
Convention, a co-equal body.

Apart from the delegation to the Chief Executive of the power to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor by the
Constitutional Convention thru its Resolution No. 29, the organization of the Citizens' Assemblies for consultation on national
issues, is comprehended within the ordinance-making power of the President under Section 63 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which expressly confers on the Chief Executive the power to promulgate administrative acts and commands touching on
the organization or mode of operation of the government or re-arranging or re-adjusting any district, division or part of the
Philippines "or disposing of issues of general concern ... ." (Emphasis supplied). Hence, as consultative bodies representing the
localities including the barrios, their creation by the President thru Presidential Decree No. 86 of December 31, 1972, cannot be
successfully challenged.

The employment by the President of these Citizens' Assemblies for consultation on the 1973 Constitution or on whether there
was further need of a plebiscite thereon, — both issues of national concern — is still within the delegated authority reposed in
him by the Constitutional Convention as aforesaid.

It should be noted that Resolution No. 29, which superseded Resolution No. 5843, does not prescribe that the plebiscite must be
conducted by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Revised Election Code. If that were the
intention of the Constitutional Convention in making the delegation, it could have easily included the necessary phrase for the
purpose, some such phrase like "to call a plebiscite to be supervised by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the
provisions of the 1971 Revised Election Code (or with existing laws)." That the Constitutional Convention omitted such phrase,
can only mean that it left to the President the determination of the manner by which the plebiscite should be conducted, who shall
supervise the plebiscite, and who can participate in the plebiscite. The fact that said Resolution No. 29 expressly states "that
copies of this resolution as approved in plenary session be transmitted to the President of the Philippines and the Commission on
Elections for implementation," did not in effect designate the Commission on Elections as supervisor of the plebiscite. The copies
of said resolution that were transmitted to the Commission on Elections at best serve merely to notify the Commission on
Elections about said resolution, but not to direct said body to supervise the plebiscite. The calling as well as conduct of the
plebiscite was left to the discretion of the President, who, because he is in possession of all the facts funnelled to him by his
intelligence services, was in the superior position to decide when the plebiscite shall be held, how it shall be conducted and who
shall oversee it.

It should be noted that in approving said Resolution No. 29, the Constitutional Convention itself recognized the validity of, or
validated Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law by resolving to "propose to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling a plebiscite ... ." The use of the term "decree" is significant for the basic
orders regulating the conduct of all inhabitants are issued in that form and nomenclature by the President as the Commander in
Chief and enforcer of martial law. Consequently, the issuance by the President of Presidential Decree No. 73 on December 1,
1972 setting the plebiscite on January 15, 1973 and appropriating funds therefor pursuant to said Resolution No. 29, is a valid
exercise of such delegated authority.

Such delegation, unlike the delegation by Congress of the rule-making power to the Chief Executive or to any of his subalterns,
does not need sufficient standards to circumscribe the exercise of the power delegated, and is beyond the competence of this
Court to nullify. But even if adequate criteria should be required, the same are contained in the "Whereas" clauses of the
Constitutional Convention Resolution No. 29, thus:

WHEREAS, the 1971 Constitutional Convention is expected to complete its work of drafting a proposed new
Constitution for the Republic by the end of November, 1972;

WHEREAS, in view of the urgency of instituting reforms, the early approval of the New Constitution has
become imperative;

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the national and local leaders that there be continuity in the immediate political
transition from the old to the New Constitution;" (Annex "1" of Answer, Res. No. 29, Constitutional
Convention).

As Mr. Justice Fernando, with whom Messrs. Justices Barredo, Antonio and the writer concurred in the Plebiscite Cases, stated:

... Once this work of drafting has been completed, it could itself direct the submission to the people for
ratification as contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution. Here it did not do so. With Congress not being
in session, could the President, by the decree under question, call for such a plebiscite? Under such
circumstances, a negative answer certainly could result in the work of the Convention being rendered
nugatory. The view has been repeatedly expressed in many American state court decisions that to avoid such
undesirable consequence the task of submission becomes ministerial, with the political branches devoid of
any discretion as to the holding of an election for that purpose. Nor is the appropriation by him of the amount
necessary to be considered as offensive to the Constitution. If it were done by him in his capacity as
President, such an objection would indeed have been formidable, not to say insurmountable. If the
appropriation were made in his capacity as agent of the Convention to assure that there be submission to the
people, then such an argument loses force. The Convention itself could have done so. It is understandable
why it should be thus. If it were otherwise, then a legislative body, the appropriating arm of the government,
could conceivably make use of such authority to compel the Convention to submit to its wishes, on pain of
being rendered financially distraught. The President then, if performing his role as its agent, could be held as
not devoid of such competence. (pp. 2-3, concurring opinion of J. Fernando in L-35925, etc., emphasis
supplied).

IV

VAGUENESS OR AMBIGUITY DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE

1973 CONSTITUTION

(1) Petitions challenge the 1973 draft as vague and incomplete, and alluded to their arguments during the hearings on December
18 and 19, 1972 on the Plebiscite Cases. But the inclusion of questionable or ambiguous provisions does not affect the validity of
the ratification or adoption of the 1973 Constitution itself (Pope vs. Gray, 104 SO, 2d 841; 7th Dec. pp. 212-219, 1956-1966).
Alexander Hamilton, one of the leading founders and defenders of the American Constitution, answering the critics of the Federal
Constitution, stated that: "I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective
bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals
of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union,
must necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?" (The Federalist, Modern Library Ed., pp. xx-xxi).

(2) The 1973 Constitution is likewise impugned on the ground that it contains provisions which are ultra vires or beyond the
power of the Constitutional Convention to propose.

This objection relates to the wisdom of changing the form of government from Presidential to Parliamentary and including such
provisions as Section 3 of Article IV, Section 15 of Article XIV and Sections 3(2) and 12 of Article XVII in the 1973
Constitution.

Article IV —

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Article XIV —

Sec. 15. Any provision of paragraph one, Section fourteen, Article Eight and of this Article notwithstanding,
the Prime Minister may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may
require." (Without the consent of the National Assembly.)

Article XVII —

Sec. 3(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective
even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. All treaties, executive agreements, and contracts entered into by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby
recognized as legal, valid and binding. When the national interest so requires, the incumbent President of the
Philippines or the interim Prime Minister may review all contracts, concessions, permits, or other forms of
privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into,
granted, issued or acquired before the ratification of this Constitution.

In the Plebiscite Cases (L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965, & L-35979), Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, concurred in by Justices Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and the writer, overruled this objection, thus:

... Regardless of the wisdom and moral aspects of the contested provisions of the
proposed Constitution, it is my considered view that the Convention was legally deemed
fit to propose — save perhaps what is or may be insistent with what is now known,
particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens — not only because the Convention
exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as
the determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is concerned
— but also, because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law
unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes cast at an election which" said
 proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in Section 1 of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. (Pp. 17-18, Decision in L-35925, etc.).

This Court likewise enunciated in Del Rosario vs. Comelec (L-32476, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 367) that the Constitutional
Convention has the authority to "entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
ideology foreign to the democratic system ...; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by
the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution."

Mr. Justice Fernando, concurring in the same Plebiscite Cases, cited the foregoing pronouncement in the Del Rosario case, supra,
and added: "... it seems to me a sufficient answer that once convened, the area open for deliberation to a constitutional convention
..., is practically limitless" (citing Cf. Koehler vs. Hill, 14 NW 738, 60 Iowa 543 [1883]; Hatch Stoneman, 6 P 734, 66 Cal. 632
[1885]; MacMillan v. Blattner, 25 NW 245, 67 Iowa 287 [1895]; State v. Powell, 27 SO 297, 77 Miss. 543 [1900]; Hammond v.
Clark, 71 SE 479, 136 Ga. 313 [1911]; Hamilton v. Vaughan, 179 NW 533, 212 Mich. 31 [1920]; State v. Smith, 138 NE 881,
105 Ohio St. 570 [1922]; Looney vs. Leeper, 292 P 365, 145 Okl. 202 [1930]; School District vs. City of Pontiac, 247 NW 474,
262 Mich. 338 [1933]).

Mr. Justice Barredo, in his concurring opinion in said Plebiscite Cases, expressed the view "that when the people elected the
delegates to the Convention and when the delegates themselves were campaigning, such limitation of the scope of their function
and objective was not in their minds."

1973 CONSTITUTION DULY ADOPTED AND

PROMULGATED.

Petitioners next claim that the 1971 Constitutional Convention adjourned on November 30, 1972 without officially promulgating
the said Constitution in Filipino as required by Sections 3(1) of Article XV on General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution. This
claim is without merit because their Annex "M" is the Filipino version of the 1973 Constitution, like the English version, contains
the certification by President Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, duly attested by its Secretary, that the
proposed Constitution, approved on second reading on the 27th day of November, 1972 and on third reading in the Convention's
291st plenary session on November 29, 1972 and accordingly signed on November 1972 by the delegates whose signatures are
thereunder affixed. It should be recalled that Constitutional Convention President Diosdado Macapagal was, as President of the
Republic 1962 to 1965, then the titular head of the Liberal Party to which four (4) of the petitioners in L-36165 including their
counsel, former Senator Jovito Salonga, belong. Are they repudiating and disowning their former party leader and benefactor?

VI

ARTICLE XV OF 1935 CONSTITUTION DOES NOT

PRESCRIBE ANY PROCEDURE FOR RATIFICATION OF
1973 CONSTITUTION.

(1) Article XV of the 1935 Constitution simply provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification."

But petitioners construe the aforesaid provision to read: "Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election called by Congress at which the amendments are submitted for ratification
by the qualified electors defined in Article V hereof, supervised by the Commission on Elections in accordance with the existing
election law and after such amendments shall have been published in all the newspapers of general circulation for at least four
months prior to such election."

This position certainly imposes limitation on the sovereign people, who have the sole power of ratification, which imposition by
the Court is never justified (Wheeler vs. Board of Trustees, supra).

In effect, petitioners and their counsels are amending by a strained and tortured construction Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.
This is a clear case of usurpation of sovereign power they do not possess — through some kind of escamotage. This Court should
not commit such a grave error in the guise of judicial interpretation.
In all the cases where the court held that illegal or irregular submission, due to absence of substantial compliance with the
procedure prescribed by the Constitution and/or the law, nullifies the proposed amendment or the new Constitution, the
procedure prescribed by the state Constitution is so detailed that it specifies that the submission should be at a general or special
election, or at the election for members of the State legislature only or of all state officials only or of local officials only, or of
both state and local officials; fixes the date of the election or plebiscite limits the submission to only electors or qualified electors;
prescribes the publication of the proposed amendment or a new Constitution for a specific period prior to the election or
plebiscite; and designates the officer to conduct the plebiscite, to canvass and to certify the results, including the form of the
ballot which should so state the substance of the proposed amendments to enable the voter to vote on each amendment separately
or authorizes expressly the Constitutional Convention or the legislature to determine the procedure or certain details thereof. See
the State Constitutions of Alabama [1901]; Arizona [1912]; Arkansas [1874]; Colorado [1976]; Connecticut [1818]; Florida
[1887]; Georgia [1945]; Illinois [1970]; Indiana [1851]; Iowa [1857]; Kansas [1861]; Kentucky [1891]; Louisiana [1921];
Maryland [1867]; Massachusetts [1790]; Michigan [1909]; Minnesota [1857]; Mississippi [1890]; and Missouri [1945]).

As typical examples:
Constitution of Alabama (1901):

Article XVIII. Mode of Amending the Constitution

Sec. 284. Legislative Proposals. Amendments may be proposed to this Constitution by the legislature in the
manner following: The proposed amendments shall be read in the house in which they originate on three
several days, and, if upon the third reading, three-fifths of all the members elected to that house shall vote in
favor thereof, the proposed amendments shall be sent to the other house, in which they shall likewise be read
on three several days, and if upon the third reading, three-fifths of all the members elected that house shall
vote in favor of the proposed amendments, the legislature shall order an election by the qualified electors of
the state upon such proposed amendments, to be held either at the general election next succeeding the
session of the legislature at which the amendments are proposed or upon another day appointed by the
legislature, not less than three months after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature at which
the amendments were proposed. Notice of such election, together with the proposed amendments, shall be
given by proclamation of the governor, which shall be published in every county in such manner as the
legislature shall direct, for at least eight successive weeks next preceding the day appointed for such election.
On the day so appointed an election shall be held for the vote of the qualified electors of the state upon the
proposed amendments. If such election be held on the day of the general election, the officers of such general
election shall open a poll for the vote of the qualified electors upon the proposed amendments; if it be held on
a day other than that of a general election, officers for such election shall be appointed; and the election shall
be held in all things in accordance with the law governing general elections. In all elections upon such
proposed amendments, the votes cast thereat shall be canvassed, tabulated, and returns thereof be made to
the secretary of state, and counted, in the same manner as in elections for representatives to the legislature;
and if it shall thereupon appear that a majority of the qualified electors who voted at such election upon the
proposed amendments voted in favor of the same, such amendments shall be valid to all intents and purposes
as parts of this Constitution. The result of such election shall be made known by proclamation of the
governor. Representation in the legislature shall be based upon population, and such basis of representation
shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.

Sec. 285. Form of ballot for amendment. Upon the ballots used at all elections provided for in section 284 of
this Constitution, the substance or subject matter of each proposed amendment shall be so printed that the
nature thereof shall be clearly indicated. Following each proposed amendment on the ballot shall be printed
the word "Yes" and immediately under that shall be printed the word "No". The choice of the elector shall be
indicated by a cross mark made by him or under his direction, opposite the word expressing his desire, and no
amendment shall be adopted unless it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of all the qualified electors
who vote at such election.

Constitution of Arkansas (1874):

Article XIX. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 22. Constitutional amendments. Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may
propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to by a majority of all the members,
elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journal with the yeas and nays, and
published in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for six months
immediately preceding the next general election for Senators and Representatives, at which time the same
 shall be submitted to the electors of the State for approval or rejection, and if a majority of the electors
voting at such election adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part of this Constitution; but no
more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so submitted as
to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.

Constitution of Kansas (1861):

Article XIV. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Proposal of amendments; publications; elections. Propositions for the amendment of this constitution
may be made by either branch of the legislature; and if two thirds of all the members elected to each house
shall concur therein, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and nays, shall be entered on the
journal; and the secretary of state shall cause the same to be published in at least one newspaper in each
county of the state where a newspaper is published, for three months preceding the next election for
representatives, at which time, the same shall be submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection; and
if a majority of the electors voting on said amendments, at said election, shall adopt the amendments, the
same shall become a part of the constitution. When more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same
time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendments separately; and not
more than three propositions to amend shall be submitted at the same election.

Constitution of Maryland (1867):

Article XIV. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Proposal in general assembly; publication; submission to voters; governor's proclamation. The
General Assembly may propose Amendments to this Constitution; provided that each Amendment shall be
embraced in a separate bill, embodying the Article or Section, as the same will stand when amended and
passed by three fifths of all the members elected to each of the two Houses, by yeas and nays, to be entered
on the Journals with the proposed Amendment. The bill or bills proposing amendment or amendments shall
be published by order of the Governor, in at least two newspapers, in each County, where so many may be
published, and where not more than one may be published, then in the newspaper, and in three newspapers
published in the City of Baltimore, once a week for four weeks immediately preceding the next ensuing
general election, at which the proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted, in a form to be
prescribed by the General Assembly, to the qualified voters of the State for adoption or rejection. The votes
cast for and against said proposed amendment or amendments, severally, shall be returned to the Governor, in
the manner prescribed in other cases, and if it shall appear to the Governor that a majority of the votes cast at
said election on said amendment or amendments, severally, were cast in favor thereof, the Governor shall, by
his proclamation, declare the said amendment or amendments having received said majority of votes, to have
been adopted by the people of Maryland as part of the Constitution thereof, and henceforth said amendment
or amendments shall be part of the said Constitution. When two or more amendments shall be submitted in
the manner aforesaid, to the voters of this State at the same election, they shall be so submitted as that each
amendment shall be voted on separately.

Constitution of Missouri (1945):

Article XII. Amending the Constitution.

Sec. 2(b). Submission of amendments proposed by general assembly or by the initiative. All amendments
proposed by the general assembly or by the initiative shall be submitted to the electors for their approval or
rejection by official ballot title as may be provided by law, on a separate ballot without party designation, at
the next general election, or at a special election called by the governor prior thereto, at which he may submit
any of the amendments. No such proposed amendment shall contain more than one amended and revised
article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject and matters
properly connected therewith. If possible, each proposed amendment shall be published once a week for two
consecutive weeks in two newspapers of different political faith in each county, the last publication to be not
more than thirty nor less than fifteen days next preceding the election. If there be but one newspaper in any
county, publication of four consecutive weeks shall be made. If a majority of the votes cast thereon is in favor
of any amendment, the same shall take effect at the end of thirty days after the election. More than one
 amendment at the same election shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment
separately.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not require a specific procedure, much less a detailed procedure for submission or
ratification. As heretofore stated, it does not specify what kind of election at which the new Constitution shall be submitted; nor
does it designate the Commission on Elections to supervise the plebiscite. Neither does it limit the ratification to the qualified
electors as defined in Article V of the 1935 Constitution. Much less does it require the publication of the proposed Constitution
for any specific period before the plebiscite nor does it even insinuate that the plebiscite should be supervised in accordance with
the existing election law.

(2) As aforequoted, Article XV does not indicate the procedure for submission of the proposed Constitution to the people for
ratification. It does not make any reference to the Commission on Elections as the body that shall supervise the plebiscite. And
Article XV could not make any reference to the Commission on Elections because the original 1935 Constitution as ratified on
May 14, 1935 by the people did not contain Article X on the Commission on Elections, which article was included therein
pursuant to an amendment by that National Assembly proposed only about five (5) years later — on April 11, 1940, ratified by
the people on June 18, 1940 as approved by the President of the United States on December 1940 (see Sumulong vs.
Commission, 70 Phil. 703, 713, 715; Gonzales, Phil. Const. Law, 1966 ed., p. 13). So it cannot be said that the original framers of
the 1935 Constitution as ratified May 14, 1935 intended that a body known as the Commission on Elections should be the one to
supervise the plebiscite, because the Commission on Elections was not in existence then as was created only by Commonwealth
Act No. 607 approved on August 22, 1940 and amended by Commonwealth Act No. 657 approved on June 21, 1941 (see Tañada
& Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1961 ed., pp. 475-476; Sumulong vs. Commission, 170 Phil. 703, 708-715;
73 Phil. 288, 290-300; Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p. 5, Vol. II,
pp. 11-19).

Because before August, 1940 the Commission on Election was not yet in existence, the former Department of Interior (now
Department of Local Governments and Community Development) supervised the plebiscites on the 1937 amendment on
woman's suffrage, the 1939 amendment to the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution (Tydings-Kocialkowski Act of the
U.S. Congress) and the three 1940 amendments on the establishment of a bicameral Congress, the re-election of the President and
the Vice-President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections (ratified on June 18, 1940). The supervision of said
plebiscites by the then Department of Interior was not automatic, but by virtue of an express authorization in Commonwealth Act
Nos. 34, 49 and 517.

If the National Assembly then intended that the Commission on Elections should also supervise the plebiscite for ratification of
constitutional amendments or revision, it should have likewise proposed the corresponding amendment to Article XV by
providing therein that the plebiscite on amendments shall be supervised by the Commission on Elections.

3) If the framers of the 1935 Constitution and the people in ratifying the same on May 14, 1935 wanted that only the qualified
voters under Article V of the 1935 Constitution should participate in the referendum on any amendment or revision thereof, they
could have provided the same in 1935 or in the 1940 amendment by just adding a few words to Article XV by changing the last
phrase to "submitted for ratification to the qualified electors as defined in Article V hereof," or some such similar phrases.

Then again, the term "people" in Article XV cannot be understood to exclusively refer to the qualified electors under Article V of
the 1935 Constitution because the said term "people" as used in several provisions of the 1935 Constitution, does not have a
uniform meaning. Thus in the preamble, the term "Filipino people" refer, to all Filipino citizens of all ages of both sexes. In
Section 1 of Article II on the Declaration of Principles, the term "people" in whom sovereignty resides and from whom all
government authority emanates, can only refer also to Filipino citizens of all ages and of both sexes. But in Section 5 of the same
Article II on social justice, the term "people" comprehends not only Filipino citizens but also all aliens residing in the country of
all ages and of both sexes. Likewise, that is the same connotation of the term "people" employed in Section 1(3) of Article III on
the Bill of Rights concerning searches and seizures.

When the 1935 Constitution wants to limit action or the exercise of a right to the electorate, it does so expressly as the case of the
election of senators and congressmen. Section 2 Article VI expressly provides that the senators "shall be chosen at large by the
qualified electors of the Philippines as may provided by law." Section 5 of the same Article VI specifically provides that
congressmen shall "be elected by the qualified electors." The only provision that seems to sustain the theory of petitioners that the
term "people" in Article XV should refer to the qualified electors as defined in Article V of the 1935 Constitution is the provision
that the President and Vice-President shall be elected "by direct vote of the people." (Sec. 2 of Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution).
But this alone cannot be conclusive as to such construction, because of explicit provisions of Sections 2 and 5 of Article VI,
which specifically prescribes that the senators and congressmen shall be elected by the qualified electors.
As aforesaid, most of the constitutions of the various states of the United States, specifically delineate in detail procedure of
ratification of amendments to or revision of said Constitutions and expressly require ratification by qualified electors, not by the
generic term "people".

The proposal submitted to the Ozamis Committee on the Amending Process of the 1934-35 Constitutional Convention satisfied
that the amendment shall be submitted to qualified election for ratification. This proposal was not accepted indicating that the
1934-35 Constitutional Convention did intend to limit the term "people" in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution to qualified
electors only. As above demonstrated, the 1934-35 Constitutional Convention limits the use of the term "qualified electors" to
elections of public officials. It did not want to tie the hands of succeeding future constitutional conventions as to who should
ratify the proposed amendment or revision.

(4) It is not exactly correct to opine that Article XV of 1935 Constitution on constitutional amendment contemplates the
automatic applicability of election laws to plebiscites on proposed constitutional amendments or revision.

The very phraseology of the specific laws enacted by the National Assembly and later by Congress, indicates that there is need of
a statute expressly authorizing the application of the election laws to plebiscites of this nature. Thus, Com. Act No. 34 on the
woman's suffrage amendment enacted on September 30, 1936, consists of 12 sections and, aside from providing that "there shall
be held a plebiscite on Friday, April 30, 1937, on the question of woman's suffrage ... and that said amendment shall be
published in the Official Gazette in English and Spanish for three consecutive issues at least fifteen (15) days prior to said
election, ... and shall be posted in a conspicuous place in its municipal and provincial office building and in its polling place not
later than April 22, 1937" (Sec. 12, Com. Act No. 34), specifies that the provisions of the Election Law regarding, the holding of
a special election, insofar as said provisions are not in conflict with it, should apply to the said plebiscite (Sec. 3, Com. Act No.
34)1; and, that the votes cast according to the returns of the board of inspectors shall be counted by the National Assembly (Sec.
10, Com. Act No. 34).

The election laws then in force before 1938 were found in Sections 392-483 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Sec. 1 of Com. Act No. 357, the previous Election Code enacted on August 22, 1938, makes it expressly applicable to plebiscites.
Yet the subsequent laws, namely, Com. Act Nos. 492 and 517 and Rep. Act No. 73 calling for the plebiscite on the constitutional
amendments in 1939, 1940 and 1946, including the amendment creating the Commission on Elections, specifically provided that
the provisions of the existing election law shall apply to such plebiscites insofar as they are not inconsistent with the aforesaid
Com. Act Nos. 492 and 517, as well as Rep. Act No. 73. Thus —

Commonwealth Act No. 492, enacted on September 19, 1939, calling for a plebiscite on the proposed amendments to the
Constitution adopted by the National Assembly on September 15, 1939, consists of 8 sections and provides that the proposed
amendments to the Constitution adopted in Resolution No. 39 on September 15, 1939 "shall be submitted to the Filipino people
for approval or disapproval at a general election to be held throughout the Philippines on Tuesday, October 24, 1939"; that the
amendments to said Constitution proposed in "Res. No. 38, adopted on the same date, shall be submitted at following election of
local officials," (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 492) that the said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least ten (10) days prior to the elections; that copies thereof shall be posted not later
than October 20, 1939 (Sec. 2, Com. Act 492); that the election shall be conducted according to provisions of the Election Code
insofar as the same may be applicable; that within thirty (30) days after the election, Speaker of the National Assembly shall
request the President to call a special session of the Assembly for the purpose of canvassing the returns and certify the results
thereof (Sec. 6, Com. Act No. 492).

Commonwealth Act No. 517, consisting of 11 sections, was approved on April 25, 1940 and provided, among others: that the
plebiscite on the constitutional amendments providing bicameral Congress, re-election of the President and Vice-President, and
the creation of a Commission on Elections shall be held at a general election on June 18, 1940 (Sec. 1); that said amendments
shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette in English and Spanish at least 20 days prior to the election
and posted in every local government office building and polling place not later than May 18, 1940 (Sec. 2); that the election
shall be conducted in conformity with the Election Code insofar as the same may be applicable (Sec. 3) that copies of the returns
shall be forwarded to the Secretary of National Assembly and the Secretary of Interior (Sec. 7); that the National Assembly shall
canvass the returns to certify the results at a special session to be called by President (Sec. 8).

Republic Act No. 73 approved on October 21, 1946 calling for a plebiscite on the parity amendment consists of 8 sections
provides that the Amendment "shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be
held on March 11, 1947, in accordance with the provisions of this Act" (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 73); that the said amendment shall
be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least 20 days prior to the election; that
copies of the same shall be posted in a conspicuous place and in every polling place not later than February 11, 1947 (Section 2,
R.A. No. 73); that the provisions of Com. Act No. 357 (Election Code) and Com. Act No. 657 creating the Commission on
Elections, shall apply to the election insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 73); and that within 30
days after the election, the Senate and House of Representatives shall hold a joint session to canvass the returns and certify the
results thereof (Section 6, R.A. No. 73).

From the foregoing provisions, it is patent that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not contemplate nor envision the
automatic application of the election law; and even at that, not all the provisions of the election law were made applicable
because the various laws aforecited contain several provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Revised Election
Code (Com. Act No. 357). Moreover, it should be noted that the period for the publication of the copies of the proposed
amendments was about 10 days, 15 days or 20 days, and for posting at least 4 days, 8 days or 30 days.

Republic Acts Nos. 180 and 6388 likewise expressly provide that the Election Code shall apply to plebiscites (See. 2, R.A. No.
180, as amended, and Section 2, Rep. Act No. 6388).

If the Election Code ipso facto applies to plebiscites under Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, there would be no need for
Congress to expressly provide therefor in the election laws enacted after the inauguration of the Commonwealth government
under the 1935 Constitution.

(5) Article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not specify who can vote and how they shall vote. Unlike the various State
Constitutions of the American Union (with few exceptions), Article XV does not state that only qualified electors can vote in the
plebiscite. As above-intimated, most of the Constitutions of the various states of the United States provide for very detailed
amending process and specify that only qualified electors can vote at such plebiscite or election.

Congress itself, in enacting Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, which was approved on June 17,
1967 and superseded Republic Act No. 2370, expanded the membership of the barrio assembly to include citizens who are at
least 18 years of age, whether literate or not, provided they are also residents of the barrio for at least 6 months (Sec. 4, R.A. No.
3590).

Sec. 4. The barrio assembly. — The barrio assembly shall consist of all persons who are residents of the
barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over, citizens of the Republic of the Philippines and
who are duly registered in the list of barrio assembly members kept by the Barrio Secretary.

The barrio assembly shall meet at least once a year to hear the annual report of the barrio council
concerning the activities and finances of the barrio.

It shall meet also at the case of the barrio council or upon written petition of at least One-Tenth of the
members of the barrio assembly.

No meeting of the barrio assembly shall take place unless notice is given one week prior to the meeting
except in matters involving public safety or security in which case notice within a reasonable time shall be
sufficient. The barrio captain, or in his absence, the councilman acting as barrio captain, or any assembly
member selected during the meeting, shall act as presiding officer at all meetings of the barrio assembly. The
barrio secretary or in his absence, any member designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary shall
discharge the duties of secretary of the barrio assembly.

For the purpose of conducting business and taking any official action in the barrio assembly, it is necessary
that at least one-fifth of the members of the barrio assembly be present to constitute a quorum. All actions
shall require a majority vote of these present at the meeting there being a quorum.

Sec. 5. Powers of the barrio assembly. — The powers of the barrio assembly shall be as follows:

a. To recommend to the barrio council the adoption of measures for the welfare of the
barrio;

b. To decide on the holding of a plebiscite as provided for in Section 6 of this Act;

 c. To act on budgetary and supplemental appropriations and special tax ordinances
submitted for its approval by the barrio council; and

d. To hear the annual report council concerning the activities and finances of the
assembly.

Sec. 6. Plebiscite. — A plebiscite may be held in the barrio when authorized by a majority vote of the
members present in the barrio assembly, there being a quorum, or when called by at least four members of
the barrio council; Provided, however, That no plebiscite shall be held until after thirty days from its approval
by either body, and such plebiscite has been given the widest publicity in the barrio, stating the date, time,
and place thereof, the questions or issues to be decided, action to be taken by the voters, and such other
information relevant to the holding of the plebiscite.

All duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote may vote in the plebiscite. Voting procedures
may be made either in writing as in regular election, and/or declaration by the voters to the board of election
tellers. The board of election tellers shall be the same board envisioned by section 8, paragraph 2 of this Act,
in case of vacancies in this body, the barrio council may fill the same.

A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council. A plebiscite shall be
called to approve any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax ordinances.

For taking action on any of the above enumerated measures, majority vote of all the barrio assembly
members registered in the list of barrio secretary is necessary.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec 10. Qualifications of voters and candidates. — Every citizen of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age
or over, able to read and write, who has been a resident of the barrio during the six months immediately
preceding the election, duly registered in the list of voters kept by the barrio secretary, who is not otherwise
disqualified, may vote or be a candidate in the barrio elections.

The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of
imprisonment, within two years after service of his sentence;

b. Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

c. Insane or feeble-minded persons.

All these barrio assembly members, who are at least 18 years of age, although illiterate, may vote at the plebiscite on the recall of
any member of the barrio council or on a budgetary, supplemental appropriation, or special ordinances, a valid action on which
requires "a majority vote of all of the barrio assembly members registered in the list of the barrio secretary" (par. 5, Sec. 6, R.A.
No. 3590). Such plebiscite may be authorized by a majority vote of the members present in the barrio assembly, there being a
quorum (par. 1, Sec. 6).

However, in the case of election of barrio officials, only Filipino citizens, who are at least 21 years of age, able to read and write,
residents of the barrio during the 6 months immediately preceding the election and duly registered in the list of voters kept by the
barrio secretary, not otherwise disqualified, may vote (Sec. 10, R.A. No. 3590).

Paragraph 2 of Section 6 likewise authorizes open voting as it provides that "voting procedures may be made ... either in writing
as in regular elections, and/or declaration by the voters to the board of election tellers."

That said paragraph 2 of Section 6 provides that "all duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote may vote in the
plebiscite," cannot sustain the position of petitioners in G.R. No. L-36165 that only those who are 21 years of age and above and
who possess all other qualifications of a voter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 3590, can vote on the plebiscites referred to in
Section 6; because paragraph 3 of Section 6 does not expressly limit the voting to those with the qualifications under Section 10
as said Section 6 does not distinguish between those who are 21 or above on the one hand and those 18 or above but below 21 on
the other, and whether literate or not, to constitute a quorum of the barrio assembly.

Consequently, on questions submitted for plebiscite, all the registered members of the barrio assembly can vote as long as they
are 18 years of age or above; and that only those who are 21 years of age or over and can read and write, can vote in the elections
of barrio officials.

Otherwise there was no sense in extending membership in the barrio assembly to those who are at least 18 years of age, whether
literate or not. Republic Act No. 3590 could simply have restated Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2370, the old Barrio Charter,
which provided that only those who are 21 and above can be members of the barrio assembly.

