G.R. No. 50464. January 29, 1990.
* the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of
1. SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Petition for Review; Review, not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion; Premises for granting review.—A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, enumerates the
premises for granting a review: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or
has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court; and (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far
sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for supervision.
Same; Motion to Dismiss; Admissions; Filing of a motion to dismiss on ground of
lack of cause of action, carries with it the admission of the material facts pleaded
in the complaint.—The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of
action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of
the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the
Republic. An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the
classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the
Republic’s complaint was never denied specifically by the defendants
(petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
Same; Certiorari; Certiorari, available only when there is no appeal, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
.—Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available
only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. The long line of decisions denying the petition for
certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where
the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was
given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and
justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Land Registration; Public Lands; Land remains unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.—If it is true that the lands
are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land
remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Sunbeam Convenience Foods
Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development
Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring to our attention the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in “Republic of the Philippines v.
Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.,” disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge
dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and
respondent judge is ordered to require private respondents to file their answer
to the complaint in said Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the
trial of the case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.1
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated
by the petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales
Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the
parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly
described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m.)
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 (area 1,401,855 sq. m.)
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the
defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate
of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for
the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-
2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-
2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation;
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for
reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062.
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible
and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor
General and not by the Director of Lands.3
The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order
of October 7, 1977,4 adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to
be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the
land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and
filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977.5 The Solicitor General then
moved for an extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal
and to pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be
followed by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General,
resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of
fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension
lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court
of Appeals was filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in—
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss,
the correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth
and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint.
Complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands; hence,
inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots 1 and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and
positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not initiated
by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged
failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside
the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No.
4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the
answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action
for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion,
enumerates the premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a
lower court as to call for supervision.7
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ granting of the petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave
abuse of discretion.
The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM
and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried
with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material
facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the
lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic’s
complaint8 was never denied specifically9 by the defendants (petitioners
herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become
moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State.11 Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer
any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of
the public forest.
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land
is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full-dress trial on the issues
involved.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient
administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They must
lead to the proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the hands
of the law or making it indifferent to realities.
Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available
only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law.15 The long line of decisions denying the petition
for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where
the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was
given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of
justice so require, or when the writs issued are null,16 or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.17
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give
due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public
concern which is the disposition of the lands of our patrimony. No less than
the Constitution protects this policy.
We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate
court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of substance in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that
the respondent Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been committed by the
respondent court.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed. Because of the Regalian doctrine, there is a presumption that unclassified lands
are of public dominion. There must be a positive act from the government
Note.—Certiorari may be availed of where appeal though available is
classifying a land into an agricultural land which is alienable.
inadequate as in wrongful issuance of preliminary injunction. (Maguan vs.
Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 107.)

Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 443, G.R. No.
50464 January 29, 1990

DIGEST

Sunbeam Convenience Food vs CA (181 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 50464, 1990)

FACTS:

The Director of Lands issued sales patents in favor of defendant Sunbeam

Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles,
Bataan. Subsequently, such sales patent was transferred to Coral Beach
Development Corporation.

The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed before
the CFI an action for reversion, which was dismissed.

The Solicitor General then filed an appeal contending that the CFI committed
grave abuse of discretion in not considering (in its decision to dismiss) the
allegation that the subject lans were forest lands. The CFI, therefore, erred in
finding the subject lots disposable and alienable lands of public domain under
the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. The CA set aside the decision of the
CFI, hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Were the sales patents validly issued? Cannot be determined unless the
land’s classification is identified.

HELD:

The case is remanded. There is a need to rule on the classification of the land.
If the land is indeed a forest land, then it is not subject to alienation or
disposition and the case is moot and academic.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
SOFRONIO G. SAYO, G.R. No. L-60413, October 31, 1990
NARVASA, J.:
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is
the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981
in Land Registration Case No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by
virtue of a compromise agreement, the title of the private respondents over a
tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application
for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral
Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950
hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province
of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act
No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua.1 In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on
December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a
compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties,
assisted by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval
(who had since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development,
the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.
Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as
applicants) renounced their claims and ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,
adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval,
but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of
the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived
and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago
Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties
in accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the
present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as
being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that —
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their
petitions for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development
had legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given
notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to
take part therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the
compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that
drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to
take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's
arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it
is not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the
private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances,
to wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the
Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of
to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not
appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the
under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of
establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens
Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for
Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court,
registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is
distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the
not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to
presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.
establish a proper title for official recognition.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that
on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement
all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming
included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of
the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the
their ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions
public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had
convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land.
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The
has been the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his
not submitted any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership,
claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other
founded on nothing but the agreement among themselves that they had rights
than factual evidence of possession and title. 5
and interests over the land.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the
and presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character
compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence
of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a
of title required of the private respondents.
certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de
Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should
under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don
be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a
Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that
mode of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the
Spanish document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a
inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the Spanish
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later
regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is
reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these
an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private
conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as
character of the land in question.
anything more than prima facie evidence of possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after
all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this
is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal,
acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not
binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." 8
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving
it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside.
Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the
Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity
to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the
petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further
appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and
thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Sayo (191 SCRA 71, G.R. No. L-60413, October 31, 1990)
certificate of the National Library dated 1932 that the property was registered
under the Spanish system of land regsitration in the name on Don Liberato
Bayaua.
ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement executed over ownership of Lot 7454
is valid. NO
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless the
applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent
and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of
possession and title.
The certificate the respondents present to bolster their case cannot be
considered title to property, as it was not a grant made during the Spanish
regime or any other primary evidence of ownership.

Digest Likewise, the parties cannot claim that the land is private, and then apply to
register it under the Torrens Act. The purpose of the Torrens Act is to establish
FACTS:
the private character of lands. The compromise agreement was likewise stuck
In 1961, the spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original down as it included persons who have not substantially proven their ownership
application to register a 33ha. tract of land known as Lot 7454. The land was of the land.
part of Isabela but transferred to Nueva Vizcaya by virtue of RA 236.
Opposition (including the Bu of Lands and the Bu of Forest Devt) dragged the
cases for 20 yrs until 1981, when the parties entered a compromise agreement,
dividing the land amongst themselves. In 1981, Judge Sayo approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties.
The parties then applied to register the lot under the Torrens system. The
SocGen then stepped in, alleging that since he was counsel for the Republic,
he should have been given notice or allowed to participate.

The respondents claim that the SocGen had no authority as Lot 7454 is not
public land. Their primary evidence to support this was a photocopy of a
3. SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001]
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually
alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of
the public domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into
ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November 29, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA), as well as the May 19, 1997 CA
Resolution[2] denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of
the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaims of
appellants are denied. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.[3]
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner:
1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development
Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector
efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in
the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the successful
prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to
acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial
Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners.
2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO
08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square meters, located at Barangay Sto.
Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425,
1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor.
3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired by
LSBDA with an aggregate area of 442, 7508 square meters.
4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent]
LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was
transcribed in the Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12,
1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, LSBDA
assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-respondent] National
Development Company (NDC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the province
of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to
[Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation
(PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).
5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial
administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of
Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages
against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was later on
amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers. After
trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against
[respondents].
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in favor of
LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is
declared NULL and VOID ab initio;
2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee simple
of the 735,333 square meters real property subject of the present action and
defendant NDC is ordered to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and
CONVEY the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT No. P-28131
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to issue a new title to
the said portion in the name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due
from 1979 to the present, plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease
Contract between NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit 54)
5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay jointly
and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS
(P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to present, plus the
accrued interest for non-payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease
Contract cited above;
6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners]
P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the ancestral home;
7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the
sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorneys fees and the further sum
of P50,000.00 as expenses for litigation;
8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit down together and
discuss the possibility of a compromise agreement on how the improvements
introduced on the landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed
of and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation relative
thereto. In the absence of any such compromise agreement, such
improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New Civil
Code.
Costs against [respondents].
SO ORDERED.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned
are presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was
no competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in
character. Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen
into ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified as
alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the issuance of the
Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of the LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were
guilty of laches, because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation
of their title, if they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on the
part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:[6]
A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin
Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void.
B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original
Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid.
C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.
D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance and
the damages awarded by the trial court.
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDAs title.
In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether, before the issuance of the
title, the land was private or public.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue: Validity of LSBDAs Title
Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-hectare Leyte
Industrial Development Estate was void, having allegedly been obtained from
Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to
the disputed property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their
predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty
years.[7] Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners
further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the
trial court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court maintain
that petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as
alienable and disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that
possession of it, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership.
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First. There was no
showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was
issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof
through acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners challenge to LSBDAs title
cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a
collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.[8] In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that
[u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
A person in open, continuous, exclusive an notorious possession of a public
land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. That title
may be the subject of judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public
Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,[10] paragraph b of the
aforecited provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the
disputed property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive
prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had
previously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion
of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without factual basis.[11]
Instead, they maintain that the private character of the land was evidenced by
various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court and
even the Supreme Court.[12]
Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive
proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[13] In Spouses Palomo v. CA,[14]
the Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent
any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable.
Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property, which
Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do not prove that the land was
private in character. The question remains: What was the character of the land
when Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights
belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the time, the
vendors were already its owners, or that the land was already classified as
alienable.
Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v. CA,[15] in which the
Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed
property. In that case, the sole issue was whether the respondent judge xxx
acted in excess of jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an
action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax
declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the
legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega.[16] The Court did not all make any ruling
that the property had been classified as alienable.
In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in
rem that was binding only between the parties.[17] The present respondents
as well as the Bureau of Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was
public, are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing
the private character of the disputed property, they make no claim that these
cases directly involve the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands
is a party thereto.
imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid
of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the
conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued
by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an
application for patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and
found that the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with the
notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public
auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[19]
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the
land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor
stipulated that the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the xxx
described property.[20] It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin
with, the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to
private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the
reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was
made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by
petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved.
In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance demonstrated its
position that the disputed land was part of the public domain. That this was so
can be inferred from LSBDAs subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent and, in a public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau
of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she did not
have.

Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on Collateral Attack
the claimant.[18] In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this
There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Petitioners insist that
burden. Hence, their possession of the disputed property, however long,
they are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system.
cannot ripen into ownership.
Supposedly, they are only praying for the segregation of 735,333 square
LSBDAs Title meters of land, or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued
to LSBDA.[21] This disputation is mere quibbling over the words, plain and
Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is
simple.
void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap,
who was allegedly not the owner of the property. Petitioners assume that
LSBDA, having acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her
Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDAs
OCT, which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging
to them. Hence, the present suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real
property and damages, is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by
law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly
provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles
would be lost.[22]
Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of
one year from the time of its registration and issuance.[23] Section 32 of PD
1529 provides that [u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree
of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved buy such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons
responsible for the fraud. Although LSBDAs title was registered in 1983,
petitioners filed the amended Complaint only in 1990.
Reconveyance
Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to
them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the
Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing
to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an
action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor
General, pursuant to section 101 of the Public Land Act, which reads as follows:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General
or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
[Republic] of the Philippines.
Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the entire case of
petitioners rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by
acquisitive prescription; and that Yap, without any right or authority, sold the
same to LSBDA.
Conclusion
In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand on. Absent
any showing that the land has been classified as alienable, their possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words,
they have not become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDAs
title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally,
petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate of title that has
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they should seek
redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper action in accordance with
law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Seville vs National Development Company (DAYHON) (G.R. No.
129401, February 2, 2001)
FACTS:
- Through PD No. 625, Leyte Sab-a Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was
created. LSBA integrated the private and government sector efforts for a
planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the province
of Leyte. LOI 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands restricted
in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate through negotiated sales with the
landowners. - (1980) Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA parcels of land (464,920 sq.m),
which through tax declaration reflects Yap as the owner of said parcels.
- (1982) Appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application before the
Bureau of Lands covering the land obtained from Yap together with other lots
acquired by LSBDA (aggregate area: 442,7508 sq.m)
- Bureau of Lands issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor, basing
on the fact that the original certificate of title was in the name of LSBDA as
transcribed in the Registration Book.
- (1989) LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to National
Development Council (NDC), which led to the issuance of the new TCTs in
NDC’s favor. The subject property was then leased to Philippine Smelting &
Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
(PHILPHOS), and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc (LEPANTO).
- (1988) Herein respondent filed for a complaint for recovery of real property,
rentals and damages against herein respondents.
The RTC declared:
o the deed of Sale executed by Yap as null and void
o herein petitioner as owner of the subject real property of the present action
and ordered NDC
o segregate from the OCT the area of the subject property and convey it to
petitioners to the respondents were also ordered to pay jointly and severally
the rentals that were due in petitioner’s favor
o with regard to the improvements introduced to the subject property,
petitioners and respondents were to discuss on the possibility of a compromise
agreement on the disposal of said improvements
- The CA applying the regalian doctrine, however, reversed the decision of the
RTC, ruling that:
o No competent evidence was presented to prove that subject property is
indeed private in character
o Granting arguendo that such evidences can be provided, failure to prove that
such property is alienable, cannot ripen into ownership
o Even prior to the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor,
the property had been untitled o Petitioners are guilty of laches for their failure
to apply for judicial confirmation of their title
o Failure to present evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent LSBDA
ISSUE: WON respondent LSBDA’ title is null and void? NO
HELD:
Petitioners argue that LSBDA’s title was void as Yap had no right over said
property. They, petitioners, claim that they have acquired title over the
property through acquisitive possession of said land for more than 30 years.
To refute said allegation, respondents claim that failure of the petitioners to
show that such land is alienable and disposable. Because of which, possession
of the land cannot ripen into ownership.
Granting arguendo that petitioners are correct in claiming that Yap’s
ownership over the property is questionable, however imputing the same to
LBDA’s title is misplaced. Petitioners failed to consider the fact that LSBDA’s
title was based on the Miscellaneous Sales Patent from the Bureau of Lands
and not on the conveyance executed by Yap.
The Court held that because of petitioners’ failure to establish that the land
had been classified as alienable prior to the issuance of the title in favor of
LSBDA, petitioners cannot claim that they have gained ownership through
acquisitive prescription.
Further, the Court held that all the lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that all lands not appearing to be unequivocally owned privately are
presumed to belong to the State. To overcome this presumption, evidence
must be shown that the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
Consequently, occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership.
4. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND J. ANTONIO ARANETA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Jimenez, Leynes & Associates for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
For review before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in the land
registration case entitled J. Antonio Araneta v. The Director of Lands and
Director of Forest Development, AC-G.R. CV. No. 00636,1 affirming the lower
court's approval of the application for registration of a parcel of land in favor
of applicant therein, J. Antonio Araneta.
Evidence show that the land involved is actually an island known as Tambac
Island in Lingayen Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan, the
area consists of 187,288 square meters, more or less. The initial application for
registration was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, Act No. 496, as amended.
The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the
application alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a
fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition
likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is a private corporation
disqualified under the (1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14.2
The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that
the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other
private parties also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn.
In an amended application, Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to
change the applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta. Despite the
supposed amendment, there was no republication.
Evidence presented by the applicant include the testimony of Placido Orlando,
fishery guard of Pacific Farms, Inc., who said he has known the disputed land
since he attained the age of reason for some forty (40) years now; that when
he first came to know the property it was then owned by and in the possession
of Paulino Castelo, Juan Ambrosio and Julio Castelo, and later on the whole
island was bought by Atty. Vicente Castelo who in turn sold it to J. Antonio
Araneta.
Deposition by oral examination of Araneta was also presented, together with
documents of sale, tax declarations and receipts, and survey of property.
Applicant, however, failed to present the tracing cloth plan and instead
submitted to the court certified copies thereof.
While this case is pending here in Court, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion
for Substitution of private respondent.3 Apparently, Antonio Araneta had
assigned his rights to and interest in Tambac Island to Amancio R. Garcia4 who
in turn assigned his rights and interest in the same property to Johnny A.
Khonghun whose nationality was not alleged in the pleadings.
On October 4, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject
property to J. Antonio Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, the decision of the lower court was affirmed on December 12, 1985.
Petitioners raised the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in adjudicating the lands subject of registration
to applicant-appellee despite his failure to present the original tracing cloth
plan the submission of which is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character.
II. The lower court erred in not denying registration in favor of J. Antonio
Araneta since the amendment of the application was simply an attempt to
avoid the application of the constitutional provision disqualifying a private
corporation — the Pacific Farms, Inc. in this case — from acquiring lands of
public domain.
III. The lower court erred in not declaring the land known as the "Tambac
Island" not subject of registration it being an island formed on the seas.
IV. The lower court erred in adjudicating the land to the applicant under Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra wherein We said that if the original tracing
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the cloth plan was indeed with the Land Registration Commission, there is no
Property Registration Decree, despite absence of any specific invocation of this reason why the applicant cannot easily retrieve the same and submit it in
law in the original and amended application. evidence, it being an essential requirement for registration.

V. The lower court erred in not granting the government's motion for As to the second assignment of error, We are inclined to agree with petitioners
reconsideration at least to enable it to present proof of the status of the land that the amendment of the application from the name of Pacific Farms Inc., as
as within the unclassified public forest, and hence beyond the court's applicant, to the name of J. Antonio Araneta Inc., was a mere attempt to evade
jurisdiction to adjudicate as private property. disqualification. Our Constitution, whether the 19739 or

VI. The lower court erred in not declaring that the applicant has failed to 1987, 10 prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable
overthrow the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain lands of the public domain except by lease. Apparently realizing such
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. prohibition, respondent amended its application to conform with the
mandates of the law.
From the foregoing it appears that the more important issues are: 1) whether
the presentation of the tracing cloth plan is necessary; and 2) whether the land However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the absence of
known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration. republication of an amended application for registration is a jurisdictional flaw.
We should distinguish. Amendments to the application may be due to change
By mere consideration of the first assignment of error, We can right away glean
in parties or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the
the merit of the petition.
land applied for.
Respondent claims that the tracing cloth plan is with the files of the Land
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, nor
Registration Commission, and the only evidence that can be presented to that
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
fact is the request for the issuance of a certified copy thereof and the certified
Decree, requires republication and registration may be allowed by the court at
copy issued pursuant to the request.5 Respondent further argues that failure
any stage of the proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. 11 On the other
of the petitioners to object to the presentation of the certified copy of the
hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change
tracing cloth plan was the basis of the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion
in the boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for.
for reconsideration.
As to the fourth assignment of error. We do not see any relevant dispute in the
In a very recent decision of this Court, entitled The Director of Lands v. The
lower court's application of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instead of Act No.
Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and Lino Anit,6 We have ruled that
496, in adjudicating the land to the then applicant, assuming that the land
the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for
involved is registrable. Both laws are existing and can stand together. P.D. 1529
registration. Reiterating Our ruling in Director of Lands v. Reyes,7 We asserted
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property, in
that failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal it being
order to facilitate effective implementation of said laws.12
a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
The third, fifth and sixth assignment of errors are likewise meritorious and shall
It is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the
be discussed forthwith together.
certified copy of the said plan. What is required is the original tracing cloth
plan of the land applied for and objection to such requirement cannot be
waived either expressly or impliedly.8 This case is no different from the case of
Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the reports
of the District Land Officer of Dagupan City, Land Inspector Perfecto Daroy and
Supervising Land Examiner Teodoro P. Nieva show that the subject property is
an unclassified public land, not forest land. This claim is rather misleading. The
report of Supervising Land Examiner Nieva specifically states that the "land is
within the unclassified forest land" under the administrative jurisdiction of the
then Bureau of Forest Development.13 This was based on the reports of Land
Inspector Daroy and District Land Officer Feliciano Liggayu.
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely:
Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands.14 Under the
Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated. Their disposition was provided for under Commonwealth Act No.
141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private
ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released
for alienation. 15 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Courts have no authority to do so. 16
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 17
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.18
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present evidence and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim. 19
In this particular case, respondent presented proof that as early as 1921, the
subject property has been declared for tax purposes with receipts attached, in
the names of respondent's predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span
of time there had been no attempt to register the same either under Act 496
or under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather intriguing that Vicente
Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the property from Alejo Ambrosia, et al.
on June 18, 1958 and from Julio Castelo on June 19, 1958 immediately sold the
same to applicant J. Antonio Araneta on 3 July 1958.
According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Vicente Castelo only in 1958 and the
purported old tax declarations are not on file with the Provincial Assessor's
Office.
In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by evidence.20
The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest
way back in 1921 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia
of a claim of ownership.21
Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified on August 8,
1927 which was the basis of the report and recommendation of the Land
Examiner, is too antiquated; that it cannot be conclusively relied upon and was
not even presented in evidence, is not well taken. As We have said in the case
of Director of Lands v. CA:22
And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject
property to be within unclassified region was not presented in evidence will
not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties
and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission there was, in
fact.
Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an unclassified public
land as of 1927 and remains to be unclassified.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession

the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. 23 The conversion of subject property does not automatically
render the property as alienable and disposable.

