Gutierrez Vs Santos

Facts:

In 1958, Benigno Musni and other filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein inter alia, that the latter had illegally
constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and
communal fishing grounds. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056,
the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed.

Gutierrez then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to
be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, would be void because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred
judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied.
Gutierrez then filed a petition for prohibition against the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, Florencio Moreno, the Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator
Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the
investigation. The said case was assigned to the Hon. Arsenio Santos

In 1959, respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying
and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for
fishpond owners, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or
adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. After hearing on the matter,
the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 15, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing
the case to the Second Branch of the court.

Thereafter, Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against the Hon. Arsenio
Santos, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Department Investigator and the
parties who filed the complaint against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge
"to proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga."

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge shall be disqualified from hearing the case

Ruling: Yes. In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion
expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja
and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion for disqualification as
Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of
April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus expressed — of not being able to under a truly impartial
judgment — does not appear to be capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularly that in
his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated
that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers
to be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, were
private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject of the petition for
prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in nature;
that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were identical to the interests of the
herein petitioner etc." In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor
that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his
decision" in the case before him.|||

IN RE IMPEACHMENT OF HONORABLE TOMAS FLORDELIZA

DOCTRINES

• Congested conditions of court dockets is deplorable and intolerable. It can have no other
result than the loss of evidence, the abandonment of cases, and the denial and frequent
defeat of justice. It lowers the standards of the courts, and brings them into disrepute

• The laws delay can be overcome to a great extent if there is judicial teamwork reaching from
the capital to the most remote district, and from the highest to the lowest judicial officer.

• A judge should display that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's
labors fixed by law and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which
proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.

• "The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be
sedulously overcome. He must not delay by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to
which a party is entitled."

FACTS:
Six members of the Bar of Sorsogon prays for the removal from office of Honorable Tomas
Flordeliza, Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District, with charges (1) certified
falsely the status of the cases pending decision before him (Sec 129 AC); (2) guilty of delay and
lack diligence in the disposition of the cases pending before him (Sec 165 AC); (3) guilty of
partiality in the performance of his official duties.

In her response, J. Flordeliza denied the charges and suggested disbarment of the complaints.
Certificates from the provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, the provincial governor
of Sorsogon, and Attorney Robert Manly, as to the moral conduct, social standing, and integrity
of the respondent have been furnished. The Court have all of the facts which are necessary for
the disposition of this matter, hence, forego the referral of the charges to the Attorney-General
for investigation.

Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest and evident partiality. Judge has allegedly
acted with discourtesy toward the complainants, while showing a spirit of condescension to Attys.
Arellano and Jimenez. Judge said partiality is difficult to prove and is to be expected from
disgruntled lawyers.
In the subject of negligent performance, complainants alleged that there are too many cases
placed on the calendar for one day; court sessions are held only for three hours and a half each
day (Sec 165 requires not less than 5-hour sessions except on Saturdays); on the annual report
of the clerk of court of Sorsogon for year 1921 there are 108 decided cases and 638 pending
cases on December 1921; and greatly delay in the disposition of criminal cases in which accused
is without bail - time elapsed between the arrest of the defendant and the trial in these cases is
between four months and nine months.

The last charge, having a close relationship with the congestion of cases on the docket of the
court of Instance of Sorsogon, the delay of the disposition of the cases and lack of diligence in
catching up with court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the respondent under
section 129 of the Administrative Code, in order to secure the payment of his salary. Respondent
stated four reasons for this state of affairs: (1) the timing taken by stenographers in transcribing
their notes should not be counted in the computation of the ninety-day period; (2) contends in
the next place that the vacation period should be excluded; (3) asserts in the next place that the
period should begin to run from the date the clerk reported the case for decision; (4) and his
construction of the law is, that an oral decision is sufficient.

ISSUE: 1. WON respondent Judge guilty of partiality in the performance of his official duties
2. WON respondent Judge guilty of delay and lack diligence in the disposition of the cases
3. WON respondent Judge guilty of falsely certifying the status of the cases pending decision
before him

HELD: Section 173 of the Administrative Code, relating to the removal and suspicion of Judges of
First Instance. The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance therein provided are two: (1)
Serious misconduct, and (2) inefficiency.