Counsels Salonga and Tañada as well as all the petitioners in L-36165 and two of the petitioners in L-36164 participated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3590 and should have known the intendment of Congress in expanding the membership of the
barrio assembly to include all those 18 years of age and above, whether literate or not.

If Congress in the exercise of its ordinary legislative power, not as a constituent assembly, can include 18-year olds as qualified
electors for barrio plebiscites, this prerogative can also be exercised by the Chief Executive as delegate of the Constitutional
Convention in regard to the plebiscite on the 1973 Constitution.

As heretofore stated, the statement by the President in Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 that the 1973 Constitution was
overwhelmingly ratified by the people through the Citizens' Assemblies in a referendum conducted from January 10 to 15, 1973,
should be accorded the presumption of correctness; because the same was based on the certification by the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government and Community Development who tabulated the results of the referendum all over the country.
The accuracy of such tabulation and certification by the said Department Secretary should likewise be presumed; because it was
done in the regular performance of his official functions aside from the fact that the act of the Department Secretary, as an alter
ego of the President, is presumptively the act of the President himself unless the latter disapproves or reprobates the same
(Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 ). The truth of the certification by the Department Secretary and the Chief
Executive on the results of the referendum, is further strengthened by the affidavits and certifications of Governor Isidro
Rodriguez of Rizal, Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto of Quezon City and Councilor Eduardo T. Parades of Quezon City.

The procedure for the ratification of the 1937 amendment on woman suffrage, the 1939 amendment to the ordinance appended to
the 1935 Constitution, the 1940 amendments establishing the bicameral Congress, creating the Commission on Elections and
providing for two consecutive terms for the President, and the 1947 parity amendment, cannot be invoked; because those
amendments were proposed by the National Assembly as expressly authorized by Article V of the 1935 Constitution respecting
woman suffrage and as a constituent assembly in all the other amendments aforementioned and therefore as such, Congress had
also the authority to prescribe the procedure for the submission of the proposed amendments to the 1935 Constitution.

In the cases at bar, the 1973 Constitution was proposed by an independent Constitutional Convention, which as heretofore
discussed, has the equal power to prescribe the modality for the submission of the 1973 Constitution to the people for ratification
or delegate the same to the President of the Republic.

The certification of Governor Isidro Rodriguez of Rizal and Mayor Norberto Amoranto could be utilized as the basis for the
extrapolation of the Citizens' Assemblies in all the other provinces, cities and municipalities in all the other provinces, cities and
municipalities, and the affirmative votes in the Citizens' Assemblies resulting from such extrapolation would still constitute a
majority of the total votes cast in favor of the 1973 Constitution.

As claimed by petitioners in L-36165, against the certification of the Department of Local Government and Community
Development that in Rizal there were 1,126,000 Yes votes and 100,310 No votes, the certification of Governor Isidro Rodriguez
of Rizal, shows only 614,157 Yes votes against 292,530 No votes. In Cavite province, there were 249,882 Yes votes against
12,269 No votes as disclosed in Annex 1-A of respondents' Compliance (the certification by the Department of Local
Government and Community Development), while the alleged certification of Governor Lino Bocalan of Cavite shows only
126,163 Yes votes and 5,577 No votes. If such a ratio is extended by way of extrapolation to the other provinces, cities and towns
of the country, the result would still be an overwhelming vote in favor of the 1973 Constitution.

The alleged certification by Governor Lino Bocalan of Cavite, is not true; because in his duly acknowledged certification dated
March 16, 1973, he states that since the declaration of martial law and up to the present time, he has been under house arrest in
his residence in Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal; that he never participated in the conduct of the Citizens' Assemblies on January
10 15, 1973 in the province of Cavite; that the acting chairman and coordinator of the Citizens' Assemblies at that time was Vice-
Governor Dominador Camerino; and that he was shown a letter for his signature during the conduct of the Citizens' Assemblies,
which he did not sign but which he referred to Vice-Governor Camerino (Annex 1-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen. dated March 20,
1973).

Mayor Pablo Cuneta likewise executed an affidavit dated March 16, 1973 stating that on January 15, 1973, he caused the
preparation of a letter addressed to Secretary Jose Roño of the Department of Local Government and Community Development
showing the results of the referendum in Pasay City; that on the same day, there were still in any Citizens' Assemblies holding
referendum in Pasay City, for which reason he did not send the aforesaid letter pending submittal of the other results from the
said Citizens' Assemblies; and that in the afternoon of January 15, 1973, he indorsed the complete certificate of results on the
referendum in Pasay City to the Office of the President (Annex 5-Rejoinder of Sol. Gen. dated March 20, 1973).

Pablo F. Samonte, Assistant City Treasurer and Officer in Charge of Pasay City also issued an affidavit dated March 15, 1973
stating that a certain Atty. Delia Sutton of the Salonga Law Office asked him for the results of the referendum; that he informed
her that he had in his possession unsigned copies of such results which may not be considered official as they had then no
knowledge whether the original thereof had been signed by the mayor; and that in spite of his advice that said unsigned copies
were not official, she requested him if she could give her the unofficial copies thereof, which he gave in good faith (Annex C-
Rejoinder to the Sol. Gen.).

There were 118,010 Yes votes as against 5,588 No votes in the Citizens' Assemblies of Quezon city (Annex V to Petitioners'
Notes in L-36165). The fact that a certain Mrs. Remedio Gutierrez, wife of alleged barrio treasurer Faustino Gutierrez, of barrio
South Triangle, Quezon City, states that "as far as we know, there has been no Citizens' Assembly meeting in our Area,
particularly in January of this year," does not necessarily mean that there was no such meeting in said barrio; for she may not
have been notified thereof and as a result she was not able to attend said meeting. Much less can it be a basis for the claim that
there was no meeting at all in the other barrios of Quezon City. The barrio captain or the secretary of the barrio assembly could
have been a credible witness.

Councilor Eduardo T. Paredes, chairman of the Secretariat of Quezon City Ratification and Coordinating Council, certified on
March 12, 1973 that as such chairman he was in charge of the compilation and tabulation of the results of the referendum among
the Citizens' Assemblies in Quezon City based on the results submitted to the Secretariat by the different Citizens' Assemblies;
but many results of the referendum were submitted direct to the national agencies having to do with such activity and all of which
he has no knowledge, participation and control (Annex 4 Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.).

Governor Isidro Rodriguez of Rizal issued a certification dated March 16, 1973 that he prepared a letter to the President dated
January 15, 1973 informing him of the results of the referendum in Rizal, in compliance with the instruction of the National
Secretariat to submit such letter 2 or 3 days from January 10 to show the trend of voting in the Citizens' Assemblies; that the
figures 614,157 and 292,530 mentioned in said letter were based on the certificates of results in his possession as of January 14,
1973, which results were made the basis of the computation of the percentage of voting trend in the province; that his letter was
never intended to show the final or complete result in the referendum in the province as said referendum was then still going on
from January 14-17, 1973, for which reason the said letter merely stated that it was only a "summary result"; and that after
January 15, 1973, he sent to the National Secretariat all the certificates of results in 26 municipalities of Rizal for final tabulation
(Annex 3-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.; emphasis supplied).

Lydia M. Encarnacion, acting chief of the Records Section, Department of Local Government and Community Development,
issued a certificate dated March 16, 1973 that she was shown xerox copies of unsigned letters allegedly coming from Governor
Lino Bocalan dated January 15, 1973 and marked "Rejoinder Annex Cavite" addressed to the President of the Philippines through
the Secretary of the Department of Local Government and Community Development and another unsigned letter reportedly from
Mayor Pablo Cuneta dated January 15, 1973 and marked "Rejoinder Annex Pasay City" addressed to the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government and Community Development; that both xerox copies of the unsigned letters contain figures
showing the results of the referendum of the Citizens' Assemblies in those areas; and that the said letters were not received by her
office and that her records do not show any such documents received by her office (Annex 2-Rejoinder of the Sol. Gen.).

Thus it would seem that petitioners in L-36165 have attempted to deceive this Court by representing said unsigned letters and/or
certificates as duly signed and/or containing the complete returns of the voting in the Citizens' Assemblies.

The observation We made with respect to the discrepancy between the number of Yes votes and No votes contained in the
summary report of Governor Rodriguez of Rizal as well as those contained in the alleged report of Governor Lino Bocalan of
Cavite who repudiated the same as not having been signed by him for he was then under house arrest, on the one hand, and the
number of votes certified by the Department of Local Government and Community Development, on the other, to the effect that
even assuming the correctness of the figures insisted on by counsel for petitioners in L-36165, if they were extrapolated and
applied to the other provinces and cities of the country, the Yes votes would still be overwhelmingly greater than the No votes,
applies equally to the alleged discrepancy between the figures contained in the certification of the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government and Community Development and the figures furnished to counsel for petitioners in L-36165 concerning the
referendum in Camarines Sur, Bataan and Negros Occidental.

The fact that the referendum in the municipality of Pasacao, Camarines Sur, shows that there were more votes in favor of the
plebiscite to be held later than those against, only serve to emphasize that there was freedom of voting among the members of the
Citizens' Assemblies all over the country during the referendum from January 10 to 15, 1973 (Annex-6 Camarines Sur to
Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165). If there was no such freedom of choice, those who wanted a plebiscite would not
outnumber those against holding such plebiscite.

The letter of Governor Felix O. Alfelor, Sr. dated January 1973 confirms the "strong manifestation of approval of the new
Constitution by almost 97% by the members of the Citizens' Assemblies in Camarines Sur" (Annex-Camarines Sur to Rejoinder
of Petitioners in L-36165).

The report of Governor Efren B. Pascual of Bataan shows that the members of the Citizens' Assemblies voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the new Constitution despite the fact that the second set of questions including the question "Do you approve of the new
Constitution?" was received only on January 10. Provincial Governor Pascual stated that "orderly conduct and favorable results
of the referendum" were due not only to the coordinated efforts and cooperation of all teachers and government employees in the
area but also to the enthusiastic participation by the people, showing "their preference and readiness to accept this new method of
government to people consultation in shaping up government policies." (Annex-Bataan to Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165).

As heretofore stated, it is not necessary that voters ratifying the new Constitution are registered in the book of voters; it is enough
that they are electors voting on the new Constitution (Bott vs. Wurts, 40 A 740 [1898]; 43 A 744, 881 [1899]; 45 LRA 251). The
fact that the number of actual voters in the referendum in certain localities may exceed the number of voters actually registered
for the 1971 elections, can only mean that the excess represents the qualified voters who are not yet registered including those
who are at least 15 years of age and the illiterates. Although ex-convicts may have voted also in the referendum, some of them
might have been granted absolute pardon or were sentenced to less than one year imprisonment to qualify them to vote (Sec. 201,
1971 Rev. Election Code). At any rate, the ex-convicts constitute a negligible number, discounting which would not tilt the scale
in favor of the negative votes.

Similarly, the fact that Mayor Marcial F. Samson of Caloocan City, who belongs to the Liberal Party, stated in his letter dated
March 13, 1973 that he does not "feel authorized by the proper authorities to confirm or deny the data" concerning the number of
participants, the Yes votes and No votes in the referendum on the new Constitution among the members of the Citizens'
Assemblies in Caloocan City, does not necessarily give rise to the inference that Mayor Samson of Caloocan City is being
intimidated, having been recently released from detention; because in the same letter of Mayor Samson, he suggested to counsel
for petitioners in L-36165 that he can secure "the true and legitimate results of the referendum" from the Office of the President
(Annex Caloocan-B to Rejoinder of Petitioners in L-36165). Why did not learned and eminent counsel heed such suggestion?

Counsel for petitioners in L-36165, to sustain their position, relies heavily on the computation of the estimated turnover in the
Citizens' Assemblies referendum on January 10 to 15, 1973 by a certain Professor Benjamin R. Salonga, of the Mapua Institute of
Technology, ostensibly a close relative of former Senator Jovito R. Salonga, eminent counsel for petitioners in L-36165 (Annex
M-as amended, to Consolidated Rejoinder of petitioners in L-36165 to the Notes of Arguments and Memorandum of
respondents). Professor Salonga is not a qualified statistician, which all the more impairs his credibility. Director Tito A. Mijares
of the Bureau of Census and Statistics, in his letter dated March 16, 1973 address to the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government and Community Development, refutes the said computation of Professor Benjamin R. Salonga, thus:

1) I do not quite understand why (Problem 1) all qualified registered voters and the 15-20-year-old youths
(1972) will have to be estimated in order to give a 101.9% estimate of the percentage participation of the "15-
20 year old plus total number of qualified voters" which does not deem to answer the problem. This
computation apparently fails to account for some 5.6 million persons "21 years old and over" who were not
registered voters (COMELEC), but who might be qualified to participate at the Citizen's Assembly.

2) The official population projection of this office (medium assumption) for "15 year olds and over" as of
January 1, 1973 is 22.506 million. If total number of participants at the Citizens' Assembly Referendum held
on January 10-15, 1973 was 16.702 million, participation rate will therefore be the ratio of the latter figure to
the former which gives 74.2%.

3) 1 cannot also understand c-2 "Solution to Problem 11." The "difference or implied number of 15-20 year
olds" of 5,039,906 would represent really not only all 15-year olds and over who participated at the Citizens'
 Assembly but might not have been registered voters at the time, assuming that all the 11,661,909 registered
voted at Citizens' Assembly. Hence, the "estimate percentage participation of 15-20 years olds" of 105.6%
does not seem to provide any meaningful information.

To obtain the participation rate of "15-20 years old" one must divide the number in this age group, which was
estimated to be 4.721 million as of January 1, 1973 by the population of "15 years old and over" for the same
period which was estimated to be 22.506 million, giving 21.0%.

In Problem III, it should be observed that registered voters also include names of voters who are already
dead. It cannot therefore be assumed that all of them participated at the Citizens' Assembly. It can therefore
be inferred that "a total number of persons 15 and over unqualified/disqualified to vote" will be more than
10,548,197 and hence the "difference or implied number of registered voters that participated" will be less
than 6,153,618.

I have reservations on whether an "appropriate number of qualified voters that supposedly voted" could be
meaningfully estimated.

5) The last remark will therefore make the ratio (a) [Solution to Problem] more than 1.71 and that for (b),
accordingly, will also be less than 36.8%." (Annex F Rejoinder).

From the foregoing analysis of the Director of Census and Statistics as of January 21, 1973, the official population projection for
15-year olds and over is 22,506,000. If 16,702,000 voted in the referendum, the participation ratio would be 74.2% of
22,506,000.

If the registered electors as of the election of November 8, 1971 numbered 11,661,909, the difference between 16,702,000 who
participated in the referendum and the registered electors of 11,661,909 for the November 8, 1971 elections, is 5,040,091, which
may include not only the 15-year olds and above but below 21 but also the qualified electors who were not registered before the
November 8, 1971 elections as well as illiterates who are 15 years old and above but below 21.

Moreover, in the last Presidential election in November, 1969, We found that the incumbent President obtained over 5,000,000
votes as against about 3,000,000 votes for his rival LP Senator Sergio Osmeña, Jr., garnering a majority of from about 896,498 to
1,436,118 (Osmeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973).

The petitioners in all the cases at bar cannot state with justification that those who voted for the incumbent President in 1969 did
not vote in favor of the 1973 Constitution during the referendum from January 10 to 15, 1973. It should also be stressed that
many of the partisans of the President in the 1969 Presidential elections, have several members in their families and relatives who
are qualified to participate in the referendum because they are 15 years or above including illiterates, which fact should
necessarily augment the number of votes who voted for the 1973 Constitution.

(6) It is also urged that martial law being the rule of force, is necessarily inconsistent with freedom of choice, because the people
fear to disagree with the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore cannot voice
views opposite to or critical of the position of the President on the 1973 Constitution and on the mode of its ratification.

It is also claimed or urged that there can be no free choice during martial law which inevitably generates fear in the individual.
Even without martial law, the penal, civil or administrative sanction provided for the violation of ordinarily engenders fear in the
individual which persuades the individual to comply with or obey the law. But before martial law was proclaimed, many
individuals fear such sanctions of the law because of lack of effective equal enforcement or implementation thereof — in brief,
compartmentalized justice and extraneous pressures and influences frustrated the firm and just enforcement of the laws. The fear
that is generated by martial law is merely the fear of immediate execution and swift enforcement of the law and therefore
immediate infliction of the punishment or sanction prescribed by the law whenever it is transgressed during the period of martial
law. This is not the fear that affects the voters' freedom of choice or freedom to vote for or against the 1973 Constitution. Those
who cringe in fear are the criminals or the law violators. Surely, petitioners do not come under such category.

(7) Petitioners likewise claim that open voting by viva voce or raising of hands violates the secrecy of the ballot as by the election
laws. But the 1935 Constitution does not require secret voting. We search in vain for such guarantee or prescription in said
organic law. The Commission on Elections under the 1940 Amendment, embodied as Article X is merely mandated to insure
"free, orderly and honest election." Congress, under its plenary law-making authority, could have validly prescribed in the
election law open voting in the election of public officers, without trenching upon the Constitution. Any objection to such a
statute concerns its wisdom or propriety, not its legality or constitutionality. Secret balloting was demanded by partisan strife in
elections for elective officials. Partisanship based on party or personal loyalties does not generally obtain in a plebiscite on
proposed constitutional amendments or on a new Constitution. We have seen even before and during martial law that voting in
meetings of government agencies or private organizations is usually done openly. This is specially true in sessions of Congress,
provincial boards, city councils, municipal boards and barrio councils when voting on national or local issues, not on
personalities.

Then again, open voting was not a universal phenomenon in the Citizens' Assemblies. It might have been true in certain areas, but
that does not necessarily mean that it was done throughout the country.

The recent example of an open voting is the last election on March 3, 1973 of the National Press Club officers who were elected
by acclamation presided over by its former president, petitioner Eduardo Monteclaro in L-36236 (see Bulletin Today, p. 8, March
3, 1973 issue). There can be no more hardboiled group of persons than newspapermen, who cannot say that voting among them
by acclamation was characterized by fear among the members of the National Press Club.

Moreover, petitioners would not be willing to affirm that all the members of the citizenry of this country are against the new
Constitution. They will not deny that there are those who favor the same, even among the 400,000 teachers among whom officers
of the Department of Education campaigned for the ratification of the new Constitution.

Not one of the petitioners can say that the common man — farmer, laborer, fisherman, lowly employee, jeepney driver, taxi
driver, bus driver, pedestrian, salesman, or salesgirl — does not want the new Constitution, or the reforms provided for therein.

(8) Petitioners likewise claim that there was no sufficient publicity given to the new Constitution. This is quite inaccurate;
because even before the election in November, 1970 of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, the proposed reforms were
already discussed in various forums and through the press as well as other media of information. Then after the Constitutional
Convention convened in June, 1971, specific reforms advanced by the delegates were discussed both in committee hearings as
well as in the tri-media — the press, radio and television. Printed materials on the proposed reforms were circulated by their
proponents. From June, 1971 to November 29, 1972, reforms were openly discussed and debated except for a few days after the
proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972. From the time the Constitutional Convention reconvened in October, 1972
until January 7, 1973, the provisions of the new Constitution were debated and discussed in forums sponsored by private
organizations universities and debated over the radio and on television. The Philippines is a literate country, second only to Japan
in the Far East, and more literate perhaps than many of mid-western and southern states of the American Union and Spain. Many
residents in about 1,500 towns and 33,000 barrios of the country have radios. Even the illiterates listened to radio broadcasts on
and discussed the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.

As reported by the eminent and widely read columnist, Teodoro Valencia in his column in Bulletin Today, March 4, 1973 issue,
"Otto Lang, Hollywood producer director (Tora, Tora, Tora) went around the country doing a 30-minute documentary on the
Philippines for American television stated that what impressed him most in his travel throughout the country was the general
acceptance of the New Society by the people which he saw in his 6-week travel from Aparri to Jolo."

The report of Frank Valeo (Bulletin Today, March 3 and 4, 1973 and Daily Express, March 3, and Sunday Express, March 4),
Secretary of the United States Senate, who conducted a personal survey of the country as delegate of Senator Mike Mansfield,
Chairman, Committee on US-Philippine relations, states:

Martial law has paved the way for a re-ordering of the basic social structure of the Philippines. President
Marcos has been prompt and sure-footed in using the power of presidential decree under martial law for this
purpose. He has zeroed in on areas which have been widely recognized as prime sources of the nation's
difficulties — land tenancy, official corruption, tax evasion and abuse of oligarchic economic power. Clearly,
he knows the targets. What is not yet certain is how accurate have been his shots. Nevertheless, there is
marked public support for his leadership and tangible alternatives have not been forthcoming. That would
suggest that he may not be striking too far from the mark.

The United States business community in Manila seems to have been re-assured by recent developments ... .
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners cannot safely assume that all the peaceful citizens of the country, who constitute the majority of the population, do not
like the reforms stipulated in the new Constitution, as well as the decrees, orders and circulars issued to implement the same. It
should be recalled, as hereinbefore stated, that all these reforms were the subject of discussion both in the committee hearings and
on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, as well as in public forums sponsored by concerned citizens or civic organizations
at which Con-Con delegates as well as other knowledgeable personages expounded their views thereon and in all the media of
information before the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972. This is the reason why the Constitutional Convention,
after spending close to P30 million during the period from June 1, 1971 to November 29, 1972, found it expedient to accelerate
their proceedings in November, 1972 because all views that could possibly be said on the proposed provisions of the 1973
Constitution were already expressed and circulated. The 1973 Constitution may contain some unwise provisions. But this
objection to such unwise or vague provisions, as heretofore stated, refers to the wisdom of the aforesaid provisions, which issue
is not for this Court to decide; otherwise We will be substituting Our judgment for the judgment of the Constitutional Convention
and in effect acting as a constituent assembly.

VI

PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF EXERCISES

LEGISLATIVE POWERS DURING MARTIAL LAW.

The position of the respondent public officers that undermartial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief is vested with
legislative powers, is sustained by the ruling in the 1949 case of Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, et al. (83 Phil. 171, 177-178) which
reiterates the 1945 case of Yamashita vs. Styer (75 Phil. 563, 571-72). The trial of General Kuroda was after the surrender of
Japan on October 2, 1945 (23 Encyc. Brit. 1969 ed., p. 799) and hence no more martial law in the Philippines.

... Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law
which are part of our Constitution.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in
Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styver (L-129, 42 Off.
Gaz., 664) when we said —

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time
of war. "An important incident to a conduct of war is the adoption measures by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war." (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war
criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military
commission "has jurisdiction so long as the technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of
treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement." (Cowles, Trial of War
Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944).

Consequently, the President as Commander-in-Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished

aspect of war, namely the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68. (83 Phil. 177-178; emphasis supplied).

Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court likewise appears to subscribe to this view, when, in his concurring
opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (327 U.S. 304 [1946]), he defined martial law as "the exercise of the power which resides in
the executive branch of the government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of emergency, when other
branches of the government are unable to function, or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety." (Emphasis
supplied). There is an implied recognition in the aforesaid definition of martial law that even in places where the courts can
function, such operation of the courts may be affected by martial law should their "functioning ... threaten the public safety." It is
possible that the courts, in asserting their authority to pass upon questions which may adversely affect the conduct of the punitive
campaign against rebels, secessionists, dissidents as well as subversives, martial law may restrict such judicial function until the
danger to the security of the state and of the people shall have been decimated.

The foregoing view appears to be shared by Rossiter when he stated:

Finally, this strong government, which in some instances might become an outright dictatorship, can have no
other purposes than the preservation of the independence of the state, the maintenance of the existing
constitutional order, and the defense of the political and social liberties of the people. It is important to
 recognize the true and limited ends of any practical application of the principle of constitutional dictatorship.
Perhaps the matter may be most clearly stated in this way: the government of a free state is proceeding on its
way and meeting the usual problems of peace and normal times within the limiting framework of its
established constitutional order. The functions of government are parceled out among a number of mutually
independent offices and institutions; the power to exercise those functions is circumscribed by well-
established laws, customs, and constitutional prescriptions; and the people for whom this government was
instituted are in possession of a lengthy catalogue of economic, political, and social rights which their leaders
recognize as inherent and inalienable. A severe crisis arises — the country is invaded by a hostile power, or a
dissident segment of the citizenry revolts, or the impact of a world-wide depression threatens to bring the
nation's economy in ruins. The government meets the crisis by assuming more powers and respecting fewer
rights. The result is a regime which can act arbitrarily and even dictatorially in the swift adaption of
measures designed to save the state and its people from the destructive effects of the particular crisis. And
the narrow duty to be pursued by this strong government, this constitutional dictatorship? Simply this and
nothing more: to end the crisis and restore normal times. The government assumes no power and abridges no
right unless plainly indispensable to that end; it extends no further in time than the attainment of that end;
and it makes no alteration in the political, social and economic structure of the nation which cannot be
eradicated with the restoration of normal times. In short, the aim of constitutional dictatorship is the complete
restoration of the status quo ante bellum. This historical fact does not comport with philosophical theory, that
there never has been a perfect constitutional dictatorship, is an assertion that can be made without fear of
contradiction. But this is true of all institutions of government, and the principle of constitutional dictatorship
remains eternally valid no matter how often and seriously it may have been violated in practice.
(Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 ed., by Clinton L. Rossiter, p. 7; emphasis supplied.)

Finally, Rossiter expressly recognizes that during martial law, the Chief Executive exercises legislative power, whether of
temporary or permanent character, thus:

The measures adopted in the prosecution of a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in
character or effect. Emergency powers are strictly conditioned by their purpose and this purpose is the
restoration of normal conditions. The actions directed to this end should therefore be provisional. For
example, measures of a legislative nature which work a lasting change in the structure of the state or
constitute permanent derogations from existing law should not be adopted under an emergency enabling
act, at least not without the positively registered approval of the legislature. Permanent laws, whether
adopted in regular or irregular times, are for parliaments to enact. By this same token, the decisions and
sentences of extraordinary courts should be reviewed by the regular courts after the termination of the crisis.

But what if a radical act of permanent character, one working lasting changes in the political and social
fabric, is indispensable to the successful prosecution of the particular constitutional dictatorship? The only
answer can be: it must be resolutely taken and openly acknowledged. President Lincoln found it necessary to
proceed to the revolutionary step of emancipation in aid of his conservative purpose of preserving the Union;
as a constitutional dictator he had a moral right to take this radical action. Nevertheless, it is imperative that
any action with such lasting effects should eventually receive the positive approval of the people or of their
representatives in the legislature. (P. 303, emphasis supplied).

From the foregoing citations, under martial law occasioned by severe crisis generated by revolution, insurrection or economic
depression or dislocation, the government exercises more powers and respects fewer rights in order "to end the crisis and restore
normal times." The government can assume additional powers indispensable to the attainment of that end — the complete
restoration of peace. In our particular case, eradication of the causes that incited rebellion and subversion as secession, is the sine
qua non to the complete restoration of normalcy. Exercise of legislative power by the President as Commander in Chief, upon his
proclamation of martial law, is justified because, as he professes, it is directed towards the institution of radical reforms essential
to the elimination of the causes of rebellious, insurgent or subversive conspiracies and the consequent dismantling of the
rebellious, insurgent or subversive apparatus.

Hence, the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 86 and 86-A as well as Proclamation No. 1102 is indispensable to the
effectuation of the reforms within the shortest possible time to hasten the restoration of normalcy.

"Must the government be too strong for the liberties of the people; or must it be too weak to maintain its existence?" That was the
dilemma that vexed President Lincoln during the American Civil War, when without express authority in the Constitution and the
laws of the United States, he suspended one basic human freedom — the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — in order to
preserve with permanence the American Union, the Federal Constitution of the United States and all the civil liberties of the
American people. This is the same dilemma that presently confronts the Chief Executive of the Republic of the Philippines, who,
more than the Courts and Congress, must, by express constitutional mandate, secure the safety of our Republic and the rights as
well as lives of the people against open rebellion, insidious subversion secession. The Chief Executive announced repeatedly that
in choosing to proclaim martial law, the power expressly vested in him by the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 10[2], Art. VII, 1935
Constitution) to insure our national and individual survival in peace and freedom, he is in effect waging a peaceful, democratic
revolution from the center against the violent revolution and subversion being mounted by the economic oligarchs of the extreme
right, who resist reforms to maintain their economic hegemony, and the communist rebels a Maoist oriented secessionists of the
extreme left who demand swift institution of reforms. In the exercise of his constitutional and statutory powers, to save the state
and to protect the citizenry against actual and threatened assaults from insurgents, secessionists and subversives, doctrinaire
concepts and principles, no matter how revered they may be by jurisprudence and time, should not be regarded as peremptory
commands; otherwise the dead hand of the past will regulate and control the security and happiness of the living present. A
contrary view would be to deny the self-evident proposition that constitutions and laws are mere instruments for the well-being,
peace, security and prosperity of the country and its citizenry. The law as a means of social control is not static but dynamic.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Constitution is neither a printed finality nor the imprisonment of the past, but the
enfolding of the future. In the vein of Mr. Justice Holmes, the meaning of the words of the Constitution is not to be determined
by merely opening a dictionary. Its terms must be construed in the context of the realities in the life of a nation it is intended to
serve. Because experience may teach one generation to doubt the validity and efficacy of the concepts embodied in the existing
Constitution and persuade another generation to abandon them entirely, heed should be paid to the wise counsel of some learned
jurists that in the resolution of constitutional questions — like those posed before Us — the blending of idealism and practical
wisdom or progressive legal realism should be applied (see Alexander M. Bickel, the Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress,
1970 ed., pp. 19-21). To Justice Frankfurter, law is "a vital agency for human betterment" and constitutional law "is applied
politics using the word in its noble sense." (Frankfurter, Law and Politics, 1939 ed., pp. 3 & 6; emphasis supplied). Justice
Brandeis gave utterance to the truth that "Our Constitution is not a straight jacket. It is a living organism. As such, it is capable
of growth — or expansion and adaptation to new conditions. Growth implies changes, political, economic and social." (Brandeis
Papers, Harvard Law School; emphasis supplied). Harvard Professor Thomas Reed Powell emphasizes "practical wisdom," for
"the logic of constitutional law is the common sense of the Supreme Court." (Powell, the Validity of State Legislation, under the
Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 Southern Law Quarterly, pp. 112, 138-139, cited in Bickel's Opus, supra; emphasis supplied).

The eternal paradox in this finite world of mortal and fallible men is that nothing is permanent except change. Living organisms
as well as man-made institutions are not immutable. Civilized men organize themselves into a State only for the purpose of
serving their supreme interest — their welfare. To achieve such end, they created an agency known as the government. From the
savage era thru ancient times, the Middle Ages, the Dark Ages and the Renaissance to this era of sophisticated electronics and
nuclear weaponry, states and governments have mutated in their search for the magic instrument for their well-being. It was trial
and error then as it is still now. Political philosophies and constitutional concepts, forms and kinds of government, had been
adopted, overturned, discarded, re-adopted or modified to suit the needs of a given society at a particular given epoch. This is true
of constitutions and laws because they are not "the infallible instruments of a manifest destiny." No matter how we want the law
to be stable, it cannot stand still. As Mr. Justice Holmes aptly observed, every "constitution is an experiment as all life is an
experiment," (Abrahms vs. U.S., 250 US 616, 631) for "the life of the law is not logic, but experience." In the pontifical tones of
Mr. Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, "so long as society is inconstant, there can be no constancy in law," and "there will be
change whether we will it or not." As Justice Jose P. Laurel was wont to say, "We cannot, Canute-like, command the waves of
progress to halt."

Thus, political scientists and jurists no longer exalt with vehemence a "government that governs least." Adherents there are to the
poetic dictum of Alexander Pope: "For forms of government let fools contest; whatever is best administered is best." (Poems of
Pope, 1931 Cambridge ed., p. 750). In between, the shades vary from direct democracy, representative democracy, welfare states,
socialist democracy, mitigated socialism, to outright communism which degenerated in some countries into totalitarianism or
authoritarianism.