In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject property
from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and
jurisdiction. We reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the
Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 24

In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously consider the matter

of the reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of people to have
disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their name
should not only be viewed with understanding attitude, but as a matter of
policy encouraged. 25

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the courts
a quo are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

NO DIGEST
5. UNITED PARACALE vs. DELA ROSA (221 SCRA 108)
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE;
PROPER ONLY WHEN THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE;
CASE AT BAR. — The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of
the mining claims under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining
claims became private property and thereby brought outside the control and
supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law
does not distinguish between private property and lands of the public domain.
The provision of law involved is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation.
A condition sine qua non before the court may construe or interpret a statute
is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Section 7 of P.D. 1281
quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of
Mines is clear. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation. There is only room for application. [Cebu Portland Cement
Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 35 SCRA 708 (1968)] Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. [Chartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (1985)].
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL RELIEF; NOT A VESTED
RIGHT; A MERE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE, NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT. — There can
be no vested right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and
not a property right. The distinction between statutory privileges and vested
rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory
privileges. The state may change or take away rights which were created by the
law of the state, although it may not take away property which was vested by
virtue of such rights.(16A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 652-653) Besides, the right to judicial
relief is not a right which may constitute vested right because to be vested, a
right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future
enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand
or legal exemption from a demand made by another. (National Carloading
Corporation v. Phoenix-E1 Paso Express, Inc., cited in 16A Am, Jur. 2d, p. 651)
Definitely, the judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall
under any of these.
3. CIVIL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1214; A VALID EXERCISE OF THE
SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE STATE AS OWNER OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN;
SUSTAINED IN CASE AT BAR. — The heart of these twin petitions is the
question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully
assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining
claims involved and would thus have no causes of action against private
respondents. This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa
Mining Company, Inc. v. Leido, Jr. [156 SCRA 1 (1987), which ruling was
reiterated in Zambales Chromite Mining Company, Inc. v. Leido, Jr., 176 SCRA
602 (1989)] thus:" (W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not
unconstitutional.’ It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as
owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner’s mining claims still
form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits
are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree
does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even
then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease
prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources
Decree of 1974. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area
from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the
same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and
maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or
sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator
should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual
work and improvements in the located mining claim. This, we cannot approve
or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the
locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for
annual work and improvements in the located mining claim. Presidential
Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The
same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The cases herein were consolidated upon the representations of petitioners
that they involve the same issues or questions of law or at the very least,
revolve around the same set of facts. A perusal of the records, however, reveals
the contrary. Only two petitions are properly consolidated. Thus, it behooves
Us to discuss the cases separately.
In blatant violation of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which in part,
provides:
"Sec. 2. Contents of the petition — The petition shall contain a concise
statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court
below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, . . . (Emphasis
ours.).
"Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set
forth . . ."
this petition devotes nine (9) pages under the subtitle "Summary statement of
the matters involved" to a discussion of matters off tangent from the real issues
in the case. Definitely, the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order suspending hearing pending the resolution of
their motion to dismiss, does not involve the Philippine Bill of 1902, Executive
Order No. 141, much less P.D. 1214. The counsel for petitioners even discussed
pending cases in this Court (G.R. No. 63786 - 87 and 69203) which have
completely nothing to do with the instant petition except for the fact that the
parties therein are being represented by the same counsel as in this petition.
In several pleadings subsequent to their petition, petitioners insisted that the
proceedings in the court below must be restrained until this Court resolves the
pending cases abovecited. For this reason this case was consolidated thereto.
A summary of the real matters involved in this petition is found in the
respondent Court’s decision, to wit:
"This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XL, in Camarines Norte from issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 5148 and to disqualify the respondent judge from
acting in that case. The case was brought by the respondents Marsman and
Co., Inc. and United Paracale Mining, Inc., to enjoin the petitioners, Joseph V.
Lopez and Miguel Andrade, from entering and conducting mining operations
within the "McDonald" and "San Antonio" Tunnels in Paracale, Camarines
Norte, in which the private respondents have mining claims ("Tulisan," "Santa
Marta," "California," and "Rocky Mountain Fraction"). On December 11, 1984
the RTC issued a restraining order against the petitioners.
On December 12 the petitioners filed their answer alleging that, in accordance
with PD 1214, the private respondents had forfeited their right to the mining
claims. They likewise argued that in view of PD 605, the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the case. On the same day the petitioners moved for the
disqualification of the respondent judge of the RTC, claiming (sic) that in
issuing the restraining order of December 11, 1984, he showed his "bias,
prejudice and personal hatred of and hostility to the [petitioners’] counsel
[Atty. Pedro A. Venida]."
On December 24, 1984 the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary hearing
on their defense that the RTC lacked jurisdiction under PD 605 to issue a
temporary restraining order or injunction in cases involving or growing out of
the action of administrative officials on the applications for permits for the
disposition, exploitation, utilization, or exploration or development of the
natural resources. Accordingly the RTC, in its order of September 5, 1985,
suspended the hearing of the case until the resolution of the petitioners’
motion to dismiss. It is at this point that the present petition was filed." 1
The respondent Court denied this petition on grounds that: (1) the questions
being raised are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but rather
defenses which should be raised in the action itself; (2) the question of
jurisdiction which has yet to be resolved by the trial court pending resolution
of the motion to dismiss is prematurely raised; and (3) there was no basis for
determining whether or not the judge must be disqualified. 2
The review of this decision is what is on appeal before.
We refuse to be persuaded by the petitioners that the RTC must be enjoined
from exercising its jurisdiction in settling the case presented before it for the
reason that the constitutionality of the law involved in the said case is being
questioned before this Court. This case should have been disposed of
independently of the other petitions herein.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. Neither did it
commit grave abuse of discretion as what petitioners want this Court to
believe. The petitioners fail to point out any assigned error which the
respondent Court had supposedly committed but simply narrate the action
taken by it. Much less have they stated the reasons relied upon for the
allowance of the instant petition. For being insufficient in substance and in
form, the instant petition lacks merit and must be dismissed.
G.R. No. 70423
This is a petition involving the question of jurisdiction of regular courts in cases
which had been placed under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Mines under P.D. 1281.
This petition seeks to reverse the order of then Judge, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, Hon. Alfredo L. Benipayo, dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioner herein on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Section 7
of P.D. 1281 and the doctrine enunciated in Twin Peaks Mining Association, Et.
Al. v. Navarro, 3 that an action for the enforcement of mining contracts, in this
case cancellation of a mining contract, is outside the competence of regular
courts in view of the law cited. 4
The complaint filed with the then CFI of Manila, Branch XVI, was one for the
rescission of its mining contract with herein private respondent on grounds of
violations of the terms and conditions thereof, with prayer for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The trial court,
however, upon motion of the defendant therein, dismissed the case.
Petitioner wants Us to construe Section 7 of P.D. 1281 as applicable only to
mineral lands forming part of the public domain and not to mining claims
located and registered under Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624 as is its
case.
Section 7 of P.D. 1281 reads as follows:
Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over
companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration,
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the
claim holder thereof with several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an
operating agreement has not been placed into actual operations within the
period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or reinforcement of mining contracts due to the
refusal of the claimowner/operator to aside by the terms and conditions
thereof.
All actions and decisions of the Director of Mines on the above cases are
subject to review, motu proprio or upon appeal by any person aggrieved
thereby, by the Secretary of Natural Resources whose decision shall be final
and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with the
applicable provisions of Presidential Decree No. 309 and Letter of Instructions
Nos. 119 and 135.
The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became
private property and thereby brought outside the control and supervision of
the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law does not
distinguish between private property and lands of the public domain. The
provision of law involved is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation. A
condition sine qua non before the court may construe or interpret a statute is
that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5 Section 7 of P.D. 1281
quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of
Mines is clear. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation. There is only room for application. 6 Where the law is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court
has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 7
This Court in Benguet Corporation v. Leviste, 8 made these pronouncements:
"We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on
January 16, 1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and
control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of
mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including mining
service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are
concerned. To effectively discharge its task as the Government’s arm in the
administration and disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. 1281
confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:
x x x defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly privately owned by
Analyzing the objective of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the
Court in Twin Peaks Mining Association, the case relied upon by petitioner,
noted that the trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely
administrative matter. This observation was reiterated in the more recent case
of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals."
The petitioner further argues that to hold that P.D. 1281 retroactively applies
to its mining claims which according to it is private property would constitute
impairment of vested rights since by shifting the forum of the petitioner’s case
from the courts to the Bureau of Mines, as urged by private respondent, the
substantive rights to full protection of its property rights shall be greatly
impaired and prejudiced. The judicial relief available for the redress of private
property rights violated, now being enjoyed by petitioner shall be lost
altogether.
This argument does not merit Our approval. There can be no vested right in a
judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The
distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in
mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may
change or take away rights which were created by the law of the state,
although it may not take away property which was vested by virtue of such
rights. 9 Besides, the right to judicial relief is not a right which may constitute
vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or
equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or
future enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made by
another. 10 Definitely, the judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner
does not fall under any of these.
The case at bar falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Mines, hence, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 63786-87
In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining Company, Inc.
and Coco Grove, Inc., petitioners seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the
case they filed with the trial court for the ejectment of their respective
them having been located and perfected under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624.
The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D.
1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere
applicants for the lease of the mining claims involved and would thus have no
causes of action against private respondents.
This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company,
Inc. v. Leido, Jr. 11 thus:
"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is a
valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the
public domain, of which petitioner’s mining claims still form a part, and over
the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It
may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all
mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over
which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators
may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres.
Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the
mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and by virtue of non-filing of an application within the prescribed period such that
appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise they (petitioners) have no causes of action against private respondents.
would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights
over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is
contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and We are not persuaded by this contention.
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements
in the located mining claim. Although We may agree that those who filed their mining lease applications
have better rights than those who forfeited all their right by not filing at all,
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 this, however, does not amount to any vested right which could be the basis
Constitution which states: for their cause of action against herein private respondents. What is precisely
waived is their right to the issuance of a mining patent upon application. This
‘All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
in effect grants the government the power, in the exercise of its sound
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
discretion, to award the patent to the applicant most qualified to explore,
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
develop and exploit the mineral resources of the country in line with the
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
objectives of P.D. 463, and not necessarily to the original locator of the mining
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
claim. To sustain their contention that they can question the award of mining
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, and exploitation, or
patents to applicants other than them would put to naught the objectives of
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
P.D. 1214 as enunciated in its WHEREAS clauses.
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses We agree with the trial court that with the waiver of their right to the issuance
other than development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be of a mining patent upon their application for a mining lease, their status is
the measure and the limit of the grant.’ reduced to a mere applicant, their only advantage over the others is the fact
that they have already conducted explorations at the site and this exploration
The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
may he ongoing. But still, this credential, so to speak, is not intended to tie the
Constitution, which declares:
hands of the government so as to prevent it from awarding the mining patent
‘All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other to some other applicants, which in its belief may he more qualified than them.
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 73931 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
merit; the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R. No. 70423 is AFFIRMED and this
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
petition is hereby likewise DISMISSED; the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R.
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
Nos. 63786-87 is AFFIRMED and these petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State . . .’"
pronouncements as to costs.
Notwithstanding Our ruling , in favor of the constitutionality of P.D. 1214,
SO ORDERED.
petitioners contend that having filed mining lease applications on the mining
claims they have previously located and registered under then existing laws,
pursuant to the requirements of this Presidential Decree, and despite the
waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor (emphasis
theirs), they cannot be placed in equal footing with those who forfeit all rights
6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented by the Director
of Lands), petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON,
MANUEL G. ATIENZA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Lucena Branch) and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents,