A strict doctrine of cases is: Here is one bad act; you ought not to have an opportunity to commit
another. The Court do not adopt the rather harsh doctrines of American cases because the
statutes in question differ from ours and because we are not prepared to say that a judge should
be separated from office where he apparently is acting in good faith, under a misconception of
the law. In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general
charges of partiality and negligence which have been led against Judge Flordeliza. We do find,
however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of
the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which
proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.

As willful and international wrongdoing in receiving compensation has not been demonstrated,
we are not prepared to find that sufficient cause exists in our judgment involving serious
misconduct or inefficiency as warrants us in recommending the removal of the respondent Judge
to the Governor-General. We will take such a step if future derelictions of duty of this character
recur.

Correcting, therefore, Judge of First Instance Tomas Flordeliza in his wrong construction of
section 129 of the Administrative Code, and admonishing him to proceed more assiduously in the
performance of his judicial labors.
The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary
judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and proceedings which have been
under submission for determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more have been
determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. In this jurisdiction, upon
the trial of a question of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and led with the
clerk.

With special reference to the answer of the respondent Judge, we state that the vacation months
should not be excluded in the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed by law, that the
time should begin to run from the submission of the case, without awaiting notification from the
clerk of court, and that an oral decision is not sufficient. As to the point that the time taken by a
stenographer to transcribe his notes should not be taken into consideration, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down. The general rule would be to conform with the intent of the law and thus not
permit decisions to be delayed for this reason.

KILAT VS MACIAS
A.M NO. RTJ-05-1960, OCTOBER 25, 2005
TINGA, J.

FACTS
This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte, with immorality, conduct
unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
According to complainant After dinner, respondent brought her to his vehicle where he
kissed and fondled her, assuring her that he will take care of her, her studies, her expenses and
her future. Later, she was brought to a hotel. Respondent removed her clothes and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her. According to her, Respondent offered her job in
Sindangan. While in Sindangan, respondent brought her to his house where he again succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he gave her money and threatened to have
her killed should she tell anyone what happened.
Complainant confessed that she was approached by Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia and Mayor
Jesus Siote Lim of Salug, Zamboanga del Norte and offered to help her prepare a case for rape
against respondent. She refused because respondent did not do anything wrong to her. Later
that day, Mrs. Margie Macias talked to complainant, telling her that she was heaven-sent,
because Mrs. Macias wanted respondent to be dismissed from his work. Vice Mayor Saldia
promised her mother that he will give complainants father a job in the municipal hall if they
agree to the filing of a rape case against respondent. When complainants mother refused, Vice
Mayor Saldia threatened her with a lawsuit. Reluctantly, complainant was left in the vice mayors
house where she was locked in one of the rooms. After two or three days, she was brought to
the house of Atty. Selda, where she was forced to sign the affidavit-complaint against
respondent.
After a few days, complainant was brought to Manila and made to stay in the house of
Atty. Reynaldo Llego in Cubao, Quezon City. She was locked up in the house for almost three
weeks and was provided with a guard. However, she was able to escape through the help of
her cousin, Carmen Manlangit, who was then working in Quezon City.
Meanwhile, complainant filed charges against those accused of kidnapping her. On 1
December 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding information, raffled to RTC
Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte presided by respondent judge. On 2 December 2003,
respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons named in the information. The next
day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent from the criminal case on the ground that
respondent is directly involved in the said case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting
himself from the criminal proceedings and recommended to the Court that another judge be
designated in his place.
The OCA submitted its findings and recommendation, to wit:

1. This matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative

complaint against respondent Judge;
2. The charge of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial
officer, rape and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against the
respondent be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence;
3. Respondent Judge be found GUILTY of bias and abuse of
authority for issuing the warrant of arrest.