Hence, even the scholar, who advances academic opinions unrelated to factual situations in the seclusion of his ivory tower, must
perforce submit to the inexorable law of change in his views, concepts, methods and techniques when brought into the actual
arena of conflict as a public functionary — face to face with the practical problems of state, government and public
administration. And so it is that some learned jurists, in the resolution of constitutional issues that immediately affect the lives,
liberties and fortunes of the citizens and the nation, recommend the blending of idealism with practical wisdom which legal
thinkers prefer to identify as progressive legal realism. The national leader, who wields the powers of government, must and has
to innovate if he must govern effectively to serve the supreme interests of the people. This is especially true in times of great
crises where the need for a leader with vision, imagination, capacity for decision and courageous action is greater, to preserve the
unity of people, to promote their well-being, and to insure the safety and stability of the Republic. When the methods of rebellion
and subversion have become covert, subtle and insidious, there should be a recognition of the corresponding authority on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to utilize all the available techniques to suppress the peril to the security of the
government and the State.
Over a century and a half ago, Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the American Constitution and former President
of the United States, who personifies the progressive liberal, spoke the truth when he said that some men "ascribe men of the
preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. ... But I know also, that laws
and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must also advance, and keep pace with the times." (Vol. 12, Encyclopedia Britanica, 1969 ed., p. 989).

The wisdom of the decision of the Chief Executive can only be judged in the perspective of history. It cannot be adequately and
fairly appraised within the present ambience, charged as it is with so much tension and emotion, if not partisan passion. The
analytical, objective historians will write the final verdict in the same way that they pronounced judgment on President Abraham
Lincoln who suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswithout any constitutional or statutory authority therefor and of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt who approved the proclamation of martial law in 1941 by the governor of Hawaii
throughout the Hawaiian territory. President Lincoln not only emancipated the Negro slaves in America, but also saved the
Federal Republic of the United States from disintegration by his suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which
power the American Constitution and Congress did not then expressly vest in him. No one can deny that the successful defense
and preservation of the territorial integrity of the United States was due in part, if not to a great extent, to the proclamation of
martial law over the territory of Hawaii — main bastion of the outer periphery or the outpost of the American defense perimeter
in the Pacific — which protected the United States mainland not only from actual invasion but also from aerial or naval
bombardment by the enemy. Parenthetically, the impartial observer cannot accurately conclude that the American Supreme Court
acted with courage in its decision in the cases of Ex parte Milligan and Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (filed on May 10, 1865 argued
on March 5 to 13, 1866, decided on April 3, 1866, and opinion delivered on December 17, 1866) after the lifting of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, long after the Civil War and the Second World ended
respectively on April 9 or 26, 18-65 (Vol. 1, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969 ed., pp. 730, 742) and on September 2, 1945 (Vol.
23, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969 ed., p. 799). Was the delay on the part of the American Supreme Court in deciding these cases
against the position of the United States President — in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in one case and
approving the proclamation of martial law in the other — deliberate as an act of judicial statesmanship and recognition on their
part that an adverse court ruling during the period of such a grave crisis might jeopardize the survival of the Federal Republic of
the United States in its life-and-death struggle against an organized and well armed rebellion within its own borders and against a
formidable enemy from without its territorial confines during the last global armageddon?

VIII

DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES

MANDAMUS AGAINST SENATORS.

In G.R. No. L-36165, mandamus will not lie to compel respondents Gil Puyat and Jose Roy to convene the Senate of the
Philippines even on the assumption that the 1935 Constitution still subsists; because pursuant to the doctrine of separation of
powers under the 1935 Constitution, the processes of this Court cannot legally reach a coordinate branch of the government or its
head. This is a problem that is addressed to the Senate itself for resolution; for it is purely an internal problem of the Senate. If a
majority of the senators can convene, they can elect a new Senate President and a new Senate President Pro Tempore. But if they
have no quorum, those present can order the arrest of the absent members (Sec. 10[2], Art. VI, 1935 Constitution). If this fails,
then there is no remedy except an appeal to the people. The dictum ubi jus, ubi remedium, is not absolute and certainly does not
justify the invocation of the power of this Court to compel action on the part of a co-equal body or its leadership. This was
emphasized with sufficient clarity by this Court in the 1949 case of Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil. 17, 22,24), with which the
distinguished counsels for the petitioners in L-36164 and L-36165 are familiar. We stress that the doctrine of separation of
powers and the political nature of the controversy such as this, preclude the interposition of the Judiciary to nullify an act of a
coordinate body or to command performance by the head of such a co-ordinate body of his functions..

Mystifying is the posture taken by counsels for petitioners in referring to the political question doctrine — almost in mockery —
as a magic formula which should be disregarded by this Court, forgetting that this magic formula constitutes an essential skein in
the constitutional fabric of our government, which, together with other basic constitutional precepts, conserves the unity of our
people, strengthens the structure of the government and assures the continued stability of the country against the forces of
division, if not of anarchy.

Moreover, if they have a quorum, the senators can meet anywhere. Validity of the acts of the Senate does not depend on the place
of session; for the Constitution does not designate the place of such a meeting. Section 9 of Article VI imposes upon Congress to
convene in regular session every year on the 4th Monday of January, unless a different date is fixed by law, or on special session
called by the President. As former Senator Arturo Tolentino, counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy in L-36165, stated, the duty
to convene is addressed to all members of Congress, not merely to its presiding officers. The fact that the doors of Congress are
padlocked, will not prevent the senators — especially the petitioners in L-36165 — if they are minded to do so, from meeting
elsewhere — at the Sunken Gardens, at the Luneta Independence Grandstand, in any of the big hotels or theaters, in their own
houses, or at the Araneta Coliseum, which is owned by the father-in-law of petitioner Gerardo Roxas in L-36165.

However, a session by the Senate alone would be purely an exercise in futility, for it cannot validly meet without the lower House
(Sec. 10[5], Art. VI, 1935 Constitution). Hence, this petition by five former senators for mandamus in L-36165 is useless.

And as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino, counsel for respondents Puyat and Roy, mandamus will lie only if there
is a law imposing on the respondents the duty to convene the body. The rule imposing such a duty invoked by petitioners in L-
36165 is purely an internal rule of the Senate; it is not a law because it is not enacted by both Houses and approved by the
President.

The Constitutional provision on the convening of Congress, is addressed to the individual members of the legislative body (Sec.
9, Art. VI of 1935 Constitution).

IX

TO NULLIFY PROCLAMATION NO. 1102 AND 1973

CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EIGHT OR TEN VOTES OF
SUPREME COURT.

The petitioners in L-36164 and L-36236 specifically pray for a declaration that the alleged ratification of the 1973 Constitution is
null and void and that the said 1973 Constitution be declared unenforceable and inoperative.

As heretofore stated, Proclamation No. 1102 is an enactment of the President as Commander-in-Chief during martial law as
directly delegated to him by Section 10(2) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.

A declaration that the 1973 Constitution is unenforceable and inoperative is practically deciding that the same is unconstitutional.
The proposed Constitution is an act of the Constitutional Convention, which is co-equal and coordinate with as well as
independent of either Congress or the Chief Executive. Hence, its final act, the 1973 Constitution, must have the same category at
the very least as the act of Congress itself.

Consequently, the required vote to nullify Proclamation No. 1102 and the 1973 Constitution should be eight (8) under Section 10
of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution in relation to Section 9 of the Judiciary Act or Republic Act No. 296, as amended, or
should be ten (10) under Section 2(2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Should the required vote of eight (8) or ten (10), as
the case may be, for the declaration of invalidity or unconstitutionality be not achieved, the 1973 Constitution must be deemed to
be valid, in force and operative.

ARTICLE OF FAITH

WE yield to no man as devotees of human rights and civil liberties. Like Thomas Jefferson, We swear "eternal hostility towards
any form of tyranny over the mind of man" as well as towards bigotry and intolerance, which are anathema to a free spirit. But
human rights and civil liberties under a democratic or republican state are never absolute and never immune to restrictions
essential to the common weal. A civilized society cannot long endure without peace and order, the maintenance of which is the
primary function of the government. Neither can civilized society survive without the natural right to defend itself against all
dangers that may destroy its life, whether in the form of invasion from without or rebellion and subversion from within. This is
the first law of nature and ranks second to none in the hierarchy of all values, whether human or governmental. Every citizen,
who prides himself in being a member or a civilized society under an established government, impliedly submits to certain
constraints on his freedom for the general welfare and the preservation of the State itself, even as he reserves to himself certain
rights which constitute limitations on the powers of government. But when there is an inevitable clash between an exertion of
governmental authority and the assertion of individual freedom, the exercise of which freedom imperils the State and the
civilized society to which the individual belongs, there can be no alternative but to submit to the superior right of the government
to defend and preserve the State. In the language of Mr. Justice Holmes — often invoked by herein petitioners — "when it comes
to a decision involving its (state life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities
of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. (See Keely vs. Sanders, 99 U.S.
441, 446, 25 L ed. 327, 328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms. And we think it is obvious,
although it was disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm." (Moyer vs. Peabody, 212
U.S. 77, 85, 53 L ed., 411, 417).

The rhetoric of freedom alone is not enough. It must be the rhetoric of freedom with order and security for all, that should be the
shibboleth; for freedom cannot be enjoyed in an environment of disorder and anarchy.

The incumbent Chief Executive who was trying to gain the support for his reform program long before September 21, 1972,
realized almost too late that he was being deceived by his partymates as well as by the opposition, who promised him
cooperation, which promises were either offered as a bargaining leverage to secure concessions from him or to delay the
institution of the needed reforms. The people have been victimized by such bargaining and dilly-dallying. To vert a terrifying
blood bath and the breakdown of the Republic, the incumbent President proclaimed martial law to save the Republic from being
overrun by communists, secessionists and rebels by effecting the desired reforms in order to eradicate the evils that plague our
society, which evils have been employed by the communists, the rebels and secessionists to exhort the citizenry to rise against the
government. By eliminating the evils, the enemies of the Republic will be decimated. How many of the petitioners and their
counsels have been utilizing the rebels, secessionists and communists for their own personal or political purposes and how many
of them are being used in turn by the aforesaid enemies of the State for their own purposes?

If the petitioners are sincere in their expression of concern for the greater mass of the populace, more than for their own selves,
they should be willing to give the incumbent Chief Executive a chance to implement the desired reforms. The incumbent
President assured the nation that he will govern within the framework of the Constitution and if at any time, before normalcy is
restored, the people thru their Citizens' Assemblies, cease to believe in his leadership, he will step down voluntarily from the
Presidency. But if, as apprehended by the petitioners, he abuses and brutalizes the people, then to the battlements we must go to
man the ramparts against tyranny. This, it is believed, he knows only too well; because he is aware that he who rides the tiger will
eventually end inside the tiger's stomach. He who toys with revolution will be swallowed by that same revolution. History is
replete with examples of libertarians who turned tyrants and were burned at stake or beheaded or hanged or guillotined by the
very people whom they at first championed and later deceived. The most bloody of such mass executions by the wrath of a
wronged people, was the decapitation by guillotine of about 15,000 Frenchmen including the leaders of the French revolution,
like Robespierre, Danton, Desmoulins and Marat. He is fully cognizant of the lessons of history.

HENCE, THE DISMISSAL OF THESE FIVE CASES IS JUSTIFIED.

ESGUERRA, J., concurring:

These petitions seek to stop and prohibit the respondents Executive Officers from implementing the Constitution signed on
November 30, 1972; in L-36165, to compel respondents Gil Puyat and Jose J. Roy, President and President Pro-Tempore,
respectively, of the Senate under the 1935 Constitution, to convene the Senate in regular session which should have started on
January 22, 1973; to nullify Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, issued on January 17, 1973, which declared the ratification
of the Constitution on November 30, 1972, by the Filipino people, through the barangays or Citizens Assemblies established
under Presidential Decree No. 86 issued on December 31, 1972, which were empowered under Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
issued on January 5, 1973, to act in connection with the ratification of said Constitution.

Grounds for the petitions are as follows:

1. That the Constitutional Convention was not a free forum for the making of a Constitution after the declaration of Martial Law
on September 21, 1972.

2. The Convention was not empowered to incorporate certain provisions in the 1972 Constitution because they are highly unwise
and objectionable and the people were not sufficiently informed about them.

3. The President had no authority to create and empower the Citizens' Assemblies to ratify the new Constitution at the
referendum conducted in connection therewith, as said assemblies were merely for consultative purposes, and

4. The provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribing the manner of amending the same were not duly observed.

The petitions were not given due course immediately but were referred to the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondents for
comment, with three members of the Court, including the undersigned, voting to dismiss them outright. The comments were
considered motions to dismiss which were set for hearing and extensively argued. Thereafter both parties submitted their notes
and memoranda on their oral arguments.
 I.

The issues raised for determination, on which the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss hinges, are as follows:

1. Is the question presented political and, hence, beyond the competence of this Court to decide, or is it justiciable and fit for
judicial determination?

2. Was the new Constitution of November 30, 1972, ratified in accordance with the amending process prescribed by Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution?

3. Has the new Constitution been accepted and acquiesced in by the Filipino people?

4. Is the new Constitution actually in force and effect?

5. If the answers to questions Nos. 3 and 4 be in the affirmative, are petitioners entitled to the reliefs prayed for?

II.

The pivotal question in these cases is whether the issue raised is highly political and, therefore, not justiciable. I maintain that this
Court should abstain from assuming jurisdiction, but, instead, as an act of judicial statesmanship, should dismiss the petitions. In
resolving whether or not the question presented is political, joint discussion of issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 is necessary so as to arrive
at a logical conclusion. For after the acceptance of a new Constitution and acquiescence therein by the people by putting it into
practical operation, any question regarding its validity should be foreclosed and all debates on whether it was duly or lawfully
ushered into existence as the organic law of the state become political and not judicial in character.

The undisputed facts that led to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A are fully set
forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Plebiscite cases decided on January 22, 1973, and need not be repeated here.

Petitioners seek to set at naught Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, claiming that the ratification
of the new Constitution pursuant to the said decrees is invalid and of no effect. Presidential Decree No. 86 organized the
barangays or Citizens Assemblies composed of all citizens at least fifteen years of age, and through these assemblies the
proposed 1972 Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification. Proclamation No. 1102 of the President announced or
declared the result of the referendum or plebiscite conducted through the Citizens Assemblies, and that 14,976,561 members
thereof voted for the ratification of the new Constitution and 743,869 voted against it. Petitioners assail these two acts of the
President as unauthorized and devoid of legal effect.

But looking through the veneer of judicial conformity with which the petitions have been adroitly contrived, what is sought to be
invalidated is the new Constitution itself — the very framework of the present Government since January 17, 1973. The reason is
obvious. The Presidential decrees set up the means for the ratification and acceptance of the new Constitution and Proclamation
No. 1102 simply announced the result of the referendum or plebiscite by the people through the Citizens Assemblies. The
Government under the new Constitution has been running on its tracks normally and apparently without obstruction in the form
of organized resistance capable of jeopardizing its existence and disrupting its operation. Ultimately the issue is whether the new
Constitution may be set aside by this Court. But has it the power and authority to assume such a stupendous task when the result
of such invalidation would be to subject this nation to divisive controversies that may totally destroy the social order which the
Government under the new Constitution has been admirably protecting and promoting under Martial Law? That the new
Constitution has taken deep root and the people are happy and contended with it is a living reality which the most articulate
critics of the new order cannot deny. 95 out of 108 members of the House of Representatives have opted to serve in the interim
National Assembly provided for under the new Constitution. 15 out of 24 Senators have done likewise. The members of the
Congress did not meet anymore last January 22, 1973, not because they were really prevented from so doing but because of no
serious effort on their parts to assert their offices under the 1935 Constitution. In brief, the Legislative Department under the 1935
Constitution is a thing of the past. The Executive Department has been fully reorganized; the appointments of key executive
officers including those of the Armed Forces were extended and they took an oath to support and defend the new Constitution.
The courts, except the Supreme Court by reason of these cases, have administered justice under the new constitution. All
government offices have dealt with the public and performed their functions according to the new Constitution and laws
promulgated thereunder.

If the real purpose of the petitions is to set aside the new Constitution, how can this Court justify its assumption of jurisdiction
when no power has ... conferred upon it the jurisdiction to declare the Constitution or any part thereof null and void? It is the
height of absurdity and impudence for a court to wage open war against the organic act to which it owes its existence. The
situation in which this Court finds itself does not permit it to pass upon the question whether or not the new Constitution has
entered into force and has superseded the 1935 Constitution. If it declares that the present Constitution has not been validly
ratified, it has to uphold the 1935 Constitution as still the prevailing organic law. The result would be too anomalous to describe,
for then this Court would have to declare that it is governed by one Constitution or the 1935 Constitution, and the legislative and
executive branches by another or the 1972 Constitution.

If it declares that the 1972 Constitution is now operative, how can it exercise judicial discretion in these cases when it would have
no other choice but to uphold the new Constitution as against any other one? In the circumstances it would be bereft of judicial
attributes as the matter would then be not meet for judicial determination, but one addressed to the sovereign power of the people
who have already spoken and delivered their mandate by accepting the fundamental law on which the government of this
Republic is now functioning. To deny that the new Constitution has been accepted and actually is in operation would be flying in
the face of reason and pounding one's bare head against a veritable stone wall or a heavily reinforced concrete, or simply "kicking
the deadly pricks" with one's bare foot in an effort to eliminate the lethal points.

When a Constitution has been in operation for sometime, even without popular ratification at that, submission of the people
thereto by the organization of the government provided therein and observance of its prescriptions by public officers chosen
thereunder, is indicative of approval. Courts should be slow in nullifying a Constitution claimed to have been adopted not in
accordance with constitutional or statutory directives [Miller vs. Johnson, 92 Ky. 589; 189 S.W. 522; Taylor vs Commonwealth,
101; Va. 829; 44 S.E. 754; Smith vs. Good, 34 F 204, 207; Wiston vs. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211; 97 N.W. 347].

In Miller vs. Johnson, supra, the Court said:

... But it is a case where a new constitution has been formed and promulgated according to the forms of law.
Great interests have already arisen under it; important rights exist by virtue of it; persons have been convicted
of the highest crimes known to the law, according to its provisions; the political power of the government has
in many ways recognized it; and, under such circumstances, it is our duty to treat and regard it as a valid
constitution, and now the organic law of our state. We need not consider the validity of the amendments
made after the convention reassembled. If the making of them was in excess of its power, yet as the entire
instrument has been recognized as valid in the manner suggested, it would be equally an abuse of power by
the judiciary, and violative of the rights of the people, — who can and properly should remedy the matter, if
not to their liking, — if it were to declare the instrument or a portion invalid, and bring confusion and
anarchy upon the state. (Emphasis supplied)

In Smith vs. Good, supra, the Court said:

It is said that a state court is forbidden from entering upon such an inquiry when applied to a new
constitution, and not an amendment, because the judicial power presupposes an established government, and
if the authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts is annulled with it;
therefore, if a state court should enter upon such an inquiry, come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and it
would be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question before it; but, if it decides at all, it
must necessarily affirm the existence of the government under which it exercises its judicial powers.
(Emphasis supplied)

These rules are all traceable to Luther vs. Borden, 48 U.S (7 How.), 12 L. Ed. 581, 598 (1849) where it was held:

Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their
execution, and appointing judges to expound and administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a
recognition of the authority of government from which it is derived. And if the authority of the government is
annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it. And if a State court
should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government it would cease to be a
court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides
at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it is
exercising judicial power.

The foreign relations of the Republic of the Philippines have been normally conducted on the basis of the new Constitution and
no state with which we maintain diplomatic relations has withdrawn its recognition of our government. (For particulars about
executive acts done under the new Constitution, see pages 22-25 of the Comments of the Solicitor General, dated February 3,
1973.)

Certainly the invalidation of Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A by this Court would smack of
plain political meddling which is described by the United States Supreme Court as "entering a political thicket" in Colegrove vs.
Green, 328 U.S. p. 549. At this juncture it would be the part of wisdom for this Court to adopt the proper attitude towards
political upheavals and realize that the question before Us is political and not fit for judicial determination. For a political
question is one entrusted to the people for judgment in their sovereign capacity (Tañada vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, Feb.
28,1967; 100 Phil. 1101), or to a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government (Vera vs. Arellano, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 35; Cabili vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 4638, May 8, 1931). A case
involves a political question when there would be "the impossibility of undertaking independent resolutions without expressing a
lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government", or when there is "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."

To preserve the prestige and eminence that this Court has long enjoyed as the "ultimate organ of the "Supreme Law of the Land"
in that vast range of legal problems often strongly entangled in popular feeling on which this Court must pronounce", let us
harken to the following admonition of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Baker vs. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; 82 S. Ct. 691; 7 L. Ed.
2d. 663:

The Court's authority — possessed neither of the purse nor the sword — ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact
and appearance, from political entanglements and abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political
forces in political settlement. ..." (Emphasis supplied)

The people have accepted and submitted to a Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution. The new organic law is now in the
plenitude of its efficacy and vigor. We are now living under its aegis and protection and only the cynics will deny this. This Court
should not in the least attempt to act as a super-legislature or a super-board of canvassers and sow confusion and discord among
our people by pontificating there was no valid ratification of the new Constitution. The sober realization of its proper role and
delicate function and its consciousness of the limitations on its competence, especially situations like this, are more in keeping
with the preservation of our democratic tradition than the blatant declamations of those who wish the Court to engage in their
brand of activism and would not mind plunging it into the whirlpool of passion and emotion in an effort to capture the
intoxicating applause of the multitude.

For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss all petitions.

ZALDIVAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

In these five cases, the main issue to be resolved by Court is whether or not the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 had been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. In the plebiscite
cases, which were decided by this Court on January 22, 1973 1, I held the view that this issue could be properly resolved by this
Court, and that it was in the public interest that this Court should declare then whether or not the proposed Constitution had been
validly ratified. The majority of this Court, however, was of the view that the issue was not squarely raised in those cases, and so
the Court, as a body, did make any categorical pronouncement on the question of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Convention was validly ratified. I was the only one who expressed the opinion that the proposed Constitution was not
validly ratified and therefore "it should not be given force and effect."

The Court is now called upon to declare, and to inform the people of this country, whether or not that proposed Constitution had
been validly ratified and had come into effect.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the issue that we have mentioned because
that issue is a political question that cannot be decided by this Court. This contention by the Solicitor General is untenable. A
political question relates to "those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative, or to the executive, branch of the
government.2 The courts have the power to determine whether the acts of the executive are authorized by the Constitution and the
laws whenever they are brought before the court in a judicial proceeding. The judicial department of the government exercises a
sort of controlling, or rather restraining, power over the two other departments of the government. Each of the three departments,
within its proper constitutional sphere, acts independently of the other, and restraint is only placed on one department when that
sphere is actually transcended. While a court may not restrain the executive from committing an unlawful act, it may, when the
legality of such an act is brought before it in a judicial proceeding, declare it to be void, the same as it may declare a law enacted
by the legislature to be unconstitutional.3 It is a settled doctrine that every officer under a constitutional government must act
according to law and subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom, or disregard thereof, must subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary. It must be remembered that the people
act through the courts, as well as through the executive or the legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon
all official actions4 . In the case of Gonzales v. Commission on Elections5, this Court ruled that the issue as to whether or not a
resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is not a political question and is therefore
subject to judicial review. In the case of Avelino v. Cuenco6, this Court held that the exception to the rule that courts will not
interfere with a political question affecting another department is when such political question involves an issue as to the
construction and interpretation of the provision of the constitution. And so, it has been held that the question of whether a
constitution shall be amended or not is a political question which is not in the power of the court to decide, but whether or not the
constitution has been legally amended is a justiciable question.7

My study on the subject of whether a question before the court is political or judicial, based on decisions of the courts in the
United States — where, after all, our constitutional system has been patterned to a large extent — made me arrive at the
considered view that it is in the power of this Court, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, to determine the validity of the
proposal, the submission, and the ratification of any change in the Constitution. Ratification or non-ratification of a constitutional
amendment is a vital element in the procedure to amend the constitution, and I believe that the Court can inquire into, and decide
on, the question of whether or not an amendment to the constitution, as in the present cases, has been ratified in accordance with
the requirements prescribed in the Constitution that was amended. And so, in the cases now before Us, I believe that the question
of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been validly ratified or not is a justiciable
question.

The Chief Justice, in his opinion, has discussed lengthily the subject on whether or not, the cases, before Us involve a political, or
a judicial, question. I fully concur with his conclusion that the question involved in these cases is justiciable.

On the question now of whether or not the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been validly ratified,
I am reproducing herein pertinent portions of my dissenting opinion in the plebiscite cases:

The ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention must be done in
accordance with the provisions of Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:

"Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."

It is in consonance with the abovequoted provision of the 1935 Constitution that on March 16, 1967, the
Congress of the Philippines Resolution No. 2 calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines. Sec. 7 of said Resolution No. 2 reads as follows:

"Section 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered
part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.

It follows that from the very resolution of the Congress of the Philippines which called for the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was a clear mandate that the amendments proposed by the 1971 Convention,
in order to be valid and considered part of the Constitution, must be approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election at which they are submitted to the people for the ratification as provided in the Constitution.

This Court, in the case of Tolentino vs. Commission Elections, L-35140, October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 715),
speaking through Mr. Justice Barredo, said:

"The Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same

nature, owes its existence and all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of
 the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case
of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of revolution
against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to
such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without
restraint and omnipotent all wise, and it as to such conventions that the remarks of
Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator
Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention
came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress
acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present
Constitution ... ."

xxx xxx xxx

"As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned
mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and
members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now we hold
that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to
the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV."

In Proclamation No. 1102, issued on January 17, 1973, the President of the Philippines certified that as a
result of the voting before the barangays (Citizens Assemblies) 14,976,561 members of the barangays voted
for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against 743,869 who voted for its rejection, and on the basis
of the overwhelming majority of the votes cast by the members of all the barangays throughout the
Philippines, the President proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention has been
ratified and has thereby come into effect.

It is very plain from the very wordings of Proclamation No. 1102 that the provisions of Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution of 1935 were not complied with. It is not necessary that evidence be produced before
this Court to show that no elections were held in accordance with the provisions of the Election Code.
Proclamation No. 1102 unequivocally states that the proposed Constitution of 1972 was voted upon by the
barangays. It is very clear, therefore, that the voting held in these barangays is not the election contemplated
in the provisions of Section 1, Article XV, of the 1935 Constitution. The election contemplated in said
constitutional provision is an election held in accordance with the provisions of the election law, where only
the qualified and registered voters of the country would cast their votes, where official ballots prepared for
the purpose are used, where the voters would prepare their ballots in secret inside the voting booths in the
polling places established in the different election precincts throughout the country, where the election is
conducted by election inspectors duly appointed in accordance with the election law, where the votes are
canvassed and reported in a manner provided for in the election law. It was this kind of election that was held
on May 14, 1935, when the Constitution of 1935 was ratified; on April 30, 1937, when the amendment to the
Constitution providing for Women's Suffrage was ratified; on June 18, 1940, when the 1940 Amendments to
the Constitution were ratified; on March 11, 1947 when the Parity Amendment to the Constitution was
ratified; and on November 14, 1967 when the amendments to the Constitution to increase the number of
Members of the House of Representatives and to allow the Members of Congress to run in the elections for
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1971 were rejected.

I cannot see any valid reason why the practice or procedure in the past, in implementing the constitutional
provision requiring the holding, of an election to ratify or reject an amendment to the Constitution, has not
been followed in the case of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

It is my view that the President of the Philippines cannot by decree order the ratification of the proposed 1972
Constitution thru a voting in the barangays and make said result the basis for proclaiming the ratification of
the proposed constitution. It is very clear, to me, that Proclamation No. 1102 was issued in complete
disregard or in violation, of the provisions of Section 1 of Article X of the 1935 Constitution.

Proclamation No. 1102 mentions, furthermore, that on the question as to whether or not the people would still
like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, 14,298,814 members of the barangays answered
that there was no need for a plebiscite but that the vote of the barangays should be considered a vote in a
plebiscite. It would thus appear that the barangays assumed the power to determine whether a plebiscite as
ordained in the Constitution be held or not. Indeed, the provision of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
was completely disregarded.

The affirmative votes cast in the barangays are not the votes contemplated in Section 1 of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution. The votes contemplated in said constitutional provision are votes obtained through the
election processes as provided by law.

"An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. In common parlance, an election is the act of casting and receiving
the ballots, counting them, and making the return." (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 632,
637).

"Election" implies a choice by an electoral body at the time and substantially in the
manner and with the safeguards provided by law with respect to some question or issue.
(Leffel v. Brown, Com. P1., 159 N.E. 2d 807, 808 cited in 29 C.J.S. 13 at footnote 6.5).

"... the statutory method whereby qualified voters or electors pass on various public
matters submitted to them — the election of officers, national, state, county, township —
the passing on various other questions submitted for their determination." (29 C.J.S. 13,
citing Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 41 N.W. 2d 1, 5, 241 Iowa
358).

"Election" is expression of choice by voters of body politic. (Ginsburg v. Giles, 72 S.W.

2d 438, 254 Ky. 720, in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 234).

"The right to vote may be exercised only on compliance with such statutory requirements
as have been set by the legislature." (People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E. 2d 642, 327
III. App. 63; Rothfels v. Southworth, 356 P. 2d 612, 11 Utah 2d 169 in 29 C.J.S. 38).
(Emphasis supplied).

In this connection I herein quote the pertinent provisions of the Election Code of 1971:

"Sec. 2. Applicability of this Act. — All elections of public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites
shall be conducted in the manner provided by this Code."

"Sec 99. Necessity of registration to be entitled to vote. — In order that a qualified voter may vote in any
regular or special election or in any plebiscite, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for the
city, municipality or municipal district in which he resides: Provided, that no person shall register more than
once without first applying for cancellation of his previous registration." (Emphasis supplied). (Please see
also Sections 100-102, Election Code of 1971, R.A. No. 6388)

It is stated in Proclamation No. 1102 that the voting was done by the members of citizens assemblies who are
15 years of age or over. Under the provision of Section I of Article V of the 1935 Constitution, the age
requirement to be a qualified voter is 21 years or over.

But what is more noteworthy is the fact that the voting in the barangays, except in very few instances, was
done by the raising of hands by the persons indiscriminately gathered to participate in the voting, where even
children below 15 years of age were included. This is a matter of common observation, or of common
knowledge, which the Court may take judicial notice of. To consider the votes in the barangays as expressive
of the popular will and use them as the basis in declaring whether a Constitution is ratified or rejected is to
resort to a voting by demonstrations, which is would mean the rule of the crowd, which is only one degree
higher than the rule by the mob. Certainly, so important a question as to whether the Constitution, which is
the supreme law of the land, should be ratified or not, must not be decided by simply gathering people and
asking them to raise their hands in answer to the question of whether the vote for or against a proposed
Constitution. The election as provided by law should be strictly observed in determining the will of the
sovereign people in a democracy. In our Republic, the will of the people must be expressed through the ballot
in a manner that is provided by law.
It is said that in a democracy, the will of the people is the supreme law. Indeed, the people are sovereign, but
the will of the people must be expressed in a manner as the law and the demands a well-ordered society
require. The rule of law must prevail even over the apparent will of the majority of the people, if that will had
not been expressed, or obtained, in accordance with the law. Under the rule of law, public questions must be
decided in accordance with the Constitution and the law. This is specially true in the case of adoption of a
constitution or in the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution.

The following citations are, to me, very relevant in the effort to determine whether the proposed Constitution
of 1972 had been validly ratified, or not:

"When it is said that "the people" have the right to alter or amend the constitution, it must
not be understood that term necessarily includes all the inhabitants of the state. Since the
question of the adoption or rejection of a proposed new constitution or constitutional
amendment must be answered a vote, the determination of it rests with those who, by
existing constitution, are accorded the right of suffrage. But the qualified electors must be
understood in this, as in many other cases, as representing those who have not the right to
participate in the ballot. If a constitution should be abrogated and a new one adopted, by
the whole mass of people in a state acting through representatives not chosen by the
"people" in political sense of the term, but by the general body of the populace, the
movement would be extra-legal." (BIack's Constitutional Law, Second Edition, pp. 47-
48).

"The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from
whom springs all legitimate authority. The people of the Union created a national
constitution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty on certain subjects, and the
people of each State created a State government, to exercise the remaining powers of
sovereignty so far as they were disposed to allow them to be exercised at all. By the
constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies,
but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as
an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol. I, p. 81 cited in Graham v. Jones,
3 So. 2d. 761, 782).