G.R. No. 73974 May 31, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision
1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the decision of the former
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II at Lucena City 2 which annulled
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP) No. 324198
issued to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of land which turned out to
be within the forest zone in Pagbilao, Quezon.
On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land
located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square
meters. By virtue of such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P-
13840.
Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in
connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that
some of the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently
acquired. Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch II, against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their
applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent
to said applications.
In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the accused of the
crime charged but, finding that the land covered by the application for free
patent of private respondent was within the forest zone, declared as null and
void OCT No. P-13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Quezon to cancel the same.
Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on May 10, 1972, then
Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco filed for the petitioner a
complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural
Bank of Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an amended
complaint, substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual
mortgagee of the subject parcel of land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the
complaint prayed for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198 and OCT No.
P-13840.
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within
the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application
for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land "was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small
portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which had been declared
disposable public land by the cadastral court on March 9, 1932 in Cadastral
Case No. 76 entitled "El Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose
Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O. cadastral Record No. 1124," he also averred that the
Director of Lands had given due course to free and homestead patent
applications of claimants to Lot 5139. He further alleged that through a certain
Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese
occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The DBP,
after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even granted him
a loan with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal
in the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for
free patent.
On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the categorical
finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in question was found
definitely within the forest zone denominated as Project 21-A."
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title No. P-13840 in
the name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as well as Free Patent No. V-324198;
(b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the Development Bank
of the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the sum of P15,053.97, and all interests
due thereon; and
(c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the
unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public
domain. The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments
he raised since petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion
that "(t)he litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for
homestead and [F]ree Patent." On December 27, 1985, the appellate court set
aside the lower court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT,
and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP.
After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of the adverse decision of the appellate
court, which noted that no appellee's brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili
also stated that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been
furnished with the appellant's brief; that the Bureau of Lands received notice
of hearing of the record on appeal filed by the appellant but the OSG had not
been informed of the "action taken thereon;" that since the Bureau of Lands
had been furnished directly with relevant pleadings and orders, the same office
should "take immediate appropriate action on the decision;" and that it may
file a motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986,
the date of receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought to be
appealed.
On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February
12, 1986. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was likewise
denied.
The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following arguments: (a)
petitioner was denied due process and fair play when Atienza did not furnish
it with a copy of his appellant's brief before the then Intermediate Appellate
Court thereby depriving it of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which later
became the sole basis of the assailed decision of December 27, 1985; (b) the
appellate court erred in holding that the land in question is part of the
alienable and disposable public land in complete disregard of the trial court's
finding that it forms part of the unclassified public forest zone; and (c) the
appellate court erred in declaring that the land in question could be alienated
and disposed of in favor of Atienza.
We find for the petitioner.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal,
particularly if the appeal is meritorious. 3 Respect for the appellant's right,
however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar
rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules
of Court. 4
Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his
brief upon the appellee with proof of service thereof. 5 This procedural
requirement is consonant with Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all
pleadings and papers "shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties
affected thereby." The importance of serving copies of the brief upon the
adverse party is underscored in Mozar v. Court of Appeals, 6 where the Court
held that the appellees "should have been given an opportunity to file their
appellee's brief in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity of
due process."
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the fact that this case
involves public lands requiring as it does the exercise of extraordinary caution
lest said lands be dissipated and erroneously alienated to undeserving or
unqualified private individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the
government's side.
Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a lawyer in the Bureau
of Lands and designated special attorney for the Office of the Solicitor General,
with two copies of the appellant's brief, thereby implying that it was not his
fault that petitioner failed to file its appellee's brief.
Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of the Solicitor
General as government counsel or of the OSG as the government's "law office."
7 Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore,
actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General, will be summarily dismissed. 8 Specifically, he is empowered to
represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings, 9
such as, an action for cancellation of title and for reversion of a homestead to
the government. 10 Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with copies of all
court orders, notices and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the
Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for
filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative, who may be a
lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or
not an appeal should be made. 11
Service of the appellant's brief on Atty. Torres was no service at all upon the
Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres could have transmitted
one of the two copies of appellant's brief upon the Solicitor General, but such
omission does not excuse Atienza's failure to serve a copy of his brief directly
on the Solicitor General.
On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, and even
quoting verbatim from, the appellant's brief was certainly arrived at in grave
abuse of discretion. It denied appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to
be heard and to rebut Atienza's allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due
process. Such violation of due process could have been rectified with the
granting of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the appellate court, 12
but even the door to this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with
the denial of petitioner's motion for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling
erroneously applied the Habaluyas doctrine. 13
Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration.
Considering the clear allegations thereunder, the appellate court would have
done well, in the interest of justice, not to blindly adhere to technical rules of
procedure by dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v.
Court of Appeals: 14
. . . The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are afforded
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and air their side. The essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling taken. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the foregoing and the long-standing procedural rule that this Court
may review the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals in the event that they
may be contrary to those of the trial court, 15 in order to attain substantial
justice, the Court now reviews the facts of the case.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be
privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral
or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership
unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence
of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 16
In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources 17 (now the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources). 18 Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President.
19 Courts have no authority to do so. 20
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the
burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the
public domain lies upon the private claimant 21 who, in this case, is Atienza.
The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence 22 to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which was not given much
weight by the court a quo, and for good reasons.
Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to present proof that
he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who answered the
petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings.
The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy, indicated the
claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In support of that decision, Atienza
presented a certification purportedly issued by someone from the Technical
Reference Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of Lands,
stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao Cadastre," which
evidence is, however, directly controverted by the sketch plan showing that the
land in controversy is actually outside the alienable and disposable public
lands, although part of Lot 5139.
The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system.
In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23 we ruled that the indefeasibility
of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by
means of fraud. The "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is
actual and extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact required by law,"
24 which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that
the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest
lands.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the decision of the court a quo dated July 27, 1981, is REINSTATED.
DIGEST (1)
Regalian Doctrine
Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff
Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception
FACTS:
Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was
issued an OCT.
Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that
the free patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of
public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime.
Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner,
praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within
the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application
for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small
portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land
by the cadastral court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be
privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral
or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership
unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence
of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs
to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President.
Courts have no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the
burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the
public domain lies upon the private claimant.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute
evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System.
The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who
procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -
- an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be
registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.
DIGEST (2)
Republic vs ROD Quezon (244 SCRA 537, G.R. No. 73974, Mar 31, 1995)
FACTS:
- Manuel G. Atienza was awarded FP (free patent) No. 324198 over a parcel of
land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon an investigation was conducted
by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in
Pagbilao.
- It appeared that some of the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were
fraudulently acquired.
- A criminal complaint for falsification of public documents was filed in the CFI
against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their
applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent
to said applications.
- In its decision, the court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but,
finding that the land covered by the application for free patent of private
respondent was within the forest zone, declared as null and void OCT (Original
certificate of title) No. P-13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of
Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same.
- Before the promulgation of said decision, the Solicitor General filed for the
petitioner a complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and
the Rural Bank of Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an
amended complaint, substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines
as actual mortgagee of the subject parcel of land.
- In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within
the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application
for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land "was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small
portion of Lot, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the
cadastral court.
- Atienza also averred that the Director of Lands had given due course to free
and homestead patent applications of claimants of the said lot.
- He further alleged that he had been in possession of the land since the
Japanese occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon.
- The DBP, after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even
granted him a loan with the subject property as collateral.
- Finally, he stated that his acquittal in the criminal case proved that he
committed no fraud in his application for free patent.
- Lower court rendered a decision with the categorical finding based on "solid
evidence" that "the land in question was found definitely within the forest
zone.
- On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the
unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public
domain.
- The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised
since petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion that "the
litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead
and [F]ree Patent."
- CA- set aside the lower court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting
Atienza's OCT, and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP.
ISSUE: WON the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable public
land. NO
HELD:
- Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing
to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest
lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not
subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution,
become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.
- In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the
public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources).
- Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department through the Office of the President. Courts have
no authority to do so.
- Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural
lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership
of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant who, in
this case, is Atienza.
- The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his
claim.
- Atienza's claim is rooted in the decision of the Court of First Instance
in the Cadastral Case which was not given much weight by the court a
quo, and for good reasons.
- Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to present
proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants
who answered the petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the
said cadastral proceedings.
7. RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO FALCASANTOS,
respondent. [G.R. No. 128017. January 20, 1999]
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Basilan province, and
dismissing petitioner's complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of
a parcel of land with the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay
Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of
7.1248 hectares.
The facts may be related as follows:
On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro
Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an
area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North by
property of Alejandro Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the
South by property of Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of
Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less."
However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of Lands
in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land
under free patent. On November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such
application.
On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving
respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to
repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in
the purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's
application for free patent.
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that
respondent had waived his right of repurchase, and rejected his application for
free patent for lack of interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land
application for the subject land.
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land
in question, but respondent refused.
On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province,
a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary
injunction of the subject parcel of land.
In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him
belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced
improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision
declaring petitioner the owner and possessor of the subject parcel of land with
all the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas,
municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares,
and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and three hundred
pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost.
In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals.
On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the
appealed decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint without prejudice to any action that petitioner may take if the