ISSUES
1. WON the respondent guilty of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer,
rape and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law
2. WON the respondent judge be found guilty of abuse of authority for issuing warrant
of arrest

HELD
1. NO. Administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be supported at
least by substantial evidence,[24] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the present case, save for
the Affidavit-Complaintdated 24 July 2001, no other document or evidence was
submitted to substantiate the charges of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer, rape, and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against respondent
judge. More importantly, complainant herself executed sworn statements recanting
her charges against respondent. As observed by the Investigating Justice, while
the Complaint-Affidavit may have been executed with great detail, the affidavits of
retraction are equally detailed and impressed with greater coherence and
spontaneity, and supported by affidavits from people who had knowledge of the
events which actually transpired. Interestingly also, even as complainant had already
retracted her charges, her counsel of record, Atty. Alexander Versoza, merely stated
that when there is smoke, there is fire.
2. YES. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge or judicial officer
to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law; (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias, accused, is the estranged
wife of respondent judge. This circumstance makes it mandatory for respondent to
inhibit himself from the case, but this he unfortunately did not do. He cannot
 exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a clear case of
violation of the Rules of Court.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not ministerial in nature, but rather requires the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the judges personal evaluation of the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information. Only
when he finds probable cause should he issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order.[28] In
Criminal Case No. L-00727, however, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest a mere day
after the filing of the information charging accused therein with grave coercion and serious illegal
detention. Such undue alacrity casts doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the
accused were known to him to be the same people who instigated the present administrative
case against him, and against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Moreover, these were the
same people whom respondent claims to have axes to grind against him. Respondents swift
issuance of the arrest warrant suspiciously smells of vengeance and vindication. He might have
been prejudiced by the malicious acts of the accused, but he should not use his position in the
judiciary for his personal concerns. In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a respect for
traditional and prevailing rules must be observed and kept constantly in mind. A judge should, in
fine, administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the judicial system. He must not be
perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power but as one dispensing justice under the sanction
of the rule of law.[29] That he inhibited himself after they moved for his inhibition cannot extenuate
his culpability. At the outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case if only to avoid any
doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality against the accused.

The administrative complaint for immorality against respondent Judge Mariano

Joaquin S. Macias is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, he is hereby
held administratively liable for abuse of authority in issuing the warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. L-00727 and for violation of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court, and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), to be
deducted from his disability benefits.

Salcedo vs Bollozos

Brion, J.

Facts: The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas
Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police
Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen
Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property)
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio
Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca
R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the
disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the
fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his
companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack
uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his
companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber
and other construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly
responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at
around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the
petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing self-help in
preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.

ased on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks
representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparodated
January 23, 2008, directing the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x
x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner
Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku. The respondent judge also directed
the police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together
with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief
Investigator. At six oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the
custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he
committed for issuing the Writ of Amparo.

Held:

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be
dismissed for lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads:
 EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, as in the instant case, or
of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers only
actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty
and security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights.

OUR RULING

We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the

administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.
In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent
judge since Tanmalacks petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege
that he is a victim of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof. The
petition merely states that he is under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that
he is not arrested but merely in custody.[6]

Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in
the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative
functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the
rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.

In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised
as an issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should
have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do
not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary;
an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other
available remedies have been settled. We laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores v.
Abesamis.

We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles
and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the
duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and
orders, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and
integrity, for good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge
their duties in accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent
judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such
as the Writ of Amparo.

We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give credence to
charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the

administrative complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.
Mercado v. Salcedo,
604 SCRA 4
FACTS: These are consolidated administrative cases filed against Judge Erasto Salcedo
(respondent judge), RTC,Tagum City, charging him with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

1. Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781

In a series of letters-complaints, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross partiality
in handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge Napy Agayan. The
complainant formally charged the respondent judge of unethical infractions, which includes,
among others, Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and using a stolen Pajero vehicle
with knowledge, actually and constructively; and Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave
misconduct relating to the handling and improper execution of the final decision in Agrarian Case
where the respondent judge modified the final judgment on the amount of just compensation
from which the respondent judge benefited in the amount of P3,000,000.

On the issue of the stolen Pajero, Judge Salcedo avers that when the owner lent him the vehicle,
he did not know that it was the same vehicle subject of Criminal Case No. 11728 which he
handled, otherwise, he would not have used it for reason of delicadeza. According to him, there
was no way of identifying the vehicle because the TMG (Traffic Management Group) authorized
the change of color-from green to dirty white.

2. Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782

State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco brought to the attention of then Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr. the indictment of the respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended that
appropriate administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations
of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He stated
that : “ There is no proof or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent Judge forgot that the
alleged owner (Leopoldo Gonzaga) of the subject vehicle previously appeared before him as
respondent in a criminal case. His contention that he did not know that he was using the very
same vehicle because its color has been changed is fallacious.

The respondent judge also posited that there was no impropriety in using the subject vehicle
since it was no longer in custodia legis as the criminal case had already been dismissed.

This case was referred to the OCA, and was thereafter referred to the Court of Appeals for report,
investigation, and recommendation. Unfortunately, Pending investigation of these administrative
cases before the CA, several significant developments took place. First, the respondent judge
retired from the Judiciary on November 25, 2003. Second, the complainant was killed by
unidentified men on April 14, 2004 and was substituted in the case by his wife and children.
Lastly, the respondent judge himself was killed on July 26, 2009.

The Court's Ruling

After considering the CA Report and the entire records, we find the Report to be substantially
supported by the evidence on record, and by applicable law and jurisprudence. We therefore
adopt the findings and recommendations of the CA Report, subject to the modifications indicated
below.
Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-honored constitutional principle that a
public office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and
more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of
honesty and integrity; his high and exalted position in the Judiciary requires him to observe
exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. The records show that respondent
judge failed to live up to these exacting standards.

Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel

In his report dated August 2, 2002, the respondent judge stated that the complaint against Judge
Agayan and his court staff for absenteeism and irregular attendance had no merit. While the
respondent judge related that he went twice to the office of Judge Agayan to ascertain the
veracity of the complaint and found that Judge Agayan was “really sickly” because of a heart
condition that compelled him to take leaves of absence, the investigation of the CA found evidence
refuting such statements. One of these was the Certification attesting that one Minda Amar, the
Clerk of Court in Judge Agayan's sala, had not reported for work prior to and during the dates
the respondent judge reportedly conducted his investigation and that no evidence was found that
the respondent judge ever examined the daily time records of Minda Amar and the court
personnel assigned to Judge Agayan's sala.

These actions tell us that the respondent judge deliberately covered up Judge Agayan’s absences
and irregular attendance. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow judge,
who was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. From all these, what appears clear
to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very superficial investigation. Based on this shallow
effort, he prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the exoneration of Judge Agayan.
The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a
thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings regardless of
his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task assigned to him was an assignment involving trust
and the exercise of his functions as a judge. The respondent judge, therefore, not only failed to
do his duty, but violated as well the trust reposed in him as a judge.

For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him, the respondent committed dishonesty,
inefficiency, and serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3, both of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which state:
Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 3.08 — A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

In this case, by giving priority to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to the faithful
discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and
inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully.

The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle

The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation of
judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and
neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees – by the very
nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions – live their
lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others. Hence, they cannot simply borrow when
such act may or can affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing
borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical
questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge
borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the
respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before his sala.

Under the circumstances, respondent judge committed serious misconduct, first, in using and
possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the subject of an anti-fencing case previously
before him; and second, he borrowed this vehicle from a litigant who had pending cases before
his sala. As aptly stated by Justice Tijam of CA, the respondent judge's act compromised the
image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law; it cast suspicion not only in his own
impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his judicial office, thereby impairing public
trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.

The Execution of a Final Judgment in the Consolidated Agrarian Cases

It should be noted that the decision rendered in the said Agrarian cases is final and
executory and could no longer be disturbed when respondent judge made his adjustments. For
modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its application to
the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the
law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence; otherwise, he erodes
the confidence of the public in the courts.

The Penalty
The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the
respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not deterrents to
the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of the sanctions demanded
by the circumstances.

Jurisprudence holds that the death of the complainant does not warrant the withdrawal
of the charges against the respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the
complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings. On the other hand, the death
of the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of
administrative liability. The recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the respondent has
not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to due process;
second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarian
considerations; and third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the
proceedings useless. None of these exceptional circumstances are present in the case.

Thus, despite the above supervening events, we can still impose the penalty of fine against
the respondent judge deductible from his retirement benefits.