"The theory that a favorable vote by the electorate, however unanimous, on a proposal to
amend a constitution, may cure, render innocuous, all or any antecedent failures to
observe commands of that Constitution in respect of the formulation or submission of
proposed amendments thereto, does not prevail in Alabama, where the doctrine of the
stated theory was denied, in obvious effect, by the pronouncement 60 years ago of broad,
wholesome constitutional principles in Collier v. Frierson, supra, as quoted in the
original opinion, ante. The people themselves are bound by the Constitution; and, being
so bound, are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates,
except through the peaceful means of a constitutional convention, or of an amendment
according to the mode therein prescribed, or through the exertion of the original right of
revolution. "The Constitution may be set aside by revolution, but it can only be amended
in the way it provides," said Hobson, C.J., in McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 791, 162
S.W. 99, 103. (Johnson vs. Craft, et al., 87 So. 375, 385, 387, On Rehearing).

"The fact that a majority voted for the amendment, unless the vote was taken as provided
by the Constitution, is not sufficient to make a change in that instrument. Whether a
proposed amendment has been legally adopted is a judicial question, for the court must
uphold and enforce the Constitution as written until it is amended in the way which it
provides for." Wood v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac 840, 25 L.R.A. 560; McConaughty v.
State, 106 Minn. 409, 119 N.W. 408; Oakland Paving Company v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 499,
11 Pac. 3; Utter v. Mosely, 16 Idaho 274, 100 Pac. 1958, 133 Am. St. Rep. 94, 18 Ann.
Cas. 723. (McCreary v. Speer, 162 S.W. 99, 104).

"Provisions of a constitution regulating its own amendment, ... are not merely directory,
but are mandatory; and a strict observance of every substantial mandatory; and a strict
observance of every substantial requirement is essential to the validity of the proposed
amendment. These provisions are as binding on the people as on the legislature, and the
 former are powerless by vote of acceptance to give legal sanction to an amendment the
submission of which was made in disregard of the limitations contained in the
constitution." (16 C.J.S. 35-36. cited in Graham v. Jones, 3 So. 2d 761, 782).

"It is said that chaos and confusion in the government affairs of the State will result from
the Court's action in declaring the proposed constitutional amendment void. This
statement is grossly and manifestly inaccurate. If confusion and chaos should ensue, it
will not be due to the action of the Court but will be the result of the failure of the drafters
joint resolution to observe, follow and obey the plain essential provisions of the
Constitution. Furthermore, to say that, the Court disregards its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution, chaos and confusion will result, is an inherently weak argument in favor of
the alleged constitutionality of the proposed amendment. It is obvious that, if the Court
were to countenance the violations of the sacramental provisions Constitution, those who
would thereafter desire to violate it disregard its clear mandatory provisions would resort
to the scheme of involving and confusing the affairs of the State then simply tell the
Court that it was powerless to exercise one of its primary functions by rendering the
proper decree to make the Constitution effective." (Graham v. Jones, 3 So. 2d. 761, 793-
794).

In our jurisprudence I find an instance where this Court did not allow the will of the majority to prevail,
because the requirements of the law were not complied with. In the case of Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil. 758,
Monsale and Nico were both candidates for the office of Municipal Mayor of Miagao, Iloilo, in the elections
of November 11, 1947. Monsale had duly filed his certificate of candidacy before the expiration of the period
for the filing of the same. However, on October 10, 1947, after the period for the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy. But on November 7, 1947 Monsale attempted to
revive his certificate of candidacy by withdrawing the withdrawal of certificate of candidacy. The
Commission on Elections, November 8, 1947, ruled that Monsale could no longer be a candidate. Monsale
nevertheless proceeded with his candidacy. The boards of inspectors in Miagao, however, did not count the
votes cast for Monsale upon the ground that the votes cast for him were stray votes, because he was
considered as having no certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, the boards of inspectors credited Nico
with 2,291 votes, and Nico was proclaimed elected. Monsale filed a protest against the election of Nico in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo. In the count of the ballots during the proceedings in the trial court, it
appeared that Monsale had obtained 2,877 votes while Nico obtained 2,276 votes, or a margin of 601 votes in
favor of Monsale. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo decided the election protest in favor of Monsale. Upon
appeal by Nico, this Court reversed the decision of the lower court. This Court declared that because Monsale
withdrew his certificate of candidacy, his attempt to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal of his certificate
of candidacy did not restore the effectiveness of his certificate of candidacy, and this Court declared Nico the
winner in spite of the fact that Monsale had obtained more votes than he.

We have cited this Monsale case to show that the will of the majority of the voters would not be given effect,
as declared by this Court, if certain legal requirements have not been complied with in order to render the
votes valid and effective to decide the result of an election.

And so, in the cases now before this Court, the fact that the voting in the citizens assemblies (barangays) is
not the election that is provided for in the 1935 Constitution for the ratification of the amendment to the
Constitution, the affirmative votes cast in those assemblies can not be made the basis for declaring the
ratification of the proposed 1972 Constitution, in spite of the fact that it was reported that 14,976,561
members of the citizens assemblies voted for the adoption as against 743,869 for the rejection, because the
votes thus obtained were not in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines. The rule of law mast be upheld.

My last observation: One of the valid grounds against the holding of the plebiscite on January 15, 1973, as
provided in Presidential Decree No. 73, is that there is no freedom on the part of the people to exercise their
right of choice because of the existence of martial law in our country. The same ground holds true as regards
to the voting of the barangays on January 10 to 15, 1973. More so, because by General Order No. 20, issued
on January 7, 1973, the President of the Philippines ordered "that the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 73 in so far as they allow free public discussion of the proposed constitution, as well as my order
of December 17, 1972 temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purpose of free
and open debate on the proposed constitution, be suspended in the meantime." It is, therefore, my view that
voting in the barangays on January 10, 1973 was not free, and so this is one added reason why the results of
 the voting in the barangays should not be made the basis for proclamation of the ratification of the proposed
Constitution.

It is my view, therefore, that Proclamation No. 1102 repugnant to the 1935 Constitution, and so it is invalid,
and should not be given effect. The Constitution of 1972 proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
should be considered as not yet ratified by the people of this Republic, and so it should not be given force and
effect.

It is urged by the Solicitor General, however, that the voting in the citizens assemblies was a substantial compliance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the primary thrust of the provision of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is that "to be valid, amendments must gain the approval of the majority recognition of the
democratic postulate that sovereign resides in the people." It is not disputed that in a democratic sovereignty resides in the
people. But the term "people" must be understood in its constitutional meaning, and they are "those persons who are permitted by
the Constitution to exercise the elective franchise."8Thus, in Section 2 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that
"the President shall hold his office during a term of four years and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same term,
shall be elected by direct vote of the people..." Certainly under that constitutional provision, the "people" who elect directly the
President and the Vice-President are no other than the persons who, under the provisions of the same Constitution, are granted the
right to vote. In like manner the provision in Section 1 of Article II of the 1935 Constitution which says "Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them", the "people" who exercise the sovereign power are no other than
the persons who have the right to vote under the Constitution. In the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini9, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Johnson, said, "In democracies, the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the State. Their
sovereign authority is expressed through the ballot, of the qualified voters, in duly appointed elections held from time to time, by
means of which they choose their officials for definite fixed periods, and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their
representatives, the exercise of the powers of government." In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, 10 this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Laurel, said, "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." And in the case of Abanil v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolod, 11 this Court said: "In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed
to have a voice therein through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribed
qualifications. The people, in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual
administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in
that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed exclusively
for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit
and welfare of the state. (U.S. v. Cruikshauk, 92 U.S. 588)..." There is no question, therefore, that when we talk of sovereign
people, what is meant are the people who act through the duly qualified and registered voters who vote during an election that is
held as provided in the Constitution or in the law.

The term "election" as used in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution should be construed along with the term
"election" as used in the Provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Independence Act of the Congress of the United States,
popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law (Public Act No. 127). Said Section 4 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law provides as
follows:

Section 4. After the President of the United States certified that the constitution conforms with the provisions
of this act, it shall be submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands for their ratification or rejection at an
election to he held within months after the date of such certification, on a date to be fixed by the Philippine
Legislature at which election, the qualified voters of the Philippine Islands shall have an opportunity to vote
directly or against the proposed constitution and ordinances append thereto. Such election shall be held in
such manner as may prescribed by the Philippine Legislature to which the return of the election shall be
made. The Philippine Legislature shall certify the result to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
together with a statement of the votes cast, and a copy of said constitution ordinances. If a majority of the
votes cast shall be for the constitution, such vote shall be deemed an expression of the will of the people of
the Philippine Independence, and the Governor-General shall, within thirty days after receipt of the
certification from the Philippine Legislature, issue a proclamation for the election of officers of the
government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands provided for in the Constitution...

It can safely be said, therefore, that when the framers of the 1935 Constitution used, the word "election" in Section I Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution they had no other idea in mind except the elections that were periodically held in the Philippines for the
choice of public officials prior to the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, and also the "election" mentioned in the Independence
Act at which "the qualified voters of the Philippine Islands shall have an opportunity to vote directly for or against the proposed
constitution..." It is but logical to expect that the framers of the 1935 Constitution would provide a mode of ratifying an
amendment to that Constitution similar to the mode of ratifying the original Constitution itself.

It is clear therefore, that the ratification or any amendment to the 1935 Constitution could only be done by holding an election, as
the term "election" was understood, and practiced, when the 1935 Constitution as drafted. The alleged referendum in the citizens
assemblies — participated in by persons aged 15 years or more, regardless of whether they were qualified voters or not, voting by
raising their hands, and the results of the voting reported by the barrio or ward captain, to the municipal mayor, who in turn
submitted the report to the provincial Governor, and the latter forwarding the reports to the Department of Local Governments,
all without the intervention of the Commission on Elections which is the constitutional body which has exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws, relative to the conduct of elections — was not only a non-substantial compliance with
the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution but a downright violation of said constitutional provision. It
would be indulging in sophistry to maintain that the voting in the citizens assemblies amounted to a substantial compliance with
the requirements prescribed in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.

It is further contended by the Solicitor General, that even if the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
not ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, the fact is that after the
President of the Philippines had issued Proclamation No. 1102 declaring that the said proposed Constitution "has been ratified by
overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the barangays (citizens assemblies) throughout the Philippines
and had thereby come into effect" the people have accepted the new Constitution. What appears to me, however, is that
practically it is only the officials and employees under the executive department of the Government who have been performing
their duties apparently in observance of the provisions of the new Constitution. It could not be otherwise, because the President of
the Philippines, who is the head of the executive department, had proclaimed that the new Constitution had come into effect, and
his office had taken the steps to implement the provisions of the new Constitution. True it is, that some 92 members of the House
of Representatives and 15 members of the Senate, of the Congress of the Philippines had expressed their option to serve in the
interim National Assembly that is provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution. It must be noted,
however, that of the 15 senators who expressed their option to serve in the interim National Assembly only one them took his
oath of office; and of the 92 members of the House of Representatives who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly, only
22 took their oath of office. The fact that only one Senator out of 24, and only 22 Representative out of 110, took their oath of
office, is an indication that only a small portion of the members of Congress had manifested the acceptance of the new
Constitution. It is in the taking of the oath of office where the affiant says that he swears to "support and defend the Constitution"
that the acceptance of the Constitution is made manifest. I agree with counsel petitioners in L-36165 (Gerardo Roxas, et al. v.
Alejandro Melchor, et al.) when he said that the members of Congress who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly did
only ex abundante cautela, or by way of a precaution, making sure, that in the event the new Constitution becomes definitely
effective and the interim National Assembly convened, they can participate in legislative work in the capacity as duly elected
representatives of the people, which otherwise they could not do if they did not manifest their option to serve, and that option had
to be made within 30 day from January 17, 1973, the date when Proclamation No. 110 was issued. Of course, if the proposed
Constitution does not become effective, they continue to be members of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. Let it be
considered that the members of the House of Representatives were elected in 1969 to serve a term which will yet expire on
December 31, 1973. Whereas, of the Senators who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly, the term of some of them
will yet expire on December 31, 1973, some on December 31, 1975, and the rest on December 31, 1977. Let if be noted that 9
Senators did not opt to serve in the interim National Assembly, and 18 members of the House of Representatives also did not opt
to serve in the interim National Assembly.

Neither can it be said that the people have accepted the new Constitution. I cannot, in conscience, accept the reported affirmative
votes in the citizens assemblies as a true and correct expression by the people of their approval, or acceptance, of the proposed
Constitution. I have my serious doubts regarding the freedom of the people to express their views regarding the proposed
Constitution during the voting in the citizens assemblies, and I have also my serious doubts regarding the truthfulness and
accuracy of the reports of the voting in the citizens assemblies. This doubt has been engendered in my mind after a careful
examination and study of the records of these cases, particularly with respect to the reports of the voting in the citizens
assemblies. Perhaps, it may be said that the people, or the inhabitants of this country, have acquiesced to the new Constitution, in
the sense that they have continued to live peacefully and orderly under the government that has been existing since January 17,
1973 when it was proclaimed that the new Constitution came into effect. But what could the people do? In the same way that the
people have lived under martial law since September 23, 1972, they also have to live under the government as it now exists, and
as it has existed since the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972, regardless of what Constitution is operative —
whether it is the 1935 Constitution or the new Constitution. Indeed, there is nothing that the people can do under the
circumstances actually prevailing in our country today — circumstances, known to all, and which I do not consider necessary to
state in this opinion. I cannot agree, therefore, with my worthy colleagues in the Court who hold the view that the people have
accepted the new Constitution, and that because the people have accepted it, the new Constitution should be considered as in
force, regardless of the fact that it was not ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution.
It is my honest view that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has not come into effect. I do not say,
however, that the proposed Constitution is invalid. To me, the validity of the proposed Constitution is not in issue in the cases
before Us. What the petitioners assail is not the validity of the proposed Constitution but the validity of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1102 which declares the proposed Constitution as having been ratified and has come into effect. It being my considered view
that the ratification of the proposed Constitution, as proclaimed in Proclamation No. 1102, is not in accordance with the
provisions of Section 1 of Article XV, of the 1935 Constitution, I hold that Proclamation No. 1102 is invalid and should not be
given force and effect. Their proposed Constitution, therefore, should be considered as not yet validly ratified, and so it is not in
force. The proposed Constitution may still be submitted to a plebiscite in conformity with Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution. Incidentally, I must state that the Constitution is still in force, and this Court is still functioning under the 1935
Constitution.

I sincerely believe that the proposed Constitution may still be submitted to the people in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, as we have adverted to in this
opinion, this was the mandate of Congress when, on March 16, 1967, it passed Resolution No. 2 calling a convention to propose
amendments to the 1935 Constitution. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the President of the Philippines has
reassured the nation that the government of our Republic since the declaration of martial law is not a revolutionary government,
and that he has been acting all the way in consonance with his powers under the Constitution. The people of this Republic has
reason to be happy because, according to the President, we still have a constitutional government. It being my view that the 1935
Constitution is still in force, I believe Congress may still convene and pass a law calling for an election at which the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention will be submitted to the people their ratification or rejection. A plebiscite called
pursuant to Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is an assurance to our people that we still have in our country the
Rule of Law and that the democratic system of government that has been implanted in our country by the Americans, and which
has become part of our social and political fabric, is still a reality.

The views that I have expressed in this opinion are inspired by a desire on my part to bring about stability in democratic and
constitutional system in our country. I feel that if this Court would give its imprimatur to the ratification of the proposed
Constitution, as announced in Proclamation No. 1102, it being very clear that the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution had not been complied with, We will be opening the gates for a similar disregard of the Constitution in the
future. What I mean is that if this Court now declares that a new Constitution is now in force because the members of the citizens
assemblies had approved the said new Constitution, although that approval was not in accordance with the procedure and the
requirements prescribed in the 1935 Constitution, it can happen again in some future time that some amendments to the
Constitution may be adopted, even in a manner contrary to the existing Constitution and the law, and then said proposed
amendment is submitted to the people in any manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed that there was approval by the
people. There will not be stability in our constitutional system, and necessarily no stability in our government. As a member of
this Court I only wish to contribute my humble efforts to prevent the happening of such a situation in the future.

It appearing to me that the announced ratification of the proposed Constitution through the voting in the citizens assemblies is a
clear violation of the 1935 Constitution, what I say in this opinion is simply an endeavor on my part to be true to my oath of
office to defend and support the 1935 Constitution. I am inspired by what the great jurist and statesman, Jose P. Laurel, said:

Let our judges be as it were the vestal keepers of the purity and sanctity of our Constitution, and the
protection and vindication of popular rights will be safe and secure in their reverential guardianship.

I only wish to help prevent, if I can, democracy and the liberties of our people from vanishing in our land, because, as Justice
George Sutherland of the U. S. Supreme Court said:

(t)he saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its
possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time.

I concur fully with the personal views expressed by the Chief Justice in the opinion that he has written in these cases. Along with
him, I vote to deny the motion to dismiss and give due course to the petitions in these cases.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

No question more momentous, none impressed with such transcendental significance is likely to confront this Court in the near or
distant future as that posed by these petitions. For while the specific substantive issue is the validity of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1102, an adverse judgment may be fraught with consequences that, to say the least, are far-reaching in its implications. As
stressed by respondents, "what petitioners really seek to invalidate is the new Constitution." 1 Strict accuracy would of course
qualify such statement that what is in dispute, as noted in the opinion of the Chief Justice, goes only as far as the validity of its
ratification. It could very well be though that the ultimate outcome is not confined within such limit, and this is not to deny that
under its aegis, there have been marked gains in the social and economic sphere, but given the premise of continuity in a regime
under a fundamental law, which itself explicitly recognizes the need for change and the process for bringing it about,2 it seems to
me that the more appropriate course is this Court to give heed to the plea of petitioners that the most serious attention be paid to
their submission that the challenged executive act fails to meet the test of constitutionality. Under the circumstances, with regret
and with due respect for the opinion of my brethren, I must perforce dissent. It would follow therefore that the legal position
taken by the Chief Justice as set forth with his usual lucidity and thoroughness has, on the whole, my concurrence, subject, of
course, to reservations insofar as it contains views and nuances to which I have in the past expressed doubts. Nonetheless, I feel
that a brief expression of the reasons for the stand I take would not be amiss.

In coping with its responsibility arising from the function of judicial review, this Court is not expected to be an oracle given to
utterances of eternal verities, but certainly it is more than just a keen but passive observer of the contemporary scene. It is, by
virtue of its role under the separation of powers concept, involved not necessarily as a participant in the formation of government
policy, but as an arbiter of its legality. Even then, there is realism in what Lerner did say about the American Supreme Court as
"the focal point of a set of dynamic forces which [could play] havoc with the landmarks of the American state and determine the
power configuration of the day."3 That is why there is this caveat. In the United States as here, the exercise of the power of
judicial review is conditioned on the necessity that the decision of a case or controversy before it so requires. To repeat, the
Justices of the highest tribunal are not, as Justice Frankfurter made clear, "architects of policy. They can nullify the policy of
others, they are incapable of fashioning their own solutions for social problems."4 Nonetheless, as was stressed by Professors
Black5 and Murphy,6 a Supreme Court by the conclusion it reaches and the decision it renders does not merely check the
coordinate branches, but also by its approval stamps with legitimacy the action taken. Thus in affirming constitutional
supremacy, the political departments could seek the aid of the judiciary. For the assent it gives to what has been done conduces to
its support in a regime where the rule of law holds sway. In discharging such a role, this Court must necessarily take in account
not only what the exigent needs of the present demand but what may lie ahead in the unexplored and unknown vistas of the
future. It must guard against the pitfall of lack of understanding of the dominant forces at work to seek a better life for all,
especially those suffering from the pangs of poverty and disease, by a blind determination to adhere to the status quo. It would be
tragic, and a clear case of its being recreant to its trust, if the suspicion can with reason be entertained that its approach amounts
merely to a militant vigilantism that is violently opposed to any form of social change. It follows then that it does not suffice that
recourse be had only to what passes for scholarship in the law that could be marred by inapplicable erudition and narrow
legalism. Even with due recognition, such factors, however, I cannot, for reasons to be set more lengthily and in the light of the
opinion of the Chief Justice, reach the same result as the majority of my brethren. For, in the last analysis, it is my firm
conviction that the institution of judicial review speaks too clearly for the point to be missed that official action, even with due
allowance made for the good faith that invariably inspires the step taken, has to face the gauntlet of a court suit whenever there is
a proper case with the appropriate parties.

1. Respondents are acting in the soundest constitutional tradition when, at the outset, they would seek a dismissal of these
petitions. For them, the question raised is political and thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Such an approach cannot be
indicted for unorthodoxy. It is implicit in the concept of the rule of law that rights belong to the people and the government
possesses powers only. Essentially then, unless such an authority may either be predicated on express or implied grant in the
Constitution or the statutes, an exercise thereof cannot survive an inquiry as to its validity. Respondents through Solicitor-
General Mendoza would deny our competence to proceed further. It is their view, vigorously pressed and plausibly asserted, that
since what is involved is not merely the effectivity of an amendment but the actual coming into effect of a new constitution, the
matter is not justiciable. The immediate reaction is that such a contention is to be tested in the light of the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers that it is not only the function but the solemn duty of the judiciary to determine what the law is and to apply
it in cases and controversies that call for decision.7 Since the Constitution pre-eminently occupies the highest rung in the
hierarchy of legal norms, it is in the judiciary, ultimately this Tribunal, that such a responsibility is vested. With the 1935
Constitution containing, as above noted, an explicit article on the subject of amendments, it would follow that the presumption to
be indulged in is that the question of whether there has been deference to its terms is for this Court to pass upon. What is more,
the Gonzales,8 Tolentino9 and Planas 10 cases speak unequivocally to that effect. Nor is it a valid objection to this conclusion that
what was involved in those cases was the legality of the submission and not ratification, for from the very language of the
controlling article, the two vital steps are proposal and ratification, which as pointed out in Dillon v. Gloss, 11 "cannot be treated
as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor." 12 Once an aspect thereof is viewed as judicial, there would be no
justification for considering the rest as devoid of that character. It would be for me then an indefensible retreat, deriving no
justification from circumstances of weight and gravity, if this Court were to accede to what is sought by respondents and rule that
the question before us is political.

On this point, it may not be inappropriate to refer to a separate opinion of mine in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 Thus: "The term has
been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case
appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which
deference must be paid. It has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the
President or Congress, or any branch thereof. If to be delimited with accuracy, "political questions" should refer to such as would
under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to full discretionary authority is vested
either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. Unless clearly falling within
the formulation, the decision reached by the political branches whether in the form of a congressional act or an executive order
could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has no choice but to look into its validity. It is not to be
lost sight of that such a power comes into play if there be an appropriate proceeding that may be filed only after each coordinate
branch has acted. Even when the Presidency or Congress possesses plenary powers, its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof,
if shown, may give rise to a justiciable controversy. For the constitutional grant of authority is usually unrestricted. There are
limits to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished. Necessarily then, the courts in the proper exercise of judicial review
could inquire into the question of whether or not either of the two coordinate branches has adhered to what is laid down by the
Constitution. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political." 14 The view entertained by Professor Dodd is not too
dissimilar. For him such a term "is employed to designate certain types of functions committed to the political organs of
government (the legislative and executive departments, or either of them) and not subject to judicial investigation." 15 After a
thorough study of American judicial decisions, both federal and state, he could conclude: "The field of judicial nonenforceability
is important, but is not large when contrasted with the whole body of written constitutional texts. The exceptions from judicial
enforceability fall primarily within the field of public or governmental interests." 16 Nor was Professor Weston's formulation any
different. As was expressed by him: "Judicial questions, in what may be thought the more useful sense, are those which the
sovereign has set to be decided in the courts. Political questions, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-
called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." 17 What appears
undeniable then both from the standpoint of Philippine as well as American decisions is the care and circumspection required
before the conclusion is warranted that the matter at issue is beyond judicial cognizance, a political question being raised.

2. The submission of respondents on this subject of political question, admittedly one of complexity and importance, deserves to
be pursued further. They would derive much aid and comfort from the writings of both Professor Bickel 18 of Yale and Professor
Freund 19 of Harvard, both of whom in turn are unabashed admirers of Justice Brandeis. Whatever be the merit inherent in their
lack of enthusiasm for a more active and positive role that must be played by the United States Supreme Court in constitutional
litigation, it must be judged in the light of our own history. It cannot be denied that from the well nigh four decades of
constitutionalism in the Philippines, even discounting an almost similar period of time dating from the inception of American
sovereignty, there has sprung a tradition of what has been aptly termed as judicial activism. Such an approach could be traced to
the valedictory address before the 1935 Constitutional Convention of Claro M. Recto. He spoke of the trust reposed in the
judiciary in these words: "It is one of the paradoxes of democracy that the people at times place more confidence in
instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them for the exercise of their sovereignty." 20 It would thus
appear that even then this Court was expected not to assume an attitude of timidity and hesitancy when a constitutional question
is posed. There was the assumption of course that it would face up to such a task, without regard to political considerations and
with no thought except that of discharging its trust. Witness these words Justice Laurel in an early landmark case, People v.
Vera, 21 decided in 1937: "If it is ever necessary for us to make vehement affirmance during this formative period of political
history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it." 22 The hope of course
was that such assertion of independence impartiality was not mere rhetoric. That is a matter more appropriately left to others to
determine. It suffices to stake that what elicits approval on the part of our people of a judiciary ever alert to inquire into alleged
breaches of the fundamental law is the realization that to do so is merely to do what is expected of it and that thereby there is no
invasion of spheres appropriately belonging to the political branches. For it needs to be kept in kind always that it can act only
when there is a suit with proper parties before it, wherein rights appropriate for judicial enforcement are sought to be vindicated.
Then, too, it does not approach constitutional questions with dogmatism or apodictic certainty nor view them from the shining
cliffs of perfection. This is not to say though that it is satisfied with an empiricism untroubled by the search for jural consistency
and rational coherence. A balance has to be struck. So juridical realism requires. Once allowance made that for all its care and
circumspection this Court manned by human beings fettered by fallibility, nonetheless earnestly and sincerely striving to do right,
the public acceptance of its vigorous pursuit of the task of assuring that the Constitution be obeyed is easy to understand. It has
not in the past shirked its responsibility to ascertain whether there has been compliance with and fidelity to constitutional
requirements. Such is the teaching of a host of cases from Angara v. Electoral
Commission 23 to Planas v. Commission on Elections. 24 It should continue to exercise its jurisdiction, even in the face of a
plausible but not sufficiently persuasive insistence that the matter before it is political.

Nor am I persuaded that the reading of the current drift in American legal scholarship by the Solicitor-General and his equally
able associates presents the whole picture. On the question of judicial review, it is not a case of black and white; there are shaded
areas. It goes too far, in my view, if the perspective is one of dissatisfaction, with its overtones of distrust. This expression of
disapproval has not escaped Dean Rostow of Yale, who began one of his most celebrated legal essays. The Democratic Character
of Judicial Review, thus: "A theme of uneasiness, and even of guilt, colors the literature about judicial review. Many of those
who have talked, lectured, and written about the Constitution have been troubled by a sense that judicial review is
undemocratic." 25 He went on to state: "Judicial review, they have urged, is an undemocratic shoot on an otherwise respectable
tree. It should be cut off, or at least kept pruned and
inconspicuous." 26 His view was precisely the opposite. Thus: "The power of constitutional review, to be exercised by some part
of the government, is implicit in the conception of a written constitution delegating limited powers. A written constitution would
promote discord rather than order in society if there were no accepted authority to construe it, at the least in case of conflicting
action by different branches of government or of constitutionally unauthorized governmental action against individuals. The
limitation and separation of powers, if they are to survive, require a procedure for independent mediation and construction to
reconcile the inevitable disputes over the boundaries of constitutional power which arise in the process of government." 27 More
than that, he took pains to emphasize: "Whether another method of enforcing the Constitution could have been devised, the short
answer is that no such method developed. The argument over the constitutionality of judicial review has long since been settled
by history. The power and duty of the Supreme Court to declare statutes or executive action unconstitutional in appropriate cases
is part of the living Constitution. 'The course of constitutional history,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter recently remarked, 'has cast
responsibilities upon the Supreme Court which it would be "stultification" for it to evade.' " 28 Nor is it only Dean Rostow who
could point Frankfurter, reputed to belong to the same school of thought opposed to judicial activism, if not its leading advocate
during his long stay in the United States Supreme Court, as one fully cognizant of the stigma that attaches to a tribunal which
neglects to meet the demands of judicial review. There is a statement of similar importance from Professor Mason: "In Stein v.
New York Frankfurter remarked, somewhat self-consciously perhaps, that the 'duty of deference cannot be allowed imperceptibly
to slide into abdication.' " 29 Professor Konefsky, like Dean Rostow, could not accept characterization of judicial review as
undemocratic. Thus his study of Holmes and Brandeis, the following appears: "When it is said that judicial review is an
undemocratic feature of our political system, it ought also to be remembered that architects of that system did not equate
constitutional government with unbridled majority rule. Out of their concern for political stability and security for private rights,
..., they designed a structure whose keystone was to consist of barriers to the untrammeled exercise of power by any group. They
perceived no contradiction between effective government and constitutional checks. To James Madison, who may legitimately be
regarded as the philosopher of the Constitution, the scheme of mutual restraints was the best answer to what he viewed as the
chief problem in erecting a system of free representative government: 'In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.' " 30

There is thus an inevitability to the flowering of judicial review. Could it be that the tone of discontent apparent in the writings of
eminent authorities on the subject evince at the most fears that the American Supreme Court might overstep the bounds allotted
to the judiciary? It cannot be a denial of the fitness of such competence being vested in judges and of their being called upon to
fulfill such a trust whenever appropriate to the decision of a case before them. That is why it has been correctly maintained that
notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision in the fundamental law of the United States Constitution, that distinguished
American constitutional historian, Professor Corwin, could rightfully state that judicial review "is simply incidental to the power
of courts to interpret the law, of which the Constitution is part, in connection with the decision of cases." 31 This is not to deny
that there are those who would place the blame or the credit, depending upon one's predilection, on Marshall's epochal opinion
in Marbury v. Madison. 32 Curtis belonged to that persuasion. As he put it: "The problem was given no answer by the
Constitution. A hole was left where the Court might drive in the peg of judicial supremacy, if it could. And that is what John
Marshall did." 33 At any rate there was something in the soil of American juristic thought resulting in this tree of judicial power
so precariously planted by Marshall striking deep roots and showing wonderful vitality and hardiness. It now dominates the
American legal scene. Through it, Chief Justice Hughes, before occupying that exalted position, could state in a lecture: "We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is ... ." 34 The above statement is more than just an aphorism
that lends itself to inclusion in judicial anthologies or bar association speeches. It could and did provoke from Justice Jackson, an
exponent of the judicial restraint school of thought, this meaningful query: "The Constitution nowhere provides that it shall be
what the judges say it is. How, did it come about that the statement not only could be but could become current as the most
understandable comprehensive summary of American Constitutional law?" 35 It is no wonder that Professor Haines could pithily
and succinctly sum up the place of the highest American tribunal in the scheme of things in this wise: "The Supreme Court of the
United States has come to be regarded as the unique feature of the American governmental system." 36Let me not be
misunderstood. There is here no attempt to close one's eyes to a discernible tendency on the part of some distinguished faculty
minds to look askance at what for them may be inadvisable extension of judicial authority. For such indeed is the case as
reflected in two leading cases of recent vintage, Baker v. Carr, 37 decided in 1962 and Powell v. MacCormack, 38 in 1969, both
noted in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The former disregarded the warning of Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green 39
about the American Supreme Court declining jurisdiction on the question of apportionment as to do so would cut very deep into
the very being of Congress." 40 For him, the judiciary "ought not to enter this political thicket." Baker has since then been
followed; it has spawned a host of cases. 41 Powell, on the question of the power of a legislative body to exclude from its ranks a
person whose qualifications are uncontested, for many the very staple of what is essentially political, certainly goes even further
than the authoritative Philippine decision of Vera v. Avelino, 42 It does look then that even in the United States, the plea for
judicial self-restraint, even if given voice by those competent in the field of constitutional law, has fallen on deaf ears. There is in
the comments of respondents an excerpt from Professor Freund quoting from one of his essays appearing in a volume published
in 1968. It is not without interest to note that in another paper, also included therein, he was less than assertive about the necessity
for self-restraint and apparently mindful of the claims of judicial activism. Thus: "First of all, the Court has a responsibility to
maintain the constitutional order, the distribution of public power, and the limitations on that power." 43 As for Professor Bickel,
it has been said that as counsel for the New York Times in the famous Vietnam papers case, 44 he was less than insistent on the
American Supreme Court exercising judicial self-restraint. There are signs that the contending forces on such question, for some
an unequal contest, are now quiescent. The fervor that characterized the expression of their respective points of view appears to
have been minimized. Not that it is to be expected that it will entirely disappear, considering how dearly cherished are, for each
group, the convictions, prejudices one might even say, entertained. At least what once was fitly characterized as the booming
guns of rhetoric, coming from both directions, have been muted. Of late, scholarly disputations have been centered on the
standards that should govern the exercise of the power of judicial review. In his celebrated Holmes lecture in 1959 at the Harvard
Law School, Professor Wechsler advocated as basis for decision what he termed neutral principles of constitutional law. 45 It has
brought forth a plethora of law review articles, the reaction ranging from guarded conformity to caustic criticism. 46 There was, to
be sure, no clear call to a court in effect abandoning the responsibility incumbent on it to keep governmental agencies within
constitutional channels. The matter has been put in temperate terms by Professor Frank thus: "When allowance has been made for
all factors, it nevertheless seems to me that the doctrine of political questions ought to be very sharply confined to where the
functional reasons justify it and that in a give involving its expansion there should be careful consideration also of the social
considerations which may militate against it. The doctrine has a certain specious charm because of its nice intellectualism and
because of the fine deference it permits to expertise, to secret knowledge, and to the prerogatives of others. It should not be
allowed to grow as a merely intellectual plant." 47

It is difficult for me at least, not to be swayed by appraisal, coming from such impeccable sources of the worth and significance
of judicial review in the United States. I cannot resist the conclusion then that the views advanced on this subject by distinguished
counsel for petitioners, with Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Jovito Salonga at the van, rather than the advocacy of the Solicitor-
General, possess the greater weight and carry persuasion. So much then for the invocation of the political question principle as a
bar to the exercise of our jurisdiction.