subject land was declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the
Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said
property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part
of the public domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence
is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C.
Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951."[1] and, hence, not capable of
private appropriation and occupation.[2]
In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest lands, like
mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private
ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In
the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.[3]
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: Thus, before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be
a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain."[4]
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[5]
And the rule is Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.[6]
What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in
question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land.
Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Ituralde vs Falcasantos (301 SCRA 293, G.R. No. 128017, January 20, 1999)
FACTS:
In 1986, Ramon Ituralde obtained a 6k ha parcel of land in Basilan Province.
Falcasantos, meanwhile, applied with the Bureau of Lands to grant him the
same parcel of land under free patent. In 1989 the Director of Lands allowed
Ituralde to file a public land application for the subject property. 1990 the trial
court named Ituralde the owner and possessor of the land. The CA reversed
this decision and set aside the trial court’s decision in Ituralde’s favor as the
land was found to be forest land, and therefore, inalienable. Ituralde, in his
appeal to the SC, claims that since the Director of Lands allowed him to file a
public land application, the said land was no longer part of public domain.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the public land application in 1989 made the land
alienable. NO.
HELD:
The CA is their decision found that since 1951, the subject parcel of land was
classified as a Forest Reserve Area, and hence, not capable of private
appropriation and occupation. Before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. The
filing of the public land application is not such positive act. The parcel of land
retained its public character and it therefore not susceptible to private
ownership. As there was no award or grant to Ituralde of the land by free
patent or other ways of acquisition, under the concept of jura regalia, the State
retains ownership over the land.
POLICY: Forest land, like mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not
subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become
private properties. In the absence of such classification from the State, the land
remains unclassified public land.
8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)
and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be
found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made
be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they
pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed
on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of
his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-
225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots
6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she
was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was
enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67
years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by
Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty
tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and
the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots
1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office
of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment
of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands
both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that
the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed
to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other
words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and
reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and
registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly
declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of
James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the
location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining
Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently
been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had
made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels
prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment.
After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June
Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench
side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots
1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral
claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution
of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had
become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia
(42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the
public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered
a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive
him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim
was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and,
of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards
included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land
located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government.
(Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc.
546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate
the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance
with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location
of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and
the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining
Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim
is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of
present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of
all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim,
except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode
locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until
patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director
of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as
held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies
with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this
right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties
of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law.
13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus,
in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy
and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit
of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935,
declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to
the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
locations as of the date of their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such
act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was
subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or
abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription.
However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at
bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support
their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964
and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his
judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of
discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la
Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession
was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they
were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the
mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace
them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of
the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much
less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural
on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting
on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The
farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below
and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep
can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-
surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137,
providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government
established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does
not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted
are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land
in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered
in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein
in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations
to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the
public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use
be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural
and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET
ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without
any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Republic vs Dela Rosa (160 SCRA 228, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership is disputed by four parties:
the dela Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau of
Forestry Development (BFD).
In 1965, Jose de la Rosa on his and on his three children’s behalf, applied to
register a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According to the
children, they acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As evidence they
produced tax declarations and realty tax receipts.
Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI) opposed their application, claiming that half
the lots were covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. Since 1934, BCI had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of
owner. As evidence BCI presented geological mappings, payment of taxes, and
construction on the land. Atok Corp’s claim is similar to BCI, that a mineral
claim covering the lots had been sold to it in 1931. Their evidence is similar to
BCI: construction and tax payments.
The BFD also objected, saying that the land was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve (CCFR) under Proc. No. 217, dated 1929. As it was
forest land, it was not subject to alienation as stated in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
In the end, the CA affirmed the BFD’s rights on the surface of the land, while
reaffirming the rights to the underground to both BCI and Atok. In other words,
the CA ruled that the surface was to be agricultural on the surface, and mineral
underneath.
ISSUE: Who has the best claim over the land? BCI and Atok Corp WON land
can be agricultural and mineral at the same time. NO
HELD:
BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The Court found that the mineral
claims sold to both BCI and Atok have been perfected prior to the approval of
the 1935 Constitution. The court had earlier declared the legal effects of a valid
mineral claim: it segregates the area from the public domain and confers to
the locator the beneficial ownership pf the claim. As of 1935, they were
removed from the public domain and had become private properties of BCI
and Atok. Even if the land was included in the CCFR, it did not impair the rights
vested in both mining companies. The claim of the dela Rosas were utterly
disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired the
land through prescription as the same had already been converted to mineral
land.
Land cannot be half agri and half mineral. The SC said the classification of land
must be categorical. In this case, while the land was intiailly classified as forest
land, it ceased to be so and became completely mineral when the mining
claims were perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled, it is still to be
considered mineral land.
Jura regalia. The SC discussed jura regalia in Sections 3-6 of Commonwealth
Act No. 137. The Regalian doctrine is intended for the benefit of the State, and
not of private persons. Example, if a person is the owner of agricultural land
and minerals are discovered underneath, his ownership pf the land does not
give him the right to extract or utilize the minerals without the permission of
the State, to which the minerals belong. To further expound, once minerals are
discovered in the land, the State can discontinue the surface tilling so as to not
impede the mining undertaken therein.
POLICY: The classification of land must be categorical, it cannot be half and
half. The perfection of mining claims convert land to mineral land even if they
were previously classified as forest land.
9. HEIRS OF GOZO vs PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORP. OF THE
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH, G.R. No. 195990
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioners Heirs of Rafael
Gozo seeking to reverse and set aside the 10 November 2010 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals and its 14 February 2011 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No.
00188. The assailed decision and resolution reversed the 30 June 2004 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte and held that
the action for nullification and recovery of possession filed by the petitioners
is already, barred by laches. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated 30 June 2004 of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh
Day Adventist Church remains the absolute owner of the donated property.[4]
The Facts
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion
Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their death, were the original owners of a
parcel of land with an area 236,638 square meters located in Sitio Simpak, Brgy.
Lala, Municipality of Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The respondents claim that
they own a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based
on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation[5] in favor of respondent Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA).
Respondents took possession of the subject property by introducing
improvements thereon through the construction of a church building, and later
on, an elementary school. On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in
1937, the Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the property yet
although they were the lawful possessors thereof. It was only on 5 October
1953 that the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-642 covering the entire
property was issued in the name of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to Concepcion
Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953.[6]
In view of Rafael's prior death, however, his heirs, Concepcion, and their six
children, namely, Abnera, Benia, Castillo, Dilbert, Filipinas and Grace caused the
extrajudicial partition of the property. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Lanao del Norte issued a new certificate of title under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. (T-347)-292[7] under the names of the heirs on 13 January 1954.
On 30 July 1992, Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision of the
entire property including the portion occupied by PUMCO-SDA.[8] It was at
this point that respondents brought to the attention of Concepcion that the
5,000 square-meter portion of the property is already owned by respondent
PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed of Donation she executed together with her
husband in their favor in 1937. When Concepcion, however, verified the matter
with the Register Deeds, it appeared that the donation was not annotated in
the title. The absence of annotation of the so-called encumbrance in the title
prompted petitioners not to recognize the donation claimed by the
respondents. The matter was left unresolved until Concepcion died and the
rest of the owners continued to pursue their claims to recover the subject
property from the respondents.
A compromise was initially reached by the parties wherein the petitioners were
allowed by respondents to harvest from the coconut trees planted on the
subject property but a misunderstanding ensued causing respondents to file a
case for qualified theft against the petitioners.
On 19 June 2000 or around six decades after the Deed of Donation was
executed, petitioners filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Document,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages against PUMCO-SDA
before the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.[9] In their-Complaint docketed
as Civil Case No. 21-201, petitioners claimed that the possession of PUMCO-
SDA on the subject property was merely tolerated by petitioners and therefore
could not ripen into ownership.[10] In addition, petitioners argued that the
signatures of the Spouses Gozo were forged underscoring the stark contrast
between the genuine signatures of their parents from the ones appearing in
the deed.[11] Finally, petitioners averred that granting for the sake of argument
that the said signatures were genuine, the deed of donation will remain invalid
for lack of acceptance which is an essential requisite for a valid contract of The [petitioners], however, are not entitled to damages, attorney's fees and
donation.[12] cost of litigation prayed for.[17]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision[18] and ordered
the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground of laches. The appellate
For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the donation and on the
court opined that petitioners failed to assert their rights over the land for more
genuineness of the signatures of the donors who had voluntarily parted with
than 60 years, thus, laches had set in. Even if petitioners were the registered
their property as faithful devotees of the church for the pursuit of social and
owners of the land in dispute, laches would still bar them from recovering
religious ends.[13] They further contended that from the moment the Spouses
possession of the same.
Gozo delivered the subject property to respondents in 1937, they were already
in open, public, continuous and adverse possession thereof in the concept of
an owner.[14] A considerable improvement was claimed to have been
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was likewise denied by
introduced into the property in the form of church and school buildings.[15]
the appellate court in a Resolution[19] dated 14 February 2011.
The argument of the petitioners, therefore, that the donation was invalid for
lack of acceptance, a question which came 63 years after it was executed, is
already barred by laches.
Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
on the sole ground that:
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties adduced
documentary and testimonial evidence to support their respective positions. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO ON THE GROUND OF
On 30 June 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[16] in favor of the petitioners
LACHES.[20]
thereby declaring that they are the rightful owners of the subject property
since the contract of donation which purportedly transferred the. ownership of The Court's Ruling
the subject property to PUMCO-SDA is void for lack of acceptance. In
upholding the right of the petitioners to the land, the court a quo held that an While the opposing parties center their arguments and counter-arguments on
action or defense for the declaration of nullity of a contract does not prescribe. the timeliness of raising the question of the validity of' donation, a careful
Anent the claim that petitioners slept on their rights, the RTC adjudged that scrutiny of the records, however, reveals a significant fact that at the time the
the equitable doctrine of laches is inapplicable in the case at bar because the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937,
action of the registered owners to recover possession is based on Torrens title the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only
which cannot be barred by laches. The RTC disposed in this wise: almost after two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its
right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby application and issuing an original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such
rendered in favor of the [petitioners], to wit: conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the
land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State.
(1) Declaring the 5,000 square meter portion of the land covered by TCT [No.]
(T-347)-292 part of the common property of the [petitioners]; and