Notes:
Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. It warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an
intention to violate the law, and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error
of judgment.

Rule of immutability of judgment- once a judgment becomes 􀀹nal, it may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are
the correction of clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no
prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.

Macias v. Macias
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650 September 29, 2009
Nachura, J.

Doctrine: Testimony to the effect that the respondent judge was seen having dinner with his
alleged paramour and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, said respondent judge
being a married man – such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct.

Facts: This involves an administrative complaint 1 filed by complainant Margie

C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7,
2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and
immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s.
The relationship continued until the time of the filing of the complaint.
Complainant enumerated some of the abuses committed by respondent, like using a
court personnel, as constant escort of his paramour and as errand boy seeing to the needs of
the respondent and his mistress, also by using court sheriff, as contact person to his young
lover and in summoning, scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait
for the session to start because respondent and his mistress are not yet through with each
other. The respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court sessions nor court
hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date with his paramour, to
the great prejudice of public service and respondent has one or two other women lovers whom
he shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court personnel.
On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution referring the complaint to Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties tried to exert all efforts for possible reconciliation, however, they failed to reach a
settlement and a scheduled hearing proceeded.
Witnesses were presented. The first witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by
complainant's son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias after suspecting that his father was
having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos
enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999, and that both dined and
spent the night there together inside one bedroom. He said that he accompanied Marquinjo
and complainant the next day to the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos
outside the house creating a commotion within the neighborhood. 19 On cross-examination,
Mutia admitted that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said house, or
whether she left that night and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent
also pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias,
was blocked by leaves and tall trees.
The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testified that he was hired
by Seranillos to drive a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge Macias. He
said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for
both Judge Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by Judge Macias for allegedly
peeping at Seranillos. On cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure
if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned by Seranillos, and that his statement was based
merely on presumption. He also admitted that he had been residing with complainant's counsel
since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations of
Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against
him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient
evidence. He believed that complainant's accusations were brought about by her psychiatric
condition characterized as severe paranoia. 28
On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and
Recommendation 29 to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however, recommended
that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and circumspection in his
actions.
Issue:

Do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge?

Ruling:

In this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence,
that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative
proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint. If
complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.

The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that
respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have
refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct
interest in making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering
that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should
have been more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges
of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily
proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutia's testimony that he
saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not
satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of
impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted
unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more
than P10,000.00. 45 In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of
Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it
reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00.

Burias v. Valencia
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1689. March 13, 2009
TINGA, J

FACTS: In a verified complaint, Perla Burias (complainant) charged Judge Mirafe B. Valencia
(respondent), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Irosin, Sorsogon, of
gross misconduct.

On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amounts of
P5,000.00 and P2,500.00, respectively.

On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified complaint for forcible entry and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTC of Bulan,
Sorsogon, presided by Judge Guan-Aragon

On 7 November 2005, Judge Guan-Aragon inhibited herself from the civil case. Respondent then
took over the case.

On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from complainant the amounts of
P15,000.00 and P3,000.00.

Complainant now alleges that complainant on 12 October 2005, respondent endorsed a check
and thereafter exchanged the same for cash in the sum of P5,000.00 that complainant provided.
Said check however was dishonored when presented for payment by complainant. She also
averred that sometime in March 2007, respondent verbally demanded from her the sum of
P50,000.00 and that her P30,500.00 indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable
decision in Civil Case No. 590. According to complainant, she refused to accede to the demands
of respondent. In April 2007, respondent reportedly called her up and threatened that she would
release any of the two (2) draft decisions she allegedly prepared favoring respondent in the civil
case. Complainant claimed that by reason of these threats, she was constrained to file the instant
administrative case

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

HELD: With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment,
Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere
with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial
interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.

Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan. However,
the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party-litigant. Respondent
admitted borrowing money from complainant during the pendency of the case. This act alone is
patently inappropriate. The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant
because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judge's conduct
should always be beyond reproach.

This Court has time and again emphasized that no government position is more demanding of
moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. Judges as models of law and
justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety,
because their conduct affects the people's faith and confidence in the entire judicial system.