3. That brings me to the issue of the validity of the ratification. The crucial point that had to be met is whether Proclamation No.
1102 manifests fidelity to the explicit terms of Article XV. There is, of course, the view not offensive to reason that a sense of the
realities should temper the rigidity of devotion to the strict letter of the text to allow deference to its spirit to control. With due
recognition of its force in constitutional litigation, 48 if my reading of the events and the process that led to such proclamation, so
clearly set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice, is not inaccurate, then it cannot be confidently asserted that there was such
compliance. It would be to rely on conjectural assumptions that did founder on the rock of the undisputed facts. Any other
conclusion would, for me, require an interpretation that borders on the strained. So it has to be if one does not lose sight of how
the article on amendments is phrased. A word, to paraphrase Justice Holmes may not be a crystal, transparent and unchanged, but
it is not, to borrow from Learned Hand, that eminent jurist, a rubber band either. It would be unwarranted in my view then to
assert that the requirements of the 1935 Constitution have been met. There are American decisions, 49and they are not few in
number, which require that there be obedience to the literal terms of the applicable provision. It is understandable why it should
be thus. If the Constitution is the supreme law, then its mandate must be fulfilled. No evasion is tolerated. Submission to its
commands can be shown only if each and every word is given meaning rather than ignored or disregarded. This is not to deny
that a recognition conclusive effect attached to the electorate manifesting its will to vote affirmatively on the amendments
proposed poses an obstacle to the judiciary being insistent on the utmost regularity. Briefly stated, substantial compliance is
enough. A great many American State decisions may be cited in support of such a doctrine. 50

Even if the assumption be indulged in that Article XV is not phrased in terms too clear to be misread, so that this Court is called
upon to give meaning and perspective to what could be considered words of vague generality, pregnant with uncertainty, still
whatever obscurity it possesses is illumined when the light of the previous legislation is thrown on it. In the first Commonwealth
Act, 51 submitting to the Filipino people for approval or disapproval certain amendments to the original ordinance appended to
the 1935 Constitution, it was made that the election for such purpose was to "be conducted in conformity with the provisions of
the Election Code insofar as the same may be applicable." 52 Then came the statute, 53 calling for the plebiscite on the three 1940
amendments providing for the plebiscite on the three 1930 amendments providing for a bicameral Congress or a Senate and a
House of Representatives to take the place of a unicameral National Assembly, 54 reducing the term of the President to four years
but allowing his re-election with the limitation that he cannot serve more than eight consecutive years, 55 and creating an
independent Commission on Elections. 56 Again, it was expressly provided that the election "shall be conducted in conformity
with the provisions of the Election Code in so far as the same may be applicable." 57 The approval of the present parity
amendment was by virtue of a Republic Act 58 which specifically made applicable the then Election Code. 59 There is a similar
provision in the
legislation, 60 which in cotemplation of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, saw to it that there be an increase in the membership
of the House of Representatives a maximum of one hundred eighty and assured the eligibility of senators and representatives to
become members of such constituent body without forfeiting their seats, as proposed amendments to be voted on in the 1967
elections. 61 That is the consistent course of interpretation followed by the legislative branch. It is most persuasive, if not
controlling. The restraints thus imposed would set limits to the Presidential action taken, even on the assumption that either as an
agent of the Constitutional Convention or under his martial law prerogatives, he was not devoid of power to specify the mode of
ratification. On two vital points, who can vote and how they register their will, Article XV had been given a definitive
construction. That is why I fail to see sufficient justification for this Court affixing the imprimatur of its approval on the mode
employed for the ratification of the revised Constitution as reflected in Proclamation No. 1102.
4. Nor is the matter before us solely to be determined by the failure to comply with the requirements of Article XV.
Independently of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in whom
sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, 62 then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision of the
utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect. Such a fundamental principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow Laski, that the
nation as a whole constitutes the "single center of ultimate reference," necessarily the possessor of that "power that is able to
resolve disputes by saying the last word." 63 If the origins of the democratic polity enshrined in the 1935 Constitution with the
declaration that the Philippines is a republican state could be traced back to Athens and to Rome, it is no doubt true, as McIver
pointed out, that only with the recognition of the nation as the separate political unit in public law is there the juridical
recognition of the people composing it "as the source of political authority." 64 From them, as Corwin did stress, emanate "the
highest possible embodiment of human will," 65 which is supreme and must be obeyed. To avoid any confusion and in the interest
of clarity, it should be expressed in the manner ordained by law. Even if such is not the case, however, once it is manifested, it is
to be accepted as final and authoritative. The government which is merely an agency to register its commands has no choice but
to submit. Its officials must act accordingly. No agency is exempt such a duty, not even this Court. In that sense, the lack of
regularity in the method employed to register its wishes is fatal in its consequences. Once the fact of acceptance by people of a
new fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The obligation to render it
obeisance falls on the courts as well.

There are American State decisions that enunciate such a doctrine. While certainly not controlling, they are not entirely bereft of
persuasive significance. In Miller v. Johnson, 66 decided in 1892, it was set forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Holt that on May
3, 1890, an act was passed in Kentucky, providing for the calling of a convention for the purpose of framing a new constitution
and the election of delegates. It provided that before any form of constitution made by them should become operative, it should
be submitted to the vote of the state and ratified by a majority of those voting. The constitution then in force authorized the
legislature, the preliminary steps having been taken, to call a convention "for the purpose of readopting, amending, or changing"
it contained no provision giving the legislature the power to require a submission of its work to a vote of the people. The
convention met in September, 1890. By April, 1891, it completed a draft of a constitution, submitted it to a popular vote, and then
adjourned until September following. When the convention reassembled, the delegates made numerous changes in instrument. As
thus amended, it was promulgated by the convention of September 28, 1891, as the new constitution. An action was brought to
challenge its validity. It failed in the lower court. In affirming such judgment dismissing the action, Chief Justice Holt stated: "If
a set of men, not selected by the people according to the forms of law, were to formulate an instrument and declare it the
constitution, it would undoubtedly be the duty of the courts to declare its work a nullity. This would be revolution, and this the
courts of the existing government must resist until they are overturned by power, and a new government established. The
convention, however, was the offspring of law. The instrument which we are asked to declare invalid as a constitution has been
made and promulgated according to the forms of law. It is a matter of current history that both the executive and legislative
branches of the government have recognized its validity as a constitution, and are now daily doing so. ... While the judiciary
should protect the rights of the people with great care and jealousy, because this is its duty, and also because; in times of great
popular excitement, it is usually their last resort, yet it should at the same time be careful not to overstep the proper bounds of its
power, as being perhaps equally dangerous; and especially where such momentous results might follow as would be likely in this
instance, if the power of the judiciary permitted, and its duty requires, the overthrow of the work of the convention." 67 In Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 68 a 1903 decision, it was contended that the Virginia Constitution reclaimed in 1902 is invalid as it was
ordained and promulgated by the convention without being submitted for ratification or rejection by the people. The Court
rejected such a view. As stated in the opinion of Justice Harrison: "The Constitution of 1902 was ordained and proclaimed by a
convention duly called by direct vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the
work of the convention has been recognized, accepted, and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the state by the Governor
in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby; by the Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint
resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by the convention which assembled in the city of Richmond on
the 12th day of June, 1901, as the Constitution of Virginia; by the individual oaths of members to support it, and by enforcing its
provisions; and the people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by registering as voters
under it to the extent of thousands throughout the state, and by voting, under its provisions, at a general election for their
representatives in the Congress of the United States. The Constitution having been thus acknowledged and accepted by the office
administering the government and by the people of the state, and there being no government in existence under the Constitution
of 1869 opposing or denying its validity, we have no difficulty in holding that the Constitution in question, which went into effect
at noon on the 10th day of July, 1902, is the only rightful, valid, and existing Constitution of this state, and that to it all the
citizens of Virginia owe their obedience and loyal allegiance." 69

It cannot be plausibly asserted then that premises valid in law are lacking for the claim that the revised Constitution has been
accepted by the Filipino people. What is more, so it has been argued, it is not merely a case of its being implied. Through the
Citizens Assemblies, there was a plebiscite with the result as indicated in Proclamation No. 1102. From the standpoint of
respondents then, they could allege that there was more than just mere acquiescence by the sovereign people. Its will was thus
expressed formally and unmistakably. It may be added that there was nothing inherently objectionable in the informal method
followed in ascertaining its preference. Nor is the fact that Filipinos of both sexes above the age of fifteen were given the
opportunity to vote to be deplored. The greater the base of mass participation, the more there is fealty to the democratic concept.
It does logically follow likewise that such circumstances being conceded, then no justifiable question may be raised. This Court
is to respect what had thus received the people's sanction. That is not for me though whole of it. Further scrutiny even then is not
entirely foreclosed. There is still an aspect that is judicial, an inquiry may be had as to whether such indeed was the result. This is
no more than what the courts do in election cases. There are other factors to bear in mind. The fact that the President so certified
is well-nigh conclusive. There is in addition the evidence flowing from the conditions of peace and stability. There thus appears
to be conformity to the existing order of things. The daily course of events yields such a conclusion. What is more, the officials
under the 1935 Constitution, including practically all Representatives and a majority of the Senators, have signified their assent to
it. The thought persists, however, that as yet sufficient time has not elapsed to be really certain.

Nor is this all. There is for me an obstacle to the petitions being dismissed for such ascertainment of popular will did take place
during a period of martial law. It would have been different had there been that freedom of debate with the least interference, thus
allowing a free market of ideas. If it were thus, it could be truly said that there was no barrier to liberty of choice. It would be a
clear-cut decision either way. One could be certain as to the fact of the acceptance of the new or of adherence to the old. This is
not to deny that votes are cast by individuals with their personal concerns uppermost in mind, worried about their immediate
needs and captive to their existing moods. That is inherent in any human institution, much more so in a democratic polity. Nor is
it open to any valid objection because in the final analysis the state exists for the individuals who in their collectivity compose it.
Whatever be their views, they are entitled to respect. It is difficult for me, however, at this stage to feel secure in the conviction
that they did utilize the occasion afforded to give expression to what was really in their hearts. This is not to imply that such
doubt could not be dispelled by evidence to the contrary. If the petitions be dismissed however, then such opportunity is forever
lost.

5. With the foregoing legal principles in mind, I find myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed brethren who vote for the
dismissal of these petitions. I cannot yield an affirmative response to the plea of respondents to consider the matter closed, the
proceedings terminated once and for all. It is not an easy decision to reach. It has occasioned deep thought and considerable soul-
searching. For there are countervailing considerations that exert a compulsion not easy to resist. It can be asserted with truth,
especially in the field of social and economic rights, that with the revised Constitution, there is an auspicious beginning for
further progress. Then too it could resolve what appeared to be the deepening contradictions of political life, reducing at times
governmental authority to near impotence and imparting a sense of disillusionment in democratic processes. It is not too much to
say therefore that there had indeed been the revision of a fundamental law to vitalize the very values out of which democracy
grows. It is one which has all the earmarks of being responsive to the dominant needs of the times. It represents an outlook
cognizant of the tensions of a turbulent era that is the present. That is why for some what was done represented an act of courage
and faith, coupled with the hope that the solution arrived at is a harbinger of a bright and rosy future.

It is such a comfort then that even if my appraisal of the situation had commanded a majority, there is not, while these lawsuits
are being further considered, the least interference, with the executive department. The President in the discharge of all his
functions is entitled to obedience. He remains commander-in-chief with all the constitutional powers it implies. Public officials
can go about their accustomed tasks in accordance with the revised Constitution. They can pursue even the tenor of their ways.
They are free to act according to its tenets. That was so these past few weeks, even petitions were filed. There was not at any time
any thought of any restraining order. So it was before. That is how things are expected to remain even if the motions to dismiss
were not granted. It might be asked though, suppose the petitions should prevail? What then? Even so, the decision of this Court
need not be executory right away. Such a disposition of a case before this Court is not novel. That was how it was done in the
Emergency Powers Act controversy. 70 Once compliance is had with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, to
assure that the coming force of the revised charter is free from any taint of infirmity, then all doubts are set at rest.

For some, to so view the question before us is to be caught in a web of unreality, to cherish illusions that cannot stand the test of
actuality. What is more, it may give the impression of reliance on what may, for the practical man of affairs, be no more than
gossamer distinctions and sterile refinements unrelated to events. That may be so, but I find it impossible to transcend what for
me are the implications of traditional constitutionalism. This is not to assert that an occupant of the bench is bound to apply with
undeviating rigidity doctrines which may have served their day. He could at times even look upon them as mere scribblings in the
sands to be washed away by the advancing tides of the present. The introduction of novel concepts may be carried only so far
though. As Cardozo put the matter: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He
is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial necessity of
order in the social life." Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains." 71Moreover what made it difficult
for this Court to apply settled principles, which for me have not lost their validity, is traceable to the fact that the revised
Constitution was made to take effect immediately upon ratification. If a period of time were allowed to elapse precisely to enable
the judicial power to be exercised, no complication would have arisen. Likewise, had there been only one or two amendments, no
such problem would be before us. That is why I do not see sufficient justification for the orthodoxies of constitutional law not to
operate.
Even with full realization then that the approach pursued is not all that it ought to have been and the process of reasoning not
without its shortcomings, the basic premises of a constitutional democracy, as I understand them and as set forth in the preceding
pages, compel me to vote the way I did.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The masterly opinion of the Chief Justice wherein he painstakingly deals with the momentous issues of the cases at bar in all their
complexity commands my concurrence.

I would herein make an exposition of the fundamental reasons and considerations for my stand.

The unprecedented and precedent-setting issue submitted by petitioners for the Court's resolution is the validity and
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 issued on January 17, 1973, certifying and proclaiming that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention "has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes
cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect."

More specifically, the issue submitted is whether the purported ratification of the proposed Constitution by means of the Citizens
Assemblies has substantially complied with the mandate of Article XV of the existing Constitution of 1935 that duly proposed
amendments thereto, in toto or parts thereof, "shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the peoplefor their ratification."1

A necessary corollary issue is whether the purported ratification of the proposed Constitution as signed on November 30, 1972 by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention may be said also to have substantially complied with its own mandate that "(T)his
Constitution shall take immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite called for the purpose and
except as herein provided, shall supersede the Constitution of Nineteen hundred and thirty-five and all amendments thereto."2

Respondents contend that "(A)lthough apparently what is sought to be annulled is Proclamation No. 1102,
what petitioners really seek to invalidate is the new Constitution", and their actions must be
dismissed, because:

— "the Court may not inquire into the validity of the procedure for ratification" which is "political in
character" and that "what is sought to be invalidated is not an act of the President but of the people;

— "(T)he fact of approval of the new Constitution by an overwhelming majority of the votes cast as declared
and certified in Proclamation No. 1102 is conclusive on the courts;

— "Proclamation No. 1102 was issued by the President in the exercise of legislative power under martial law.
... Alternatively, or contemporaneously, he did so as "agent" of the Constitutional Convention;"

— "alleged defects, such as absence of secret voting, enfranchisement of persons less than 21 years, non
supervision (by) the Comelec are matters not required by Article XV of the 1935 Constitution"; (sic)

— "after ratification, whatever defects there might have been in the procedure are overcome
and mooted (and muted) by the fact of ratification"; and

— "(A)ssuming finally that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution was not strictly followed, the ratification of
the new Constitution must nonetheless be respected. For the procedure outlined in Article XV
was not intended to be exclusive of other procedures, especially one which contemplates popular and direct
participation of the citizenry ... ."3

To test the validity of respondents' submittal that the Court, in annulling Proclamation No. 1102 would really be "invalidating the
new Constitution", the terms and premises of the issues have to be defined.

— Respondents themselves assert that "Proclamation No. 1102 ... is plainly merely declaratory of the fact
that the 1973 Constitution has been ratified and has come into force.4
 — The measure of the fact of ratification is Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. This has been consistently
held by the Court in the Gonzales:5 and Tolentino6 cases.

— In the Tolentino case, this Court emphasized "that the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the
Convention and the other departments of the government. It must be added that ... they are no
less binding upon the people."7

— In the same Tolentino case, this Court further proclaimed that "as long as any amendment is formulated
and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter, any proposal for such amendment which is not in
conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the Charter for effecting amendments, cannot receive the
sanction of this Court."8

— As continues to be held by a majority of this Court, proposed amendments to the Constitution "should be
ratified in only one way, that is, in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in
only by qualified and duly registered voters"9 and under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. 10

— Hence, if the Court declares Proclamation 1102 null and void because on its face, the purported
ratification of the proposed Constitution has not faithfully nor substantially observed nor complied with the
mandatory requirements of Article XV of the (1935) Constitution, it would not be "invalidating" the proposed
new Constitution but would be simply declaring that the announced fact of ratification thereof by means of
the Citizens Assemblies referendums does not pass the constitutional test and that the proposed new
Constitution has not constitutionally come into existence.

— Since Proclamation 1102 is acknowledged by respondent to be "plainly merely declaratory" of the

disputed fact of ratification, they cannot assume the very fact to be established and beg the issue by citing the
self-same declaration as proof of the purported ratification therein declared.

What complicates the cases at bar is the fact that the proposed 1972 Constitution was enforced as having immediately taken
effect upon the issuance on January 17, 1973 of Proclamation 1102 and the question of whether "confusion and disorder in
government affairs would (not) result" from a judicial declaration of nullity of the purported ratification is raised by the Solicitor-
General on behalf of respondents.

A comparable precedent of great crisis proportions is found in the Emergency Powers cases, 11 wherein the Court in its
Resolution of September 16, 1949 after judgment was initially not obtained on August 26, 1949 for lack of the required six (6)
votes, finally declared in effect that the pre-war emergency powers delegated by Congress to the President, under Commonwealth
Act 671 in pursuance of Article VI, section 26 of the Constitution, had ceased and became inoperative at the latest in May, 1946
when Congress met in its first regular session on May 25, 1946.

Then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran recited the great interests and important rights that had arisen under executive orders
"issued in good faith and with the best of intentions by three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced
extensive effects on the life of the nation" — in the same manner as may have arisen under the bona fide acts of the President
now in the honest belief that the 1972 Constitution had been validly ratified by means of the Citizens Assemblies referendums —
and indicated the proper course and solution therefor, which were duly abided by and confusion and disorder as well as harm to
public interest and innocent parties thereby avoided as follows:

Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared
to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and void.
It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been issued in good faith and with the best of
intentions by three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive effects in
the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945,
appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7,
1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89,
issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on
November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders appropriating
funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of all these executive orders will be
unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before nullifying them, other important
circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have been ratified by Congress
expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in
 the last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contracts of parties
acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive order must be viewed in the light of its peculiar
circumstances, and, if necessary and possible, nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid
harm to public interest and innocent parties. 12

Initially, then Chief Justice Moran voted with a majority of the Court to grant the Araneta and Guerrero petitions holding null and
void the executive orders on rentals and export control but to defer judgment on the Rodriguez and Barredo petitions for judicial
declarations of nullity of the executive orders appropriating the 1949-1950 fiscal year budget for the government and P6 million
for the holding of the 1949 national elections. After rehearsing, he further voted to also declare null and void the last two
executive orders appropriating funds for the 1949 budget and elections, completing the "sufficient majority" of six against four
dissenting justices "to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter." 13

Then Chief Justice Moran, who penned the Court's majority resolution, explained his vote for annulment despite the great
difficulties and possible "harmful consequences" in the following passage, which bears re-reading:

However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the nullity of
the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give my
unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two executive
orders were issued without authority of law.

While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that positive
compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all
these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the opposite result because it would
legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion,
repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way or practices which may
undermine our constitutional structure.

The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass should the
said executive orders be immediately declared null and void are still real. They have not disappeared by
reason of the fact that a special session of Congress is not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in
the hands of the Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a
special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriations act.

That Congress may again fail to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under the
circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and
furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so desires, compel Congress
to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the country.

Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in
this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated sphere, complies with
its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.

Our Republic is still young, and the vital principles underlying its organic structure should be maintained
firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a
stable and vigorous democracy. 14

The late Justice Pedro Tuason who penned the initial majority judgment (declaring null and void the rental and export control
executive orders) likewise observed that "(T)he truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances 'the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are
called upon 'to perform the duties discharge the responsibilities committed to respectively.' " 15

It should be duly acknowledged that the Court's task of discharging its duty and responsibility has been considerably lightened by
the President's public manifestation of adherence to constitutional processes and of working within the proper constitutional
framework as per his press conference of January 20,1973, wherein he stated that "(T)he Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the
Constitution. It can and will probably determine the validity of this Constitution. I did not want to talk about this because actually
there is a case pending before the Supreme Court. But suffice it to say that I recognize the power of the Supreme Court. With
respect to appointments, the matter falls under a general provision which authorizes the Prime Minister to appoint additional
members to the Supreme Court. Until the matter of the new Constitution is decided, I have no intention of utilizing that
power." 16
Thus, it is that as in an analogous situation wherein the state Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the questions of whether the
submission of the proposed constitutional amendment of the State Constitution providing for an elective, instead of an
appointive, judiciary and whether the proposition was in fact adopted, were justifiable and not political questions, we may echo
the words therein of Chief Justice Whitfield that "(W)e do not seek a jurisdiction not imposed upon us by the Constitution. We
could not, if we would, escape the exercise of that jurisdiction which the Constitution has imposed upon us. In the particular
instance in which we are now acting, our duty to know what the Constitution of the state is, and in accordance with our oaths to
support and maintain it in its integrity, imposed on us a most difficult and embarrassing duty, one which we have not sought, but
one which, like all others, must be discharged." 17

In confronting the issues at bar, then, with due regard for my colleagues' contrary views, we are faced with the hard choice of
maintaining a firm and strict — perhaps, even rigid — stand that the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means" save in the particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people, who, in Cooley's words, so "tied up
(not only) the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well" 18 in the exercise of their sovereign will or a liberal
and flexible stand that would consider compliance with the constitutional article on the amending process as merely directory
rather than mandatory.

The first choice of a strict stand, as applied to the cases at bar, signifies that the Constitution may be amended in toto or
otherwise exclusively "by approval by a majority of the votes cast an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", 19 participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters twenty-one years of age or over 20 and
duly supervised by the Commission on Elections, 21 in accordance with the cited mandatory constitutional requirements.

The alternative choice of a liberal stand would permit a disregard of said requirements on the theory urged by respondents that
"the procedure outlined in Article XV was not intended to be exclusive of other procedures especially one which contemplates
popular and direct participation of the citizenry", 22 that the constitutional age and literacy requirements and other statutory
safeguards for ascertaining the will of the majority of the people may likewise be changed as "suggested, if not prescribed, by the
people (through the Citizens Assemblies) themselves", 23 and that the Comelec is constitutionally "mandated to oversee ...
elections (of public officers) and not plebiscites." 24

To paraphrase U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall who first declared in the historic 1803 case of Marbury vs. Madison25 the U.S.
Supreme Court's power of judicial review and to declare void laws repugnant to the Constitution, there is no middle ground
between these two alternatives. As Marshall expounded it: "(T)he Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act, contrary to the Constitution, is not law; if the latter
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of a people, to limit a power, in its own nature, illimitable."

As was to be restated by Justice Jose P. Laurel a century and a third later in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 26 "(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations of good government and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living Constitution."

Justice Laurel pointed out that in contrast to the United States Constitution, the Philippine Constitution as "a definition of the
powers of government" placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers"
and stressed that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments ... but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument
secures and guarantees to them."

II

Marshall was to utter much later in the equally historic 1819 case of McCulloch vs. Maryland 27 the "climactic phrase," 28 "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding," — termed by Justice Frankfurter as "the single most important
utterance in the literature of constitutional law — most important because most comprehensive and comprehending." 29 This
enduring concept to my mind permeated to this Court's exposition and rationale in the hallmark case of Tolentino, wherein we
rejected the contentions on the Convention's behalf "that the issue ... is a political question and that the Convention being a
legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of Congress
and the Courts." 30
This Court therein made its unequivocal choice of strictly requiring faithful (which really includes substantial) compliance with
the mandatory requirements of the amending process.

1. In denying reconsideration of our judgment of October 16, 1971 prohibiting the submittal in an advance election of 1971
Constitutional Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 proposing to amend Article V, section 1 of the Constitution by lowering
the voting age to 18 years (vice 21 years) 30a "without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future ... on
other portions of the amended section", this Court stated that "the constitutional provision in question (as proposed) presents no
doubt which may be resolved in favor of respondents and intervenors. We do not believe such doubt can exist only because it is
urged that the end sought to be achieved is to be desired. Paraphrasing no less than the President of Constitutional Convention of
1934, Claro M. Recto, let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the fundamental
law purportedly in order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with purportedly more
laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent and continue the destruction of the Constitution, making those who laid
down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the Constitution the victims of their own folly." 31

2. This Court held in Tolentino that:

... as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the
provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments
to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV. This must be so, because it is
plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be
undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the
most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding
fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And
because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives
of all the people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in
preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution
itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature
of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations,
restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of
subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it
that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the
people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing
political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of
their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it
does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such
conditions because they are powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts. 32

3. This Court in Tolentino likewise formally adopted the doctrine of proper submission first advanced in Gonzales vs. Comelec33,
thus:

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basisfor
an intelligent appraisal of the nature of amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things,
where the Convention hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, proposals to amend
the existing Constitution, to present to people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for
the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to
enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted
by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez,
speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, 'no proper submission.' " 34
4. Four other members of the Court 35 in a separate concurrence in Tolentino, expressed their "essential agreement" with Justice
Sanchez' separate opinion in Gonzales on the need for "fair submission (and) intelligent rejection" as "minimum requirements that
must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" thus:

... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We
believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and
the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or
100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word
as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government,
in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For as
we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection. 36

They stressed further the need for undivided attention, sufficient information and full debate, conformably to the intendment of
Article XV, section 1 of the Constitution, in this wise:

A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the
voting age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not
19 or 20? And why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old, so that there is
no need of an educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can
the 18-year old be relied upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not
performed so well? If the proposed amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional
Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional
Convention in having this particular proposed amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
members of the Convention have future political plans which they want to begin to subserve by the approval
this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby mean that the 18-year old should
not also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be required to compulsory
military service under the colors? Will the contractual consent be reduced to 18 years? If I vote against the
amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973?

The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the
bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already
long litany. And the answers cannot except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully,
and accorded undivided attention.

Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been
afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from
a full and dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their
traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the
need for and the wisdom proposed
amendment. 37

5. This Court therein dismissed the plea of disregarding mandatory requirements of the amending process "in favor of allowing
the sovereign people to express their decision on the proposed amendments" as "anachronistic in the real constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law," in the following terms:

... The preamble of the Constitution says that the Constitution has been ordained by the 'Filipino people,
imploring the aid of Divine Providence.' Section 1 of Article XV is nothing than a part of the Constitution
thus ordained by the people. Hence, in construing said section, We must read it as if thepeople had said, 'This
Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that the amendment must beproposed and submitted to Us for
ratification only in the manner herein provided.' ... Accordingly, the real issue here cannot be whether or not
the amending process delineated by the present Constitution may be disregarded in favor of allowing the
sovereign people to express their decision on the proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that the
very idea of departing from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of
 constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law; rather, it is whether or not the provisional
nature of the proposed amendment and the manner of its submission to the people for ratification or
rejection conform with the mandate of the people themselves in such regard, as expressed in, the Constitution
itself. 38

6. This Court, in not heeding the popular clamor, thus stated its position: "(I)t would be tragic and contrary to the plain
compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations
other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger
measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the
Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate
cases with the proper parties and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved
to discharge that duty. 39

7. The Chief Justice, in his separate opinion in Tolentino concurring with this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration,
succinctly restated this Court's position on the fundamentals, as follows:

— On the premature submission of a partial amendment proposal, with a "temporary provisional or tentative
character": — "... a partial amendment would deprive the voters of the context which is usually necessary for
them to make a reasonably intelligent appraisal of the issue submitted for their ratification or rejection. ...
Then, too, the submission to a plebiscite of a partial amendment, without a definite frame of reference, is
fraught with possibilities which may jeopardize the social fabric. For one thing, it opens the door to wild
speculations. It offers ample opportunities for overzealous leaders and members of opposing political camps
to unduly exaggerate the pros and cons of the partial amendment proposed. In short, it is apt to breed false
hopes and create wrong impressions. As a consequence, it is bound to unduly strain the people's faith in the
soundness and validity of democratic processes and institutions.

— On the plea to allow submission to the sovereign people of the "fragmentary and incomplete" proposal,
although inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution: "The view, has, also, advanced that the
foregoing considerations are not decisive on the issue before Us, inasmuch as thepeople are sovereign, and
the partial amendment involved in this case is being submitted to them. The issue before Us is whether or not
said partial amendment may be validly submitted to the people for ratification "in a plebiscite coincide with
the local elections in November 1971," and this particular issue will not be submitted to the people. What is
more, the Constitution does not permit its submission to the people. The question sought to be settled in the
scheduled plebiscite is whether or not the people are in favor of the reduction of the voting age.

— On a "political" rather than "legalistic" approach: "Is this approach to the problem too "legalistic?" This
term has possible connotations. It may mean strict adherence to the law, which in the case at bar is
the Supreme Law of the land. On point, suffice it to say that, in compliance with the specific man of such
Supreme Law, the members of the Supreme Court taken the requisite "oath to support and defend the
Constitution." ... Then, again, the term "legalistic" may be used to suggest inversely that the somewhat
strained interpretation of the Constitution being urged upon this Court be tolerated or, at least, overlooked,
upon the theory that the partial amendment on voting age is badly needed and reflects the will of the people,
specially the youth. This course of action favors, in effect, adoption of apolitical approach, inasmuch as the
advisability of the amendment and an appraisal of the people's feeling thereon political matters. In fact, apart
from the obvious message of the mass media, and, at times, of the pulpit, the Court has been literally
bombarded with scores of handwritten letters, almost all of which bear the penmanship and the signature of
girls, as well as letterhead of some sectarian educational institutions, generally stating that the writer is 18
years of age and urging that she or he be allowed to vote. Thus, the pressure of public opinion has brought to
bear heavily upon the Court for a reconsideration of its decision in the case at bar.