(2) Declaring the Deed of Donation as void. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.[21]
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[22]
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain. As already
well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his
title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized
by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.[23]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, remains to this day the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain,
other than timber and mineral lands. The following provisions under Title I,
Chapter II of the Public Land Act, as amended, is very specific on how lands of
the public domain become alienable or disposable:[24]
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of
the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the Batasang Pambansa or the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Natural Resources, may from time to time
declare what public lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the President may, for reasons
of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or
may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they
are again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly
published or by Act of the Congress.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided
for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands
from one class to another.[25]
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code, the President delegated to the DENR Secretary the power to
determine which of the unclassified lands of the public domain are (1) needed
for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to form part of the
forest reserves; and (2) not needed for forest purposes and declare them as
alienable and disposable lands.[26]
Per the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[27]
Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural land is granted
after compliance by an applicant with the conditions and requirements laid
down under Title II, Chapter IV of the Public Land Act, the most basic of which
are quoted below:
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the
head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in
the Philippines or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more
than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by
the United States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four
hectares of agricultural land of the public domain.
SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of
Lands, if he finds that the application should be approved, shall do so and
authorize the applicant to take possession of the land upon the payment of
five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after
the date of the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work
the homestead, otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land.
SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for
until at least one-fifth of the land has been improved and cultivated. The period
within which the land shall be cultivated shall not be less than one nor more
than five years, from and after the date of the approval of the application. The
applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as
he is ready to acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is
located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same and has cultivated at least
one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application, and
shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or
encumbered, and that he has complied with all the requirements of this Act,
then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a
patent.[28]
It is clear under the law that before compliance with the foregoing conditions
and requirements the applicant has no right over the land subject of the patent
and therefore cannot dispose the same even if such disposal was made
gratuitously. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does
not have, nemo dat quod non habet.[29] It is true that gratuitous disposal in
donation may consist of a thing or a right but the term right must be
understood in a "proprietary" sense over which the possessor has jus
disponendi.[30] This is because in true donations there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets.[31] In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared the contract of donation, executed by
the donor who has no proprietary right over the object of the contract, null
and void, viz:
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site"
was executed between Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation
would anyway be void because Eugenio de Jesus held no dominical rights over
the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
Proclamation No. 85. of President Quezon already withdrew the area from sale
or settlement and reserved it for military purposes, x x x Eugenio de Jesus
cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary" right over the whole 33
hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at the time this
12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass disposable public
lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded from the Sales Award.
Impoverishment of Eugenio's asset as a result of such donation is therefore
farfetched. (Emphasis supplied)
It is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by
the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the
public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It was only on 5 October
1953 that the ownership of the property was vested by the State to the Spouses
Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the
donation of the subject property which took place before 5 October 1953 is
null and void from the very start.[33]
As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal effect whatsoever.
Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum[34] That which is a nullity produces
no effect.[35] Logically, it could not have transferred title to the subject
property from the Spouses Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there can be no basis
for the church's demand for the issuance of title under its name. Neither does
the church have the right to subsequently dispose the property nor invoke
acquisitive prescription to justify its occupation. A void contract is not
susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration of absolute nullity
of such contract is imprescriptible.[36]
The lack of respondents' right over the property was confirmed when the
Spouses Gozo had the entire property, including the portion occupied by the
church, surveyed and patented, and covered by their homestead patent.
Further, after a certificate of title was issued under their names, the Spouses
Gozo did not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation.
Registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land.[37] Indeed it has been ruled that where there was nothing
in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto.[38] If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the
certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be
futile and nugatory.[39] The public shall then be denied of its foremost
motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act.[40]
Just as significantly, the homestead application of the Spouses Gozo over the
entire area of the property including that occupied by respondents and the
issuance in their favor of the corresponding title without any complaint or
objection from the respondents, remove the case of the petitioners from the
operation of the doctrine of laches.
And, further than the issuance of an original title, the entire property was made
subject of an extrajudicial partition of the property by the Gozo heirs resulting
in the issuance of TCTs in their names in 1954. Again, in no instance during the
partition did the respondents make known their claim over the property.
Clearly from the facts, the petitioners asserted their rights repeatedly; it was
the respondents who kept silent all throughout about the supposed donee's
rights.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated 10 November 2010 and Resolution dated 14
February 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00188 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
The Facts
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Spouses Gozo. The respondents
claim that they own a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The
assertion is based on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation in favor of
respondent Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventist (PUMCO-SDA). On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in
1937, the Spouses Gozo were not the registered owners of the property yet
although they were the lawful possessors thereof. The land in question was
part of the inalienable public domain
RULING:
The Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937,
the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only
almost after two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its
right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent
application and issuing an original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such
conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the
land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain. As already well-settled in
jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that
the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government
that the land applied for is alienable and disposable. It is beyond question that
at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
ownership of the property was vested by the State to the Spouses Gozo by
virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by
the President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the
subject property which took place before5 October 1953 is null and void from
the very start. As a void contract, the Deed of Donation produces no legal
effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. That which is a
nullity produces no effect logically, it could not have transferred title to the
subject property from the Spouses Gozo to PUMCO-SDA and there can be no
basis for the church's demand for the issuance of title under its name. Neither
does the church have the right to subsequently dispose the property nor
invoke acquisitive prescription to justify its occupation. A void contract is not
susceptible to ratification, and the action for the declaration of absolute nullity
of such contract is imprescriptible
10. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN v.
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA +REYES, J.: [ GR No. 174964,
Oct 05, 2016 ]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorart[1] of the Decision[2]
dated February 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85902
upholding the Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan which granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in Special
Civil Action No. 7043.
Antecedent Facts
Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, containing 1,222 square
meters and 10,598 sq m, respectively, were registered in the name of the
Province of Bataan. Both lots were embraced in Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. N-182, and occupied by the Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and
the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both State-
run schools.[3]
On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8562, authored by Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Cong. Garcia),
converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as the Bataan
Polytechnic State College (BPSC), and integrating thereto the BCC.[4] Section
24 of R.A. No. 8562 provides that:
All parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the Medina
Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades and the Bataan Community Colleges
are hereby declared to be the property of the Bataan Polytechnic State College
and shall be titled under that name: Provided, That should the State College
cease to exist or be abolished or should such parcels of land aforementioned
be no longer needed by the State College, the same shall revert to the Province
of Bataan.
On the basis of the above provision, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of
Bataan Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan
(petitioner), requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid
lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected.[5]
Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned
students of BPSC (collectively, the respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for
Mandamus with the RTC of Balanga, Bataan against the Governor and the
petitioner. Initially, the Board of Trustees of the BPSC was impleaded as an
unwilling plaintiff but was eventually included as co-petitioner in the civil suit
pursuant to Resolution No. 14, Series of 2000 of the BPSC.[6]
In their Comment, the Governor and the petitioner took issue with the standing
of the respondents, arguing that they were not the real parties in interest who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. They asserted that the subject properties were owned by the
Province of Bataan and not the State, for them to be simply transferred to the
BPSC by virtue of the law.[7]
In its Decision dated November 29, 2002, the RTC granted the writ of
mandamus. The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, a writ of mandamus is hereby issued, ordering respondents to
forthwith:
1. Deliver the owner's duplicate copy of [OCX] No. N-182 to the Register of
Deeds of Bataan, free from any hen or encumbrance;
2. Execute the corresponding deed of conveyance of the parcels of land in issue
in favor of the [BPSC]; and
3. Cause the transfer and registration of the title to and in the name of the
[BPSC].
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Governor and the petitioner appealed to the CA alleging that the subject
lots were the patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, and as such
they cannot be taken by the National Government without due process of law
and without just compensation. They also pointed out that certain loan
obligations of the Province of Bataan to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
were secured with a mortgage on the lots; and since the mortgage lien was
duly annotated on its title, OCT No. N-182, the writ of mandamus violated the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The Governor and the petitioner
reiterated that the respondents had no legal standing since they were not the
real parties in interest.[9]
In the Decision[10] dated February 7, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC.
The CA rejected the claim that the subject lots were the patrimonial properties
of the Province of Bataan, declaring that the petitioner failed to provide proof
that the Province of Bataan acquired them with its own private or corporate
funds, and for this reason the lots must be presumed to belong to the State,
citing Salas, etc., et al. v. Hon. Jarencio, etc., et al.[11] Concerning the mortgage
to the LBP, the appellate court agreed with the RTC that the consent of the LBP
to the transfer of title to BPSC must be obtained, and the mortgage lien must
be carried over to the new title. The CA also held that BPSC is a real party in
interest on the basis of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, and was correctly
impleaded as a co-petitioner. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied in the CA Resolution[12] dated September 20, 2006; hence, this
petition.
Issues
I WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ARE PATRIMONIAL
PROPERTIES OF THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
II WHETHER OR NOT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE
PETITIONER TO COMPEL THE TRANSFER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.[13]
The petitioner insists that the subject lots are not communal lands, or legua
comunal as they were known under the laws of colonial Spain, but are the
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, which were issued a Torrens
title by the Cadastral Court on August 11, 1969 in Cadastral Case No. 5;[14]
that while in Salas,[15] the title of the State over the disputed lot was expressly
recognized by the City of Manila, this is not so in the case at bar;[16] that in
the exercise of its proprietary rights over the subject lots, the Province of
Bataan has used them as collateral for its loan obligations with the LBP;[17]
that in its Manifestation and Motion dated February 24, 2000, the Board of
Trustees of BPSC even acknowledged the titles of the Province of Bataan over
the subject properties.[18]
In addition to the above contentions, the petitioner proffers an alleged novel
argument that R.A. No. 8562 infringes on the State's underlying policy of local
autonomy for its territorial and political subdivisions, found in Article X of the
1987 Constitution (formerly Article XI, 1973 Constitution) and now fleshed out
in a landmark legislation, R.A. No. 7160, better known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC). Thus, for this Court to still sustain its ruling in Salas would
render the State's policy of local autonomy purely illusory.[19]
Ruling of the Court
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
A. Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain are under the absolute control and ownership of
the State.
The State's ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public
domain are beyond dispute. Reproducing almost verbatim from the 1973
Constitution,[20] Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State, x x x." In
Section 1, Article XIII of the Amended 1935 Constitution, it was also provided
that "[a]ll agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State x x x."
Thus, in Cariño v. Insular Government,[21] a case of Philippine origin, the
Supreme Court of the United States of America acknowledged that "Spain in
its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown x x x." In Hong Hok v. David,[22] citing Cariño, the Court
likewise said that the theory is a manifestation of the concept of the Regalian
Doctrine, or jura regalia,[23] which is enshrined in our 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions. As adopted in our republican system, this medieval concept is
stripped of royal overtones; and ownership of all lands belonging to the public
domain is vested in the State.[24] Under this well-entrenched and time-
honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are under the
absolute control and ownership of the State.
B. Local government property devoted to governmental purposes, such as
local administration, public education, and public health, as may be provided
under special laws, is classified as public.
In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al.[25] cited
by the CA, the Province of Zamboanga del Norte sought to declare
unconstitutional R.A. No. 3039, which ordered the transfer of properties
belonging to the Province of Zamboanga located within the territory of the
City of Zamboanga to the said City, for depriving the province of property
without due process and just compensation. In said case, the Court classified
properties of local governments as either (a) properties for public use, or (b)
patrimonial properties, and held that the capacity in which the property is held
by a local government is dependent on the use to which it is intended and for
which it is devoted. If the property is owned by the municipal corporation in
its public and governmental capacity, it is public and Congress has absolute
control over it; but if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity,
then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control, in which case, the
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.[26] In upholding the validity of R.A. No. 3 039, the Court noted
that it affected "lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital
and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites - a total of 24 lots
- since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental
capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress." [27]
According to the Court, there are two established norms to determine the
classification of the properties: that of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 423
and 424 thereof, and that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations.
Articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code provide, as follows:
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property.
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
In Province of Zamboanga del Norte,[28] properties for the free and
indiscriminate use of everyone are classified under the Civil Code norm as for
public use, while all other properties are patrimonial in nature. In contrast,
under the Municipal Corporations Law norm, to be considered public property,
it is 'enough that a property is held and devoted to a governmental purpose,