As above stated, however, the wisdom of the amendment and the popularity thereof are political questions
beyond our province. In fact, respondents and the intervenors originally maintained that We have no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition herein, upon the ground that the issue therein raised is a political one.
Aside from the absence of authority to pass upon political question, it is obviously improper and unwise for
the bench to develop into such questions owing to the danger of getting involved in politics, more likely of a
partisan nature, and, hence, of impairing the image and the usefulness of courts of justice as objective and
impartial arbiters of justiciable controversies.

Then, too, the suggested course of action, if adopted, would constitute a grievous disservice to the people and
the very Convention itself. Indeed, the latter and the Constitution it is in the process of drafting stand
 essentially for the Rule of Law. However, as the Supreme Law of the land, a Constitution would not be
worthy of its name, and the Convention called upon to draft it would be engaged in a futile undertaking, if we
did not exact faithful adherence to the fundamental tenets set forth in the Constitution and compliance with
its provisions were not obligatory. If we, in effect, approved, consented to or even overlooked a
circumvention of said tenets and provisions, because of the good intention with which Resolution No. 1 is
animated, the Court would thereby become the Judge of the good or bad intentions of the Convention and
thus be involved in a question essentially political in nature.

This is confirmed by the plea made in the motions for reconsideration in favor of the exercise of judicial
statesmanship in deciding the present case. Indeed, "politics" is the word commonly used to epitomize
compromise, even with principles, for the sake of political expediency or the advancement of the bid for
power of a given political party. Upon the other hand, statesmanship is the expression usually availed of to
refer to high politics or politics on the highest level. In any event, politics, political approach, political
expediency and statesmanship are generally associated, and often identified, with the dictum that "the end
justifies the means." I earnestly hope that the administration of justice in this country and the Supreme Court,
in particular, will adhere to or approve or indorse such dictum." 40

Tolentino, he pointed out that although "(M)ovants' submittal that "(T)he primary purpose for the submission of the proposed
amendment lowering the voting age to the plebiscite on November 8, 1971 is to enable the youth 18 to 20 years who comprise
more than three (3) million of our population to participate in the ratification of the new Constitution in so far as "to allow young
people who would be governed by the Constitution to be given a say on what kind of Constitution they will have" is a laudable
end, ... those urging the vitality and importance of the proposed constitutional amendment and its approval ahead of the complete
and final draft of the Constitution must seek a valid solution to achieve it in a manner sanctioned by the amendatory process
ordained by our people in the present Constitution" 41 — so that there may be "submitted, not piece-meal, but by way of complete
and final amendments as an integrated whole (integrated either with the subsisting Constitution or with the new proposed
Constitution)..."

9. The universal validity of the vital constitutional precepts and principles above-enunciated can hardly be gainsaid. I fail to see
the attempted distinction of restricting their application to proposals for amendments of particular provisions of the Constitution
and not to so-called entirely new Constitutions. Amendments to an existing Constitution presumably may be only of certain parts
or in toto, and in the latter case would rise to an entirely new Constitution. Where this Court held in Tolentino that
"any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself and perforce must be conceived
and prepared with as much care and deliberation", it would appeal that the reverse would equally be true; which is to say, that the
adoption of a whole new Constitution would be of no less importance than any particular amendment and therefore the necessary
care and deliberation as well as the mandatory restrictions and safeguards in the amending process ordained by the people
themselves so that "they (may) be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political
moods or fancies" must necessarily equally apply thereto.

III

1. To restate the basic premises, the people provided in Article XV of the Constitution for the amending process only"by approval
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the (duly proposed) amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."

The people ordained in Article V, section 1 that only those thereby enfranchised and granted the right of suffrage may speak the
"will of the body politic", viz, qualified literate voters twenty one years of age or over with one year's residence in the
municipality where they have registered.

The people, not as yet satisfied, further provided by amendment duly approved in 1940 in accordance with Article XV, for the
creation of an independent Commission on Elections with "exclusive charge" for the purpose of "insuring free, orderly and
honest elections" and ascertaining the true will of the electorate — and more, as ruled by this Court in Tolentino, in the case of
proposed constitutional amendments, insuring proper submission to the electorate of such proposals. 42

2. A Massachussets case 43 with a constitutional system and provisions analogous to ours, best defined the uses of the
term "people" as a body politic and "people" in the political sense who are synonymous with the qualified voters granted the
right to vote by the existing Constitution and who therefore are "the sole organs through which the will of the body politic can be
expressed."
It was pointed out therein that "(T)he word 'people' may have somewhat varying significations dependent upon the connection in
which it is used. In some connections in the Constitution it is confined to citizens and means the same as citizens. It excludes
aliens. It includes men, women and children. It comprehends not only the sane, competent, law-abiding and educated, but also
those who are wholly or in part dependents and charges upon society by reason of immaturity, mental or moral deficiency or lack
of the common essentials of education. All these persons are secured fundamental guarantees of the Constitution in life, liberty
and property and the pursuit of happiness, except as these may be limited for the protection of society."

In the sense of "body politic (as) formed by voluntary association of individuals" governed by a constitution and common laws in
a "social compact ... for the common good" and in another sense of "people" in a "practical sense" for "political purposes" it was
therein fittingly stated that in this sense, "people" comprises many who, by reason of want of years, of capacity or of the
educational requirements of Article 20 of the amendments of the Constitution, can have no voice in any government and who yet
are entitled to all the immunities and protection established by the Constitution. 'People' in this aspect is coextensive with
the body politic. But it is obvious that 'people' cannot be used with this broad meaning of political signification. The 'people' in
this connection means that part of the entire body of inhabitants who under the Constitution are intrusted with the exercise of the
sovereign power and the conduct of government. The 'people' in the Constitution in a practical sense means those who under the
existing Constitution possess the right to exercise the elective franchise and who, while that instrument remains in force
unchanged, will be the sole organs through which the will of the body politic can be expressed. 'People' for political
purposes must be considered synonymous with qualified voters.' "

As was also ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, "... While the people are thus the source of political power, their governments,
national and state, have been limited by constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as against
the sudden impulse of mere majorities." 44

From the text of Article XV of our Constitution, requiring approval of amendment proposals "by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification", it seems obvious as above-stated that
"people" as therein used must be considered synonymous with "qualified voters" as enfranchised under Article V, section 1 of the
Constitution — since only "people" who are qualified voters can exercise the right of suffrage and cast their votes.

3. Sound constitutional policy and the sheer necessity of adequate safeguards as ordained by the Constitution and implementing
statutes to ascertain and record the will of the people in free, orderly and honest elections supervised by the Comelec make it
imperative that there be strict adherence to the constitutional requirements laid down for the process of amending in toto or in
part the supreme law of the land.

Even at barrio level 45 the Revised Barrio Charter fixes certain safeguards for the holding of barrio plebiscites thus: "SEC.
6. Plebiscite. — A plebiscite may be held in the barrio when authorized by a majority vote of the members present in the barrio
assembly, there being a quorum, or when called by at least four members of the barrio council: Provided, however, That no
plebiscite shall be held until after thirty days from its approval by either body, and such plebiscite has been given the widest
publicity in the barrio, stating the date, time and place thereof, the questions or issues to be decided, action to be taken by the
voters, and such other information relevant to the holding of the plebiscite." 46

As to voting at such barrio plebiscites, the Charter further requires that "(A)ll duly registered barrio assembly members qualified
to vote may vote in the plebiscite. Voting procedures may be made either in writing as in regular elections, and/or declaration by
the voters to the board of election tellers." 47

The subjects of the barrio plebiscites are likewise delimited thus: "A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any
member of the barrio council. A plebiscite shall be called to approve any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax
ordinances" and the required majority vote is specified: "(F)or taking action on any of the above enumerated measures, majority
vote of all the barrio assembly members registered in the list of the barrio secretary is necessary." 48

The qualifications for voters in such barrio plebiscites and elections of barrio officials 49 comply with the suffrage qualifications
of Article V, section 1 of the Constitution and provide that "(S)EC. 10. Qualifications of Voters and Candidates. — Every citizen
of the Philippines, twenty one years of age or over, able to read and write, who has been a resident of the barrio during the six
months immediately preceding the election, duly registered in the list of voters by the barrio secretary, who is not otherwise
disqualified, may vote or be a candidate in the barrio elections." 50

IV
1. Since it appears on the face of Proclamation 1102 that the mandatory requirements under the above-cited constitutional articles
have not been complied with and that no election or plebiscite for ratification as therein provided as well as in section 16 of
Article XVII of the proposed Constitution itself 51 has been called or held, there cannot be said to have been a valid ratification.

2. Petitioners raised serious questions as to the veracity and genuineness of the reports or certificates of results purportedly
showing unaccountable discrepancies in seven figures in just five provinces 52 between the reports as certified by the Department
of Local Governments and the reports as directly submitted by the provincial and city executives, which latter reports
respondents disclaimed inter alia as not final and complete or as not signed; 53whether the reported votes of approval of the
proposed Constitution conditioned upon the non-convening of the interim National Assembly provided in Article XVII, section 1
thereof, 54 may be considered as valid; the allegedly huge and uniform votes reported; and many others.

3. These questions only serve to justify and show the basic validity of the universal principle governing written constitutions that
proposed amendments thereto or in replacement thereof may be ratified only in the particular mode or manner prescribed therein
by the people. Under Article XV, section 1 of our Constitution, amendments thereto may be ratified only in the one way therein
provided, i.e. in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and duly supervised by the Commission on Elections, and
which is participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. In this manner, the safeguards provided by the election code
generally assure the true ascertainment of the results of the vote and interested parties would have an opportunity to thresh out
properly before the Comelec all such questions in pre-proclamation proceedings.

4. At any rate, unless respondents seriously intend to question the very statements and pronouncements in Proclamation 1102
itself which shows on its face, as already stated, that the mandatory amending process required by the (1935) Constitution was
not observed, the cases at bar need not reach the stage of answering the host of questions, raised by petitioners against the
procedure observed by the Citizens Assemblies and the reported referendum results — since the purported ratification is rendered
nugatory by virtue of such non-observance.

5. Finally, as to respondents' argument that the President issued Proclamation 1102 "as "agent" of the Constitutional
Convention" 55 under Resolution No. 5844 approved on November 22, 1973, and "as agent of the Convention the President could
devise other forms of plebiscite to determine the will of the majority vis-a-vis the ratification of the proposed Constitution." 56

The minutes of November 22, 1972, of the Convention, however, do not at all support this contention. On the contrary, the said
minutes fully show that the Convention's proposal and "agency" was that the President issue a decree precisely calling
a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution on an appropriate date, under the charge of the Comelec, and
with a reasonable period for an information campaign, as follows:

12. Upon recognition by the Chair, Delegate Duavit moved for the approval of the resolution, the resolution
portion of which read as follows:

"RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the 1971 Constitutional

Convention propose to President Ferdinand E. Marcos that a decree be issued calling a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed New Constitution on such appropriate date
as he shall determine and providing for the necessary funds therefor, and that copies of
this resolution as approved in plenary session be transmitted to the President of the
Philippines and the Commission on Elections for implementation."

He suggested that in view of the expected approval of the final draft of the new Constitution by the end of
November 1972 according to the Convention's timetable, it would be necessary to lay the groundwork for the
appropriate agencies of the government to undertake the necessary preparation for the plebiscite.

xxx xxx xxx

12.2 Interpellating, Delegate Pimentel (V.) contended that the resolution was unnecessary because section 15,
Article XVII on the Transitory Provision, which had already been approved on second and third readings,
provided that the new constitution should be ratified in a plebiscite called for the purpose by the incumbent
President. Delegate Duavit replied that the provision referred to did not include the appropriation of funds for
the plebiscite and that, moreover, the resolution was intended to serve formal notice to the President and the
Commission on Elections to initiate the necessary preparations.

xxx xxx xxx

 12.4 Interpellating, Delegate Madarang suggested that a reasonable period for an information campaign was
necessary in order to properly apprise the people of the implications and significance of the new charter.
Delegate Duavit agreed, adding that this was precisely why the resolution was modified to give the President
the discretion to choose the most appropriate date for the plebiscite.

12.5 Delegate Laggui asked whether a formal communication to the President informing him of the adoption
of the new Constitution would not suffice considering that under Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions, the
President would be duty-bound to call a plebiscite for its ratification. Delegate Duavit replied in the negative,
adding that the resolution was necessary to serve notice to the proper authorities to prepare everything
necessary for the plebiscite.

12.6 In reply to Delegate Britanico, Delegate Duavit stated that the mechanics for the holding of
theplebiscite would be laid down by the Commission on Elections in coordination with the President.

12.7 Delegate Catan inquired if such mechanics for the plebiscite could include a partial lifting of martial
law in order to allow the people to assemble peaceably to discuss the new Constitution. Delegate Duavit
suggested that the Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification could coordinate with the COMELEC on the
matter.

12.8 Delegate Guzman moved for the previous question. The Chair declared that there was one more
interpellant and that a prior reservation had been made for the presentation of such a motion.

1.8a Delegate Guzman withdrew his motion.

12.9 Delegate Astilla suggested in his interpellation that there was actually no need for such a resolution in
view of the provision of section 15, Article XVII on the Transitory Provisions. Delegate Duavit disagreed,
pointing out that the said provision did not provide for the funds necessary for the purpose.

13. Delegate Ozamiz then moved to close the debate and proceed to the period of amendment.

13.1 Floor Leader Montejo stated that there were no reservations to amend the resolution.

13.2 Delegate Ozamiz then moved for the previous question. Submitted to a vote, the motion was approved.

Upon request of the Chair, Delegate Duavit restated the resolution for voting.

14.1. Delegate Ordoñez moved for nominal voting. Submitted to a vote, the motion was lost.

57
14.2. Thereupon, the Chair submitted the resolution to a vote. It was approved by a show of hands.

I, therefore, vote to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

Promulga
ted: June
4, 1973 *

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

In conformity with my reservation, I shall discuss the grounds for my concurrence.

It is my view that to preserve the independence of the State, the maintenance of the existing constitutional order and the defense
of the political and social liberties of the people, in times of a grave emergency, when the legislative branch of the government is
unable to function or its functioning would itself threaten the public safety, the Chief Executive may promulgate measures
legislative in character, for the successful prosecution of such objectives. For the "President's power as Commander- in-chief has
been transformed from a simple power of military command to a vast reservoir of indeterminate powers in time of emergency. ...
In other words, the principal canons of constitutional interpretation are ... set aside so far as concerns both the scope of the
national power and the capacity of the President to gather unto himself all constitutionally available powers in order the more
effectively to focus them upon the task of the hour." (Corwin, The President: Office & Powers, pp. 317, 318, [1948]).

1. The proclamation of martial rule, ushered the commencement of a crisis government in this country. In terms of power, crisis
government in a constitutional democracy entails the concentration of governmental power. "The more complete the separation
of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult, and yet the more necessary" according to Rossiter, "will be their fusion in
time of crisis... The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded, it must be freed from the normal
system of constitutional and legal limitations. One of the basic features of emergency powers is the release of the government
from the paralysis of constitutional restraints" (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 290).

It is clearly recognized that in moments of peril the effective action of the government is channeled through the person of the
Chief Executive. "Energy in the executive," according to Hamilton, "is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks ... to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt
the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy." (The Federalist, Number 70). "The entire strength of the nation", said Justice Brewer in the Debs case (158 U.S. 564;
39 L. ed. 1092), "may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security
of all rights entrusted by the constitution to its care." The marshalling and employment of the "strength of the nation" are matters
for the discretion of the Chief Executive. The President's powers in time of emergency defy precise definition since their extent
and limitations are largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances.

2. The power of the President to act decisively in a crisis has been grounded on the broad conferment upon the Presidency of the
Executive power, with the added specific grant of power under the "Commander-in-Chief" clause of the constitution. The
contours of such powers have been shaped more by a long line of historical precedents of Presidential action in times of crisis,
rather than judicial interpretation. Lincoln wedded his powers under the "commander-in-chief" clause with his duty "to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," to justify the series of extraordinary measures which he took — the calling of volunteers for
military service, the augmentation of the regular army and navy, the payment of two million dollars from unappropriated funds in
the Treasury to persons unauthorized to receive it, the closing of the Post Office to "treasonable correspondence", the blockade of
southern ports, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the arrest and detention of persons "who were represented to him" as
being engaged in or contemplating "treasonable practices" — all this for the most part without the least statutory authorization.
Those actions were justified by the imperatives of his logic, that the President may, in an emergency thought by him to require it,
partially suspend the constitution. Thus his famous question: "Are all laws but one to be unexecuted, and the Government itself
go to pieces lest that one be violated?" The actions of Lincoln "assert for the President", according to Corwin, "an initiative of
indefinite scope and legislative in effect in meeting the domestic aspects of a war emergency." (Corwin, The President: Office &
Powers, p. 280 [1948]). The facts of the civil war have shown conclusively that in meeting the domestic problems as a
consequence of a great war, an indefinite power must be attributed to the President to take emergency measures. The concept of
"emergency" under which the Chief Executive exercised extraordinary powers underwent correlative enlargement during the first
and second World Wars. From its narrow concept as an "emergency" in time of war during the Civil War and World War I, the
concept has been expanded in World War II to include the "emergency" preceding the war and even after it. "The Second World
War" observed Corwin and Koenig, was the First World War writ large, and the quasi-legislative powers of Franklin Roosevelt
as "Commander-in-Chief in wartime"... burgeoned correspondingly. The precedents were there to be sure, most of them from the
First World War, but they proliferated amazingly. What is more, Roosevelt took his first step toward war some fifteen months
before our entrance into shooting war. This step occurred in September, 1940, when he handed over fifty so-called overage
destroyers to Great Britain. The truth is, they were not overage, but had been recently reconditioned and recommissioned. ...
Actually, what President Roosevelt did was to take over for the nonce Congress's power to dispose of property of the United
States (Article IV, Section 3) and to repeal at least two statutes." (Corwin & Koenig, The Presidency Today, New York
University Press, 1956; sf Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1948.)

The creation of public offices is a power confided by the constitution to Congress. And yet President Wilson, during World War I
on the basis of his powers under the "Commander-in-Chief" clause created "offices" which were copied in lavish scale by
President Roosevelt in World War II. In April 1942, thirty-five "executive agencies" were purely of Presidential creation. On
June 7, 1941 on the basis of his powers as "Commander-in-Chief", he issued an executive order seizing the North American
Aviation plant of Inglewood, California, where production stopped as a consequence of a strike. This was justified by the
government as the exercise of presidential power growing out of the "duty constitutionally and inherently resting upon the
President to exert his civil and military as well as his moral authority to keep the defense efforts of the United States a going
concern" as well as "to obtain supplies for which Congress has appropriated money, and which it has directed the President to
obtain." On a similar justification, other plants and industries were taken over by the government. It is true that in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube vs. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579; 72 S. Ct. 863; 96 L. Ed. 1153, [1952]), the Supreme Court of the United States did not
sustain the claims that the President could, as the Nation's Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, validly
order the seizure of most of the country's steel mills. The Court however did not face the naked question of the President's power
to seize steel plants in the absence of any congressional enactment or expressions of policy. The majority of the Court found that
this legislative occupation of the field made untenable the President's claim of authority to seize the plants as an exercise of
inherent executive power or as Commander-in-Chief. Justice Clark, in his concurrence to the main opinion of the Court,
explicitly asserted that the President does possess, in the absence of restrictive legislation, a residual or resultant power above or
in consequence of his granted powers, to deal with emergencies that he regards as threatening the national security. The same
view was shared with vague qualification by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, two of the concurring Justices. The three
dissenting Justices, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, apparently went further by quoting with approval a passage extracted
from the brief of the government in the case of United States vs. Midwest Oil Co., (236 U.S. 459 59 L. Ed. 673, 35 S. Ct. 309)
where the court sustained the power of the President to order withdrawals from the public domain not only without Congressional
sanction but even contrary to Congressional statutes.

It is evident therefore that the Steel Seizure Case, cannot be invoked as an authority to support the view that the President in
times of a grave crisis does not possess a residual power above or in consequence of his granted powers, to deal with emergencies
that he regards as threatening the national security. The lesson of the Steel Seizure case, according to Corwin and Koenig,
"Unquestionably ... tends to supplement presidential emergency power to adopt temporary remedial legislation when Congress
has been, in the judgment of the President, unduly remiss in taking cognizance of and acting on a given situation." (Corwin and
Koenig, The Presidency Today, New York University Press, 1956).

The accumulation of precedents has thus built up the presidential power under emergency conditions to "dimensions of executive
prerogative as described by John Locke, of a power to wit, to fill needed gaps in the law, or even to supersede it so far as may be
requisite to realize the fundamental law of nature and government, namely, that as much as may be all the members of society are
to be preserved." (Corwin and Koenig, The Presidency Today).

In the light of the accumulated precedents, how could it be reasonably argued therefore, that the President had no power to issue
Presidential Decree Nos. 86 and 86-A as well as Proclamation No. 1102, since these measures were considered indispensable to
effect the desired reforms at the shortest time possible and hasten the restoration of normalcy? It is unavailing for petitioners to
contend that we are not faced by an actual "shooting war" for today's concept of the emergency which justified the exercise of
those powers has of necessity been expanded to meet the exigencies of new dangers and crisis that directly threaten the nation's
continued and constitutional existence. For as Corwin observed: "... today the concept of 'war' as a special type of emergency
warranting the realization of constitutional limitations tends to spread, as it were, in both directions, so that there is not only "the
war before the war," but the 'war after the war.' Indeed, in the economic crisis from which the New Deal may be said to have
issued, the nation was confronted in the opinion of the late President with an 'emergency greater than war'; and in sustaining
certain of the New Deal measures the Court invoked the justification of 'emergency.' In the final result constitutional practices of
wartime have moulded the Constitution to greater or less extent for peacetime as well, seem likely to do so still more
pronouncedly under fresh conditions of crisis." (Corwin, Ibid. p. 318.)

The same view was expressed by Rossiter thus:

The second crisis is rebellion, when the authority of a constitutional government is resisted openly by large
numbers of citizens who are engaged in violent insurrection against enforcement of its laws or are bent on
capturing it illegally or destroying it altogether. The third crisis, one recognized particularly in modern times
as sanctioning emergency action by constitutional governments, is economic depression. The economic
troubles which plagued all the countries of the world in the early thirties involved governmental methods of
an unquestionably dictatorial character in many democracies. It was thereby acknowledged that an economic
existence as a war or a rebellion. And these are not the only cases which have justified extraordinary
governmental action in nations like the United States. Fire, flood, drought, earthquake, riots, great strikes
have all been dealt with by unusual and of dictatorial methods. Wars are not won by debating societies,
rebellions are not suppressed by judicial injunctions, reemployment of twelve million jobless citizens will not
be effected through a scrupulous regard for the tenets of free enterprise, hardships caused by the eruptions of
nature cannot be mitigated letting nature take its course. The Civil War, the depression of 1933 and the recent
global conflict were not and could not have been successfully resolved by governments similar to those of
James Buchanan, William Howard Taft, or Calvin Coolidge. (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship — Crisis
of Government in the Modern Democracies, p. 6 [1948).

II

We are next confronted with the insistence of Petitioners that the referendum in question not having been done inaccordance with
the provisions of existing election laws, which only qualified voters who are allowed to participate, under the supervision of the
Commission on Elections, the new Constitution, should therefore be a nullity. Such an argument is predicated upon an
assumption, that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provides the method for the revision of the constitution, and automatically
apply in the final approval of such proposed new Constitution the provisions of the election law and those of Article V and X of
the old Constitution. We search in vain for any provision in the old charter specifically providing for such procedure in the case
of a total revision or a rewriting of the whole constitution.

1. There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of
the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing
constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new constitutions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. 1 The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the
1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.

According to an eminent authority on Political Law, "The Constitution of the Philippines and that of the United States expressly
provide merely for methods of amendment. They are silent on the subject of revision. But this is not a fatal omission. There is
nothing that can legally prevent a convention from actually revising the Constitution of the Philippines or of the United States
even were such conventions called merely for the purpose of proposing and submitting amendments to the people. For in the final
analysis, it is the approval of the people that gives validity to any proposal of amendment or revision." (Sinco, Philippine Political
Law, p. 49).

Since the 1935 Constitution does not specifically provide for the method or procedure for the revision or for the approval of a
new constitution, should it now be held, that the people have placed such restrictions on themselves that they are not disabled
from exercising their right as the ultimate source of political power from changing the old constitution which, in their view, was
not responsive to their needs and in adopting a new charter of government to enable them to rid themselves from the shackles of
traditional norms and to pursue with new dynamism the realization of their true longings and aspirations, except in the manner
and form provided by Congress for previous plebiscites? Was not the expansion of the base of political participation, by the
inclusion of the youth in the process of ratification who after all constitute the preponderant majority more in accord with the
spirit and philosophy of the constitution that political power is inherent in the people collectively? As clearly expounded by
Justice Makasiar, in his opinion, in all the cases cited where the Courts held that the submission of the proposed amendment was
illegal due to the absence of substantial compliance with the procedure prescribed by the constitution, the procedure prescribed
by the state Constitution, is so detailed, that specified the manner in which such submission shall be made, the persons qualified
to vote for the same, the date of election and other definite standards, from which the court could safely ascertain whether or not
the submission was in accordance with the Constitution. Thus the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.E. 408) relied upon in one of
the dissenting opinions involved in the application of the provisions of the state Constitution of Minnesota which clearly
prescribed in detail the procedure under which the Constitution may be amended or revised. 2 This is not true with our
Constitution. In the case of revision there are no "standards meet for judicial judgment."3

The framers of our Constitution were free to provide in the Constitution the method or procedure for the revision or rewriting of
the entire constitution, and if such was their intention, they could and should have so provided. Precedents were not wanting. The
constitutions of the various states of the American Union did provide for procedures for their amendment and methods for
their revision.4

Certainly We cannot, under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, remodel or rewrite the 1935 Charter. To declare
what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power, but to declare what the law shall be is not within Our judicial competence and
authority.

Upon the other hand, since our fundamental charter has not provided the method or procedure for the revision or complete
change of the Constitution, it is evident that the people have reserved such power in themselves. They decided to exercise it not
through their legislature, but through a Convention expressly chosen for that purpose. The Convention as an independent and
sovereign body has drafted not an amendment but a completely new Constitution, which decided to submit to the people for
approval, not through an act of Congress, but by means of decrees to be promulgated by the President. In view of the inability of
Congress to act, it was within the constitutional powers of the President, either as agent of the Constitutional Convention, or
under his authority under martial law, to promulgate the necessary measures for the ratification of the proposed new Constitution.
The adoption the new Charter was considered as a necessary basis for all the reforms set in motion under the new society, to root
out the causes of unrest. The imperatives of the emergency underscored the urgency of its adoption. The people in accepting such
procedure and in voting overwhelmingly for the approval of the new Constitution have, in effect, ratified the method and
procedure taken. "When the people adopt completely revised or new constitution," said the Court in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees
(37 SE 2nd 322, 326-330), "the framing or submission of the instrument is not what gives it binding force and effect. The fiat of
the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution."

This has to be so because, in our political system, all political power is inherent in the people and free governments are founded
on their authority and instituted for their benefit. Thus Section 1 of Article II of the 1935 Constitution declares that: "Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanate from them." Evidently the term people refers to the
entire citizenry and not merely to the electorate, for the latter is only a fraction of the people and is only an organ of government
for the election of government officials.

III

The more compelling question, however is: Has this Court the authority to nullify an entire Constitution that is
already effective as it has been accepted and acquiesced in by the people as shown by their compliance with the decree
promulgated thereunder, their cooperation in its implementation, and is now maintained by the Government that is in undisputed
authority and dominance?

Of course it is argued that acquiescence by the people can be deduced from their acts of conformity, because under a regime of
martial law the people are bound to obey and act in conformity with the orders of the President, and has absolutely no other
choice. The flaw of this argument lies in its application of a mere theoretical assumption based on the experiences of other
nations on an entirely different factual setting. Such an assumption flounders on the rock of reality. It is true that as a general rule
martial law is the use of military forces to perform the functions of civil government. Some courts have viewed it as a military
regime which can be imposed in emergency situations. In other words, martial rule exists when the military rises superior to the
civil power in the exercise of some or all the functions of government. Such is not the case in this country. The government
functions thru its civilian officials. The supremacy of the civil over the military authority is manifest. Except for the imposition of
curfew hours and other restrictions required for the security of the State, the people are free to pursue their ordinary concerns.

In short, the existing regime in this Country, does not contain the oppressive features, generally associated with a regime of
Martial law in other countries. "Upon the other hand the masses of our people have accepted it, because of its manifold blessings.
The once downtrodden rice tenant has at long last been emancipated — a consummation devoutly wished by every Philippine
President since the 1930's. The laborer now holds his head high because his rights are amply protected and respected." * A new
sense of discipline has swiftly spread beyond the corridors of government into the social order. Responding to the challenges of
the New Society, the people have turned in half a million loose firearms, paid their taxes on undeclared goods and income in
unprecedented numbers and amount, lent their labors in massive cooperation — in land reform, in the repair of dikes, irrigation
ditches, roads and bridges, in reforestation, in the physical transformation of the environment to make ours a cleaner and greener
land. "The entire country is turning into one vast garden growing food for the body, for thought and for the soul." * More
important the common man has at long last been freed from the incubus of fear.

"Martial law has paved the way for a re-ordering of the basic social structure of the Philippines" reported Frank Valeo to the
United States Senate. "President Marcos has been prompt and sure-footed in using the power of presidential decree under martial
law for this purpose. He has zeroed in on areas which have been widely recognized as prime sources of the nation's
difficulties — land tenancy, official corruption, tax evasion and abuse of oligarchic economic power. Clearly he knows his targets
... there is marked public support for his leadership..." (Bulletin Today, March 3 and 4, 1973)..

In a similar vein, C.L. Sulzberger, a foreign affairs columnist wrote, in the April 11 issue of The New York Times:

During his first Presidential term (1965-1969), Mr. Marcos was discouraged by the failure of legislators to
approve urgently needed reforms. He found his second term further frustrated by spread riots, a Maoist
uprising in Luzon and a much more serious Moslem insurrection in the southern islands from Mindanao
across the Sulu archipelago to the frontier regions of Malaysia and Indonesia. Manila claims this war is
Maoist-coordinated.

Mr. Marcos has now in effect taken all the reins of power and makes no promise as to when he will relinquish
them. But, while fettering a free press, terminating Congress and locking up some opponents (many of whom
were later amnestied), he has hauled the Philippines out of stagnation.

Sharecropping is being ended as more than three million acres of arable land are redistributed with state
funds. New roads have been started. The educational system is undergoing revision, a corruption is
diminished. In non-communist Asia it is virtually impossible to wholly end it and this disagreeable
phenomenon still reaches very high.

Mr. Marcos, an imaginative, gifted man, hopes to reshape society by creating an agrarian middle-class to
replace the archaic sharecropper-absentee landlord relationship. He is even pushing for a birth control
program with the tacit acceptance of the Catholic Church. He has started labor reforms and increased wages.
(Daily Express, April 15, 1973)
As explained in this writer's opinion of April 24, 1973 on the "Constancia" and "Manifestation" of counsel for petitioners:

The new Constitution is considered effective "if the norms created in conformity with it are by and large applied and obeyed. As
soon as the old Constitution loses its effectiveness and the new Constitution has become effective, the acts that appear with the
subjective meaning of creating or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by presupposing the old basic norm, but by
presupposing the new one. The statutes issued under the old Constitution and not taken over are no longer regarded as valid, and
the organs authorized by the old Constitution no longer competent." (Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, [1967].)

The essentially political nature of the question is at once made manifest by understanding that in the final analysis, what is
assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of approval
or ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is addressed more to the framework and political character of this
Government which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already effective.

In such a situation, We do not see how the question posed by petitioners could be judicially decided. "Judicial power presupposes
an established government capable of enacting laws and enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and
administer them. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it
is exercising judicial power." (Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. [7 How.] 1, 12 L. Ed. 598.)

In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political action, the Court whose
existence is affected by such change is, in the words of Mr. Melville Fuller Weston, "precluded from passing upon the fact of
change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted."5 Such change in the organic law relates to the existence of a prior
point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of
powers."6 It involves in essence a matter which "the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments of government
or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action."7

The non-judicial character of such a question has been recognized in American law. "From its earliest opinions this Court has
consistently recognized," said Justice Frankfurter, in his illuminating dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d. 633,
722, 726, 727), "a class of controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies. To classify the
various instances as "political questions" is rather a form of stating this conclusion than revealing of analysis ... The crux of the
matter is that courts are not fit instruments of decision where what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests
of policy traditionally fought out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the actions of governments are made and
unmade."

The diversity of views contained in the opinions of the members of this Court, in the cases at bar, cannot be a case on "right" or
"wrong" views of the Constitution. It is one of attitudes and values. For there is scarcely any principle, authority or interpretation
which has not been countered by the opposite. At bottom, it is the degree of one's faith — in the nation's leadership and in the
maturity of judgment of our people.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dismissal of these five cases, and the conclusion of this Court in its
judgment of March question becomes wholly moot except for this consideration, that, when the judges as
individuals or as a body of individuals come to decide which king or which constitution they will support and
assert to represent, it may often be good judgment for them to follow the lead of the men who as a practical
matter are likely to be looked to by the people as more representative of themselves and conversely are likely
to be more directly in touch with popular sentiment. If, however, the judges hold too strong views of their
own to be able to take this course, they may follow their own leads at their own hazard. No question of law is
involved. (Political Questions, 38 Harvard Law Review [1924-25], pp. 305-309.)

31, 1973 are fully justified.

Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX TO OPINION

(G.R. Nos. L-36142, 36164, 36165, 36236 & 36283)

PROVISIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS SPECIFICALLY

PROVIDING FOR AMENDMENT AND REVISION @
1. Alaska (1959) — Art. XIII. Amendment and Revision.

Sec. 1. Amendments. Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. The
secretary of state shall prepare a ballot title and proposition summarizing each proposed amendment, and shall place them on the
ballot for the next statewide election. If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition favor the amendment, it becomes effective
thirty days after the certification of the election returns by the secretary of state.

Sec. 2. Convention. The legislature may call constitutional conventions at any time.

Sec. 3. Call by referendum. If during any ten-year period a constitutional convention has not been held, the secretary of state shall
place on the ballot for the next general election the question: "Shall there be a Constitutional Convention?" If a majority of the
votes cast on the question are in the negative, the question need not be placed on the ballot until the end of the next ten-year
period. If a majority of the votes cast on the question are in the affirmative, delegates to the convention shall be chosen at the next
regular statewide election, unless the legislature provides for the election of the election delegates at a special election. The
secretary of state shall issue the call for the convention. Unless other provisions have been made by law, the call shall conform as
nearly as possible to the act calling the Alaska Constitutional Convention of 1955, including, but not limited to, number of
members, districts, election and certification of delegates, and submission and ratification of revisions and ordinances. ... .

Sec. 4. Powers. Constitutional conventions shall have plenary power to amend or revise the constitution, subject only to
ratification by the people. No call for a constitutional convention shall limit these powers of the convention.

2. California (1879) — Art. XVIII. Amending and Revising the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Constitutional amendments. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or
Assembly, and if two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the houses shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be entered in their Journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon; and it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner, and at such time, and after such
publication as may be deemed expedient. Should more amendments than one be submitted at the same election they shall be so
prepared and distinguished, by numbers or otherwise, that each can be voted on separately. If the people shall approve and ratify
such amendment or amendments, or any of them, by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon such amendment or
amendments shall become a part of this constitution.

Sec. 2. Constitutional convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature shall deem it
necessary to revise this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general for or against a Convention
for that purpose, and if a majority of the electors voting at such election on the proposition for a Convention shall vote in favor
thereof, the Legislature shall, at its next session, provide by law for calling the same. The Convention shall consist of a number of
delegates not to exceed that of both branches of the Legislature, who shall be chosen in the same manner, and have the same
qualifications, as Members of the Legislature. The delegates so elected shall meet within three months after their election at such
place as the Legislature may direct. At a special election to be provided for by law, the Constitution that may be agreed upon by
such Convention shall be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection, in such manner as the Convention may
determine. The returns of such election shall, in such manner as the Convention shall direct, be certified to the Executive of the
State, who shall call to his assistance the Controller, Treasurer, and Secretary of State, and compare the returns so certified to
him; and it shall be the duty of the Executive to declare, by his proclamation, such Constitution, as may have been ratified by a
majority of all the votes cast at such special election, to be the Constitution of the State of California.

3. Colorado (1876) — Art. XIX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Constitutional convention; how called. The general assembly may at any time be a vote of two-thirds of the members
elected to each house, recommend to the electors of the state, to vote at the next general election for or against a convention
to revise, alter and amend this constitution; and if a majority of those voting on the question shall declare in favor of such
convention, the general assembly shall, at the next session, provide for the calling thereof. The number of members of the
convention shall be twice that of the senate and they shall be elected in the same manner, at the same places, and in the same
districts. The general assembly shall, in the act calling the convention, designate the day, hour and place of its meeting; fix the
pay of its members and officers, and provide for the payment of the same, together with the necessary expenses of the
convention. Before proceeding, the members shall take an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and of the state of
Colorado, and to faithfully discharge their duties as members of the convention. The qualifications of members shall be the same
as of members of the senate; and vacancies occurring shall be filled in the manner provided for filling vacancies in the general
assembly. Said convention shall meet within three months after such election and prepare such revisions, alterations or
amendments to the constitution as may be deemed necessary; which shall be submitted to the electors for their ratification or
rejection at an election appointed by the convention for that purpose, not less than two nor more than six months after
adjournment thereof; and unless so submitted and approved by a majority of the electors voting at the election, no such revision,
alteration or amendment shall take effect.

Sec. 2. Amendments to constitution; how adopted. Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either
house of the general assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, such
proposed amendment or amendments, together with the ayes and noes of each house hereon, shall be entered in full on their
respective journals; the proposed amendment or amendments shall be published with the laws of that session of the general
assembly, and the secretary of state shall also cause the said amendment or amendments to be published in full in not more than
one newspaper of general circulation in each county, for four successive weeks previous to the next general election for members
of the general assembly; and at said election the said amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of
the state for their approval or rejection, and such as are approved by a majority of those voting thereon shall become part of this
constitution.

Provided, that if more than one amendment be submitted at any general election, each of said amendments shall be voted upon
separately and votes thereon cast shall be separately counted the same as though but one amendment was submitted. But the
general assembly shall have no power to propose amendments to more than six articles of this constitution at the same session.

4. Delaware (1897) — Art. XVI. Amendments and Conventions.

Sec. 1. Proposal of constitutional amendments in general assembly; procedure. Any amendment or amendments to this
Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all
the members elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas
and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of State shall cause such proposed amendment or amendments to be published three
months before the next general election in at least three newspapers in each County in which such newspaper shall be published;
and if in the General Assembly next after the said election such proposed amendment or amendments shall upon yea and nay
vote be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, the same shall thereupon become part of the
Constitution.

Sec. 2. Constitutional conventions; procedure; compensation of delegates; quorum; powers and duties; vacancies. The General
Assembly by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each House may from time to time provide for the submission to the
qualified electors of the State at the general election next thereafter the question, "Shall there be a Convention to revise the
Constitution and amend the same?;" and upon such submission, if a majority of those voting on said question shall decide in
favor of a Convention for such purpose, the General Assembly at its next session shall provide for the election of delegates to
such convention at the next general election. Such Convention shall be composed of forty-one delegates, one of whom shall be
chosen from each Representative District by the qualified electors thereof, and two of whom shall be chosen from New Castle
County, two from Kent County and two from Sussex County by the qualified electors thereof respectively. The delegates so
chosen shall convene at the Capital of the State on the first Tuesday in September next after their election. Every delegate shall
receive for his services such compensation as shall be provided by law. A majority of the Convention shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business. The Convention shall have the power to appoint such officers, employees and assistants as it may
be deem necessary, and fix their compensation, and provide for the printing of its documents, journals, debates and proceedings.
The Convention shall determine the rules of its proceedings, and be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members. Whenever there shall be a vacancy in the office of delegate from any district or county by reason of failure to elect,
ineligibility, death, resignation or otherwise, a writ of election to fill such vacancy shall be issued by the Governor, and such
vacancy shall be filled by the qualified electors of such district or county.

5. Florida (1887) — Art. XVII. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Method of amending constitution. Either branch of the Legislature, at any regular session, or at any special or extra-
ordinary session thereof called for such purpose either in the governor's original call or any amendment thereof, may propose the
revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this Constitution. Any such revision or amendment may relate to one subject
or any number of subjects, but no amendment shall consist of more than one revised article of the Constitution.

If the proposed revision or amendment is agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, it shall be entered upon
their respective journals with the yeas and nays and published in one newspaper in each county where a newspaper is published
for two times, one publication to be made not earlier than ten weeks and the other not later than six weeks, immediately
preceding the election at which the same is to be voted upon, and thereupon submitted to the electors of the State for approval or
rejection at the next general election, provided, however, that such revision or amendment may be submitted for approval or
rejection in a special election under the conditions described in and in the manner provided by Section 3 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. If a majority of the electors voting upon the amendment adopt such amendment the same shall become a part of this
Constitution.

Sec. 2. Method of revising constitution. If at any time the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members of both Houses,
shall determine that a revision of this Constitution is necessary, such determination shall be entered upon their respective
Journals, with yea's and nay's thereon. Notice of said action shall be published weekly in one newspaper in every county in which
a newspaper is published, for three months preceding the next general election of Representatives, and in those countries where
no newspaper is published, notice shall be given by posting at the several polling precincts in such counties for six weeks next
preceding said election. The electors at said election may vote for or against the revision in question. If a majority of the electors
so voting be in favor of revision, the Legislature chosen at such election shall provide by law for a Convention to revise the
Constitution, said Convention to be held within six months after the passage of such law. The Convention shall consist of a
number equal to the membership of the House of Representatives, and shall be apportioned among the several counties in the
same manner as members of said House.

6. Idaho (1890) — Art. XIX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. How amendments may be proposed. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either
branch of the legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of each of the two houses, voting
separately, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it
shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general
election, and cause the same to be published without delay for at least six consecutive weeks, prior to said election, in not less
than one newspaper of the general circulation published in each county; and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same,
such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution.

Sec. 3. Revision or amendments by convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at
the next general election, for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have voted
for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session provide by law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist of
a number of members, not less than double the number of the most numerous branch of the legislature.

7. Iowa (1857) — Art. X. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 3. Convention. At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and in each tenth year
thereafter, and also at such times as the General Assembly may, by law, provide, the question, "Shall there be a Convention
to revise the Constitution, and amend the same?" shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members of the General
Assembly; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting at such election, for and against such proposition, shall
decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by law for the election
of delegates to such Convention.

8. Michigan (1909) — Art. XVII. Amendments and Revision.

Sec. 1. Amendments to constitution; proposal by legislature; submission to electors. Any amendment or amendments to this
constitution may be proposed in the senate or house of representatives. If the same shall be agreed to by 2/3 of the members
elected to each house, such amendment or amendments shall be entered on the journals, respectively, with the yeas and nays
taken thereon; and the same shall be submitted to the electors at the next spring or autumn election thereafter, as the legislature
shall direct; and, if a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the legislature voting thereon shall ratify and
approve such amendment or amendments, the same shall become part of the constitution.

Sec. 4. General revision; convention; procedure. At the Biennial Spring Election to be held in the year 1961, in each sixteenth
year thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a General Revision of the Constitution shall be
submitted to the Electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature. In case a majority of the Electors voting on the
question shall decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, at an Election to be held not later than four months after the
Proposal shall have been certified as approved, the Electors of each House of Representatives District as then organized shall
Elect One Delegate for each Electors of each Senatorial District as then organized shall Elect One Delegate for each State Senator
to which the District is entitled. The Delegates so elected shall convene at the Capital City on the First Tuesday in October next
succeeding such election, and shall continue their sessions until the business of the convention shall be completed. A majority of
the delegates elected shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. ... No proposed constitution or amendment adopted
by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for approval as hereinafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all
the delegates elected to the convention, the yeas and nays being entered on the journal. Any proposed constitution or amendments
adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the qualified electors in the manner provided by such convention on the first
Monday in April following the final adjournment of the convention; but, in case an interval of at least 90 days shall not intervene
between such final adjournment and the date of such election. Upon the approval of such constitution or amendments by a
majority of the qualified electors voting thereon such constitution or amendments shall take effect on the first day of January
following the approval thereof.

9. Minnesota (1857) — Art. XIV. Amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 1. Amendments to constitution; majority vote of electors voting makes amendment valid. Whenever a majority of both
houses of the legislature shall deem it necessary to alter or amend this Constitution, they may proposed such alterations
or amendments, which proposed amendments shall be published with the laws which have been passed at the same session, and
said amendments shall be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection at any general election, and if it shall appear, in a
manner to be provided by law, that a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have voted for and ratified such
alterations or amendments, the same shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of this Constitution. If two or more
alterations or amendments shall be submitted at the same time, it shall be so regulated that the voters shall vote for or against each
separately.

Sec. 2. Revision of constitution. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall think it
necessary to call a convention to revise this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general election
for members of the legislature, for or against a convention; and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have
voted for a convention, the legislature shall, at their next session, provide by law for calling the same. The convention shall
consist of as many members as the House of Representatives, who shall be chosen in the same manner, and shall meet within
three months after their election for the purpose aforesaid.

Sec. 3. Submission to people of revised constitution drafted at convention. Any convention called to revise this constitution shall
submit any revision thereof by said convention to the people of the State of Minnesota for their approval or rejection at the next
general election held not less than 90 days after the adoption of such revision, and, if it shall appear in the manner provided by
law that three-fifths of all the electors voting on the question shall have voted for and ratified such revision, the same shall
constitute a new constitution of the State of Minnesota. Without such submission and ratification, said revision shall be of no
force or effect. Section 9 of Article IV of the Constitution shall not apply to election to the convention.

10. Nevada (1864) — Art. 16. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Constitutional amendments; procedure. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the
Senate or Assembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a Majority of all the members elected to each of the two houses, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their respective journals, with the Yeas and Nays taken thereon, and
referred to the Legislature then next to be chosen, and shall be published for three months next preceding the time of making such
choice. And if in the Legislature next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a
majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the Legislature to submit such proposed amendment
or amendments to the people, in such manner and at such time as the Legislature shall prescribe; and if the people shall approve
and ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the Legislature voting
thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the Constitution.

Sec. 2. Convention for revision of constitution; procedure. If at any time the Legislature by a vote of two-thirds of the Members
elected to each house, shall determine that it is necessary to cause a revision of this entire Constitution they shall recommend to
the electors at the next election for Members of the Legislature, to vote for or against a convention, and if it shall appear that a
majority of the electors voting at such election, shall have voted in favor of calling a Convention, the Legislature shall, at its next
session provide by law for calling a Convention to be holden within six months after the passage of such law, and such
Convention shall consist of a number of Members not less that of both branches of the legislature. In determining what is a
majority of the electors voting such election, reference shall be had to the highest number of vote cast at such election for the
candidates of any office or on any question.

11. New Hamspire (1784) —

Art. 99. Revision of constitution provided for. It shall be the duty of the selectmen, and assessors, of the several towns and places
in this state, in warning the first annual meetings for the choice of senators, after the expiration of seven years from the adoption
of this constitution, as amended, to insert expressly in the warrant this purpose, among the others for the meeting, to wit, to take
the sense of the qualified voters on the subject of a revision of the constitution; and, the meeting being warned accordingly, and
not otherwise, the moderator shall take the sense of the qualified voters present as to the necessity of a revision; and a return of
the number of votes for and against such necessity, shall be made by the clerk sealed up, and directed to the general court at their
then next session; and if, it shall appear to the general court by such return, that the sense of the people of the state has taken, and
that, in the opinion of the majority of the qualified voters in the state, present and voting at said meetings, there is a necessity for
a revision of the constitution, it shall be the duty of the general court to call a convention for that purpose, otherwise the general
court shall direct the sense of the people to be taken, and then proceed in the manner before mentioned. The delegates to be
chosen in the same manner, and proportioned, as the representatives to the general court; provided that no alterations shall be
made in this constitution, before the same shall be laid before the towns and unincorporated places, and approved by two thirds of
the qualified voters present and voting on the subject.

12. Oklahoma (1907) — Art. XXIV. Constitutional Amendments.

Sec. 1. Amendments proposed by legislature; a submission to vote. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be
proposed in either branch of the Legislature, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of
the two houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and
referred by the Secretary of State to the people for their approval or rejection, at the next regular general election, except when
the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote of each house, shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of all
the electors voting at such election shall vote in favor of any amendment thereto, it shall thereby become a part of this
Constitution.

If two or more amendments are proposed they shall be submitted in such manner that electors may vote for or against them
separately.

No proposal for the amendment or alteration of this Constitution which is submitted to the voters shall embrace more than one
general subject and the voters shall vote separately for or against each proposal submitted; provided, however, that in the
submission of proposals for the amendment of this Constitution by articles, which embrace one general subject, each proposed
article shall be deemed a single proposals or proposition

Sec. 2. Constitutional convention to propose amendments or new constitution. No convention shall be called by the Legislature to
propose alterations, revisions, or amendments to this Constitution, or to propose a new Constitution, unless the law providing for
such convention shall first be approved by the people on a referendum vote at a regular or special election, and any amendments,
alterations, revisions, or new Constitution, proposed by such convention, shall be submitted to the electors of the State at a
general or special election and be approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, before the same shall become effective
Provided, That the question of such proposed convention shall be submitted to the people at least once in every twenty years.

13. Oregon (1859) — Art. XVII. Amendments and Revisions.

Sec. 1. Method of amending constitution. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch
of the legislative assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each of the two houses,
such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and referred by the
secretary of state to the people for their approval or rejection, at the next regular election, except when the legislative assembly
shall order a special election for that purpose. If a majority of the electors voting on any such amendment shall vote in favor
thereof, it shall thereby become a part of this Constitution. The votes for and against such amendment, or amendments, severally,
whether proposed by the legislative assembly or by initiative petition, shall be canvassed by the secretary of state in the presence
of the governor, and if it shall appear to the governor that the majority of the votes cast at said election on said amendment, or
amendments, severally, are cast in favor thereof, it shall be his duty forthwith after such canvass, by his proclamation, to declare
the said amendment, or amendments, severally, having received said majority of votes to have been adopted by the people of
Oregon as part of the Constitution thereof, and the same shall be in effect as a part of the Constitution from the date of such
proclamation. When two or more amendments shall be submitted in the manner aforesaid to the voters of this state at the same
election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately. No convention shall be called to amend or
propose amendments to this Constitution, or to propose a new Constitution, unless the law providing for such convention shall
first be approved by the people on a referendum vote at a regular general election. This article shall not be construed to impair the
right of the people to amend this Constitution by vote upon an initiative petition therefor.

Sec. 2. Method of revising constitution. (1) In addition to the power to amend this Constitution granted by section 1, Article IV,
and section 1 of this Article, a revision of all or part of this Constitution may be proposed in either house of the Legislative
Assembly and, if the proposed revision is agreed to by at least two-thirds of all the members of each house, the proposed revision
shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered in their journals and referred by the Secretary of State to the people for their
approval or rejection, notwithstanding section 1, Article IV of this Constitution, at the next regular state-wide primary election,
except when the Legislative Assembly orders a special election for that purpose. A proposed revision may deal with more than
one subject and shall be voted upon as one question. The votes for and against the proposed revision shall be canvassed by the
Secretary of State in the presence of the Governor and, if it appears to the Governor that the majority of the votes cast in the
election on the proposed revision are in favor of the proposed revision, he shall, promptly following the canvass, declare, by his
proclamation, that the proposed revision has received a majority of votes and has been adopted by the people as the Constitution
of the State of Oregon, as the case may be. The revision shall be in effect as the Constitution or as a part of this Constitution from
the date of such proclamation.

14. Utah (1896) — Art. 23. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Amendments; method of proposal and approval. Any amendments to his Constitution may be proposed in either house of
the Legislature, and if two-thirds of all the members elected of the two houses, shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be entered on their respective journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon; and the Legislature
shall cause the same to be published in at least one newspaper in every county of the State, where a newspaper is published, for
two months immediately preceding the next general election, at which time the said amendment or amendments shall be
submitted to the electors of the State, for their approval or rejection, and if a majority of the electors voting thereon shall approve
the same, such amendment or amendments shall become part of this Constitution. If two or more amendments are proposed, they
shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each of them separately.

Sec. 2. Revision of the Constitution by convention. Whenever two-thirds of the members, elected to each branch of the
Legislature, shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the
electors to vote at the next general election, for or against a convention, and, if a majority of all the electors, voting at such
election, shall vote for a convention. The Legislature, at its next session, shall provide by law for calling the same. The
convention shall consist of not less than the number of members in both branches of the Legislature.

15. Wyoming (1890) — Art. XX. Amendments.

Sec. 1. Procedure for amendments. Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the
legislature, and, if the same shall be agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of the two houses, voting separately, such
proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and it shall be the duty
of the legislature to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the state at the next general election, in at least one
newspaper of general circulation, published in each county, and if a majority of the electors shall ratify the same, such
amendment or amendments shall become a part of this constitution.

Sec. 2. How voted for. If two or more amendments are proposed, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors shall
vote for or against each of them separately.

Sec. 3. Constitutional convention; provision for. Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at
the next general election for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at such election shall have voted
for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session provide by a law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist
of a number of members, not less than double that of the most numerous branch of the legislature.

Sec. 4. New constitution. Any constitution adopted by such convention shall have no validity until it has been submitted to and
adopted by the people.

Footnotes

1 Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra.

2 Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Fernando and Teehankee.

3 Justice Zaldivar.

4 Case G.R. No. L-36164.

5 Case G.R. No. L-36236.

6 Case G.R. No. L-36293.

7 Who withdrew as petitioner on January 25, 1973.

8 Originally, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla and Salvador H. Laurel. Now, after the withdrawal of the
latter, the first two (2) only.

9 Namely, Jovito R. Salonga, Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw.

10 Napoleon V. Dilag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.

11 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 431, 437-438. See, also, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
L-28196 & L-28224, Nov. 9, 1967. Emphasis ours.

12 Art. VI, sec. 20(1), Constitution.

13 Art. VII, sec. 10(7), Constitution.

14 Emphasis ours.

15 See page 4, last paragraph, of his Comment dated Feb. 6, 1973.

16 In re Opinion of Justices, 107 Atl. 673, 5 A.L.R. 1412; Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. Rep. 963; McAdams
v. Henley, 273 S.W. 355; Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 74 N.D. 1, 168 A.L.R. 621, 24 N.W. 2d. 907; State ex
rel. Landis, Atty. Gen. v. Thompson, 163 So. Rep. 270; St. Louis Brewing Association v. Moore, 64 L. ed.
947; Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. Rep. 1, 18; Johnson v. Craft, 87 So. Rep. 375.

17 Mun. of Malabang v. Benito, L-28113, Mar. 28, 1969; NAWASA v. Piguing, et al., L-35573, Oct. 11,
1968; Fernandez v. P. Cuerva & Co., L-21114, Nov. 25, 1967; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-
28224, Nov. 29, 1967; Bara Lidasan v. COMELEC, L-28089, Oct. 25, 1967; Mun. of San Juan v. NAWASA,
L-22047, Aug. 31, 1967; Mun. of San Joaquin v. Siva, L-19870, Mar. 18, 1967; Pelayo v. Auditor General,
L-23825, Dec. 24, 1965; Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, L-23326, Dec. 18, 1965; Mun. of
La Carlota v. NAWASA, L-20232, Sept. 30, 1964; Guevara v. Inocentes, L-25577, Mar. 15, 1966; Gillera v.
Fernandez, L-20741, Jan. 31, 1964; Siguiente v. Secretary of Justice, L-20370, Nov. 29, 1963; Mun. of
Naguilian v. NAWASA, L-18540, Nov. 29, 1963; Herrera v. Liwag, L-20079, Sept. 30, 1963; Aytona v.
Castillo, L-19313, Jan. 19, 1962; La Mallorca, etc. v. Ramos, et al., L-15476, Sept. 19, 1961; Tan v. De Leon,
et al., L-15254, Sept. 16, 1961; Macias v. Commission on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961; Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. v. Sabugo, et al., L-16017, Aug. 31, 1961; Miller v. Mardo, L-
15138, July 31, 1961; Cu Bu Liong v. Estrella, et al., L-14212, July 31, 1961; Pampanga Sugar Development
Co., Inc. v. Fuentes, et al., L-14738, July 31, 1961; Earnshaw Docks & Honolulu Iron Works v. Mardo, et al.,
L-14759, July 31, 1961; Liwanag v. Central Azucarera Don Pedro, L-15372, July 31, 1961; Lecura v.
Regional Office No. 3, etc., L-15582, July 31, 1961; Pitogo v. Sen Bee Trading Co., et al., L-15693, July 31,
1961; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works and Communications, L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960; Corominas, Jr. v.
Labor Standards Commission, L-14837, June 30, 1961; City of Baguio v. NAWASA, L-12032, Aug. 31,
1959; City of Cebu v. NAWASA, L-12892, April 20,1960; Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101
Phil. 490, Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368; Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil.
322.

18 G.R. Nos. L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961,
L-35965 and L-35979, decided on January 22, 1973..

19 L-33964, Teodosio Lansang, et al. v. Brigadier-General Eduardo M. Garcia; L-33965, Rogelio V. Arienda
v. Secretary of National Defense, et al.; L-33973, Luzvimindo David v. Gen. Eduardo Garcia, et al.; L-33962,
Felicidad G. Prudente v. General Manuel Yan, et al.; L-34004, Domingo E. de Lara v. Brigadier-General
Eduardo M. Garcia; L-34013, Reynaldo Rimando v. Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia; L-34039, Carlos C.
Rabago v. Brig. Gen. Eduardo Garcia, et al.; L-34265, Antolin Oreta, Jr. v. Gen. Eduardo Garcia, et al.; and
L-34339, Gary B. Olivar, et al. v. Gen. Eduardo Garcia, et al.
20 5 Phil. 87.

21 91 Phil. 882.

22 G.R. Nos. L-28196 and L-28224, Nov. 9, 1967.

23 78 Phil. 1.

24 Supra.

25 In re McConaughy, 119 N.W. 408, 417.

26 103 Phil. 1051, 1067.

27 119 N.W. 408, 411, 417.

28 92 Ky. 589,18 S.W. 522, 523.

29 Citing Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. Rep. 738, and 15 N.W. Rep. 609; State v. Tufly, 19 Nev.
391, 12 Pac. Rep. 835.

30 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 157. Emphasis ours.

31 12 L. ed. 581 (1849).

32 Luther v. Borden, supra, p. 598. Emphasis ours.

33 In re McConaughy, supra, p. 416. Emphasis ours.

34 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. ed. 2d. 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (March 26, 1962).

35 395 U.S. 486, 23 L. ed. 2d. 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969).

36 In re McConaughy, 119 N.W. 408, 415. Emphasis ours. The observation as to the uniformity of authorities
on the matter has been reiterated in Winget v. Holm, 244 N.W. 329, 332.

37 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. ed. 2d 663, 686, 82 S. Ct. 691.

38 See p. 5 of the Petition.

39 Emphasis ours.

40 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, by Aruego, Vol. I p. 215.

41 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, by Aruego, Vol. I pp. 215, 221, 227-228.

42 Ibid., pp. 222-224.

43 Id., pp. 224-227.

44 SEC. 431. Qualifications prescribed for voters. — Every male person who is not a citizen or subject of a
foreign power, twenty-one years of age or over, who shall have been a resident of the Philippines for one year
and of the municipality in which he shall offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting is
entitled to vote in all elections if comprised within either of the following three classes:
"(a) Those who, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands upon the twenty-eighth day of August,
nineteen hundred and sixteen, were legal voters and had exercised the right of suffrage.

"(b) Those who own real property to the value of five hundred pesos, declared in their name for taxation
purposes for a period not less than one year prior to the date of the election, or who annually pay thirty pesos
or more of the established taxes.

"(c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, English, or a native language.

"SEC. 432. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:

"(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon.

"(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States.

"(c) Insane or feeble-minded persons.

"(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.

"(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next preceding section who, after failing to make a sworn
statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision,
that they are incapacitated preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present themselves at
the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective whether such incapacity be real or feigned."

45 L-34150, October 16 and November 4, 1971.

46 "For taking action on any of the above enumerated measures, majority vote of all the barrio
assembly members registered in the list of the barrio secretary is necessary."

47 "All duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote may vote in the plebiscite. Voting
procedures may be made either in writing as in regular elections, and/or declaration by the voters to the board
of election tellers. The board of election tellers shall be the same board envisioned by section 8, paragraph 2
of this Act, in case of vacancies in this body, the barrio council may fill the same."

48 Edwards v. Lesueur, 33 S.W. 1130; Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071; Ellingham v. Dye
(1912), 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1; State v. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354, 152 N.W. 419.

49 In Alcantara v. Secretary of the Interior, 61 Phil. 459, this Court held that "when a state constitution
enumerates and fixes the qualifications of those who may exercise the right of suffrage, the
legislature cannot take from nor add to said qualifications unless the power to do so is conferred upon it by
the constitution itself."

Since suffrage, according to Webster, is a voice given not only in the choice of a man for an office or trust,
but, also, in deciding a controverted question, it follows, considering the said ruling in Alcantara, that the
constitutional qualifications for voters apply equally to voters in elections to public office and to voters in a
plebiscite.

Similarly, the Revised Election Code provides in its section 2 that all elections of public officers by the
people and all votings in connection with plebiscites shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions of
said Code.

50 Republic Act No. 6388, section 101 of which, in part, provides:

"SEC. 101. Qualifications prescribed for a voter. — Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, twenty-one years of age or over, able to read and write, who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the city, municipality or municipal district wherein he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election, may vote at any election.

xxx xxx xxx

51 "SEC. 102. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

"(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer an imprisonment of not less than one
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon: Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of ten
years after service of sentence unless during such period, he shall have been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer an imprisonment of not less than one year.

"(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court of having violated his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

"(c) Insane or feeble-minded persons.

"(d) Persons who cannot prepare their ballots themselves."

52 "SEC. 10. ...

"The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

"a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment, within
two years after service of his sentence;

"b. Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

"c. Insane or feeble-minded persons."

53 20 C.J., 179-181, quoted in Demetrio v. Lopez, 50 Phil. 45, 60. See, also, Garchitorena v. Crescini, 39
Phil. 258.

54 Baldauf v. Gunson, 8 P. 2d. 265. See, also, Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, Glenn v. Gnau, 64 S.W. 2d.
168. Emphasis ours.

55 L-33325 and L-34043, December 29, 1971.

56 Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 83 N.W. 536, 538. Emphasis ours.

57 Maddox v. Board of State Canvassers, 149 P. 2d. 112, 115. Emphasis ours.

58 Port of Palm Beach District v. State, 22 So. 2d. 581, 582-583. Emphasis ours.

59 Art. X, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.

60 Ten (10) years.

61 Art. X, section 2 of the 1935 Constitution.

62 Ibid.
63 Art. X, section 3 of the 1935 Constitution.

64 "SEC. 5. Organization of the Commission on Elections. — The Commission shall adopt its own rules of
procedure. Two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. The concurrence of two members
shall be necessary for the pronouncement or issuance of a decision, order or ruling.

"The Commission shall have an executive and such other subordinate officers and employees as may be
necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and duties, all of whom shall be appointed by the
Commission in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules.