such as local administration, public education, and public health.[29]
Nonetheless, the Court clarified that the classification of properties in the
municipalities, other than those for public use, as patrimonial under Article 424
of the Civil Code, is "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws,"[30]
holding that the principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations
can be considered as "special laws"[31]
Moreover, in the 2009 case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the
Philippines,[32] the Court reiterated that Article 420(2) of the Civil Code makes
clear that properties "which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth," are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth."[33]
C. Property registered in the name of the municipal corporation but without
proof that it was acquired with its corporate funds is deemed held by it in trust
for the State.
The Court takes instructions from the case, of Salas as to properties belonging
to the municipal government. In Salas, at issue was the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 4118 passed on June 20, 1964,[34] whereby Congress reserved a lot, long
titled in the name of the City of Manila, as communal property, and converted
it into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots to its bona fide
occupants. On February 24, 1919, Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastre of the
City of Manila, containing 9,689.80 sq m, was declared by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch 4, acting as a land registration court in Case No. 18,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, as owned by the City of Manila in fee simple. On
August 21, 1920, OCT No. 4329 was issued in the name of the City of Manila
over the said lot. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of
Lot No. 1, Block 557 to a certain Pura Villanueva (Villanueva). OCT No. 4329
was cancelled, and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to Villanueva
for the portions sold to her, while TCT No. 22547 was issued to the City of
Manila for the remainder of Lot No. 1 containing 7,490.10 sq m, now
designated, as Lot No. 1-B-2-B of Block 557.[35]
On September 21, 1960, the local board of the City of Manila wrote to the
President of the Philippines seeking assistance in declaring the aforesaid lot as
patrimonial property of the city for the purpose of reselling the same in small
lots to the actual occupants thereof. R.A. No. 4118 was passed by Congress on
June 20, 1964 for this purpose.[36] On February 18, 1965, Manila Mayor
Antonio Villegas (Mayor Villegas) was furnished a copy of a subdivision plan
for TCT No. 22547. He interposed no objection to the implementation of R.A.
No. 4118, and TCT No. 22547 was duly surrendered to the Land Authority.[37]
Inexplicably, now claiming that R.A. No. 4118 was unconstitutional, Mayor
Villegas brought on December 20, 1966 an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the
Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila from implementing R.A.
No. 4118. On September 23, 1968, the RTC declared the said law
unconstitutional for depriving the City of Manila of its property without due
process and just compensation.[38]
Acting on the petition for review, the Court declared that Lot 1-B-2-B of Block
557 was a communal property held in trust by the City of Manila for the State,
and therefore subject to the paramount power of Congress to dispose of. Thus:
[T]he City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee
simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired
said land as its private or patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila
as well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly acquire
property in its corporate or private capacity, following the accepted doctrine
on the dual character - public and private - of a municipal corporation. And
when it acquires property in its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person
capable of entering into contracts or making transactions for the transmission
of title or other real rights. When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have
done so under any of the modes established by law for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land
claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its
private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the
State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil.
695). Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those
that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. Other
properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate
powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or
pueblo was established in this country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title
III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the
Philippines were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public
domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct
of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be
granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition,
but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any
event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 327).
xxxx
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source
or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property
is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the
paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes
its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work,
the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for
purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same
as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 Mc
Quilin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed. p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage,
218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not
absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to public use, for such
control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their
property or rights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the
obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with
its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to
an agency of the National Government to be exposed of according to its
discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the
people.[39] (Underscoring ours)
D. R.A. No. 8562 was not intended to expropriate the subject lots titled in the
name of the Province of Bataan, but to confirm their character as communal
land of the State and to make them available for disposition by the National
Government.
The case of Rabuco v. Hon. Villegas,[40] decided in 1974, is a virtual reprise of
the 1968 case of Salas. In Rabuco, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 3120[41] was
challenged, which provided for the subdivision of Lot No. 21-B, Block 610 of
the Cadastre of the City of Manila, containing about 10,198 sq m into
residential lots, and the sale thereof to the tenants and bona fide occupants.
The law declared Lot No. 21-B "reserved as communal property" and then
ordered it converted into "disposable and alienable lands of the State."[42]
The Court ruled that, like R.A. No. 4118 in Salas, R.A. No. 3120 was intended to
implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government's
program of land for the landless. Thus, the sale of the subdivided lots to the
bona fide occupants by authority of Congress was not an exercise of eminent
domain or expropriation without just compensation, which would have been
in violation of Section 1(2),[43] Article III of the 1935 Constitution, but simply a
manifestation of its right and power to deal with State property.[44] "It is
established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the
exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered
with by the courts."[45] In Rabuco, the rule in Salas was reiterated that property
of the public domain, although titled to the local government, is held by it in
trust for the State. It stated:
The Court [in Salas] reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of
the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality,
excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity,
such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands
subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for
after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of
its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality
thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is
the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use"
and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not
acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary
capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this
title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered
thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign
upon its creation."[46]
E. The State's policy to promote local autonomy and to devolve the powers of
the National Government to its political subdivisions has for its purpose to
improve the quality of local governance.
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, relied upon by the
petitioner, provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
Pursuant to its mandate, the Congress passed the LGC in 1991 to spell out the
above-declared policy of the State, which is now amplified in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7160. It states, as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.
xxxx
Also invoked by the petitioners are Sections 18 and 22 of the LGC, which state
as follows:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. — Local government units
shall have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be
responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their
development plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them;
to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly
released to them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share
in the, proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth
and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing
the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits; to acquire, develop,
lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property
held by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and
assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and
thereby ensure their development into self-reliant communities and active
participants in the attainment of national goals.
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x
xxxx
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their
proprietary functions and in the management of their economic enterprises,
subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.
In the instant petition, it is essentially the petitioner's assertion that the State's
policy of local autonomy and decentralization endows the Province of Bataan
with patrimonial rights to use or dispose of the subject lots according to its
own development plans, program objectives and priorities.
The Court disagrees.
Local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the local political
subdivisions are the results of putting restraints upon the exercise by the
Presidents of executive powers over local governments. Section 4, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution reads in part: "The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments." As with the counterpart
provisions of our earlier Constitutions, the aforesaid provision has been
interpreted to exclude the President's power of control over local
governments.[47] The Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987 have uniformly
differentiated the President's power of supervision over local governments and
his power of control of the executive departments, bureaus and offices.[48] In
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre,[49] it was held that Section 4 confines the
President's power over local governments to one of general supervision, thus:
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the
President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely
alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President,
at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from
the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat,
they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their
acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given
them by the Constitution and the law.[50]
On the other hand, local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the
local political subdivisions have for their object to make governance directly
responsive at the local levels by giving them a free hand to chart their own
destiny and shape their future with minimum intervention from central
authorities, thereby rendering them accountable to their local
constituencies.[51] Thus, [h]and in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local
autonomy"[52] As farther explained in Pimentel, Jr.:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn,
economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.[53] (Citation omitted)
It is clear, then, that local autonomy and decentralization do not deal directly
with Issues concerning ownership, classification, use or control of properties of
the public domain held by local governments. The State retains power over
property of the public domain, exercised through Congress.
F. The grant of autonomy to local governments, although a radical policy
change under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, does not affect the settled rule
that they possess property of the public domain in trust for the State.
The 1973 Constitution devoted an entire Article, Article XI, consisting of five
sections, to laying down its policy for the empowerment of the local
governments. The 1987 Constitution, in turn, fully devotes all 21 sections of its
Article X for local government. It introduces significant new provisions, such as
the establishment of autonomous regions (Section 18) and the guarantee of
just share of the local governments in the national taxes and equitable share
in the proceeds from the utilization of the national wealth (Sections 6 and 7).
It was unlike in the 1935 Constitution, which simply provided in Section 10 of
Article VII, dealing with the Executive Department, that "[t]he President shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
provision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed."
The erudite Justice Enrique Fernando (Justice Fernando), in his highly
instructive separate concurring opinion in Rabuco,[54] did at first admit to
doubts as to the continuing authoritativeness of Province of Zamboanga del
Norte and Salas, both promulgated before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, in view of the significant innovations introduced therein
pertaining to the autonomy of local governments. He stated that the goal of
the 1973 Constitution was "the fullest autonomy to local government units
consistent with the basic theory of a unitary, not a federal, polity,"[55] hoping
thereby to attain "their fullest development as self-reliant communities."[56]
According to him, under the 1973 Constitution, "[tjhings have changed
radically,"[57] noting that under the 1935 Constitution, "[i]t could hardly be
assumed x x x that x x x the [local governments] could justifiably lay claim to
real autonomy."[58] He observed thus:
We start with the declared principle of the State guaranteeing and promoting
the autonomy of local government units. We have likewise noted the
earnestness of the framers as to the attainment of such declared objective as
set forth in the specific article on the matter. It is made obligatory on the
National Assembly to enact a local government code. What is more, unlike the
general run of statutes, it cannot be amended except by a majority vote of all
its members. It is made to include "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall," with an expressed
reference to "qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, [as well as] all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units." Mention is likewise made of
the "powers, responsibilities, and resources," items that are identified with local
autonomy. As if that were not enough, the last sentence of this particular
provision reads: "However, any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose." To the extent that the last section requires
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a boundary of a
province, city, municipality, or barrio, must be in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in such unit or units, the adherence to
the basic principle of local self government is quite clear. Equally significant is
the stress on the competence of a province, city, municipality or barrio "to
create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law." The care and circumspection with which the
framers saw to the enjoyment of real local self-government not only in terms
of administration but also in terms of resources is thus manifest. Their intent is
unmistakable. Unlike the case under the 1935 Constitution, there is thus a clear
manifestation of the presumption now in favor of a local government unit. It is
a well-nigh complete departure from what was. Nor should it be ignored that
a highly urbanized city "shall be independent" not only of the national
government but also of a province. Would it not follow then that under the
present dispensation, the moment property is transferred to it by the national
government, its control over the same should be as extensive and as broad as
possible, x x x.[59] (Citations omitted)
Up to that point, it could almost be presumed that Justice Fernando would
dissent from the lucid ponencia of Justice Claudio Teehankee (Justice
Teehankee), borne of logical doubts as to whether Province of Zamboanga del
Norte and Salas still retained their unimpaired doctrinal force under the then
new 1973 Constitution. But two considerations kept him reined in, so to speak.
One was Justice Teehankee's "reference to the ratio decidendi of [Salas] as to
the trust character impressed on communal property of a municipal
corporation, even if already titled,"[60] "regardless of the source of
classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity."[61] Justice
Fernando acknowledged that the local government "holds such [communal
property] subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the
same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of
a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration."[62]
Rabuco stressed that the properties in controversy were not acquired by the
City of Manila with its own private funds. Thus, according to Justice Fernando,
"That [the City of Manila] has in its name a registered title is not questioned,
but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land
covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation."[63] This doctrine, according to Justice Fernando,
has its basis in the Regalian Doctrine and is unaffected by the grant of
extensive local autonomy under the 1973 Constitution. "It is my view that
under the [1973] Constitution, as was the case under the 1935 charter, the
holding of a municipal corporation as a unit of state does not impair the
plenary power of the national government exercising dominical rights to
dispose of it in a manner it sees fit, subject to applicable constitutional
limitations as to the citizenship of the grantee."[64]
The other consideration noted by Justice Fernando in the ponencia of Justice
Teehankee in Rabuco he found further compelling was "the even more
fundamental principle of social justice, which was given further stress and a
wider scope in the present Constitution."[65] He concluded that R.A. No. 3120,
like R.A. No. 4118, was intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the government program of land for the landless, and was
not "intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its
character as communal land of the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government."[66]
G. The Province of Bataan has the duty to provide an adequate security for its
loans with the LBP, without defeating BPSC's right to hold title to the contested
lots.
The RTC ordered the Province of Bataan to deliver the owner's duplicate copy
of OCT No. N-182 to the Register of Deeds of Bataan, free from any lien or
encumbrance, to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of
BPSC, and to cause the transfer and registration of the title to and in the name
of the said college. The Province of Bataan erroneously believed that it could
mortgage the subject lots, notwithstanding that it held the same in trust for
the State and despite the fact that the said lots were actually being occupied
by two government schools. As the RTC urged, then, the Province of Bataan
must address this issue of security for its loans with LBP. It cannot complain
that its compliance with the order of the RTC might violate the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution, since its duty to provide a replacement security for
its loans with LBP is clear.