"The executive officer of the Commission, under the direction of the Chairman, shall, have charge of the
administrative business of the Commission, shall have the power to administer oaths in connection with all
matters involving the business of the Commission, and shall perform such, other duties as may he required of
him by the Commission.

"SEC. 6. Power of the Commission to Investigate and to Hear Controversy and Issue Subpoena. — The
Commission or any of the members thereof shall, in compliance with the requirement of due process, have
the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenae and subpoenae duces
tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such
power to any officer of the Commission who shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. In case of failure of a
witness to attend, the Commission, upon proof of service of thesubpoenae to said witness, may issue a
warrant to arrest the witness land bring him before the Commission or officer before whom his attendance is
required. The Commission shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court under
the controversy submitted to the Commission shall after complaince with the requirements of due process be
heard and decided by it within thirty days after submission of the case.

"The Commission may, when it so requires, deputized any member of any national or local law enforcement
agency and/or instrumentality of the government to execute under its direct and immediate supervision any of
its final decisions, orders, instructions or rulings.

"Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on election controversies may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of a certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or such applicable laws as may enacted.

"Any violation of any final executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt
thereof."

65 64 S.W. 2d. 168.

66 L-35538, Roses, et al. v. Secretary of National Defense, et al.; L-35539, Diokno v. Hon. Enrile, et al.; L-
35540, Soliven, et al. v. Secretary of National Defense, et al.; L-35546, Aquino, Jr., et al. v. Hon. Enrile, et
al.; L-35547, Garcia II v. Hon. Enrile, et al.; L-35567 Doronila, et al. v. Secretary of National Defense, et al.;
L-35573, Randon v. Hon. Enrile, et al.

67 "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-A

"STRENGTHENING AND DEFINING THE ROLE OF

BARANGAYS (CITIZENS ASSEMBLIES).

"WHEREAS, on the basis of preliminary and initial reports from the field as gathered from barangays
(citizens assemblies) have so far been established, the people would like to decide themselves questions or
issues, both local and national, affecting their day to day lives and their future.

"WHEREAS, the barangays (citizens assemblies) would like themselves to be the vehicle for expressing the
views of the people on important national issues;

"WHEREAS, such barangays (citizens assemblies) desire that they be given legal status and due recognition
as constituting the genuine, legitimate and valid expression of the popular will; and
"WHEREAS, the people would like the citizens assemblies to conduct immediately a referendum on certain
specified questions such as the ratification of the new Constitution, continuance of martial law, the convening
of Congress on January 22, 1973, and the elections in November 1973 pursuant to the 1935 Constitution.

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby
declare as part of the law of the land the following.

"1. The present barangays (citizens assemblies) are created under Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December
31, 1972, shall constitute the base for citizen participation in governmental affairs and their collective views
shall be considered in the formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be
translated into concrete and specific decision;

"2. Such barangays (citizens assemblies) shall consider vital national issues now confronting the country, like
the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution, the continuation of martial rule, the convening of
Congress on January 22, 1973, and the holding of elections in November 1973, and others in the future,
which shall serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the national government;

"3. The barangays (citizens assemblies) shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on
important national issues, including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit the results thereof to
the Department of Local Governments and Community Development immediately thereafter, pursuant to the
express will of the people as reflected in the reports gathered from the many thousands of barangays (citizens
assemblies) throughout the country.

"4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
three." (Emphasis ours.).

68 McKinney v. Baker, 180 Ky. 526 203 S.W. 303, 304. Emphasis ours.

69 Art. VII, section 2, 1935 Constitution.

70 Michael W. Roche v. Lamb, 306 N.Y.S. 2d. 515 (Dec. 17, 1969); State ex rel. Sathre v. Bryne, 258 N.W.
121; State ex rel. Shriver v. Hayes, 76 N.E. 2d. 869; Smith v. Bangham, 76 p 2d. 1022. McKim v. Brast, 117
S.E. 875; Head v. Wood, 107 So. 854; State ex rel. Watson v. Pigg, 46 N.E. 2d. 232.

71 See cases cited in the preceding footnote. See, also, Tiegs v. Patterson, 318 P. 2d. 588; State ex rel. Brown
v. St. Joseph Circuit Court, 95 N.E. 2d. 632; Williamson v. State Election Board, 431 P. 2d. 352, Baker v.
Conway, 108 So. 18; Cohoon v. Swain, 5 S.E. 2d. 1; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Walcott, 83 A. 2d. 762; Doyle
v. Ries, 285 N.W. 480; Grossglaus v. Board of Elections of Stark County, 88 N.E. 2d. 245; Walker v.
Hughes, 36 A. 2d. 47; Reese v. Dempsey, 152 P. 2d. 157; Dodd v. Gower, 62 S.W. 2d. 1; Galloway v.
Bradburn, 82 S.W. 1013; Hagan v. Henry, 76 S.W. 2d. 994.

72 106 Minn 392, 119 N.W. 408, 409.

73 63 N.J. Law, 289, cited in In re McConaughy, supra.

74 78 Ark. 439, 96 S.W. 396, cited in In re McConaughy, supra.

75 See cases listed on pages 105-106, footnotes 56, 57 and 58.

76 On December 19, 1972.

77 24 Kansas 700, 714. See, also, State ex rel. Williams v. Robb, 183 P. 2d. 223, 228; Harris v. Shanahan,
387 P. 2d. 771, 784, 785.
78 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.ed. 2d. 663, 684, citing Chaselton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547, 548, 68 L. ed.
841, 843, 44 S. Ct. 405.

79 Art. VII, section 10, paragraph (1).

80 101 Va. 529, 44 S.E. 754.

81 Marifosque, et al. v. Luna, 101 Phil. 1223 (unreported); 37 Am. Jur. 669; 62 C.J.S. 749-750; Guevara v.
Inocentes, L-25577, March 15, 1966.

82 Which, in some respects, is regarded as an organ of the Administration, and the news items published
therein are indisputably censored by the Department of Public Information.

83 Daily Express, November 29, 1972, p. 4. Emphasis ours.

84 231 U.S. 28, 58 L. ed. 107, 114, 34 S. Ct. 1.

85 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. ed. 2d. 663, 82 S.Ct. 691.

86 Justice Barredo's opinion in the plebiscite cases.

87 Joint Opinion of Justices Makalintal and Castro, p. 153.

88 Justice Barredo's language.

89 At p. 153, joint opinion of Justices Makalintal and Castro.

90 Joint Opinion of Justices Makalintal and Castro, p. 153.

91 At p. 8, Idem.

ANNEX B

* The undersigned (Justice Querube C. Makalintal) who had reserved his right to do so, filed a separate
dissenting opinion when the Court denied a motion for reconsideration, and voted in favor of the validity of
the questioned Resolution. Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando joined in the dissent.

* Thus by Presidential Decree No. 86 what the Constitutional Convention itself had proposed unsuccessfully
as an amendment to the 1935 Constitution, reducing the voting age from 21 to 18, but the submission of
which to a plebiscite was declared invalid by this Court in Tolentino vs. COMELEC, became a reality of an
even more far-reaching import — since fifteen-year olds were included in the Citizens Assemblies.

* According to the Solicitor General 92 Congressmen and 15 Senators (both numbers constituting majorities)
have expressed their option.

* Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Haw.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849).

BARREDO, J., CONCURRING:

1 Charito Planas vs. Comelec, et al., L-35925, January 22, 1973; Pablo C. Sanidad vs. Comelec,
L-35929, January 22, 1973; Gerardo Roxas, etc., et al. vs. Comelec, et al., L-35940, January 22, 1973; Eddie
B. Monteclaro vs. Comelec, et al., L-35941, January 22, 1973; Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al., vs. The National
Treasurer of the Philippines, et al., L-35942, January 22, 1973; Vidal Tan, et al., vs. Comelec, et al., L-35948,
January 22, 1973; Jose W. Diokno, et al., vs. Comelec,
L-35953, January 22, 1973; Jacinto Jimenez vs. Comelec, et al., L-35961, January 22, 1973; Raul M.
Gonzales vs. Comelec, et al., L-35965, January 22, 1973 and Ernesto Hidalgo vs. Comelec, et al., L-35979,
January 22, 1973.

2 Executive Agreements are not included in the corresponding provision of the 1935 Constitution.

3 It Must be recalled that in the Tolentino case, the Constitutional Convention intended to submit one
amendment which was to form part of the Constitution still being prepared by it separately from the rest of
the other parts of such constitution still unfinished, and We held that a piece-meal submission was improper.
We had no occasion to express any view as to how a whole new Constitution may be ratified.

* In 1880, he also wrote his "Constitutional Law." Judge Cooley, who was born in Attica, New York in 1824,
died in 1898. Judge Cooley was also professor and later dean of the Law Department of the University of
Michigan and Justice of the State Supreme Court of Michigan from 1864 to 1885, when he failed to win re-
election to the court.

ESGUERRA, J., CONCURRING:

1 Charito Planas v. Commission on Elections, et al., L-35925; Pablo C. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,
L-35929; Gerardo Roxas, etc., et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., L-35940; Eddie B. Monteclaro v. The
Commission on Elections, et al., Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al. v. The National Treasurer of Philippines, et al., L-
35942; Vidal Tan, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., L-35948; Jose W. Diokno, et al. v. The
Commission on Elections, L-35953; Jacinto Jimenez v. Commission on Elections, et al., L-35961; Raul M.
Gonzales v. The Honorable Commission on Elections, et al., L-35965; Ernesto Hidalgo v. Commission
Elections, et al.,
L-35979.

2 See Tañada, et al. v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

3 See 16 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 468, Note 14, and cases cited therein.

4 Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 NW 251.

5 L-38196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774.

6 83 Phil. 1957.

7 McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 119 N.W. 408, 413; 32A Words and Phrases p. 516. See also the
plebiscite cases, mentioned in footnote 1, ante.

8 Cooley, Constitutional Limitation, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 82.

9 39 Phil. 258, 268.

10 69 Phil. 199, 204.

11 70 Phil. 28, 31.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

1 Memorandum for Respondents, 2.

2 According to the 1935 Constitution: "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part
of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification." Art. XV, Section 1.
3 Lerner, Ideas are Weapons, 426 (1939). Earlier, in this collection of essays, Lerner made this not-entirely-
inaccurate observation: "No governmental institution that consists of a group of legal technicians appointed
for life can ever hope to cope with, much less solve, the exigent problems of our polity." Ibid, 231. He was
referring of course to the Supreme Court of the United States.

4 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 25-26 (1938).

5 Black, The People and the Court (1960).

6 Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964).

7 Cf. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Vera
v. Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351.

8 Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774.

9 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, L-24150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702.

10 Planas v. Commission on Elections, L-35925, Jan. 25, 1973.

11 256 US 368 (1921).

12 Ibid, 374-375.

13 L-33964, Dec. 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.

14 Ibid, 504-505.

15 Dodd, Judicially Nonenforceable Provisions of Constitutions, in I Selected Essays on Constitutional Law

355, 387 (1938).

16 Ibid, 395.

I7 Weston, Political Questions, I Selected Essays an Constitutional Law 418, 422 (1938)..

18 Cf. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).

19 Cf. Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court (1950). Also his The Supreme Court of the United
States (1962).

20 Laurel, S., VII Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-1935), Appendix L, 800.

21 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

22 Ibid, 96.

23 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

24 L-35925, January 22, 1973.

25 Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review in Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1938
1962, 1, 2 (1963).

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, 3.

28 Ibid, 3-4. The decision of Justice Frankfurter referred to is that of Rochin v. People of California, 342 US
165 (1952).

29 Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren, 154 (1967). The words of Justice Frankfurter found in
his opinion in Stein v. New York, 346 US 156 (1953).

30 Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis, 293 (1956).

31 Corwin, Judicial Review in I Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 449, 450 (1938).

32 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

33 Curtis, Lions Under the Throne, 12 (1947).

34 Addresses and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, 139-140 (1908).

35 Jackson, Robert H. The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 3 (1949).

36 Haines, Charles Grove, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1789-1835,
3 (1960).

37 369 US 186.

38 395 US 486.

39 328 US 549 (1946).

40 Ibid, 556.

41 Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1, 11 L ed 2d 481, 84 S Ct. (1964); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 US 52,
11 L ed 2d 512, 84 S Ct (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 12 L ed 2d 506, 84 S Ct 1362 (1964);
WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 US 633, 12 L ed 2d 568, 84 S Ct. (1964); Maryland Committee v. Tauses, 377 US
656, 12 L ed 2d 595, 84 S Ct. 1442 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 US 678, 12 L ed 2d 609, 84 S Ct. 1453
(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 US 695, 12 L ed 2d 620, 84 S.Ct. 1462 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, 377 US 713, L ed 2d 632, 84 S Ct. 1472 (1964); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 us 433, 13 L ed 2d 401,
85 S Ct. 498 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 US 73, 16 L ed 2d 376, 86 S Ct. 1286 (1966); Sailors v. Kent
Board of Education, 387 US 105, 18 L ed 2d 650, 87 S Ct. 1549 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 US 112, 18 L
ed 2d 656, 87 S Ct. 1554 (1967).

42 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

43 Ibid, 56.

44 New York Times Company v. United States, 29 L ed. 822 (1971).

45 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 72 Harv. Law Review 77 (1959). It is the
first essay in his Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law.

46 The principal articles are: Pollak, Constitutional Adjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. Pub.
L. 48 (1962); Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of Profession, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123, 136-
46 (1962); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 637 (1961);
Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In re Meaning, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 553 (1961); Miller, A Note on the
Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions, 10 J. Pub. L. 139 (1961), Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot be
Neutral, 40 Texas L. Rev. 599 (1961); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 (1960);
Black, The Lawfulness of the Segration Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421 (1960); Griswold, Of Time and
Attitudes: Professor art and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81 (1960); Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Supreme Court Rev. 75; Miller and Howell The Myth of Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 27U. Chi. L. Rev. 661 (1960); Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral
Principles, 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 571 (1960); Hart, Forward, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
84 (1959); Pollak, Racial Domination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1 (1959).

47 Cahn, Supreme Court and Supreme Law, 40 (1954).

46 Cf. Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1089 (1957).

49 Collier v. Frierson, 124 Ala. 100 (1854); Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650 (1856); Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark.
545 (1871); Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 14 NW 738 (1883); McMillan v. Blattner, 67 Iowa 287, 25 NW
245 (1885); State v. Davis, 2D Neb. 220, 19 Pac. 894 (1888); State v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840
(1894); Russie v. Brazzell, 128 Mo. 93, 30 SW 526 (1895); State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927 (1900);
State v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa 250, 84 NW 1064 (1901); In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 NE 359 (1901); Utter
v. Moseley, 16 Idaho 274, 100 P. 1058 (1909); Willis v. Kalbach, 109 Va. 475, 64 SE 342 (1909); People ex
rel. Swift v. Luce, 74 Misc. Rep. 551, 133 US 9 (1912); McCreary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 162 SW 99 (1914);
State v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 NW 331 (1915); State v. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354, 152 NW 419 (1915); State
v. Campbell, 94 Ohio St. 403, 115 NE 29 (1916); In re Opinion of Justices, 226 Mars. 607, 115 NE 921
(1917); Scott v. Vouchan, 202 Mich. 692, 168 NW 709 (1918); Hooper v. State, 89 So. 593, 206 Ala. 371
(1921); Switzer v. State, 103 Ohio St. 306, 133 NE 552 (1921); Johnson v. Craft, 87 So. 375, 205 Ala. 386
(1921); In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mars. 589, 130 NE 202 (1921); Power v. Robertson, 130 Miss. 188,
93 So. 769 (1922); Hamilton v. Deland, 191 NW 829, 221 Mich. 541 (1923); In re Initiative Petition, 89 Okl.
124, 214 P. 186 (1923); Armstrong v. King, 281 Pa. 207, 126 A. 263 (1924); McAdams v. Henley, 169 Ark.
97, 273 SW 355 (1925); Heinitsh v. Floyd, 130 SC 434, 126 SE 336 (1925); State v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis.
180, 204 NW 803 (1925); Brown v. City of New York, 125 Misc. Rep. 1, 210 NYS 786 (1926); State ex rel.
Bahns v. City of New Orleans, 163 La. 777 So. 718 (1927); Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., 145 SC 196, 143 SE
31 (1928); Lane v. Lukens, 48 Idaho 517, 283 P. 532 (1929); School Dist. of City of Pontiac v. City of
Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338, 247 NW 474 (1933); Collier v. Gray, 116 Fla. 845, 157 So. 40 (1934); In re Opinion
to Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935); State ex rel Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860,163 So. 270
(1935); Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235 (1938); Downs v. City of Bromingham, 240 Ala. 177,
198 So. 231 (1940); Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941); Pearson v. Taylor, 159 Fla. 775, 32
So. 2d 826 (1947); Palmer v. Dunn, 216 SC 558, 59 SE 158 (1950).

50 Cf. Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, 15 Am. Rep. 563 (1874); Senate File No. 31, 25 Neb. 864, 41 NW 981
(1889); State v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 Pac. 190 (1893); Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 Pac. 221 (1894);
Hays v. Hays, 5 Idaho 154, 47 P. 732 (1897); Lovett v. Ferguson, 10 SD 44, 71 NW 756 (1897); Russell v.
Grey, 164 Mo. 69, 63 SW 849 (1901); Gabbert v. Chicago, R.I. Ry. Co. 171 Mo. 84, 70 SW (1902); People
v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 102 74 P. 167 (1903); People v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 NW 262 (1904); West v.
State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 So. 412 (1905); State v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 NW 113 (1907); Farrell v. Port of
Columbia, 50 Or. 169, 93 P. 254 (1908); In re Mcconaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 119 NW 408 (1909); Fletcher v.
Gifford, 20 Idaho 18, 115 P. 824 (1911); Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 SE 479 (1911), Crawford v.
Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963 (1912); Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913); State v.
Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 P. 374 (1913); Tabor v. City of Walla Walla, 77 Wash. 579, 137 P. 1040 (1914);
State v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914); Ramsey v. Persinger, 43 Okl. 41,141 P. 13 (1914); Cress
v. Estes, 43 Okl. 213 P. 411 (1914); Cooney v. Foote, 142 Ga. 647, 83 SE 537 (1914); Hildreth v. Taylor,
117 Ark. 465, 175 SW 40 (1915); Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala. 230, 75 So. 988 (1917); State v. Wetz, 40 N.D.
299, 168 NW 835 (1918); Ex Parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 P. 319 (1919); Lee V. Price, 54 Utah, 474, 181 P.
948 (1919), Erwin v. Nolan, 280 Mo. 401, 217 SW 752 (1922); Boyd v. Olcott, 102 Or. 327, 202 P. 431
(1921); Thompson v. Livingston, 116 S.C. 412, 107 SE 581 (1921); Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138
NE 532 (1922); Brawner v. Curran, 141 Ind. 586, 119 A. 250 (1922); Fahey v. Hackmann, 291 Mo. 351 SW
752 (1922); Goolsby v. Stephens, 155 Ga. 529, 117 SE 439 (1923); Manos v. State, 98 Tax. Cr. 87, 263 SW
310 (1924); State v. Zimmermann, 187 Wis. 180, 208 NW 803 (1925); Taylor v. King, 284 Pa. 235, 130 A.
407 (1925); Board of Liquidation of State Debt of Louisiana v. Whitney-Central Trust and Savings Bank, 168
La. 560, 122 So. 850 (1929); State v. Cline, 118 Neb. 150, 224 NW 6 (1929); California Teacher's Ass'n. v.
Collins, 1 Cal. 2d 202, 34 P. 2d 134 (1934); Collier v. Gray, 116 Fla. 845, 157 So. 40 (1934); State ex rel. v.
State Bldg. Commission v. Smith, 335 Mo. 840, 74 SW 2d 27 (1934); Mayer v. Adams, 182 Ga. 524, 186 SE
420 (1936); Doody v. State ex rel. Mobile County, 233 Ala. 287, 171 So. 504 (1937); Swanson v. State, 132
Neb. 82, 271 NW 264 (1937); Stonns v. Heck, 238 Ala. 196, 190 So. 78 (1939); Graham v. Jones, 198 La.
507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941); In re Initiative Petition No. 224, 197 Okl. 432, 172 P. 2d 324 (1946); City of
Jackson v. Nims, 316 Mich. 694, 26 NW 2d 569 (1947); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P. 2d 662
(1948).

51 Commonwealth Act No. 492 (1939).

52 Ibid, Section 3.

53 Commonwealth Act No. 517 (1940).

54 Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.

55 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.

56 It is to be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 607 (1940), subsequently amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 657 (1940), there was a statutory creation of an independent Commission on Elections.

57 Section 3, Commonwealth Act No. 517.

58 Republic Act No. 73 (1946).

59 Section 3 of Republic Act 73 reads as follows: "The provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Three
Hundred and fifty-seven, otherwise known as the Election Code, and Commonwealth Numbered Six hundred
and fifty-seven, entitled "An Act to Reorganize the Commission on Elections," is so far as they are not
inconsistent herewith, are hereby made applicable to the election provided for in this Act."

60 Republic Act 4913 (1967).

61 Section 3 of Republic Act 4913 reads thus: "The provisions of Republic Act Numbered One hundred
eighty, as amended, insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith, are made applicable to the election
provided for in this Act." It is to be remembered that in the plebiscite held, the two proposals last. Cf. on this
point, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774.

62 The 1935 Constitution provides: "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." Article II, Section 1.

63 Laski, Grammar of Politics, 4th ed., 34 (1937).

64 Mclver, The Web of Government, 84 (1947).

65 Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law, in 1 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law 3 (1938).

66 92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522.

67 Ibid, 523.

68 101 Va. 829, 44 SE 754.

69 Ibid, 755. A similar approach may be noted in Arie v. State, 23 Okl. 166, 100 P. 23 (1909) and Hammond
v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 SE 479 (1911).

70 Araneta v. Dinglasan. 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

71 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 141 (1921).

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

1 Section 1, which is the lone section of Art. XV; emphasis supplied.

2 Article XVII, section 16, proposed Constitution of Nov. 30,1972; emphasis supplied.

3 All quotations from respondents' memo of arguments dated March 2, 1973, pp. 2-5; emphasis supplied.

4 Respondents' memo dated March 2, 1973, p. 8; emphasis supplied.

5 Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (No. 9, 1967).

6 Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (Oct. 16, 1971).

7 Resolution on motion for reconsideration in Tolentino Comelec, L-34150; dated Nov. 4, 1971, at page 3,
per Barredo, J. with seven Justices concurring; emphasis supplied.

8 Idem, at page 4, emphasis supplied.

9 Joint opinion of JJ. Makalintal and Castro, p. 153.

10 Article X, sec. 1 of the Constitution entrusts "exclusive charge" of the conduct of elections to the
Comelec. See also the Election Code of 1971.

11 Araneta vs. Dinglasan (L-2044); Araneta vs. Angeles (L-2756); Rodriguez vs. Treasurer
(L-3054); Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs; and Barredo vs. Comelec (L-3056), jointly decided and
reported in 84 Phil. 368.

12 Idem, at pp. 384-385; emphasis supplied.

13 Idem, at p. 437.

14 Idem, at pp. 435-437.

15 Idem, at p. 383. Justice Tuason further duly noted that "These observations, though beyond the issue as
formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for good of the Nation,
the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or indirectly
traceable to the late war harass the Philippines."

16 Petitioner Monteclaro's notes of oral argument dated February 23, 1973, p. 2, and Annex A thereof.

17 State vs. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 south 927.

18 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 81.

19 Article XV, sec. 1, Constitution.

20 Article V, sec. 1, Constitution.

21 Article X, sec. 2, Constitution.

22 Respondents' memo dated March 2, 1973, p. 5.

23 Respondents' Comment dated Feb. 3, 1973, p. 67.

24 Idem, at p. 46; note in parentheses supplied.

25 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

26 63 Phil. 134 (1936).

27 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).

28 Dean Pollak's "The Constitution and the Supreme Court", Vol. 1, p. 221.

29 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Of Law and Men (1956), p. 5.

30 Tolentino vs. Comelec L-34150; decision of October 16, 1971, per Barredo, J. at p. 8.

30a Con-Con Res. No. 1 proposing the urgent lowering of the voting age to enfranchise the 18-year olds
retained the "permissive" language of section 1, Art. V. Thus, the proposed amendment read "Section 1.
Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty one) EIGHTEEN years of age or over and are able to read and write ..."

31 Resolution of Nov. 4, 1971, per Barredo, J. at p. 15.

32 Decision of Oct. 16, 1971, at p. 21.

33 21 SCRA 774 (Nov. 9, 1967).

34 Decision of Oct. 16, 1971, at p. 24.

35 Reyes, J.B.L. (now retired), Zaldivar, Castro and Makasiar, JJ.

36 Idem at pp. 1-2.

37 Idem at p. 3.

38 Resolution of Nov. 4, 1971 in Tolentino, per Barredo, J.; pp. 3-4.

39 Decision of Oct. 16, 1971 in Tolentino, per Barredo, J. at p. 19.

40 All quotations are from the Chief Justice's concurring opinion in Tolentino, pp. 4-7.

41 Separate op. of J. Teehankee concurring in Res. of No. 4, 1971 in Tolentino, pp. 8, 9, 10.

42 This Court thus declared in Tolentino the Con-Con voting age reduction resolution as null and void and
prohibited its submittal at the 1971 elections for lack of proper submission since it did not "provide the voter
... ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the amendment. "Dec. of October 16, 1971, per Barredo, J.

43 In re-Opinion of Justices, 115 N.E. Rep. 922-923.

44 Duncan vs. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 35 L. Ed. 219.

45 "Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated ... ." Rep. Act 3590,
sec. 2.
46 Rep. Act 3590, sec. 6, par. 1.

47 Idem, par. 2.

48 Idem, par. 3 and 4, emphasis supplied.

49 One barrio lieutenant and six barrio councilmen; "Voting shall be by secret ballot. ... ." Idem,
sec. 8.

50 Idem, sec. 10, italics supplied. The same section further disqualifies persons convicted by final judgment
to suffer one year or more of imprisonment "within two years after service" or who have violated their
allegiance to the Republic and insane or feeble-minded persons.

51 Supra, p. 2.

52 Rizal, Cavite, Bataan, Camarines Sur and Negros Occidental, petitioners' manifestation and supplemental
rejoinder dated March 21, 1973 in L-36165.

53 Respondents' rejoinder dated March 20, 1973 and sur-rejoinder dated March 29, 1973.

54 Under Proclamation No. 1103 dated Jan. 17, 1973, it is recited that "fourteen million nine hundred seventy
six thousand five hundred sixty one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the
proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty nine (743,869) who
voted for its rejection; but a majority of those who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on
the demand that the interim National Assembly provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be
convened."

55 Respondents' memo dated March 2, 1973, supra, p. 2.

56 As restated by Barredo, J. in his separate op. in the plebiscite cases, who, however, did not look on the
same with favor, since the constitutional point (that the Comelec has exclusive charge of the conduct of
elections and plebiscites) seems to have been overlooked in the Assemblies."

57 Convention Minutes of Nov. 22, 1972 submitted as Annex A of petitioner-delegate Sedfrey A. Ordoñez et.
al. in the plebiscite case L-359042, par. 12 of petition and admitted in par. 4 of answer of therein respondents
dated Dec. 15, 1972.

ANTONIO, J., CONCURRING:

* First decision promulgated by First Division of the Supreme Court.

1 "When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a
changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained in the old
house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that
you have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga. L. 1945, pp.
8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely
revised or new Constitution." (Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, 327).

"Every proposal which affects a change in a Constitution or adds or takes away from it is an "amendment',
while a "revision" implies a re-examination and statement of the Constitution, or some part of it, in a
corrected or improved form." (Const. Secs. 196, 197, Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E. 2d 49, 53 183 Va. 613).

"Amendment" and "revision" of constitution are separate procedures each having a substantial field of
application not mere alternative procedures in the same field." (McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P. 2d 787, 797 32
Cal. 2d 330).
2 Cf. Sections 1 and 2 of Article XIV, Constitution of Minnesota in Appendix.

3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; 7 L. ed. 663.

4 Cf. State Constitutions of Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming in Appendix to this opinion.

* Leon O. Ty, Seven Months of Martial Law, Daily Express.

* Panorama, May 6, 1973.

5 "A written constitution is susceptible of change in two ways: by revolution, which implies action not
pursuant to any provision of the constitution itself; and by revision, which implies action pursuant to some
procedural provision in the constitution. This distinction is concerned with the quare and not with
the quantum of change. It may be significant, however, that the alleged alteration does or does not purport to
affect the existence of the court itself. In the nature of things, a revolutionary charge does not admit judicial
power as such to determine the fact of its occurrence. If revolutionary constitution sets up a court differently
constituted from the pre-revolutionary court, neither tribunal is confronted with a substantial problem, for
neither can deny the act by which it was created without denying the fact of its creation. Thus the Supreme
Court in Luther v. Borden (supra) uses language substantially parallel with what has been indicated above as
logical explanation of the Duke of York's case. For the court to give serious judicial consideration to such a
question would present "the singular spectacle of a court sitting as a court to declare that we are not a court."
(Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198, 214 [1873].) And even the alleged new constitution purports to leave intact the
former court and to permit its work to go on without hiatus, the decision which the judges must make is still
an individual choice to be made by them as a matter of practical politics. Two commissions are being held
out to them, and if they will act as a court they must assess under which commission they are acting. To put
the matter another way, it must be true that in the first case above — of two constitutions purporting to
establish two different courts, — the men who were judges under the old regime and the men who are called
to be judges under the new have each to decide as individuals what they are to do; and it may be that they
choose at grave peril with the factional outcome still uncertain. And, although it is equally obvious, the
situation is logically identical where the same men are nominated to constitute the court under both the old
and new constitution, at a time when the alleged change is occurring — if it is — peaceably and against a
placid popular background. Men under such circumstances may write most praiseworthily principles of
statesmanship, upon sovereignty and, its nature modes of action, and upon the bases of government, to justify
the choice between the two commissions. They can assert their choice in the course of purported judicial
action. But they cannot decide as a court, for the decision, once made, by a retroactive hypothesis excludes
any assumption of controversiality in the premises..

"Where the alleged change occurs not through revolutionary measures but through what has been called
revision, these logical difficulties disappear in one aspect, but become far more embarrassing in another.
Where the alteration purports to be made along the lines of a procedural method laid down in the constitution,
there is a standard which the court can apply and, by so doing, it can perceive judicially whether or not the
change has followed the prescribed lines. If it has, there is no difficulty in pronouncing as a matter of law its
accomplishment. Only one exception is possible, namely, the ease where the alteration purports at once to
abolish the court or to depose its personnel. Then, although there would be a question of law to be decided, it
may be wondered who there is to decide it. Suppose, however, the mode of change has failed in some way to
conform to a directory provision of the amending clause of the constitution; is the court to declare the attempt
at alteration unsuccessful? It would seem as a matter of law that it must do so; and yet what is the situation if
the proponents of the change say, "It is true that this measure failed under the amending clause, but as a
revolutionary measure it was a success and we insist upon its recognition." Clearly the members of the court
are now more badly than ever entangled in the logical difficulties which attend a purported judicial
pronouncement upon the achievement or non-achievement of revolutionary change. For the temptation will
be great to treat the matter as a legal question. The times are peaceful. The changes probably do no affect the
tenure of many offices of any branch of the government. The popular inertia is likely to allow the court
successfully to assume the question to be one of law. The path of fallacy is not too strikingly fallacious to the
uncritical observer. It may lead to just results. The judges' personal inclinations will be to show deference to
the expression of popular sentiment which has been given. And yet, if they declare the change in force, they
are truly making a personal declaration that they believe the change to be the directly expressed will of the
sovereign, which will they assert to be law, but the fact of existence of which will — and this is the real
decision — is not ascertainable in the given case by any legal means. It is submitted that this is true, and that
the conclusions offered in the discussion of revolutionary change are true, also, whether the quantum of
change involved be vast or almost negligible.

"The net result of the preceding discussion is this: that in almost the whole field of problems which the Duke
of York's case and the American constitutional amendment cases present, the court as a court is precluded
from passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted. It follows that
there is no room for considering whether the court ought graciously and deferentially to look to the executive
or legislative for a decision that a change has or has not taken place.