H. BPSC is entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of
mandamus shall issue where a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty, to command the respondent to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner. Herein petitioner has argued that the
mandamus applicants are not entitled thereto because they are not real parties
in interest. It is a rule re-echoed in a long line of cases that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, meaning
"the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[67]

At issue in this petition is Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, which directs that "[a]ll
parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the [MLLSAT] and
the [BCC] are hereby declared to be the property of the [BPSC] and shall be
titled under that name." There is no dispute that the Congress has expressly
intended to entrust to BPSC the titles to the subject lots. Being the sole
beneficiary of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, BPSC is the real party in interest,
and is entitled to mandamus to enforce its right thereunder.[68]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 2006 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85902 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
11. REPUBLIC v. VALENTINA ESPINOSA
[ GR No. 186603, Apr 05, 2017 ]
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] seeking to nullify the Court of
Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision[2] and February 4, 2009 Resolution[3] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00421. The CA modified the May 12, 2004 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
and dismissed the reversion case filed by the Republic of the Philippines (State)
against respondents Valentina Espinosa and her successor-in-interest, Leonila
B. Caliston, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 12, 2004 and
Order dated July 16, 2004 are hereby modified upholding the validity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
91117, respectively, issued in the names of Valentina Espinosa and Leonila
Caliston. The award of damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in
favor of Leonila Caliston is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was issued to Valentina
Espinosa (Espinosa) in Cadastral Case No. 39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980.
It covered a 28,880-square meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral
Record No. 980, Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental (property). By virtue
of the decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was issued on
October 15, 1962 in the name of Espinosa.[6] On June 17, 1976, Espinosa sold
the property to Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-91117[7] on June 29, 1976.[8]
On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional Executive Director
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI,
Iloilo City, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Complaint[9] for annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC,
Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State claimed that the
property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area
indicated under Project No. 27-C, Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No.
2978, as certified by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986.[10]
The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses Escarda) intervened,[11]
alleging that they have been occupying the property since 1976 on the belief
that it belongs to the State.[12] They prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease
and desist from ejecting them.[13]
In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not timberland. Invoking
laches and prescription, she argued that her title was issued earlier in 1962,
while the map shows that the property was classified only in 1986.[14] Caliston
also claimed that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or personality to
intervene because only the State may initiate an action for reversion. She also
alleged that the spouses Escarda cannot claim a better right as against her
because she merely tolerated their occupancy of the property until their refusal
to vacate it.[15] As counterclaim, Caliston claimed for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses against the spouses Escarda
for the baseless and malicious complaint.[16]
The RTC rendered a Decision[17] dated May 12, 2004. Relying on LC Map No.
2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the State and ordered the reversion of the
property to the mass of the public domain, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N in the name of Valentina
Espinosa and all its derivative titles, such as: TCT No. T-91117 in the name of
Leonila Caliston, null and void ab initio;
Ordering defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 191-
N and TCT N[o]. T-91117 to defendant Register of Deeds for the Province of
Negros Occidental and the latter to cancel said titles and all their derivative
titles, if any;
Ordering the reversion of the land covered by the aforesaid patent and title to
the mass of the public domain under the administration and disposition of the
Director of Forestry (now Regional Executive Director, Region VI, Iloilo City);
Declaring that defendant Leonila Caliston has better right over the subject lot
as against intervenors Spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda; and
Ordering the intervenors to pay defendant Leonila Caliston the following sums:
a)Not less than P20,000.00 for moral damages;
b)Not less than P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
c)Not less than P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus so much appearance fees
of P2,000.00 incurred and/or paid by answering defendant in connection with
this case; and
d)Not less than P5,000.00 for expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Caliston's motion for reconsideration[19] was denied in an Order[20] dated
July 16, 2004. On August 5, 2004, Caliston filed a Notice of Appeal[21] with the
RTC. On the other hand, the spouses Escarda did not file a notice of appeal.
Records were then forwarded to the CA, where proceedings ensued.
There, Caliston argued that the trial court improperly relied upon LC Map No.
2978, which was prepared long after the property was alienated and awarded
to Espinosa, her predecessor-in-interest. The map, the admissibility and
genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used to defeat the
cadastral proceedings presumed to have been regularly conducted. Even
assuming the map can be considered, Caliston claims that her property is
situated in an area indicated as alienable and disposable. She also reiterated
her defenses of laches and prescription.[22]
For its part, the State argued that the lower court did not err in relying upon
LC Map No. 2978 though it was prepared only in 1986. According to the State,
forest lands are incapable of private appropriation and possession, however
long; prescription does not run against the government.[23]
The CA rendered a Decision[24] dated July 25, 2008 modifying the RTC
Decision. It upheld the validity of OCT No. 191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in
the names of Espinosa and Caliston, respectively, and affirmed the award of
damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation in favor of Caliston.
The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of Espinosa when she was issued OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the
State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence
consisting of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the Director of Forestry on January
17, 1986, was not authenticated pursuant to Section 24,[25] Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to the existence of
the map, but not as to its genuineness or the truthfulness of its content.
Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa's rights over the
property, which accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent
classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.[26] The CA cited[27]
the case of SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines.[28]
In a Resolution[29] dated February 4, 2009, the CA denied the State's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue presented is whether the State has sufficiently proved that the
property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the
cadastral decree and issued a title.
We deny the petition.
I -The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the
time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government.[30] Since cadastral
proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the
applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts—that they are entitled to
the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered.[31]
As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after
proving these jurisdictional facts.[32]
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No.
91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can
be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.[33] This means that Espinosa, as
the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property
is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the
property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The
State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine,
seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain.[34] It is proper
when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations.[35] There are also instances when we granted reversion on
grounds other than fraud, such as when a "person obtains a title under the
Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered
under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain."[36]
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title
in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was
unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.[40]
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land
classification map prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map
No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that
documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the
presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed
by the court, in writing.[41] Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for
the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts.[42]
This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the
admissibihty of the evidence.[43] When evidence has not.been formally
offered, it should not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.[44]
Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to have
considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the
reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of the
same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will
not help to further the State's cause. This is because the only fact proved by
the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land was
reclassified in 1986.[45] This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion
that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955,
proved that the land is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree
issued in his favor in 1962.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden
II- The reclassification of the area where the property is located in 1986 should
is on the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest
not prejudice Espinosa and her successor-in-interest.[46] Apropos is the case
land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.[37] To reiterate, there is no burden
of Sta. Monica Industrial and Dev't Corp. v. Court of Appeals.[47] In that case,
on Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable
the State offered in evidence a land classification map to prove that at the time
land.[38] At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom
the land was decreed to the original owner, it had not yet been released and
Caliston derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable
still fell within the forest zone. However, the map did not conclusively state the
and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over
actual classification of the land at the time it was adjudicated to the original
it.[39] In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an
owner. We thus ruled that the State failed to prove that the titles should be
oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title because
annulled—
it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment,
the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The
petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment
is fatally defective. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic
before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in
favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were
still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested
solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the
decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual
classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court,
petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908
proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and
alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons
discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor
of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the
application for registration and the date of hearing thereof, addressed to the
Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the
Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and
that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private
rights.[48]
We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the doctrine that forest lands
are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation.
Neither are we changing the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for reversion.
We are merely deciding on the facts as proved by the record. To allow a
reversion based on a classification made at the time when the property was
already declared private property by virtue of a decree would be akin to
expropriation of land without due process of law.[49]
At this juncture, we agree with the CA's application of SAAD Agro-Industries,
Inc.,[50] which involved a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of a
lot covered by a free patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot
was part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted as evidence
a photocopy of a land classification map. This map also became the basis of
the testimonies of City Environment and Natural Resources Office officers
declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The State,
however, failed to submit either a certified true copy or an official publication
of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence. After
proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State's failure
to show that the subject lot therein is part of the timberland or forest reserve
or has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the
original title. The CA, relying on the map, reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court's
decision. We held that the photocopy of the land classification map cannot be
considered in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We
emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are bound by the rules
of admissibility and must comply with it—
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true
when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes
to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are
substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a
superior advantage. This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are
justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights
of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules
on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as
proof to show that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve.[51]
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted in evidence to prove
that the lot was classified as part of the timberland or forest reserve, the
classification was made long after private interests had intervened. Not only
was the lot already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a certificate of
title were also awarded and issued years ahead of the classification—
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in
evidence, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the
timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the
"correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the
provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made only in 1980. Thus, the
delineation of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was awarded the
free patent over the subject lot.

xxx
Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification was made
pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her
predecessors-in-interest cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a
free patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as
1971. In fact, it appears that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of
title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the requisites for the
acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
to discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it the presumption
that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the property in the
cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent
reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private
property without just compensation and due process of law.[53] This, however,
is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due process are paramount
considerations that must still be observed.[54]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' July 25, 2008 Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution are AFFIRMED.
No costs.

xxx

The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution SO ORDERED.
but also in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized
and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's
property regime. Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight
of the fact that in every claim or right by the Government against one of its
citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be
observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot is part of
timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted
status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular
issuances, respondent's insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the
forest reserve must be rejected.[52]

These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. undoubtedly apply

here. As part of fair play and due process, the State is as bound by the rules on
formal offer of evidence as much as every private party is. More, the State's
subsequent reclassification of the area where the property is situated cannot
be used to defeat the rights of a private citizen who acquired the land in a valid
and regular proceeding conducted 24 years earlier.

The result would have been different had the State proved that the property
was already classified as part of forest land at the time of the cadastral
proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed